THE DILEMMA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY:

A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE

Shah M. Tarzi

The idea of collective security has been invoked throughout this century as the
international community’s solution to the interminable problem of international
violence. The First World War was the seminal event that disillusioned political
leaders and scholars with the instrument of military alliances to prevent war. The
sheer destructiveness of modern warfare horrified millions. In an anarchic inter-
national system characterized by a Hobbesian state of nature, and imbued by an
endless struggle for power and wealth among sovereign states, the development
of international organizations based on the idea of collective security excited the
minds of many statesmen, the most prominent being President Woodrow Wilson.
The idea of collective security found expression in the League of Nations which
was created in 1919 to institutionalize the ideals of peace and stability, and to

overcome the limitations of the ’balance of power’ as a system for managing and

limiting international violence.

The League failed to terminate a number of aggressions, notably Italy’s inva-
sion of Ethiopia in 1935, and it was completely emasculated in the face of the
events leading to the Second World War. Its successor, the United Nations, was
created to orchestrate concerted diplomatic, economic and military action, and
intervene anywhere against a ’breach of peace’. The UN system was designed to
overcome the weakness of the League by strengthening the veto power of the
Great Powers, and by embodying the principle of Great Power unanimity. The
United Nations, too, has failed to institutionalize the ideal of collective security.
The term collective security was then used with reference to military alliances and
regional organizations: NATO, OAS, OAU, the Arab League, etc. All in all, the
international organizations, through which the principle of collective security
found expression, have not met the expectations associated with this ideal.
The objective of this article is to shed light on the conceptual problems associ-
ated with the idea of collective security. Another goal is to discern a set of oper-
ating principles that must be present in order for a collective security system to
work. Using the Realist critique as a point of departure, it is argued that these
principles cannot be made to work on a global basis in the contemporary world.
Thus, attempts at putting the principle of collective security into practice through
the League of Nations and the United Nations have been largely unsuccessful.
Moreover, instead of replacing the balance of power system, the instances of suc-
cessful collective security actions have been a function of the prevailing balance
of power conditions.
Finally, this article presents a brief analysis of the concept of national interest,
and examines the relationship of national interests to the concept of collective
defence by adducing a set of hypotheses from the studies on regional collective
defence organizations and alliances. In the process, it illuminates the conditions
for the cohesion, duration and relative success of regional collective defence orga-
nizations and alliances in preventing and managing interstate conflict.

43
44

The conceptual dilemma of collective security

The concept of collective security is complex and illusive. As Inis L. Claude has
observed, ’Since President Wilson’s proposal to reform the international system
on the basis of collective security, it has largely lost its clarity and specificity’.’ For

the purpose of clarity, the concept of collective security may be defined as gener-
al cooperative action for the maintenance and enforcement of international
peace.2 A brief explanation will illuminate the concept. First, it assumes that each
state is interested, to varying degrees, in the occurrence of interstate conflict and
in methods employed in the settlement of international disputes. Secondly, the
notion of a ’general cooperative action’ means that a collective security system is
incompatible with the doctrine of self-help as a basis for international organiza-
tions. Thirdly, in order to preserve or reestablish peace, collective action, when-
ever necessary, can be undertaken. Fourthly, ’general cooperative action’ also

implies that the vast majority of states in the collective security system must unite
against the aggressor country’.3 This last feature is central to the proper func-
tioning of the collective security system. In order to restrain the use of force
among states, collective security is supposed to contain the system’s own ability to
use force against a member, if pacific settlement of disputes fails.

The reference to ’action’ does not imply immediate or automatic resort to mil-
itary action. In order to preserve the international status quo and deal with acts
of aggression or imminent threat, collective security provides a set of norms and
procedures for inducing the members to delay hostilities under the pacific settle-
ment of disputes. However, if these norms and procedures for dealing with acts
of aggression do not work, and if the deterrent to aggression fails and war begins,
the interests of the peaceful countries are assumed to be preserved by concen- &dquo;

trating a preponderance of power against the aggressor and by resorting to force

to restore peace.4 The principle of global collective action found expression in the

League of Nations. Aggression was declared illegal. It was to be deterred by the

collective action of all states. Since all states were to come to the assistance of a vic-
tim state anywhere in the world, the preponderance of power would deter aggres-
sion. If deterrence failed and war began, all non-aggressive forces would join in
collective action and punish the aggressor.
The conceptual ambiguity of the term ’collective security’ is in part due to con-
fusion about whether it is an objective of states, a condition that prevails in the rela-
tions among states or a_ formula for deterring aggression. Thus, for instance, if the

