Being and Essence in Aristotle and Aquin PDF

BEING
AND ESSENCE IN ARISTOTLE AND

AQUINAS

by

Dino Jakušić

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Philosophy in Philosophy
University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy
July 2014
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. 4
Declaration of authorship ....................................................................................................... 4
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 5
Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 8
Chapter 1: Aristotle ............................................................................................................... 10
1. Aristotle’s Account of Being ...................................................................................... 10
1.1. Two non-‐Aristotelian conceptions of being ...................................................... 10
1.2. Ontology and Primary Philosophy .................................................................... 11
1.3. Τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν .......................................................................................................... 13
2. Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς ........................................................................................... 15
2.1. Equivocation ..................................................................................................... 15
2.2. Πρὸς ἕν equivocation ........................................................................................ 17
2.3. Being, genus and indefinability ......................................................................... 19
2.4. Ways in which being is said ............................................................................... 21
2.5. Philosophical order ........................................................................................... 23
3. Τίς ἡ οὐσία; ............................................................................................................... 26
3.1. Being and substance ......................................................................................... 26
3.2. Substance as substrate ..................................................................................... 29
3.3. Substance and the Physics ................................................................................ 31
3.4. Substance and ἐνέργεια .................................................................................... 32
3.5. Substance and Causes ....................................................................................... 37
4. Summary ................................................................................................................... 40
Chapter 2: Aquinas ............................................................................................................... 41
1. The change of context .............................................................................................. 41
2. Ens per se dicitur... .................................................................................................... 43
2

3. …dupliciter ................................................................................................................ 44
4. Substantia ................................................................................................................. 46
5. Essentia ..................................................................................................................... 48
5.1. Essence of complex substances ........................................................................ 49
5.2. Essences of simple substances .......................................................................... 52
6. Esse ........................................................................................................................... 55
6.1. Esse and efficient causation .............................................................................. 59
7. Summary ................................................................................................................... 62
Chapter 3: The missing sense ............................................................................................... 64
1. Absence of existence in Aristotle .............................................................................. 64
2. Essentialist and Existentialist Ontology .................................................................... 67
3. Why existence? ......................................................................................................... 69
3.1. Eternity of motion ............................................................................................. 69
3.2. Creation ............................................................................................................ 71
3.3. Matter ............................................................................................................... 74
4. Summary ................................................................................................................... 75
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 77
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 80
Primary Sources ................................................................................................................ 80
Aristotle ........................................................................................................................ 80
Aquinas ......................................................................................................................... 81
Secondary Sources ............................................................................................................ 82

3

Acknowledgments
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Arthur David Smith, for all
the help, patience and understanding in leading me through the two dark forests of being. I
can just hope he enjoyed my discoveries as much as I have his guidance. I would also like to
thank Mrs. Susan Podmore for leading me, and many of my colleagues, through even
darker forests of university administration. Without these two people this work would
never even have begun.
Secondly, I wish to thank dear friends and colleagues for all the help and
companionship they have provided throughout the years. I have to specifically mention
Jeffery Pickernell and Paul Conduit, as well as Graham Wetherall and Juan Camilo Espejo-‐
Serna.
Finally, and closest to my heart, I have to thank Robert King and Bethany Parsons.
They believed that this thesis will be complete all those times I did not believe it. Without
them I do not know how I would have endured these two years on the way of despair.
Declaration of authorship

I declare that this thesis is the product of my own work and that no part of it has been
submitted for a degree at any other university.
4

Abstract

This work discusses the concepts of being and essence in Aristotle and Aquinas. It is divided
into three chapters. The first chapter starts by considering how these concepts were
understood by Aristotle, focusing on the Metaphysics. The second chapter considers the
same concepts in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, tracking his treatment of the
topics through several of his works. The final chapter attempts to synthesise the first two in
order to reveal the crucial difference between the two thinkers and speculates on the
origin of such difference. This difference will show itself to be the one between
existentialist and essentialist ontology, the former of which understands being as form,
while the latter understands it as an act of the efficient cause.
5

Abbreviations
De Ente – De Ente et Essentia
(trans. Bobik 1965)
De Trinitate – Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate
(trans. Brennan 1946 & Mauer 1953)
SCG – Summa Contra Gentiles
(trans. Pegis 1991 & Anderson 1992)
ST – Summa Theologiae
(trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1947)
Sent. Metaph. – In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Expositio
(trans. Rowan 1961)
Super Sent. – Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum
(trans. McInerny 1999)
6

“ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι ταύτης, ἀμεινων δ’ οὐδεμία”
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, 2.983a10-‐11.
7

Introduction
Franz Brentano prefaces his book On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle with
the following apology:
Humbly and with reluctance I put this small essay before the
public; yet I feel that I deserve rather to be criticized for being too
bold than too timid. For if one does what is too daring he must
appear overly bold, even if he undertakes it with apprehension.
And what is more daring than what I have done here more than
once: I have tried to resolve difficulties which experienced men
have described as unsolvable.
In this small work which I reluctantly put forward, I feel that I deserve to be
criticised for being too timid. For I have not tried to resolve difficulties posited by the ones
more experienced than myself, I have simply tried to understand them. What I have tried
to understand in this work are two concepts: being and essence. More precisely, I have
tried to understand how they were understood by two thinkers: Aristotle and Aquinas. I
have attempted this as a part of a larger project, a project for which I might one day be
accused of being too daring. This project is to understand being, not in other thinkers, but
in itself. More specifically, the aim of the project is to understand whether asking the
question of being itself is meaningful after Kant. But in order to undertake this project it is
important to understand how the question of being has been asked and answered
throughout the history of philosophy.
When interpreting something through its historical development one has to start
from somewhere. If one is interested in being, starting with Aristotle does not seem
strange at all. The problem with Aristotle, however, is that even though there have been
8

many centuries of Aristotelian interpretation, Aristotle’s Metaphysics remains notoriously
difficult. Even the choice about the order of progression and legitimacy of the books of
Metaphysics is a highly debated and hermeneutically significant issue. Due to this, I have
followed an interpretation of the series of metaphysical treatise as argued for by Joseph
Owens in his book The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics.
The choice to focus on both Aristotle and Aquinas might seem strange. The
decision to do it was, in a sense, a leap into darkness. Scholastic philosophy can be seen as
a ground from which philosophy developed in the 17th century, therefore making even
philosophy of today its distant heiress. Regardless of this historical significance
scholasticism is rarely taught or discussed in the mainstream academic philosophy of today,
hence I approached it without engaging with it prior to the writing of this work. The
motivation to consider Aquinas was therefore mostly based on a hope that there is
something significant to find in a period of philosophy rarely considered by anyone
anymore. By the end of the work I hope I will sufficiently show that there is something
interesting and worth considering in Aquinas.
The work is separated into three chapters. The first chapter provides an
interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of being and essence with few references to
Aquinas. The second chapter focuses on Aquinas’ understanding of these concepts, and
references back to Aristotle are not infrequent. The third chapter attempts to compare the
ontologies of two thinkers and discusses the potential origin of their differing
understandings of being. Plenty is left unsaid in my treatment of these figures; however, I
have tried not to omit anything crucial for the understanding of their theories. I only hope
that I have been successful in my interpretation and presentation.

9

Chapter 1: Aristotle
1. Aristotle’s Account of Being
1.1. Two non-‐Aristotelian conceptions of being
For Aristotle, being is said in many ways – to on legetai pollachōs. Before we start
explicating what this means and where it takes us, it will be important to note that there
are two similar, but importantly different ways in which the word “being” can be used
within English philosophical practice. “Being”, used to translate the Aristotelian phrase, is a
way of rendering the Greek present active participle (on) of the word with the infinitive
einai – to be. There are two standard ways of rendering such a Greek or Latin participle in
English – either with the addition of the suffix “-‐ing” (be-‐ing, writ-‐ing, runn-‐ing), or through
the phrase “the one which x” (the one which is, writes, runs). Where the participle is
rendered by the –ing form, i.e. as “being” rather than “the one which is”, some traditions
of translation attempt to make explicit that “being” is still to be understood in sense of “the
one which is” by translating it as “a being”, “beings”, or “entity”. This specification is
deemed necessary by some in order to differentiate this sense of “being” from the one
usually implied when we translate the infinitive or gerund.1 This second sense, in contrast
to the first one which signifies something (anything) that is, stands for the act of such
beings, i.e. that in which beings designated by the participle participate, the to be of all that
is, sometimes called the being of beings. If we take to on to signify the participle usage we
can understand to on legetai pollachōs as saying something along the lines of “that which
is, <is> said <to be> in many senses.”2

1
For example, to einai pollachōs – “various senses of being” is Ross’ translation of the gerund to
einai (Metaphysics, 5.1019a5).
2
Ross sometimes translates to on as “that which is”, cf. Metaphysics 4, 5.1009a32; 7, 1.1028a19.
10

1.2. Ontology and Primary Philosophy
The account or the science of beings can be called ontology, logos of onta. The
term ontology, however, is younger than Aristotle and does not appear in his works. One
interesting question we might ask is whether and in what sense one can treat (parts of)
Aristotle’s philosophy as what we might today call ontology. Aristotle’s account of being
can be found in the edition of his work now known as the Metaphysics, another term alien
to Aristotle himself.3 The term Aristotle uses to describe the work undertaken in the
Metaphysics is Prote Philosophia or Sophia – First/Primary Philosophy or Wisdom.4
Wisdom, Aristotle tells us, is knowledge [epistēmē] about certain causes and
principles.5 Since a wise man knows all things [epistasthai panta], although not each of
them individually,6 the science proposed here will have to be the science of first principles
and causes.7 Aristotle foreshadows that this science will also be the one which is the most
divine and honourable since it is the one which deals with god amongst the causes of all
things and as a first principle and with divine objects8 – and due to this he names it
theology.9 In a sense, all sciences investigate beings [ta onta], their causes and principles.
After all, it would be difficult to have a science of ‘that which is not’. However, unlike the
science we are looking for, the science which can be understood as wisdom or primary
philosophy, all other sciences mark off some particular region of being, some genus, and

3
The commonly accepted mythos is that the name has its origins in Andronicus of Rhodes’
placement of the work in the library of Alexandria after the work on nature – meta ta physika.
Owens (1963, p. 74) disputes this claim, but argues in favour of the idea that the meta signifies the
fact that the philosophical work Metaphysics undertakes comes after the Physics in the doctrinal
sequence, and goes beyond the physical order. This interpretation is shared by Aquinas in De
Trinitate, pars 3, q.5, a. 1, co.
4
Metaphysics 1, 1.981b29; Ibid. 4, 2.1004a35.
5
Metaphysics 1, 1.982a3.
6
Metaphysics 1, 2.982a7-‐9. Arguing for a different point, Kosman (2013, p. ix) points out that the
scholarship on Aristotle benefited from reading episteme as understanding rather than knowledge. If
we adopt this practice the claim that the understanding of first causes and principles gives us a
general understanding of all things becomes more intuitive than what might be seen as a strange
state of knowing all things, but not individually.
7
Metaphysics 1, 2.982b3.
8
Metaphysics 1, 2.983a8-‐9.
9
11

confine their theorising to one class of beings.10 In this way, the science of nature deals
with things which are inseparable from matter, but not immovable, some parts of
mathematics deal with things which are immovable, but embodied in matter, while the
Primary Philosophy, Aristotle again foreshadows, will deal with what is separable and
immovable.11 I say ‘foreshadows’ since there has been no treatment at the part of the
Metaphysics discussing Primary Philosophy which would suggest that there is such an
object for the First Philosophy to deal with– the justification for the assumption of the
separable and the immovable has not been given. Indeed, Aristotle raises the possibility
that there might be no substance other than natural substance, in which case the science
of nature would be the first science.12 If there were such a thing as something separable
and immovable then First Philosophy would be first in the sense of investigating the
immovable as the cause of the movable.13 However, regardless of the status of the
separable and the immovable, it will be primary in another way: it will investigate being
qua being [to on hē(i) on]. 14 In this sense, it will be primary because it will not be a special
science, that is, it will not confine itself to a certain region of being. What it will do is
investigate being as being [theōrei to on hē(i) on] and the attributes [kai ta toutō(i)
hyparchonta] which belong to it in itself [kath’ hauto].15 We can phrase this as an
investigation into what anything is simply in virtue of the fact that it is.
Primary philosophy will be the science of the first causes and principles, but we
could ask in what sense it is going to investigate such a priority. The answer will become
clear in the next section when we discuss the idea of equivocation due to the single nature.
Aristotle discusses the nature of priority throughout his work and the sense of this kind of

10
Metaphysics 6, 1.1025b7-‐10.
11
12
13
14
15
12

priority seems difficult to categorise according to Aristotle’s different ways of
understanding priority, i.e. in terms of time, being, certain order, and goodness.16 I do not
wish to spend a lot of time on this issue. It will suffice to say that in Metaphysics 7,
1.1028a31-‐2 Aristotle tells us that substance, which will be identified as the common
nature sought by Primary Philosophy is primary in every sense, and by every sense, at this
point he means “in formula [logo(i)], in order of knowledge, in time.” I believe that the
reasons for such priority become clear once we accept Aristotle’s reduction of the question
of being to the question of substance and form, i.e. that through which something is made
actual and knowable.17
1.3. Τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν
The way the phrase to on hē(i) on is understood is crucial. Its importance goes
beyond the attempt to reach a proper hermeneutical account of Aristotle’s thought. It
provides us with the account of the original conception of the science of ontology and it is
therefore indispensable for all of us who wish to ask ontological questions today while
engaging with Aristotle. The problem, of course, is the aforementioned lack of the use of
the term ontology in Aristotle and therefore the lack of the explicit designation of the
object, scope, and method of what we would today call ontology. At this point I would like
to set out the conception of ontology and the Aristotelian project of the science of being
qua being which will underpin this investigation.
Kosman (2013, pp. 252-‐3) characterises the project of Aristotle’s philosophy
presented in the Metaphysics as “an ontology of being.” He recognises that this phrase
sounds horribly pleonastic. What would ontology be of if not of being? But the reason

16
Categories 12.14a27-‐30, Physics 8, 7.260a27-‐30, Metaphysics 7, 1.1028a31-‐2.
17
For a more detailed and complex argument for the primacy of substance over other categories for
understanding the nature of Being cf. Kosman 2013, pp. 82, 132 who develops the idea Aristotle
argues for the both ontic and conceptual (i.e. explanatory) primacy of substance in Metaphysics 7,
1.1028b2-‐3 (“we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or
what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we know also,
only when we know what the quantity or the quality is”).
13

Kosman introduces the phrase is in order to draw attention to the distinction “between the
notion of entity and that of being” – this is the distinction which I have presented as the
distinction between the participle and gerundial use, between anything at all and that by
which anything is simply in virtue of the fact that it is. Indeed, Kosman continues, Aristotle’s
ontology is the one “of being in its full gerundive [sic] and verbal force”, and as such “is not
so much a theory of beings as it is a theory of the being of those beings.”18 In my
understanding, this means that Aristotle (and any ontology inspired by Aristotle) is not a
discipline which asks itself what kinds of beings there are, or lists what there is –
differentiating between objects, stuffs, events, minds, brains, etc. It is a more fundamental
inquiry, one which confronts the philosopher listing what there is and discussing kinds of
beings that are there with the question: where?19 This is more than a distinction between
what will in some later philosophical traditions be called regional and fundamental
ontology, although this distinction can be found in Aristotle, exemplified in his distinction
between special sciences and the science of to on hē(i) on. The ontology of Aristotle,
understood in the way Kosman seems to propose, and which I can sympathise with, is one
which will not only not be regional (i.e. it will not be an ontology of mathematics, or of
natural science, but of being), but will also not be restricted to an investigation of
fundamental kinds of entities. Ontology which investigates to on hē(i) on – an entity in so
far as it is an entity, that which is in virtue of its simply being – will not be satisfied with
only investigating kinds of entities. It has to investigate the being shared by all of them,
since if it is possible to differentiate several entities, their fundamental unity lies in the fact

