Marinas, Rodeleine Grace C.

Case no.193. Teddy Maravilla v. Joseph Rios G.R. no. 196875 August 19, 2015

Facts:

In 2003, respondent Joseph Rios filed a criminal case against petitioner Teddy Maravilla for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2168-
MTCC. Respondent accused petitioner of recklessly driving his jeep which caused it to collide
with the motorcycle he (respondent) was then driving; as a result, respondent was injured and
incapacitated to work for more than ninety days.

Ruling of MTCC:

Teddy Maravilla is hereby acquitted of the crime charged. However, as the court finds
preponderance of evidence to hold the accused liable in damages for the injuries sustained by the
private complainant as a result of the lack of proof or lack [sic] basis and, as adverted to above,
the accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as temperate
damages.

Ruling of the RTC:

Accused-appellee is hereby held liable to pay private complainant Joseph Rios the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Twenty Five Centavos
(P256,386.25) as actual and compensatory damages

Ruling of CA:

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA but failed to attach the following:

a. Copy of the information filed before the municipal trial court;

b. Copy of the appellant's brief filed before the RTC;
c. Copy of the appellee's brief, if any;
d. Other pieces of evidence/documents adduced before the lower court.

Thus, for failure of the petitioner to comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules, the petition is
hereby dismissed.

Issue:

Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review under rule 42
due to technicalities.

Ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.

Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for
review shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule
states that failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements regarding the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. In petitioner's case, however, while he submitted additional necessary
attachments along with his Motion for Reconsideration, he left out important parts of the record -
excerpts of the transcript of stenographic notes, the respondent's formal offer of evidence, and
the trial court's Order admitting said formal offer of evidence - that would support his claim that
the trial court erred in awarding damages to respondent since the latter failed to testify as to his
hospital expenses and identify particular exhibits. There are three guideposts in determining the
necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of
the 1997 Rules, to wit

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only
those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document
will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due
course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it
is shown that the contents thereof can also be found in another document already attached to the
petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the
documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on
the merits.

The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42,
reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether
the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition. Thus, going by the ruling in
Galvez v. CA, petitioner's failure to attach relevant portions of the evidence and transcript of
stenographic notes - to his Petition, initially, and Motion for Reconsideration, subsequently -
which were not tackled in the decisions of the courts below, but which are material to his claim
that respondent failed to testify as to and prove actual damages, is fatal to his Petition for Review
before the CA. In short, none of the three guideposts spelled out in Galvez were observed in
petitioner's case.
Case no. 194 Boardwalk Business Ventures Inc. v. Villareal G.R. no 181182 April 10, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner is a duly organized and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling of
ready to wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira is one of Boardwalks’s distributors of
RTW merchandise. Petitioner filed an amended complaint for replevin against the respondent in
the MeTC covering the 1995 Toyota Tamarraw FX for the latter’s alleged failure to pay a car
loan obtained from the former. The decision of the MeTC is in favor to Boardwalk. The
Boardwalk has the right to possession of the subject motor vehicle and Elvira should pay the cost
of the suit. Motion of reconsideration was denied. Appealed to the Manila RTC and the MeTC
decison was reversed. Villareal has the right of possession to and the value of the subject vehicle.
Boardwalk is directed to deliver the subject vehicle to Villareal or its value in case of delivery
cannot be made. Complaint and counterclaim are both dismissed

Issue:

Whether the filing of the petition with the appellate court was late and beyond the reglementary
15 day period under Rule 42

Ruling:

Yes. The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of another 15 days extension or
a total of 30 days extension is allowed only for the most compelling reason. The Boardwalk’s
prayer for 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension was irregular because the maximum
period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension
of 15 days should only be granted for the most compelling reason which the petitioner never
cited any. The record shows that the petitioner failed to comply with the rules of 1,2 and 3 of
Rule 42. The petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees with the RTC. Sec
1 of Rule 42 states that payment of docket fees and other lawful fees should be made to the clerk
of CA. A plain reading of Rules leaves no room for interpretation; It is categorical and explicit.

