I00 - United States v.

Bustos
37 Phil 731 (1918)

Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
they prepared and assigned a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office
of Crossfield & O’Brien, and 5 individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punzalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal. Crossfield & O’Brien submitted this petition and these
affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these
attorneys was signed by 34 citizens. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the
judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper
action and report. The Honorable Percy M. Moir, recommended to the Governor-
General that Punzalan be removed from his position as justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and ordered that the proceedings had
in the case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary. Later the justice of the peace file
a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the
hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president
and is councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was
the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace,
had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered
a suppression of the charges against Punzalan and acquitted him of the same.
Attorneys for complainant’s thereupon appealed to the Governor-General. On 12
October 1916, Felipe Bustos, et al. were charged for libel. The Honorable Percy M. Moir
found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso,
Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of the to pay a fine of
P10 and 1/32 of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handling down of the
decision, filed on 16 December 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of
which was to retire the objection interposed by then counsel for the defendants to the
admission of the documents consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The
trial court denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and
Fortunato Macalino appealed.

Issue:
Whether the intemperate allegations set forth in the information against the public
official may be the basis of libel case against the petitioning citizens.

Held:
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceable assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare
verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of great English
and American Constitutional cases. The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on
the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be
exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the
individual is less that the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common
good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public opinion
should be the constant sources of liberty and democracy. The guaranties of a free
speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration
of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a
justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative
as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty
which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any
alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of any official dereliction on the part
of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into ad punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice
Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. “The people are not obliged to
speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath iin a free
government, but only in a despotism. “The right to assemble and petition is the
necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of
free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means any person or group of persons
can apply, without fear of penalty. To the appropriate branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must , of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made. Public policy, the welfare or society, and
the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.
The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
doctrine of privilege.

I01 - Burgos v. Chief of Staff

133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
(Quezon City), issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was
filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants,
and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City,
from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC
Quezon City. The prayer of preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and
academic when, on 7 July 1983, the Solicitor General manifested that said articles
would not be used until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of said articles.

Issue:
Whether the continued sealing of the printing machines in the offices of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” is anathematic to the democratic framework.

Ruling:
The premises searched were the business and printing offices of the “Metropolitan Mail”
and “We Forum” newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, the
premises of the Metropolitan Mail and we Forum were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of Burgos, et. al’s freedom to express themselves in print. Thus state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. Although
the public officers would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that have been sequestered under Section 8 of PD 885, as amended, which
authorizes “the sequestrat6ion of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted
authorities in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by
Secretary of National Defense. “It is doubtful, however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absences of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated
by the Minster of National Defense.

I04 - DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six
feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check
mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team
Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right
to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the
body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter
threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable
infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that
they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property
or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not
religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
Exercise Criminal Law Amendment Constitutions Adoptions
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
I05 - PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. DUQUE
FACTS:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the
DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006.
ISSUE:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
HELD:
YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

I06 - LEO PITA v. CA

GR 80806 (October 5, 1989)
Sarmiento, J
Facts:
Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of City Mayor of Manila, Ramon D.
Bagatsing, policemen seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand
owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned
the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in
the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita.

Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain Bagatsing,
Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing
the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected
by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines
which was granted by the court. Pita filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants,
and or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine
before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not."

The trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the
Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the freedom of the press is not
without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature
that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications; and that the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the
search or seizure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or
movable structure. Pita filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result of an anti-
smut campaign.

Held:
No. The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. It is basic that searches and seizures may
be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and
subject to challenge.
 First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The fact that the former Mayor's act was sanctioned by
"police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The Court
finds greater reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a
warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the present case involves an obscenity rap makes
it no different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political case, because speech is
speech, whether political or "obscene." Although the Court is not ruling out warrantless
searches, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must
be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such
charges being readied against any party. There is no "accused" here to speak of, who
ought to be "punished". Further, to say that the Mayor could have validly ordered the
raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in
his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the Mayor judge,
jury, and executioner rolled into one.

Thus, the court made a resume, to wit: (1) The authorities must apply for the
issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in
order; (2) They must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action; (3) The judge must determine whether or not the
same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and
on His Honor's sound discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists,
it may issue the search warrant prayed for; (5) The proper suit is then brought in the
court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to
appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed
"obscene." The Court states, however, that "these do not foreclose, however, defenses
under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official
power under the Civil Code or the Revised Penal code."

Notes:

OBSCENE
In People vs. Kottinger , the Court laid down the test, in determining the
existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another test, so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Kottinger hastened to say,
however, that " whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
"judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."

I07 - Eliseo Soriano v. Laguardia

GR 164785 (April 29, 2009)
Velasco, Jr., J;

Facts:

Eliseo Soriano was the host of the program Ang Dating Daan made obscene
remarks against Michael Sandoval (INC’s minister:

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka

pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng
mga demonyong ito”

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and other members of INC, against
Soriano in connection with the above broadcast. After a preliminary conference, the
show Ang Dating Daan was suspended for 20 days. Later, in MTCRB’s decision, it
found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a 3-month suspension from his TV
program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTCRB.

Issue:
Are Soriano’s statement during the televised program part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Article III?

Ruling:

No. The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, UNPROTECTED speech. A
cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case
reveal that to an average adult, the utterances may not constitute obscene but merely
indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on
words. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV
program that is rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely
reach even the eyes and ears of children. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks
are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot
avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made
in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said
utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue

curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights,
the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

I08 - Soriano v Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010

FACTS:
In this case, Eliseo F. Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the
Court dated April 29, 2009, modifying that of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) by imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on
the television show Ang Dating Daan, instead of on petitioner Soriano, as host of that
program.

Soriano seeks reconsideration on the following grounds or issues:

(1) the suspension thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint;
(2) the Court erred in ruling that his utterances did not constitute exercise of religion;
(3) the Court erred in finding the language used as offensive and obscene;
(4) the Court should have applied its policy of non-interference in cases of conflict
between religious groups.

HELD:
1. The court held that Soriano’s threshold posture that the suspension imposed
constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and
freedom of expression is a mere rehash of the position he articulated in the
underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his memorandum. So are the
supportive arguments and some of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and
American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed
in some detail, and found to be without merit in the Courts’ Decision. It would,
thus, make little sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the same
issues and arguments.
2. The Court held that there is nothing in Soriano’s statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his
avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even Soriano’s
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the
need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its
veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts
Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used
in retaliation as religious speech. The Court cannot accept that Soriano made his
statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no
intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group.
 3. The Court note that the ratings and regulation of television broadcasts take into
account the protection of the child, and it is from the child’s narrow viewpoint that
the utterances must be considered, if not measured. The ratings "G," "PG"
(parental guidance), "PG-13," and "R" (restricted or for adults only) suggest as
much. The concern was then, as now, that program Soriano hosted and
produced would reach an unintended audience, the average child, and so it is
how this audience would view his words that matters. The average child would
not be concerned with colorful speech, but, instead, focus on the literal, everyday
meaning of words used. It was this literal approach that rendered petitioner’s
utterances obscene.
(note: The program was rated G purported to be suitable for all ages)
4. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of
some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public
welfare. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.

I09 - Celdran vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220127

FACTS:
Celdran was charged in an Information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila for the offense of Offending the Religious Feelings defined and penalized under
Article 133 of the RPC. That on or about September 30, 2010, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, Celdran did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously disrespect,
disregard and offended the feelings of various religious leaders in the persons of
Cardinal Gaudencio Rosales, Papal Nuncio, Ambassador de Villa and other leaders of
different Christian denominations, by then and there displaying a placard/board bearing
the word "DAMASO" while ecunemenical service was going on inside the Manila
Cathedral Church, Intramuros, which notoriously offended the feelings of the religious
leaders and the faithful, represented by Msgr. Cerbo Y Cerda, Rector of the Manila
Cathedral Church, lntramuros, this City. This was during the celebration of the second
anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and the launching of the Hand
Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome. The MeTC in its Decision
dated December 14, 2012, found Celdran guilty of the crime Offending Religious
Feelings. Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter in its Decision affirmed Celdran's
conviction. Undaunted, Celdran filed a petition for review before the CA. In its Decision
dated December 12, 2014, the CA affirmed the findings of the MeTC and the RTC.
Celdran's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated August 14, 2015.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did Celdran offend the religious feelings of those who were present during the
celebration of the
HELD:
Yes. The Court agree with the CA in its finding that the acts of Soriano were meant to
mock, insult, and ridicule those clergy whose beliefs and principles were diametrically
opposed to his own.
As held in the case of The People of the Philippines v. Jose M Baes:
[W]hether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of
the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that ce1iain acts may
offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive
to the feelings of those professing another faith.
Therefore, for failure of Soriano to sufficiently show any reversible error in the uniform
findings of the Me TC, the RTC and the CA, The Court resolve to DENY the instant
petition.

I0C - Sanidad v COMELEC GR 90878; 1990

FACTS:
RA 6766 entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law,
all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the
ratification of said Organic Act. The Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution
No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of
the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated
in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Respondent Comelec
maintains that it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and
regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which provides:

The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. It is stated further by respondent
that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views
and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views
or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. This is
provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881. Respondent Comelec has relied much
on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the
promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167. Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) likewise provides: Prohibited
forms of election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: ... (b) for
any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer, or personality who is a candidate for any elective office shall
take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis
ours)

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 19 of COMELEC Res No. 2167 violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press?

HELD:
YES, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted
to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil
sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may
favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio
or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of
absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646).
It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be
more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take
a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section
19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167
does not absolutely bar petitionercolumnist from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec
space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was
advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of
regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no
justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The
people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including
the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.

I0D - Reno vs American Civil Liberties Union

Facts:

The 1996 Communications Decency Act (the 'CDA') is a controversial act that

includes two provisions aimed to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet.
The provisions prohibit:
1. the 'knowing' transmission of 'obscene or indecent' messages to a recipient who
is less than 18 years old.
2. knowingly sending or displaying to a minor any patently offensive message as
measured by current standards.
The law imposes fines of up to $250,000 for posting certain undesirable language.
Fearing a loss of their freedoms in the online environment, concerned plaintiffs,
including a publisher of an online newsletter as well as The National Writers Union, a
representative for thousands of freelance journalists, authors, and writers, filed a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the two described provisions.
A Philadelphia District Court entered a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of
both provisions. Attorney General Janet Reno, on behalf of the Government, appealed
directly to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the 1996 Communications Decency Act, being broad and vague, violates the
First and Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the 1996 Communications Decency Act violates the First and Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Under the CDA, neither parents’ consent nor their participation would avoid application
of the statute.
The CDA fails to provide any definition of “indecent” and omits any requirement that the
“patently offensive material” lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Further, the CDA’s broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and
are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique
characteristics of the Internet.

CDA applies to the entire universe of the cyberspace. Thus, the CDA is a content-
based blanket restriction on speech, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a
form of time, place and manner restriction.
The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment of the Constitution requires
when a statute regulates the content of speech.
In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the statute
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive.
The CDA places an unacceptable burden on protected speech, thus, the statute is
invalid as unconstitutional.
I0E - Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs. CA GR 127930, 15 December 2000

FACTS:
Following the publication of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of
Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan
ng Chi-Rho), the members of the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all
students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the
Miriam College Discipline Committee.

The Letter dated 4 November 1994 informed them that letters of complaint were "filed
against you by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five
student have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation.
Please find enclosed complaints. As expressed in their complaints you have violated
regulations in the student handbook specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and
32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2
(minor offenses) letter a, page 37. You are required to submit a written statement in
answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing to be held on November
15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room." None of the
students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to
transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order 94, Series of 1992, supposedly
had jurisdiction over the case. In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again
required the students to file their written answers. In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte,
lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee reiterating his
clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty.
Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of
their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence,
he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and
its implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the
members of said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position"
against his clients.

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the
Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon the students, to wit: (1) Jasper Briones [Editor-in-Chief of
ChiRho, 4th year student]: Expulsion; (2) Daphne Cowper: Suspension up to (summer)
March 1995; (3) Imelda Hilario: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995;
(4) Deborah Ligon [4th year student and could graduate as summa cum laude]:
suspension up to May 1995; (5) Elizabeth Valdezco: suspension up to (summer) March
1995; (6) Camille Portuga [Octoberian]: graduation privileges withheld, including
diploma; (7) Joel Tan: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995; (8) Gerald
Gary Renacido [2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer credentials; (9) Relly
Carpio [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials; (10) Jerome
Gomez [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials; and (11) Jose Mari
Ramos [Art editor of Chi-Rho, 2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer papers.

Said students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning
the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. On 17 January
1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.,
issued an order denying the students' prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. The
students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration."
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of
preliminary injunction. Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In
an Order dated 22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition. The students,
excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in the
Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary
injunction/restraining order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24
February 1995. On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for disposition. In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, the appellate
court granted the students' petition. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22 February
1995, as well as the students' suspension and dismissal, void. Miriam College filed the
present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act precludes the school’s right to
discipline its students.

HELD:
In several cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech
in school premises. The right of the students to free speech in school premises,
however, is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the Court upheld the right
of the students to free expression in the cases of Malabanan vs. Ramento, Villar vs.
Technological Institute of the Philippines, Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, and Non vs. Dames II, the Court did not rule out disciplinary action by the
school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

Provisions of law (such as Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act) should be

construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be
construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the
fundamental law. A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be
saved by a narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe
upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, said
provision should not be construed as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free
speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is read
to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class work or
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Further, the power of the
school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary
corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to
suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court therefore rule that Miriam College
has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against the students.

I10 - United States v. O’Brien

Facts. The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, amended in 1965 to include the applicable
provision that made it an offense to “alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate” a
Selective Service registration certification. Defendant knowingly burned his draft card on
the front steps of the local courthouse. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment
unconstitutional as a law abridging the freedom of speech.

Issue. 
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant because his
act of burning the draft card was protected “symbolic speech” within the First
Amendment?

Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to notify registrants of
their registration or classification, to be retained or tossed into the waste basket
according to the convenience of the registrant?

Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because it was intended

to “suppress freedom of speech?”

Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be accepted that there
is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that constitutes “speech” whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea. However, even if the
alleged communicative element of Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is constitutionally protected activity.
First, a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental
interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirement
s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied to Defendant.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the initial purpose of the draft
card is to notify, it serves many other purposes as well. These purposes would be
defeated if the card were to be mutilated or destroyed.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of Congress is not a basis
for declaring this legislation unconstitutional. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is
constitutional as enacted.

Discussion. This case creates a symbolic speech test that was used here to uphold the
1965 Amendment to the UMTSA.

I12 - ROQUE vs. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF -
G.R. No. 214986 - February 15, 2017

FACTS:

We resolve a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt filed by petitioner Atty. Herminio
Harry L. Roque, Jr. against respondents Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig. Gen. Arthur
Ang, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, for violating Rule 139-B, Section18 of the Rules of
Court.

Antecedent Facts:

On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in
Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton. After nearly
a month since the killing, he was still confined by his superiors on a ship under US
custody. Thus, the question of custody over Pemberton was subject of public
discussions.

On October 22, 2014, news broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp
Aguinaldo, where a detention facility had been constructed for him, in the premises of
the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board.

Thus, petitioner, together with his clients, the family of the slain Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude,
and German national Marc Sueselbeck, went to Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City, to demand to see Pemberton.

Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced their way inside the premises
of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and gained entry despite
having been instructed by Military Police personnel not to enter the compound, and
even though the gates were closed.

Instead of restraining the family of Jennifer and German national Sueselbeck, Atty.
Roque instead encouraged and lead the forced entry to the restricted premises.
Respondents allege that the actions showed by herein petitioner is rather inappropriate
and scandalous, thus violating the camp rules and regulations.

In response to the events of October 22, 2014, respondents released a press statement
that they were considering filing disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The plan of
filing a disbarment case was also published in newspapers and TV.

Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Further, petitioner claims that respondents' acts put to
question his professional and personal reputation.

Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality rule. This
is laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and

confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents’ public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court and whether respondents may be punished for contempt.

HELD:

NO. The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be
applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. As a general principle,
speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. Matters of public interest
should not be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the
confidentiality rule.

The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote the
proper administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as
contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a restrictive
interpretation.

In any case, the Press Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on the
part of petitioner that would damage his personal and professional reputation. Although
the Press Statement mentioned that a disbarment complaint had been filed against
petitioner, no particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual
charges filed.

Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a
subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against
petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the performance of
respondents' official functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the
publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of security.
Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for
responding publicly to such public actions.

This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of expression. It
may interfere, on occasion, for the proper administration of justice. However, the power
of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of expression, especially
when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters. Freedom of
expression must always be protected to the fullest extent possible.

The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration of the
circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of punishing the act.
Especially where freedom of speech and press is involved, this Court has given a
restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes contempt.

I13 - Babst vs. National Intelligence Board, GR L-62992, 28 September 1984

Facts:
Arlene Babst, et al. are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local
publications. At different dates since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been
summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation
on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even
their private lives. Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed
by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal,
Manila, against Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo
based on an article written by Doyo and published in the 28 March 1982 issue of the
Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada
(Ret.), et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An
information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al. filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, which was superseded by the
amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking
to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst,
et. al. and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been
the subject of inquiry by the National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Issue:
Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their subsequent
interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and
unconstitutional as they are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression
since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Held:
Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against
Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed. The writ of prohibition is directed
against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel
cases adverted to are not pending before the NIB or any other respondent. Further, the
issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of
expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court
where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to
the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of
an inquiry or interrogation conducted by the NIB, which Babst, et. al. claim to have been
illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and
individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the officials has the
authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his
right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez
and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And
the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to
complain of libel.
I14 - Chavez v Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Facts :
Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor
President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye)
held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential
press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a
man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed
that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that
President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press
release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for
the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued
to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group,
Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The
NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom.

Issue :
Whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes
an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held :
When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other
expression is not subject to prior restrain Expression not subject to prior restraint is
protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on
protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression
means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on
expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the
expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the prior
restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral
even if it burdens expression.

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior
restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that
the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and
thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The
public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under
any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this
jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it
exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a
COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.
The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot.

Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that
cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral
process is one of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves
the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no exception, is
that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this
ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional.

Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not,
endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by
respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and
publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the
airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of
any law, and that
includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to
this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the
content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected
expression.

I16 - ARTURO BORJAL v. CA, G.R. NO. 126466, January 14, 1999

FACTS:

Arturo Borjal filed a petition to reverse the decision of the CA that holds the former with
Maximo Soliven solidarily liable for damages for writing and publishing certain articles
claimed to be derogatory and offensive to Francisco Wenceslao.
Arturo Borjal was the President of the Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhiSTAR
Daily., Inc., owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. Maximo Soliven was its
Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. On the other hand, Francisco Wencelsao
served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the
House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy.
Between May and July 1989 Borjal wrote and published a series of articles in his
column Jaywalker that dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an “organizer of a
conference” without naming or identifying Francisco Wenceslao. Wenceslao filed a
complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner for unethical conduct. In
turn, Borjal published a rejoinder to challenge of private respondent not only to protect
his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for
character assassination.
Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel and thereafter instituted a civil action against
Borjal and Soliven for damages based on libel, the trial court decided in his favor. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA found that Borjal’s column writings
sufficiently identified Wenceslao as the “conference organizer.” Hence the petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject articles do not constitute
qualifiedly privileged communication?
RULING:
Yes. The Court Ruled that Borjal's questioned writings are not within the
exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the
appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without
any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis
not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing
freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete, this
Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right
cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition
in the statute punishing libels.
Privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This
closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-
determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-
expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, makes its appeal
to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture. It is
therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the
penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and true
report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective of the
rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy
effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic
societies.

I17 – Baguio Midland Courier v CA, GR 107566, 25 November 2004

Freedom of Expression; the public has the right to be informed on the mental,
moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.

FACTS:

1. In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC),  Cecille
Afable, the Editor-in-Chief, in her column “In and Out of Baguio”  made the
following comments:
“Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has the most
imponderables about him. People would ask: “can he read and write”?
Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a
Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid
to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the
Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account
of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all
advertisements for him if he pays his old account first.”

2. In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her 
January 10, 1988 column at the Courier:
“I heard that the ‘Dumpty in the Egg’ is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair.
Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has
not also paid their medical services with them. Since he is donating millions
he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount
 of P27,000 only. If he wins, several teachers were signifying to resign and
leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.”

3. As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for Damages
before the RTC of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous. He
likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed;

4. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was
allegedly described as “Dumpty in the Egg”  or one “who is a failure in his
business” which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to
mean “zero or a big lie”;  that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged failure to pay
his medical expenses;

5. The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation
to the Courier in the amount of P27,415.00  for the ads placed by his
campaigners for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;

6. The Regional Trial Court dismissed Labo’s complaint for damages on the ground
that the article of petitioner Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment
on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation and honesty
of private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;

7. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the petitioners to
pay Ramon Labo, Jr.  damages after concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg”
refers to no one but Labo himself.

ISSUE: Were the news articles libelous or privileged?

HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in the Egg”
in the questioned article. This is so because the article stated that “The Dumpty
in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes”, another candidate for mayor and opponent
of Labo himself. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent and
against himself. Also, it was held that: ‘it is also not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but
it must be shown that at least a 3 rd person could identify him as the object
of the libelous publication.

2. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke “public interest” to justify the
publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. This argument is
without merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio. As
such, the article is still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the
freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the public’s
right to be informed of the mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates
for public office.
 “…it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the
character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The
importance to the State and to society of such discussions is so vast, and
the advantages derived so great, that they more than counterbalance the
inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and
occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small,
that such discussion must be privileged. “

Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public interest as
it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective
post in Baguio City at that time.

IID - Nestlé Philippines v. Honorable Sanchez G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

Facts:
The Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism, and Nationalism - OLA LIA intensified their efforts for the intermittent pickets
they have been conducting since June 17, 1987 at the Padre Faura gate of the
Supreme Court. On June 10, 1987, the Court En Banc issued a resolution giving the
unions opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders of Union of
Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism, and
Nationalism - OLA LIA, in the Nestlé case and in the Kimberly case, respectively, to
appear before the court to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of
court. Atty. Espinas, the counsel for the Union of Filipino Employees, apologized on
behalf of the union leaders for the acts mentioned, with the assurance that said acts will
not be repeated, and cited persons who were willing to suffer such penalty as may be
warranted under the circumstance.

Issue: Whether or not the unions should be held in contempt for picketing as an attempt
to influence the Court in deciding pending cases.

Held: No. The Court forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described. However, the liberal stance taken by the Court should be
considered as an acknowledgement of the euphoria resulting from the rediscovery of a
long-redressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply
the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the
Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,
must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice.” The right of petition is conceded to be an
inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety
entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies."

IIE - In RE: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr. AM No. 90-5-2373 July 12, 1990

Facts:
Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr., a lawyer and journalist writing for the Manila Standard,
wrote a headline news in relation to the deliberation by the Supreme Court of “a
supposed decision awaiting immediate promulgation on one or another of the cases
then pending in this Court that challenged the validity of criminal informations charging
various persons with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder in connection
with the failed coup attempt of December, 1989.” The headline alleged that according
to his source, who’s not in any way connected with the Supreme Court, a promulgation
was going to be issued by the Court upholding the Hernandez Doctrine, hence affirming
that the crime of rebellion complex with murder and other common offenses does not
exist and by a vote of 14 to one denied the government’s motion to repeal the doctrine.
While headlines and news about the matter continued to greet Manila Standard readers
on Tuesday, May 29, 1990, the tenor of these had materially changed. The headlines
now proclaimed that “Cory (Aquino) awaits SC ruling” and “Tribunal still deliberating
rebellion complex issue.” The news inside was no longer about a decision already
reached or a ruling made. It reported a statement of the Chief Justice, made through
Assistance Clerk of Court Luz Puno, that there was no such decision and that the
matter was still under deliberation. For the first time in three days, Mr. Jurado’s subject
was silent on the subject. On the same Tuesday, the Court En Banc issued a
Resolution branding as false the news reports of May 27, 1990, declaring that as of that
day, no decision or resolution on the subject of said reports have been signed, either by
the supposed ponente or any other member of the Court, and requiring Mr. Emil Jurado,
a member of the bar as well as a journalist, to explain within five (5) days why he should
not be dealt with administratively” ** for publishing obviously false statements relative to
the Court’s action on a pending proceeding or otherwise indulging in speculation or
conjecture, or airing illicit information about the same.” In his column in the Wednesday,
May 30, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, respondent acknowledge having received
the show-cause Resolution and sought to justify the questioned news items as
legitimate reporting duly verified by both himself and his editorin-chief and approved for
publication of the latter. On June 1, 1990, respondent filed a “Compliance” with the
show-cause Resolution which pleads in justification freedom of the press as well as the
right of the public to information on matters of public concerns, both he avers, being
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the report and comments made by the respondent, regardless of their
truth and of the motives or purposes behind their publication, are protected by the
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.

Held: No. There is no dispute of the existence and fundamental character of these
guarantees. But equally fundamental, needing no express statement or sanction in
statute or charter because inherent in the very nature of the judicial power and
indispensable to the free and untrammelled exercise by the courts of their traditional
functions, is the principle of confidentiality of all actuations of, or records or proceedings
before, a Court in a pending action which are not essentially public in character .
As far as the proceedings in this Court are concerned, these confidential matters
include, among others, raffling of cases, deliberation and discussions of the En Banc or
the divisions, drafts of decisions and resolutions embodying conclusions reached and
dispositions agreed upon by the members in consultation. The respondent cannot
shield himself from culpability by invoking the freedoms of the press and of information.
There can be no doubt that his published report and comments on a non-existent
decision tended directly to embarrass the court and obstruct its proper functioning,
putting it to what should have been the unnecessary task of defending or proving the
integrity of its proceedings. Even assuming that he had learned, correctly but
surreptitiously through unauthorized “leaks,” of a voting trend in favor of upholding the
Hernandez doctrine, or of deliberations pointing to such a trend, or even of a draft
decision or resolution of the terms and tenor reported, premature revelation thereof
placed the Court in disrepute as an inept and incompetent guardian of its own
confidential proceedings or, worse, offered the temptation to rewrite the decision in
order to avoid such odium. These, considering that as the highest tribunal in the land,
the Court is and should serve as the model and exemplar for all lower courts to emulate,
constituted a clear and present danger to the orderly and impartial administration of
justice.
Note: It is as old as their common history, a long- standing subject of judicial inquiry,
and the weight of jurisprudence thereby developed clearly supports the view that a
publication relating to judicial action in a pending case which tends to impede,
embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is
punishable as contempt. A person charged with contempt of court in making utterances
or publishing writings which clearly constitute a contempt may not ordinarily escape
liability therefor by invoking the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the
press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with the abuse of such
liberties. Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of
justice by the courts has been described as abuse of the liberty of the speech or the
press such as will subject the abuse to punishment for contempt of court.

IIF - Jose Gonzalez v. Chairman Maria Kalaw Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500 July 22,
1985
Facts:
In a resolution of a sub-committee of the respondent Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television, they granted the permit to exhibit the film “Kapit sa Patalim”
under the classification “For Adults Only”, with certain changes and deletions
enumerated therein. The petitioner, represented by Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez,
President of Malaya Films, filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the
classification of the film “For Adults Only” was without basis. Then on November 12,
1984, respondent Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for
Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of
the sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of
the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application,
the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance
of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied. The Court, in a resolution of
January 12, 1985, required respondent to answer. In such pleading submitted on
January 21, 1985, as one of its special and affirmative defenses, it was alleged that the
petition is moot as "respondent Board has revoked its questioned resolution, replacing it
with one immediately granting petitioner company a permit to exhibit the film Kapit
without any deletion or cut [thus an] adjudication of the questions presented above
would be academic on the case.” Further: "The modified resolution of the Board, of
course, classifies Kapit as for-adultsonly, but the petition does not raise any issue as to
the validity of this classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of the
Board's action are the deletions ordered in the film. For the petitioners, the classification
“For Adults Only”, “is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible
restraint of artistic expression.” They further added that the portions which the Board
objected were essential for the integrity of the film.

Issue: Whether or not the classification given by the BRMPT for the film “Kapit Sa
Patalim” violated the petitioner’s freedom of expression.

Held: No. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be
limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the
State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There
should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of.
The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension
about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such
danger be only probable. As explained in the respondent Board’s Answer to the
amended petition: "The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater
operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the
scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots
concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the
theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing
as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive
violence attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable
and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes."
I23 - In RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT", AM No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8,
2011

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was
promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente.  Motion for reconsideration
was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most notably on the ground
that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in
discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such
quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works.  The authors and
their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International
Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation
Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking
the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve
Journal of Internation Law in 2006.  Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the
Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief
Justice expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on
the matter of plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty
members.   In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court
had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war “crushed by a
singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court
of the Land.” 

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and

misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty,
pure and simple.”  Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form
part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be
promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case
undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of
the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano
del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the
remarks and choice of words used were such a great insult to the members of the Court
and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and
13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.

In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common

Compliance stating therein that their intention in issuing the article in question “was not
to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure
continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing on
constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking
responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus,
rectifying their issuance of the article.  Furthermore, the respondents argued that the
article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

ISSUES:

W/N the show cause resolution denies the respondents freedom of speech.

HELD:

No, the show cause resolution did not deny the respondent’s freedom of speech.
A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact
that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of
its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in
the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that
gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court
of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of
expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free
and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only
goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. 
Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice.
Some of the phrases from the letter that the court questioned were:
Reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land.  x x x.

An  extraordinary act of injustice  has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

J00 - JBL Reyes v Bagatsing, GR No. L-65366, 9 November 1983, Fernando, J.

Retired Justice JB L. Reyes, representing the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit
from Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing to hold a peaceful march and rally from Luneta
Park to the US Embassy. After the march, the participants were planning to hold a
program in an open public space in front of the said embassy. They wanted to protest
the presence of all foreign military bases in the country.
The mayor refused to issue a permit due to police intelligence reports regarding “plans
of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend.” He also invoked
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila which prohibits the holding of rallies within a
radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. The
mayor, however, informed the participants that he would issue a permit only if the
gathering were to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the
participants’ safety may be guaranteed.
A few days before the scheduled protest, Reyes filed a suit for mandamus with
alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court
to compel the respondent to issue a permit.
Issue:
WON the mayor’s refusal to issue a permit violated the petitioners’ constitutional right(s)
to peaceful assembly (and free speech)
Held: YES.The Constitution guarantees that “no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievances.” The right to peaceful assembly
(and free speech) is not to be limited, much less denied, except upon the showing of the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent.
The use of public places, including parks and streets, in exercising the freedom of
speech and of peaceable assembly, is also guaranteed to the people. Absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, requests to use such
places may not be denied. Authorities issuing permits to use such places may only
regulate the time, place, and manner of the activities, for purposes of conserving public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing.
In this case, the mayor failed to convince the Court that such danger was existent.
Firstly, the petitioner made clear that all the necessary steps would be taken to ensure a
peaceful march and rally. General Cabrera, the Superintendent of the Manila Police
Force, also guaranteed that the police force is in a position to cope with such
emergency should it arise. Cabrera also admitted that there were at least five previous
rallies that occurred in front of the US Embassy where no untoward event had
happened.
Regarding the Ordinance invoked by the respondent, there was no proof that the
distance of the venue was less than 500 feet. Even if such condition were satisfied, the
constitutionality of the Ordinance as regards the right to peaceful assembly could still be
questioned.
Dispositive: The petition was granted.
J01 - Acosta vs CA, GR 132088

Facts:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the

Decision 1 dated August 29, 1997 and Resolution 2 dated January 7, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39878, affirming the Resolutions 3 of respondent Civil
Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service
and imposing a penalty of six-(6) months suspension without pay.

Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila, who on various
dates of September and October decided not to report to work and participated in mass
actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress of their grievances.

On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals that petitioners
participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with the return-to-work order
issued September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), petitioners were administratively charged with
such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service
law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the
investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating Committees, Secretary Cariño
found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the
service.

Issue(s):

1. Respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed

resolutions of the civil service commission that wrongly penalized petitioners
 whose only "offense" was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

2. Respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed

resolutions of the civil service commission that wrongly denied petitioners
their right to back wages.

Ruling(s):

1. No. The character and legality of the mass actions which they participated in
have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public
School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr. wherein we ruled that
"these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work
which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially
economic reasons." In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we added that:

It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that

petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding
their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not
used by the striking employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and
not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the

absence of statute, public employees for not have the right to
engaged in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.

Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not

because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and
petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse
effects upon their students for whose education they are
responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable
under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by

the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable assemble
that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such
right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service and classes in various public schools in Metro
Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues,
other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could
petition the government for redress of grievances.
 It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however
temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one
of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid
grievances and noble intentions in staging the "mass action," but
that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an
illegal work stoppage.

2. No. As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any

compensation if he has not rendered any service. 1 While there recognized
instances when back wages may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed
public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in
citing Bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar impel us to rule
otherwise.

J02 - C3A. BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP)

VS. ERMITA, G.R. NO. 169838, APRIL 25, 2006
FACTS:
Bayan et al. and two petitioners allege that their rights as organizations and individuals
were violated. All of the petitioners assail B.P. 880 and seek to stop the violent dispersal
of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy. They also argued that that B.P. No. 880
requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Moreover,
petitioners contend that BP 880 is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or
influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against
the government because they are being tolerated. Respondents contend that,  B.P. No.
880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement
of the public assembly’s time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to
prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of
commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a
permit on the basis of a rally’s program content or the statements of the speakers
therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger test."
ISSUE
Whether B.P. 880 violates of the constitutional right to assemble because it is a content-
based regulation.
HELD

No. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it
as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies.

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies 22 that would use public places. The reference to
"lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to
be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

J04 - David v Macapagal - Arroyo 489 SCRA 160; 2006

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in
the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of EDSA People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal
of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. In the
early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against
representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in
their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. These seven (7) petitions
challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed
PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
(2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech
and of assembly. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune
Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a
clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term
"emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence,
there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. In G.R. No.
171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty
one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives
Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They
asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers";
"violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that
President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without
clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that
there is necessity to do so." In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and
their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1)
they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their
issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. In G.R. No.
171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections
1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of
Article XII of the Constitution. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et
al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her
Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial
Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency
powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017
"goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code." And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda
maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of the
freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and
the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under
Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these
issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot;
second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.),
171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not
necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017
has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right
to free expression and redress of grievances. In summary, these petitions allege that it
encroached the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly. However, on March 3,
2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.

ISSUE:
Whether PP 1017 violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly?

HELD:
PARTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue
decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein,
the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as
Commander-in-Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of
PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the military and the police
should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence. "But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5
have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be
deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in
media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. On
the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear
that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2)
the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press;
and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of
some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution,
the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but
such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts
of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of
Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on
the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

J05 - Terminiello vs Chicago (1949)

Facts:
A meeting by the Christian Veterans of America drew considerable public attention with
more than 800 persons in attendance. Outside the auditorium where the meeting was
held, protesters who were against the meeting of the Christian Veterans of America
filled the crowd. Policemen were trying to maintain order but several disturbances from
the crowd occurred.
The petitioner in his speech, condemned the conduct of the outside crown, he also
criticized various pollical groups and racial groups whose activities he denounced as
inimical to the nation’s welfare.
The trial court charged the petitioner with a violation of an ordinance that punishes
"breach of the peace" that consists of any "misbehavior which violates the public peace
and decorum", and that the "misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs
the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a
disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by
arousing alarm."

Petitioner argues that the said ordinance violated his right to free speech under the
Federal Constitution. After being convicted in the trial court and in the appellate court,
the case is now here on a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the said ordinance is violative of the right to free speech under the Federal
Constitution?

Ruling:
The court ruled that the ordinance is violative of the right to free speech.
As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 299 U. S. 365, it
is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains
responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief
distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
Accordingly, a function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute,
is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative
would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups.
The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this province. It
permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those
grounds may not stand.
The Court reversed the ruling of the Appellate and Trial Court.