18
For Kosman’s arguments why it is important to understand that Aristotle is not concerned with
distinctions “among kinds of things, but among modes of being […] differences not between animals
and artifacts, but between the substantial being Aristotle takes to be exemplified in animals and the
accidental being he takes to be exemplified in artifacts,” cf. Kosman 2013, pp. 120-‐1; 239.
19
This is, of course, an attempt at a lyrical expression. I am aware about the grammatically
innocuous status of “there” in the expressions such as “what there is”. On the other hand, however,
maybe language points to something which we would not always explicitly admit it does.
14

that they are all entities, that they all, on the simplest level, are.20 This is even suggested by
the phrase itself – to on is a neuter participle, hence it is not his being, nor her being, but a
neutral, general being – and this being is to be seen in no other determination but the
beingness of beings as beings.
2. Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς
2.1. Equivocation
Aristotle tells us many times that being is said in many ways,21 but being is not the
only thing which is legetai pollachōs. Other things which are said in many ways are, for
example, “that in virtue of which,”22 “cause,”23 and “potentiality.”24
At this point it would be pertinent to discuss the sense of something being said in
many ways. The meaning of this phrase is made clear in the first chapter of Aristotle’s
Categories. Aristotle writes:
When things have only a name [onoma] in common and the definition
of being [logos tēs ousias] which corresponds to the name is different,
they are called homonymous [homōnyma]. Thus, for example, both a
man and a picture are animals… for if one is to say what being an animal
is [to zō(i)ō(i) einai] for each of them, one will give two distinct
definitions… When things have the name in common and the definition
of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called

20
I do not think this falls into Dancy’s (1986, p. 64) “magnifying glass fallacy”, i.e. thinking there is
something special about the word is in a sentence, and then extracting the word is from the context
of the sentence and squeezing it until it leaks various meanings. Dancy’s approach is fundamentally
linguistic, while I am hoping to follow what could be seen as a metaphysical one. The difference in
perspective when approaching and interpreting a philosophical text or idea is not innocent.
21
Physics 1, 2.185a22; Metaphysics 4, 2.1003a33, b5; Metaphysics 7, 1.1028a10. Also Metaphysics 5,
11.1019a5, although pollachōs here refers to to einai, rather than to on.
22
To kath’ ho legetai pollachōs – Metaphysics 5, 18.1022a14.
23
24
Physics 8, 4.255a32 – although this phrase does not use pollachōs – to dynamei pleonachōs
legetai.
15

synonymous [synōnyma]… for example, both a man and an ox are
animals… for if one is to give the definition of each – what being an
animal is for each of them – one will give the same definition [ton auton
logon apodōsei].25
Even though synōnyma and homōnyma can be translated as synonym and
homonym I will follow the more common way of translating them as univocals and
equivocals respectively. Owens argues that this practice is prudent since the contemporary
practice is to use homonym and synonym to designate words and terms, while for Aristotle
they designate things.26 Let us focus on equivocals. There are at least three ways in which
something can be said equivocally27: accidentally [kata symbebēkos], by analogy, and
because of a common origin [aph’ henos] or a kind of a common reference [pros hen].28
Accidental equivocity designates the use of two identical names completely by accident. A
common example in in modern English is the word ‘bank’, which can mean either a
financial institution or the shore of a river. Historically, the favourite example seems to
have been the use of the word dog for both canis lupus familiaris and for the star Sirius.29
Equivocation by analogy follows the formula presented by Aristotle in the Poetics: “when
the second is related to the first as the fourth is to the third.”30 The final kind of equivocals
which I wish to present here is the one referred to as the pros hen equivocals – equivocity
through some common nature.

25
Categories, 1.1a1-‐12. I am omitting paronyms since they will not be relevant for the discussion.
26
Owens 1963, p. 112.
27
Owens 1963, pp. 117-‐25.
28
Kosman (2013, p. 8) explains such equivocals are those said in reference to a single sense [pros
hen] or in reference to a single nature [pros mian physin legomena].
29
Cf. Aquinas, Sent. Metaph, lib. 4, lec. 1, n.7.
30
Poetics, 21.1457b16-‐18 as quoted by Owens 1963, p. 123 who also provides an example from
Rhetoric III, 11.1412a5-‐6 – “As the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless man to his victim.”
16

2.2. Πρὸς ἕν equivocation
Examples of pros hen equivocity can be found in the Metaphysics:
Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense
that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another
in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable
of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing in
the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally
adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical
art…31 For each of these [terms, i.e. medical and healthy] also we use in
many senses [pollachōs legomen]; and each is used in this way because
the former refers somehow to medical science and the latter to health.
Other terms refer to other things, but each term refers to some one
thing. For a prescription and a knife are called medical because the
former proceeds from medical science, and the latter is useful to it. And
a thing is called healthy in the same way; one thing because it is
indicative of health, another because it is productive of it.32
The following clarifying example is provided by Kosman (2013, p. 8): urine, exercise,
and medicine can all be healthy, but not in the same sense. What it is for urine to be
healthy is different from what it is for exercise to be healthy. But something still unites
them. Healthy urine is indicative of health, exercise contributes to and maintains health,
and medicine produces or restores it. What unites them is the fact that they are all called
‘healthy’ in relation [pros hen] to a single, primary sense of being healthy – that is, an
animal’s health (or an animal’s being healthy).

31
Metaphysics 4, 2.1003a33-‐b4.
32
Metaphysics 11, 3.1060b35-‐1061a6.
17

The reason for focusing on pros hen equivocation can be found in the lines of the
Metaphysics which give context to Aristotle’s discussion of health – the lines which I have
so far omitted. Prior to the passages cited above Aristotle writes that: “There are many
senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’ [to de on legetai men pollachōs], but they are
related to one certain point [pros hen], a single nature [mian tina physin].”33 This claim is
then illustrated with the example of “health” and “healthy”. Similarly, immediately prior to
the second quote, Aristotle writes that: “Since the science of the philosopher treats of
being qua being universally and not of some part of it [tou ontos hē(i) on katholou kai ou
kata meros], and ‘being’ has many senses [to d’ on pollachōs (…) legetai] and is not used in
only one (…) if it is used in virtue of some common nature, it will fall under one science.”
The term being, Aristotle suggests is used in the way we have mentioned, “like ‘medical’
and ‘healthy’.”34 This illuminates how we are to approach the question of being in Aristotle
and reveals what is hidden behind the phrase legetai pollachōs – being [to on], which is the
object of the general science of Primary Philosophy, a philosophy of being qua being [to on
hē(i) on], is to be understood and treated as a pros hen equivocal, equivocal with the
reference to a common nature.35

33
Metaphysics 4, 2.1003a33-‐4. Translation slightly modified from Ross who translate mian tina
physin as “a definite kind of thing.”
34
35
A careful reader will notice that I omit an interesting claim by Aristotle which appears in the same
parts of the text I quote here in order to support the idea that to on is a pros hen equivocal. The
claim is, simply put, that being is not said equivocally (11, 3.1060b33 – ei men oun homōnymōs; 4,
2.1003a34 – kai ouch homōnymōs). With respect to this aporia I follow Owens, who claims that in
these paragraph homōnymōs, which Aristotle urges us not to consider being to be, refers to things
which are totally equivocal, i.e. equivocals of the kind of the bank or the dog star. I will not present
Owens’ argument here, but it is important to point out that he argues for this through the appeal to
the “equivocal nature of equivocity itself” (Owens 1963, pp. 121-‐2). Another interesting fact Owens
points to in the same discussion (Ibid, pp. 124-‐5) is that the pros hen type of equivocals are not
called “analogous” by Aristotle, but that such denomination of them was common in the subsequent
Scholastic tradition. While, Owens argues, these two kinds of equivocity are not mutually exclusive,
they are clearly distinct. To distinguish them simply, pros hen is a two-‐term (knife is medical as a
tool, prescription is medical as a product) while analogy is a four-‐term relation (cf. Ibid, p. 123: “As
the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless man to his victim”). Owens does not speculate about
the reasons why the tradition took over the name analogy to render pros hen, but we could assume
that it might owe to the tradition’s not sharing the thought Owens expresses by his claim that
homōnymōs legetai pollachōs.
18

2.3. Being, genus and indefinability
At this point, we have established that a being, to on, is to be treated as a pros hen
equivocal. What else does Aristotle tell us about being? Prior to the discussion of to on as a
pros hen equivocal, Aristotle argues that it is impossible to treat being [to on] as a genus of
beings [tōn ontōn], of things that are.36 The reason for this, Aristotle argues, is that the
differentiae of any genus must themselves have being; that is to say, they have being
predicated of them, i.e. they have to be. But, Aristotle continues, it is impossible for the
genus “to be predicated of the differentiae taken apart from the species”. From this,
Aristotle concludes that if being were a genus, no differentia would have being.37
Let us try to clarify this with an example. Man belongs to the genus animal and can
be defined as the rational animal. The differentia which differentiates man as rational
animal is rational, or possession of rationality. What we cannot do is to predicate the
genus, animal, of the differentia, rational, apart from the species – apart from rational
animal. This means we can say a rational animal is an animal, but we cannot say that
rational is an animal, nor that rationality is an animal. Now, if we posit being as a genus this
rule would be violated. Let us say that there is a genus being, and that its two species are
extended being and thinking being, or being possessing extension, and being possessing
thought. In this case we can ask whether extension and thought are themselves beings. If
we say yes we have violated the posited principle. If we say no, that is, if we say that
thought and extension are not beings, then we are saying that there are no such things as
thought and extension. If we follow this thought beyond the examples we see that we
cannot attribute any differentia to the genus being since anything which we might posit to

36
Metaphysics 3, 3.998b23 – ouch hoion te de tōn ontōn hen einai genos oute to hen oute to on· As a
reader of Greek will notice, Aristotle discusses both being [to on] and unity [to hen] at this point, on
equal grounds.
37
19

serve that purpose either cannot be or will violate the principle of non-‐differential
predication. 38
A significant consequence follows from this, which concerns the indefinability and
apparent unknowability of being:
In so far as we know each thing by its definition, and the genera are the
principles of definitions, the genera must also be the principles of
definable things. And if to get the knowledge of beings [kan ei esti tēn
tōn ontōn labein epistēmēn] is to get the knowledge of the species
according to which they are named, the genera are at least starting-‐
points of the species.39
If we read this quote in connection with the claim that being is not a genus and
hence that beings cannot be known according to the species from which they derive
their name, the conclusion which suggests itself is that the science of being qua
being will not be able to proceed in discussing its subject matter through a
definitional model of generic-‐specific constitution and hence it will not be possible to
reach any knowledge of being qua being. To say what being is, to talk about it qua
being, will not be possible through the attempt to give a definition of it, at least not if
we understand definition through the model of explicating something’s genetic-‐
specific constitution. The solution to the problem, however, seems to already be

38
Some could say that the examples I have provided are question-‐begging since I identify
differentiae as attributes such as rational and extended with the possession of certain beings:
rationality and extension. The legitimacy of such identification certainly does not seem
unproblematic; however, it does not seem to me that Aristotle would disagree with such a
presentation of his reasoning. The problem might be with my example, rather than with the claim
that being is not a genus.
39
Metaphysics 3, 3.998b4-‐8. Slightly modified Ross translation. The actual aim Aristotle seems to
have in this section seems to be to show that eidos, which can be translated as either species or
form, exemplifies these two distinct senses. Hence, ho logos tēs ousias will be different from tōn
genōn horismos. Cf. Ibid. 3.998b10-‐13. Later in the Metaphysics (8, 1.1042a19) we are told that a
“definition is a formula” [epei de ho horismos logos], but as we have seen here, this will refer to a
different kind of definition than the genetic-‐specific one.
20

implicit. The way to reach the possibility of a discourse on being and hence an
understanding of being is through pros hen equivocity. Let us accept this for now and
postpone the discussion of the precise mechanism of this solution until later.
2.4. Ways in which being is said
If something is called a being in various ways it will be good to say more about
what Aristotle believes these ways are. We can find one list of the many ways in
which to on is said in Book 5 of the Metaphysics. The first distinction is that “Things
are said to be (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.”40 Under the
accidental sense fall instances such as “when we say the just is musical, and the man
is musical and the musical is a man… for here ‘one thing is another’ means ‘one is an
accident of another’… either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or
because that to which the attribute belongs is or because the subject which has as an
attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.” 41
The kath’ hauto sense is the sense related to what are today known as the
“Aristotelian categories” discussed in the Topics. This is followed by another two
senses of to on. The first of these senses is the veridical sense. Aristotle names it the
“’Being’ and ‘is’”42 sense and understands it as referring to the truth (is) or falsity
(non-‐being, is not) of the statement. The second of these two senses Aristotle calls
“’Being’ and ‘that which is’”43 and understands it in the sense of the distinction
between potentiality [dynamis] or actuality [entelecheia].
This division is repeated in books 6 and 7 with slight variations. 44 In book 6, we
are given a similar list (accidental, true, categories or “figures of predication”, and

40
To on legetai to men kata symbebēkos, to de kath’ hauto…
41
Metaphysics 5, 7.1017a8-‐1017b1.
42
To einai kai to estin…
43
To einai sēmainei kai to on…
44
Cf. Metaphysics 6, 2.1026a34-‐b4 and Metaphysics 7, 1.1028a10-‐20.
21

potentiality and actuality). A new insight found in this book is that the science of
being qua being is not to treat of the accidental sense of being (since “there can be
no scientific treatment of it”45) and that it is not to treat of being as truth (since
“falsity and truth are not in things (…) but in thought; while with regard to simple
things and essences [ta ti estin] falsity and truth do not exist even in thought”46).
Finally, in book 7, Aristotle seems to leave out the potentiality-‐actuality sense and,
referring to the fact that “we pointed out previously in our book on the various
senses of words,” being is said in the sense of “what a thing is or a ‘this’,”47 and in
the sense of the categories.48
What seems to be suggested by this is that Aristotle is providing a more
definite scope for our enquiry. We must remember that what is being attempted
here is a discourse on being qua being. Since being is said in many ways in the sense
of a pros hen equivocal, it will have various senses; however, as in the case of health,
there will be one primary sense which unites all the other. The fact that there is a
reduction of scope under which we will investigate the instances of being should not
strike us as strange. While in principle the primary instance of being could be
elaborated from any particular instantiation of a pros hen equivocal, it does not seem
strange that some routes would be more direct than others. Aristotle, after all, gives
an explanation of why certain routes will not work.49 What might remain a cause for
concern, however, is how we are to justify the claim that all of these equivocals
actually are pros hen equivocals.

45
46
47
To men ti esti kai tode ti…
48
49
At least for the accidental and the true; potentiality-‐actuality mysteriously disappears.
22

2.5. Philosophical order
At this point, it becomes useful to reflect upon Aristotle’s conception of
philosophical method. Aristotle opens the Physics50 with the claim that if the object
of an inquiry has principles, causes, or elements, knowledge and understanding [to
eidenai kai to epistasthai] of the object will be achieved through the acquaintance
with these principles, causes, or elements. What Aristotle calls the natural way of
attaining such knowledge is to “start from the things which are more knowable and
clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by
nature [tēj physei].” Since the same things “are not knowable relatively to us and
knowable without qualification” we must “advance from what is more obscure by
nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.”
The Metaphysics51 expresses a similar thought. “[L]earning proceeds,” Aristotle
stresses, “for all in this way – through that which is less intelligible by nature [physei]
to that which is more intelligible [by nature] (…) so it is our work to start from what is
more intelligible to oneself and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to
oneself… [O]ne must start from that which is barely intelligible but intelligible to
oneself, and try to understand what is intelligible in itself, passing (…) by way of
those very things which one understands.”52
Understanding the nature of Aristotle’s method discloses two implications.
The first of them concerns the reasons for the consideration of the physical ousia by
the Primary Philosophy. This implication will be addressed shortly. The second tells
us about what we can call Aristotelian ‘induction’. For Aristotle, the science of
metaphysics will not take the course of an a priori deduction in the style of the

50
Physics 1, 1.194a10-‐21.
51
52
In the subsequent tradition this will be called a philosophical order and contrasted with the
theological order of inquiry. Cf. Aquinas, De Trinitate, Prooemium; Gilson 1961, p. 22; Wippel 1984,
p. 124 & 2000, p. xxvii.
23

Leibniz-‐Wolff school or of Spinoza. On the other hand, it would be wrong to consider
it as a form of empiricism, at least in the way we today understand the term. For
Aristotle, what we might call experience is the starting point for knowledge, rather
than being an induction-‐based instrument of knowability (in a modern sense of the
universal conclusion from the particulars based on the repetition of observation or
hypothesis-‐verification/falsification). The Aristotelian treatment of experience could
be compared to the method of Kant, in which the empirical world provides us with a
bewildering puzzle which is to be theoretically justified. However, Aristotle is
certainly not looking for the conditions of the possibility of experience of objects.
What interests Aristotle, in any theoretical science, not just in the primary science, is
the explanation of causes and principles of things, rather than objects of experience.
Even if we acknowledge this, it does not seem to exhaust the difference
between the approach of Kant and Aristotle. Indeed, there seems to remain
something more inherently incompatible between the two methods. This
incompatibility owes to the difficulty of conceiving of the notion of the “conditions of
possibility of x” within the context of Aristotelian thought.53
A similar thought seems to drive Owens to proclaim, in reference to the
Metaphysics, that “The doctrine in the treatises is therefore neither Wolffian nor
Platonic. If it is to be labelled, it can be named only from its own author. It is properly
Aristotelian.”54 Owens is here referring to Aristotle’s doctrine of being, and its
difference from the subsequent doctrines need not to be thought strange, if we take
into consideration Aristotle’s fundamental philosophical orientation, his fundamental
conception of what philosophy is and how to engage in it. Aristotle’s primary