Case no. 195. Elena Duarte v. Miguel Duran G.R.no 173038 September 14 2011

Facts:

February 14, 2002, he offered to sell a laptop computer for the sum of ₱15,000.00 to petitioner
thru the help of a common friend, Josephine Dy (Dy). Since petitioner was undecided,
respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two days. On February 16, 2002, petitioner told
respondent that she was willing to buy the laptop on installment. Respondent agreed; thus,
petitioner gave ₱5,000.00 as initial payment and promised to pay ₱3,000.00 on February 18,
2002 and ₱7,000.00 on March 15, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her second
installment of ₱3,000.00 to Dy, who signed the handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner
as proof of payment. But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance on March 15, 2002,
petitioner offered to pay only ₱2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth ₱10,000.00.
Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance, respondent thru counsel sent
petitioner a demand letter dated July 29, 2002.

Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002, and receiving the
demand letter dated July 29, 2002. Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale.
Petitioner said that Dy offered to sell respondent’s laptop but because petitioner was not
interested in buying it, Dy asked if petitioner could instead lend respondent the amount of
₱5,000.00. Petitioner agreed and in turn, Dy left the laptop with petitioner. On February 18,
2002, Dy came to get the laptop but petitioner refused to give it back because the loan was not
yet paid. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional amount of ₱3,000.00 to respondent who
allegedly was in dire need of money. Petitioner gave the money under agreement that the
amounts she lent to respondent would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case
she decides to buy it. Sometime in the first week of March 2002, petitioner informed respondent
that she has finally decided not to buy the laptop. Respondent, however, refused to pay and
insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.

Ruling of MTC

In favor of Duran

Ruling of RTC

Reversed the ruling of MTC and in favor of Duarte

Ruling of CA

The CA said that the RTC erred in not giving weight and credence to the demand letter dated
July 29, 2002 and the receipt dated February 18, 2002. The CA pointed out that petitioner failed
to overturn the presumption that the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 sent by respondent’s
counsel by registered mail was received by her. Neither was she able to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the receipt dated February 18, 2002. The CA reversed the RTC
Decision and reinstated the Decision of the MTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the CA denied in a Resolution dated May 22, 2006.

Issue:

Whether the CA committed grave error in not resolving the issue as to whether or not the petition
for review that respondent filed in the said court was filed out of time.

Ruling:

The Petition lacks merit.

The Petition for Review was timely filed with the CA

To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we
ruled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within
which to appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court. This ruling, as we
have said in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, retroactively applies even to cases
pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, there being no vested rights
in the rules of procedure.

Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was promulgated, respondent is
entitled to a fresh period of 15 days, counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received
the RTC Order dated May 13, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision
dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11, 2004, within which to file his Petition for Review with
the CA. Thus, we find that when he filed the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004,
his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

Case no. 196 Magsaysay Maritime Corp. V. Cruz G.R. no. 204769 June 6, 2016

Facts:

On November 5, 2007, MMC, in behalf of its foreign principal, CSCS, employed respondent as
housekeeping cleaner on board the vessel Costa Fortuna. Respondent's employment was for eight
months with basic monthly salary of €306.00 and other benefits. On January 27, 2008,
respondent boarded the vessel. On April 23, 2008, while lifting heavy objects in the course of
performing his duties, respondent experienced low back pain. As a result, he was repatriated on
June 19, 2008, and was immediately referred to Dr. Benigno A. Agbayani (Dr. Agbayani), the
company-designated doctor. On June 20, 2008, Dr. Agbayani noted that there was no limitation
on respondent's motion but the latter still complained of pain on forward flexion of the lumbar
spine. On September 22, 2008, Dr. Agbayani declared that despite more than 20 PT sessions,
respondent showed little signs of improvement and possible surgical intervention was being
considered. He noted that respondent would be referred to the Pain Management Clinic. On
December 11, 2008, respondent underwent another MRI scan revealing that he was suffering
from mild degenerative changes in the lumbar spine which remained unchanged when compared
to his July 7, 2008 MRI scan.On December 12, 2008, Dr. Agbayani declared that respondent's
illness was work-related. On January 21, 2009, respondent received sickness allowance for 120
days (from June 18,2008 to October 15, 2008) amounting to €1,198.66. On February 12, 2009,
Dr. Agbayani reported that respondent's condition had not improved despite various treatments
since April 2008. Nevertheless, he reiterated that respondent's condition was work-related.
Consequently, on November 25, 2009, respondent filed a Complaint for permanent and total
disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney's fees against MMC, Marlon Rono,
its President, and CSCS (petitioners).

