THE UNITED STATES vs.

TERESA CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-10396          
July 29, 1915

FACTS:

On the night of the 2nd of December, 1913, several policemen went to the house of the
defendant, where she was living with her husband, Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving there, they
obtained permission to enter and immediately proceeded to make a search of the premises for
opium. While there is some dispute concerning the fact, we believe the proof shows that the
defendant, during the time the policemen were searching the house, went to a bed located in the
house, after being so ordered by her husband, and took from beneath a pillow a small can of
opium, said to contain about 7½ grams of opium, and attempted to throw it away. At that
moment the policemen took possession of the can. There is some conflict in the proof as to just
what took place at that moment. That the policemen inquired to whom the opium belonged is not
denied. The conflict arises in the answer which was given to that question. The defendant in the
present case, according to some of the witnesses, declared that it belonged to her. Her husband,
Felix Ricablanca, according to some witnesses, declared that he was the owner of the house and
was responsible for everything that was found within it. The policemen, at that moment,
evidently believed that the opium belonged to the husband, Felix Ricablanca, for the reason that
they arrested him and took him to the pueblo, and later filed a complaint against him for a
violation of the Opium Law. He was later brought to trial and was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with a violation of the Opium Law. The complaint alleged that she
had in her possession and under her control a quantity of opium. She was arrested, arraigned,
pleaded not guilty, tried, found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of P300 and costs.

From that sentence she appealed to this court. In this court she alleges that the lower court
committed several errors, both of law and of fact. Upon the question of fact, she alleges that the
lower court committed an error in deciding that the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause was sufficient to show that she was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not herein defendant is guilty of the possession of opium;

2. Whether or not the lower court committed an error in permitting the testimony of her
husband to be presented against her over her objection;

HELD:

1. The mere fact that she had in her possession the opium for but a moment and took
possession of it under her husband's order, is not, in our opinion, such a possession of
opium as is intended to be condemned by the law. The fact that the defendant took the
opium from under the pillow on the bed, at the request of her husband, seems to us to be
entirely supported by the proof. Her husband was a confirmed user of opium. She
certainly did not intend, even remotely, to have in her possession opium. She did exactly
what any other faithful wife would have done under similar circumstances. There is no
proof that she was a user of opium in any form. There is no proof that she knew that the
can contained opium and consequently there is no proof of the animus possidendi. In the
absence of such proof there can be no conviction under the complaint for the illegal
possession of opium.
2. It will be noted that the law prohibits a husband from giving testimony against his wife
without her consent, except in a civil action between husband and wife, and in a criminal
action when the crime was committed by one against the other. The present is not a civil
action between husband and wife, neither it is a criminal action where the crime was
committed by one against the other. It would seem to clear, therefore, that the testimony
of the husband is not admissible if the wife objected. The testimony of the husband
should not have been admitted.

In addition, his testimony was not given in the present case. It was a copy of his
declaration given in another case, in which he was the defendant and in which he was
charged with the illegal possession of the opium in question. It will be remembered that
at the time the opium was found in the house of the defendant, the husband of the present
defendant was arrested; that later a complaint was presented against him. During the trial
he testified in his own behalf. It was the testimony given in that case which was presented
as proof in the present case. He was not called as a witness. His testimony is not only not
admissible under the provisions above quoted of section 383, but it is not admissible
under the Philippine Bill, which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf." The defendant was not given an opportunity "to meet the witness face to face."
The acceptance of the testimony of her husband, given in another case, was in absolute
violation of her rights.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN FRANCISCO
G.R. No. L-568
July 16, 1947

FACTS:

On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was
being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he
requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico
Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed
the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant
remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman.
Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right breast
which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son
Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound
in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.

The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relies
mainly on: (1) the affidavit, Exhibit C, which is a virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit
D, which is the record made by the justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the
defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia
Taladtad, wife of the appellant.

Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn to by the appellant before the justice of the peace of
Mansalay on March 5, 1945. Exhibit C-1 is its English translation. In said affidavit appellant
declares that: "I asked permission from the chief of police so that I may be able to raise my bond
and to indicate to me the house of one Guillermo Gervasio, a policeman, and I was consented
and the sergeant of police accompanied me to my house; that upon arriving at the house, Sgt.
Pacifico Pimentel allowed me to go up in order that I may be able to talk to my wife and the
sergeant of police awaited me in the stairs of the house; when I was in the house, I remembered
what my uncle told me to the effect that he would order someone to kill me because I am a
shame and a dishonor to our family and suddenly I lost my sense and I thought to myself that if
someone would kill me it would be more preferable for me to kill myself; when I looked at the
bed I saw a scissor near my wife and unconsciously I picked up the said scissor and immediately
stabbed my wife whereupon I looked for my child on the bed and stabbed him; I killed my son
Romeo Francisco whose age is more or less two years and after that I stabbed myself; after
stabbing myself, I heard a shot and the sergeant of police asked me if I would surrender to him or
not; I replied him "yes" then I lost my consciousness."

Defense counsel impugns, among others, the admissibility of the testimony of appellant's wife,
invoking the provision of section 26 (d) of Rule 123 prohibiting the wife and the husband from
testifying for or against each other.

Still, he was convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court of First Instance of Mindoro. Juan
Francisco appeals to this Court and asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court and to acquit
him of the crime charged.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the testimony of appellant's wife is admissible;

HELD:
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution
but under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified against
her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their
son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which had theretofore refrained
from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal;
and the the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course, against
being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or
all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a criminal
prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding authorities upon the basis
of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral and social sense, her being believed by
those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may read the same, once put
in writing, to be the killer of her infant child. It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the
law of common sense. Presuming the husband who so testified against his wife to be endowed
with common sense, he must be taken to have expected that the most natural reaction which the
said testimony would give rise to on the part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to
deny upon rebuttal the new matter which was involved in the same testimony, namely, the
imputation that it was his wife who killed their little son. Upon the part of the prosecution,
because he not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but went further and added
what was really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. And upon
the part of the wife, because of the reasons already set forth above. Hence, in giving such
testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its aforesaid natural and
necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband — himself exercising the very right which
he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations — must be taken to have
waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection
would have been available at the outset.

As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be waived.

The accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner, the reason being
that the State is entitled to question the spouse so presented as to all matters germane and
pertinent to the direct testimony. In the same way, and for a similar reason, when the herein
appellant gave his testimony in question in his defense, the State had the right to rebut the new
matter contained in that testimony consisting in the imputation upon his wife of the death of the
little boy. And that rebuttal evidence, which was rendered necessary by appellant's own
testimony,  could be furnished only by his wife who, as he fully knew, was alone with him and
their son at the precise place and time of the event. This right to rebut is secured to the State, no
less than to the accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the provision further authorizing
the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the other party to offer "new additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." So that if the waiver that we here declare to
flow from the above-mentioned testimony of appellant does not happen to be among those which
were mentioned in the cases cited by Mr. Wharton, that is no reason against the existence of said
waiver.

When the husband testified that it was his wife who caused the death of their son, he could not,
let us repeat, justly expect the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting such new matter in
his testimony, through the only  witness available, namely, the wife; nor could he legitimately
seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger of criminal proceedings against her
being started by the authorities upon the strength and basis of said testimony of her husband, or
to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the
killer of her own offspring. A decent respect and considerate regard for the feelings of an
average mother will tell us that such a moral and social stigma would be no less injurious to her
than a criminal punishment. And if the wife should, in such a case and at such a juncture, be
allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the scope of her testimony should at least be the same as that of
her husband. This is only simple justice and fairness dictated by common sense. Since the
husband had testified that it was his wife who caused the death of the little boy, she should be
allowed to say that it was really her husband who did it. We hold that it is not necessary, to
justify such rebuttal evidence, and to declare the existence of the waiver upon which it was
based, that the wife be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case by reason of such testimony
of her accused husband. The rule of waiver of objection to the competency of witnesses
generally does not require this prerequisite in the case between husband and wife. Rather the rule
makes the determination of the question hinge around the consequences which by common
sense, in justice and in fairness, should be deemed to have been expected by the spouse who first
testified naturally to flow from his act of giving that testimony. At any rate, the trial court not
only had the power to allow the State to utilize the wife as rebuttal witness, but also the
discretion to permit "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." But even
restricting the wife's testimony to merely contradicting her husband's version that she was the
one who killed their child, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the
killer. With the testimony of both spouses upon the point, instead of that of the accused alone, let
justice take its course.
 AVELINO ORDOÑO vs. HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN
G.R. No. L-39012
January 31, 1975

FACTS:

Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped
his daughter, Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973
was signed by the twenty four year old victim.

In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn
statement wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her
of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill them if
they reported the crime to the police.

Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their
other daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.

Catalina Ordoño said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoño against Leonora was
mentioned during the investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoño for the rape committed against
Rosa Ordoño. During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora,
Catalina manifested that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoño because he was
already in jail for having raped Rosa Ordoño.

The case against Avelino Ordoño, where Leonora Ordoño was the complainant, was elevated to
the Court of First Instance of La Union, San Fernando. On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented
Catalina Ordoño as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal
circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital
disqualification rule. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not consented expressly or
impliedly to his wife's testifying against him.

The trial court overruled the objection. He filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition.
He was allowed to sue in forma pauperis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoño could testify against her
husband;

HELD:

The phrase a “criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" is broad enough to
refer to any offense causing marital discord, such that the rape committed by the husband against
his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife falls within the meaning of the
exception found in the marital disqualification rule.

As the court held in Cargill vs. State, the better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or
directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.

Using the criterion, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the
father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife.
That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where,
normally, the daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is
always ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is
in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she usually utters the word Inay (Mother). But in
this case, when Avelino Ordoño, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early morning of
October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora shouted
"Mother" and, on hearing that word, Avelino desisted.

The rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with
incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too
obvious to require much elucidation.

Thus, the statutory provision that husband or wife shall in no case be a witness for or against the
other, does not include a criminal proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, and
the wife was competent to testify against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for
incest committed against his daughter.

The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoño could testify against her husband,
Avelino Ordoño, in the case where he is being tried for having raped their daughter, Leonora.
 MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 143439
October 14, 2005

FACTS:

Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness for arson pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein
petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.

The testimony of the wife was offered for the purpose of proving that the accused Maximo
Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo
Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-
dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that
accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez
ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire of
Susan Ramirez; that he knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family
as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the
accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was
burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.

Subsequently, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying
against him pursuant to the rule on marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition to the
motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with
the presentation of the other witnesses.

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez to file with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The
Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by
the trial court.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband;

HELD:

Under the law, during their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to
be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the
latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a
case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital
Disqualification Rule."
 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION
BENEFITS SYSTEM vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188956
March 20, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over three parcels of land constitutIng a
land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former President Fidel V.
Ramos located in West Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application
was later docketed as LRC Case No. N-11517 and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo.

The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized to do so by the
Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s Certificate dated
August 18, 2003.

After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since no oppositor registered any
oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued an
order of general default against the whole world, and the petitioner was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte

The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President
and Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: among her main duties
is to ensure that the properties and assets of petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled
and freed of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties were acquired by the petitioner
through a land grant under Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential
Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject properties in the concept of an
owner to the exclusion of the world since time immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the
Philippines transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, assumed open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation, and exercised control over them in
the concept of owner, and likewise assumed the obligations of an owner; petitioner has been
paying the real estate taxes on the subject properties; and the subject properties are not
mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.

Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following which, the court a
quo granted the application in a Decision dated April 21, 2008. It confirmed and ordered the
registration of AFPRSBS’ title thereto.

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 12, 2008, wherein it argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to own
property in its name and the petitioner failed to show that the witness it presented was duly
authorized to appear for and in its behalf.

On June 2, 2008, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition. Then, the court a quo issued the
assailed Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG on the ground that the
petitioner failed to prosecute its case.

The Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the court a quo in the other assailed
Order dated July 9, 2009. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case considering that it presented Ms.
Aban by reason of the alleged lack of authority of the witness to testify on behalf of the
petitioner;

HELD:

The petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject case considering that it appeared during trial,
presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the titling of the subject lots, and
the court a quo never held petitioner liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject case.

The Court believes that OSG was correct in observing that indeed the AFPRSBS did not present
its duly authorized representative to prosecute this case. And the records support the observation
since AFPRSBS presented only one witness – Mrs. Aban. In view of the foregoing the Court is
left without choice than to grant OSG’s motion for reconsideration.

However, there is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to
present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No
law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a
failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of
a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided therein. Such that, the law disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and
children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20
provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides
for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a
rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached
by the party against whom he was called.

The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to testify
as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and
being able to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.