53
It would be lazy and ultimately incorrect to try to transpose Kantian “conditions of possibility”
literally into Aristotelian vocabulary. The postulate of ta katastēmata tēs dynameōs would run
contrary to the core of Aristotle’s metaphysical ‘system’.
54
Owens 1963, p. 437.
24

philosophy is, in the same vein, not to be understood as Cartesian First Philosophy
since Aristotle is not primarily concerned with justifying the case of knowledge
against extreme doubt. One could argue that the post-‐Cartesian philosophy has
grown from the seed of doubt planted by Descartes’ Malicious Demon and in that
case one is to remember that Aristotle thinks prior to this global shift to the primacy
of epistemology in Western thought. In this case, Aristotle’s primary target is not the
Sceptic, but the earlier Metaphysician, and he does not attack their claims to
knowledge (or to ignorance), but their claims to truth.
Taking this into account, it becomes clearer why and how Aristotle can treat
different ways one speaks about being as a starting point for an inquiry into being
qua being. As Owens writes: “Unlike Parmenides, and to a lesser degree Plato,
[Aristotle] does not commence by taking a ‘one’ and asking how it can be many. He is
taking a ‘many’ and asking how it can be one.”55 The answer to the question of unity
in plurality will be some form of pros hen unity exemplified in the primary nature.
This is a valid starting point in Aristotelian conception of philosophy. This pros hen
unity will still have to be demonstrated if it is to provide a solution to the question of
being qua being. The primary nature will have to explain the ways in which to on
legetai pollachōs.
What will then be the primary nature of being whose principles and causes we
are to investigate? Aristotle gives us his answer:
[T]he question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and
always been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is [ti to on], is just the
question, what is substance? [tis hē ousia] (…) and so we also must

55
Owens 1963, p. 460. Kosman (2013, p. 111) contemplates whether Aristotle’s thought in general is
rooted in or influenced by his earlier endeavours in biological thinking.
25

consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which
is in this sense.56
3. Τίς ἡ οὐσία;
It might seem prima facie strange to claim that the primary object of the question
what is a being should be something called substance. This strangeness, however, is due to
the historical path which the term has taken from its original instantiation – ousia.57 As
mentioned above, to on, that which is, a being, is a neuter active participle of einai, to be.
Einai also possesses masculine and feminine present participle forms – ōn and ousa. From
the feminine form, the nominalised form ousia is derived. A more literal way of rendering
ousia would be, rather than substance, beingness.58 I will, however, retain the traditional
rendering substance.
3.1. Being and substance
After providing an etymological link between to on and ousia the question whether
Aristotle provides any other justification for their link arises. As mentioned above, in book 7
being is said in the sense of “what a thing is or a ‘this’ [to men ti esti kai tode ti]” and in the
sense of the categories.59 Aristotle elaborates:

56
57
Kosman (2014, passim; also cf. Owens 1963, pp. 138-‐145) gives an account of the “two interwoven
stories” of Stoicism and Christianity in an attempt to explain the historical factors contributing to the
decision of the Latin, and subsequently English, tradition to understand ousia as substantia and how
this caused a great deal of historical misinterpretation of Aristotle. This misinterpretation, Kosman
argues, influenced the philosophies of Locke, Descartes, and Spinoza to such an extent that our
abandonment of such a translation could be problematic for our understanding of the philosophical
tradition following early modernity.
58
It seems that the contemporary scholars rarely tire from making this point – cf. Owens 1963, pp.
18, 139, 140, 188, et passim; Gilson 1952, p. 74. Kosman (2014, p. ix) also points out that ousia tends
to be translated as being in translation of Plato’s texts and that translating it as substance obscures
the fact that Aristotle responds to the Platonic worries about being. Another very interesting point is
Owens’ (Owens 1963, pp. 138-‐151) attempt to argue that the translation of ousia as Entity manages
to capture the semantic implications in English which ousia might exhibit in Ancient Greek.
59
26

While ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily is
the ‘what’ [proton on to ti estin], which indicates the substance of the
thing [hoper sēmainei tēn ousian]. For when we say of what quality a
thing is, we say that it is good or beautiful, but not that it is three cubits
long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is [ti estin], we do not
say ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘three cubits long’, but ‘man’ or ‘God’. And all
other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities
of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others
affections of it, and others some other determination of it… Therefore
that which is primarily and is simply (not is something) must be
substance [hē ousia].”60
Similarly, in Book 561 Aristotle tells us that one of the senses of substance is
that which is a ‘this’ [tode ti] and which is separable. We can interpret this in the
following way: if we are looking for to on hē(i) on, for what anything at all is simply in
virtue of the fact that it is, what else remains for us to enquire after other than this?
Remembering Aristotle’s philosophical order, we are not to treat being in some
abstract void of “Being, pure Being without further determination” or in a
Parmenidean sense of the overarching is which is opposed to is-‐not. If to on is “that
which is” then the only place left to look for it is in a “this” – in an empty, formal
answer to the empty, formal question of the “what?” Such a question and such an
answer Aristotle finds implicit in the meaning (or in the use) of the Ancient Greek
word ousia, a word for which we lack a modern (English) equivalent. Starting from
the recognition of the particular beings surrounding him, the most fundamental
question Aristotle can ask is “what?” pointing to any “this” surrounding him. But this

60
61
27

“what” is understood in a primary and simple sense, not as a quality, quantity,
relation, etc. Aristotle’s language gave him a suitable word for this, and it is ousia
which “’is seen’ or ‘appears’ in every predication of Being.”62 What Aristotle called
ousia we have ended up calling substance, and it is difficult for us to see why the
answer to the question of what is being should relate to substance. But in Greek,
ousia and to on are semantically related. Being is not “seen” in the word substance in
the English language. It is not intuitive why substance would be the why of being.
However, if we translate ousia not as substance but as beingness we see why the
question about the what of being is the question about its beingness, just as we can
see how the question about what a man is is a question about humanity. Therefore,
to ask the question about the what of anything is in a sense similar to asking about
its substance, or about it as substance, especially since Aristotle makes substance not
just the first of the metaphysical categories, but of the logical categories as well. The
question what, as stated above, which we can understand as essence or form,
signifies this, a substance. This is why substance is what primarily and simply is. It is
as such since “we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is [ti
estin], e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its
quantity, or where it is; since we know each of these things also, only when we know
what [ti esti] the quantity or the quality is.”63 This is why, Aristotle tells us, “the
question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and always been the
subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance?”64

62
Owens 1963, p. 317.
63
64
Metaphysis 7, 1.1028b3-‐5.
28

3.2. Substance as substrate
Ousia is first discussed in the Categories where it is separated into primary
and secondary substance. Primary substance, Aristotle writes, is “that which is
neither said of a subject [hypokeimenou] nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or
the individual horse.” Secondary substances are “the species [eidesin] in which the
things primarily called substances are (…) as also are the genera of these species. For
example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the
species; so these – both man and animal – are called secondary substances.”65 More
than that, we can learn that with regards to “the primary substances, it is
indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain this”66 and that secondary
substances signify a “this” but as a qualification, but not “a certain qualification” (as
a colour would) but a qualification of substance, a substance of a certain
qualification.”67 The final characteristics of the (primary) substance from the
Categories I would like to mention are that “no substance (…) is in a subject;”68 that
“nothing is contrary to them,”69 and that while “numerically one and the same”
substance is still able to receive contraries. Aristotle explains that the last
characteristic means that an individual man can be both hot and cold, dark and pale,
good and bad. 70 Good as such cannot be bad, white cannot be black, but the
individual man (an example of primary substance) can be both good and bad,
although not at the same time.
If we understand substance solely in the light of the Categories, in terms of
the characteristics listed, we will gain a conception of it as a hypokeimenon,

65
Categories, 5.2a11-‐18.
66
Categories, 5.3b10-‐11.
67
Categories, 5.3b15-‐21.
68
Categories, 5.3a19.
69
Categories, 5.3b24.
70
Categories, 5.4a10-‐21.
29

sometimes called subject or substratum, and understood as the ultimate subject of
predication. The correct approach, however, would be the reverse, namely, to
understand ousia as it is explained in the Metaphysics, since this is where it is
explained in its primary way, and only then to see how and whether it applies to
other domains. If substance is the primary instance and the primary nature required
for the understanding of being as being, then what we can find out about substance
from the Metaphysics should find its equivalent in other branches of science.
Accepting that substance is the primary way of understanding everything
which is, and since the task of Primary Philosophy is to discover the principles
inherent in all other sciences, substance has to appear, and indeed does appear71, in
a pros hen manner (since it cannot appear as a genus), in the logical works of the
Organon such as the Categories, and in the works on nature. All of these sciences are
“special,” insofar as they confine themselves to certain regions of being. The
understanding of being in its primary sense, which encompasses all of these regions,
is supposed to shed light on the understanding of principles and objects in the
sciences of such regions. The way of being of substance as a hypokeimenon is
legitimate within certain regions, and it features in the Categories as the ultimate
subject of predication, and in Physics as the underlying matter of change,72 but it will
not be the primary understanding of substance. The primary understanding of
substance, which the Primary Philosophy attempts to explicate, is supposed to
illuminate all other ways of being which are said in the manner of pros hen
equivocation.73 It is enough for our present purposes to point out that substance

71
Owens 1963, p. 369.
72
Owens 1963, p. 326.
73
A lot of hard work has been undertaken in discussing how the account of ousia translates from the
Categories to Metaphysics. Owens (1963, passim) shows that the correspondence is rather erratic
and there is no simple transposition of primary and secondary ousia in the context of Metaphysics.
For a more specialised treatment of the problem, cf. Driscoll 1981.
30

cannot be understood solely and primarily as a substratum or hypokeimenon
(although it certainly is that as well) since that would, Aristotle argues, make
substance into matter. And this he considers impossible74 for reasons which we will
discuss shortly.
3.3. Substance and the Physics
As mentioned, substance is also considered in the Physics. It is important to
address the treatment of substance in the Physics for several reasons. Firstly, Aristotle’s
philosophical order discussed above encourages us to start by treating what is most
familiar to us, if not the most familiar in itself. This suggests that while Metaphysics stands
beyond physics in the order of being, i.e. in the order of how things are in themselves,
metaphysical discourse is also beyond the physical in the sense that it comes after the
discourse on physics in the didactic order.75 Secondly, and connected to the previous point,
Aristotle’s examples of substances fall within the realm of the physical – usually individual
men and horses, etc. even though it was mentioned that Aristotle seems to consider
separate beings as the more appropriate object of the primary philosophy. Moreover,
Physics, or the “student of nature” deals with things which fall within the realm of change
[metabolē], which is paradigmatically characterised by the phenomenon of motion
[kinesis].76 In order to understand Primary Philosophy, one must first understand what it is
not, for Primary Philosophy does not deal with change, but with what is beyond it, that is
with the “modes of existence and essence of the separable”77, while the student of nature
must:

74
75
Aquinas believed that the name Metaphysics only possesses the second signification, i.e. one that
comes after in the didactic order. Cf. De Trinitate, pars 3, q. 6, a. 1, co. 22.
76
Physics 3, 1.200b12.
77
Physics 2, 2.194b14-‐15. [P]ōs d’ echei to chōriston kai ti esti – lit. “But how the separable is taken
and what it is…”
31

know the form [to eidos] or essence [to ti estin] (…) up to a point,
perhaps, as the doctor must know sinew or the smith bronze (i.e. until
he understands the purpose of each); (…) student of nature is concerned
only with things whose forms are separable indeed, but do not exist
apart from matter. Man is begotten by man and by the sun as well.78
Another important reason to consider the account from the Physics is that, as
mentioned above, it contests with the science of being qua being for the title of primary
philosophy. To refer to the same passage again: “if there is no substance other than those
which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an
immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy.”79
There are two ways in which Aristotle argues for these immovable substances,
separated from matter, or at least for the need of postulating them. The first way is more
direct and explicit. This is the argument given in the Physics 8 for the necessity of the First,
unmoved mover for the possibility of change. I will not go into the details of this argument,
since the second way is more interesting for present purposes.80 This second way is less
direct than the first, by which I mean that there is no argument Aristotle explicitly gives
following this trajectory, but his ideas can be connected in a meaningful sequence which
will help us understand substance as the primary instance of being.
3.4. Substance and ἐνέργεια
The second way concerns the fundamental understanding of the physical as the
realm of change, and can be found within Aristotle’s definition of change. In the Physics,

78
Physics 2, 2.194b10-‐15.
79
80
Owens (1963, p.438n10) notes that it is a point of dispute as to whether the unmoved mover of
the Physics is the same as the eternal separate substance and God of the Metaphysics. Aquinas in
Contra Gentiles takes Aristotle’s motion-‐based arguments from the Physics as a proof for the
existence of God, but points out that the God of the Metaphysics, the absolutely unmoved separate
first mover, is not part of any self-‐moving mover which the Physics might prove, and can be
identified with the Christian God. Cf. Contra Gentiles, lib. 1, cap. 13, n3-‐28.
32

the way substance is presented seems very close to the Categories. No things can have
contradictory properties at the same time, or come from nothing. Substance seems to be
closely understood as, if not identical, then nonetheless akin to the hypokeimenon, but
since the object of the Physics is not predicates, but rather the realm of change, the subject
of predication comes to be understood as the subject of change.81 Aristotle argues that
previous thinkers have been confused when thinking along the same lines and could not
fathom how anything comes to be. Aristotle presents one of his solutions to their
problems, but then says that the problem is also easily solvable if we start thinking about
change and becoming in terms of potentiality and actuality [tēn dynamin kai tēn
energeian].82 Indeed, prior to that, motion was defined as the “actuality of a potential qua
potential”. There has been a lot written about the proper interpretation of this cryptic
formula, but I cannot go into details about it. The thing to remember is that motion (and
hence change and the realm characterised by it) is itself a certain actuality [energeia].
Motion is telic, it exists between two points and stops when it reaches its goal. It is, as
Kosman called it, a “suicidal mode of being”.83 Motion itself is fully actual, however, unlike
substance, motion in its complete actuality qua motion is incomplete. It is incomplete since
its end is not within itself and therefore once it reaches it, it disappears. If this incomplete
actuality, activity, or energeia is what characterises the realm of the physical, is there a way
to discuss energeia in its complete form?
One might now interrupt and ask why we are suddenly concerning ourselves with
actuality. We were promised a discourse on being qua being, yet we quickly turned to a
discussion of substance, and are now changing the topic one again with a discussion of
actuality. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle reflects on the physical treatise and tells us that

81
Physics 1, 7. 190a.
82
Physics 1, 8.191a25-‐30, 191b27-‐30.
83
Kosman 2013, p. 44. I will not go further into the interpretation of motion, but I rely on Kosman’s
1969 interpretation and its development in his Activity of Being (2013) to which I direct an
interested reader.
33

substance as described in the Physics, i.e. substance as a substratum, is generally
recognised by other philosophers. To understand substance in such a way is to understand
it in the sense of potentiality and as matter.84 This is, Aristotle acknowledges, “the strictest
sense of potentiality [dynamis], but not the most useful for our present purposes”85
because “both potentiality [dynamis] and actuality [energeia] extend further than the mere
sphere of motion [kinesis].”86 Instead what we must now do is to ask about substance of
sensible things as actuality or energeia, rather than as substratum or as matter and
potentiality [dynamis].87 Following Aristotle’s order of philosophy and starting with physical
universe and things as they are clear to us we see that energeia “is in the strict sense
identified with movement,” but we must then extend this understanding “from movements
to other things.”88 Actuality, for Aristotle, becomes the primary instance of substance,
because “both substance or form is actuality,” and actuality as such is prior to
potentiality.89
Why is this so? For Aristotle, to ti ēn einai of each thing, the phrase commonly
translated as essence,90 “is what it is said to be in virtue of itself [kath’ hauto].”91 It belongs
primarily and simply to substance, and it is a pros hen equivocal in the same way being is.92
Furthermore, we only know each thing when we know its essence,93 and each “primary and
self-‐subsistent thing” (i.e. substance) “is one and the same as its essence.”94 In short, to ti

84
85
86
87
88
Metaphysics 9, 3.1047a30-‐2. By “most strictly” Aristotle seems to refer to the way the Greek word
is most generally understood.
89
Hē ousia kai to eidos energeia estin. Metaphysics 9, 8.1050b.
90
In a similar attempt to his rendering of ousia as Entity, Owens translates the phrase as “what-‐IS-‐
being” in order to eliminate any connotations the word essence might bear which would lead us
away from the proper understanding of what to ti ēn einai is supposed to mean for Aristotle. For his
arguments and distinctions cf. Owens 1963, p. 173.
91
92
93
94
34

ēn einai, is one of the ways in which substance is said.95 Now, it has been said that we need
to proceed from sensible things, and that sensible things are compounds of form and
matter. Moreover, we have mentioned that in the realm of sensible, physical things,
substance is usually understood as a substrate, hypokeimenon. We have already said that
this is not supposed to be the primary way of understanding substance, but Aristotle says
that it is common and important to discuss. Aristotle tells us that by hypokeimenon people
commonly refer to either matter [hylē], shape [morphē], or the compound of the two, i.e.
the concrete thing in question. If we take Aristotle’s example of a bronze statue, we
understand hypokeimenon to either be the bronze, the shape or form96, or the statue as a
compound. Now, if substance is to stand for the nature of a being understood as a being,
understood as a this, and if it is to be identified with essence which is what something is
said to be in virtue of itself and that by which things are knowable, what is it to know what
a statue is kath’ hauto or qua statue? It is not to know its matter. If we know the matter of
the statue kath’ hauto we know it as bronze qua bronze, not qua matter of the statue. It
tells us nothing about what this statue is qua statue. With the form, however, things are
different. If we know form the of the statue, we know the statue qua statue, we know what
it is to be a statue. If we phrase this in terms of potency and actuality, bronze qua bronze,
kath’ hauto, is actually bronze, but bronze qua bronze is not potentially a statue. There is
nothing in the nature of the bronze itself which would point towards it being a statue. On
the other hand, bronze qua statue is bronze as potentially a statue, it is bronze as the
matter of the statue. But then it is no longer kath’ hauto. It stops being entelic and
becomes telic – its actualisation lies in something else, in a form to which it belongs, the
form of a statue, rather than to the form of bronze.