Respondent argued that he is entitled to disability benefits because of the reasonable connection
between his work and his illness. He stressed that before his embarkation lie was declared fit to
work; as such, it can be logically inferred that he acquired his illness while aboard the vessel and
by reason of its harsh working environment. He added that he is entitled to disability benefits as
he already suffered loss and impairment in his earning capacity.
Respondent denied that he is guilty of medical abandonment and insisted that he did not cause
delay in his treatment. According to him, his refusal to undergo surgery was valid as he
previously experienced "pre-operative awareness" which caused post-traumatic stress disorder.
Allegedly, he feared that he would experience the same trauma if an operation be pursued.

For their part, petitioners affirmed that after having been medically repatriated respondent was
diagnosed of mild L4-L5 disc bulge. They, nonetheless, asserted that respondent underwent PT
sessions but in September 2008, he started to malinger and complained of pain; thus, his
attending doctor referred him to a Pain Management Team. They alleged that respondent
abandoned his scheduled nucleoplasty on October 24, 2008 but admitted that the procedure
pushed through on November 4, 2008. They also averred that respondent refused to undergo the
surgery scheduled on February 23, 2009. They insisted that respondent is estopped from
claiming permanent and total disability benefits because the delay in his treatment is due to his
own fault.

Ruling of the LA:

The LA rendered his Decision ordering MMC and CSCS to jointly and severally pay respondent
disability compensation amounting to US$39,180.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment and 10% thereof as attorney's fees.

Ruling of NLRC:

The NLRC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. The NLRC modified the LA
Decision. It found respondent entitled to partial and permanent disability compensation of Grade
8 amounting to US$16,795.00.

Issue:

Can respondent be presumed totally and permanently disabled entitling him to maximum
benefits under the employment contract?

Ruling:

As a rule, the Court is not a trier of fact and only questions of law are reviewable under a Rule 45
Petition. This principle applies with greater force in labor cases as questions of fact are for labor
tribunals to resolve. Nonetheless, this rule admits of exceptions including instances where the
findings of the lower courts or tribunals are contradictory with the other. Here, considering the
opposing positions of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and the NLRC on the other, the Court is
compelled to resolve the factual issues and examine the evidence on record. In this case,
petitioners did not explain the reasons for their failure to present the September 5, 2008 Medical
Report at the earliest opportunity. It was only after an unfavorable decision was rendered did
petitioners present it with the CA. Petitioners' belated submission of this Report without any
explanation casts doubt on its credibility especially since it does not appear to be a newly
discovered evidence. Here, it is undisputed that respondent required medical treatment even after
the lapse of 120 days from repatriation. As such, Dr, Agbayani should have made his definite
assessment on respondent's condition within the aforesaid 240-day period. Unfortunately, Dr.
Agbayani failed to timely issue a declaration as he only issued an assessment on respondent's
disability on June 1, 2009, almost one year from the latter's repatriation. By operation of law,
respondent is deemed permanently and totally disabled and is thus entitled to full disability
compensation. respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability compensation of
US$60,000.00 because of the absence of definite assessment from the company-designated
doctor within the maximum period of 240 days within which he is allowed to make his
declaration; and, by the established fact that respondent is unable to return to work and had been
under continuous treatment even after more than one year from his repatriation.