1
Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshare: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations, 4th ed.
(New York: Random House, 1971), p. 245.
2 For a classic work on the concept of collective security see Willard N. Hogan, International Conflict and
Collective Security: Principle of Concern in International Organization (Kentucky: University of Kentucky
The
Press, 1955), pp. 176-83. For recent exposition see Janne E. Noland, Global Engagement: Cooperation and

Security in the 21th Century (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Dietrich Fischer, Nonmilitary
Aspect of Security: A System Approach (1994), and Charles W. Kegley, A Multipolar Peace: Great Power Politics
in the 21st Century (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). For an illuminating work on the operation
of the collective security system in the context of a global organization see Bruce Russet and S. Sutterlin,
’The UN in a New World Order’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 69-83.
3 Hogan, International Conflict and Collective Security: The Principle of Concern in International Organization,
pp. 179-80.
4
Kenneth Thomson, ’Collective Security Reexamined’, American Political Science Review, vol. 47
(September 1953), p. 750.
 45

o~jective of collective security is reached, one may safely assume that a condition of
collective security prevails among states in the collective security system. Yet this
lack of distinction makes it quite easy to consider the League of Nations or the
United Nations as failures, since conditions of collective security were not reached
under either of them.
It is unrealistic, however, to assume that such a state of international relations
can be reached. Therefore, the proper conception of the term is a ’method of
cooperative action’ designed to achieve the objective of deterring international
conflicts, and maintaining a stable international order. This way of thinking
about collective security removes some of the confusion because collective securi-
ty is construed, in the narrow sense, as a formula that entails appropriate organi-
zational and procedural instruments of joint action. It is designed to work toward
the general goal of maximizing the national security goals of member states .6
The ideal of collective security seems simple, workable and desirable. It would
prevent war by creating a powerful deterrent to aggression. Yet it is puzzling, as
Thomson has noted, ’ why the implementation of a system logically so flawless,
enjoying such impressive official devotion and popular support, should have been
accompanied by a period of virtually unprecedented collective insecurity’.7 Upon
further examination, it is clear that there are several requisites for the successful
operation of collective security as a device for preventing war. These requisites
are considered below. It is argued that, in the contemporary world, it is highly

unlikely that these conditions will be fulfilled.

A common and identifiable aggressor

Central to the successful application of collective security is an identified aggres-
sor on which all nations agree. In reality, there is yet to emerge a consensus on
the meaning of aggression. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations
have been able to develop a satisfactory definition of aggression under interna-
tional law. For example, is the aggressor the state that fires the first shot? Is it the
nation that launches the first attack? Can a state launch a preemptive strike on the
expressed basis of ’self defence’ and not be considered an aggressor? If so, how
do we establish whether the action was based on the doctrine of self-defence? If
not, how do we ascertain the underlying motives of such a state so as to deny that
particular country the legitimacy that the self-help doctrine provides? What are
the limitations of ’humanitarian intervention’?
Whenever it is necessary to identify an aggressor, states tend to do so through
the perceptual lenses of their own self interest, national security needs, and costs
and benefits. For example, when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, France and
Great Britain were hesitant to take any military action against Italy. It was
deemed not in their interest to punish Italy as they were concerned that harsh
punishment would push Italy into an alliance with Germany. As a result, only eco-
nomic sanctions were halfheartedly employed, and Italy’s aggression went large-

5
Hogan, International Conflict and Collective Security, pp. 180-81.
6
Arnold Wolfers, Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 51.
See also P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman, 1986), pp.14-38.
7
Thomson, ’Collective Security Reexamined’, op. cit. p. 760.
46

ly unpunished. In the hierarchy of a state’s interests the punishment of an aggres-

sor state ranks very low unless, of course, if it is in the vital national interests of
states. Later we will explore the implications of the concept of national interests
for collective security.
The proper application of collective security assumes a consensus on which is
the aggressor state. In reality, members of the collective security organization usu-
ally take sides with either one of the two combatants for reasons of national secu-
rity and ideology. For instance, in 1950 when North Korea attacked South Korea,
communist states refused to identify North Korea as the aggressor state. The
United States orchestrated military action under the banner of the United
Nations by taking advantage of the absence of the Soviet delegate at the Security
Council. In short, as Organski has noted, without a clear definition of aggression
in international law, ’Aggressive acts can be disguised and even when they are
committed openly, claims and counter claims can be launched as to which side
started it all’.88
Conceptual ambiguity aside, global collective action incorporates a major oper-
ational flaw: the focus of collective security is on the aggressive policies of states
rather than the capacity to stage war. Thus, the actual growth in capabilities that
make it possible for aggressive states to translate their intentions into actions is
largely missed. Early actions, such as alliance formations and other counteracting
measures, do not get recognition until it is too late.

