SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6927, March 14, 2018

TOMAS N. OROLA AND PHIL. NIPPON AOI INDUSTRY, INC., Complainants, v. ATTY. ARCHIE S.

BARIBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The case stemmed from a Complaint1 dated October 17, 2005 filed before this Court by complainants Tomas
N. Orola (Orola) and Phil. Nippon AOI Industry, Inc. (Phil. Nippon) against Atty. Archie S. Baribar (Baribar),
for allegedly inventing numerous offenses against them, procuring documents with forged signatures,
representing a person not his client, and notarizing a document without the person appearing before him as
required by law, in violation of his lawyer's oath and Rule 138, Section 20 (c), (d) and (g) of the Rules of
Court.

Complainants alleged that Baribar filed a baseless labor case on behalf of his twenty-four (24) clients
against them. Orola denied any connection with AOI Kogyo Company Ltd.-Japan which was allegedly not
paying labor benefits. In the appeal filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Baribar
included certain individuals who were not original complainants. Complainants further averred that Baribar
notarized the Motion for Reconsideration on September 19, 2005 without the personal appearance of
Docufredo Claveria (Claveria) since the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that he was overseas at
that time. It was also mentioned that Baribar has a prior administrative case, which demonstrates his
penchant for committing acts inimical to the image of the legal profession.

In his Comment,2 Baribar denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that the administrative
complaint was a mere harassment suit filed by a political opponent's brother whose wounded family pride
caused them to pursue imaginary causes of action against him. During the campaign for 2004 congressional
elections, Orola's family's employees approached him to represent them; however, he suggested that they
file the case after the elections to avoid misinterpretation. The labor complaint was not baseless since it was
supported by a joint affidavit of his clients against Orola and Phil. Nippon.

Sometime in March 2004, he prepared an "Authority to Represent" document. He requested Claveria,

Apolonio Akol, Jr. (Akol) and Connie Labrador (Labrador) to obtain the signatures of the others who live in
different municipalities of Negros Occidental. On September 6, 2004, he personally met 24 of the 27
signatories, asked them to produce their residence certificates and confirm their signature in the document.
He confirmed the identities of the others who were unable to bring their residence certificates through their
leaders. He overlooked the notarization of the document and was only able to notarize the same on April 15,
2005 because of the renovation of their law office from October 2004 to February 2005. He averred that his
mistake to strike through the names of four individuals in the Authority to Represent and verification of the
labor complaint left the impression that the latter were parties to the appeal.

Akol and Labrador signed the verification of the motion for reconsideration in his presence. He then asked
them to secure Claveria's signature. Thereafter, he received the verification on the last day of filing, and did
not hesitate to notarize the same since he personally knew Claveria and was familiar with the latter's
signature. He claimed that he acted in the best interest of his client and in good faith.

In a Resolution3 dated November 22, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.

On October 30, 2008, IBP Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) submitted his Report
recommending, thus:

Given the foregoing circumstances, it is therefore recommended that respondent Atty. Archie Baribar be
REPRIMANDED, that his incumbent notarial commission, if any, be REVOKED, and that he be prohibited from
being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years, effective immediately, with a stem warning that
[a] repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.4
In his report, Commissioner Limpingco stated that an attorney should not be administratively sanctioned for
filing a suit on behalf of his client, or for availing of proper procedural remedies, since the choice of legal
strategy or theory is his sole concern. Complainants may or may not be liable in the labor case, but the
administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to resolve the issue. An examination of the joint affidavit
reveals that one Romulo Orola merely stated that he did not authorize any lawyer to represent him, and that
he never appeared before Baribar to subscribe any document. Thus, it was not established that he procured
documents with forged signatures. Baribar was careless in failing to remove the names of four individuals in
the pleadings. He and his clients could not have gained any kind of possible benefit or advantage to the said
error.

Lastly, Baribar did not deny that Claveria was not present when he notarized the document on September
19, 2005. When he asked Akol and Labrador to obtain the signature for him, he effectively admitted that it
was not his intent to require Claveria's personal presence before him. The Notarial Law mandates that a
notary public shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as a signatory to the instrument is not in
his presence personally at the time of notarization.