Case no. 197 Narcisa M. Nicolas v. People of the Philippines G.R. no 186107 April 20 2016

Facts:

While in Belgium as an overseas worker, Ralph conveyed to Abel his interest in acquiring a
residential land in the Philippines. When Ralph came home in the first week of December 1996,
he met petitioner at her residence at Matatdo, San Isidro, Sucat, Parañaque City. Abel introduced
petitioner to Ralph as a real estate agent and a friend of his mother-in-law. Petitioner showed a
293-square meter lot located at Matatdo with a selling price of P2,500.00 per square meter.
Petitioner claimed to be the owner of the property though the title was not yet registered in her
name. She told Ralph that the registered owners, Conrado and Virginia Montero, will transfer the
title directly to him to avoid paying higher taxes. Ralph agreed and gave a partial payment of
P350,000.00 and the remaining balance to be paid in installment. Soon after, a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the property was executed on December 4, 1996. Meanwhile, on December 15,
1996, Ralph went back to Belgium. In January 1997, Abel informed him that the property is now
registered in his (Ralph) name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 119421. In
December 1997, however, petitioner asked from Abel the owner's duplicate copy of the title,
claiming that there is a mistake in the area which must be corrected.

When Ralph returned to the Philippines, he visited the property. To his surprise, there was a
notice posted on said property which reads, "lot for sale." Upon inquiry at the Registry of Deeds
of Parañaque City, Ralph discovered that his title over the property has already been transferred
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale purporting to have been executed by him in favor of
Cagadas, Cacho and Espiritu. Ralph's TCT No. 119421 was already cancelled and in lieu thereof
TCT No. 138613 was issued in the name of Cagadas, while TCT No. 138614 was issued in the
names of Cacho and Espiritu. Ralph denied his signature and that of his wife Rowena in the
Deed of Absolute Sale. He maintained mat they were in Belgium when the said deed was
notarized on October 8, 1998, Ralph also discovered mat his property was previously mortgaged
to the spouses Emilio and Magdalena Marquez. He likewise denied his and his wife's signature
on the Real Estate Mortgage for the same reason that they were out of the country when the
mortgage was allegedly executed on October 20, 1997. When confronted by Ralph upon his
return, petitioner asked for forgiveness because she sold the property. She offered to swap a 300-
square meter lot located in Greenheights Subdivision for the sold lot. The proposed swapping did
not, however, materialize since petitioner was found to own only about 50 square meters of the
Greenheights property. Repeated request for petitioner to return the title was made by Abel and
Ralph, but to no avail. Consequently, petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.

Petitioner denied forging the signature of Ralph and his wife in the Real Estate Mortgage and in
the Deed of Absolute Sale. She claimed that it was Abel who mortgaged the subject property to
the spouses Marquez and later sold the same to Cacho, Espiritu and Cagadas.

Ruling of RTC:

The Court finds the accused Narcisa Mendoza Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document as charged in the Information

Ruling of the CA:

The CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment

Issue:

Whether the Honorable fourteenth division of the Court of Appeals undertook a review of the
evidence beyond the findings of the trial court.

Ruling:

We deny the Petition

Verily, the resolution of the issues raised is factual in nature and calls for a review of the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. "Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing errors of law, the findings of fact of the appellate court being conclusive.
We have emphatically declared that it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such
evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court.

Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals coincide, as in this
case, the same are binding on this Court. We stress that, subject to some exceptional instances,
none of which is present in this case, only questions of law - not questions of fact - may be raised
before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court." Whether
petitioner falsified the signatures of Ralph and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
October 8, 1998 and the Real Estate Mortgage dated October 20, 1997 is a question of fact.
Following the foregoing tenet, therefore, it is not reviewable in this Rule 45 petition.