The ’peace is indivisible’ premise

A preponderant body of the members of the collective security system must be
convinced that the maintenance of the status quo is in their common interest.
Morgenthau provided an eloquent description of this assumption underlying
the collective security system, yet, he has concluded, it cannot be made to work in
contemporary world politics: (1) At least those nations whose combined strength
would constitute an overwhelming strength against any potential aggressor must
have the same conception of security and peace which they are supposed to
defend; (2) ’those nations must be willing to subordinate whatever conflicting
political interests may still separate them to 9the common good defined in terms of
the collective defence of all member states’.9
In contemporary international relations it is quite unreasonable to assume that
all nations will be equally interested in opposing aggression from whatever source
it comes. War in distant parts of the world, for example, is not a challenge to the
interests of most states. Only if it is assumed that all nations are equally vulnera-
ble to a threat to peace, breach of peace, or the acts of aggression, can one deduce
the validity of the axiom that ’peace is indivisible’. Existing international order
does not lend itself to such a consensual view on most issues of international pol-
itics that fall within the realm of high politics in which vital national interests are
involved. The recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia clearly indicates that there
is potential for divergent interests and foreign policies in circumstances where an
intrastate ethnic conflict does not directly engage the vital interests of the United

8
A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 377.
9
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 389.
 47

States and other great powers. Russia took a reluctant approach to Western inter-
vention in the crisis. In line with Russia’s historical support for Serbs, the religious
and historical ties between Serbs and Russians bear strong affinity with Serbia in
the Russian body politic. Russia tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to block the econom-
ic embargo against Serbia. European powers were unable to agree on the objec-
tive of collective action. A preliminary resolution to the crisis was spearheaded by
the United States, with the support of allies outside and independent of the
machinery of the United Nations.
It is worth noting that the relative power ranking of states affects threat per-
ception. Thus, for instance, a superpower or a second tier state with vast military
resources and nuclear capability, do not share the concern of lesser powers

regarding a threat to world peace. Indeed, such states are concerned with peace
only if their security interests are at stake. For example, American projection of
military power to the Korean peninsula under the UN sanctioned peacemaking
banner was dictated by American containment policy and the desire to prevent
communism from spreading in Asia. In short, national interests and national
security take precedence over the noble goal of preserving world peace.

The fallacy of overwhelming strength

The combined power of the collective must be great enough to overwhelm the
aggressor. The interests of states will be defended in the event of a war breaking
out because of the concentration of a preponderance of power against the aggres-
sor. Therefore, an aggressor state that challenges the status quo is assumed not to

be strong enough to cope with the combined power of all other nations.
Morgenthau has stated this assumption succinctly: ’the collective system must be
able to muster at all times such overwhelming strength against any potential
aggressor or coalition of aggressors that the latter would never dare to challenge
the order defended by the collective system...’.’°
Preponderance of power is the sine qua nnn of effective collective security. The
problem is that states which have vital interests in the preservation of the inter-
national status quo and revisionist states that pursue a policy of imperialism
designed to overturn the status quo have fundamental and inherent conflicts of
interests. The net result is that ’the attempt to freeze the particular status quo by
means of collective security is in the long run doomed to failure’.&dquo; For example,

prior to the Second World War, the conflict between the status quo states, such as
Great Britain, and Germany, a revisionist state, rendered obsolete the principle
of using ’preponderance of power’ for the common collective defence of member
states. Likewise, the clash between the United States, a country with a vested
interest in preserving the post-Second World War status quo and the Soviet
Union, a revisionist state bent on changing the international distribution of power
in circumstances in which there was no agreement on the post-Second World War
territorial status quo, rendered the UN Security Council ineffectual.
The principle of preponderant power assumes participation by great powers.
However, even in Korea, in which the United States, as the most powerful state

10
Ibid. p. 389.
11
Ibid. p. 390.
48

in the international system, made extensive contribution to the forces that fought
in Korea fell short of stopping North Korea’s aggressive claims. China’s entry into
the war further complicated the American position, and the final outcome of the
war was undesirable for the United States and the West.