The Board of Governors adopted the findings of the IBP Commissioner, but modified the recommendation in
Resolution No. XVIII-2009-17, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for performing a notarial act without requiring the personal
appearance of the person involved as signatory to the document at the time of the notarization, Atty. Archie
S. Baribar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and DISQUALIFICATION from
being commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.5
Baribar moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied. Resolution No. XX-
2012-619 reads:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY  Respondent's  Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2009-17 dated February
19,2009 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court's Ruling

The Court grees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In this case, the Bureau of Immigration certified that Claveria departed from the Philippines on April 27,
2005, and that his name did not appear in its database file of Arrival from April 28, 2005 to October 17,
2005.6 Baribar also readily admits that Claveria was not present when he notarized the Motion for
Reconsideration on September 19, 2005. He explained that he asked the other two affiants, Akol and
Labrador, to obtain Claveria's signature. He notarized the signed verification he received as he personally
knew Claveria and was familiar with his signature.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. It. is impressed with substantial public interest,
and only those who are qualified or authorized may act as such. It is not a purposeless ministerial act .of
acknowledging documents executed by parties who. are willing to pay fees for notarization.7 Notarization of
documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.8

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.9 It is his duty to demand that the document presented to him for notarization be signed in
his presence.10 The purpose of the requirement of personal appearance by the acknowledging party before
the notary public is to enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the former. It may be
added, too, that only by such personal appearance may the notary public be able to ascertain from the
acknowledging party himself that the instrument or document is his own free act and deed.11

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before the
notary public. Rule II, Section 1 and Rule IV, Section 2 (b) provide:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed
by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument
or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity,
that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - ...

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an a knowledgment
or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code
of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices,
such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.12

As a lawyer, Baribar is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
integrity of the legal profession.

As to the penalty, Baribar alleges in his Supplication dated June 24, 2009 that his penalty was grossly
disproportionate and inequitable. He cites the 1995 case of Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons (NBP)
Officials13 where the Court imposed a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to the lawyer who notarized
the jurat in the verification of the petition in the absence of his client who was then an inmate in the NBP
and thus was unable to sign before him.

Jurisprudence provides that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such is meted out the
following penalties: (1) revocation of notarial commission; (2) disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public; and (3) suspension from the practice of law-the terms of which vary based on the
circumstances of each case.14 In this case, the IBP Commissioner recommended the penalty of reprimand
and prohibition from being commissioned as notary public for three (3) years. The Board of Governors,
however, modified the penalty imposing one year of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification
from being commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.

There are instances where the Court imposed the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and
disqualification from being commissioned for one year. In Villarin v. Atty. Sabate, Jr.,15 the Court suspended
respondent's commission as a notary public for one year for notarizing the Verification of the Motion to
Dismiss with Answer when threof the affiants thereof were not before him and for notarizing the same
instrument of which he was one of the signatories. In Coquia v. Atty. Laforteza,16the Court revoked
respondent's notarial commission and disqualified him from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of one year for notarizing a pre-signed subject document presented to him and failing to personally
verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject documents as he merely relied upon the
assurance of Luzviminda that her companions are the actual signatories to the said documents.

In this case, Baribar asked Akol and Labrador to  acquire Claveria's signature in the Verification of the
Motion for Reconsideration and subsequently notarized the pre-signed document upon receiving it. We agree
with the IBP Commissioner that Baribar did not intend to require Claveria's personal appearance before him.
It is also noted that he admitted that in another notarized document, he merely relied on the assurances of
his clients' leaders that the others who were unable to pr sent competent evidence of identity were the
actual signatories of the document.
Clearly, Baribar failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public. His acts also show
his offhand disregard of the Notarial rules as to requiring the personal presence of the affiants and the
presentation of competent evidence of identity. He must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion. To deter further violations, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, revocation of incumbent commission as a notary
public, if any, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Archie S. Baribar GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDShim from
the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018

ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA,

JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9, 2006 filed by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla
(Zarcilla) and Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada)
for gross misconduct.

The facts are as follows:

On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada

and complainant Marita Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public documents docketed as I.S. No.
02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria
Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it
appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land under TCT No. T-
18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite knowledge that his parents were already deceased since
March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988, respectively, as per Death Certificates4 issued by the Office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of deed of sale was allegedly witnessed by a
certain Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada.

Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses
Quezada filed a petition for the administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where
they presented the Joint Affidavit of his then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and
Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-Affidavit of the Spouses Quezada was again notarized by
Atty. Quesada.