Case no. 198 Doehle-Philman Manning Agency Inc. v. Henry C. Haro G.R. no. 206522 April 18
2016

Facts:
On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd., hired
respondent as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA CGM Providencia for a period of nine months
with basic monthly salary of US$547.00 and other benefits. Before deployment, respondent
underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty.

Respondent stated that on June 1, 2008, he boarded the vessel and assumed his duties as oiler;
however, in November 2008, he experienced heartache and loss of energy after hammering and
lifting a 120-kilogram machine; thereafter, he was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam where he
was informed of having a hole in his heart that needed medical attention.

After his repatriation on December 6, 2008, respondent reported to Doehle-Philman which in

turn referred him to Clinico-Med. Respondent claimed that he was confined for two days in UST
Hospital and that a heart operation was recommended to him. He nevertheless admitted that he
had not yet undergone any surgery. On April 24, 2009, respondent's personal doctor, Dr.
Luminardo M. Ramos (Dr. Ramos), declared him not fit to work.

Consequently, on June 19, 2009, respondent filed a Complaint for disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against
petitioners. Respondent claimed that since he was declared fit to work before his deployment,
this proved that he sustained his illness while in the performance of his duties aboard the vessel;
that he was unable to work for more than 120 days; and that he lost his earning capacity to
engage in a work he was skilled to do. Thus, he insisted he is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits.

For their part, petitioners alleged that respondent boarded the vessel on June 2, 2008; that on or
about November 21, 2008, respondent was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam; and that upon
repatriation, he was referred to Dr. Leticia Abesamis (Dr. Abesamis), the company-designated
doctor, for treatment.

Petitioners denied that respondent has a hole in his heart. Instead, they pointed out that on
December 27, 2008, Dr. Abesamis diagnosed "him of "aortic regurgitation, moderate" but
declared that his condition is not work-related. They averred that despite such declaration, they
still continued with respondent's treatment. However, on January 19, 2009, Dr. Abesamis
declared that respondent had not reported for follow up despite repeated calls. On April 8, 2009,
the company-designated doctor reported that respondent refused surgery. And on April 15, 2009,
she reiterated that respondent's condition is not work-related.

Petitioners insisted that the determination of the fitness or unfitness of a medically repatriated
seafarer rests with the company-designated physician; and since Dr. Abesamis declared that
respondent's illness is not work-related, such determination must prevail. They also stressed that
the company-designated doctor continuously treated respondent from, his repatriation in
December 2008, until April 2009, hence, her finding that his illness is not work-related must be
respected.

Finally, petitioners argued that since respondent's illness is not an occupational disease, then he
must prove that his work caused his illness; because of his failure to do so, then he is not entitled
to disability benefits.

Ruling of Labor Arbiter and NLRC:

Dismissed. The LA noted that Dr. Abesamis declared that respondent's illness is not work-
related.

Ruling of the CA:

Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA arguing that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding him not entitled to disability benefits, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.

On July 20, 2012, the CA granted the Petition and concomitantly reversed and set aside the
September 28, 2010 and November 30, 2010 NLRC Resolutions.

Issue:

Is the CA correct in setting aside the NLRC Resolutions denying respondent's claim for
permanent and total disability benefits?

Ruling:

The Court finds merit in the Petition.

This Court does not review factual issues as only questions of law can be raised in a Rule 45
Petition. However, such rule admits of exceptions including a situation where the factual
findings of the tribunals or courts below are conflicting. Here, there being contrary findings of
fact by the LA and NLRC, on one hand, and the CA, on the other, we deem it necessary to make
our own determination and evaluation of the evidence on record.

Essentially, petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits on the sole basis that he was unable to work for more than 120 days.

