FI - 10-219 - Dec 16 2010

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE
* Wayward biweekly journal focusing on not yet established intelligence news *

* Editor: Roger Vleugels - roger.vleugels@planet.nl *
* Donations are very welcome, see colophon *
* Year 10 - No. 219 – Dec 16 - 2010 *
Content minus NARINT & The Netherlands 51► The Middle East Fallout Could Be Grave
52► Obstructionists Hinder WikiLeaks Probe
Colour = WikiLeaks related articles 53► The Not So Secret US War in Pakistan
56► Army withholds … Lewis Spy Probe
02► Private Guards Outnumber Policemen 57► Is Killing our only Option for Terrorists?
02► Clumsy Vatican Diplomacy 58► Attacks on Nuclear Scientists in Tehran
04► Taking Stock of WikiLeaks 60► Anti-terror Expert to Prevent new Leaks
07► JASON: Science of Cyber Security … 61► WikiLeaks and Rendition
08► How Many … Security Clearances? 63► Sifting Through The Wikileaks Fallout
08► The Shadow War in Iran 63► Kim Philby on Truth in Diplomatic Cables
11► Islamic FBI Set-Ups 64► US Focuses on Pakistan's Nuclear …
13► WikiLeaks Cables on Litvinenko 65► Doubt on Iran Missile Cache
14► Sweden Military Knew about Attacks 66► Haftstrafe für Telekom-Mitarbeiter
14► Focus on the Policy, not Wikileaks
15► WL Iimplications for "the Cloud"
16► Targeted Sanctions
16► European Investigation Order
16► Jailed Afghan Drug Lord Was US Spy Content on NARINT: Natural Resources Intel
19► The CIA's El-Masri Abduction [Co-editor Laetitia Baars -More info in colophon]
20► België & VS akkoord: vingerafdrukken
21► Leaks: Military Treatens Courts-Martial 67► Conference: The Future of Intelligence
21► Govt Response to WikiLeaks Problematic 68► US Monitors Aggressive China in Africa
22► Ex-Intel Officers See WikiLeaks Plusses 69► Somalia's Pirates Take to the high Seas
24► Criminal Prohibitions … WikiLeaks
25► US Pressed Germany on CIA Kidnapping
26► Publishing Classified Info
26► Guidance on Using Leaked Docs
27► Selling Classified US Docs Content on The Netherlands
28► Call to Probe Sweden-US Intel Contact 70► Why Holland Is so Important to US
28► The Many Headed Hydra 75► Conference: The Future of Intelligence
31► US Used Israel Intel … Arms Trade 76► OM hield stukken achter …
32► US Govt Forced to Release Spy Docs 76► Boston – Child Abuse - Netherlands
33► Washington Fights to Rebuild Reputation 77► Foute jurist blijkt lek FIOD
38► Iran: Elite Security Unit after Stuxnet 78► NCTb krijgt ook rampen en crises erbij
38► CRS Blocks Access to Wikileaks
39► National Security: The Limits Change
40► More Foreign Fighters … Back in Iraq
41► Mossad: Was this the Chief's last Hit?
43► Vast Hacking by a China that Fears … Content ’in the Fringe’
45► Russian Mole inside NSA
47► Norwegian Firm Wins NATO Contract 79► De Roy van Zuydewijn in het gelijk
47► WikiLeaks War Room - Revisited
49► JTF2: Canadian Secret Unit
49► Syrian Spies Deployed to … Capitals
05► Govt Reports Violations of Limits … 80► Fringe Colophon
FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 1

PRIVATE GUARDS OUTNUMBER POLICEMEN IN SEVEN EU COUNTRIES
► http://euobserver.com/9/31501/?rk=1
► EU Observer / by Andrew Rettman
► Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl
Dec 15 2010 ► Dec 14. Private-sector security guards outnumber policemen in seven mostly post-
Communist EU countries according to the latest figures from the CoESS, the Brussels-based private
security lobby.
Hungary tops the list with 104.97 private guards per 10,000 inhabitants compared to 39.94 police
officers. The pro-private ratio is the second heaviest in Romania (49.84 private guards versus 25.62
policemen), followed by Ireland, Poland, Finland, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and
Slovenia.
Italy, Spain, Malta, Denmark, Belgium and Lithuania have the lowest levels of private policing.
The most populous EU countries tend to have the largest private security 'armies' overall, with 170,000
private guards in Germany, 165,000 in Poland, 160,000 in France and 120,000 in the UK. Romania
(107,000) and Hungary (105,121) give the big countries a run for their money. But Turkey has the
biggest private security corps in Europe with 257,192 personnel.
"It is mostly the new EU member states that have a high private security force ratio," the study, entitled
Third White Paper, says. "This trend confirms a continued and sustained choice for new economic
aims, which are closer to the free market than the 'old' Europe, with the exception of Luxembourg and
Ireland."
The sector currently employs 1,630,524 people in Europe, up by 176,888 compared to 2009, and is
dominated by men. In one trend: "Companies, individuals and a growing number of public authorities
are asking the private security industry for personal protection [bodyguards]."
CoESS is keen for the EU to roll out universally-recognised vocational qualifications for private guards
to help them move jobs from country to country. But on the other hand, "in line with intensive lobbying
by CoESS," the sector was kept out the EU's Services Directive, which obliges 'old' EU countries to let
in workers from newcomers.
Zooming in on Belgian legislation, bodyguards and guards accompanying consignments of valuables
are allowed to carry guns. But most guards who protect buildings such as cinemas or shopping malls
and night watchmen may not. Belgian law also forbids the vast majority of guards from using force.
They can perform citizens' arrest using handcuffs in special cases, however.
EU buildings in Brussels are currently protected by the UK-based G4S company, which famously
failed to stop an armed robbery inside the European Parliament in 2009.
Meanwhile, the EU's new diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), is drawing
up new guidelines on how to protect its 136 foreign delegations.
An EU official told this website that Brussels tends to borrow soldiers from member states which
already have heavily-guarded embassies in given hotspots, such as the UK in Iraq and France in
Chad. "It is envisaged that there will be 'public sector' soldiers providing security for some delegations.
In some cases it will be too politically sensitive to have physical security provided exclusively by
private companies. So we are in this debate," the contact said.
The official added that there are "different cost and legal implications" of using private security forces:
"If a guard killed somebody, unfortunately it is the company that provides the services that is
responsible for those services."
In one example, the EU compound in Kabul is guarded by an outer ring of foreign-trained Afghan
police, an inner ring of Nepalese Gurkhas and close protection bodyguards from the private London-
ased company Page Group.
The specialist Paris-based publication, Intelligence Online, reported in October that France's General
Secretariat for Defence and National Security is trying to help French companies break Anglo-Saxon
firms' dominant position in the sector. It named the French ambassador in Baghdad, Boris Boillon, as
promoting services by AICS Protection, Gallice Iraq Services and Anitcip.
CLUMSY VATICAN DIPLOMACY

► http://euobserver.com/24/31487
► EU Observer / by Andrew Rettman
Dec 14 2010 ► Dec 13. Freshly-published cables from the US mission to the Vatican have shed light
on the inner workings of Europe's most secretive diplomatic corps, including the Pope's opposition to
Turkey's EU membership, hopes for Polish influence inside the EU and church ideas on how to

undermine the Castro administration in Cuba.
The 15 cables published by WikiLeaks on Friday (10 December), covering the period from 2001 to
2010, highlight US belief in the Vatican's global clout.
"The Vatican is second only to the United States in the number of countries with which it enjoys
diplomatic relations (188 and 177 respectively), and there are Catholic priests, nuns and lay people in
every country on the planet. As the spiritual leader of 1.3 billion Catholics worldwide and enjoying
respect as well from non-Catholics, the Pope wields an unparalleled moral megaphone," a 2009 US
note ahead of President Barack Obama's meeting with the pontiff says. "Private comments from
Vatican officials to European diplomats also carry some weight - particularly in the traditionally
Catholic countries," a 2006 cable says.
The cables praise Pope Benedict XVI's broad support for the Middle East Peace Process and his
handling of a tricky encounter with the Socialist Zapatero government in Spain in 2006. "The pope's
tack in Spain [on same-sex marriages] was milder than some expected," a 2006 US cable says.
"Benedict has used tact and persuasion rather than fire and brimstone in his battle against relativism
and secularism."
The rest of the material indicates that the Vatican has fumbled almost every diplomatic crisis in recent
years, however.
The cables note that in 2004 the church stood back while media depicted private remarks by the then
Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, that Turkey should not join the EU as being sofficial
Vatican policy.
In 2009, the church angered the international Jewish community by failing to denounce the holocaust-
denying views of a renegade bishop and proposing to canonize Nazi-collaborator Pope Pius XII. "The
Pope welcomed him [Bishop Williamson] back into the Church, but they waited days to do so [speak
out on the holocaust], and then did it weakly," a 2009 US cable says. "Church officials did not expect
the criticism and were annoyed by it," the cable adds on Pius XII.
The same year, Pope Benedict XVI's announcement that disgruntled Anglican bishops should join the
Roman Catholic church raised concerns in Washington. "There is still latent anti-Catholicism in some
parts of England and it may not take much to set it off. The outcome could be discrimination or in
isolated cases, even violence, against this [Catholic] minority," a US diplomat remarked.
The church in 2009 also caused a "public furore" in Ireland by complaining that a major sex-abuse
inquiry violated "Vatican sovereignty." "The Nuncio in Ireland made things worse by simply ignoring
the requests [to appear before national commissions]," the related cable says.
The US links the failures to Pope Benedict XVI's inner circle of septuagenerian advisors, who are out
of touch with the modern world, do not speak English and act as "Yes-men" to the pontiff. "Most of the
top ranks of the Vatican - all men, generally in their seventies - do not understand modern media and
new information technologies. The blackberry-using Father Lombardi remains an anomaly in a culture
in which many officials do not even have official email accounts," another 2009 cable says.
Turkey: in or out?
The cables indicate that the Vatican is ambiguous about the prospect of Turkish EU entry.
On one hand, Cardinal Ratzinger said in 2004 that "Turkey had always been 'in permanent contrast to
Europe' and that linking it to Europe would be a mistake." "Ratzinger has been a leading voice behind
the Holy See's unsuccessful drive to secure a reference to Europe's 'Christian roots' in the EU
constitution, and he clearly understands that allowing a Muslim country into the EU would further
weaken his case for Europe's Christian foundations," the 2004 cable adds.
On the other hand, senior Vatican officials believe: "Turkey could help to ease tensions between the
Western and Muslim worlds, illustrating how a secular state with a Muslim population could co-operate
with countries with a Judeo-Christian heritage." But a 2009 US cable says: "The Vatican might prefer
to see Turkey develop a special relationship short of membership with the EU."
Meanwhile, the Vatican hopes that Poland will help it to steer EU policy-making on social issues.
"The Holy See's attention to Poland is not simply customer service or 'taking care of the troops.' As
was clear under Pope John Paul II, the Vatican has high hopes that Poland will serve as a counter-
weight to Western European secularism," a 2006 US note says. "Certainly the Holy See hopes that
Poland will hold the line at the EU on 'life and family' issues that arise."
Handling the Castro brothers
Not all of Pope Benedict XVI's lieutenants are as ignorant of communications issues as the 2009 cable
on his inner circle suggests, however.
In a 2010 cable, one Monsignor Nicolas Thevenin told Washington that the Vatican supports Spain's
failed push to lift EU sanctions on Cuba. "He ... implied a preference for the soft approach of Spain
over that of Poland or the Czech Republic as being more conducive to a positive response from the
Cubans," the US note says. Monsignor Thevenin also advised the US to "lean on telecommunications

companies to make sure that rates for Cubans to call the US would be very low. This, he thought,
could have a positive impact in promoting political change."
The Vatican in a statement released at the weekend tried to undermine the value of the WikiLeaks
material.
"These reports reflect the perceptions and opinions of the people who wrote them and cannot be
considered as expressions of the Holy See itself, nor as exact quotations of the words of its officials," it
said. "I am very proud to be described as a 'Yes-man'," one of the Pope's top advisors, Cardinal
Tarcisio Bertone, told Italian media.
TAKING STOCK OF WIKILEAKS

► http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101213-taking-stock-wikileaks
► Stratfor / by George Friedman
► Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
Dec 14 2010 ► Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into pre-"Cablegate"
and post-"Cablegate" eras. That was a bold claim. However, given the intense interest that the leaks
produced, it is a claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed since the first
of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time now to address the following questions: First,
how significant were the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their release a
crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and most important, is the WikiLeaks premise
that releasing government secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position?
Let's begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents constituted the third wave of leaks.
The first two consisted of battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those as a
benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed information that ran counter to informed opinion. I
use the term "informed opinion" deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and Afghanistan
with some care over the previous years, the leaks might have provided interesting details but they
would not have provided any startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was
revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren‘t paying close attention, and WikiLeaks provided your first
and only view of the battlefields in any detail, you might have been surprised.
Let's consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of thousands of reports released on
Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by
U.S. troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in violation of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, did not go into combat wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish
themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always been adamant on this
requirement because they regarded combatants operating under the cover of civilians as being
responsible for putting those civilians in harm's way, not the uniformed troops who were forced to
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when the combatants deliberately chose to act
in violation of the Geneva Conventions.
It follows from this that such actions against civilians are inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents
chose to wage. Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in a war in which
combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by
uniformed troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the idea that criminal acts
would be absent is absurd. What is most startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but
their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read histories of World War II would
be struck not by the presence of war crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few
potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when controls fail - as they inevitably do -
uncontrolled and potentially criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with much
fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of American troops as much as it did the
consequences of the insurgents violating the Geneva Conventions.
Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a war going on, or who had no
understanding of war, or who wanted to pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial
points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for criminal acts under the Geneva
Conventions for posing as non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential war
crimes that were contained in the leaks.
The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was revealed that was unknown to the
informed observer. For example, anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not
only the Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian power and most insistent
that the United States do something about it. While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it

required a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf to regard U.S.
diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' statement in the leaks that the Saudis were always prepared to
fight to the last American was embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi
leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks of them. Of course, the Saudis
are canny politicians and diplomats and they already knew how the American leadership regarded
their demands.
There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer. Almost anyone who worries
about such things is aware that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and
likes to party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the American diplomatic
service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi is aware that they know of these things, which will
make it hard for diplomats to pretend that they don't know of these things. Of course, Berlusconi was
aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly didn't care, since the charges were all over
Italian media.
I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent reality of the leaks is that they do
not reveal anything new to the informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments,
such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev being called "Batman
and Robin." That's amusing, but it isn't significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never
significant is what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks.
Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their own advantage. For example, the
Russians feigned shock that NATO would be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential
Russian invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish relations are an illusion.
The Russians know well of NATO plans for defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian
invasion, and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex but far from illusory.
The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning shock and anger and extracting possible minor
concessions or controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure of geopolitics.
Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent. While their public statements
after a conference may be vacuous, it is encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of
foreign leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior leaders to anonymous
snippets from apparently junior diplomats not only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees
with them) but are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a flattering picture
overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without revealing, for the most part, anything particularly
embarrassing.
At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the leaks, particularly personal
comments about leaders and sometimes their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of
these will damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal tension and none of
their authors will likely return to the countries in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional,
but the task of a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and none expect their
observations ever to be seen by the wrong people. Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over
such insults, not in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most significant
embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal tension is not, however, international
tension.
This raises the question of why diplomats can't always simply state their minds rather than publicly
mouth preposterous platitudes. It could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He
completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was
awful and he knew I knew he was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is called
politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection among nations, but politeness calls for
behaving differently when a person is in the company of certain other people than when that person is
with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of human rules. Not admitting what
you know about others is the foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and nations.
And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a great deal of information about
people who aren't American that others certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and
now they have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn‘t understand how
geopolitics really works to think that this would make a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in
other postings, and perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would somehow
change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I have yet to see Assange point to
something so significant that that it would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is
hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not to be found in what has been
released so far.