Military participation in pursuit of collective action

It is assumed that member states will fulfil their obligation to contribute militari-
ly to collective action at all times generate the kind of overwhelming
so as to

power necessary to stop aggression. As Morgenthau has noted, ’Collective securi-

ty expects the policies of the individual nations to be inspired by the ideal of
mutual assistance and a spirit of self-sacrifice which will not shrink even from the
supreme sacrifice of war should it be required by that ideal’.’2 Yet it is practically
impossible for many states to be able to mobilize an effective and decisive power
in order to defend the status quo. There are many reasons why states might not
be able to mobilize their forces to join in collective action against an aggressor: the
troops of some states may be deployed in different parts of the world; the aggres-
sor state may be a strong ally of one or more states; some of the member states

may not have the economic resources and military means. Moreover, domestic
problems such as political instability, recession, etc., may very well constitute seri-
ous obstacles to full participation in collective action. Indeed as Morgenthau has

observed, ’No nation or combinations of nations, however strong and devoted to

international order, can afford to oppose by means of collective security all
aggression at all times’. 13
In Korea, forces fighting under the UN command were comprised overwhelm-
ingly of American and South Korean soldiers. The participation of other countries
can be characterized at best as ’token’. In the case of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
many states made modest military contributions to collective action to eject Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. Britain and France made significant contributions in terms of
the deployment of military forces and the execution of war. However, this opera-
tion was heavily dependent on the ability and willingness of the United States to
project vast military power. Other coalition members presumably accepted the
American control of armed forces and intelligence. In short, contributions to com-
mon purpose under collective security is likely to be sub-optimal. Further, in the
absence of a superpower’s leadership, military capabilities and willingness to project
military power, collective enforcement seems virtually impossible.
This peculiar problem of collective action makes international collective secu-
rity less credible. For instance, the Gulf War could have been avoided had
Saddam Hussein been convinced of the resolve of the United States to use force
and of the strong determination of the UN members to respond. Given American
tacit support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, American appeasement of
Saddam prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the perception of America as a pow-
erful state yet lacking the resolve to use large-scale military power in the face of
the well-known Vietnam Syndrome, and the lack of sufficient historical evidence
to indicate that such a preponderant power would be ready to oppose Saddam,

12
Ibid. p. 391.
13
Ibid. p. 408.
 49

the Iraqi leader made a historical miscalculation. The Gulf example indicates that
the principle of collective security according to which the combined strength of
the world’s states would deter aggression in the first place is highly questionable.
As Morgenthau has suggested, ’Under a system of collective security operating in
less than ideal conditions, war between A and B or between any other two nations
anywhere in the world is of necessity tantamount to war among all or at best most
nations of the world. Since ideal conditions are not presently in sight, collective
security is tantamount to war’.’4

Balance of power configurations and collective security

On the surface at least there is a similarity between the balance of power policies
and collective security policies. Both systems seek to deter aggression through the
instrument of coalitions, and both postulate the use of force should deterrence
fail. However, differences between the two are more profound. Collective securi-
ty offers a structured system of international relations containing a set of rules and
procedures that clearly define the nature of relations among nations with the col-
lective security system. Power is centralized and policies are implemented in
accordance with clearly defined general principles. In collective security, the focus
is on actual aggression, not on the capacity of states to engage in aggression.
Alliances are not formed in advance since it is not known which state will be
aggressive. Further, this system rests on the premise of global or universal collec-
tive action or all against one and one against all. In order for the system to work
properly, there can be no neutral states nor free riders so as to uphold the prin-
ciple of the preponderance of power. Too many neutral states or free riders will
diminish the capacity of global collective action to punish aggression.
In contrast, under the balance of power system, power is decentralized and
states operate autonomously, shifting alliances according to the requisites of
national security needs, and without the control of a superior agency or organi-
zation. Based on the concept of mutual deterrence, the balance of power system
is supposed to impede or limit war by establishing a minimum power balance or
a relative power advantage, favouring the status quo state vis-A-vis an adversary
that pursues a revisionist policy of imperialism or territorial aggrandizement.
Since the focus is on the aggressor state’s capacity to wage war, alliances are cre-
ated in advance against a state that is becoming too strong.
In reality, the success and failure of collective security action has been heavily
influenced by the prevailing balance of power relations among states. For
instance, the primary reason for the failure of the League of Nations was the mis-
match between the distribution of power within the League and the distribution
of power prevailing in the international system. The United States was not a
member. The Soviet Union opted out. The membership of France and Britain
and the non-membership of the United States, the Soviet Union and other major
states rendered the League powerless to preserve peace on a world-wide scale.&dquo;
The League was unable to orchestrate an overwhelming concentration power
needed to stop aggression. Similarly, throughout the Cold War, the UN Security

14
Ibid. p. 335.
15
Ibid. p. 450.
50

Council was dealing with threats to peace where the vital interests of
ineffective in
permanent members, the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, were
in conflict. The geopolitical, historical and ideological contest between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the context of a loose bipolar balance of power sys-
tem rendered the Council largely ineffective.

Throughout the Cold War period, the basic problem of the United Nations
was inherent in the fact that implementation and enforcement of its decisions

depended upon supporting national policies and cooperative action by super-

powers that had fundamentally conflicting objectives regarding the global status
quo and in conditions of rough military parity. Consequently, with few excep-
tions, notably the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, adequate cooperation in
the field of peacemaking was not sufficiently forthcoming. As Claude, a leading
authority on the subject suggests: ’The history of the United Nations has been
characterized by the occasional pretension to offer greater promise of collective
security than the Charter indicated and the persistent failure to develop even the
limited version of collective security which the Charter promised’.’s
The 1990-91 Gulf action illuminates this line of argument. Advocates of col-
lective security hold that the UN intervention in the Gulf is a shining example of
international collective action. In actuality it was the United States not the
Security Council that assumed the ’primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security’ stipulated in article 12 of the Charter. The
United States efforts to orchestrate authorization to use force against Iraq
through the Security Council was motivated, in part, by President Bush’s desire
to gain the imprimatur of UN legitimacy. This factor was important for consen-
sus-building at home and abroad in support of deploying substantial forces in the
Middle East. The United Nations authorized ’effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threat to the peace, and for the suppression of aggres-
sion’ as foreseen in Article 1 of the UN Charter. However, the UN resolutions in
support of the use of force became possible primarily because the Soviet Union
cooperated with the United States in the Security Council. The end of the Cold
War in conjunction with improved Soviet-American relations made possible the
American-led campaign in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union’s unequivocal com-
mitment to the liberation of Kuwait also helped facilitate President Bush’s task to
convince the American public of the necessity to pursue the military option.
In short, the United States was able to use the machinery of the Security
Council to orchestrate and legitimize collective military action because of the
prevalence of certain global balance of power configurations. Specifically, the
severe domestic economic and political crises in the Soviet Union in conjunction
with the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and a general decline in Soviet military
power had weakened the Soviet international position. As a consequence of these
factors, changes in the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev and the massive
American military build-up under President Reagan, a decisive shift in the bal-
ance of power favouring the United States had taken place. In part in response to
these events, the Soviet Union had already begun a major departure in foreign
policy that sought accommodation with the American dominated post-Second
World War status quo. As a consequence, the Soviet Union chose not to oppose

16
Claude, Power and International Relations, op. cit., p. 750.
 51

the American-led coalition against Iraq. Thus, it became possible for the perma-
nent members to cooperate on a matter of a challenge to international peace and
security in the way that was originally envisioned in the Charter.

National interest and collective defence: a

concluding note
The foregoing discussion questions the blind acceptance of collective security.
However, it does not preclude the use of collective security in a narrow and mod-
est sense - as a method designed to deter the threat of a known adversary in the
form of collective defence. This limited conception does away with the broader
notion of applying collective security to deter the actions of any country that poses
a threat to international security. Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that

collective defence and regional collective action is likely to be more viable. Since
membership is restricted to a few states with common or complementary nation-
al security interests, cooperation is more likely. Further, it is easier for a limited
number of states to harmonize national policies in pursuit of a common goal to
deter a known common adversary, and do so in accordance with their obligations
in a collective defence organization.
As noted earlier, a state’s national interest and national security needs to dictate
its foreign policy, including the desire to join and act in the context of a regional
defence organization. As Thomson says, ’at all and in all places the national interest
prevails’. 17 Therefore, illuminating the relative success and duration of a collective
defence to deter aggression requires a preliminary clarification of the concept of
national interest, and establishing the conceptual linkage between the concept of
national interest and collective defence, such as military-political alliances.
In the literature several types of national interests are identified.&dquo; For the pur-
pose of this discussion we make a distinction between the ’national’ and ’interna-
tional’ interests of the state. In the former category, at least four ’national’ interests
are relevant: (1) Primrzry interests which entails the preservation of the state, its terri-

tory, its cultural identity, population and institutions from the threat or encroach-
ment of an outside power; (2) Secondary interests which include the preservation of

tertiary concerns such as the protection of a state’s citizens abroad, diplomatic

immunity and other secondary interests; (3) General interest include a wide range of
interests in the fields of economics, trade, diplomacy, etc. that a state can pursue
with reference to a large number of other states and in different regions of the
world; (4) S~ecific interests are narrowly defined with reference to specific state, time,
space or place. The free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, for instance, is
both a permanent interest and a specific interest of the United States.
In the second category, we may distinguish between identical interests such as
the common Anglo-American interests to prevent the domination of Europe by a
single actor, complementary interests that enable states to develop agreements with

17
Thomson,’ Collective Security Reexamined’, op. cit., p. 750.
18
For a discussion of the concept of national interests in recent literature see, Bruce Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1995), Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Britain: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); A. J. Groom, Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Cassell Leicester
University Press, 1994).
52

respect to specific issues, even in the absence of identical interests; and conflicting
interests - those not included in identical and complementary interests
On the basis of the typology above, we can relate the national interests of states
to the concept of a collective defence organization by adducing a set of proposi-
tions. In the process we will shed some light on the conditions for the duration,
cohesion and relative success of regional collective defence.

1) Inverse relationships exist between the relative level of shared national inter-
ests of states embodied in a collective defence organization and the duration of
the alliance. Regional collective defence organizations that are founded on a
wide array of general interests are less likely to endure compared to limited
alliances based on specific interests or identical interests.
2) There exists a direct, positive correlation between a state’s desire to protect!-
mary interests and secondary interests respectively and entry into an alliance,
regardless of the relative power position of a state in the international system.
In other words, both powerful and weak states alike join regional military
alliances to defend first primary interests and next, secondriry interests.
3) A great power is more likely to enter into an alliance to protect the primary
interests of a weaker state only if there exist completely identical national interests
between such states expressed in the alliance’s goals.
4) Collective defence organizations whose objectives reflect a complete úlentity of
interests of member states are more likely to succeed than those organizations
that reflect only complementary interests, or worse, conflicting interests.
5) There exists a positive correlation between the degree of common interests of
the member states of a collective security organization and the degree of cohe-
sion and unity of such organization. Neither the degree of integration
achieved in other non-vital spheres of interaction, nor the legal ties that bind
states are any substitute for the unity created by a strong community of primary
interests. among states.
6) If a conflict arises between the policies of a state based on its national interest,
and policies dictated by a state’s legal obligations to a collective defence orga-
nization, the former will prevail. Put differently, legal ties that bind nations
together can not override the national interests of a state especially if primary
and permanent interests are involved.
7) A regional collective defence organization based on common ideology is not
likely to succeed, if the alliance does not embody specific common or comple-
mentary interests. Conversely, an alliance that is firmly based on specific com-
man and complementary interests is likely to benefit from a shared ideQl.ogy, pro-
vided that the shared ideology of member states does not obscure the nature
and limits of such a collective defence arganization.2o

19
For an exposition of common and conflicting interests and inchoate (rudimentary, incipient) interests see
Hans Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 198,
p. 203; For a discussion of primary and secondary interests, identical and complementary interests, vital
interests, legitimate interests, specific interests, material interests, permanent and variable interests, see
Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 274.
20
Propositions 1, 3, 5 and 7 have been deduced from the writings of Hans Morgenthau, ’Alliances in
Theory and Practice’, in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in The Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1959) p. 191; ’The Crisis in the Western Alliance’, Commentary, vol. 35 (1963), p. 186; The
Impasse of American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 219; ’Alliance in Theory and Practice’ op. cit., p. 188-89.
 53

The above propositions regarding the relationship between national interests

and collective defence organizations help provide an appropriate perspective on
a variety of interstate organizations, including international institutions that are

based on the principle of collective security. For instance, the United Nations, an
interstate institution, may be thought of as an arena for the traditional pursuit of
national interests or a venue through which member states, especially the United
States and other great powers, rationalize or justify their policies by appealing to
the ideals of collective security and the rule of law envisioned in such an interna-
tional institution. An analysis of national interests, as a point of departure, will
enable analysts to examine the success and failures of international organizations,
regional organizations and collective defence institutions, not in terms of legal
charters, principles, ideals and institutional objectives. Instead, it will focus on the
national interests of member states in the international organization, the policies
that flow from such interests, the portfolio of political, military and economic
resources which member states bring to bear in pursuit of such interests, and the

overall global or regional balance of power relationship prevailing at a that time.