However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed
to be the real owner of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also
stated therein that she facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated
her co-respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx

6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the expenses she incurred when she was
sick and need medication and all the (sic) to pay for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the property
to Spouses MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale between PERFECTO
ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the paper that my mother signed giving me the land;

7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land provided I will be the one to transfer the
said land to their name. They gave me an advance payment so that I could transfer the land to them. I
made it appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the property to the said spouses because the title
of the land was still in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent when I
did it because the land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like Petition
for Reconstitution in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was still in his name. However,
there was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my
mother and the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said land;

8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA did not falsify any document because I
was the one who facilitated the transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged
to me. Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I sold the land. I
just delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the
title in their name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in their name was finally delivered.7

All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada, also filed their respective
counter-affidavits where they reiterated Bumanglag's admission.8

In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag
only to undergo trial. All other respondents, including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his counter-
affidavit, were exonerated for insufficiency of evidence.

Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied.
Consequently, Bumanglag was indicted for four counts of falsification of public documents before the
Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La Union, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and
3598.

However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that Bumanglag was not aware of the
contents of her counter-affidavit when she signed the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was
deceived by her co accused, including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an Order10dated
July 27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification cases against Bumanglag.

In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the
complaint against him.

On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment12 due to voluminous
workload. On September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a second motion for extension to file comment. In a
Resolution13 dated November 20, 2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a
warning that the second motion for extension shall be the last and that no further extension will be given.

On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a comment on the complaint against him
within the extended period which expired on October 17, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada
to (a) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from such failure, and
(b) comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment.14

Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the
Court resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to
comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein.15

No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced by a Certification16 which was issued by
Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.
Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the fine imposed against him and to submit
his comment, the Court, in a Resolution17 dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty.
Quesada an additional fine of P1,000.00, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not
paid within 10 days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26,
2006 to submit his comment on the complaint against him. Atty. Quesada was also warned that should he
fail to comply, he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the National Bureau of Investigation until he
shall have made the compliance or until such time as the Court may order.

Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment of fine was ever made as of September
3, 2010 as evidenced by a Certification18 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial
Staff Officer. On December 28, 2010, another Certification19 was issued anew showing no record of payment
of fine by Atty. Quesada.

Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to (1) increase the fine imposed on Atty.
Quesada to P3,000.00, or imprisonment often (10) days if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period;
and (2) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required
comment on the complaint.

No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a Certification21 which was issued by
Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.

It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine
imposed upon him and submit comment on the complaint against him, in a Resolution22 dated August 24,
2011, the Court ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until he
shall have compli[ed] with the Court's Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a
Warrant of Arrest.23

Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years, Atty. Quesada filed his Comment24dated
October 10, 2011, in compliance with Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of
political harassment, vengeance and retribution, and that the instant case against him was filed solely for
the purpose of maligning his person. Attached to his compliance was postal money order in the amount of
P3,000.00 as payment for the fine imposed upon him.

In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr., Regional Director of the NBI, informed
the Court that Atty. Quesada voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and
claimed that he had already complied with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of
his comment and payment of fine, thus, on the same day, Atty. Quesada was immediately released from
custody.

On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.26

During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag
and her counsel appeared. Atty. Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference was
reset to July 11, 2012. However, on July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the
mandatory conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012. Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that
co-complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005.

On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory conference be reset due to health reasons.
He submitted his Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012 showing that he underwent a head operation and
that he is still on recovery period.

On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the parties were directed to appear on August
23, 2012 and submit their respective verified position papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only
Bumanglag and her counsel appeared, and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus, considering that the
parties were duly notified of the hearing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty.
Quesada be disbarred from the practice of law.

In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

RULING

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers.27 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify
the imposition of the administrative penalty.28

Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery against Atty. Quesada must be
competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations should
first be established and determined in appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by
such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal
competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or
forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is whether or not the
respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Accordingly, We decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed
falsification of the subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate
proceeding.29

We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of
Sale30 dated April 12, 2002 purportedly executed by and between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and
Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto
Zarcilla; and the (2) Joint Affidavit31 dated March 20, 2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela
Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490, when in both occasions the spouses
Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute said documents and appear before Atty.
Quesada since they have long been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died
on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001.32

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal
appearance before the notary public:

xxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very
same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in
question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of
notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This is more evident when he
certified in the acknowledgment thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons
who executed the document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him and
acknowledged to him that the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the fact that the
vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false
representations, and was not merely negligent.

Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when
he notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as
a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility
to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.33

Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.34

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.35

Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public, what this Court find more deplorable was
his defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to
file his comment on the complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of
fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more than five years.
Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time. More than five (5) years have
already elapsed from the time the Court issued the first Resolution dated June 26, 2006 which required Atty.
Quesada to file his comment until his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It took a
warrant of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines imposed upon him.
While the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its directives, he shamelessly
ignored the same and wasted the Court's time and resources.

And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any apology and/or any justification for his
long delay in complying with the directives/orders of this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada
finally complied with the Court's directives, his compliance was neither prompted by good faith or willingness
to obey the Court nor was he remorseful of his infractions but was actually only forced to do so considering
his impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his failure or obstinate refusal without justification or
valid reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of
Court, amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.36

Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which this Court will not tolerate."37

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest
form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and
processes.38 Considering Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but also
the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this Court's orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no
remorse as to his misconduct which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar.
Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross
misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in
the legal profession. He is, thus, ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-off of
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial commission, if
any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10756 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3218), February 21, 2018

JUNIELITO R. ESPANTO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERWIN V. BELLEZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is the verified Complaint1 of Junielito R. Espanto (Junielito) against Atty. Erwin V. Belleza (Atty.
Belleza) for grave misconduct, malpractice, deliberate falsehood, violation of oath of office and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in connection with the demolition of complainant's 2-storey
residential house situated at Barangay Maya, MacArthur, Leyte, without his knowledge and against his will.

Complainant alleged that he is the owner of a 2-storey concrete residential house situated on a lot covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. P-43641,2 which was sold by his father to him on January 12,
2001.3 Junielito alleged that sometime in 2006 while working abroad, he was informed that Nelia
Alibangbang-Miller (Nelia), their neighbor, was claiming that his house was encroaching on a portion of the
adjoining lot she bought. Thereafter, Nelia filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Damages before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte, docketed as Civil Case No. 75
against the Espantos.4 However, Junielito asserted that he was not included as party to said complaint
despite Nelia's allegation that his house was encroaching on the latter's lot.

In January 2009, after Junielito went back to the Philippines, he averred that Nelia would always harass him
to pay the portion of the land allegedly being encroached upon by his house. He complained that Nelia
threatened him and his family that she would demolish their houses as she already won in the case she filed
against his brother, sister and mother.

On November 22, 2010, through a letter,5 Atty. Belleza notified Junielito that he is given seven (7) days to
vacate the subject property of his client, Nelia. After seven days, Nelia posted a notice on the door of his
house stating "To: Lito, your 7 days is up! Nelia Miller" and padlocked the gate of Junielito's house.6

On December 1, 2010, Junielito alleged that Atty. Belleza went to his house and threatened him that they
will file a writ of execution to demolish his house if he will not agree to sell and vacate his house. Junielito
lamented that while he initially refused, he eventually gave in as he was already tired of his situation.

On the same day, because Junielito was initially reluctant, Nelia and Atty. Belleza assured him that he will
be informed of the final details of the sale should there be a buyer of the property. Junielito alleged that
Atty. Belleza drafted an acknowledgment receipt7 where it was indicated therein that he received the
amount of P50,000.00 as a partial payment, and that he will receive the final percentage of the sale price
when the property of Nelia is sold. Thereafter, Atty. Belleza and the Spouses Miller told him to vacate the
house to facilitate its sale and to be able to make the necessary repairs to which he complied as he believed
their sincerity and honesty.

Thus, in the morning of February 14, 2011, Junielito was surprised to receive a text message from his niece,
Elenita Pille, informing him that his house was being demolished with the participation of Nelia and a certain
Irene Tano (Irene), allegedly the buyer of the property.

Junielito lamented that when he got hold of the Deed of Absolute Sale8 executed by Nelia and Irene, which
was prepared and notarized by Atty. Belleza, he then realized that the latter defrauded him as shown by the
fact that he facilitated the sale without his knowledge. Junielito felt aggrieved as they agreed that Atty.
Belleza and Nelia will inform him should there be a buyer of the property so he can participate in the sale
transaction, considering that his house sits on a portion of Nelia's property. However, not only did Atty.
Belleza fail to inform him of the sale of the property, but they also had his house demolished without his
knowledge and consent, and without permit from the municipal government.

Likewise, Junielito pointed out that in his Counter-Affidavit9 dated April 30, 2011 Atty. Belleza lied when he
stated therein that Civil Case No. 75 has been decided with finality, when in truth and in fact, said case has
yet to be decided with finality as shown by the Certification10 dated May 19, 2011 issued by Melba Lagunzad,
Clerk of Court II, 13th MCTC, MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte.

Junielito also alleged that in the Counter-Affidavit11 dated April 30, 2011 of the Spouses Miller, they lied
when they made it appear that the P50,000.00 was given to him out of pity when in fact it was a partial
payment and guarantee that he will be informed of the sale should there be anyone interested to buy his
property.

Junielito expressed his frustration as he believed that Atty. Belleza, a lawyer, was supposed to be an
instrument in the administration of justice. However, given his above-mentioned actuations and behavior,
Atty. Belleza not only failed to observe his duty and obligations as a lawyer but he likewise showed his
unfitness to be retained as member of the bar. He, thus, pray that Atty. Belleza be suspended or disbarred
from the practice of law.

On October 7, 2011, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), ordered
Atty. Belleza to submit his Answer on the complaint against him.12

In his Answer13 dated November 10, 2011, Atty. Belleza countered that there was already a Compromise
Agreement between the parties in Civil Case No. 75, which was approved by the court on December 27,
2006.14 He, likewise, claimed that he merely typed and printed the acknowledgment receipt and served as
witness to the issuance of the same. He further denied that he had any participation in the demolition of
complainant's house.

In its Report and Recommendation15 dated July 19, 2012, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Belleza be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for his deliberate disregard of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-761,16 dated June 21, 2013,
resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and
instead suspended Atty. Belleza from the practice of law for three (3) months.

We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Well established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. These
cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.17 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.18 Corollarily, We will
limit the issue on whether Atty. Belleza committed transgressions that would question his fitness to practice
law, and thus, refrain from discussing issues that are judicial in nature.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of his
ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is
contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also
inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public.19

Given the facts of the case, we find that Atty. Belleza failed to exercise the good faith required of a lawyer in
handling the legal affairs of his client. Even without touching the issue of the subject properties' ownership,
Atty. Belleza cannot deny that the subject property sold by Nelia to Irene was still pending litigation due to
the alleged encroachment of Junielito's house on the property of Nelia. It was precisely the reason why they
filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Junielito's relatives. Moreover, when Atty. Belleza sent a
notice to vacate Nelia's property to Junielito on November 22, 2010, the civil case was still pending
litigation.

As noted by the IBP-CBD, the acknowledgment receipt of P50,000.00 issued by Nelia as witnessed and
signed by Atty. Belleza is an evidence by itself that he had knowledge of Junielito's interest on the property
even if he disputes the latter's ownership of the subject property. We quote the acknowledgment receipt for
clarification, to wit:

I, LITO ESPANTO acknowledge receipt of the sum of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency
from Nelia Miller as partial payment towards sale of "house". I acknowledged I will receive a final
percentage of sale price when house and lot by Nelia Miller is ultimately sold. Final sales details
will be disclosed immediately to me when all property is sold and final payment will be made at
that time. I acknowledge sale price cannot be "predetermined" due to economic conditions.

x x x20

Upon review of the foregoing acknowledgment receipt, it can be inferred that Junielito acknowledged that he
received P50,000.00 as partial payment and that he will receive the final percentage of sale price when
house and lot by Nelia is sold. It likewise stated therein that Junielito has the right to be informed of the
final sale price and other details related to the sale. Considering that Junielito was in fact paid albeit partial
and was given the right to be informed of the final sale details, it clearly shows that Nelia and Atty. Belleza
recognized Junielito's interest as an owner although it pertains only to a portion of Nelia's property where his
house sits. Why else would they agree on informing Junielito of such material information if they knew that
he has no right whatsoever with the property being sold.
It should also be pointed out that Atty. Belleza neither denied the existence of the acknowledgment receipt
nor the fact that he signed the same.21 Thus, given the foregoing circumstances, it can be presumed that
Atty. Belleza knew that the sale of the property will necessarily affect Junielito. Consequently, when they
sold the property of Nelia without informing Junielito despite their agreement to such effect, Atty. Belleza
not only breached their agreement and betrayed Junielito's trust; he also instigated a malicious and unlawful
transaction to the prejudice of Junielito.

Furthermore, even assuming there was already a compromise agreement, it was malicious to sell Nelia's
property without complying with the conditions and agreements set forth therein. Atty. Belleza knew that
one of the issues sought to be resolved in said case was the issue on whether Junielito's house was
encroaching on Nelia's property. However, said issue could not be resolved without settling the boundaries
of the lots, which explains why the compromise agreement contained provisions for a relocation survey. For
clarification, We quote the pertinent portion of the compromise agreement as thus:

1. Parties agreed to relocate the subject properties designated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 127, and 159;

2. Parties agreed that a commissioner be appointed by the Court to conduct the relocation survey
which be (sic) composed of a qualified and licensed geodetic engineer from the office of the Land
and Surveys Division of the Department Environment and Natural Resources, Sto. Niño,
Extension, Tacloban City;

xxxx

4. Parties likewise agreed that if ever it will be found out by the result of the survey that indeed defendants
encroached a portion of the land of the plaintiff designated as Cadastral Lot No. 159, parties have the
following options:

a. Defendants will buy from the plaintiff the whole area encroached at a reasonable price; or 
b. If defendants cannot afford, defendants shall buy only the area encroached which the house of the
defendant is located with reasonable yard at reasonable price and defendant shall vacate the remaining area
and transfer to the unoccupied portion of lot 127 vacated by the heirs of Onofre Lagarto provided further
that plaintiff will be responsible to the heirs of Onofre Lagarto for them to remove their house; or 
c. Plaintiff shall buy the value of the house at a reasonable price;

5. That if ever if (sic) it's found out by the relocation survey that the defendants have not encroached the
land of the plaintiff designated as Cadastral Lot No. 159, then, plaintiff will not disturb the peaceful
possession of the defendants and would voluntarily dismiss the above-entitled complaint;22

However, when Junielito's house was demolished on February 14, 2011, it appears that no relocation survey
was conducted on the subject properties. In fact, in Order23 dated April 4, 2011, the court ordered the
appearance of the parties in Civil Case No. 75 since while there was already a compromise agreement
entered into by them, the court wanted to verify if a relocation survey has been conducted on the lots
subject of the case as the records were bereft of any showing that a commissioner's report has been
submitted to the court.

Atty. Belleza should know that a compromise agreement once approved by final order of the court has the
force of  res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or
forgery.24 Hence, when a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory; it has the force of law
and is conclusive between the parties. Compromise agreements are contracts,25 and contractual obligations
between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they must be complied with in good
faith.26 Thus, when Atty. Belleza ignored the provisions of the compromise agreement and proceeded with
the sale of the property even without the relocation survey, there is no question that he wantonly violated
Canon 1 of the CPR.

Moreover, as found during the mandatory conference before the IBP, Atty. Belleza knew that complainant
was not a party in Civil Case No. 75, albeit, his 2-storey concrete residential house appeared to be
encroaching on Nelia's property. Thus, even assuming that there was a valid compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 75, said judgment based on compromise agreement will not bind complainant. Consequently, even
if there was already a writ of execution, the same will not likewise bind complainant. Moreso, while Atty.
Belleza claims that there was a valid compromise agreement, he, however, failed to show that there was a
demolition order issued by the court. There was likewise no demolition permit issued by the local
government.27

It is basic that there could be no demolition of building or structures without a writ of execution and
demolition issued by the court. This Court in a number of decisions held that even if there is already a writ
of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court
before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested
property.28 The pertinent provisions are the following:

Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and
reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion
of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a
reasonable time fixed by the court.

The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be a
hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of
demolition.29

The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns
upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an
amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.30 Furthermore, it appeared that when the demolition was made on February 14, 2011, the case has
not yet attained finality as evidenced by a certification issued by Clerk of Court Melba E. Lagunzad of the
13th MCTC of MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte on May 19, 2011.31

In his last ditch effort to exonerate himself, Atty. Belleza denied that he or his client consented or had
knowledge or participated on the demolition and pointed instead on the buyer, Irene, as the sole perpetrator
of the illegal demolition. We are, however, unconvinced since the demolition would not have happened if
Atty. Belleza and his client did not sell the subject property to Irene in violation of the compromise
agreement and while Civil Case No. 75 is still pending litigation. Thus, Atty. Belleza cannot wash his hands
from liability as to the illegal demolition of complainant's house since in the first place, he facilitated the sale
of the subject property.

Clearly, Atty. Belleza's actuations which resulted in the demolition of Junielito's house violates Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and
promote respect for the legal processes. Infact, contrary to this edict, Atty. Belleza's acts of demanding
Junielito to vacate his house, and the selling of the property while Civil Case no. 75 was still pending, he
violated the basic constitutional right of Junielito not to be deprived of a right or property without due
process of law.

Despite his assertions of good faith, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Belleza's acts of: (1) issuing
the notice to vacate to Junielito while the case was still pending litigation; (2) failing to inform Junielito of
the sale of Nelia's property in contravention to the stipulation in the acknowledgment receipt; and (3)
facilitating, drafting and notarizing of the deed of sale between Nelia and Irene in violation of the
compromise agreement due to the absence of relocation survey. If the Court allows these irregular practice
for the reason that lawyers are constrained to suit their client's interests, the Court would, in effect, sanction
impropriety and wrongdoing.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of
their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. They
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.32

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients should
never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights,
as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It
needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect
and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions.33

PENALTY

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as
an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, the acts of Atty. Belleza in: (1) issuing the notice to vacate to Junielito while the case was still pending
litigation; (2) failing to inform Junielito of the sale of Nelia's property in contravention to the stipulation in
the acknowledgment receipt; and (3) facilitating, drafting and notarizing the deed of sale between Nelia and
Irene in violation of the compromise agreement due to the absence of relocation survey, clearly constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Erwin V. Belleza GUILTY of violations of Canons 1 and 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Erwin V.
Belleza's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the IBP,
and the OCA, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

Atty. Erwin V. Belleza is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the
Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12062, July 02, 2018

HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO* A. UNITE, REPRESENTED BY HIS SOLE HEIR, FLORENTINO S.

UNITE, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAYMUND P. GUZMAN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Petition for Disbarment1 filed on December 9, 2014 by Florentino
S. Unite (complainant), as the sole heir of Herminigildo A. Unite (Herminigildo), before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman (respondent) for violation of Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), his oath as a lawyer, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice (Notarial Rules).2

The Facts

In his Petition for Disbarment, complainant alleged that on December 19, 2012, respondent notarized a
Deed of Self Adjudication with Sale and/with Deed of Absolute Sale3 (Deed) executed by Jose Unite Torrices
(Torrices), claiming to be the sole heir of Herminigildo, in favor of one Francisco U. Tamayo (Tamayo),
covering a parcel of land located in Ballesteros, Cagayan and covered by a title4 under Herminigildo's name.
According to complainant, the Deed was executed with only Torrices's community tax certificate (CTC) as
evidence of identity.5 Complainant asserted that he is the only surviving heir of his father, Herminigildo, as
Torrices is his cousin. As a result of respondent's acts, the Deed was recorded in the Registry of Deeds,
which caused the cancellation of his father's title and the issuance of a new one in the name of
Tamayo.6 Complainant added that on October 20, 2014, he filed a complaint for the annulment of the Deed
and Tamayo's title, with liquidation/accounting and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros,
Cagayan, Branch 33, docketed as Civil Case No. 33-471-2014.7 In support of his Petition, complainant
attached copies of the Deed, Certificate of Death of Herminigildo,8 his birth certificate,9 the marriage
contract of his parents,10 Tamayo's Transfer Certificate of Title,11 and the Complaint12 in Civil Case No. 33-
471-2014 with its annexes.13

In his Answer,14 respondent denied the charges against him and claimed that he complied with the
requirements of the Notarial Rules. Particularly, he verified the identity of the parties to the Deed from their
current government identification documents with pictures and CTCs.15 He further inquired from the parties,
especially from Torrices, their capacity to execute the Deed.

In reply16 to respondent's Answer, complainant pointed out, among others, that: (a) a CTC is no longer
considered a competent evidence of identification as it does not bear the photograph and signature of the
individua1;17(b) the other documents presented by Torrices as proof of being the sole heir did not cure the
absence of the required competent evidence of identity;18(c) and the pendency of Civil Case No. 33-471-
2014 does not bar the instant administrative action.19

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated April 21, 2015, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IBP-IC) found
respondent administratively liable for violation of the Notarial Rules. The IBP-IC held that respondent failed
to confirm the identity of the parties to the Deed through the presentation of competent evidence of identity
as required by the Notarial Rules, pointing out, in this regard, that a CTC is not one of the enumerated
evidence of identity under the Rules.21 Accordingly, the IBP-IC recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and be disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of one (1) year.22

In a Resolution23 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the above-findings but reduced
the recommended penalty imposed on respondent to reprimand, "considering that [r]espondent personally
knows the affiant and the [CTC] then will suffice."

Dissatisfied, complainant moved for reconsideration,24 which the IBP Board of Governors denied in a
Resolution25 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent liable for violation
of the Notarial Rules.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the findings and adopts the recommendations of the IBP with modifications.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the act of notarization is impressed with public interest.
Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. 26 A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credence.27 As
such, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties
in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.28 In this light, the
Court has ruled that notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they
should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.29

Under Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is "in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization," and is "personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity."30 Section 12, Rule II of the same rules, as amended by the
February 19, 2008 En Banc  Resolution in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, defines "competent evidence of identity"
thus:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:

(a)

At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual; such as but not limited to, passport, driver's license, Professional
Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's
ID, Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government
office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or

(b)
The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP-IC, clearly failed to faithfully observe his duties as a
notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of Torrices through the competent evidence of identity
required by the Notarial Rules. This fact is clear from the Deed itself which shows that Torrices presented
only his CTC when he appeared before respondent. Jurisprudence31 provides that a community tax certificate
or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity not only because it is not
included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules; more importantly, it does not bear the
photograph and signature of the person appearing before notaries public which the Rules deem as the more
appropriate and competent means by which they can ascertain the person's identity.

While respondent argues that, apart from the CTC, he required all the parties to the Deed to present at least
two (2) current government identification documents and conducted further interviews to ascertain their
capacity and personality to enter into the transactions, the Deed itself, however, belies this contention. Had
respondent indeed required – and had the parties presented – current government identification documents
at the time of the Deed's notarization, respondent should have reflected these facts on the Deed's.
acknowledgement portion in the same manner that the Deed reflected Torrices' CTC. By notarizing the Deed
notwithstanding the absence of the competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial Rules,
respondent undoubtedly failed to properly perform his duty as a notary public.

In this regard, the Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governor's finding that respondent personally
knows the affiant, hence, the CTC suffices. Under Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules quoted above,
a notary public may be excused from requiring the presentation of competent evidence of identity of the
signatory before him only if such signatory is personally known  to him. In this case, the acknowledgment
portion of the Deed does not state that Torrices is personally known to respondent, as the Rules require;
rather, it simply states that Torrices is known to me(respondent), thus:

"Personally came and appeared before me on this ___day of  ____ at [sic] Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Jose
U. Torrices with his CTC No. appearing below his signature known to me and to me known to be the same
person who executed the foregoing instrument and who acknowledged to that the same is her [sic] free act
and voluntary deed."32(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, nowhere in the Deed did respondent declare that Torrices is personally known to him so as
to excuse the presentation of any of the enumerated competent evidence of identity. Moreover, it should be
clarified that the phrase "personally known" contemplates the notary public's personal knowledge of the
signatory's personal circumstances independent and irrespective of any representations made by the
signatory immediately before and/or during the time of the notarization.33 It entails awareness,
understanding, or knowledge of the signatory's identity and circumstances gained through firsthand
observation or experience which therefore serve as guarantee of the signatory's identity and thus eliminate
the need for the verification process of documentary identification. In this case, if indeed respondent
personally knows Torrices, as the IBP Board of Governors surmised, there would have been no need for
respondent, as he asserted in his Answer, to require the parties to present at least two (2) current
government identification documents and conduct further interviews to ascertain their capacity and
personality to execute the Deed.

Lastly, as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.34 By notarizing the subject Deed, he engaged in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for violation of the CPR, particularly
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 thereof which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As herein discussed, respondent's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in
damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also in undermining the integrity of the
office of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization.35 He should thus be held liable for
such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Consistent with jurisprudence,36 he should
be meted out with the modified penalty of immediate revocation of his notarial commission, if any,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years, and suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman GUILTY of violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
hereby: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months; REVOKES his incumbent
commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for
a period of two (2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, and disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public shall take effect immediately upon receipt of this Resolution by respondent.
He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.