There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold secrets, which is at the root of the
WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His
ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money and resources are being spent
on keeping something secret, then the reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many
reasons, from protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some advantage in
negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it is difficult to imagine a state - or a business or a
church - acting without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in an attempt to
figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea that you discarded or clueless comment you
expressed would now be pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should
engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes diplomacy impossible. If what you
really think of the guy on the other side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work?
This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given what I have read Assange saying,
he seems to me to be an opponent of war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these
documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more difficult. It is not that it will lead to
war by any means; it is simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that
negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their negotiations. No business could do that,
nor could any other institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of its own
organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs.
Assange's claims are made even more interesting in terms of his "thermonuclear" threat. Apparently
there are massive files that will be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they will
not be revealed if he is unharmed - otherwise the threat makes no sense. So, Assange's position is
that he has secrets and will keep them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly
reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is to control what the other side
does to you. So Assange is absolutely committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests
not to, in which case the public has no need to know.
It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond embarrassment. It is also difficult to
understand why WikiLeaks thinks it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of
irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness and his willingness to keep
secrets when they benefit him. But there is also something important here, which is how this all was
leaked in the first place.
To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling in its aftermath that the failure of
various government entities to share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share
information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from all sources in order to connect
the dots. Intelligence organizations hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of
information vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it also makes it
harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between intelligence and security is eternal, and
there will never be a clear solution.
The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what controls were put on them. Did the IT
department track all external drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was
information that was classified secret and below, with the vast majority being at the confidential, no-
foreign-distribution level. This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S. government.
Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how the U.S. government decides to classify material.
But it has to be remembered that given their level of classification these files did not have the highest
security around them because they were not seen as highly sensitive.
Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who gave a copy of the Pentagon
Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance
to provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a publisher to publish it, or so it has
become practice since the Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been the
practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the publisher in any way encouraged or
participated in either the theft of the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg case,
he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was. Assange has been insisting that he
was the passive recipient of information that he had nothing to do with securing.
Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks constituted encouragement or
conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on classified information to him. But more interesting by far is
the sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only to secure the material but to
know where to send it and how to get it there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the
theft by himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is clear. But anyone
who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what
was being done, he is probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping Manning.
Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is undoubtedly doing now. Assange

cannot be guilty of treason, since he isn't a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His
bestdefense will be that he can't be guilty of espionage because the material that was stolen was so
trivial.
I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of the material. I do know - given the
material leaked so far - that there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it. Therefore,
Assange's claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as it is bold. Whether he committed any
crime, including rape, is something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is hyperbole. But
contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to the United States. New controls will be placed on
the kind of low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the following point on
this: "Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a
game-changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is,
governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not
because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments - some
governments - deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they
need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation."
"Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly
modest."
I don't like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case Robert Gates' view is definitive. One can
pretend that WikiLeaks has redefined geopolitics, but it hasn't come close.
JASON: SCIENCE OF CYBER SECURITY NEEDS MORE WORK

► Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org
Dec 14 2010 ► Dec 14. "Cyber security is now critical to our survival but as a field of research [it]
does not have a firm scientific basis," according to the Department of Defense. "Our current security
approaches have had limited success and have become an arms race with our adversaries. In order
to achieve security breakthroughs we need a more fundamental understanding of the science of cyber
security."
To help advance that understanding, the DoD turned to the JASON defense advisory panel, which has
just produced a new report on the subject. "There is a science of cyber security," the JASONs said,
but it "seems underdeveloped in reporting experimental results, and consequently in the ability to use
them." The JASON report began by noting that "A science of cyber security has to deal with a
combination of peculiar features that are shared by no other area of study."
"First, the background on which events occur is almost completely created by humans and is digital.
That is, people built all the pieces. One might have thought that computers, their software, and
networks were therefore completely understandable. The truth is that the cyber-universe is complex
well beyond anyone's understanding and exhibits behavior that no one predicted, and sometimes can't
even be explained well [after the fact]," the report said.
"Second, cyber security has good guys and bad guys. It is a field that has developed because people
have discovered how to do things that other people disapprove of, and that break what is thought to
be an agreed-upon social contract in the material world. That is, in cyber security there are
adversaries, and the adversaries are purposeful and intelligent."
The JASON report went on to discuss the importance of definitions (including the definition of cyber
security itself, which is "imprecise"), the need for a standard vocabulary to discuss the subject, and the
necessity (and difficulty) of devising experimental protocols that would permit development of a
reproducible experimental science of cyber security.
"There are no surprises in this report, nor any particularly deep insights," the JASON authors stated
modestly. "Most people familiar with the field will find the main points familiar." Also, "There may be
errors in the report, and substantive disagreements with it."
In fact, however, the report is full of stimulating observations and is also, like many JASON reports,
quite well written. While cyber security fundamentally requires an understanding of computer science,
the report explained that it "also share aspects of sciences such as epidemiology, economics, and
clinical medicine; all these analogies are helpful in providing research directions." An analogy
between cyber security and the human immune system, with its "innate" and "adaptive" components,
was found to be particularly fruitful.
"At the most abstract level, studying the immune system suggests that cyber security solutions will
need to be adaptive, incorporating learning algorithms and flexible memory mechanisms.... [However,]
adaptive solutions are expensive in terms of needed resources. Approximately 1% of human cells are
lymphocytes, reflecting a rather large commitment to immune defense. [By analogy,] one should

therefore expect that significant amount of computational power would be needed to run cyber security
for a typical network or cluster."
The report recommended DoD support for a network of cyber security research centers in universities
and elsewhere. With barely a hint of irony, the JASONs also endorsed an April 2010 statement by
Wang Chen, China's chief internet officer, that "Leaking of secrets via the Internet is posing serious
threats to national security and interests."
A copy of the new JASON report was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Science of Cyber-Security,"
November 2010.
HOW MANY PEOPLE HAVE SECURITY CLEARANCES?

Dec 14 2010 ► Dec 14. How many government employees and contractors hold security clearances
for access to classified information? Remarkably, it is not possible to answer that question today with
any precision. But it should be possible by next February, officials said at a House Intelligence
Subcommittee hearing on December 1.
Currently there is no precise tally of the number of cleared persons, and there is no way to produce
one, said John Fitzpatrick, Director of the ODNI Special Security Center.
"We can find definitively if any individual has a clearance at any one point in time," he told Rep. Anna
Eshoo, the subcommittee chair. But "to take that point in time and define the number of all the people
that do takes a manipulation of data in databases that weren't intended to do that."
"To give a precise [answer] requires, I think, due diligence in the way we collect that data and the way
that data changes." And in fact, "we have a special data collection to provide a definitive answer on
that in the February 2011 IRTPA report," referring to an upcoming report required under the 2004
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
In the meantime, Mr. Fitzpatrick said, "To give a ballpark number [of total security clearances] is not
difficult."
Well then, Rep. Eshoo asked, "What would a ballpark figure today be?"
"Oh, I'd like to take that one for the record," Mr. Fitzpatrick replied. "It's -- you know, I'd give you -- I'd
like to take that one for the record."
Based on prior reporting by the Government Accountability Office, the ballpark figure that we use is
2.5 million cleared persons. ("More Than 2.4 Million Hold Security Clearances," Secrecy News, July
29, 2009).
THE SHADOW WAR IN IRAN

Someone is killing Iran’s nuclear scientists. But a computer worm may be the scarier threat
► http://www.newsweek.com/2010/12/13/the-covert-war-against-iran-s-nuclear-program.print.html
► Newsweek / by Christopher Dickey, R. M. Schneiderman and Babak Dehghanpisheh
Dec 14 2010 ► Dec 13. The covert operations that target Iran‘s nuclear program suddenly came to
light with explosive violence and stunning implications for the future of warfare on Nov. 29.
On that Monday morning, dawn had just broken over a bustling Tehran so deeply shrouded in smog
that many commuters wore face masks to protect against the fumes and dust in the air. On Artesh
Street, among rows of new and half-finished apartment blocks, the nuclear physicist Majid Shahriari
was working his way through rush-hour traffic with his wife and bodyguard in his Peugeot sedan. A
motorcycle pulled up beside the scientist‘s car. Nothing extraordinary about that. But then the man on
the bike stuck something to the outside of the door and sped away. When the magnetically attached
bomb went off, its focused explosion killed Shahriari instantly. It wounded the others in the car but
spared their lives. A clean hit.
Only a few minutes later and a few miles away, in a leafy neighborhood in the foothills of the Alborz
Mountains, again a motorcycle pulled alongside the car of another scientist, Fereydoun Abbasi
Davani. A longtime member of Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards, Abbasi Davani was named specifically in
a United Nations sanctions resolution as ―involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities.‖ Sensing
what was about to happen, he stopped the car, jumped out, and managed to pull his wife to safety
before the bomb went off.
That same morning, in Israel, where many see Iran‘s nuclear program as a threat to the very existence
of the Jewish state, nobody celebrated the Tehran attacks publicly. Nobody claimed responsibility. But

nobody denied it, either. And as it happened, that was the morning Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu announced that Meir Dagan would be stepping down after eight years directing the
Mossad and its secret operations against Iran. Under a photograph of Shahriari‘s thoroughly
perforated Peugeot, one of Israel‘s tabloids ran the headline LAST SHOT FOR DAGAN?
This longest day in a dark war was not over yet, however. In Tehran that Monday afternoon, at a press
conference that had been delayed for two hours, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told
reporters there was ―no doubt the hand of the Zionist regime and the Western governments‖ had been
involved in the attacks on the scientists. Then, for the first time, Ahmadinejad admitted something that
his government had tried to deny until that moment: the high-speed centrifuges used to enrich uranium
for use as nuclear fuel in reactors, or possibly for weapons, had been damaged by a cyberattack.
Iran‘s enemies—he didn‘t specify which ones—had been ―successful in making problems for a limited
number of our centrifuges with software they installed in electronic devices.‖ Ahmadinejad assured the
press that the problem was now taken care of. ―They are unable to repeat these acts,‖ he claimed. Yet
only a few days before, top Iranian officials had declared there was no problem at all.
Rarely has a covert war been so obvious, and rarely have the underlying facts been so murky.
Conspiracy theory hangs as heavy in Tehran these days as the smog: a number of Iranian reformists
opposed to Ahmadinejad have suggested the two scientists targeted in November, as well as another
one, Masoud Ali Mohammadi, killed by an exploding motorcycle in January, were attacked by the
regime itself because their loyalties were suspect. All reportedly sympathized to some extent with the
opposition Green Movement. Both Mohammadi and Shahriari had attended at least one meeting of
SESAME, a U.N.-linked research organization based in Jordan, where Israelis as well as Arabs and
Iranians were present. ―In the eyes of the Revolutionary Guards, everybody‘s a potential spy,‖ says a
former Iranian intelligence officer, who asked not to be named because of likely retributions inside
Iran. ―You are either 100 percent dedicated to the system or you are an enemy.‖
So, who done it? The speculation itself is part of the psychological game played by various
governments against Iran and to some extent against each other. In what Cold War spies would have
called ―a wilderness of mirrors,‖ different intelligence services may take credit, with a wink and a nod,
for things they did not do, while denying they did what they actually did do. Enemies of Iran can take
pleasure, for now at least, in the fear stirred up by uncertainty.
What we can deduce from the limited evidence that has emerged so far, according to former White
House counterterrorism and cyberwarfare adviser Richard Clarke, is that at least two countries
conducted operations against Iran simultaneously and not necessarily in close coordination. One likely
carried out the hits; the other created and somehow infiltrated the highly sophisticated Stuxnet worm
into computers of the Iranian nuclear program. In an interview, Clarke, who now runs a security-
consulting business, strongly suggested Israel and the United States are the likely sources of the
attacks. Other analysts suggest that France, Britain, and especially Germany, home of Siemens,
which made the software and some of the hardware attacked by the Stuxnet worm, might also be
involved. (A spokesman for Siemens says the company no longer does business with Iran.)
Historically, Israel‘s covert operations have been on the violent side. When it comes to strategic
murders, the Mossad has established a record 50 years long of ―targeted assassinations,‖ often taking
out scientists who tried to help its enemies develop weapons of mass destruction. It has carried out
hits all over the Middle East and Europe (see following story). Iran knows this history well: Israeli
intelligence sources, who decline to be named on the record, coyly suggest that the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards are so convinced the Mossad directed the assassination plots that the Guards
are taking extreme measures to protect the man considered next on the hit list: Mohsen Fakhrizadeh,
a professor of nuclear physics whom the Israelis sometimes call ―the Iranian Dr. Strangelove.‖ They
believe he‘s directing a secret nuclear-weapons program that is distinct from the public enrichment
operations at Natanz and elsewhere, which are open to United Nations inspectors. (The official Iranian
government position is that all its nuclear research and all its uranium enrichment are for purely
peaceful purposes.)
The real damage to the Iranian nuclear program, however, was done by Stuxnet—the most
sophisticated computer worm ever detected and analyzed, one targeting hardware as well as
software, and a paradigm of covert cyberweapons to come. ―Stuxnet is the start of a new era,‖ says
Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the U.S. National Security Agency. ―It‘s the first time we‘ve
actually seen a weapon created by a state to achieve a goal that you would otherwise have used
multiple cruise missiles to achieve.‖
According to figures compiled by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security,
a Washington think tank that follows the Iranian program closely, Tehran had major problems bringing
new centrifuges online throughout 2009. The first 4,000 already installed at the Natanz facility
continued to spin, but the next 5,000 were beset by delays. The worst problems came in an array of

centrifuges known as A-26, which Iran began installing in late 2008—around the time Stuxnet was
sent on its mission. In the late summer of 2009, half the functioning A-26 centrifuges had to be pulled
out of service. At the turn of this year, Albright has learned, 1,000 more simply broke down. This may
have been the ―limited number‖ Ahmadinejad was talking about.
Not all of the breakdowns can be attributed to Stuxnet. Spies from Israel and probably elsewhere have
long been involved in the sabotage of high-tech materials and components for the Iranian nuclear
program that Tehran has had to acquire on the black market because of U.N. sanctions. As far back
as April 2007, Eli Levite, then deputy director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, told a closed
forum that ―our efforts gained time for us and have doubtlessly caused significant delays in the [Iranian
nuclear] project.‖ The threshold at which Iran can be deemed a real nuclear-weapons power—which is
the point at which Israel might launch a military strike to neutralize the threat, even if that risked
dragging the United States into a third Muslim-world war—is pushed back by these covert operations.
And that gives diplomacy a chance even if, as happened in Geneva last week, talks with Iran appear
to make little progress.
Some press reports suggest that Stuxnet, too, is an Israeli weapon. They point to Tel Aviv‘s prowess
in computer science, especially in highly secretive groups like Unit 8200, the Israeli military‘s
legendary cyber outfit. They point to some code in Stuxnet that might suggest the date on which a
prominent Jewish businessman was executed in Tehran in 1979, or the name ―Myrtus,‖ which could
be construed as a reference to Esther, the biblical Jewish queen of Persia who stopped a genocide,
and so on. But Clarke cautions against such convoluted explanations. ―The argument is that the
Israelis are trying to subtly let the Iranians know it was them—not so subtly that they claim it publicly,
but enough so the Iranians get to know,‖ he says. ―Stay away from all that.‖
What‘s clear, says Clarke, is that major resources went into Stuxnet‘s development. Microsoft
estimates that building the virus likely took 10,000 man-days of labor by top-rank software engineers.
Unlike most of the worms and viruses that wreak havoc on computers, this one was not designed to
spread far and wide, doing damage wherever it landed. It is structured to target a specific set of
devices manufactured only in Finland and Iran that are used to determine the speed at which the
centrifuges rotate. If that speed is not modulated perfectly, vibrations make the machines break down,
as indeed they have. According to Eric Chien of the antivirus firm Symantec, who has pulled Stuxnet
apart like a strand of DNA, all that incredibly complex information was built into it before it ever
infected the Iranian system. Clarke suggests that whoever developed Stuxnet probably had the same
types of software and centrifuges on which to run tests. ―That‘s expensive,‖ he says. ―That‘s millions of
dollars.‖
Because the Iranian nuclear program‘s computers are not connected to the Internet, the worm couldn‘t
have been introduced to them online. It‘s presumed to have come from a USB thumb drive that the
user may or may not have known was infected: Stuxnet was designed to do nothing to computers that
didn‘t connect with the control mechanisms it targeted. And then, depending on where it found itself,
Stuxnet was supposed to self-destruct. According to Chien, different components of the virus have
different ―time to live‖ mechanisms. A USB key inserted into a newly infected computer can‘t carry the
worm for more than 21 days. After that, it disappears. The worm is programmed to quit exploiting one
particular weakness in Microsoft‘s software after June 1, 2011, and the worm‘s overall time to live runs
out in June 2012.
Why bother with an expiration date at all? The answer supplied by Clarke is so very Washington-
centric that it‘s almost a dead giveaway. ―All that suggests to me a nation-state actor with a series of
lawyers involved in looking at the covert action,‖ says Clarke, whose latest book is Cyber War: The
Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It. ―I‘ve never seen or heard of a worm before
that limited its spread.‖ One explanation, of course, is that the creators of the virus hoped it would self-
destruct before it was discovered. Another, however, is that the creators and their government hoped
to limit their liability if they were ever exposed. A former senior intelligence official in the U.S.
government has doubts the CIA could have vetted such an attack. ―The applicable presidential
findings we had in this arena did not cover this kind of activity,‖ he says. If the United States were
involved, he adds, it would have had to be a Defense Department operation.
Whoever was behind this seminal cyberattack, the next such worm, which might be adapted from the
Stuxnet codes that are now widely circulated, may not be so punctilious. (Imagine what WikiLeaks-
supporting anarchists might do with it. Or the Iranians.) Like other weapons that have transformed the
battlefields of the last century only to become so widespread that they threaten their creators, this
worm could turn.