Case no. 199 New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc. v. Datayan G.R. 202859 November 11 2015

Facts:

On August 8, 2007, New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA), for and on behalf of St. Paul
Maritime Corp. (SPMC), employed Simon Vincent Datayan II (Simon) as deck cadet on board
the vessel Corona Infinity. His employment was for nine months with basic monthly salary of
US$23 5.00.8 Prior to his deployment, Simon underwent pre-employment medical examination
(PEME) and was declared fit for sea duties. On August 17, 2007, he boarded the vessel and
assumed his duties as deck cadet. On December 30,2007, at 12:40 a.m., the Master authorized
the conduct of an emergency fire drill in which the crew participated. At about 1:25 a.m., he
declared that Simon jumped overboard. A futile search-and-rescue operation ensued. After a few
weeks, Simon was declared missing and was presumed dead.

Simon's father, Vincent H. Datayan (respondent), alleged that he went to NFMA to claim death
benefits but his claim was unheeded. On May 11, 2009, he filed a complaint for death benefits
and attorney's fees against NFMA. Respondent averred that because Simon died during the term
of his employment, the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) among All
Japan Seamen's Union, Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), and the International Mariners Management Association of Japan, must be applied
in the grant of death benefits and burial assistance in his favor, being the heir of Simon.
Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action against them because Simon's death
was a result of his (Simon's) deliberate act. They insisted that based on the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (SEC) and CBA, a
complainant is not entitled to death benefits when the cause of the seaman's death was the latter's
willful act. Petitioners added that the Master's Report, Statement of Facts, Marine Note of Protest
and Investigation Report conclusively proved that Simon committed suicide. They stated that
this conclusion was bolstered by the suicide note found on the vessel, signed by Simon himself.

Issue:

Is the CA correct in finding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
respondent's claim for death benefits?

Ruling:

In labor cases, the review of the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court involves the
determination of the legal correctness of the CA Decision. This means that the Court must
ascertain whether the CA properly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC Decision. Simply put, "in testing for legal correctness, the Court views
the CA Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented
to it."34 It entails a limited review of the acts of the NLRC, of whether it committed errors of
jurisdiction. It does not cover the issue of whether the NLRC committed any error of judgment,
unless there is a showing that its findings and conclusion were arbitrarily arrived at or were not
based on substantial evidence.

Case no. 200 Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. Julia Aligway G.R. no. 201793 September 16
2015

Facts:

On November 25, 2008, the Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC), for and in behalf of its
foreign principal, the Norwegian Crew Management (NCM), employed Demetrio as chief cook
on board the vessel Amasis. Demetrio's employment contract was for nine months with a
monthly salary of US$758.00. Demetrio alleged that prior to his deployment, he underwent pre-
employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit to work. Thereafter, while
aboard the vessel, he suffered from "vomiting, anorexia, weight loss, and palpitations followed
by dizziness and a feeling of lightheadedness." As a result, on April 22, 2009, he was medically
repatriated. Demetrio claimed that despite medical examinations by the company-designated
physician, his illness persisted beyond 120 days. This condition allegedly rendered him
incapacitated to work again as a seafarer but the PTC and the NCM refused to pay him disability
benefits. Consequently, Demetrio filed a Complaint dated January 22, 2010 for disability
benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against the PTC, the NCM, and their
officers. He alleged that his work as chief cook, which involved food intake, contributed to or
aggravated his gastric cancer. He claimed that although the cause of gastric cancer was unknown,
there was speculation that smoked food may be promoting factors. Demetrio invoked the
presumption laid down in the provision of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC) mat
his illness was work-related. He also averred that he passed the PEME; and that as such, the
PTC, the NCM, and their officers were estopped from claiming that he was unfit to work prior to
his deployment or that he did not contract his illness aboard the vessel. He likewise argued that
because the vessel Amasis was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), it stands to
reason that he was entitled to the benefits stipulated in that agreement. The PTC, the NCM and
their officers did confirm that on December 25, 2008, Demetrio boarded the vessel; that on April
20, 2009, he was brought to the Entabeni Hospital in Durban due to gastritis; and that eventually,
he was repatriated for further treatment. The PTC, the NCM, and their officers however
contended that Demetrio was a heavy smoker, and that he was smoking 12 to 15 cigarette sticks
a day; that the company-designated physician Dr. Susannah Ong-Salvador (Dr. Salvador),
declared that Demetrio's condition was not work-related; and that the risk factors in Demetrio's
condition included age, diet rich in saturated fat, fatty acid, linoleic acid, and genetic
predisposition. The PTC, the NCM, and their officers also argued that stomach cancer is
asymptomatic - or an illness that has nonspecific symptoms in its early stage and only becomes
apparent when in the advanced stage already; that since Demetrio was only about four months
aboard the vessel when the symptoms of his cancer manifested, then it could not be inferred that
he acquired it during his employment with them; and, that while Demetrio's contract was covered
by an AMOSUP CBA, this CBA did not include non-occupational illnessess, such as gastric
cancer. In sum, the PTC, the NCM, and their officers maintained that Demetrio's work involved
food preparation and not food intake; that the company-designated doctor found that the cause of
his illness was not work-related; that there was no evidence to indicate that his working
conditions increased the risk of contracting it; that there was no evidence that his illness was
caused by the food being served on the vessel; and, that no causal connection was established
between Demetrio's work as chief cook and his gastric or stomach cancer.