95
96
Aristotle here uses morphē, but he seems to treat shape and form equivalently in general. Cf.
Metaphysics 5, 8.1017b22; 7, 8.1033b5.
35

In this way, form is prior to matter in the sense that form is the seat of determinacy,
actuality and knowability. If we are to know something as it is in itself, we must know it qua
form. Knowing it qua matter requires us to understand what it is the matter of. Matter
kath’ hauto, i.e. matter conceived as matter without the “of something” is unknowable,
since it lacks the necessary determination for knowability – it lacks the “of something.”
Substance, even as a hypokeimenon, cannot be of something, since it is that something.
Substance, therefore, if it is the essence, form, and energeia is prior to matter because it is
what gives matter its determination, it gives matter shape, purpose, and context for
understanding. Moreover, this does not mean that the material component in artefacts is
something ‘less real’ or ‘not really’ part of an artefact, or that every compound features
two things competing for explanatory space. As Owens puts it:
The matter, then, is the thing itself. It and the form are one and the
same thing. The matter is the thing as potency. In saying that a statue is
bronze, you are expressing the Being of the statue. You are saying what
it is. Everything in the statue is in some way bronze. But you are
expressing the Being of the statue only as potency. If you say: “It is a
figure of Hercules” you are expressing the very same Being, but you are
expressing it as act… there is nothing in the statue considered from a
material viewpoint, that is not bronze. The bronze expresses everything
in the statue, but only as its matter… the matter has to be conceived as
being the whole composite – potentially.97
This suggests that for Aristotle, substance [ousia], essence [to ti ēn einai], actuality
[energeia], and form [eidos] are equivalent in their primary instance. This, then, provides us
with context for the interpretation of being qua being. What being is just as being, in itself,

97
Owens 1963, p.341.
36

kath’ hauto, is substance, essence, actuality, and form, and this is the context through
which we need to interpret all other, non-‐primary instantiations of being.98 But before we
discuss some of the implications of such a position, I would like to shortly address
Aristotle’s treatment of causes in this context.
3.5. Substance and Causes
In having given the horizon for interpretation of the question of being qua being,
the job of Primary Philosophy is not yet complete. What we still need to provide are “the
first principles and highest causes (…) of being as being.”99 For Aristotle, the number of
causes is four and they are listed in the Physics. They are: “the matter, the form, the mover,
and that for the sake of which.”100 Interestingly, at the same point, Aristotle tells us that
“the last three often coincide; for the what and that for the sake of which are one, while
the primary source of motion is the same in species as these.”101
In the book 1 of the Metaphysics, the causes are listed again. Here, however, the
formal cause is described as the one by which “we mean the substance, i.e. the essence,”102
and, in contrast to the Physics, nothing is said about the reduction of other causes to
formal cause. For this, we have to look a bit closer at book 7 of the Metaphysics. When
talking about the production of things, i.e. the efficient cause, Aristotle repeats the phrase
“man begets man”. For example: “both that from which [things] are produced is nature,

98
I recognise this is a very nuanced and complicated matter and I have presented it very swiftly and
crudely. To gain a complete understanding of Aristotle’s ideas, one would need to be clear about
how a thing can be one thing in number but different in being (e.g. a statue as potency and a statue
as actuality are one and the same thing, but different in being), understand the difference in
substance or being between natural things (e.g. horse), accidental instances of natural things (e.g.
grey horse), and artefacts, and be clear on Aristotle’s mereology, especially ideas of how a dead
body is a body equivocally, or how a blind eye is not an eye. Even apropos essences, I have only
provided one instantiation of ‘essence’, to ti ēn einai, while the others remain undiscussed. The lack
of space and time prevents me from discussing these issues in any more detail; however, it might be
of interest to note that my understanding of the background nuances is largely based on Kosman’s
(2013) interpretation.
99
Metaphysics 4, 1.1003a.
100
Tēn hulēn, to eidos, to kinēsan, to hou heneka.
101
Physics 2, 7.198a24-‐28.
102
Tēn ousian kai to ti ēn einai. Metaphysics 1, 3.983a24-‐983b1.
37

and the type according to which they are produced is nature (…), and so is that by which
they are produced – the so-‐called ‘formal’ nature, which is specifically the same as the
nature of the thing produced.”103 Similarly, “in some cases it is even obvious that the
producer is of the same kind as the produced (not, however, the same nor one in number,
but in form), e.g. in the case of natural products (for man produces man).”104 The
significance of the phrase for the status of the efficient cause can be additionally clarified
by appealing to the Physics, where we are told that: “the mover will always transmit a form
(…), which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual
man begets man from what is potentially man.”105
This shows us that the efficient cause and the formal cause are “formally identical
but materially different,”106 meaning that they differ with respect to matter. The essential
difference between a man and his son, when observed on the primary level of substance
and to ti ēn einai lies solely in matter. Their form is the same, i.e. the form of “man”, but
each is made of different ‘stuff’. This suggests that “since the matter is unknowable, the
efficient cause must, for purpose of scientific knowledge, be reduced to the form.”107 This
suggests that from the metaphysical perspective, the only interesting aspect of efficient
causation is that it is a certain transmitting of form. How certain forms get transmitted,
how a man begets a man, is not of interest to Primary Philosophy. From the perspective of
substance, i.e. the perspective of a thing simply in virtue of its being, the only thing which
happens in the efficient cause is the formation of matter, a form being transmitted. As
such, it is concerned only with the form which is transmitted, and not how it is transmitted.

103
104
105
Physics 3, 2.202a9-‐11.
106
Owens 1963, p.359.
107
Owens 1963, p.359.
38

In order to understand the identification of the final cause with the formal one, we
need to consider the eternal unmovable substance of the Metaphysics, i.e. the god of
Aristotle. In Book 12, Aristotle argues that there must necessarily be an eternal unmovable
substance. He appeals to the necessity of the eternal existence and the continuity of
motion, which was proven in the Physics.108 In order to guarantee the eternity and
continuity of motion, such a substance must be actuality [energeia] itself, for if there were
any potentiality in it there could be no eternal movement, since the movement would be
able to stop, even if it were never actually to stop.109 Such a mover moves the first heavens
without being moved and is eternal, ousia, and energeia itself. Aristotle then likens this
mover to the object of thought, since the object of thought moves thought without being
moved. This allows Aristotle to introduce the idea of the final cause, or “that for the sake of
which”, in the eternal mover. Final cause is “both that for which and that towards which.”
And in that sense, all other things move towards the first mover through love110 – for when
thought is moved by the itself unmoving object it is moved so by love. Because such a
mover is conceived as pure actuality it must “of necessity exist; and in so far as it is
necessary, it is good, and in this sense a first principle.”111
If, therefore, the final cause is primarily understood in the sense of love towards
the absolutely actual, unmoved, eternal mover, and actuality has already been identified
with substance and form, we can see how the final cause has its primary instance with
respect to actuality. As pure actuality which is not in motion, the eternal mover is entelic
rather than telic. Its final cause is not outside it, but within it, it is its substance and
essence. Through this series of reductions we reach the primary way and primary instance
of being – being as being is actuality, energeia.

108
109
110
Metaphysics 12, 7.1072a24-‐1072b3.
111
39

4. Summary
In this chapter I have discussed Aristotle’s conceptions of being and essence,
although the focus has primarily fallen on the side of being. Being, to on, can be
understood as “a group of pros hen equivocals, of which the primary instance is form in the
sense of act,” or actuality. Form understood in this sense is ousia which can be found in all
sensible things, it is their Beingness.112 The paragon example of such substance, which is
different from sensible things through the fact that it is free from any potentiality, is
Aristotle’s god, i.e. the entelic, absolutely immobile and eternal separate substance. Since
the causes, which are there to explain what a thing is, are reduced to the formal one, there
will be a correspondence between, the formal essence of a thing, to ti ēn einai, and the
being of the thing, ousia. Aristotle’s to ti ēn einai posits the formal question of what (rather
than the material, final, or the question of the origin of motion), to which the answer is
ousia as energeia, the specific form of the substance in the context of actuality.
What remains now is investigate the nature of these concepts as their appear in
the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

112
Owens 1963, p.470.
40

Chapter 2: Aquinas
1. The change of context
Many things changed between the times of Aristotle and Aquinas. A good starting
point for mapping such changes is in the project and perception of the science of
metaphysics, a name which, unlike in Aristotle's time, becomes the one commonly used in
the philosophical discourse (although we are still to wait for ontology). As discussed in the
previous chapter, Aristotle's Prote Philosophia is an inquiry into being as being, to on hē(i)
on, and as such is the pinnacle of human activity. Aquinas, however, is not an ancient
philosopher, but a Christian philosopher and theologian and as such had to struggle with
the relation between the two disciplines, how to dwell in both of them without corrupting
their essence.1 The Greek Wisdom Aristotle looks for becomes the Christian Wisdom in the
philosophy of Aquinas. Fortunately, we might say, metaphysics as such is for Aquinas,
similarly to Aristotle, a divine science, although less perfect than the science of Revelation,
and proceeds through a different order.2 Furthermore, the truth of philosophy and the
Revealed truth, in the eyes of Aquinas, cannot contradict each other, and if philosophy
contradicts Revelation it is not philosophy in anything but in name.3
This might make us worry about Aquinas’ philosophical integrity, but engaging with
Aquinas quickly puts such fears at ease. Interpreting the Scripture is not straightforward,

1
Cf. Gilson 1961, p. 10.
2
One noticeable difference being that in Aquinas divinity will adopt the familiar context of
Abrahamic God and the hierarchy of angelic intelligences, unlike for Aristotle and other Greeks for
whom “god” and “divine” served as predicates to indicate greatness (cf. Owens 1963, p. 171).
Philosophical and Theological order are discussed briefly in the Prooemium to De Trinitate and SCG
Lib. 2, cap. 4 in which Aquinas identifies that for philosophers, who follow the natural order of
cognition, the knowledge of creatures comes before the knowledge of the divine things, but for
theologians the order is reversed. The philosophical order, although not called by that name
explicitly, is adopted in De Ente, Prooemium. For more details on the Aquinas’ distinction between
philosophy and theology regarding their objects cf. De Trinitate, pars 1, q.5, a.4, co.
3
De Trinitate, pars 1, q. 2, a. 3, co. 1-‐2; Contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, cap. 9, n. 2.
41

especially for metaphysical purposes, and when reading Aquinas it seems as if the Angelic
Doctor has been more careful in ensuring that his interpretation of the Scripture does not
contradict his interpretation of the Philosopher, rather than vice versa. This suggests that it
is possible, for a philosopher of today, to read and engage with Aquinas on the
metaphysical level, without the need to take over Aquinas’ theological project and
worries.4
This means that Aquinas will, similarly to Aristotle, start from the particulars, or in
the context of ontology, from the particular ways being is said. Aquinas, however, seems
not to be as keen as Aristotle to look for metaphysical underpinnings within the bounds of
ordinary speech. He was, after all, speaking Latin, a long time after it was spoken ordinarily,
unless one understands the term ordinary language as the language spoken by the men
who belonged to an order. Aquinas was a man of the Dominican order, and his legetai
pollachos was not of the kind Aristotle's legetai pollachos was – Aquinas had to respond to
Church Authorities, the Scripture, and the commentarial. Similarly to Aristotle, Aquinas
proceeds through the ways this term tends to be used, but not within the context of the
agora or Plato’s Academy, but within the context of the Latin-‐speaking community of
scholars.

4
This is, in few words, Wippel’s position and method of reading Aquinas (Wippel, 2000, p. xxvii),
however, it is not a universally accepted interpretation amongst the Thomists and scholars of
Thomism. Wippel, for example, criticises Gilson for the insistence of reading Aquinas’ philosophy as
Christian philosophy and for the denial of the possibility to focus only on the philosophical parts of
Aquinas’ work (cf. Ibid, p. xx & Gilson 1961, pp. 21-‐2). It seems to me that the source of their
disagreement lies in their differing interpretation of the object of metaphysics. Wippel (2000, pp. 14
& 47) argues that the subject of metaphysics is to be understood as the science of beings as beings
(“quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens,” De Trinitate, pars 3, q. 5, a. 1), or “being in
general” [ens commune]. On the other hand, Gilson argues (1961, p. 16) that for St. Thomas
metaphysics is not ultimately concerned with beings as beings, but the primary principle of being,
th
i.e. God (hence, with esse, rather than ens). Owens (1963, p.15) argues that in the 12 Century
Aristotelian formula Being qua Being becomes equated with the problem of separate ousiai as the
theme of Primary Philosophy and that during the Christian Middle Ages, up until the Modern era it is
interpreted as meaning ens commune in opposition to the divine Being – it was of widest possible
extension and comprehension, but distinguished from Being of God.
42

This suggests that in Aquinas, similarly to Aristotle, the solution to the question of
being will be the one of the common nature underlying differing uses of the term. The
formula unifying different instances of being, however, changes from the pros hen
equivocation to the one of analogy. The mediaeval understanding of the concept of
analogy, however, will differ from the way it was understood by Aristotle.5
2. Ens per se dicitur...
In the same manner as Aristotle, Aquinas recognises equivocity by chance or pure
equivocity. In such equivocity [a casu aequivoca] there is “no order or reference of one to
another but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things… there is no
likeness in things themselves; there is only the unity of a name.”6 Aquinas does not provide
an example at this point, but we can understand this kind of equivocation as the one
mentioned in the previous chapter, the one between bank understood as the shore of a
river, and bank understood as a financial institution.
Differing from Aristotle, Aquinas keeps the name equivocity for pure equivocity and
refers to what was called pros hen equivocity in Aristotle by the term analogy. For Aquinas,
when something is said analogically it is said “according to an order or reference to
something one.” This can take two modes. By the first mode Aquinas understands
analogical expression as the one in which “many things have reference to something one.”
The example he gives is the reference to health: “an animal is healthy as the subject of
health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign.“ This first
mode of analogy is therefore the one which is in Aristotle called the pros hen equivocity.
Aquinas provides the second mode of analogy as well. In this mode “analogy can obtain
according as the order or reference of two things is not something else but to one of them.
Thus, being is said of substance and accident [sicut ens de substantia et accidente dicitur]

5
Cf. Chapter 1, footnote 35.
6
SCG lib. 1, cap. 33, n1-‐3.
43

according as an accident has reference to a substance, and not according as substance and
accident are referred to a third thing.”7
It is initially difficult to understand Aquinas’ explanation, even with the help from
the provided example, but spelling out the example could help us to grasp the meaning. In
the example Aquinas tells us that we call both substances and accidents beings [entia]. The
reason why substance is the proper way to understand beings we know from Aristotle. The
reason, however, why we are allowed to call accidents beings is not because both
substances and accidents ultimately refer to a single unifying nature (as urine and medicine
refer to animal health, neither of them themselves being animal health), but because
accident is understood as something which inheres in a substance. The order and relation
between them is not to be sought in an external common nature, but is to be found in the
relation and order of inherence exemplified between the two.
As will become clear from the subsequent explications, unlike for Aristotle,
Aquinas’ metaphysical project cannot be exhausted by reference to the pros hen
equivocity, but will need to incorporate both modes of, what he calls, analogy. In order to
understand the reasons for this, however, we need to look deeper into Aquinas’
philosophy.
3. …dupliciter
Following the path laid down by Aristotle, Aristotelian terms in Aquinas’ philosophy
take their Latin names. To on, a word designating a being, becomes ens, however the
specific focus on ens per se, the equivalent of to on hē(i) on, does no longer seem to be the
main focus of Aquinas’ ontology and even the phrase ens per se does not appear very often
in that context. The phrase explicitly appears in the context of treatment of being qua
being at the beginning of De Ente and in Summa Theologiae Lib. 1, q. 48, a.2, ad 2. Both

7
SCG Lib. 1, cap. 34, n1-‐3.
44

occurrences, coming from two different stages in Aquinas’ life and work, and two different
kinds of treatises,8 give what seems to be an identical account, both referring to
Metaphysics 5. Through this account, we can see a slight change from Aristotle. Aristotelian
legetai pollachos, which follows most of Aristotle’s discussions of to on hē(i) on, changes to
dicitur dupliciter – being is said, for Aquinas, in two ways. 9
The first of these ways is, Aquinas continues, “as it is divided into the ten genera”;
in the second way “as meaning the truth of propositions.”10 Aquinas then explains that if
we understand being in this second way then we can use the term ens for anything an
affirmative proposition can be formed of “even though this <might> posit nothing in
reality”11. In this (second) sense, Aquinas says, privations and negations can be called entia,
but in the first sense they cannot. Aquinas gives two, not very detailed examples of using
ens in this secondary sense: “when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that
blindness exists in the eye.” If we focus on the second example it could become clearer
what Aquinas is trying to say. The proposition “there was blindness in the eyes of Homer”
can be a true proposition. Blindness, therefore, as the subject of the affirmative
proposition, can be called an ens.12 On the other hand, if we try to fit blindness in one of

8
I have followed the chronology and systematisation of Aquinas' work suggested by Wippel 2000,
pp. xiv-‐xviii.
9
“Ens per se dicitur dupliciter...” Weidemann (1986, p. 181) comments on the strangeness of
Aquinas’ dichotomy of being, due to our familiarity with the so-‐called “Frege trichotomy” (i.e.
distinction between “is” of existence, of predication and of identity). Although I would not want to
claim that Weidemann is forcing Aquinas into post-‐Fregean analytic discourse I think such
comments, implying the equivalence between the meanings of the term “being” used in the
contexts several centuries apart, could serve as a good example of how dangers of anachronistic
interpretations could sneak into our readings of texts, and how, if we are aiming to learn about
practices of ontology from its far history, we are to exercise extreme caution. In the similar vein,
Owens (1963, p. 23) criticises Dimmler and Apelt for their “grammatical approach to the Aristotelian
problem of Being”, i.e. in basing the entire doctrine of Being on the function of the copula in the
sentence, which he sees to be alien to the approach to the problem taken by Aristotle.
10
De Ente Cp. 1. ST Lib. 1, q. 48, a.2, ad 2 gives “ten predicaments”, rather than genera.
11
De Ente Cp. 1. “etiam si illud in re nihil ponat.” Aristotle’s argument for rejecting the truth-‐sense as
the primary instance of being is based on the understanding that the truth is only in the intellect and
not in reality (Metaphysics 6, 4.1027b26-‐7). Aquinas does not seem to base his conclusion on the
same reasoning.
12
A possible challenge to this reading might come from the fact that Aquinas does not say that
secondary sense of ens signifies the “subject” of the affirmative proposition, but the “truth of the
45

Aristotelian categories we will not be successful since blindness itself is nothing positive,
but is, Aquinas would agree, a privation of sight. Similarly, it is not, unlike sight, a quality,
relation, possession, action or passion of an eye. It is therefore itself not something
“posited in reality”, but something removed from reality (from the thing, the eye). It stands
for the diminishing of the power of a substance, the incapability of an eye to perform its
function of sight.
Metaphysics 5, 7.1017a which Aquinas seems to be referring to,13 besides the two
senses provided by Aquinas, provides us with two more senses – the kata symbebēkos
sense and the sense of dynamis/entelecheia. It is not strange that Aquinas does not
consider kata symbebēkos instantiation since ens per se is an equivalent of kath’hauto, i.e.
the opposite of the kata symbebēkos, however, the reason for omitting the sense of
actuality and potentiality is not explained. Be that as it may, we see at this point that “a
being” can be understood as something belonging to Aristotelian categories (or more
specifically and primarily to the first category). Similarly to Aristotle, and in reference to
Aristotle’s arguments, ens, like to on, will not be a genus of things and is therefore not
susceptible to a definition.14
4. Substantia
The treatment of ens per se does not seem to significantly deviate from the
treatment of to on hē(i) on, however, I have mentioned that the phrase ens per se is rarely
used in this context and is more often used in order to refer to what Aquinas sees as a
common conception of substance – a being persisting of itself. Moreover, in another

proposition.” However, if we assume that the subject of grammatical predication stands for what
something properties are predicated of in reality and that ens signifies rem habentem esse (Gilson
1961, p. 42) – a sense of ens which will be discussed shortly – then the truth of the proposition
refers to the correspondence between grammatical predication and the grammatical subject on the
one hand and their correspondent in reality. This also clarifies why Aquinas rejects this as the
primary use of the notion of ens.
13
The text only explicitly refers to “Metaphysica V”.
14
SCG Lib. 1, cap. 25, n. 6 refers to Metaphysics 3, 3 to make this point, as does ST Lib. 1, q. 3, a.5,
co.
46

similarity with Aristotle, we are told that while anything falling under Aristotelian
categories can be called a being, it is absolutely said of only the first category: substance.15
As mentioned, Aquinas believed that substance is commonly understood as ens
per se or ens per se subsistens, a being through itself, or a being that subsists of itself.16
Aquinas did not find this understanding satisfying and proposes “that which has a quiddity
to which it belongs to be not in another.”17 This understanding suggests that there is a
closeness, perhaps similar to the one in Aristotle, between substance and essence or
quiddity. We will arrive at the treatment of quiddity or essence shortly, however, a good
question to ask at this point regards the change from Aristotelian ousia to the Mediaeval
substantia.
The original translation of ousia into Latin appears in Seneca and Quintilian as
essentia, while neither of them use the term substantia to designate the primary sense of
Aristotelian ousia discussed in the preceding chapter (sense of energeia). The translation of
ousia as substantia appears in Boethius’ translation of Aristotle’s logical texts, designating
the understanding of ousia as a subject of predication, while in his theological work,
Boethius still renders it essentia. According to one account, due to the popularity of
Boethius’ logical work, substantia becomes the accepted scholastic rendition of ousia.
Another account locates the reasons for this shift not in the popularity of Boethius’ logical
commentaries, but within the context of the attempts to understand the Christian Trinity
through the Neoplatonic notion of hypostasis which then develops to be functionally
equivalent to hypokeimenon – Aristotelian understanding of ousia as a substratum, or a
subject.18

15
De Ente, Caput 1.
16
SCG Lib. 1, cap. 25, n9 – common understanding; ST Lib. 1, q. 3, a. 5, arg. 1.
17
SCG Lib. 1, cap. 25, n10.
18
For more detail cf. Owens 1963, pp. 141-‐145 & Kosman 2014, pp. 269-‐272.
47

This shows why the rendition of ousia, being-‐ness, which in Aristotle’s language
possessed the semantic closeness with to on and therefore can be seen as a non-‐
problematic candidate for the primary mode of to on, is replaced, in both Latin and English,
by a word lacking an etymological correspondence to either ens, or being. Be that as it may,
it would be too hasty to conclude that due to this terminological shift Aquinas understands
substance as hypokeimenon. And this is indeed not the case. Within Aquinas’ philosophy
the concept of substantia remains almost identical with the Aristotelian concept of ousia
described in the previous chapter.19 It will signify the kath’ hauto way of being of individual
entities (composite or simple) primarily expressible through energeia, which will be
rendered in Latin as actuality or act. In the place in which he directly refers to ousia
Aquinas tells us that “ousia in Greek is the same as essentia for us.”20 This, however, should
not be understood as saying that whenever the word essentia appears in Aquinas’ work we
are to understand it as a direct translation of ousia. That function is performed by
substantia, the relation between essentia and ousia is a different one and one not very
different from what we have called essence in our investigation of Aristotle’s philosophy.
5. Essentia
Essences are known through definitions21 since the definition signifies what a thing
is [quid est].22 Indeed, Aquinas sometimes simply uses the phrase quid sit in order to refer
to the essence of something.23 Similarly to ens the name essence applies without
qualification to substances24 and Aquinas differentiates the way it is said of a substance
from the way hypostasis is said of it.25 As mentioned above, essentia will be understood
similarly to the Aristotelian essence or to ti ēn einai. In fact, Aquinas tells us that to ti ēn

19
Gilson 1952, p. 160.
20
De Ente, cap. 1.
21
De Trinitate, pars 3, q. 6, a. 4, s.c.; ST, Lib. 1, q. 3, a. 3, co.
22
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 21, n. 3.
23
ST, Lib. 1, q. 2, a. 1, co.
24
De Ente, cap. 1.
25
ST, Lib. 1, q. 39, a. 2, ad. 1.
48

einai [quod quid erat esse] is Aristotle’s term for quiddity.26 The difference between
quiddity and essence is at best slight. Gilson (1961, p. 30) suggests understanding
substance as a concrete ontological unit taken in itself, essence as the ontological unit
taken as susceptible to definition, and quiddity as the ontological unit taken as signified by
definition. For most purposes, however, quiddity and essence can be used interchangeably
as Aquinas sometimes tends to do.27
Since essence is the what of the thing and susceptible to definition, it is through it
that the thing is knowable.28 More importantly it is “that through which and in which a
thing has being.”29 Since it is, in its absolute sense, said of substances, it will tell us what the
substance is. Since for Aquinas we can differentiate between two kinds of substances,
simple and complex, or the ones which do not include matter and the ones which do,
essence will relate to each of them differently.
5.1. Essence of complex substances
Since complex substances are composed of both matter and form, their definition and
essence should include both matter and form. In De Ente, cap. 1 we can find four ways in
which Aquinas argues for this claim.
One argument why the essence of a composite substance needs to include both
matter and form proceeds by showing why neither matter nor form can individually be
considered as an essence of a composite substance. Matter on its own cannot be called an
essence since, Aquinas tells us, essence is what makes a thing knowable and assigns it to
genus and species. Matter can do neither of these, Aquinas claims, since matter is not a
principle of knowledge or a principle by which something can be assigned in genus and
species. The principle for assigning something into genus or species is “that by which

26
De Ente, cap. 1.
27
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 21, n. 1, 3, 4; ST, lib. 1, q. 3, a. 4, arg. 2.
28
De Ente, cap. 2.
29
Per eam et in ea ens habet esse – De Ente, cap. 1.
49

something is in act.” 30 Matter, however, is in itself always in potency, never in act,
according to both Aristotle and Aquinas.
Such treatment of matter, however, suggests that the essence could be identified
with the form. Aquinas tells us that “by the form, which is the act of matter, a being is
made actual and <made> this something.”31 As discussed in the previous paragraph,
essence assigns things into genus and species. In order for something to perform such an
assignment it must be that which makes something to be in act. Form, therefore, which
makes matter be in act, seems to be, on its own, identifiable with the essence of a complex
substance. Aquinas, however, tells us this is not the case, although “some try to assert
that.” Definitions of natural substances, Aquinas argues, need to include not only form, but
matter as well, otherwise there would be no difference between natural and mathematical
definitions.32
The second argument picks up where the previous one left, which is in trying to
show why form on its own is insufficient to count as an essence of a complex substance. If
it were sufficient, then matter would be something added to the essence or definition of
the substance, something added to form and originally external to it. But this would mean
that matter is something accidental to the essence of a complex substance and there would
be no difference between the definition of a natural substance and an accident of that
substance (and accidents themselves do not have “perfect essences”, like substances do,

30
Secundum id quod aliquid actu est – De Ente, cap. 1.
31
Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid – De Ente, cap.
1.
32
One can notice a quick shift Aquinas makes from talking about complex to talking about natural
substances. While it does not seem very problematic to say that all natural substances, understood
in an Aristotelian sense, as ones partaking in motion are complex substances (Aquinas’ example is
man, composed of matter – body – and form – soul) it is questionable whether the reverse holds. A
solution might be found in SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 27, n4. At that point, Aquinas defines complex
substances as ones which exemplify a unity of potentiality and actuality, not necessarily matter and
form. This does not exactly show that all complex substances are natural but, as it will be made clear
shortly, it does extend the domain of complex substance in Aquinas and makes natural and complex
substances equivalent in a mode independent of motion.
50

and need to include an external subject in their definition, while with complex substances
the subject itself is, supposedly, contained in the definition).
The third argument tries to show that essence, if it has to encapsulate both matter
and form, is not to be understood as signifying a certain relation between matter and form
or something added to them. This would, similar to the previous point, make essence itself
something accidental to a thing and the thing [res], for Aquinas, could not in that case be
knowable through its essence.
The fourth argument Aquinas presents involves another trait of essence, the one
regarding its connection with being [esse]. Aquinas tells us that “essence is that according
to which a thing is said to be,”33 that by which a thing [res] is denominated as a being [ens].
It is, therefore, necessary that essence is neither form alone, nor matter alone since the
being of a complex substance is not the being of its form or matter alone, but of the
composite thing itself.34 When we say of some composite that it is, we are not saying that
only the form or only the matter belonging to it is, but that the composite thing itself is.
Essence, as that according to which a complex thing is said to be, needs to be that
according to which the complex thing as a whole is as a composite: both matter and form
taken together.
On the other hand, after arguing that essence needs to be both form and matter
Aquinas, somewhat mysteriously, tells us that regardless of this “form on its own could be,
in its own way, the cause of such being.”35 We should probably interpret this in reference
to what has already been said about form which is “the act of matter,” through which “a
being is made actual and <made> this something.” For something to be a composite thing it

33
Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur.
34
Kenny points out that Aquinas does not identify essence with a composite substance, but by “the
composite” means “composite item” – it refers to things around us which are not pure matter or
pure form but parcels of matter-‐plus-‐form, matter under form, informed matter (Kenny 2002, pp.
10-‐11).
35
De Ente, cap. 1.
51

needs to be composed of both matter and form. Form acts on matter, it actualizes matter.
Matter on its own, since it is potency and indeterminacy, could not formalize itself or make
itself actual since potentiality can only be actualized by something already actual.36 In order
of causation, therefore, it is form which can be said to be the cause of what the composite
thing is to be, but the composite thing itself cannot be grasped as a whole purely through
considerations of form. On the other hand, the question which can now be posited is the
one about the connection between “such being” which form confirms to matter in the
generation of the composite thing and being [esse] considered in itself. For Aquinas there is
a need to talk about being different from this one, about the one which is not understood
in reference to form grasped by essence and definition and the most direct way to
introduce such being is through the discussion of the essence of simple substances.
5.2. Essences of simple substances
Aquinas tells us that separate (or simple) substances are those which philosophers
prove to be without any matter, 37 such as the soul, intelligences and the First Cause.38 The
essence of such substances is the form alone.
The argument for the possibility of the existence of simple substances presented in
De Ente is fairly simple: when one thing is a cause of the other thing’s being, the cause can
be, without the caused, but not vice versa.39 In a matter-‐form relation, the form is that
which gives being to matter. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be matter without

36
SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 16, n11.
37
De Ente, cap. 3.
38
At this point in De Ente, the First Cause is not identified with God, but Aquinas will do that shortly.
In the subsequent works, such as the two Summae, Aquinas will see the identification of God and
First Cause as unproblematic and will focus on explicating in what sense God is considered to be the
First Cause. Kenny (2002, pp. 25-‐6) understands the soul as referring to “the souls of human beings,
in the intermediate state between death and the final resurrection” existing disembodied, while by
intelligences he understands “both the angels of biblical tradition and the immaterial agencies that
in Aristotelian theory were responsible for the movement of the heavens”.
39
Additional argument claiming that simple substances, such as angles, are not only conceivable, but
necessary for the perfection of the universe can be found in ST, Lib. 1, q.50, a. 1.
52

form, but not vice versa.40 Aquinas then acknowledges that there might be forms which
cannot have being except in matter.41 This, however, does not change the principle of
dependency of matter on form since, Aquinas claims, these forms are such due to their
distance from “the first principle, which is first and pure act.” The nearer the form is to the
first principle, according to Aquinas, the more it can subsist without matter.42
At this point Aquinas says something very important. As was discussed in the part
on complex substances, the form of a complex substance can, in a way, be considered as a
cause of being of the complex substance. How does this idea translate into substances
which are pure forms? Aquinas tells us that although such substances are forms alone
“there is no utter simplicity in them nor are they pure act, but have an admixture of
potency.”43 In De Ente, Aquinas explains what this means or how a substance without
matter can have “admixture of potency” (since matter is traditionally what mixes
potentiality into a substance) through the example of the phoenix.44
The example is as follows: no essence can be understood without its parts, because
whatever is not of the essence or quiddity comes to the thing from outside of it and makes
a composition with essence. Any essence can be understood without anything being
understood about its being – it is possible to understand what a man is, or what a phoenix
is, without knowing whether they exist in reality. Therefore, being [esse] is different from

40
Kenny (2002, p. 31) argues that this conclusion is too quick and that Aquinas needs to specify that
this holds for formal causation, not the efficient one; that form makes the matter the kind of thing
that it is (“gives esse quid”), not that it brings it into existence.
41
The human soul is one of such forms and is the lowest of intelligences.
42
I will not go into details about this hierarchical view of created things. It will be sufficient to say
that it is based on the idea that in order to create the world in His own likeness, which is greater
than the whole of creation, God had to create multiple ways of being. Cf. SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 45, n2.
43
De Ente, cap. 3. Cf. also SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 52, n. 1.
44
Another argument can be found in SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 52-‐4 based on the distinction between God
and Created Intellectual Substances. The same basic thought about the admixture of potentiality in
simple creatures is repeated in the discussion on the nature of Angels in ST, Lib. 1, q. 50.
53

essence or quiddity, except in a case where a thing’s quiddity would be its being, and the
thing would itself be pure being.45
We can ask at this point what about other simple substances -‐ ones whose esse is
different from their quiddity, nature or form. After all, we have been told that all other
simple substances, besides this unique one, are not “utterly simple” and possess an
“admixture of potentiality.” Such substances, Aquinas claims, possess both form and being,
where being is something besides their form.
The argument for and elaboration of this thought is as follows: whatever belongs to
something, it belongs to it either as caused by the principles of its nature or comes to it
from an external principle. The being of a thing cannot be efficiently caused by the own
form or quiddity of the thing because in this case the thing would be its own cause which is,
Aquinas tells us, impossible.46 In that case, every thing which has being other than its
nature has being from another.47 What is ‘by another’ is led back to its first cause. To avoid
infinite regress there has to be some thing which is the cause of being of all things because
it is wholly being [esse tantum]. Such a cause must be God and First Cause.
But this does not yet answer the question about the exact relation between the
form and being in simple substances and how this accounts for their “admixture of
potentiality”. As Aquinas has already argued, simple substances receive being from God.
Whatever receives something from another is in potency to what it receives. That which is

45
Scholars disagree whether this passage is successful in proving, or whether it is even supposed to
prove, the so-‐called thesis of the real distinction between esse and essence, however it has been
traditionally taken to be Aquinas’ early attempt at doing so. Cf. Wippel 1984, p. 113, Kenny 2002, p.
35. The question of how and even whether Aquinas posited the real distinction (rather than either
conceptual or modal) between being and essence is among the most controversial questions about
Thomism and is beyond the scope of this work. For an interesting interpretation of the distinction,
which argues against the traditional “misreading” Suarez is culpable for, i.e. of the real distinction as
a distinction between two “things”, see Gilson 1952, pp. 99-‐105.
46
De Ente, cap. 3; ST, Lib. 1, q. 2, a. 3, co.
47
“habeat esse ab alio” Owens (1985, p. 77) argues that even if this is the case it still allows for the
distinction between essence and esse to be only conceptual, rather than real.
54

received then constitutes the thing’s act. Therefore, quiddity or form of intelligences is in
potency to being received from God and the being which is received is received as an act. In
a sense, one can therefore find potency and act in simple substances in their essence and
esse, although one cannot, strictly speaking, find matter and form in them (except, Aquinas
tells us, if we are speaking equivocally).48
The treatment of the essence of simple substances suggests that the highest
conception of being is the pure simplicity of God and the First Cause. It is the conception of
being purer than the simple substance composed only of form. It is being as pure actuality
without admixture of any potentiality whatsoever.
6. Esse
At this point, we can witness Aquinas’ departure from Aristotle. Aristotle’s Prime
Mover was a paragon example for the understanding of being [to on] within the context of
ousia as pure energeia and understood through formal causality; we can already see the
difference between this and the way Aquinas interprets the Abrahamic God as First Cause.
Similarly to Aristotle, Aquinas locates this purest conception of being in pure act, or pure
actuality, in energeia. God, however does not appear to be the formal cause of everything,
and is not understood through the Latin equivalent of ousia, be that substantia or essentia,
but through esse. In this sense, the infinitive of to be in Aquinas adopts a signification which
was not present in Aristotle’s einai. Gilson (1961, p. 29) decides to translate esse as “act-‐of-‐
being” or even “the very act-‐of-‐being”. This designates its difference from the participle
expression ens. Esse designates an act, while ens designates a state: a state in which esse
places whatever receives it. Ens signifies quasi esse habens49 or quasi esse participants.50

48
De Ente, cap. 3. Also cf. SCG Lib. 2, cap. 54. This is the way in which Aquinas extends the concept
of a complex substance beyond motion and form-‐matter composition, as mentioned in chapter 2,
footnote 32.
49
Sent. Meta., lib. 12, l. 1, n. 4.
55

Aquinas identifies this pure esse with God, or to be more precise, argues that the
only thing we can know about God is that He is pure esse.51 God, as the First Cause of
everything, absolutely eternal and immutable needs to be esse pure and simple. In order to
philosophically explicate such an understanding of the First Cause, Aquinas needs to
explicate this through the Aristotelian philosophical system of his time. Hence, Aquinas
argues, there is no distinction between esse and essentia in God. The answer to the
question what is He? is the same as the answer to the question is He? His quod est and esse
are one and the same.52 What God is, is His own being [Quod Deus est sit suum esse].53 The
essence of a thing can either be, Aquinas writes, the thing itself or related to the thing as a
cause in some way. But God, as the first being [primum ens], cannot have a cause.54 In God,
therefore, essence must be God itself. Alternatively, what is not the thing’s essence is
related to the thing “according to some part of itself as potency to act.”55 Since there is no
potency in God, Aquinas concludes, God must be His essence.56 Aquinas concludes this very
quickly and the following example might prove useful for understanding his reasoning. As
Owens (1985, p. 63) explains, the relation of a man’s nose to the man whose nose it is is
the one of part. We cannot say “man is a nose”, however, we can say “man has a nose.”
Similarly, individual substances, complex or simple, are not their essences. This is
characteristic only of God. Hence, according to what Aquinas seems to be saying, essences
are related to things in the manner of parts.57 We cannot say “Socrates is humanity”, or “an

50
Super. Sent., lib. 2, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, ad. 3.
51
Since we cannot know what He is [quid est], at least not perfectly, or even adequately, but we can
at least know that He is [an est] (De Trin, part 3, q. 6, a. 3, ad. 6 & a. 4, arg. 10). Aquinas’ arguments
for the impossibility of our knowing what God is, at least in this life, are scattered throughout his
work, but do not differ substantially. Unfortunately, I will not have the opportunity to address them
here, but I can point an interested reader to Aquinas’ arguments for the possibility of gaining
knowledge through effects, and through negation. Cf. ST Lib. 1, q. 2, a. 1, co. & a. 2, co.; SCG Lib 1,
cap. 14, n. 2 & cap. 11, n. 5; De Trin, part 3, q. 6, a. 3, co.
52
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 10, n. 4; ST, Lib. 1, q. 50, a. 2, ad. 3.
53
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 11, n. 2.
54
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 21, n. 5.
55
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 21, n. 6.
56
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 21, n. 6.
57
For a more explicit discussion of this cf. De Ente, cap. 3 & 4.
56

angel is angelity”, but we can say “Socrates has humanity” or “an angel has angelity.” If, as
Aquinas claims, this relation is the relation of actuality and potentiality as well, and if there
is no potentiality in God to underpin this distinction, we can say that God is His essence, or
that “divine form is simply the divinity itself.”58 Moreover, due to God’s eternity and
immutability He is beyond change and potency59 and since God is required to be the first
being [primum ens] there cannot be any potency in Him60 making God the pure act or
actuality.
We should recall now what we have mentioned before, i.e. that Aquinas told us
that “the form alone in its own way” is the cause of esse of a composite substance.61
Aquinas is, however, careful to point out that God is not “that universal esse whereby each
and every thing formally is.”62 That by which each thing formally is Aquinas sometimes
refers to as ens commune or esse commune and identifies it as the object of metaphysics.63
The way to understand this is in contrast to Aristotle where the being of ousia, identified
with essence and formal cause can be seen as that universal being whereby every thing
formally is. This reading is supported by SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 26, n2 in which Aquinas tells us
that formal being [esse formale] is divided into the being of substance and the being of
accidents and, since God is neither, impossibile est igitur Deum esse illud esse quo
formaliter unaquaeque res est.
In SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 25n5-‐6 Aquinas argues that if God cannot be a substance and
esse were to belong in a genus of substance then ens would be a genus. In ST, Lib. 1, q. 3, a.
5, co. Aquinas phrases the same thought differently, saying that if God were in any genus,
then He would have to be, as the principle of all being, in the genus “being” [ens], but as we

58
De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6, art. 3, s.c.
59
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 16, n. 6.
60
ST, Lib. 1, q. 3, a. 1, co.
61
De Ente, cap. 1.
62
De Ente, cap. 4.
63
De Trinitate, pars 3, q. 5, a. 4, ad. 6; pars 3, q. 6, a. 1, co. 22.
57

have already seen above, Aquinas, with Aristotle, held very strongly to the idea that being
is not a genus. Moreover, if God were a genus and a formal being of everything all things
would be, Aquinas argues, absolutely one. Moreover, God would need to have a cause for
His existence (since there would need to be an account of an efficient cause bringing Him
about) and all existing things [omnes res existens] would not exist outside the intellect.64
Additionally, God cannot be thought of as esse commune since being in that sense can be
predicated of anything, but God cannot.65 Aquinas does not provide us with much detail
behind this inference, but we could understand it as saying that whatever falls under esse
commune can be said to be. More specifically, of everything that is we can say “it is a
being”.66 What we cannot do is say, of the same things of which “is a being” can be said,
that they are God. Moreover, besides not being a substance, God can only be called ens
analogically.67 The reason why we sometimes talk about God in substance terms is because
our intellect, due to its limitations, needs to comprehend everything through the model of
complex substances.68
This distinction between substance as the formal esse and God is significant in
relating Aquinas to Aristotle. While in Aristotle the model of ousia was supposed to
explicate the primary way of being, the being of everything, in Aquinas this cannot be the
case. Esse commune which characterises the substantial way of being, is different from the

64
I will not go into more detail about these arguments, but an interested reader might find all of
these consequences argued for in SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 26, n. 3-‐5.
65
ST, Lib. 1, q. 3, a. 4, arg. 1.
66
Absolutely of everything if we take ens in its secondary signification “as meaning the truth of
propositions”. In its primary signification we cannot say it of anything which does not “posit anything
in reality”, as we have explained in the third section of the chapter. Still, we are here interested in
distinguishing esse from this primary sense connected with essence and substance and showing how
it differs from it.
67
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 33, n6. And this according to the second analogy, not the pros hen analogy, but
analogy according to the order of two things, as discussed in the second section of the chapter. Cf.
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 34, n. 3.
68
ST, Lib. 1, q. 3, a. 3, ad. 1.
58

way of being of God, the truly primary way of being, better described as esse omnium or
esse proprium.69
6.1. Esse and efficient causation
We have seen that the proper sense of being, esse, goes beyond substance and
therefore the Aristotelian solution to the question of being as ousia will need to be
supplemented. We should remind ourselves that Aristotle in the Metaphysics tried to find a
context for the interpretation of being as being, for which he posited ousia, as well as
asking for the primary causes of being as being. These were four – material, formal,
efficient, and final. We have also shown how Aristotle argued that the efficient and the
final cause should, in the context of Primary Philosophy, be interpreted as a formal cause.
But this was in the context of substance, and in Aquinas’ context, going beyond substance,
there is only one first cause, which is prior to substantial being. This cause is God and God
is the efficient, rather than formal cause of everything.70
The identification of God with the formal cause is impossible for Aquinas for
several reasons. Since the primary way of being of substance is form, doing so would
identify God with esse commune and substance. This identification cannot be done in the
case of God and esse, due to the implications this has regarding the relation to genus,
multiplicity, and predication, as discussed above. Certain kind of identification between
efficient and formal cause, Aquinas tells us, is indeed possible. This is so since efficient and
formal cause are not numerically identical (they are two different causes), but they can still
be seen as specifically identical. The example Aquinas gives to clarify this claim is the one
commonly used in Aristotle: “man begets man”.71 This should be understood as saying that
when we are referring to efficient causation within the same species, the formal cause of

69
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 25, n. 8 & 11.
70
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 13, n33.
71
ST Lib. 1, Q. 3, a. 8, co.
59

the effect is what is transferred by the agent, or the efficient cause. This is not to say that
when “man begets man” the only thing which occurs is two forms reproducing. The
interaction between individual human beings is required, however, from the perspective of
metaphysics, this is not what is of interest. Within Primary Philosophy there is no reason to
invoke the specific nuances of the efficient causation involved in reproduction. What
interests us, as metaphysicians, is the transference of form. The concern about efficient
causality in the case of human reproduction will be relegated to biology, anthropology, or
medicine. Since God, however, is not in any species or genus, He cannot be the formal
cause at the same time as He is the efficient cause since there is no causation within the
same species in the context of God. The reduction of efficient causality to the formal one
cannot happen in the case of God, since God is neither a formal cause nor a substance. The
relegation of efficient causality to another domain cannot happen as well, since Aquinas
has posited God’s esse as the primary way of being. This will result in the most significant
consequence for our purposes, the one which will be discussed in more details in the next
chapter, which is the consequence of the increased metaphysical importance of efficient
causation.
While God cannot be a formal cause, Aquinas argues that God, as the First Cause,
must be understood as the first efficient cause. If God were not the first efficient cause He
would need to be caused either by Himself or by something prior to Him. Efficient self-‐
causation is impossible for Aquinas, and if we are talking about a god which is caused by
something else then we are not talking about something absolutely primary. Aquinas bases
this reasoning on an argument, similar to Aristotle’s argument for the necessity of the first
unmoved mover. There has to be the first unaffected efficient cause in order for there to
60

be efficient causation in the universe at all, and God, since He is the First Cause, and not in
the formal sense, is to take such a position.72
The final reason I will discuss of why God has to be the efficient cause is the
attempt of accounting for Creation. For Aristotle, the universe was eternal, but for
Abrahamic religions it is created by God, from non-‐being to being. For Aquinas that which
comes to be anew, which comes from non-‐being, rather than from some pre-‐existing
matter, must take its origin from some pre-‐existing innovating cause, because nothing
brings itself from potency to act, from non-‐being to being, but is brought there from
something already in act. Formal cause will not do to account for the Creation. Formal
cause does not bring something from non-‐being into being absolutely. The only thing it
does is bring something into being from pre-‐existing matter, it forms or shapes the matter
already there. Efficient cause, which for Aristotle was known as the cause of motion [aitia
hōs kinoun], for Aquinas becomes efficient cause, the cause of being.
Indeed, Aquinas distinguishes the cause of being [esse] from the cause of becoming
[fieri]. A builder is an efficient cause of becoming of the house, i.e. forming the house from
pre-‐existing material, and as such the cause of motion or change, the efficient cause as
conceived in the Aristotelian realm of substance. For God, to Create is not to start the
process of becoming, to put matter into motion and shape it. It is to cause being as such, to
give being where once there was none.73 This, Aquinas agrees, violates the ex nihilo nihil fit
principle. Aquinas, however, does not see this as problematic. He argues that this principle

72
ST, Lib. 1, q. 2, a. 3, co. A careful reader might observe that I have not talked about the possibility
of God being the material or final cause, but have played this game of elimination only between
efficient and final. I do not wish to go into much detail about this, but Aquinas does address the
possible suggestions that God could be so understood. He argues at various points that God cannot
be conceived as matter, not even prime matter, since matter is potentiality, while God is pure
actuality. The reason why God should not be primarily understood as the final cause is because
unlike the Aristotelian Prime Mover which is a final cause in virtue of its entelic completeness,
Aquinas’ conception of God’s final causality needs to be understood in the terms of God’s free
creative Will (Gilson 1961, 78-‐9) and hence, as connected to creation, it sees its actualization in
efficient causality.
73
ST Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, co. & ad2.
61

does not apply absolutely. It only applies to the cases in which we are discussing the cause
of becoming. It does not apply when talking about the cause of being. The mistaken idea of
the absolutely universal applicability of this principle is due, according to Aquinas, to the
Ancient philosophers’ misunderstanding of making. They understood it, Aquinas argues, as
restricted to motion and change. They believed that every case of ‘making’ necessarily
involves motion or chance, burdening themselves with images of building when thinking of
efficient causation. “A builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and
wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the
"being" of a house [esse domus] depends on the nature of these materials, just as its
"becoming" depends on the action of the builder.”74 In this case of becoming, an efficient
cause puts pre-‐existing matter, to motion and simply gives it form. Its esse, however, is pre-‐
given, presupposed. The builder is therefore an efficient cause of becoming, of forming, not
of being in the sense of existing, of bringing the house out of non-‐being. But God cannot be
compared to the builder, to “an agent which is not the cause of ‘being’ but only of
‘becoming’.”75 Creation, on the other hand, is a ‘making’, but it is not becoming, or change,
except metaphorically76 and God is the First Cause in the sense of the first cause of being,
in the sense of the Creator, in the sense of the first efficient cause.
7. Summary
In this chapter, I have attempted to present Aquinas’ thoughts on being and
essence through considering the various treatments of the issue scattered across various
works. While there is much more that could be said about Aquinas’ metaphysics the
characteristics of his thought crucial for this project have been laid out. What is most
important to take from this treatment is that the understanding of substance in Aquinas
remains more or less unchanged from the one provided by Aristotle. Substance will be the

74
ST, Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, co.
75
Non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi, sed fieri tantum. ST, Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, ad. 2.
76
SCG Lib. 2, cap. 37, n2-‐4.
62

primary ontological unit, receiving its determinability and knowability from essence, and
hence from the form. The significant shift from Aristotle, however, will be found in the fact
that substance becomes understood as the created substance. The way of being of
substance will therefore not be able to serve as the primary way of understanding being
and the formal actuality of a substance, even if it is the simple substance lacking any
matter, will not exemplify perfectly pure actuality, but will contain the “admixture” of
potency. The perfect and complete actuality will only be found within the necessarily actual
way of being of God beyond the substantial order and will be signified by the term esse. It
is therefore God in Aquinas’ philosophy, rather than a separate substance, which will
provide the explanation of the primary way of being, and the primary cause of being
(rather than becoming) will be one, rather than multiple, and it will be efficient rather than
formal. The only thing left now is to address the key differences between the views of the
two philosophers and the causes for such differing.

63

Chapter 3: The missing sense
1. Absence of existence in Aristotle
“What a dead lump of being the world of substance is!” Etienne Gilson laments.1
This lamentation is presented in the context of the comparison of Aquinas’ and Aristotle’s
ontology. The reason for this lamentation is Gilson’s argument that there is a lack of
novelty in the world exhausted by Aristotle’s ontology, the world of substance. This is a
novelty which Gilson does not see missing from the religious world of Aquinas. Aquinas’
world, unlike the world of Aristotle, is guided by the ontology of existence, rather than that
of substance or form, and it is the world of Creation.2 For Gilson “[t]he world of Aristotle
owes its divine maker everything, except its existence.”3 Indeed,
The distinctive character of a truly Aristotelian metaphysics of being (…)
lies in the fact that it knows of no act superior to the form, not even
existence. There is nothing above being; in being, there is nothing above
the form, and this means that the form of a given being is an act of
which there is no act. If anyone posits, above the form, an act of that
act, he may well use the technical terminology of Aristotle, but on this
point at least he is not an Aristotelian.4
This might strike us as strange. Is Gilson claiming that no word for existence is to be
found in Aristotle? Such a claim seems easy to refute. In Metaphysics 9, for example,
Aristotle writes that “actuality means the existence of the thing” – hē energeia to

1
Gilson 1952, p. 73.
2
Gilson 1952, p. 61.
3
Gilson, 1952, p. 72.
4
Gilson, 1952, p. 47.
64

hyparchein to pragma.5 The problem with this quote, however, is that hyparchein ordinarily
means to begin or to be present, rather than to exist. In Tredennick’s rendition of this
passage in his Loeb translation he uses presence rather than existence. Ross translates
hyparchein interchangeably as either existence or presence in Metaphysics 7, 1041b4-‐6 and
throughout the text uses the word exist or a certain combination (e.g. an existing thing) to
render einai or to on.
While suggesting that there is no specific word for existence in the Ancient Greek,
this also seems to suggest that there still is an understanding or a sense of it. Owens (1963,
p. 146) and Dancy (1986, p. 50) confirm that there is no separate verb for to exist in Greek.
All of them, however, Gilson, Owens, and Dancy, argue that even the sense of our term
existence is lacking or is being overlooked or ignored by Aristotle. Gilson writes:
Aristotle has never stopped to consider existence in itself and
then deliberately proceeded to exclude it from being. There is no
text in which Aristotle says that actual being is not such in virtue
of its own “to be”, but we have plenty of texts in which he tells us
that to be is something else. In fact, everything goes as if, when
he speaks of being, he never thought of existence. He does not
reject it, he completely overlooks it.6
Owens shares a similar sentiment. He argues that in Aristotle existential problems
and a sense of existence are not denied, but reduced to the level of accidents. Therefore,
there cannot be a scientific treatment of them, Primary Philosophy cannot deal with them,
since primary sciences does not deal with the accidental.7 In fact, Owens argues that what I
have presented as a crucial factor in Aristotle’s ontology, the reduction of the efficient

5
Metaphysics, 9, 6.1048a38-‐b4.
6
Gilson 1952, 45-‐6.
7
Owens 1963, p. 309.
65

cause to the formal one, prevents Aristotle from considering existence within the context
of Primary Philosophy:
All that is scientifically knowable in the efficient cause is the
form… Aristotle has shown no interest in any existential
problems. He sees, most certainly, efficient causality as a fact in
the world of nature (…) but is satisfied with its explanation in
terms of form… The agent has the form, and so is able to cause
that form in another matter. All that has to be accounted for is
the same form in a different matter… Nothing prompts him to ask
how existence can be given to the new individuals by their
efficient cause. The fact is taken for granted. The problem is
ignored.8
Additionally, we have discussed Aristotle’s absolutely unmoved separate first
mover or the Aristotelian god, which will feature as the object of Primary Philosophy since
it can exemplify the pure energeia needed for the understanding of ousia as actuality.
What is lacking in Aristotle’s account, however, is the explicit question about the existence
of such a substance.9 As Kosman expresses it (2013, pp. 236-‐7) the “question of the
existence of God” as we would understand it today is not present in Aristotle in the context
in which we understand it.
If we return to Aquinas, the problem that most directly posited the need for the
metaphysical account of being understood as existence was the problem concerning the
explanation of the theological notion of Creation. Aristotle cannot account for Creation.
Owens (1963, p. 467) argues that something like a Christian Creation cannot be posited

8
Owens 1963, p. 359.
9
Owens 1963, p. 292. Unless we are to identify this mover with the one discussed in the Physics, cf.
chapter 1, footnote 80.
66

within Aristotle’s system, at least not as the worry of Primary Philosophy. The reason he
gives, once again, is the fact that such Creation is understood through the efficient
causation which, in Aristotle, is reducible to explanations through form, and outside of that
context it falls under the accidental. Interestingly, Gilson (1952, pp. 52-‐3) writes how
Averroes, in order to salvage the Aristotelian system from what he saw as theological
distortions, needs to reject the notion of Creation. The universe is eternal, “as is well
known by those who truly philosophize.” For Averroes there was never any Creation, it is
just something which is being preached to people incapable of understanding philosophy in
order to make them feel that God is their Master. For Averroes, the philosophical notion of
existence of a kind which Aquinas will later adopt came from a mistaken idea that “a
religious belief can assume a philosophical meaning.” Averroes, while living in the culture
which preaches the idea of Creation, still needs to reject the notion of existence Creation
implies, the same notion which will later appear in Aquinas. Averroes needs to do so in
order to save Aristotle’s system. This suggests that Aristotle’s system is indeed inimical to
such an understanding of being as proposed by Aquinas.
2. Essentialist and Existentialist Ontology
The distinction between Aristotle’s ontology in which there is no metaphysical
consideration of being as existence, where being is sufficiently explained through the form
and the ontology of Aquinas in which the primary act of being is beyond substance and
form and is understood as the efficient cause of existence can be labelled as a distinction
between Aristotelian essentialist and Thomist existentialist ontology. This distinction,
however, is not to be taken as necessarily identical with saying that Aristotle is an
essentialist in a way in which this is sometimes proclaimed, or that Thomas’ philosophy is
akin to certain post-‐Kierkegaardian French and German thinkers. The reason for this is that
it does not seem straightforward what exactly is meant when we say Aristotle is an
67

essentialist. Dancy (1986, p. 55) proclaims that “it is not news to anyone that Aristotle is an
essentialist,” however, in the context in which Dancy writes this to be an essentialist is to
reject “the democratic attitude toward S’s predicates”, i.e. to reject that “S’s existence
consists in (…) the logical sum of all the predicates true of S.”10 Kosman (2013, pp. 168-‐174)
raises the worry about the ambiguity of the notion of essentialism and interprets it in two
ways. The first way, which he calls “Quine’s essentialism”, Kosman defines as a position
claiming that certain attributes of a thing are essential to their subject independently of the
language in which the thing is referred to. Kosman then argues about the difficulty and
inappropriateness of understanding Aristotelian metaphysics in this sense and posits what
he believes is the proper phrasing of the question of Aristotle’s essentialism – are there
some descriptions under which a subject is referred to that are privileged over others? To
this he gives an Aristotelian answer – from one point of view no, from another yes.
The way, however, in which I would like to use the phrases essentialist and
existentialist ontology is the one posited by Gilson (1961, p. 33). This way understands
essentialist ontology as holding that the element of the form, achieving completion in
substance, is the very core of reality. Alternatively, within the existentialist ontology the
form is further actualized by existence. Gilson uses this distinction in order to provide a
fundamental differentiation between Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ conception of the primary
way of being. This distinction corresponds to the readings I have presented of these two
thinkers in the previous two chapters. As we learn from Aristotle, after explaining what
something is we need to ask for its causes. Up to this point, I have attempted to explain
what being was for Aristotle and what it was for Aquinas. Now I would like to investigate
the reasons why Aquinas believed it was necessary to understand the fundamental way of
being differently from Aristotle.

10
Dancy, 1986, p. 55.
68

3. Why existence?
The difficulty of explaining the reasons why Aquinas needed to depart from
Aristotelian ontology are difficult to pinpoint since Aquinas never explicitly argues against
the Philosopher. The account given in the previous chapter for Aquinas’ need to posit
existential ontology instead of simply adopting the Aristotelian essentialist system might
not be universally convincing. Most of it seems to rely on an attempt to find a place for
Christian Revelation and the notion of Creation within the Aristotelian philosophical
setting. If we were to accept Creation we can follow Aquinas’ arguments why the Creator
has to be an efficient cause, indeed the first uncaused efficient cause, etc. The only
argument which I have presented is Aquinas’ example saying that knowing what a phoenix
is tells us nothing about whether a phoenix is, whether it exists at all. This argument, on its
own, even if one were convinced by it, does not seem to be sufficient to create a domino
effect of philosophical commitments leading to the God of Creation. After all, Kant argues
that there is no difference between the essence of an existing and non-‐existing thing and
that therefore an essence cannot tell us anything about the existence of the thing,
however, his system does not require the first efficient cause for its completeness. Due to
this, we should investigate what Aquinas’ positing of God as the first efficient cause beyond
substance depends on.
3.1. Eternity of motion
If we were to think of beginning to be and ceasing to be as motion and change,11
and if the world were eternal, motion itself would be eternal, as it is for Aristotle. The
problem, however, is that the “eternity of motion is false for Catholics”12 This suggests that
Aquinas’ positing of the created world, the world which came into being, is based on
theological, rather than philosophical grounds. On the other hand, while Aquinas’

11
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 15, n. 2.
12
SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 13, n. 29.
69

motivation might have been theological, this particular commitment does not necessarily
have to be philosophically problematic.
Gilson (1952, pp. 160-‐2) argues that, if the Revelation were not to say differently,
Aquinas would believe that the world is eternal in Aristotelian fashion. Such a world, in
Aquinas’ philosophy, would still be, Gilson continues, a radically contingent world whose
being would still depend on God. Gilson substantiates this claim by Aquinas’ analogy
between God and the Sun.13 The Sun is the cause of light and God is the cause of esse of
beings. Light permeates objects such as air or water without ever mixing with them or
belonging to them. As soon as the Sun ceases to shine these objects are engulfed by
darkness, just as they would return to nothingness if God were to withdraw being from
creatures. From the point of view of the substance, i.e. from Aristotle’s perspective, the
world might appear and can be eternal, but from the point of view of existence, it cannot, it
depends on the first efficient cause. Since, as we have discussed above and in the previous
chapter, the efficient cause of creation is not formal, and is the cause of being, not of
becoming, formal non-‐existence (corruption) will be of a different kind from the efficient
non-‐existence (annihilation). In that sense, Gilson argues, this world can at once be
substantially eternal and existentially contingent. The reason for this contingency is its
dependency on God’s will in order to be or not to be, and if it depends on a will it does not
depend on a necessity and is therefore contingent.
If we accept Gilson’s interpretation the dogma of the non-‐eternity of motion is not
philosophically problematic since Creation and Aquinas’ understanding of God seems
indifferent to the status of eternity of the world. The problem is, however, that we are in a
need of such a solution, the one which squares Creation with the eternity of the world, if
we already wish to account for the specific conception of God. For the God the Creator

13
ST, Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, co.
70

which is different from the god of Aristotle. The analogy, saying that God is to beings as
light is to diaphanous media, is an illustration which helps us grasp the relation of God to
creatures and understand Creation as an act of a different kind to change. It is of itself not
an argument for such state of affairs. It does show that it matters not for Aquinas’
conception of being whether we accept the eternity or non-‐eternity of the world and
motion, however another question remains. Is the requirement to posit the primary way of
being as the one of the efficient cause beyond the level of substance and form necessitated
by another dogma, the dogma of Creation?
3.2. Creation
As we see in Averroes and from other considerations discussed above,
metaphysical principles such as that of the Christian Creation are certainly toxic to an
Aristotelian system. The question is why posit it in the first place. The question is not
whether we have to posit specifically Christian Creation, but whether we would want
anything of the same basic metaphysical structure, i.e. whether we want a system which
posits an efficient act as the cause prior to the act of the form; whether the system such as
the one of Aquinas is required if Aquinas’ theological commitments are bracketed.
One suggestion for positing a kind of existentialist ontology is in order to preserve
novelty. But this raises a question of why would something such as ontological novelty
need to be addressed by a philosophical system? We would need to give an account of the
philosophical order which we are following in order to say that lacking novelty presents the
problem for the Aristotelian system. It might as well be the case that the system takes
precedence and we can say that Aristotle shows that there indeed is nothing new under
the heavens, metaphysically speaking, but that all that comes to be is nothing but
formation, transformation, or deformation of the pre-‐existing matter.
71

Another reason why we might prefer existentialist over essentialist ontology is
because there is something intuitive in the notion of existence through efficient causality
which we might desire to retain. Consider the following example by Gilson (1952, p. 175):
This is to say that “to be,” or to exist, is the supreme act of all that is.
And the reason for it is clear, since, before being anything else, that is,
this or that substance, any substance is, or is a “being.” The form of a
horse makes it “to be a horse;” it does not make it to be, nor
consequently, does it make it to be a being.
The way we could interpret this claim by Gilson is that in Aristotelian ontology
there is a ‘missing question’. We could agree with Aristotle that the form makes something
“to be a horse” but it still seems intuitive to ask by what does it exist? What makes it into a
being? By what do things which possess form exist? Form tells us what they are, but it
seems intuitive that it does not tell us that they are. Aristotle’s approach is to answer that
this is indeed so, but the question of that or whether something is, the question of the
efficient cause, is not metaphysically interesting. If you are interested in why this horse is,
do not ask a metaphysician but a horse-‐breeder or a biologist. But we could change the
context of our question. If the form will be unsatisfactory in answering whether any being is
at all and for this efficient cause is needed, then the form will not satisfy in answering
whether even Aristotle’s separate substances, which are eternal, have being. To answer
such a question we will then need something else, for example an efficient cause, to
explain their existence, since the formal will not do. The fact that they are eternal will add
little to their existential status, since the form does not carry with it existential answers.
Such an answer is what Gilson, in his reading of Aquinas, sometimes refers to as the act of
an act or the act of an act of form and sees this as a metaphysically revolutionising moment
in Aquinas’ reaction to Aristotle – the distinction between the form and an act, all forms
72

being acts, but not acts being forms. Esse is not a form of the form, but it is the act of the
form.14 And it seems strange to say that such an answer should fall under the domain of
accidents, change, etc. such as the study of horses might, since it would require a cause
greater and more perfect than the greatest and most perfect substance Aristotle could
posit. The purely formal account seems to be unable to address our intuitive feeling that
such a question is meaningful. We could therefore say that Aquinas’ existentialist ontology
addresses the question which we might find missing in Aristotle and this could be a reason
for preferring it to an essentialist ontology. Moreover, as mentioned above, both theories
of being, Aristotle’s and Aquinas’, do posit certain separate entities, different from the
composite entities which surround us. In both systems it seems meaningful to ask the
question of the existence of god, Christian God or Aristotelian god, and about the existence
of various other separate entities. Even if we are not to consider the dogma of Creation, it
seems that in both cases there is a meaningful question to be asked about existence, and in
one of the two systems such a question is ignored.
A problem which might arise with this is the fact that we are unsure about the
origin of our intuitions suggesting to us that there is a meaning in the metaphysically
fundamental existential question. Intuitively it might seem to us that such questions should
be there, but this intuition might have arisen from the shared background of the culture
which developed within the context of the religions of Creation. As we saw from the
example of Averroes, there were thinkers who believed that such ideas do come from
people confusing religion for philosophy. If we are to base our argument for preferring one
system over the other simply on our intuitions of a lack, then the question needs to be
raised about the origins of such intuitions -‐ but we find an answer to this question in
neither Aristotle nor Aquinas.