ISLAMIC FBI SET-UPS
Islamic 'Pipeline to Extremism' Turns Out to Be Mostly FBI Set-Ups
► Foreign Policy in Focus / by Francis Njubi Nesbitt [Foreign Policy in Focus contributor. He is the author of Race
for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994 and is currently completing a book on U.S. foreign
policies in the Horn of Africa]
► http://www.alternet.org/story/149107/
► Alternet
► Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl
Dec 13 2010 ► Dec 7. The recent rash of charges against Somali-Americans on ―conspiracy to
provide material support‖ to al-Shabaab, a Somali rebel group on the U.S. terrorism list, seems
designed to send a clear message that any support for the militants will lead to criminal prosecution. It
also demonstrates the ubiquitous presence of law enforcement in these communities.
The Obama administration must be careful, however, not to play into the hands of jihadists by
overreacting or seeming to unfairly target Somali immigrants.
The recent arrest of Mohamed Osman Mahmoud , a 19-year-old Oregonian of Somali descent, is a
case in point. Like other inept would-be terrorists who fell for recent FBI sting operations, Mahmoud
was obviously incapable of pulling off any complex operation without the help of the FBI. His attempts
to contact international jihadists had failed. FBI agents then contacted him, built the bomb, and
provided the suspect with money to rent an apartment. His indictment states Mahmoud wanted to
commit an act of terrorism since he was 15 years old. Although Mahmoud‘s alleged views are
deplorable, merely fantasizing about jihad is not a crime.
Radicalization
The media and policymakers argue that this is a process of ―radicalization‖ that turns self-identified
radicals into jihadists. The New York Police Department‘s much- quoted 2006 analysis of
radicalization, Radicalization of the West: The Homegrown Threat , argued that there are four
identifiable stages (pre-radicalization, self- identification, indoctrination, jihadization) in the process of
radicalization. Borrowing mainly from the European experience, the report ascribes ―jihadist or jihadi-
Salafi ideology‖ as what mainly ―motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry
out autonomous jihad via acts of terrorism against their host countries.‖
However, this assumption does not apply to all would-be militants. Some, like the Somali youth who
joined al-Shabaab in 2008, may have been motivated by nationalism rather than anti-Americanism.
Analyzing the Mahmoud case in the context of the NYPD theory, the teen was only at the second
stage -- self-identification. As the NYPD report indicates, there is no formula for determining who will
move from ―self-identification‖ to ―jihadization.‖ Indeed, according to the report, both ―indoctrination‖
and ―jihadization‖ require close contact and support from spiritual and operational leaders. It seems,
therefore, that the FBI became Mahmoud‘s operational leader.
Another recent report, the American Security Project‘s Enemies Among Us: Domestic Radicalization
After September 11 , focuses on the psychological motivations of individuals. The report uses
adjectives such as ‗bewildering‖ and ―unpredictable.‖ It argues that the only commonality identified is
the eventual exposure of the so-called radicals to ―radical Islam‖ at mosques, the Internet, or through
friends and recruiters. ―Alienation‖ is considered a major factor, but it is not clear why alienation turns
to actual action or plans to act.
The Bipartisan Policy Center report entitled ―Assessing the Terrorist Threat," released this year and
timed to coincide with the 9/11 anniversary, portrays the FBI as failing to understand that these
incidents were not isolated. Rather, they indicate ―an embryonic terrorist radicalization and recruitment
structure had been established in the U.S. homeland.‖ The authors argued that the FBI, and
Americans in general, seem to have been lulled into a sense of complacency by polls and statistics
that showed that Americans Muslims as well-off and integrated.
The media and law enforcement officials continue to refer to these cases as ―terrorism,‖ although so
far there is no record of a person of Somali descent committing an act of violent terrorism in the United
States. This amorphous definition creates the impression that Somalis, in general, are a threat. In
March 2009, for instance, Deputy Director of Intelligence for the National Counterterrorism Center
Andrew Liepman told a Senate hearing on al-Shabaab recruitment in the United States that some
Somalis were susceptible to ―criminal or extremist influence‖ because of their background.
According to Liepman, ―Among Somali-Americans, the refugee experience of fleeing a war-torn
country, combined with perceived discrimination, marginalization, and frustrated expectations, as well
as local criminal, familial, and clan dynamics may heighten the susceptibility of some members of
these communities to criminal or extremist influences.‖
At this same congressional hearing , Philip Mudd, the FBI associate executive assistant director of the
National Security Branch, said that the FBI believed there were deliberate efforts to recruit young

people to fight for al-Shabaab. He stated the youths seemed to be motivated by nationalism, with the
desire to defend their country from an Ethiopian invasion, rather than Islamist ideology, although the
appeal was based on shared Islamic identity. Mudd also indicated that socio-economic conditions
such as ―violent youth crime and gang subcultures, and tensions over cultural integration may have
played some role in the recruitment process.‖
Do these activities indicate a growing alienation and anger among the 1.5 and second generation of
Somali youth growing up in the United States? The vague accusations threaten to indict thousands of
otherwise law-abiding Somalis who were outraged by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. The
majority of parents and community leaders consider the United States a place of refuge from the
chaos and violence that led to their flight from Somalia. They were as surprised and dismayed as other
Americans when they learned that their children had joined the jihadist movement in Somalia.
Material Support
Providing ―material support or resources‖ -- such as money, goods, personnel, and advice that can be
used in terrorist activity -- to a group designated as a ―foreign terrorist organization‖ is illegal and
carries a 15-year sentence. Congress first criminalized material support in 1996 in order to deny
terrorist groups with humanitarian offshoots the ability to raise funds in the United States. After 9/11,
the 2001 Patriot Act broadened it to criminalize ―expert advice or assistance.‖ In June 2010, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the ―material support‖ provision to include money and materials as well as
―training‖ and ―advice‖ -- even if for humanitarian purposes.
In August 2010, the Justice Department indicted 14 Somali-Americans on charges of providing
―material support‖ to al-Shabaab and allegedly recruiting youth to join the militia. Twelve of the
suspects from California, Minnesota, and Alabama were indicted for leaving the United States to join
al-Shabaab. Six of the suspects are U.S. citizens. Attorney General Eric Holder stated that these
indictments indicate the existence of a ―deadly pipeline that has routed funding and fighters from cities
across the United States.‖
Three months later, prosecutors in San Diego charged five Somali-Americans with providing ―material
support‖ to a foreign terrorist organization. The group allegedly sent about $9,000 to al-Shabaab
between 2007 and 2008, with some of the funds possibly transferred after the United States added al-
Shabaab to its terrorist list in 2008. But in 2008, al-Shabaab was an insignificant threat to the
international community, having emerged to resist an Ethiopian invasion supported by the Bush
administration. The defendants included such community leaders as Mohamed Mohamed Mahmood,
who has served as the imam of a Somali mosque for over a decade. Some of the defendants claimed
that they were collecting funds for humanitarian projects in Somalia.
Also in November, prosecutors indicted a San Diego woman for allegedly sending $800 to two former
Minnesota residents fighting in Somalia. The amounts sent by the defendants are minimal considering
that al-Shabaab has other more lucrative funding sources including piracy in the Gulf of Aden and
supporters across the oil-rich Arabian peninsula.
The ―material support:‖ provision of the Patriot Act is already very controversial among human rights
activist interested in Latin America and Asia where it has been used to deny refugee status to indivi-
duals forced to cooperate with rebel groups. This provision of law was also used to justify a recent raid
on the homes of 14 peace activists (non-Somalis) who oppose U.S. foreign policy in Latin America
and Israel/Palestine. The railroading of suspects into the justice system is reminiscent of tactics used
by the FBI and prosecutors during the era of McCarthyism and COINTELPRO, both of which perse-
cuted perceived ―radicals‖ such as Paul Robeson, W.E.B. DuBois, and Martin Luther King, Jr.
Changing Directions
These so-called counter-radicalization policies focus on individuals rather than structures, symptoms
rather than root causes. A more proactive domestic approach would include policies that prevent
radicalization instead of focusing on arresting and prosecuting perpetrators. The aggressive and overt
policing and prosecution of marginal cases may deter some, but has the strong potential to breed anti-
Muslim and anti-American sentiments at home and abroad. The retaliatory arson attack on the
mosque, where the Portland bombing suspect allegedly worshipped, is but one example.
There is an urgent need to change direction by establishing ―pipelines to integration‖ to counter the
efforts to establish a pipeline to extremism. Such pipelines could include tackling poverty and un-
employment by expanding English as a Second Language classes, after-school programs, job train-
ing, and citizenship programs in Somali communities. These, in turn, would engage the youth in posi-
tive alternatives to the lure of extremism, gangs, drug dealing, and prostitution. In addition, integrating
Somalis into the larger community, while respecting their cultural heritage and traditions, requires
cultural competency training for law enforcement personnel, teachers, and other public officials.
Somali immigrant youth, often children of immigrants themselves, are in danger of losing connection
with their ethnic heritage and values. This dilemma of being neither American nor Somali leads them

to search for identity and belonging that some satisfy by turning to religion, following a radical
preacher, or in rare cases joining a jihadist group. The overwhelming majority of Somalis, even those
who oppose U.S. policies abroad, do not join jihadist groups. For those few who do, it is the exposure
to particular personal and communicative networks that turn radical thought into violent action. Trying
to identify and neutralize the few youth who attempt to join al-Shabaab does not even begin to deal
with the problem.
WIKILEAKS CABLES ON LITVINENKO

WikiLeaks cables: Russia 'was tracking killers of Alexander Litvinenko but UK warned it off'
Claim that British intelligence was incompetent will deepen diplomatic row sparked by move to
deport MP's Russian researcher
► The Guardian / by Jamie Doward and Emily Dyer
Dec 13 2010 ► Dec 11. Russia was tracking the assassins of dissident spy Alexander Litvinenko
before he was poisoned but was warned off by Britain, which said the situation was "under control",
according to claims made in a leaked US diplomatic cable.
The secret memo, recording a 2006 meeting between an ex-CIA bureau chief and a former KGB
officer, is set to reignite the diplomatic row surrounding Litvinenko's unsolved murder that year, which
many espionage experts have linked directly to the Kremlin.
The latest WikiLeaks release comes after relations between Moscow and London soured as a result of
Britain's decision to expel a Russian parliamentary researcher suspected of being a spy.
The memo, written by staff at the US embassy in Paris, records "an amicable 7 December dinner
meeting with ambassador-at-large Henry Crumpton [and] Russian special presidential representative
Anatoliy Safonov", two weeks after Litvinenko's death from polonium poisoning had triggered an
international hunt for his killers.
During the dinner, Crumpton, who ran the CIA's Afghanistan operations before becoming the US
ambassador for counter-terrorism, and Safonov, an ex-KGB colonel-general, discussed ways the two
countries could work together to tackle terrorism. The memo records that "Safonov opened the
meeting by expressing his appreciation for US/Russian co-operative efforts thus far. He cited the
recent events in London – specifically the murder of a former Russian spy by exposure to radioactive
agents – as evidence of how great the threat remained and how much more there was to do on the
co-operative front."
The memo contains an observation from US embassy officials that Safonov's comments suggested
Russia "was not involved in the killing, although Safonov did not offer any further explanation".
Later the memo records that Safonov claimed that "Russian authorities in London had known about
and followed individuals moving radioactive substances into the city but were told by the British that
they were under control before the poisoning took place".
The claim will be rejected in many quarters as a clumsy attempt by Moscow to deflect accusations that
its agents were involved in the assassination.
Russia says it had nothing to do with the murder, but espionage experts claim the killing would not
have been possible without Kremlin backing. Shortly before he died, Litvinenko said he had met two
former KGB agents, Dmitry Kovtun and Andrei Lugovoi, on the day he fell ill. Both men deny
wrongdoing, but Britain has made a formal request for Lugovoi's extradition following a
recommendation by the director of public prosecutions.
New evidence linking Russia with the death of Litvinenko was recently produced by his widow, Marina,
who procured documents allegedly showing the FSB security service seized a container of polonium in
the weeks before the poisoning. Moscow disputes the claims.
The allegation that British authorities were monitoring the assassins' progress through London is likely
to raise questions about whether Litvinenko was warned his life may have been at risk in the days
before he was murdered.
Several people familiar with the affair said they thought Safonov's claims implausible, with one saying
he had never heard it aired within London intelligence circles before. Nevertheless Safonov's remarks
– in effect questioning the competence of Britain's security services – will do little to heal the
relationship between London and Moscow.
The claims come after Britain announced that Katia Zatuliveter, a 25-year-old Russian working for the
Liberal Democrat MP Mike Hancock, is to be deported amid suspicions she was spying for the
Kremlin, a charge she plans to contest.

Alexander Sternik, chargé d'affaires at Russia's embassy in London, hinted that the deportation could
trigger tit-for-tat expulsions and denounced the move as a "PR stunt" designed to mask Britain's own
problems. "These problems are many over the last couple of months," Sternik said. "You can cite the
unflattering leaks from WikiLeaks and [England's] unsuccessful [World Cup] bid."
The Paris embassy memo also shines new light on relations between Washington and Moscow. Henry
Crumpton reportedly gained almost mythical status after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He has been
identified in the US media as a CIA agent quoted in the 11 September commission report as
unsuccessfully pressing the agency to do more in Afghanistan to combat Osama bin Laden.
Safonov was once tipped to take the top job at the federal security service after the then Russian
president, Boris Yeltsin, dismissed its incumbent.
SWEDEN MILITARY STAFFER KNEW ABOUT ATTACKS

► http://www.thelocal.se/30794/20101212/
► The Local
Dec 13 2010 ► Dec 12. A Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) employee warned an acquaint-
tance to stay clear of an area in central Stockholm on Saturday where, several hours later, two
explosions went off in what is being called a terrorist attack.
―If you can, avoid Drottninggatan today. A lot can happen there…just so you know,‖ the message said,
according to the TT news agency.
Armed Forces spokesperson Jonas Svensson told TT on Sunday he was unaware of the message.
―I haven‘t heard about this at all. Now I‘m going to check out the information,‖ he told TT when
confronted with the news.
Later the Swedish military said it was now ―preparing how the issue will be dealt with‖.
―The Swedish Armed Forces did not know ahead of time about the plans or the circumstances
surrounding the events which have taken place. If that had been the case, (Swedish security service)
Säpo, which is the responsible agency in these types of cases, would have been informed
immediately,‖ said military spokesperson Erik Lagersten in a statement.
Swedish intelligence agencies may have known that something was in the works, Wilhelm Agrell, a
professor in intelligence analysis, told TT.
―A warning is a slippery term and nothing concrete. Warnings can consist of very precise information
that can be acted on, but it‘s common that warnings are more diffuse and can‘t be acted on,‖ Agrell
said.
On Saturday night, TT spoke with John Daniels, head of security for Swedish military intelligence
agency MUST. But he refused to comment, instead directing all inquiries to Säpo.
Säpo said on Sunday it was taking over the investigation of the two blasts, which occurred within
minutes of one another and about 200 metres apart on Drottninggatan, a busy shopping street in
central Stockholm.
The agency considers the explosions to be a terrorist crime.
One man believed to be a suicide bomber was killed in the second blast, while the first explosion
injured two others.
Shortly before the explosions, Säpo and the TT news agency received a message from a 29- year-old
man from southern Sweden who claimed that the prophet Mohammed was being degraded.
FOCUS ON THE POLICY, NOT WIKILEAKS