Ruling of LA:

Dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit

Ruling of the NLRC:

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the LA

Ruling of CA:
The petition is Granted. The presumption of compensability prevails and that Demetrio is
entitled to full disability benefits pursuant to the CBA.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Demetrio's appeal and in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

Ruling:

As a rule, in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law can
be raised and be reviewed by this Court. However, this rule admits of exceptions and one such
exception is where the Court may make its own evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
parties because the factual findings of the tribunals or courts a quo are in conflict with each
other. In this case, the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC, found that Demetrio was not entitled to
disability benefits, among other claims, and dismissed his complaint for lack of merit. The CA
ruled otherwise. Thus, because of the conflicting findings of fact of the LA and NLRC, on one
hand, and of the CA, on the other, this Court has to exercise its mandated authority to examine
the evidence on record. This Court agrees with the finding of the NLRC that there is no
substantial evidence to support the allegation that Demetrio's stomach cancer was caused by
work-connected factors. In addition, Julia cannot point to Demetrio's having successfully passed
the PEME as basis for the conclusion that he acquired his illness on board the vessel. This is a
non-sequitur. The PEME conducted upon a seafarer would not or could not necessarily reveal or
disclose his illness because such examination is not at all fool-proof or thoroughly exploratory.
In the absence of a second opinion from Demetrio's own physician of choice, this Court may not
arbitrarily disregard the finding of the company-designated doctor, Dr. Salvador. If anything, we
hew close to the jurisprudential teaching that the seafarer is not entitled to disability benefits if he
does not adduce substantial evidence of a medically-established connection between his work
and his illness. This is as it should be. For, unopposed and uncontradicted by equally credible
and trustworthy countervailing substantial evidence from herein respondents-spouses who, as the
original suitors-at-law in this indemnity-recovery suit, had the onus to establish their suit by the
presentation of such specie of substantial evidence called for by this case: this Court is not at
liberty to reject, with no show of reason, the unopposed and uncontradicted testimony of the
company-designated physician.

All told, this Court finds that the CA erred in setting aside the NLRC Decision which affirmed
the Decision of the LA dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit.

Case no. 201 The Heirs of Delfin Dela Cruz v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers G.R. no. 196357
April 20 2015

Facts:

The late Delfin Dela Cruz was contracted for the position of Oiler by Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc., a local manning agent for and in behalf of the latter's principal. As required by law
and by the employment contract, Delfin underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination
(PEME) and was declared Fit for Sea Service. Delfin] left the Philippines on 16 August 2000 and
immediately embarked the vessel "Lady Hilde" on 17 August 2000. While on board, he felt
gradual chest pains and pain in his upper abdominal region. On 26 June 2001, while performing
his regular duties, he was hit by a metal board on his back. He, thereafter, requested medical
attention and was given medications and advised to be given light duties for the rest of the week.
Upon the vessel's arrival at a convenient port on 16 August 2001, his contract expired and he was
signed off from the vessel. He xxx reported to respondents as required. He also sought medical
assistance but was not extended such.

