STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION authority conferred on him by law when he entertained
the suit for damages, arising from picketing that
Introduction to Statutory Construction
Construction
Construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its applica-tion to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of
Laws, p. 1). In the present case, the question of
whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is
within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as
much a question of construction or interpretation as
any other. (Caltex vs. Palomar
Fundamental Rules of Construction
Same; Statutes; Phrase “may be promulgated” should
not be interpreted to mean “shall” or “must.” P.D. 217
does not command the NTC to promulgate rules. It can
function under existing rules.—The basic canon of
statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law
must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary
intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase
“may be promulgated” should not be construed to
mean “shall” or “must”. It shall be interpreted in its
ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary on the
part of the delegate—department or the Board of
Communications then, now the National
Telecommunications Commission—whether or not to
promulgate pertinent rules and regulations. There is
nothing in P.D. No. 217 which commands that the
phrase “may be promulgated” should be construed as
“shall be promulgated.” The National
Telecommunications Commission can function and has
functioned without additional rules, aside from the
existing Public Service Law, as amended, and the
existing rules already issued by the Public Service
Commission, as well as the 1978 rules issued by the
Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor
of respondent NTC. It should be recalled that the PLDT
petition for approval of its revised SIP schedule was
filed on March 20, 1980. (PCFI vs. NTC)
Distinction between Statutory Construction and
Interpretation – When a Statute should be construed
Jurisdiction, The Labor Arbiter rather than a regular
court has jurisdiction to entertain, a complaint for
damages by an employer against his employees
arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.—
Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein
provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that
a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court
judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the
express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot
therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant
ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v.
Yap Tico, a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the
ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience.
Thus, “The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without
them.” It is so even after the lapse of sixty years. NFL
vs Eisma
Statutes; Statutory Construction; Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should
be given such a construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.—The Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate
and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The
phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be
made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it
must be read in such a way as to give effect to the
purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should
be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.
Same; Same; When the statute is clear and explicit,
there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.—With the
introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending
Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products
without authority constitutes a distinct offense
independent now from the crime of theft under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the
penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear
from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it
eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft
as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code” and inserted the words “shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.” When the
statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the
law. (PAAT vs. CA)
Courts; Statutes; Fundamental duty of courts.—The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible
 or inadequate without them." It is not within the power
of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of
a statutory provision. (People vs. Mapa)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;
Rule that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted.—Well known is the rule of
statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear
and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted;
stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an
ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of
statutory construction. (Daoang vs. Municipal Judge)
The Context of a Statute
Paras vs. COMELEC
Election Law; Recall; Statutory Construction; It is a rule
in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment.—It is a rule
in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office.
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is,
during the second year of his term of office.
Same; Same; Same; In the interpretation of a statute,
the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute.—In the interpretation of a
statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; It is likewise a basic precept in
statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.—It is
likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of
the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b)
thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional
mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to
“enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; The spirit, rather than the letter of
a law, determines its construction.—Moreover,
petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a
case, the Court made the following admonition: “We
admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this
is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth’ x x x.” The spirit, rather than the
letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its
spirit and intent.
Statutory Construction vs. Judicial Legislation
The Role of the Judiciary in Statutory Construction
Overlap of Government Functions and its Effect on
Construction
Rule Making Powers of Executive
Administrative Agency Performing Quasi-Judicial
Functions
Executive Branch to Interpret acts of Legislative
Branch
Difference between Construction and Judicial
Legislation
Floresca vs Philex Mining
Constitutional Law; Labor Law; Courts; Contrary to
dissenting opinion, this Court does not legislate as it is
merely applying and giving effect to social guarantees
of the Constitution.—Contrary to the perception of the
dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the
instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect
to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then
secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by
Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and
2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
Constitutional Law; Judgments; Courts; The dissenting
opinion clings to the myth that courts cannot legislate.
This myth has already been exploded.—That myth had
been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.”
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Hence, even the
legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil
Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in
the language of Justice Holmes, “do and must
legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind
of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which
 the law may apply. Nor has the human mind the infinite
capacity to anticipate all situations.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—But about two centuries
before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding
fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and
recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to
legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the
ambiguities in the American Constitution and the
statutes. Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically
admits that judicial legislation may be justified but
denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes
may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist,
Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed,), Thomas
Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even
independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American
Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Finally, Justice Holmes
delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically
admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: “that
judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions” (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244
US 204 1917).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Use of word “exclusively”
is manifest legislative intent that remedy of injured
worker must be sought under the WCA.—The use of
the word “exclusively” is a further confirmation of the
exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to
exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—If the legislative
intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to
allow the injured employee to sue his employer under
the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have
formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5
according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not
done shows the legislative intent not to allow any
option to an employee to sue the employer under the
Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; Courts should not
assume the role of legislator.—I am against the Court
assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for
actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers
already required to contribute to the State Insurance
Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or
get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be
necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching
than the interests of the poor victims and their families.
All workers covered by workmen’s compensation and
all employers who employ covered employees are
affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the
victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from
the majority opinion.
Legislative Intent
Insurance Law; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure;
Statutory Construction; The definition of an insurance
agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189
of the Insurance Act is intended to define the word
“agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs
thereof which states to be considered an insurance
agent the solicitation must be for a compensation.—
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the
second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define
the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly,
in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the
definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of
Section 189. Hence—“Any person who for
compensation x x x shall be an insurance agent within
the intent of this section, x x x.” Patently, the definition
of an insurance agent under the second paragraph
holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the
other two paragraphs of the said section. The second
paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and
interpretative clause intended to qualify the term
“agent” mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs
of the aforesaid section.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute;
Words and phrases and clauses should not be studied
in isolation or detached from the rest.—Applying the
definition of an insurance agent in the second
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and
second paragraphs would give harmony to the
aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.
The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is
not to be extracted from any single part, portion or
section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or
sentences but from a general consideration or view of
the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. (Aisporna vs
CA&People)
Same; Same; Same; In passing Republic Act 1405, no
intention of the Legislature to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final
judgment.—–It is clear from the discussion of the
conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351
and House. Bill No. 3977, which later became
RepublicAct 1405, that the prohibition against
examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under
Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed
there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if existence
of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to
conceive that it was ever within the intention of
Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their
just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the
expedient of converting their assets into cash and
depositing the same in a bank. (China Bank vs Ortega)
Same; Same; Right to war veteran’s pension does not
 begin from the time the application therefor is
approved.—Petitioner contends that since the
foregoing section impliedly requires that the application
filed should first be approved by the Board of
Administrators before the claimant could receive his
pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits
should commence from the date of the approval of the
application. This stand of the petitioner does not
appear to be in consonance with the spirit and intent of
the law, considering that Republic Act 65 is a veteran
pension law which must be accorded a liberal
construction and interpretation in order to favor those
entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits granted
thereunder, among which are the right to resume old
positions in the government, educational benefits, the
privilege to take promotional examinations, a life
pension for the incapacitated, pensions for widow and
children, hospitalization and medical care benefits.
Same; Same; Veteran’s pension, its purpose and
objective.—A veteran pension law is, therefore, a
governmental expression of gratitude to and
recognition of those who rendered service for the
country, especially during times of war or revolution,
by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this
reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction
is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to
pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such
constructional preference is to be considered with other
guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension
laws must depend on its own particular language.
(Board of Administrators vs PVA)
Literal Construction of Statutes
When Statutes Should be Literally Construed
Civil Law; Contracts; Statutory Construction; Contracts
which are the private laws of the contracting parties,
should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their
stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room
for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties.
—We find no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of
the extrajudicial partition. The terms of the agreement
are clear and unequivocal, hence the literal and plain
meaning thereof should be observed. The applicable
provision of law in the case at bar is Article 1370 of the
New Civil Code which states: “Art. 1370—If the terms
of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulation shall control.” Contracts which are the
private laws of the contracting parties, should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their
stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room
for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms
may be, whenever the essential requisites for their
validity are present. (Salvatierra vs CA)
Statutory Construction; Case where judiciary’s power
of interpretation not applicable; In the absence of doubt
as to scope of operation of the law, the law must be
obeyed.—The applicable provision of Republic Act No.
2023, quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no
ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied.
Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid
objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would
have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the
judiciary. That is a function that property appertains to
the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga
v. Court of Ap-peals: “It has been repeated time and
time again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do
except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the
scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions
have consistently been to that effect.” (Kapisanan vs
Manila RailRoad)’
When Literal Construction is NOT favored
Statutory construction; Case at bar, literal construction
of law not favored.—Counsel is not to ignore the basic
purpose of litigation, which is to assure parties justice
according to law. He is not to fall prey, as admonished
by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness. The
law as an instrument of social control will fail in its
function if through an ingenious construction sought to
be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural
rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being
given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.
(Abellana vs Marave)
Executive Construction
Rule on Executive Construction
Statutory construction; Contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by executive officers charged
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of the
statute should be given controlling weight, unless such
interpretation clearly erroneous.—The principle that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
executive officers of the government, whose duty it is
to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that
no authorities need be cited to support it. (PAFLU vs
Bureau of Labor Relations)
When Executive Construction is NOT Given Weight
Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction;
Great weight should be given to the interpretation of a
given statute by the government agency called upon to
implement it.—One thing is for sure. The Department
had the right to construe the word "granted", as used in
Section 1 (k). The construction it had adopted cannot
be viewed as so wrong as to allow us to reverse it. The
rule followed in this jurisdiction since Madrigal vs.
Rafferty (38 Phil. 414 [1918]) is that great weight shall
be given to the interpretation or construction given to a
statute by the Government agency called upon to
implement the statute. In this case, the weight in favor
of the Department of Labor should be greater, because
 the Department is not interpreting or construing a
statute, but it had explained the extent of its own rule.
(PAWU vs NLRC)
Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is elementary in the
rules of statutory construction that when the language
of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar,
the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to
the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit—it
provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from
the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then
Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state
that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid
employees, when the law clearly states that every
worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a
flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4
of the Labor Code, which states that “All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.”
Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the
legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent
statute which would have the most beneficial effect that
its language permits.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; The judiciary’s role
invokes the work of making a correct interpretation of
the actions of the three branches of government.—
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty
is to enforce it should be given great weight by the
courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in
the instant case, the same must be declared as null
and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and,
when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or
statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government,
almost always in situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from
some legitimate area of governmental power (The
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C. B. Swisher, 1958,
p. 36). (IBAA vs Inciong)
Difference between an Executive Construction and an
Opinion
Statutory construction; Distinction between an
administrative rule and an administrative interpretation
of law; Nature of administrative rules and regulations.
—When an administrative agency promulgated rules
and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force
and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an
opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative
Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules
and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by
a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general terms,
after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature.
The details and the manner of carrying out the law are
often times left to the administrative agency entrusted
with its enforcement.
Same; Interpretation of terms or words; Rule when a
term or word is specifically defined in a statute.—While
the rule is that terms or words are to be interpreted in
accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law,
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically
defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be
adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not
be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have
one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for
some other purpose. (Victorias Milling vs SSC)
Subjects of Construction
Constitution
- Definition
- How the Constitution should be Construed
Sarmiento vs. Mison
Statutory Construction; Constitution; Intent of the
framers of the constitution and of the people adopting it
must be given effect.—The fundamental principle of
constitutional construction is to give ef fect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is
that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus
construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the 1987
Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers is to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation on the Commission on Appointments
except appointments to offices mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.—In the 1987
Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear
and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to
use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that
Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-
ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, because the power to
appoint officers whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence
of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16 Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution is a redundancy in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.—Therefore, the
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated
merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the
Congress may by law vest their appointment in the
President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government. In short, the word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of
par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution,
appears to be redundant in the light of the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy
cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Perfecto vs. Meer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; TAX ON
INCOME OF CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS.—The
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
diminution thereof, and violates the Constitution.
RIGHT NOT WAIVABLE.—The undiminishable
character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of
judges—personal and therefore waivable—but a basic
limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in
the public interest.
On income other than judicial salary, tax assessments
may be levied for men on the Bench. It is only when the
tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of
the tax is to diminish their official stipend when taxation
becomes an infringement of the fundamental charter.
Perhaps the Legislature may validly provide by a law
that salaries of judges appointed after its passage shall
be subject to income tax.
Endencia vs. David
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ; TAXATION; INTERPRETATION OF
LAWS, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.—The Legislature cannot
lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public official, especially a judicial officer, not
a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has
found and decided otherwise. "Defining and interpreting
the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch
may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts
by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44
N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11 Am. Jur., 714-715 and
905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary,
Nitafan vs. CIR
Statutory Construction; Intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.—The debates, interpellations and opinions
expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of
that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and
of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers. Besides, construing Section 10,
Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity,
is again reproduced hereunder: "The salary of the Chief
Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by
law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased."(Italics supplied). It is plain that the
Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges
but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would
be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.
It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
- Whether a Preamble may be considered in Construing
the Constitution
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that
the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to
courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their
own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts
are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary
for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or
vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil.,
304, 307.)
The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to
this country." The officials concerned merely took
advantage of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people." The stamps as actually designed and printed
(Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice
as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription
as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not
the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of
 the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
- Constitution vs Statutes: Which Prevails
PH Political Law
Paras vs. Comelec (Done)
- Whether the Constitution is Self-Executing
PH Political Law
Statutes
- Types of Statutes
- Distinction between Statute – Parts of a Statutes
- Single Subject Requirement for Enacting Laws “Rule on
Headings”
- How a Bill becomes a Law
- President’s Veto Power
- Publication of Laws
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states
its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication
in the Official Gazette as they constitute important
legislative acts, particularly in the present situation
where the President may on his own issue laws.—The
clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Presidential Decrees and issuances of general
application which have not been published shall have
no force and effect.—The Court therefore declares that
presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about
the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on
acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency
of this petition, have put the question as to whether the
Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank.
- Whether a Whereas Clause may be used in Statutory
Construction
People vs. Echaves
Statutory Construction; Rule of ejusdem generis
merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when
legislative intent is uncertain; Rule does not apply to
Pres. Decree 772 where intent of decree is
unmistakable.—The rule of ejusdem generis (of the
same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not
apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The
rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory
construction which is resorted to when the legislative
intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615, 618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
Ordinances
- Definition
- Ordinance vs. Statutes
Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta
Regulatory ordinances must be clear, definite and
certain.—Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance,
its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more
important so that “an average man should be able with
due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain
whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or
courses of conduct.”
- Administrative Orders vs Statutes
Conte vs. COA
Retirement; Words and Phrases; “Retirement Benefits”
and “Pensions,” Explained.—That the Res. 56 package
is labelled “financial assistance” does not change its
essential nature. Retirement benefits are, after all, a
form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to
the employer, and are intended to help the employee
enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the
burden of worrying about his financial support or
upkeep. On the other hand, a pensionpartakes of the
nature of “retained wages” of the retiree for a dual
purpose: to entice competent people to enter the
government service, and to permit them to retire from
the service with relative security, not only for those who
have retained their vigor, but more so for those who
have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
Statutes; Teves Retirement Law (R.A. 4968);
Social Security System; Section 28(b) of CA 186 as
amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the
creation of any insurance or retirement plan—other than
the GSIS—for government officers and employees, in
order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation
of such plans; SSS Res. 56 contravenes Sec. 28(b) of
CA 186 and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect.—
We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28(b) as
amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the
creation of any insurance or retirement plan—other than
the GSIS—for government officers and employees, in
order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation
of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56
contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore
 invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule
otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other
government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise
of such “financial assistance.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The SSS cannot, in
the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or
worse, render them nugatory.—We are not unmindful of
the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and the
positive results it must have had, not only in reducing
costs and expenses on the part of the SSS in
connection with the pay-out of retirement benefits and
gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for
scores of retirees. But it is simply beyond dispute that
the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement
such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the
statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of
rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render
them nugatory.
Interpretation of Different Types of Statutes
Penal Statutes
- General Rule
People vs. Purisima
Statutory Construction; Criminal Law; Local
Governments; P.D. 9 did not repeal by implication Act
No. 1780 and City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by
Ordinance No. 3928 of Manila which punish the
carrying, concealed in one’s body, of bladed or other
deadly weapons.—We do not agree with petitioner that
the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are
deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). P.D. 9 (3) does not
contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. This principle holds true with
greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a
rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. In fact, Article 7 of the
New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
People vs. Gatchalian
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PENAL LAW; STRICT
CONSTRUCTION, WHEN MAY BE INVOKED. — The
rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed
against the State may be invoked only where the law is
ambiguous and there is doubt as to their interpretation.
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no
room for the application of the rule.
People vs. Manantan
Statutory Construction; Rule of "casus omisus"
when applicable.—The rule of "casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est" can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established. In the
case at bar, the Legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
Rather, they were merely called by another term
—"judges." The rule, therefore, has no applicability to
the instant case.
Same; Penal Statutes; Rule of Strict Construction.
—The rule that penal statutes are given a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (3
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court
may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in
this particular instance, where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would feat
the clear purpose of the lawmakers (Crawford,
Interpetation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294).
Same;Same; Rule of Exclusion.—Where a statute
appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions
to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but
no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and
manifest injustice will follow by not so including them,
the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius,should
not be invoked. (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 P. 307, 22 Cal.
App. 519).
- Retroactivity of Penal Statutes
- Ex-Post Facto Laws
- Rule in Case of Conflict among Versions of RPC
People vs. Manaba
RAPE; VALIDITY OF COMPLAINT; JURISDICTION ;
JEOPARDY.—Whether the defendant was placed in
jeopardy for the second time or not when he was tried
for rape in the present case depends on whether or not
he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The
first complaint filed against the defendant was signed
and sworn to by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it
was not the complaint of the offended party, it was not
a valid complaint in accordance with the law. The
judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the defendant
was never in jeopardy.
REVISED PENAL CODE; ENGLISH AND SPANISH
TEXT OF PARAGRAPH 3, ARTICLE 344,
COMPARED.—The Spanish equivalent of the word
"filed" is not found in the Spanish text of the third
paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Spanish text of said Code is controlling as this was
the text approved by the Legislature.
Tax Laws
- General Rule
CIR vs. CA
Taxation; Statutory Construction; It is error to apply the
principles of tax exemption without first applying the
well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the
imposition of taxes—it is obviously both illogical and
impractical to determine who are exempted without first
determining who are covered by a provision of the
National Internal Revenue Code.—Petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in applying the
principles of tax exemption without first applying the
well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the
imposition of taxes. It is obviously both illogical and
impractical to determine who are exempted without first
determining who are covered by the aforesaid provision.
The Commissioner should have determined first if
private respondent was covered by Section 205,
applying the rule of strict interpretation of laws imposing
taxes and other burdens on the populace, before asking
Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom. The Court
takes this occasion to reiterate the hornbook doctrine in
the interpretation of tax laws that “(a) statute will not be
construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly,
expressly, and unambiguously. x x x (A) tax cannot be
imposed without clear and express words for that
purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring
adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies
with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of
a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.”
Parenthetically, in answering the question of who is
subject to tax statutes, it is basic that “in case of doubt,
- Tax Refunds
such statutes are to be construed most strongly against
La Carlota vs. Jimenez
the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens
because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed
to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and
clearly import.”
Same; Same; Schools and Universities; Contractor’s
Tax; To impose the three percent contractor’s tax on
Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine Culture, it should be
sufficiently proven that it is indeed selling its services for
a fee in pursuit of an independent business.—To fall
under its coverage, Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code requires that the independent contractor
be engaged in the business of selling its services.
Hence, to impose the three percent contractor’s tax on
Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine Culture, it should be
sufficiently proven that the private respondent is indeed
selling its services for a fee in pursuit of an independent
business. And it is only after private respondent has
been found clearly to be subject to the provisions of
Sec. 205 that the question of exemption therefrom
would arise. Only after such coverage is shown does
the rule of construction—that tax exemptions are to be
strictly construed against the taxpayer—come into play,
contrary to petitioner’s position. This is the main line of
reasoning of the Court of Tax Appeals in its decision,
which was affirmed by the CA.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no evidence that
Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine Culture ever sold its
services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in
business apart from and independently of the aca-
demic purposes of the university.—After reviewing the
records of this case, we find no evidence that Ateneo’s
Institute of Philippine Culture ever sold its services for a
fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a business apart
from and independently of the academic purposes of the
university. Stressing that “it is not the Ateneo de Manila
University per se which is being taxed,” Petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that “the
tax is due on its activity of conducting researches for a
fee. The tax is due on the gross receipts made in favor
of IPC pursuant to the contracts the latter entered to
conduct researches for the benefit primarily of its
clients. The tax is imposed on the exercise of a taxable
activity. x x x [T]he sale of services of private
respondent is made under a contract and the various
contractors entered into between private respondent
and its clients are almost of the same terms, showing,
among others, the compensation and terms of
payment.” (Italics supplied.) In theory, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may be correct.
However, the records do not show that Ateneo’s IPC in
fact contracted to sell its research services for a fee.
Clearly then, as found by the Court of Appeals and the
Court of Tax Appeals, petitioner’s theory is inapplicable
to the established factual milieu obtaining in the instant
case.
Statutory Construction; Tax Exemption; Exempting
provision construed strictly against taxpayer.—
Exempting provisions are to be construed liberally in
favor of the taxing authority and strictly against
exemption from tax liability. As a result, statutory
provisions governing the refund of taxes are strictly
construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer
(82 C.J.S. pp. 957-958; Helvering vs. Northwest Steel
Rolling Mills, 311 US 46, 85 L. ed. 29 S. Ct., 51 Am. Jur.
p. 526).
ABS CBN vs CTA
Taxation; Statutory Construction, Retroactivity; BIR
circulars or rulings have no retroactive effect where their
application would be prejudicial to taxpayers.—It is clear
from the foregoing that rulings or circulars promulgated
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no
retroactive application where to so apply them would be
prejudicial to taxpayers. The prejudice to petitioner of
the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular No.
4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or
three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had
withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The
assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency
withholding income tax was also made three years after
1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965.
Petitioner was no longer in a position to withhold taxes
due from foreign corporations because it had already
remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control
 but also to allay possible suspicion of collusion
over them when the new Circular was issued. And in so
between the buyer and public officials to enforce such
far as the enumerated exceptions are concerned,
laws; Notice of sale to delinquent landowners and to
admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any of them.
the public in general is an essential and indispensable
requirement of law. —The assailed decision of the
Same; Same; Principle of legislative approval of
appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure
administrative interpretation by re-enactment; Case at
in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in
bar.—The principle of legislative approval of
derogation of property rights should be followed
administrative interpretation by re-enactment clearly
punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing
obtains in this case. It provides that “the re-enactment of
tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the
a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive
tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of
indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior
collusion between the buyer and the public officials
executive construction.” Note should be taken of the fact
called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the
that this case involves not a mere opinion of the
delinquent land owners and to the public in general is
Commissioner or ruling rendered on a mere query, but a
an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the
Circular formally issued to “all internal revenue officials”
non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. We give our
by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
stamp of approval on the aforementioned ruling of the
respondent court. In the case at bar, there is no
MCIAA v Marcos
evidence that Nemesia Baltazar, who had obtained a
transfer certificate of title in her name on January 18,
Same; Statutory Construction; Since taxation is a
1946, was notified of the auction sale which was
destructive power which interferes with the personal
scheduled on October 30, 1956. Neither was she
and property rights of the people and takes from them a
furnished as the owner of the delinquent real property
portion of their property for the supportof the
with the certificate of sale as prescribed by Sec. 37 of
government, tax statutes must be construed strictly
Commonwealth Act No. 470. These infirmities are fatal.
against the government and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer; But since taxes are what we pay for civilized
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tax Sales;
society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns
Purchaser of real estate at the tax sale obtains only
against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting
such title as that held by the taxpayer. and the principle
tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris
of caveat emptor applies; Where land is sold for
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
deliquency taxes under the Provincial Assessment
authority.—Verily, taxation is a destructive power which
Law, the rights of registered but undeclared owners of
interferes with the personal and property rights of the
land are not affected by the proceedings and the sale
people and takes from them a portion of their property
conveys only such interest as the person who has
for the support of the government. Accordingly, tax
declared the property for taxation has therein.—A
statutes must be construed strictly against the
purchaser of real estate at the tax sale obtains only
government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But
such title as that held by the taxpayer, the principle of
since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are
caveat emptor applies. Where land is sold for
the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
delinquency taxes under the provisions of the
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax
Provincial Assessment Law, rights of registered but
exemptions are thus construed stricissimi juris against
undeclared owners of the land are not affected by the
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
proceedings and the sale conveys only such interest as
A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly
the person who has declared the property for taxation
shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
has therein;
mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule,
exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the
grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or
instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not Labor Laws
apply because the practical effect of the exemption is - General Rule
merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be Cosico vs. NLRC
handled by the government in the course of its Same; Same; Redundancy and Retrenchment
operations. Distinguished.—When an employer decides to reduce
the number of its personnel in order to prevent further
- Burden of Proof in Tax Cases losses, he is exercising his right to retrench employees
CIR vs. CA to prevent losses in his business operations. On the
other hand, where for purposes of economy, a company
- Construction of Laws on Sales Tax decides to reorganize its departments by imposing on
Serfino vs. CA employees of one department the duties performed by
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Interpretation; the employees of the other department, thus rendering
Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is unnecessary the job of the latter, the service of the
imperative not only for the protection of the taxpayer employees whose functions are now being performed
by others may be validly terminated on the ground of
redundancy.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral and exemplary
damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of
an employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.—Given the preceding factual and legal milieu,
petitioner’s claim for moral and exemplary damages falls
to naught. Moral and exemplary damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. Since none of
the circumstances warranting the grant of moral and
exemplary damages obtains here, the same cannot be
awarded.
Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as
will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.
INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER
FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET
ABSURDUM. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity
is to be adopted. . . . .
Sec. 2. CONSTRUCTION. — These Rules shall be
liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the
Constitution and the Labor Code of the Philippines and
to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious and
inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.
Bustamante vs. NLRC
Same; Same; Backpay could be awarded where in
the opinion of the Court of lndustrial Relations such was
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Industrial
Peace Act.—In accordance with these provisions,
backpay (the same as backwages) could be awarded
where, in the opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR), such was necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Industrial Peace Act. Only in one case was backpay
a matter of right, and that was, when an employer had
declared a lockout without having first bargained
collectively with his employees in accordance with the
provisions of the Act.
Same; Same; CIR also had the implied power of
mitigating the backpay where backpay was allowed.—
As the CIR was given wide discretion to grant or
disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an
employee, it also had the implied power of mitigating
(reducing) the backpay where backpay was allowed.
Thus, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR
increased or diminished the award of backpay,
depending on several circumstances, among them, the
good faith of the employer, the employee's employment
in other establishments during the period of illegal
dismissal, or the probability that the employee could
have realized net earnings from outside employment if
he had exercised due diligence to search for outside
employment.
Same; Same; Court ruled in the case of Mercury
Drug Co., Inc., et al. v. CIR, et al. that a fixed amount of
backwages without qualifications should be awarded to
an illegally dismissed employee.—From this ruling came
the burden of disposing of an illegal dismissal case on
its merits and of determining whether or not the
computation of the award of backwages is correct. In
order not to unduly delay the disposition of illegal
dismissal cases, this Court found occasion in the case
of Mercury Drug Co., Inc., et al. v. CIR, et al. to rule that
a fixed amount of backwages without further
qualifications should be awarded to an illegally
dismissed employee (hereinafter the Mercury Drug
rule). This ruling was grounded upon considerations of
expediency in the execution of the decision.
Same; Same; Under P.D. No. 442 it became
mandatory to award backwages to illegally dismissed
regular employees.—Under the above quoted provision,
it became mandatory to award backwages to illegally
dismissed regular employees. The law specifically
declared that the award of backwages was to be
computed from the time compensation was withheld
from the employee up to the time of his reinstatement.
This notwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the
Court after the promulgation of the Mercury Drug case,
and during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 was still the
Mercury Drug rule. A survey of cases from 1974 until
1989, when the amendatory law to P.D. No. 442,
namely, R.A. No. 6715 took effect, supports this
conclusion.
Same; Same; Court declared in a later case that
the general principle is that an employee is entitled to
receive as backwages all the amounts he may have
received from the date of his dismissal up to the time of
his reinstatement.—In the case of New Manila Candy
Workers Union (Naconwa-Paflu) v, CIR (1978), or after
the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442) had taken effect, the
Court still followed the Mercury Drug rule to avoid the
necessity of a hearing on earnings obtained elsewhere
by the employee during the period of illegal dismissal. In
an even later case (1987) the Court declared that the
general principle is that an employee is entitled to
receive as backwages all the amounts he may have
received from the date of his dismissal up to the time of
his reinstatement. However, in compliance with the
jurisprudential policy of fixing the amount of backwages
to a just and reasonable level, the award of backwages
equivalent to three (3) years, without qualification or
deduction, was nonetheless followed in said case.
Same; Same; Any decision or order granting
backwages in excess of three (3) years is null and void
 as to the excess.—In a more direct approach to the rule
on the award of backwages, this Court declared in the
1990 case of Medado v. Court of Appeals that "any
decision or order-granting backwages in excess of three
(3) years is null and void as to the excess."

Manahan vs. ECC

Workmen’s Compensation; Statutory Construction;
Doubts in interpretation of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be
resolved in favor of the worker.—In any case, We have
always maintained that in case of doubt, the same
should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that
social legislations—like the Workmen’s Compensation
Act and the Labor Code—should be liberally construed
to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the
workman and/or his dependents in the event that the
former should die or sustain an injury.

Villavert vs. ECC

Same; Same; Statutory Construction, Doubts in

implementation of Labor Code and its implementing
rules resolved in favor of labor.—It should be noted that
Article 4 of the Labor Code of the PHILIPPINES, as
amended, provides that “All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved
in favor of labor.”

- Construction of Retirement Laws