14
Gilson 1952, pp. 174-‐5.
73

3.3. Matter
Another reason why we might posit the need for existentialist over the essentialist
theory of being, and the reason which seems the least dependent on theological motifs, is
the question about the origin of matter. A reader might observe that I have been avoiding
going into detailed description of matter and material cause in Aristotle. This is because it
seems that the origin of matter, or specifically prime matter, matter which is pure dynamis
and is not seen as matter of anything, but is matter kath’ hauto is a question which cannot
be addressed by Aristotle. Gilson (1952, pp. 156-‐7) argues that while the final and moving
causes in Aristotle can be reduced to the formal cause, matter cannot. As we have been
saying in the first chapter the Metaphysics tries to explain the question of being qua being
through the appeal to actuality and form. The material cause is certainly indispensable in
Aristotle’s universe, however, due to its irreducibility to the paragon way of being of
Aristotle’s God, which is pure formal actuality without matter, it must be posited as a cause
which cannot be reduced and discussed in the science of metaphysics. Therefore, Aristotle,
according to Gilson, needs to posit two causes as primary, formal and material, and we
must remain in the dark about the latter. Because of this, Gilson argues, Aristotle’s system
is incomplete since it cannot account for matter.
On the other hand, Owens (1963, p. 363) argues that the material cause, and hence
(prime) matter itself can be reduced to form. Aristotle’s matter, according to Owens, “is the
form – potentially.” This, however, still does not answer our question about the origin of
such matter. What it does is disqualify substantial explanations through material causes in
composite things, as materialist philosophers Aristotle often argues against attempted to
do. What it cannot explain is what this matter is in itself, since such knowledge would
require placing prime matter under a certain form in order to make it intelligible, but then
we would not be talking about prime matter anymore or how it came about. Composite
things come about by some indeterminate matter taking form. But prime matter could not
74

have come about through taking a form, since it is by definition formless. This is similar to
what has been discussed about the existence of simple substances, the one which are pure
forms. The solution is that they are eternal, because they are perfectly actual and non-‐
composite. They have no potentiality in them and hence have no beginning or end. But the
prime matter, which is pure potential would need to be equally eternal, since it cannot
‘come about’ but it is pure potential. Even if we reduce it to form in the way Owens
suggests, to see it as form potentially this does not give us the principle of its eternity and
the intuitive question about its existence nags us once again. Essentialist ontology cannot
treat these questions. It cannot say what matter is in itself or how it came about.
Existentialist ontology, at least the one of Aquinas, will still not be able to tell us what
matter is per se, because this would require it to take a certain form, but it will be able to
account for its origin on the grounds of the First efficient cause. If Gilson is right and if
prime matter remains unexplainable and irreducible in Aristotle, but is still one of the
primary causes, Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy is incomplete and such an endeavour can
reach completeness through positing Aquinas’ efficient cause over and above Aristotle’s
causes. And indeed, for Aquinas God is, in addition to all already said, identified as the
cause of prime matter.15
4. Summary
To be, for Aristotle, is to take a certain form. It does not mean to be brought into
being, and if bringing into being can be posited for Aristotle it will have to be in the context
of formal causation. This is why we can say that there is no novelty in Aristotle’s universe.
What happens through the eternity of the world, on the primary, metaphysical level, is just
some matter taking shapes. Aquinas’ ontology, in a sense, treats the Aristotelian
metaphysical realm as a physical one – even if there is no motion or change, since the

15
SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 16, n. 12.
75

simple, separate beings for Aquinas are still not in the state of pure actuality.16 In Aquinas’s
philosophy the world of Aristotle’s substance necessarily becomes something it was not in
Aristotle, the world of created substance. The deepest level of being in Aquinas reveals the
distinction between existential presence and absence. Being is not simply given and
eternal, but is created on the deepest metaphysical level and therefore allows for the world
to be seen as something more than the eternal process of generation and corruption, but
as something brought to be out of nothing, rather than as something emerging in different
shapes of what was always already there.
The question which still remains is the one of the philosophical grounds for
preferring the ontology of existence to that of essence. For Aquinas there was a need to
introduce Christian teaching within Aristotelian philosophy, and we discussed the reasons
why he needed to shift from form to existence. But we might not share Aquinas’ needs,
and the question is what remains after his needs are removed. One thing that remains are
our intuitions supporting the thought that there are certain questions fundamentally
missing from Aristotle, questions which an ontology of existence can at least raise, if not
answer. There does seem to be some intuitive sense in asking about what brought beings
to be in a level deeper than the one of becoming and moving causation, to ask about the
cause of prime matter. Unfortunately, no matter how much our theory supported our
intuitions this means nothing if the intuitiveness of our intuitions is itself unsupported. But
that is a worry for another day.

16
Gilson 1952, p. 166. Cf. also chapter 2, section 5.2 above.
76

Conclusion
The aim of this work was to investigate the development of the concepts of being
and essence by providing a reading of two thinkers from two different historical periods.
From what has been said one can see that the change which occurs within the two
metaphysical systems is slight, but very significant.
The first kind of change was in the terms used. To on becomes ens, ousia becomes
substantia, energeia becomes actus or actualitas, to ti ēn einai becomes essentia. One
word, however, was introduced: esse. This word had a grammatical equivalent in Aristotle’s
Greek, its equivalent was einai, but their philosophical meanings were significantly
different. Esse signified the act of being which was beyond the Aristotelian order of form, a
non-‐formal actuality. It was connected to the efficient, rather than the formal cause of
being and it was something which was not to be found in the formal nature of substances,
not even the simple substances. Simple substances, being forms without matter,
exemplified pure actuality, however Aquinas did not consider them pure enough. Even they
were only potential in comparison with the primary way of being, the one of God the
Creator. Understanding of being remains more or less the same in Aquinas and Aristotle.
Being cannot be defined, it is not a genus, and it is not directly graspable in thought, but
must be discussed in an analogical or equivocal manner. Even Aristotle’s metaphysics of
substance is not completely rejected by Aquinas. What is rejected, however, is its
absoluteness and explanatory exhaustiveness. There is another way of being which is to be
understood as primary and to which the way of being of substance is dependent on. This is
the way of being of God, the way of pure existence, rather than of the complete form. With
Aquinas, therefore, the existential understanding of being appears on the philosophical
landscape.
77

With essence, the development was much less radical. It is true that the conception
of essence changes slightly due to the deeper changes in the understanding of being. From
the question designating the form of to ti ēn einai, the focus in understanding changes into
that through which a thing has esse. What it is important to note is that in both cases the
primary signification of essence is connected to the primary understanding of being. What
cannot be cannot have an essence and essence is not understood as a collection of
necessary and sufficient properties as it is today. While this approach to essences as sets of
properties might provide us with the same descriptions of certain essences (e.g. the
essence of a man), it is important to note that the context of understanding of essence we
share today is different from the one in Aristotle and Aquinas. What becomes interesting in
that case is what consequences this has on our subsequent metaphysics.
The final question which I will raise here is the one about the applicability of this
investigation for further philosophical research. I am confident that few would claim that
familiarising oneself with Aristotle is not useful for the purposes of further work on
ontology, but I believe that the endorsement of Aquinas would be less enthusiastic. A
historical reason why one might avoid Aquinas is the fact that early modern philosophy was
more directly influenced by Suarez and his ontology, rather than that of Aquinas, and that
Suarez might be more useful for understanding subsequent philosophical developments.
While this is true being familiar with Aquinas can only help with the understanding of
Suarez. Additionally, the historical significance of Aquinas is the genesis of what Gilson
called existential ontology. I have provided a short discussion on whether Aquinas’ need to
construct an existential ontology necessarily depends on his attempts to philosophically
interpret the Christian dogma (another reason why some might be wary of Aquinas) and it
is difficult to see whether it does or not. Regardless of the actual reasons the fact still
remains that with Aquinas a new conception of ontology arises. Whether it arises from
worries which are philosophical or theological does not, ultimately, matter much.
78

Existentialist ontology does not have to be the one of Aquinas, nor does essentialist
ontology have to be the one of Aristotle, but it can only benefit us to find out what such
conceptions of ontology are and that they are.

79

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Aristotle
Greek Texts
Cook, P. H. (1962) ‘Categories’ in T. E. Page (ed.) Aristotle: The Categories, On
Interpretation, Prior Analytics – The Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann
Ltd).
Tredennick, H. (1933) ‘Metaphysics Books I-‐IX’ in Jeffrey Henderson (ed.) Aristotle in
Twenty-‐Three Volumes, Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle XVII, LCL 271 (London: Harvard
University Press).
Tredennick, H. (1935) ‘Metaphysics, X-‐XIV’ in Jeffrey Henderson (ed.) Aristotle in Twenty-‐
Three Volumes, Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle XVIII, LCL 287 (London: Harvard University
Press).
Wicksteed P. H. & Cornford F. M. (1996) ‘The Physics Books I-‐IV’ in Jeffrey Henderson (ed.)
Aristotle in Twenty-‐Three Volumes, Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle IV, LCL 228 (London:
Harvard University Press).
Wicksteed P. H. & Cornford F. M. (1980) ‘The Physics Book V’ in Jeffrey Henderson (ed.)
Aristotle in Twenty-‐Three Volumes, Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle V, LCL 255 (London:
William Heinemann Ltd).
80

Translations
Ackrill, J. L. (1995) ‘Categories’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed.) The Complete Works of Aristotle,
the Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, Chichester).
Hardie, R. P. & Gaye, R.K. (1995) ‘Physics’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed.) The Complete Works of
Aristotle, the Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, Chichester).
Ross, W. D. (1995) ‘Metaphysics’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed.) The Complete Works of Aristotle,
the Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, Chichester).
Aquinas
All the Latin text refers to the Leonine edition accessed through
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/
Translations
Anderson, J. F. (1992) Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Two: Creation (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press)
Bobik, Joseph (1965) Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation (Notre
Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press).
Brennan, R. E. (1946) The Trinity and the Unicity of the Intellect. (St. Louis: Herder). [BOOKS
1-‐4 of De Trinitate]
Clark, Mary T. (1974) An Aquinas Reader (London: Hodder and Stoughton).
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1947) Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger
Bros.).
Maurer, A. (1953) The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of his
Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies).
81

McInerny, R. (1999) Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings (London: Penguin Classics)
Pegis, A. C. (1991) Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One: God (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press)
Rowan, J. P. (1961) Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (Chicago: H. Regnery
Company).
Secondary Sources
Brentano, F. (1975) On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. R. George (ed. & trans.)
(London: University of California Press).
Dancy, R.M. (1986) ‘Aristotle and Existence’ in S. Knuuttila & J. Hintikka (eds.) The Logic of
Being: Historical Studies (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company).
Driscoll, J. A. (1981) ‘EIΔH in Aristotle’s Earlier and Later Theories of Substance’ in D. J.
O’Meara (ed.) Studies in Aristotle, pp. 129-‐159 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press).
Gilson, E. (1952) Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies).
________ (1961) The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Victor Gollancz).
Heidegger, M. (1988) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press).
Kenny, A. (2002) Aquinas on Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Knuuttila, S. (1986) ‘Being qua Being in Aquinas and Scotus’ in S. Knuuttila & J. Hintikka
(eds.) The Logic of Being: Historical Studies (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company).
82

Kosman, L. A. (1969) ‘Aristotle’s Definition of Motion’ in Phronesis, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 40-‐
62.
___________ (2013) The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press).
___________ (2014) ‘Translating Ousia’ in Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 267-‐279.
Owens, J. (1963) The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’: A Study in the
Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies).
________ (1985) Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Huston, TEX: Center for Thomistic
Studies).
Weidemann, H. (1986) ‘The Logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas’ in S. Knuuttila & J. Hintikka
(eds.) The Logic of Being: Historical Studies (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company).
Wippel (1984) Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press).
Wippel, John F. (2000) The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to
Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press).
Woods, M. J. (1975) ‘Substance and Essence in Aristotle’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, New Series, Vol. 75, (1974-‐1975), pp. 167-‐180.
83

Being and Essence in Aristotle and Aquin PDF

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Being and Essence in Aristotle and Aquin PDF

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

BEING

AND ESSENCE IN ARISTOTLE AND

Master of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy

Declaration of authorship ....................................................................................................... 4

Chapter 1: Aristotle ............................................................................................................... 10

1. Aristotle’s Account of Being ...................................................................................... 10

1.1. Two non-­‐Aristotelian conceptions of being ...................................................... 10

1.2. Ontology and Primary Philosophy .................................................................... 11

1.3. Τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν .......................................................................................................... 13

2. Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς ........................................................................................... 15

2.1. Equivocation ..................................................................................................... 15

2.2. Πρὸς ἕν equivocation ........................................................................................ 17

2.3. Being, genus and indefinability ......................................................................... 19

2.4. Ways in which being is said ............................................................................... 21

2.5. Philosophical order ........................................................................................... 23

3. Τίς ἡ οὐσία; ............................................................................................................... 26

3.1. Being and substance ......................................................................................... 26

3.2. Substance as substrate ..................................................................................... 29

3.3. Substance and the Physics ................................................................................ 31

3.4. Substance and ἐνέργεια .................................................................................... 32

3.5. Substance and Causes ....................................................................................... 37

4. Summary ................................................................................................................... 40

Chapter 2: Aquinas ............................................................................................................... 41

1. The change of context .............................................................................................. 41

2. Ens per se dicitur... .................................................................................................... 43

4. Substantia ................................................................................................................. 46

5. Essentia ..................................................................................................................... 48

5.1. Essence of complex substances ........................................................................ 49

5.2. Essences of simple substances .......................................................................... 52

6. Esse ........................................................................................................................... 55

6.1. Esse and efficient causation .............................................................................. 59

7. Summary ................................................................................................................... 62

Chapter 3: The missing sense ............................................................................................... 64

1. Absence of existence in Aristotle .............................................................................. 64

2. Essentialist and Existentialist Ontology .................................................................... 67

3. Why existence? ......................................................................................................... 69

3.1. Eternity of motion ............................................................................................. 69

3.2. Creation ............................................................................................................ 71

3.3. Matter ............................................................................................................... 74

4. Summary ................................................................................................................... 75

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 77

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 80

Primary Sources ................................................................................................................ 80

Aristotle ........................................................................................................................ 80

Aquinas ......................................................................................................................... 81

Secondary Sources ............................................................................................................ 82

never even have begun.

Declaration of authorship

submitted for a degree at any other university.

De Ente – De Ente et Essentia

(trans. Bobik 1965)

De Trinitate – Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate

(trans. Brennan 1946 & Mauer 1953)

SCG – Summa Contra Gentiles

(trans. Pegis 1991 & Anderson 1992)

(trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1947)

Sent. Metaph. – In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Expositio

(trans. Rowan 1961)

Super Sent. – Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum

(trans. McInerny 1999)

“ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι ταύτης, ἀμεινων δ’ οὐδεμία”

1.1. Two non-‐Aristotelian conceptions of being ...................................................... 10

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, 2.983a10-‐11.

1.1. Two non-‐Aristotelian conceptions of being

we understand definition through the model of explicating something’s genetic-‐

hypothesis-‐verification/falsification). The Aristotelian treatment of experience could