On 13 November 2003, Delfin went to De Los Santos Medical Center for proper medical
attention. There, he underwent X-Ray and MRI of the Thoracic Spine. Afterwards, he was not
employed by respondents because he was already incapacitated to engage in his customary work.
He filed his claim for sickness allowance from the same manning agency but the same was not
granted. His health deteriorated and shouldered own medical expenses. On 4 December 2003, he
filed a complaint before the NLRC to, claim payment for sickness allowance and disability
compensation.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription, the claim having been filed
beyond one year from the date of the termination of the contract. Delfin countered that the
applicable prescription period is 3 years, according to the POEA Standard Employment Contract.
The parties, thereafter, submitted their position papers. Delfin claimed for medical
reimbursement and sickness allowance, permanent disability compensation, and damages and
attorney's fees.

Ruling of LA:

The LA opined that Delfin contracted his illness during the period of his employment with
respondents and that such illness is a compensable occupational disease. Hence, Delfin is entitled
to his claims.

Ruling of NLRC

It found Delfrn's claims to be barred by prescription for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period of one year from the termination of the employment contract. The NLRC
also found no evidence that would establish a causal connection between Delfrn's ailment and his
working conditions.

Ruling of CA

the CA sustained the NLRC's pronouncement that petitioners are not entitled to disability
compensation as they failed to establish that Delfrn's illness was work-related.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are entitled to permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance.
Ruling:

The issues petitioners brought before this Court pertain to questions of fact since they basically
seek to determine if the illness responsible for Delfrn's disability was acquired by him during the
course of his employment as to entitle petitioners to permanent disability benefits, sickness
allowance, attorney's fees and damages.

As a general rule, this Court does not review questions of facts in a petition filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court as only questions of law can be raised in such petition. However, this rule
is not absolute and without exceptions. In case the factual findings of the tribunals or courts
below are in conflict with each other, this Court may make its own examination and evaluation
of the evidence on record. Here, the LA found that petitioners ought to be awarded permanent
disability benefits, sickness allowance, attorney's fees and damages; the NLRC and the CA, on
the other hand, ruled otherwise. Hence, the Court is constrained to examine the evidence on
record.

The fact that respondent passed the company's PEME is of no moment. We have ruled that in the
past the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and
thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. The PEME merely determines
whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of health
of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work" declaration in the respondent's PEME cannot be a
conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. While a
PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for
overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer's true state of
health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the
examinations were not exploratory.

The Court holds that the NLRC and the CA correctly disallowed petitioners' claim for permanent
disability benefits and sickness allowance.

Case no. 202 Paje v. Casino G.R. no 207257 February 3 2015

Facts:

In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized
and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation
(TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build
a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP). On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby
TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. On April 4, 2007, the SBMA
Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan
Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction,
installation, and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal
Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore. On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under
the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy). RP Energy then
contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the
proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance of an ECC
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city
government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the
proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay. On December 22, 2008,
the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-
MW coal-fired power plant. Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional
components in its proposed coal-fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an
amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional components, among others.
Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead of
constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought to
construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant. On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the
request and further amended the ECC (second amendment). The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof
Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal
power plant. The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of
2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source. Hon.
Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, DENR. The Casiño
Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause environmental damage.
that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales,
Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo. While the case was pending in the CA, RP Energy
applied for another amendment to its ECC proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-
MW coal fired power plant

Ruling of the CA:

Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened

Issue:

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling:

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of
fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of
the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ
is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to
 a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition
should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino
group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will
cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the
other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause
grave environmental damage through its environmental management plan which will ensure that
the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards.