US embassy cables: Thai king opposed to 2008 coup

 guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 14 December 2010 20.05 GMT

 Article history

Thursday, 06 November 2008, 07:30

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003317
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU
EO 12958 DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ASEC, TH
SUBJECT: PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR OF THE KING'S
OPPOSITION TO A COUP AND TO PAD PROTESTS
REF: A. BANGKOK 3289 (POLARIZATION TO PERSIST) B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN
ADDRESSES UDD) C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPES FOR MEDIATION) D. BANGKOK 3080
(QUEEN SHOWS SUPPORT)
BANGKOK 00003317 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).
Summary
1. This cable alleges Thai king Bhumibol ordered army chief Anuphong Paochinda not to attempt a coup
against then prime minister Somchai Wongsawat in autumn 2008. It also suggests the king was irritated by
protests by pro-royalist parties. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

2. Read related article

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

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1. (C) King Bhumibol explicitly told Army Commander Anupong Paojinda not to launch a coup,
XXXXXXXXXXXX, an advisor to Queen Sirikit, told Ambassador November 4. XXXXXXXXXXXX
also claimed that the Queen had not meant to signal support for the People's Alliance for
Democracy (PAD) anti-government agenda when she presided over funeral ceremonies on
October 13. XXXXXXXXXXXX said PAD's activities had irritated the King, who reportedly wants
PAD protestors to leave Government House. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke well of Prime Minister
Somchai Wongsawat, saying Somchai was open to compromising with the PAD, although
XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would be forced from office by the end of the year.
Separately, a politically active businessman with strong connections to the palace told us that the
Queen's funeral appearance had hurt the monarchy's image, thereby serving the agenda of
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This contact also discussed a possible assassination
plot against Thaksin and PAD plans for violence. Both contacts claimed the King suffered from
back pain and his condition was frail.

2. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX's claim that the King instructed Anupong not to conduct a
coup is the strongest account we have heard to date about the King's opposition to a coup and
his communicating this to Anupong; it would explain why Privy Counselors Prem and Siddhi, both
seen as opponents of the current government, gave recent assurances to the Ambassador that
there would not be a coup. While XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify how he heard of this
exchange, the purported instruction does appear consistent with Anupong's actions, other high-
level military assurances to the Ambassador, and reporting in other channels. We agree that the
Queen's funeral appearance was a significant blunder, jeopardizing the public's perception of the
palace's neutrality. PAD appears increasingly divided; this divide, as well as the intense and
dynamic condition of Thai politics, may make it appear realistic to hope for a PAD-government
compromise. Possible further violence, however, remains a concern. End Summary and
Comment.
PALACE-PAD RELATIONS

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3. (C) Ambassador met privately at the Residence on November 4 with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a

close advisor to Queen Sirikit who in the past has also served as a confidant of the
King.XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that he regretted the Queen's October 13 appearance at the
funeral of a PAD supporter (ref D). He claimed the Queen had been emotionally affected when
she learned that one victim of the October 7 violence was a young lady about to be married, and
that she had told her father she was going to the protest to defend the monarchy. Initially, the
Queen had wanted to send Princess Chulabhorn to the funeral. It was only at the request of
Chulabhorn and Chulabhorn's companion, Chaichon Locharernkul, that the Queen decided to go
herself. XXXXXXXXXXXX said there was no intention for the Queen to involve either herself or
the monarchy in political matters, but, unfortunately, some members of the public could interpret
the funeral appearance differently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Queen later reached out to
seriously injured police officers in an attempt to show her neutrality, but this signal went largely
unnoticed.

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that King Bhumibol was highly irritated by PAD's occupation
of Government House and other disruptions caused by the anti-government group, but the King
was unsure how best to ensure PAD would vacate the compound. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the
King had instructed two of his loyalists to convey his desire that PAD leave Government House.
(One of these messengers was well-known associate of the King Disathorn

BANGKOK 00003317 002.2 OF 003

Watcharothai, who said publicly on October 29 that Thais who love the King should "go home";
see ref A.) XXXXXXXXXXXX considered XXXXXXXXXXXX to be obstinate, however, saying
Sondhi had become obsessed with his own sense of mission. By contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX
thought that XXXXXXXXXXXX was reasonable and willing to compromise.

POSITIVE VIEW OF SOMCHAI

------------------------

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to have spoken to Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat about
the current standoff. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that Somchai had agreed that the
government could meet with the PAD and reach a compromise, but the time was not yet ripe. In
his conversation with the Ambassador, XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke highly of Somchai, saying he
was "very good" and had many qualities that made him suitable to be Prime Minister, including a
sense of fairness and a moderate temperament. Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that
Somchai could not remain long in office because he would likely be forced out by an adverse
Constitutional Court ruling in the People's Power Party (PPP) dissolution case (ref A), which
XXXXXXXXXXXX believed the Court might issue before the King's birthday (December 5).
XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would dissolve the parliament before being forced from
office.

KING TO ANUPONG: NO COUP

------------------------

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the current turmoil would not result in a military coup. He
said that the King, speaking with Army Commander Anupong Paojinda, had referred to the 2006
coup and made a statement to the effect that there should be no further coups.
POLITICIZATION OF THE MONARCHY

------------------------------

7. (C) We also met on November 5 with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), the well-connected
scion of a wealthy family with close palace ties. XXXXXXXXXXXX had a leading role in the
XXXXXXXXXXXX; his wife, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has the royal title of "XXXXXXXXXXXX" and
works closely with the Queen. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that the Queen's appearance at the
October 13 funeral had highly negative ramifications, saying that even politically neutral Thais felt
she had inappropriately brought the monarchy into politics. He also acknowledged increasing
semi-public criticism of the monarchy, focused on the Queen (septel). XXXXXXXXXXXX stated
with confidence that the King had sought to deter the Queen from attending the funeral by
questioning the wisdom of that plan, but had stopped short of forbidding her to do so.

8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed former Prime Minister Thaksin's statement in his November 1
address to supporters (ref B) that either "royal mercy or the people's power" could allow his
return to Thailand. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this juxtaposition, which he viewed as highly strategic,
had the predictable effect of energizing Thaksin's opponents in the royalist camp. This reaction
allowed Thaksin to demonstrate publicly that many palace figures were aligned against him,
thereby eroding the prestige that the palace derived from its status as an institution above
politics. (Separately, after Thaksin's remarks, a member of Thaksin's legal team told us that the
sentence in question was part of a "very refined product" and that she had heard this sentence
"four or five times" in Thaksin's rehearsal of the speech.)
THAKSIN'S ENEMIES' PLANS FOR VIOLENCE

-------------------------------------

9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believed PAD continued to aim for a violent clash that would spark a
coup. He asserted that he had dined on October 6 with a leading PAD figure (NFI), who
explained that PAD would provoke violence during its October 7 protest at the parliament. The
unnamed PAD figure predicted (wrongly) that the Army would intervene against the

BANGKOK 00003317 003.2 OF 003

government by the evening of October 7. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to us that PAD remained

intent on a conflict that would generate at least two dozen deaths and make military intervention
appear necessary and justified.

10. (C) We mentioned to XXXXXXXXXXXX the claim by Thaksin associate XXXXXXXXXXXX

that Thaksin had been the target of an assassination plot (ref C). (Note: Subsequent to the
Ambassador's meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX, another Thaksin ally related the same claim, and
said Thaksin himself had spoken of this plot. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested
XXXXXXXXXXXX's list of conspirators -- including two prominent judges -- was not credible, but
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he could confirm (presumably because of first-hand discussion with an
organizing figure) that certain enemies of Thaksin (NFI) had sought to kill him. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said he had been surprised to learn that the contract on Thaksin's life entailed a relatively low
payment of only several hundred thousand Baht (in the range of 10,000 USD), although it also
entailed resettlement abroad for the person(s) directly involved.

REMARKS ON THE KING'S HEALTH

----------------------------

11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (late August/early September). At that time, he said, the King's
complexion appeared healthy, but overall the King appeared frail. He added that the King was
upset with the Thai doctor who had organized the team that performed back surgery on the King
two years ago, as the operation had not worked as well as the King had been led to expect.
XXXXXXXXXXXX, in his meeting with the Ambassador, also said the King was suffering from
back pain, and his activities were more limited than in recent years. JOHN