► http://paul.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1802:focus-on-the-policy-not-wikileaks&catid=31:texas-straight-talk
► Congressman Ron Paul
► Source: Infowarrior / https://attrition.org/mailman/listinfo/infowarrior
Dec 12 2010 ► Dec 10. We may never know the whole story behind the recent publication of sensitive
U.S. government documents by the Wikileaks organization, but we certainly can draw some important
conclusions from the reaction of so many in government and media.
At its core, the Wikileaks controversy serves as a diversion from the real issue of what our foreign
policy should be. But the mainstream media, along with neoconservatives from both political parties,
insist on asking the wrong question. When presented with embarrassing disclosures about U.S. spying
and meddling, the policy that requires so much spying and meddling is not questioned. Instead, the

media focus on how so much sensitive information could have been leaked, or how authorities might
prosecute the publishers of such information.
No one questions the status quo or suggests a wholesale rethinking of our foreign policy. No one
suggests that the White House or the State Department should be embarrassed that the U.S. engages
in spying and meddling. The only embarrassment is that it was made public. This allows ordinary
people to actually know and talk about what the government does. But state secrecy is anathema to a
free society. Why exactly should Americans be prevented from knowing what their government is
doing in their name?
In a free society, we are supposed to know the truth. In a society where truth becomes treason,
however, we are in big trouble. The truth is that our foreign spying, meddling, and outright military
intervention in the post-World War II era has made us less secure, not more. And we have lost
countless lives and spent trillions of dollars for our trouble. Too often "official" government lies have
provided justification for endless, illegal wars and hundreds of thousands of resulting deaths and
casualties.
Take the recent hostilities in Korea as only one example. More than fifty years after the end of the
Korean War, American taxpayers continue to spend billions for the U.S. military to defend a modern
and wealthy South Korea. The continued presence of the U.S. military places American lives between
the two factions. The U.S. presence only serves to prolong the conflict, further drain our empty
treasury, and place our military at risk.
The neoconservative ethos, steeped in the teaching of Leo Strauss, cannot abide an America where
individuals simply pursue their own happy, peaceful, prosperous lives. It cannot abide an America
where society centers around family, religion, or civic and social institutions rather than an all powerful
central state. There is always an enemy to slay, whether communist or terrorist. In the neoconserva-
tive vision, a constant state of alarm must be fostered among the people to keep them focused on
something greater than themselves-- namely their great protector, the state. This is why the neocon-
servative reaction to the Wikileaks revelations is so predictable: See, we told you the world was a
dangerous place, goes the story. They claim we must prosecute- or even assassinate- those respon-
sible for publishing the leaks. And we must redouble our efforts to police the world by spying and
meddling better, with no more leaks.
We should view the Wikileaks controversy in the larger context of American foreign policy. Rather than
worry about the disclosure of embarrassing secrets, we should focus on our delusional foreign policy.
We are kidding ourselves when we believe spying, intrigue, and outright military intervention can
maintain our international status as a superpower while our domestic economy crumbles in an orgy of
debt and monetary debasement.
WL IMPLICATIONS FOR "THE CLOUD"

► http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/dec/11/wikileaks-amazon-denial-democracy-lieberman
► The Guardian / by John Naughton
Dec 12 2010 ► Dec 11. One of the most interesting aspects of the WikiLeaks controversy is the light it
has shed on the providers of cloud computing. One after another they have fallen over like dominoes
when the going got rough. First, some of the ISPs hosting WikiLeaks caved in; then EveryDNS, the
company that mapped its domain names (eg wikileaks.org) on to machine addresses, dropped it; then
Amazon, which had enough computer power and bandwidth to resist even the most determined cyber-
attacks, took it off its computers; then PayPal and later Mastercard, the online conduits for donations,
cancelled its accounts. The rationalisations these outfits gave for dropping WikiLeaks had a common
theme, namely that it had violated the terms and conditions under which the terminated services had
been provided.
Amazon is the most interesting case. It provides so-called "cloud computing services" by renting out
some of the thousands of computers used to run its online store. WikiLeaks moved its site on to
Amazon's cloud to ensure that it would not be crippled by the denial-of-service attacks that had
brought other ISPs to their knees. But then the company received a call from senator Joseph
Lieberman, the kind of politician who gives loose cannons a bad name, who had been frothing about
WikiLeaks being "implacably hostile to our military and the most basic requirements of our national
security". Some time after that, Amazon terminated WikiLeaks's account.
Lieberman then declared: "I will be asking Amazon about the extent of its relationship with WikiLeaks
and what it and other web service providers will do in the future to ensure that their services are not
used to distribute stolen, classified information."

Amazon denied that it had caved in to "a government inquiry" but declared that it had kicked
WikiLeaks out because it was not adhering to the company's terms and conditions ? which require that
"you warrant that you own or otherwise control all of the rights to the content" and "that use of the
content you supply... will not cause injury to any person or entity".
"It's clear," pontificated Amazon, "that WikiLeaks doesn't own or otherwise control all the rights to this
classified content. Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of 250,000 classified
documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully redacted in such a way as to ensure
that they weren't putting innocent people in jeopardy."
The more you think about it, the more disturbing this becomes. What gives a US senator the right to
ask anybody about "the extent of its relationship" with WikiLeaks? His declaration led the New
Yorker's Amy Richardson to wonder "if Lieberman feels that he, or any senator, can call in the
company running the New Yorker's printing presses when we are preparing a story that includes
leaked classified material, and tell it to stop us".
And what about Amazon's assertion that WikiLeaks "doesn't own or otherwise control" all the rights to
the classified cables that it published? As Markus Kuhn, a computer security researcher at the Cam-
bridge Computer Lab, pointed out to me, any work "prepared by an officer or employee of the US go-
vernment as part of that person's official duties" is not entitled to domestic copyright protection under
US law. So, in the US at least, the leaked cables are not protected by copyright and it doesn't matter
whether WikiLeaks owns the rights or not.
But, in a way, that's the least worrying aspect of Amazon's behaviour. More troubling is what its
actions portend for democracy. Rebecca MacKinnon, a scholar who has written incisively about
China's efforts to censor the net, wrote a sobering essay about this last week. "A substantial, if not
critical amount of our political discourse," she points out, "has moved into the digital realm. This realm
is largely made up of virtual spaces that are created, owned and operated by the private sector."
As far as the law of contract is concerned, Amazon can do what it likes. But this isn't just about con-
tracts any more. "While Amazon was within its legal rights," MacKinnon warns, "the company has
nonetheless sent a clear signal to its users: if you engage in controversial speech that some individual
members of the US government don't like? Amazon is going to dump you at the first sign of trouble."
Yep. For years people have extolled cloud computing as the way of the future. The lesson of the last
week is simple: be careful what you wish for.
TARGETED SANCTIONS
► Source: Statewatch / London / www.statewatch.org
Dec 12 2010 ► Dec 12. EU: European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR): New
ECCHR-Report - Blacklisted: Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights
Press release:
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/dec/eu-ecchr-blacklisted-prel.pdf
Full report written by Gavin Sullivan and Ben Hayes with a foreword by Martin Scheinin, the outgoing
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism:
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/dec/eu-ecchr-blacklisted-report.pdf
EUROPEAN INVESTIGATION ORDER

► Source: Statewatch / London / www.statewatch.org
Dec 12 2010 ► Dec 12. Statewatch Analysis: Update The Proposed European Investigation Order
(pdf) by Steve Peers, Professor of Law, University of Essex: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-
112-eu-eio-update.pdf
JAILED AFGHAN DRUG LORD WAS US SPY

► www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/world/asia/12drugs.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=globaleua2
► NY Times / by James Risen
Dec 12 2010 ► Dec 11. When Hajji Juma Khan was arrested and transported to New York to face
charges under a new American narco-terrorism law in 2008, federal prosecutors described him as

perhaps the biggest and most dangerous drug lord in Afghanistan, a shadowy figure who had helped
keep the Taliban in business with a steady stream of money and weapons.
But what the government did not say was that Mr. Juma Khan was also a longtime American informer,
who provided information about the Taliban, Afghan corruption and other drug traffickers. Central
Intelligence Agency officers and Drug Enforcement Administration agents relied on him as a valued
source for years, even as he was building one of Afghanistan‘s biggest drug operations after the
United States-led invasion of the country, according to current and former American officials. Along the
way, he was also paid a large amount of cash by the United States.
At the height of his power, Mr. Juma Khan was secretly flown to Washington for a series of clandestine
meetings with C.I.A. and D.E.A. officials in 2006. Even then, the United States was receiving reports
that he was on his way to becoming Afghanistan‘s most important narcotics trafficker by taking over
the drug operations of his rivals and paying off Taliban leaders and corrupt politicians in President
Hamid Karzai‘s government.
In a series of videotaped meetings in Washington hotels, Mr. Juma Khan offered tantalizing leads to
the C.I.A. and D.E.A., in return for what he hoped would be protected status as an American asset,
according to American officials. And then, before he left the United States, he took a side trip to New
York to see the sights and do some shopping, according to two people briefed on the case.
The relationship between the United States government and Mr. Juma Khan is another illustration of
how the war on drugs and the war on terrorism have sometimes collided, particularly in Afghanistan,
where drug dealing, the insurgency and the government often overlap.
To be sure, American intelligence has worked closely with figures other than Mr. Juma Khan
suspected of drug trade ties, including Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president‘s half brother, and Hajji
Bashir Noorzai, who was arrested in 2005. Mr. Karzai has denied being involved in the drug trade.
A Shifting Policy
Afghan drug lords have often been useful sources of information about the Taliban. But relying on
them has also put the United States in the position of looking the other way as these informers ply
their trade in a country that by many accounts has become a narco-state.
The case of Mr. Juma Khan also shows how counternarcotics policy has repeatedly shifted during the
nine-year American occupation of Afghanistan, getting caught between the conflicting priorities of
counterterrorism and nation building, so much so that Mr. Juma Khan was never sure which way to
jump, according to officials who spoke on the condition that they not be identified.
When asked about Mr. Juma Khan‘s relationship with the C.I.A., a spokesman for the spy agency said
that the ―C.I.A. does not, as a rule, comment on matters pending before U.S. courts.‖ A D.E.A.
spokesman also declined to comment on his agency‘s relationship with Mr. Juma Khan.
His New York lawyer, Steven Zissou, denied that Mr. Juma Khan had ever supported the Taliban or
worked for the C.I.A.
―There have been many things said about Hajji Juma Khan,‖ Mr. Zissou said, ―and most of what has
been said, including that he worked for the C.I.A., is false. What is true is that H. J. K. has never been
an enemy of the United States and has never supported the Taliban or any other group that threatens
Americans.‖
A spokeswoman for the United States Attorney‘s Office for the Southern District of New York, which is
handling Mr. Juma Khan‘s prosecution, declined to comment.
However, defending the relationship, one American official said, ―You‘re not going to get intelligence in
a war zone from Ward Cleaver or Florence Nightingale.‖
At first, Mr. Juma Khan, an illiterate trafficker in his mid-50s from Afghanistan‘s remote Nimroz
Province, in the border region where southwestern Afghanistan meets both Iran and Pakistan, was a
big winner from the American-led invasion. He had been a provincial drug smuggler in southwestern
Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban governed the country. But it was not until after the
Taliban‘s ouster that he rose to national prominence, taking advantage of a record surge in opium
production in Afghanistan after the invasion.
Briefly detained by American forces after the 2001 fall of the Taliban, he was quickly released, even
though American officials knew at the time that he was involved in narcotics trafficking, according to
several current and former American officials. During the first few years of its occupation of
Afghanistan, the United States was focused entirely on capturing or killing leaders of Al Qaeda, and it
ignored drug trafficking, because American military commanders believed that policing drugs got in the
way of their core counterterrorism mission.
Opium and heroin production soared, and the narcotics trade came to account for nearly half of the
Afghan economy.
Concerns, but No Action
By 2004, Mr. Juma Khan had gained control over routes from southern Afghanistan to Pakistan‘s

Makran Coast, where heroin is loaded onto freighters for the trip to the Middle East, as well as
overland routes through western Afghanistan to Iran and Turkey. To keep his routes open and the
drugs flowing, he lavished bribes on all the warring factions, from the Taliban to the Pakistani
intelligence service to the Karzai government, according to current and former American officials.
The scale of his drug organization grew to stunning levels, according to the federal indictment against
him. It was in both the wholesale and the retail drug businesses, providing raw materials for other drug
organizations while also processing finished drugs on its own.
Bush administration officials first began to talk about him publicly in 2004, when Robert B. Charles,
then the assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement, told Time maga-
zine that Mr. Juma Khan was a drug lord ―obviously very tightly tied to the Taliban.‖ Such high-level
concern did not lead to any action against Mr. Juma Khan. But Mr. Noorzai, one of his rivals, was lured
to New York and arrested in 2005, which allowed Mr. Juma Khan to expand his empire.
In a 2006 confidential report to the drug agency reviewed by The New York Times, an Afghan informer
stated that Mr. Juma Khan was working with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the political boss of southern
Afghanistan, to take control of the drug trafficking operations left behind by Mr. Noorzai. Some current
and former American counternarcotics officials say they believe that Mr. Karzai provided security and
protection for Mr. Juma Khan‘s operations.
Mr. Karzai denied any involvement with the drug trade and said that he had never met Mr. Juma Khan.
―I have never even seen his face,‖ he said through a spokesman. He denied having any business or
security arrangement with him. ―Ask them for proof instead of lies,‖ he added.
Mr. Juma Khan‘s reported efforts to take over from Mr. Noorzai came just as he went to Washington to
meet with the C.I.A. and the drug agency, former American officials say. By then, Mr. Juma Khan had
been working as an informer for both agencies for several years, officials said. He had met repeatedly
with C.I.A. officers in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 or 2002, and had also developed a relationship
with the drug agency‘s country attaché in Kabul, former American officials say.
He had been paid large amounts of cash by the United States, according to people with knowledge of
the case. Along with other tribal leaders in his region, he was given a share of as much as $2 million in
payments to help oppose the Taliban. The payments are said to have been made by either the C.I.A.
or the United States military.
The 2006 Washington meetings were an opportunity for both sides to determine, in face-to-face talks,
whether they could take their relationship to a new level of even longer-term cooperation.
―I think this was an opportunity to drill down and see what he would be able to provide,‖ one former
American official said. ―I think it was kind of like saying, ‗O.K., what have you got?‘ ‖
Business, Not Ideology
While the C.I.A. wanted information about the Taliban, the drug agency had its own agenda for the
Washington meetings — information about other Afghan traffickers Mr. Juma Khan worked with, as
well as contacts on the supply lines through Turkey and Europe.
One reason the Americans could justify bringing Mr. Juma Khan to Washington was that they claimed
to have no solid evidence that he was smuggling drugs into the United States, and there were no
criminal charges pending against him in this country.
It is not clear how much intelligence Mr. Juma Khan provided on other drug traffickers or on the
Taliban leadership. But the relationship between the C.I.A. and the D.E.A. and Mr. Juma Khan
continued for some time after the Washington sessions, officials say.
In fact, when the drug agency contacted him again in October 2008 to invite him to another meeting,
he went willingly, believing that the Americans wanted to continue the discussions they had with him in
Washington. He even paid his own way to Jakarta, Indonesia, to meet with the agency, current and
former officials said.
But this time, instead of enjoying fancy hotels and friendly talks, Mr. Juma Khan was arrested and
flown to New York, and this time he was not allowed to go shopping.
It is unclear why the government decided to go after Mr. Juma Khan. Some officials suggest that he
never came through with breakthrough intelligence. Others say that he became so big that he was
hard to ignore, and that the United States shifted its priorities to make pursuing drug dealers a higher
priority.
The Justice Department has used a 2006 narco-terrorism law against Mr. Juma Khan, one that makes
it easier for American prosecutors to go after foreign drug traffickers who are not smuggling directly
into the United States if the government can show they have ties to terrorist organizations.
The federal indictment shows that the drug agency eventually got a cooperating informer who could
provide evidence that Mr. Juma Khan was making payoffs to the Taliban to keep his drug operation
going, something intelligence operatives had known for years.
The federal indictment against Mr. Juma Khan said the payments were ―in exchange for protection for

the organization‘s drug trafficking operations.‖ The alleged payoffs were what linked him to the Taliban
and permitted the government to make its case.
But even some current and former American counternarcotics officials are skeptical of the
government‘s claims that Mr. Juma Khan was a strong supporter of the Taliban.
―He was not ideological,‖ one former official said. ―He made payments to them. He made payments to
government officials. It was part of the business.‖
Now, plea negotiations are quietly under way. A plea bargain might keep many of the details of his
relationship to the United States out of the public record.
THE CIA'S EL-MASRI ABDUCTION

Cables Show Germany Caved to Pressure from Washington
► http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,733860,00.html
► Der Spiegel / by Matthias Gebauer and John Goetz
Dec 10 2010 ► Dec 9. The American diplomatic cables provide new details about the case of Khaled
el-Masri, a German citizen abducted by the CIA in 2003. The reports confirm just how much pressure
the US put on Germany to not pursue 13 agents believed to have been involved. But they also reveal
how cooperative and responsive German officials were in light of American worries.
In the case of Khaled el-Masri, the Lebanese-born German abducted by the CIA, the Munich public
prosecutor's office and Germany's Justice Ministry and Foreign Ministry, in Berlin, all generously
cooperated with the United States. The new insights on the German-American secret talks in the
politically controversial issue in 2007 come from previously unpublished cables from the United States
Embassy. Previously, the only thing known was that the US had applied pressure on Berlin in the
case.
Just a few days ago, WikiLeaks http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/wikileaks/ published a cable
recounting the details of a meeting that then-Deputy US Ambassador John M. Koenig had in the
German Chancellery, the official office of Chancellor Angela Merkel. During the conversation, Koenig
asked the Germans to "weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the
US" that investigations into the CIA-organized abduction would have. In another embassy cable, the
Americans reported that Berlin had been informed of the "potential negative implications for our
bilateral relationship" in the longer term.
A previously unknown cable from the US Embassy in Berlin, dated Feb. 1, 2007, throws light on how
the Germans behaved during this back-room horse-trading. A day earlier, German prosecutors in
Munich had issued arrest warrants for 13 suspected CIA operatives believed to have been involved in
the abduction of el-Masri in Macedonia in late 2003 as well as in his being taken via Baghdad to a
secret CIA prison in Afghanistan on Jan. 23, 2004. There, el-Masri was detained and interrogated until
finally being released without charges and brought back to Germany at the end of May that year.
The abduction undoubtedly involved one of the CIA's so-called "extraordinary renditions." After 9/11,
the CIA launched a highly secret program <http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/cia_renditions/>
that saw several dozen suspected terrorists abducted in foreign countries and transported to secret
detention centers. Over time, journalists and European Union officials only slowly uncovered details
about the program. The el-Masri case is one of the best-documented instances of such abductions.
When it first came to light, it caused significant strains between Berlin and Washington.
Double-Dealing in Germany
The US diplomatic cables now reveal just how accommodating the Germans were in their behavior
toward the Americans. On Feb. 1, American diplomats in Berlin were hectically making calls to people
all over Germany in an effort to figure out just how serious German efforts to investigate the CIA
abduction were at the time. That evening, they relayed their impressions in cables to the State
Department, the Department of Justice and the National Security Council. Given the enormous risks
involved in the case to both the CIA and the American government, the report was to be delivered
immediately to all three agencies.
The details that have recently emerged illustrate that Germany was engaged in a bit of double-dealing
when it came to the el-Masri case. In public, the German government continued to call for an
investigation. But neither the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel nor the Justice Ministry would
have touched the hot issue of illegal CIA kidnappings if it hadn't have been for the pressure exerted
upon them by the media. Behind closed doors, German officials agreed that el-Masri was apparently
merely the unfortunate victim of mistaken identity because of his name. But nobody wanted to have
investigations into the CIA, which would surely cause even more damage to already tattered German-

American relations.
The reports document the fact that this stance was also shared by Munich's public prosecutor's office,
the state government of Bavaria and the Justice Ministry, in Berlin. For example, Bavaria's top prose-
cutor, August Stern, told one American diplomat that he had "felt compelled to act due to media pres-
sure" to issue the arrest warrants. In fact, it was actually the research of journalists that led to the true
identifications of the pilots of the CIA jets and the other members of the group involved in the
kidnapping.
Bavarian State Officials 'Surprised and Displeased' by Arrest Warrants
According to the diplomatic cable, a short time later, an official from the Bavarian Chancellery, the
offices of the state governor and his cabinet, also made an unsolicited call to the US Embassy. In the
conversation, the official emphasized that the state's chancellery had played "no role in the actions of
the prosecutor, who is independent." At the same time, the official said that the state governor's office
had been "surprised and displeased" about the arrest warrants. According to the cable, Bavarian
Justice Minister Beate Merk also expressed her surprise to American diplomats, although she
refrained from making any other comments.
At the time, one of the most crucial issues for the Americans was whether or not the Munich arrest
warrants would be observed outside of Germany. Although the flight manifests of the CIA-affiliated
company Aero Contractors used pseudonyms, such as "Kirk James Bird," it wouldn't take too much
research to figure out the true names of the CIA's kidnappers. Having an international arrest warrant
with their names on it could mean that whenever they traveled -- either in the United States or abroad,
whether for business or pleasure -- they could be brought before a court on charges of participating in
the state-organized abduction of el-Masri. A trial like that would be a nightmare for the CIA.
Given these circumstances, the US Embassy in Berlin contacted the German Justice Ministry (BMJ),
which provided it with some very thoughtful advice. According to one BMJ official, international arrest
warrants could only be issued once the ministry had evaluated their legal soundness on a case-by-
case basis as well as the "foreign policy implications." The official also cautioned the embassy that any
strong political interference by Washington into domestic affairs "might be perceived as an admission
of involvement" of the CIA agents by the Germans. Another BMJ official assured the embassy that the
cases would not be "handled as routine" and that any step in any investigation would still first require a
green light from Berlin.
The Americans also got some helpful hints from Germany's Foreign Ministry in the form of then-State
Secretary Georg Boomgaarden, who is currently serving as Germany's ambassador to London.
Though he admitted that he had only learned about the arrest warrants from media reports, he said
that the legal maneuvers seemed a bit "premature" to him. Indeed, the senior diplomat even voiced his
doubt about the validity of international arrest warrants approved by a German court that were
apparently only based on information reported in the media. And, if Germany's Justice Ministry were to
decide to pursue international arrest warrants, Boomgaarden assured the Americans that the Foreign
Ministry would of course take any foreign-policy consequences into account.
It would be easy to write off the details from the cables as mere trifles if they hadn't been confirmed by
reality. In 2007, then-Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries decided not to further pursue the 13 CIA agents.
Though their names were still on an Interpol wanted persons list, the United States stated that it would
not recognize its validity. Zypries explained that the Americans had made clear to her that they would
neither arrest nor hand over the 13 CIA agents. In the end, she concluded that, given the slim chances
of success, it made no sense to even try to get them extradited.
BELGIË EN VS AKKOORD OVER UITWISSELING VINGERAFDRUKKEN

► http://knack.rnews.be/nl/actualiteit/nieuws/belgie/belgie-en-vs-akkoord-over-uitwisseling-vingerafdrukken/article-1194885579827.htm
► Knack
Dec 10 2010 ► Dec 10. België heeft een akkoord gesloten met de Verenigde Staten over de
uitwisseling van vingerafdrukken en DNA-gegevens. Dat heeft minister van Binnenlandse Zaken
Annemie Turtelboom (Open VLD) bekendgemaakt in de marge van een Europees-Amerikaanse top in
Washington, meldt de VRT-nieuwsdienst. Het akkoord heeft volgens de openbare omroep heel wat
voeten in de aarde gehad. Vooral de Belgische privacycommissie maakte heel wat voorbehoud. Nu
zouden er echter voldoende garanties zijn over het gebruik van de gegevens.
Door het akkoord hebben de politiediensten er een belangrijk werkmiddel bij in de strijd tegen zware
misdaad. Turtelboom benadrukt ook dat het akkoord over veel meer dan terreurbestrijding gaat.
Het akkoord zal in de loop van januari in België worden ondertekend, in de aanwezigheid van de
Amerikaanse minister van Binnenlandse Veiligheid Janet Napolitano.

LEAKS: MILITARY TREATENS COURTS-MARTIAL
Military Bans Disks, Threatens Courts-Martial to Stop New Leaks
► www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/military-bans-disks-threatens-courts-martials-to-stop-new-leaks/
► Wired / by Noah Shachtman
Dec 10 2010 ► Dec 9. It‘s too late to stop WikiLeaks from publishing thousands more classified
documents, nabbed from the Pentagon‘s secret network. But the U.S. military is telling its troops to
stop using CDs, DVDs, thumb drives and every other form of removable media or risk a court martial.
Maj. Gen. Richard Webber, commander of Air Force Network Operations, issued the Dec. 3 Cyber
Control Order obtained by Danger Room which directs airmen to immediately cease use of removable
media on all systems, servers, and stand alone machines residing on SIPRNET, the Defense Depart-
ment‘s secret network. Similar directives have gone out to the military‘s other branches.
Unauthorized data transfers routinely occur on classified networks using removable media and are a
method the insider threat uses to exploit classified information. To mitigate the activity, all Air Force
organizations must immediately suspend all SIPRNET data transfer activities on removable media,?
the order adds.
It‘s one of a number of moves the Defense Department is making to prevent further disclosures of
secret information in the wake of the WikiLeaks document dumps. Pfc. Bradley Manning says he
downloaded hundreds of thousands of files from SIPRNET to a CD marked Lady Gaga before giving
the files to WikiLeaks.
To stop that from happening again, an August internal review suggested that the Pentagon disable all
classified computers ability to write to removable media. About 60 percent of military machines are
now connected to a Host Based Security System, which looks for anomalous behavior. And now
there‘s this disk-banning order.
One military source who works on these networks says it will make the job harder; classified
computers are often disconnected from the network, or are in low-bandwidth areas. A DVD or a thumb
drive is often the easiest way to get information from one machine to the next. They were asking us to
build homes before, the source says. Now they‘re taking away our hammers.
The order acknowledges that the ban will make life trickier for some troops.
Users will experience difficulty with transferring data for operational needs which could impede time-
liness on mission execution, the document admits. But military personnel who do not comply may be
punished under Article 92 of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. Article 92 is the armed forces
regulation covering failure to obey orders and dereliction of duty, and it stipulates that violators shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
But to several Defense Department insiders, the steps taken so far to prevent another big secret data
dump have been surprisingly small. After all the churn. The general perception is business as usual.
I‘m not kidding, one of those insiders says. We haven‘t turned a brain cell on it.
Tape and disk backups, as well as hard drive removals, will continue as normal in the military‘s Secure
Compartmented Information Facilities, where top-secret information is discussed and handled. And
removable drives have been banned on SIPRNET before.
Two years ago, the Pentagon forbade the media?s use after the drives and disks helped spread a
relatively unsophisticated worm onto hundreds of thousands of computers. The ban was lifted this
February, after the worm cleanup effort, dubbed Operational Buckshot Yankee, was finally completed.
Shortly thereafter, Manning says he started passing information to WikiLeaks.
Specialists at the National Security Agency are looking for additional technical ways to limit, disable or
audit military users actions. Darpa, the Pentagon‘s leading-edge research arm, has launched an effort
to greatly increase the accuracy, rate and speed with which insider threats are detected within
government and military interest networks.
But, like all Darpa projects, this one won‘t be ready to deploy for years if ever. For now, the Pentagon
is stuck with more conventional methods to WikiLeak-proof its networks.
GOVT RESPONSE TO WIKILEAKS PROBLEMATIC

Dec 10 2010 ► Dec 10. The U.S. Government insists that the classification markings on many of the
leaked documents being published by Wikileaks and other organizations are still in force, even though
the documents are effectively in the public domain, and it has directed federal employees and
contractors not to access or read the records outside of a classified network.

But by strictly adhering to the letter of security policy and elevating security above mission
performance, some say the government may be causing additional damage.
"At DHS we are getting regular messages [warning not to access classified records from Wikileaks],"
one Department of Homeland Security official told us in an email message. "It has even been
suggested that if it is discovered that we have accessed a classified Wikileaks cable on our personal
computers, that will be a security violation. So, my grandmother would be allowed to access the
cables, but not me. This seems ludicrous."
"As someone who has spent many years with the USG dealing with senior officials of foreign
governments, it seems to me that the problem faced by CRS researchers (and raised by you) is going
to be widespread across our government if we follow this policy."
"Part of making informed judgments about what a foreign government or leader will do or think about
something is based on an understanding and analysis of what information has gone into their own
deliberative processes. If foreign government workers know about something in the Wikileaks
documents, which clearly originated with the U.S., then they will certainly (and reasonably) assume
that their US counterparts will know about it too, including the staffers. If we don't, they will assume
that we simply do not care, are too arrogant, stupid or negligent to find and read the material, or are so
unimportant that we've been intentionally left out of the information loop. In any such instance, senior
staff will be handicapped in their preparation and in their inter-governmental relationships," the DHS
official said.
"I think more damage will be done by keeping the federal workforce largely in the dark about what
other interested parties worldwide are going to be reading and analyzing. It does not solve the
problem to let only a small coterie of analysts review documents that may be deemed relevant to their
own particular 'stovepiped' subject area. Good analysis requires finding and putting together all the
puzzle pieces."
So far, however, this kind of thinking is not finding a receptive audience in government. There has
been no sign of leadership from any Administration official who would stand up and say: "National
security classification is a means, and not an end in itself. What any reader in the world can discover
is no longer a national security secret. We should not pretend otherwise."
EX-INTEL OFFICERS, OTHERS SEE PLUSSES IN WIKILEAKS DISCLOSURES

► http://www.accuracy.org/newsrelease.php?articleId=2404
► The Institute for Public Accuracy / by Sam Husseini and David Zupan
► www.intelforum.org
► Intelforum
Dec 10 2010 ► Dec 7. The following statement was released today, signed by Daniel Ellsberg, Frank
Grevil, Katharine Gun, David MacMichael, Ray McGovern, Craig Murray, Coleen Rowley and Larry
Wilkerson; all are associated with Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence.
WikiLeaks has teased the genie of transparency out of a very opaque bottle, and powerful forces in
America, who thrive on secrecy, are trying desperately to stuff the genie back in. The people listed
below this release would be pleased to shed light on these exciting new developments.
How far down the U.S. has slid can be seen, ironically enough, in a recent commentary in Pravda
(that's right, Russia's Pravda): "What WikiLeaks has done is make people understand why so many
Americans are politically apathetic ... After all, the evils committed by those in power can be
suffocating, and the sense of powerlessness that erupts can be paralyzing, especially when ...
government evildoers almost always get away with their crimes. ..."
So shame on Barack Obama, Eric Holder, and all those who spew platitudes about integrity, justice
and accountability while allowing war criminals and torturers to walk freely upon the earth. ... the
American people should be outraged that their government has transformed a nation with a reputation
for freedom, justice, tolerance and respect for human rights into a backwater that revels in its
criminality, cover-ups, injustices and hypocrisies.
Odd, isn't it, that it takes a Pravda commentator to drive home the point that the Obama administration
is on the wrong side of history. Most of our own media are demanding that WikiLeaks leader Julian
Assange be hunted down -- with some of the more bloodthirsty politicians calling for his murder. The
corporate-and-government dominated media are apprehensive over the challenge that WikiLeaks
presents. Perhaps deep down they know, as Dickens put it, "There is nothing so strong ... as the
simple truth."
As part of their attempt to blacken WikiLeaks and Assange, pundit commentary over the weekend has
tried to portray Assange's exposure of classified materials as very different from -- and far less

laudable than -- what Daniel Ellsberg did in releasing the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Ellsberg strongly
rejects the mantra "Pentagon Papers good; WikiLeaks material bad." He continues: "That's just a
cover for people who don't want to admit that they oppose any and all exposure of even the most
misguided, secretive foreign policy. The truth is that EVERY attack now made on WikiLeaks and Julian
Assange was made against me and the release of the Pentagon Papers at the time."
Motivation? WikiLeaks' reported source, Army Pvt. Bradley Manning, having watched Iraqi police
abuses, and having read of similar and worse incidents in official messages, reportedly concluded, "I
was actively involved in something that I was completely against." Rather than simply go with the flow,
Manning wrote: "I want people to see the truth ... because without information you cannot make
informed decisions as a public," adding that he hoped to provoke worldwide discussion, debates, and
reform.
There is nothing to suggest that WikiLeaks/Assange's motives were any different. Granted, mothers
are not the most impartial observers. Yet, given what we have seen of Assange‘s behavior, there was
the ring of truth in Assange‘s mother‘s recent remarks in an interview with an Australian newspaper.
She put it this way: "Living by what you believe in and standing up for something is a good thing. …
He sees what he is doing as a good thing in the world, fighting baddies, if you like."
That may sound a bit quixotic, but Assange and his associates appear the opposite of benighted. Still,
with the Pentagon PR man Geoff Morrell and even Attorney General Eric Holder making thinly
disguised threats of extrajudicial steps, Assange may be in personal danger.
The media: again, the media is key. No one has said it better than Monseñor Romero of El Salvador,
who just before he was assassinated 25 years ago warned, "The corruption of the press is part of our
sad reality, and it reveals the complicity of the oligarchy." Sadly, that is also true of the media situation
in America today.
The big question is not whether Americans can "handle the truth." We believe they can. The challenge
is to make the truth available to them in a straightforward way so they can draw their own conclusions
-- an uphill battle given the dominance of the mainstream media, most of which have mounted a
hateful campaign to discredit Assange and WikiLeaks.
So far, the question of whether Americans can "handle the truth" has been an academic rather than an
experience-based one, because Americans have had very little access to the truth. Now, however,
with the WikiLeaks disclosures, they do. Indeed, the classified messages from the Army and the State
Department released by WikiLeaks are, quite literally, "ground truth."
How to inform American citizens? As a step in that direction, on October 23 we "Sam Adams
Associates for Integrity in Intelligence" (see below) presented our annual award for integrity to Julian
Assange. He accepted the honor "on behalf of our sources, without which WikiLeaks' contributions are
of no significance." In presenting the award, we noted that many around the world are deeply indebted
to truth-tellers like WikiLeaks and its sources.
Here is a brief footnote: Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence (SAAII) is a group of former
CIA colleagues and other admirers of former intelligence analyst Sam Adams, who hold up his
example as a model for those who would aspire to the courage to speak truth to power. (For more,
please see here.)
Sam did speak truth to power on Vietnam, and in honoring his memory, SAAII confers an award each
year to a truth-teller exemplifying Sam Adams' courage, persistence, and devotion to truth -- no matter
the consequences. Previous recipients include:
-Coleen Rowley of the FBI
-Katharine Gun of British Intelligence
-Sibel Edmonds of the FBI
-Craig Murray, former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan
-Sam Provance, former Sgt., US Army
-Frank Grevil, Maj., Danish Army Intelligence
-Larry Wilkerson, Col., US Army (ret.)
-Julian Assange, WikiLeaks
"There is nothing concealed that will not be revealed, nothing hidden that will not be made known.
Everything you have said in the dark will be heard in the daylight; what you have whispered in locked
rooms will be proclaimed from the rooftops."-- Luke 12:2-3
The following former awardees and other associates have signed the above statement; some are
available for interviews:
DANIEL ELLSBERG
A former government analyst, Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers, a secret government history of
the Vietnam War to the New York Times and other newspapers in 1971. He was an admirer of Sam
Adams when they were both working on Vietnam and in March 1968 disclosed to the New York Times

some of Adams' accurate analysis, helping head off reinforcement of 206,000 additional troops into
South Vietnam and a widening of the war at that time to neighboring countries.
FRANK GREVIL
Grevil, a former Danish intelligence analyst, was imprisoned for giving the Danish press documents
showing that Denmark's Prime Minister (now NATO Secretary General) disregarded warnings that
there was no authentic evidence of WMD in Iraq; in Copenhagen, Denmark.
KATHARINE GUN
Gun is a former British government employee who faced two years imprisonment in England for
leaking a U.S. intelligence memo before the invasion of Iraq. The memo indicated that the U.S. had
mounted a spying "surge" against U.N. Security Council delegations in early 2003 in an effort to win
approval for an Iraq war resolution. The leaked memo -- published by the British newspaper The
Observer on March 2, 2003 -- was big news in parts of the world, but almost ignored in the United
States. The U.S. government then failed to obtain a U.N. resolution approving war, but still proceeded
with the invasion.
DAVID MacMICHAEL
MacMichael is a former CIA analyst. He resigned in the 1980s when he came to the conclusion that
the CIA was slanting intelligence on Central America for political reasons. He is a member of Veteran
Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.
RAY McGOVERN
McGovern was a CIA analyst for 27 years, whose duties included preparing and briefing the
President's Daily Brief and chairing National Intelligence Estimates. He is on the Steering Group of
Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.
CRAIG MURRAY
Murray, former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan, was fired from his job when he objected to Uzbeks
being tortured to gain "intelligence" on "terrorists." Upon receiving his Sam Adams award, Murray said,
"I would rather die than let someone be tortured in an attempt to give me some increment of security."
Observers have noted that Murray was subjected to similar character assassination techniques as
Julian Assange is now encountering to discredit him.
COLEEN ROWLEY
Rowley, a former FBI Special Agent and Division Counsel whose May 2002 memo described some of
the FBI's pre-9/11 failures, was named one of Time Magazine's "Persons of the Year" in 2002. She
recently co-wrote a Los Angeles Times op-ed titled, "WikiLeaks and 9/11: What if? Frustrated
investigators might have chosen to leak information that their superiors bottled up, perhaps averting
the terrorism attacks."
LARRY WILKERSON
Wilkerson, Col., U.S. Army (ret.), former chief of staff to Secretary Colin Powell at the State
Department, who criticized what he called the "Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal." See recent interviews
CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REGARDING WIKILEAKS

CRS: Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information
► CRS / by Jennifer K Elsea
► http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41404.pdf
► FAS
► Source: Sabrina Pacifici / BeSpacific / Silver Spring US / www.bespacific.com
Dec 9 2010 ► Dec 6, The recent online publication of classified defense documents and diplomatic
cables by the organization WikiLeaks and subsequent reporting by the New York Times and other
news media have focused attention on whether such publication violates U.S. criminal law. The
Attorney General has reportedly stated that the Justice Department and Department of Defense are
investigating the circumstances to determine whether any prosecutions will be undertaken in
connection with the disclosure. This report identifies some criminal statutes that may apply, but notes
that these have been used almost exclusively to prosecute individuals with access to classified
information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents, or to
foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. Leaks of
classified information to the press have only rarely been punished as crimes, and we are aware of no
case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government
employee has been prosecuted for publishing it. There may be First Amendment implications that
would make such a prosecution difficult, not to mention political ramifications based on concerns about
government censorship. To the extent that the investigation implicates any foreign nationals whose

conduct occurred entirely overseas, any resulting prosecution may carry foreign policy implications
related to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and whether suspected persons may be extradited
to the United States under applicable treaty provisions.
US PRESSED GERMANY ON CIA KIDNAPPING

► www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/europe/09wikileaks-elmasri.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=globaleua22
► NY Times / by Michael Slackman
Dec 9 2010 ► Dec 8. American officials exerted sustained pressure on Germany not to enforce arrest
warrants against Central Intelligence Agency officers involved in the 2003 kidnapping of a German
citizen mistakenly believed to be a terrorist, diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks show.
John M. Koenig, the American deputy chief of mission in Berlin, issued a pointed warning in February
2007 urging that Germany ―weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with
the U.S.‖ in the case of Khaled el-Masri, a German of Lebanese descent. Mr. Masri said he was held
in a secret United States prison in Afghanistan and tortured before his captors acknowledged their
mistake and let him go.
The United States‘ concern over the Masri case was detailed in cables sent from the United States
Embassies in Germany, Spain and Macedonia in 2006 and 2007.
The cables indicated what was long suspected by German opposition leaders who led a parliamentary
inquiry into the case: intense political pressure from Washington was the reason that Germany never
pressed for the arrest and extradition of 13 operatives believed to be from the C.I.A. who were
ultimately charged in indictments issued in Spain and in Munich.
―I am not surprised by this,‖ said Hans-Christian Ströbele, a member of the Green bloc in Parliament
who then sat on the legislative investigative committee. ―It was confirmed once again that the U.S.
government kept the German government‖ from seeking the arrest of the agents.
In one cable, written before Mr. Koenig‘s warning to Germany‘s deputy national security adviser, the
embassy in Berlin reported that diplomatic officials had ―continued to stress with German counterparts
the potential negative implications for our bilateral relationship, and in particular for our counter-
terrorism cooperation, if further steps are taken to seek the arrest or extradition of U.S.
citizens/officials.‖
In 2006 and 2007, the Masri case was one of the most difficult issues between Washington and Berlin,
exposing to public scrutiny secret tactics used in the Bush administration‘s antiterrorism efforts that
were sharply criticized both in the United States and in Europe. At the time, political pressure was
mounting in Germany to investigate and expose the practice of extraordinary rendition, which involved
capturing suspects and sending them to third-party countries for questioning in secret prisons.
Mr. Masri was seized on Dec. 31, 2003, as he entered Macedonia while on vacation; border security
guards confused him with an operative of Al Qaeda with a similar name. He says he was turned over
to the C.I.A., which flew him to Afghanistan, where he says he was tortured, sodomized and injected
with drugs. After five months, he was dropped on a roadside in Albania. No charges were brought
against him.
The case drew widespread attention in Europe. The cables show that the United States was especially
concerned about cooperation between Spanish and German prosecutors. The Spanish courts became
involved because they concluded that the plane that transported Mr. Masri had traveled through
Spanish territory.
―This coordination among independent investigators will complicate our efforts to manage this case at
a discreet government-to-government level,‖ read a cable sent from the embassy in Madrid in January
2007.
The cables‘ release has created a stir in Germany mostly because the documents contain American
diplomats‘ caustic comments about German officials and because they show that the embassy had
informants in one of the governing parties. The Masri case, however, has already been so thoroughly
discussed in public, and the degree of Washington‘s pressure on Berlin is so well known, that it has
not gained much attention.
The one cable that has caught the attention of some in the German press was written on Feb. 6, 2007,
by Mr. Koenig, the second-highest-ranking diplomat in the embassy, under the title ―CHANCELLERY
AWARE OF USG CONCERNS.‖
Rolf Nikel, Germany‘s deputy national security adviser, told Mr. Koenig that the two governments had
differences over Washington‘s antiterrorism methods, including German opposition to the prison at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and to rendition. Mr. Nikel said, according to the cable, ―the Chancellery is

well aware of the bilateral political implications of the case, but added that this case ‗will not be easy,‘
because of the intense pressure from the parliament and the German media.‖
Mr. Koenig said that while Washington ―recognized the independence of the German judiciary,‖ he
added that ―to issue international arrest warrants or extradition requests would require the concurrence
of the German Federal Government.‖
His point was that the case could be stopped.
The prosecutor‘s office in Munich issued warrants for the arrest of the C.I.A. operatives, but
Germany‘s government did not press for arrests or extraditions.
―We already dealt with this, including in the Bundestag, about why the German federal government did
not take further action to carry out the arrest warrant,‖ said Mr. Ströbele. ―How one deals with the fact
that he was taken into custody and tortured — whether more will be revealed on that — what was
done in order to keep it a secret: that is what interests me.‖
PUBLISHING CLASSIFIED INFO

Dec 8 2010 ► Dec 8. "There appears to be no statute that generally proscribes the acquisition or
publication of diplomatic cables," according to a newly updated report (pdf) from the Congressional
Research Service, "although government employees who disclose such information without proper
authority may be subject to prosecution."
But there is a thicket of statutes, most notably including the Espionage Act, that could conceivably be
used to punish unauthorized publication of classified information, such as the massive releases made
available by Wikileaks. See "Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Informa-
tion", December 6, 2010.
The updated CRS report sorts through those statutes, provides an account of recent events, presents
a new discussion of extradition of foreign nationals who are implicated by U.S. law, and summarizes
new legislation introduced in the Senate (S. 4004).
A previous version (pdf) of the CRS report, issued in October, was cited by Sen. Dianne Feinstein in a
Wall Street Journal op-ed yesterday in support of prosecuting Wikileaks, though the report did not
specifically advise such a course of action. Sen. Feinstein also seemed to endorse the view that the
State Department cables being released by Wikileaks are categorically protected by the Espionage
Act and should give rise to a prosecution under the Act.
But the Espionage Act only pertains to information "relating to the national defense," and only a
minority of the diplomatic cables could possibly fit that description.
The new CRS report put it somewhat differently: "It seems likely that most of the information disclosed
by WikiLeaks that was obtained from Department of Defense databases [and released earlier in the
year] falls under the general rubric of information related to the national defense. The diplomatic
cables obtained from State Department channels may also contain information relating to the national
defense and thus be covered under the Espionage Act, but otherwise its disclosure by persons who
are not government employees does not appear to be directly proscribed. It is possible that some of
the government information disclosed in any of the three releases does not fall under the express
protection of any statute, despite its classified status."
Incredibly, CRS was unable to meaningfully analyze for Congress the significance of the newest relea-
ses because of a self-defeating security policy that prohibits CRS access to the leaked documents.
The CRS report concludes that any prosecution of Wikileaks would be unprecedented and challeng-
ing, both legally and politically. "We are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained
through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it.
There may be First Amendment implications that would make such a prosecution difficult, not to
mention political ramifications based on concerns about government censorship."
For our part, we would oppose a criminal prosecution of Wikileaks under the Espionage Act.
GUIDANCE ON USING LEAKED DOCS

Dec 8 2010 ► Dec 8. After its access to the Wikileaks web site was blocked by the Library of
Congress, the Congressional Research Service this week asked Congress for guidance on whether
and how it should make use of the leaked records that are being published by Wikileaks, noting that
they could "shed important light" on topics of CRS interest.

CRS "has informed our House and Senate oversight committees, and solicited their guidance, regard-
ing the complexities that the recent leaks of classified information present for CRS," wrote CRS Di-
rector Daniel Mulhollan in a December 6 email message (pdf) to all CRS staff. "I have also contacted
the majority and minority counsels of select committees in the House and Senate requesting guidance
on the appropriate boundaries that CRS should recognize and adhere to in summarizing, restating or
characterizing open source materials of uncertain classification status in unclassified CRS reports and
memoranda for Congress."
"Our challenge is how to balance the need to provide the best analysis possible to the Congress on
current legislative issues against the legal imperative to protect classified national security information.
This is especially a problem in light of the massive volume of recently released documents, which may
shed important light on research and analysis done by the Service," Mr. Mulhollan wrote.
"As guidance becomes available from Congress, I will follow-up with additional information. At present,
it seems clear that the republication of known classified information by CRS in an unclassified format
(e.g., CRS reports or congressional distribution memoranda) is prohibited. We believe this prohibition
against the further dissemination of classified information in an unclassified setting applies even if a
secondary source (e,g., a newspaper, journal, or website) has reprinted the classified document. The
laws and applicable regulations are decidedly less clear, however, when it comes to referencing and
citing secondary sources that refer to, summarize, or restate classified information."
A copy of Mr. Mulhollan's email message was obtained by Secrecy News.
SELLING CLASSIFIED US DOCS

Navy serviceman accused of trying to sell classified military documents
► http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/06/AR2010120607109.html
► Washington Post / by Ellen Nakashima
Dec 8 2010 ► Dec 6. A Navy intelligence specialist at the Joint Special Operations Command has
been accused of taking top secret documents from military networks and offering to sell them to an
investigator posing as a foreign agent.
Petty Officer Bryan Minkyu Martin was arrested last week by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service,
after a sting operation in which he passed classified documents to an FBI undercover agent claiming
to be an intelligence officer of a foreign country, according to the affidavit for a search warrant filed last
week in a federal court in North Carolina.
Martin, who enlisted in 2007 and was assigned to the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg,
has not been charged. An attorney for Martin could not be contacted Tuesday night.
The military is investigating Martin under some of the same Espionage Act statutes as those being
used to investigate Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, the Army intelligence analyst suspected of leaking cables
and other classified documents to WikiLeaks.
According to the affidavit, Martin met the agent at a Hampton Inn in Spring Lake, N.C., on Nov. 15. He
is alleged to have described his access to various classified systems and offered to bring two
classified documents to their next meeting. He also allegedly said that he was seeking "long-term
financial reimbursement," that his current assignment focused on Afghanistan and that he would be
working for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Martin said that over his prospective 15- to 20-year career, he could be "very valuable," NCIS special
agent Richard J. Puryear said in the affidavit. Puryear said Martin accepted $500 in cash, with the
promise of more money to come.
Over the following days, Martin handed over more documents - marked secret and top secret -
according to the affidavit. The document shows he was paid a total of $3,500.
Martin's arrest comes as the Pentagon and other federal agencies are trying to strengthen security
measures in the wake of WikiLeaks's release of secret diplomatic cables. The State Department said
recently that it had cut down access to one of its classified networks.
Manning, who was arrested in May, allegedly exceeded his "authorized access" to the military's Secret
Internet Protocol Router network, or Siprnet, to obtain data, according to a charge sheet.
Dale Meyerrose, former chief information officer of the intelligence community, said special
authorization is needed for specific parts of Siprnet. An estimated 3 million people have secret-level
clearances, but no more than 15 to 20 percent of those have access to Siprnet, he said.

CALLS TO PROBE SWEDEN-US INTEL CONTACTS
► http://www.thelocal.se/30654/20101206/
► The Local
Dec 8 2010 ► Dec 6. Morgan Johansson, the Social Democrat chair of the parliamentary justice
committee, has demanded clarification on alleged informal intelligence contacts between the Swedish
government and the US authorities.
"The justice minister has to firstly explain what has gone on. And secondly she has to probe whether
there is any truth to the information that the government tried to withhold important information from
the Riksdag," Johansson said on Monday.
If the information released as part of the WikiLeaks Cablegate documents turns out to be true it could
be a very serious breach of the constitution, Johansson argued.
"If we hand over details of Swedish citizens to a foreign power, then it could ultimately be considered
to be a breach of the constitution, then it is a very serious issue," he said.
According to media reports on Sunday, Anna-Karin Svensson, a senior Swedish civil servant from the
justice department, is alleged to have refused US demands for a formal agreement on information
exchange covering terrorists as doing so would have required the issue to be presented to parliament.
The revelations were contained in a diplomatic cable sent from the US embassy in Stockholm in 2008
following discussions on the matter in Stockholm which included representatives from the United
States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
According to the document, Svensson told the US delegations that it was a "particularly sensitive
time", as the government was still dealing with the fallout from a protracted debate about the so-called
'FRA-law', which authorised the Sweden's National Defence Research Establishment (Försvarets
radioanstalt) to carry out signals intelligence activities on domestic cable-bound traffic.
She added that it would be "politically impossible" for Sweden's justice minister to avoid presenting a
formal agreement with the United States on the exchange of information about possible terror
suspects, explaining that doing so would also jeopardise existing "strong but informal arrangements"
between the two countries.
As an alternative, Svensson advocated that Sweden and the United States continue with "existing
informal channels" in order to avoid having to bring the matter to the Riksdag, according to the cable.
But Sweden's foreign minister Carl Bildt on Monday rejected the notion that the intelligence sharing
arrangement might constitute a breach of Swedish law. "We have an extensive intelligence and
security cooperation with many countries and it has become increasingly intense," Bildt said.
Johansson argued however that the revelations could lead to demands for justice minister Beatrice
Ask to resign. "If it is shown to be as extensive as it sounds and is shown to be unconstitutional, then a
demand to resign could result. It is a question of this magnitude, but we are not there yet," he said. But
Ask responded on Monday that nothing of any note had occurred, underlining that the agreement that
the Americans wanted with Sweden concerned terrorist screening, something Sweden didn't want.
"This was rejected by the civil servant. We can't have agreements which can't be presented in the
parliament and there is nothing strange about that," Ask told news agency TT.
The revelations that an official from the Swedish justice ministry may have acted in a way so as to
purposely keep the issue from being discussed in the Riksdag led the Left Party to demand the
establishment of a truth commission.
"That a representative for the government or civil servant from the government offices conducts this
type of discussion with a foreign power is not only inappropriate but perhaps also illegal," said Jens
Holm of the Left Party in an interpellation to Beatrice Ask on Monday.
But Ask argued that the leaked cables show that Sweden is generally sceptical of these types of
intelligence agreements and explained that informal contact was a matter of course.
"I presume it refers to routine intelligence and security work which you always have in regard to
fighting crime. This follows the rule and regulations which (Sweden's security service) Säpo and others
have," Ask said.
THE MANY HEADED HYDRA

A Difficult US Fight to Choke Off Terror Finance
► http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,733340,00.html
► Der Spiegel / by Yassin Musharbash
Dec 8 2010 ► Dec 7. US diplomats around the world have been trying for years to cut off funding for

terrorism. But many governments have proven reluctant to join the effort. Particularly in Pakistan, high-
level contacts to extremist groups are proving to be a significant hurdle.
The document exuded confidence -- and officially it didn't exist. "With your help," the US State
Department wrote in a "non-paper" to the Saudi Arabian government, "we can learn more and stop the
abuse of al-Haramain by terrorists." Then-US Secretary of State authorized the several-page-long
memo on Jan. 28, 2003. Its focus was charitable organizations that allegedly also provided funding for
terrorism -- organizations like al-Haramain. Above all, the letter was intended to turn Saudi Arabia from
a shady half-friend into a solid US ally in the fight against terrorism and its sponsors.
The Americans were aware that cash injections from wealthy benefactors in Saudi Arabia were al-
Qaida's most important source of revenue. "Finding these people and stopping the financial flows --
whether through public or private action -- would seriously impede the al-Qaida leadership‘s ability to
reconstitute the group and launch devastating new attacks in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and
elsewhere," wrote Powell in the non-paper.
His efforts met at least with partial success. Riyadh has since become an ally of the West when it
comes to combating terrorism. As recently as a few weeks ago, in late October, Saudi Arabian
intelligence helped foil a plan to send two parcel bombs to the US via Europe.
But the flow of money to al-Qaida and organizations connected with it has by no means been stopped
in Saudi Arabia. In May 2009, Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
traveled to the Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh himself, precisely for that reason. He told Saudi Financial
investigators that "private donations from the Gulf" were still the most important source of funding for
the Taliban in Afghanistan.
'A Source of Funding'
The US embassy noted that "it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat
terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority." It said "donors in Saudi Arabia
continue to constitute a source of funding to Sunni extremist groups worldwide." As for al-Haramain, it
apparently continues to operate, albeit under a different name.
Holbrooke's warning came a full six years after Powell's memo. But Osama bin Laden continues to
lead the al-Qaida terror network, Mullah Omar still heads the Afghan Taliban -- and the terrorists
haven't run out of money.
Militant Islamists collected funds for bomb attacks on suburban railway trains in Madrid in 2004 and
the London Underground in 2005. They funded suicide attacks on hotels in Jordan and on the Sinai
Peninsula, and they pay for deadly bombings in Iraq and Pakistan that take place almost daily. The
problem that Powell described back in 2003 has still not been solved. Everyone has an idea how the
terrorists get their money, but no-one can find a way to stem the flow of funds.
US diplomats are battling a multi-headed Hydra. The dispatches leaked by WikiLeaks reveal just how
bitter this battle has become. The memos repeatedly show the State Department's barely concealed
frustration with America's partners.
As Many Levels as Possible
The authorities in Qatar are described as "largely passive" in the fight against terror and "overall ...
considered the worst in the region." Indonesia is said to be an "alphabet soup" of government bodies
supposedly responsible, and a "universe of aliases" of suspected terrorists and terrorism sponsors --
in short, a bureaucratic nightmare. As for Kuwait, the diplomats told Washington that cooperation only
improved after a Kuwaiti blew himself up in Iraq.
There are, of course, some countries which are particularly helpful, including Morocco, Jordan, Abu
Dhabi and Egypt. Cairo has even pointed out new methods that the terrorists are using.
The US is trying to wage war on the terrorists on as many levels as possible. In Indonesia, for
example, it is helping legislators draft anti-money laundering laws. The US also offers training courses
and provides advisers to ministries in many other countries.
But essentially little has changed. The diplomatic dispatches on the subject of terror finance tend to
focus on three countries: Saudi Arabia, because so much money allegedly flows through the country;
Kuwait, because its government took years to blacklist three terror sponsors; and Pakistan, where the
US is confronted with a wall of demonstrative non-commitment.
Added to the List
Diplomacy is a delicate business, and Kuwait is a perfect case in point. The US efforts in Kuwait
center on three men: Jabir Al-Jalamah, Mubarak Al-Bathali and Hamid Al-Ali. In the US, they have
been officially designated "terrorist facilitators" and financiers since December 2006, and Washington
was keen to have them added to the relevant United Nations list.
In June of 2006, Washington asked its embassy in Kuwait to sound out how the government there
might react to such a move. The diplomats didn‘t envisage any fundamental problems, but predicted
the Kuwaitis would drag their feet on the issue. What actually transpired was that Kuwait asked Qatar

to prevent the men's names from being added to the UN watch list. US negotiators urged the Kuwaitis
to end the blockade in May 2007. The result was a diplomatic spat. The US information about the
three men was "full of holes," the Kuwaitis said. As a result, the American request could unfortunately
not be granted.
Naturally Kuwait is allowed to have legal concerns -- the documents only show the American point of
view. Washington responded by sending Kuwait a "non-paper" listing detailed accusations against the
men. But the Kuwaitis said that wasn't enough either. US diplomats adopted a blunter tone: After the
three men had been listed as terrorist facilitators in the US, the diplomats pointed out, Kuwait had
agreed to at least keep them under surveillance. In reality, however, the three financiers had
continued to collect funds for terrorists, the Americans wrote.
The Pakistan Question
The men were eventually added to the UN's al-Qaida list in January 2008. In May, Kuwait froze the
trio's bank accounts. But in the latest available report on the matter, from January 2010, the US
expresses "concern, however, that the three Kuwaiti UN 1267 designees (Al Bathali, Al-Ali, and
Jalamah) and others, are still traveling and providing support to extremist groups." In addition, the US
told the Kuwaiti government that "funding from Kuwait to extremist networks in South Asia is of
particular concern, especially funding of Taliban activity" along the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
US relations with Saudi Arabia are likewise less than ideal. Like Kuwait, officials in Riyadh have
repeatedly delayed or obstructed legislation and other efforts to control the flow of donations. One has
to be careful not to create "economic martyrs" among the extremists, the Saudis warn. They are also
concerned about the reaction of the conservative religious establishment in the country.
The documents from the US Embassy in Riyadh are also interesting for another reason: The scope of
the American-Saudi dialog is much wider than in other countries. It is not solely about money, but also
about politics. And the Americans' Saudi interlocutors -- who are often members of the royal family --
provide the West with profound insights.
The Saudis talk freely about others and sometimes even about themselves. They describe Iran as a
significant sponsor of terrorism, and warn that Shiite Saudis are transferring money to Hezbollah in
Lebanon. The annual pilgrimage to Mecca, known as the Hajj, creates a "security vacuum," they say.
They know full well that terrorists arrange to meet there.
A 'Rotten Head'
When Washington once again urged for more controls on donations, a member of the royal household
promised in 2006 to put the matter to the monarch: "Since we often get accused of being autocratic,
we might as well be autocratic once in a while," he said.
The Saudis are particularly clear about what they think of Pakistan. A memo dated February 2010
says the king himself described Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari as an "obstacle" and a "rotten
head." In May 2009, the Saudis made it apparent that they also mistrust the Pakistani secret service,
the ISI: "We think 10 times before approaching them," they said according to a US dispatch.
Saudi Arabia is important to the US, not least because of its importance within the Muslim world. For
the rulers in Riyadh, the role is not inconvenient. And the Saudis do not seem particularly bothered
about the fact that the Saudi Interior Ministry is "almost completely" dependent on the CIA in the war
on terror, as a US embassy memo asserted in February 2010.
And Pakistan? If Saudi Arabia was only a half-friend back in 2003, Pakistan is almost a half-enemy in
2010. The US is not really sure where it stands vis-à-vis Islamabad. Sometimes it appears as if
progress is being made, for instance when a civil servant asks for training in tackling terrorist
fundraisers. But then there are reports like the following memo from the US Embassy in February
2010: "The military and intelligence establishment has taken steps since spring 2009 to hamper the
operations of the Islamabad Embassy."
'Not Be Won for Many Years'
Pakistan's non-committal stance appears to be systematic. Islamabad took a similar approach in
response to moves to put Pakistani sponsors of terrorism on the UN list. The Pakistani Foreign
Ministry gave its assurances that Pakistan gave its wholehearted backing to the process. It could not,
however, take part in the process -- there was a lack of proof, they argued, and the government would
undoubtedly be sued.
A US "non-paper" dated Aug. 10, 2009 addressed the problem of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT), the southern
Asian terror organization that carried out the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed a total of 175 people.
It also focused on the groups and people who helped LT, whose tricks the Americans had identified.
The aid organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa, for example, pays for a new school or the expansion of a
madrassa, but part of the money is then diverted to fund bomb builders. They "would inflate the cost to
siphon money to LT," a US diplomat wrote.

Pakistan nevertheless remains intractable. The US diplomats concede that "some officials from
Pakistan's ISI continue to maintain ties with a wide array of extremist organizations." What choice do
US diplomats have? Not much. They warn Islamabad about the threat of damage to the country's
reputation, and tell the State Department that "Pakistan‘s intermittent support to terrorist groups and
militant organizations threatens to undermine regional security."
Have US efforts been entirely in vain? There have certainly been successes, but it is impossible to
completely defeat a Hydra. In February 2007, the US Embassy in Riyadh cabled the following
prediction back to Washington: "The Saudi leadership acknowledges privately that the war on
terrorism will not be won for many years."
US USED ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE TO STIFLE ARMS TRADE

► Guardian News Service
► http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article936132.ece
► The Hindu
Dec 7 2010 ► Dec 7. The Hindu State department documents record that Khartoum then privately
accused the U.S. of carrying out two air attacks in eastern Sudan: one in January 2009, with 43 dead
and 17 vehicles destroyed, and another on 20 February, with 45 dead and 14 vehicles destroyed.
Pressure on Arab states over weapons sent to militants by Iran and Syria. The U.S has worked
discreetly to block the supply of Iranian and Syrian weapons to the Palestinian movement Hamas and
Lebanon‘s Hezbollah, pressuring Arab governments not to co-operate -- in many cases its requests
based on secret intelligence provided by Israel.
State department cables show that Sudan was warned by the U.S. in January 2009 not to allow the
delivery of unspecified Iranian arms that were expected to be passed to Hamas in the Gaza Strip
around the time of Israel‘s Operation Cast Lead offensive, in which 1,400 Palestinians were killed.
U.S. diplomats were instructed to express ―exceptional concern‖ to the Khartoum authorities. Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Chad were informed of the alleged Iranian plans and warned
that any weapons deliveries would be in breach of UN resolutions banning Iranian arms exports.
Sudan‘s foreign minister told a U.S. official his government‘s formal response would be that it was not
permitting the import of weapons from Iran, only to be told that ―a simple regurgitation of Sudan‘s
previous denial would be unfortunate‖.
Months later the media reported that in mid-January, Israeli planes mounted a long-range bombing
attack on an arms convoy in Sudan‘s Red Sea province. The Sharq al-Awsat newspaper quoted a US
official as saying Sudan had been warned in advance about the shipment.
State department documents record that Khartoum then privately accused the U.S. of carrying out two
air attacks in eastern Sudan: one in January 2009, with 43 dead and 17 vehicles destroyed, and
another on 20 February, with 45 dead and 14 vehicles destroyed. ―We assume that the planes that
attacked us are your planes,‖ a senior Sudanese official said. The U.S. embassy in Khartoum then
sought clarification from Washington.
―Should this potentially explosive story somehow leak to the sensationalistic Sudanese press,‖ the
cable said, ―it could very well turn our security situation here from bad to worse.‖ Explaining the
political background to the confrontation, the head of Sudan‘s intelligence and security service, Salah
Ghosh, told U.S. diplomats of his government‘s frustration over Washington‘s support for Israel during
the Gaza war. U.S. actions would ―calamitously increase support for violent extremism and [push]
Hamas into an alliance with Iran‖, he warned.
In March 2009 Jordan and Egypt were informed by the U.S. of new Iranian plans to ship a cargo of
―lethal military equipment‖ to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan and then to Hamas. Host nations
were requested to require that the flights land for inspection, or deny them over flight rights. It is not
known whether any deliveries went ahead.
In April Egypt‘s interior minister, General Habib al-Adly, was described in U.S. cables as being behind
the dismantling of a Hezbollah cell in Sinai as well as ―steps to disrupt the flow of Iranian-supplied
arms from Sudan through Egypt to Gaza‖.
At the end of that month Egypt‘s intelligence chief, General Omar Soleiman, told U.S. officials Egypt
was ―succeeding‖ in preventing Iran from funnelling financial support to Hamas. ―Egypt had sent a
clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS [the
Egyptian intelligence service] had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria,‖ Soleiman said.
In June Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel‘s prime minister, told US officials there was ―a steady flow of
Iranian weapons to Gaza through Sudan or Syria and then by sea‖, though ―Egypt‘s performance in

stopping the tunnels [into Gaza] improved after Cairo understood that the Iranian arms pipeline is a
direct threat to Egypt as well‖.
Iran, a Mossad representative told a U.S. delegation in late 2009, ―is very creative in finding ways to
transfer weapons systems to its proxies‖. It was widely reported in February 2010 that Mahmoud al-
Mabhouh, a senior Hamas official who was assassinated in Dubai by suspected Mossad agents, had
been the key weapons procurement link between the Palestinian organisation and Iran.
Only rarely do the U.S. cables show evidence of direct Israeli requests to the U.S. to block arms
deliveries, probably because they would be highly classified.
But in one bilateral meeting in Tel Aviv in 2009 a senior state department official noted ―most requests
to third countries to deny arms transfer over flights are based on Israeli intelligence. Additional
information/intelligence from the government of Israel would ensure greater cooperation.‖ In February
2010, Israeli military intelligence informed the U.S. that Syria ―intended to imminently transfer‖ Scud-D
ballistic missiles to Hezbollah, warning of a ―new level of concern‖ on the northern border if the transfer
went ahead. Israel requested that any demarche be delivered before the arrival in Washington of their
defence minister, Ehud Barak, to avoid the impression ―that the U.S. and Israel collaborated to
uncover and thwart the transfer‖. Three days later the US warned Syria that it would be a ―strategic
miscalculation‖ to provide Hezbollah with these weapons.
President Assad was informed of US concerns by the undersecretary of state, William Burns. But the
Syrian leader ―bluntly stated that he knew of no new weapons systems going to Hezbollah ... despite
disturbing and weighty evidence to the contrary‖.
Syria‘s deputy foreign minister, Faisal Miqdad, countered that the message showed that ―the U.S. has
not come to a mature position [that would enable it] to differentiate between its own interests and
Israel‘s‖.
But U.S. allies in the west and the Arab world were told bluntly: ―These are U.S. concerns. We are not
carrying somebody else‘s ‗water‘ on this issue‖ -- a clear reference to Israel.
US GOVT FORCED TO RELEASE SPY DOCS

► http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=3423
► IPS / by William Fisher
Dec 6 2010 ► Dec 6. Last week's release of 900 pages of U.S. government documents dealing with
the implementation of the nation's primary surveillance law suggests that the government has been
systematically violating the privacy rights of U.S. citizens.
How many citizens is unclear, since the documents were extensively redacted. The previously secret
internal documents were obtained through a court battle by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
The government declined to disclose the number of citizens who had their telephone calls, e-mail, or
other communications intercepted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments
Act of 2008. They also declined to discuss any specific abuses, the ACLU said.
The 900 documents were delivered in keeping with a previously agreed schedule.
Alex Abdo, a senior attorney with the ACLU, told IPS, "For two years now, the government has had
the authority to engage in the dragnet and unconstitutional surveillance of Americans' communications
with little to no oversight of its actual surveillance decisions."
"This week's disclosures confirm that the government repeatedly abused even the minimal, and
unconstitutional, limits set out in this new surveillance authority," he added. "Although we know that
abuses occurred, the government has withheld all critical details about them."
The lawsuit seeks to enforce a November 2009 Freedom of Information Act request for records related
to the government's interpretation and implementation of the FAA, including reports and assessments
mandated by the law concerning how the FAA is being used, how many citizens are affected and what
safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of privacy rights.
Prior to the government's release of last week's 900 pages, it had not released any of the records
requested. The lawsuit alleges that the requested records are needed to enable informed public
debate about whether the FAA - which expires in 2012 - should be repealed, amended or extended.
In July 2008, the ACLU and the NYCLU filed a landmark lawsuit to stop the government from
conducting surveillance under the FAA on behalf of a broad coalition of attorneys and human rights,
labour, legal and media organisations whose work requires them to engage in sensitive and
sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients, journalistic
sources, witnesses, experts, foreign government officials and victims of human rights abuses located
outside the United States.

A district court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs could not challenge the secret surveillance
law because they could not prove that their own communications had been monitored under it.
The ACLU and NYCLU appealed that ruling and have asked a federal appeals court to reinstate the
case. The groups argued that, because of the secret nature of the FAA, the law may never be subject
to judicial review at all if Americans are prohibited from challenging it unless they can show that their
own communications have been collected.
"It is unfortunate that once again we have to sue over the secrecy that continues to shroud so much of
our government's work," said NYCLU Associate Legal Director Christopher Dunn. "While we have
seen recent improvements in transparency, much more remains to be done before we have a truly
open government."
Attorneys on the case are Alex Abdo and Jameel Jaffer of the ACLU and Dunn and Arthur Eisenberg
of the New York Civil Liberties Union.
However, routine oversight reports carried out by the government itself acknowledge ongoing
violations of legal parametres and civil rights that limit when citizens are targeted and minimise the
amount of data collected.
As noted by the Washington Post, "The documents note that although oversight teams did not find
evidence of 'intentional or willful attempts to violate or circumvent the law...certain types of compliance
incidents continue to occur', as a March 2009 report stated."
The Post goes on to assert that the unredacted portions of the reports refer only elliptically to what
those actions were, but the March 2009 report stated that, "information collected as a result of these
incidents has been or is being purged from data repositories."
ACLU attorneys say violations of the FISA Amendments Act's "targeting and minimisation
procedures...likely means that citizens and residents' communications were either being improperly
collected or targeted or improperly retained and disseminated."
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is an Act of Congress which prescribes procedures
for the physical and electronic surveillance and collection of "foreign intelligence information" between
"foreign powers" and "agents of foreign powers" - which may include U.S. citizens and permanent
residents suspected of being engaged in espionage and violating U.S. law on territory under United
States control. The act was amended in 2001 by the USA PATRIOT Act, primarily to include terrorism
on behalf of groups that are not specifically backed by a foreign government. Lawmakers amended
the 1978 law again in 2008 to "broaden and clarify legal authorities" after the Sep. 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and advances in internet communications prompted fresh concerns over expanded
surveillance powers.
The ACLU, human rights activists and other parties sued, charging that the new law is
unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches.
A U.S. district judge dismissed the case, but the ACLU appealed the verdict, which is still pending.
Meantime, the ACLU has pursued the related Freedom of Information Act request.
WASHINGTON FIGHTS TO REBUILD BATTERED REPUTATION

► http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,733088,00.html
► Der Spiegel
Dec 6 2010 ► Dec 6. Few leaks have ever caused so much anger and shock as the publication of the
US diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been trying to repair the
damage done to Washington's reputation, while some on the right have even called for Julian
Assange's execution.
Her face has seemed frozen in place for days. She looks peaked, thin-lipped and serious, very se-
rious. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is currently enduring the consequences of what is probably
the biggest indiscretion in the history of diplomacy, and it shows.
Clinton, who has embarked on a damage-control trip around the world, sharply condemned the public-
cation of the embassy cables by the website WikiLeaks, calling it a "very irresponsible, thoughtless act
that put at risk the lives of innocent people all over the world."
"Secretary Clinton is literally working night and day in conversations with countless leaders around the
world to try as best we can not only to express regret but to work through these issues," Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns told US lawmakers. Her husband, former
President Bill Clinton, said he would be "very surprised if some people don't lose their lives" as a result
of the leaks.
In the Spotlight

On Wednesday of last week, Hillary Clinton was in the Kazakh capital Astana for a long-planned
summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was her first major
appearance on the international stage in the wake of the leaks, and she knew that it could be an
embarrassing one.
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 70-year-old ruler of Kazakhstan, was standing on a large stage
in the Palace of Independence, waiting for 38 heads of state, as well as other senior politicians from
around the world. He was the host of the event, the first OSCE summit since 1999. The head of each
delegation had to walk up a small staircase onto the stage to shake the Kazakh autocrat's hand.
Finally it was Hillary Clinton's turn. Wearing a dark-blue suit, she climbed up the stairs and walked
toward Nazarbayev, smiling broadly. As she stood on the stage with Nazarbayev, Clinton knew that
the spotlight was on her, as the head of the US State Department, the government agency responsible
for writing so many unflattering psychological profiles and political assessments of politicians
worldwide.
Some of the people Clinton's ambassadors wrote about were now sitting in the room in front of her.
They included Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, whom the diplomats characterized as "pale and
hesitant" and likened to a comic-book character, and the president of Turkmenistan, who, according to
the cables, is "a practiced liar" and "not very bright".
Host Nazarbayev is apparently fond of warm weather, has about 40 horses in his stable and owns a
palace in the Arab Emirates. Nazarbayev has already told the Americans that he will get over the
revelations.
More Than Just Damaged Egos
But it's more than a question of potentially damaged egos. The published cables offer insights into the
thought processes of American leaders and their counterparts abroad. They provide authentic direct
quotes from the world's crisis regions. They report on North Korean B25 rockets capable of carrying
nuclear warheads and with an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers (4,800 miles), which Pyongyang
allegedly shipped to Iran. They reveal that US diplomats were given secret instructions in the summer
of 2009 to spy on foreign officials at the UN. They discuss Arab leaders who favored bombing Iran.
They describe a suitcase containing $52 million (€39 million) in cash, with which Afghanistan's former
vice-president was caught in Dubai before he was released again. And they mention a Lebanese
defense minister who said that he hoped Israel would bomb his own country and annihilate Hezbollah.
The cables, as reports from a world of secretiveness and discretion, contain astonishingly clear and
unvarnished statements made in the context of the diplomatic realm of duplicity. They have shocked,
alienated and appalled the world.
Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, seemingly in shock and speaking somewhat prematurely,
called the leaks the "September 11th of world diplomacy." French government spokesman François
Baroin, calling the leaks a threat that needed to be combated, said: "I always thought that a
transparent society was a totalitarian society."
Hillary Clinton is aware of all of these irritations. According to her spokesman, she claimed not to have
read a single one of the problematic documents. This is astonishing. In her speech before the OSCE
plenary assembly, she didn't say a word about the WikiLeaks disclosures.
'No Better Friend'
Suddenly German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the woman American diplomats described as "rarely
creative," was sitting next to Clinton. Merkel was also wearing blue that day. The two women seemed
to be having an amiable conversation. The chancellor would later say that the WikiLeaks affair played
only a "secondary" role at the meeting.
Things did not go quite as smoothly for Clinton with Silvio Berlusconi. Since the leaks occurred, the
Italian prime minister -- the last world leader to arrive at the meeting, carrying a folder under his arm
and visibly out of breath -- has been under suspicion of securing benefits for himself in connection with
energy deals with Russia, which he denies. The cables describe Berlusconi as "feckless, vain and
ineffective" and as a party animal who doesn't get enough sleep. But in Astana, Clinton also felt
compelled to make amends with the Italian. "We have no better friend, we have no one who supports
the American policies as consistently as Prime Minister Berlusconi has," Clinton told reporters.
Apologies, professions of solidarity and efforts to make amends: Is this what American foreign policy
will look like for the next few months?
"We cannot, of course, put the toothpaste back in the tube," writes former CIA case officer Robert
Baer in an opinion piece for the Financial Times. "The credibility of the State Department as a reliable
interlocutor has evaporated, and no doubt for a long time."
In an interview with SPIEGEL, former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal says that
American's "credibility and honesty are the victim of these leaks" and assumes that from now on
people "will no longer speak to American diplomats frankly."

'Anything Less than Execution Is Too Kind'
Those at the right end of the American political spectrum feel threatened by a foreign power once
again. Whoever passed on this information is guilty of treason, says former Baptist preacher Mike
Huckabee, one of the leading contenders for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012.
According to Huckabee, "anything less than execution is too kind a penalty."
His rival Sarah Palin wrote on her Facebook page that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange should be
hunted down like a terrorist. "He is an anti-American operative with blood on his hands. … Why was
he not pursued with the same urgency we pursue al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders?"
One leading politician who hasn't said much is President Barack Obama, whose handling of the
WikiLeaks affair thus far only confirms his political adversaries' criticisms. Just like with the
controversy over an Islamic center in New York and the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Obama is once
again being accused of not taking decisive action, showing weakness and putting America's
superpower status at risk. Obama's inaction in the WikiLeaks case was the focus of conservative
criticism in the second half of the week.
Commentator Ann Coulter calls Obama a hesitant, powerless leader who is stuck in the White House,
incapable of doing anything to defend his country. While Interpol is looking for Assange, she says, the
US government isn't doing everything in its power to apprehend him. She characterizes the United
States as "a helpless, pitiful giant."
Conspiracy Theories
Turkey has considered taking legal action because of the leaks. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, described in the cables as an "ignorant Islamist" with eight Swiss bank accounts, wants to
strike back at US diplomats in a big way. "Those who have slandered us will be crushed under these
claims, will be finished and will disappear," Erdogan announced in Istanbul, where he is considering
filing a lawsuit against the diplomats.
Many Turks suspect that a massive conspiracy by the Jewish lobby is behind the WikiLeaks
campaign, a view held even by the deputy chairman of the governing party, the AKP. The goal of the
reports, he says, is to weaken the Turkish government.
The cables will probably have their most serious long-term effects in places where the world was
already extremely fragile before the leaks: the Middle East, Yemen, the countries bordering Iran,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Critics in Islamabad said last week that the United States, Pakistan's
strategic partner in the war on terrorism, mistrusts its Pakistani allies and is "playing a double game."
Some of the cables revealed US concerns that Islamabad is not sufficiently protecting its nuclear
arsenal. "The documents show what Washington really thinks about us," says one official in a
Pakistani ministry.
Humble Pie
Secretary Clinton's diplomats will have to woo their foreign counterparts and openly express their
regrets, and they'll even have to eat some humble pie to offset the loss of confidence. The State
Department is already thinking about withdrawing some of its ambassadors as a way of making
amends. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns says that the WikiLeaks
disclosures have done "substantial damage" to diplomacy.
The peculiar thing about this debate is that it also has another, entirely different side, in the form of
those who feel that the leaked cables are "embarrassing but not damaging" and "lack relevant new
information."
"The WikiLeaks disclosures did not offer any surprises," writes Switzerland's Neue Zürcher Zeitung,
while the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit argues there is nothing at risk "that ought to preoccupy
humanity, at least not in Europe."
From Banal to Explosive
Everyone, from the outraged to those who downplay the significance of the cables, is talking about the
same dispatches, the same data sets that WikiLeaks began releasing on its website on Sunday, Nov.
28. The New York Times, Britain's Guardian newspaper, SPIEGEL, the French daily newspaper Le
Monde and Spain's El Pais were given advance access to this treasure trove and were able to analyze
it. Rarely has an exposé angered so many people and provoked such widely diverging reactions. And
rarely have leaks been disseminated so widely and so simultaneously.
Some of the 251,287 documents are banal, but some are so explosive that the publications analyzing
them agreed not to publish them. There were thousands of instances in which journalists had to
exercise discretion in handling the information in the cables responsibly. To protect so-called
secondary sources, their names were not mentioned. Certain counterterrorism efforts and military
operations were kept secret, out of consideration for the governments involved.
SPIEGEL spent months examining this material, just as it has done with material from any other
source in the past and will continue to do in the future. The only difference in the WikiLeaks case was

that the five participating publications agreed on the date of release, and agreed not to disclose the
names of people whose freedom or lives could be put at risk by such disclosures.
Source of Resentment
Many of the cables are part of ordinary diplomatic reporting, while others clearly document borderline
cases. The recruitment of a source within Germany's Free Democratic Party (FDP) by employees of
the US embassy in Berlin is certainly in the latter category.
Another such case clearly involves the State Department's instructions to its diplomats to spy on UN
officials in New York. The directive on which they were based included a wish list of information about
senior UN officials drawn up by the CIA. "The contents of that came from outside the Department of
State," department spokesman Philip Crowley said in a press briefing last week.
The cables, which instructed diplomats to obtain biometric data on UN envoys, as well as the details of
their frequent flier accounts and even credit card numbers, were justifiably a source of resentment and
anger at the UN building on New York's East River.
Speaking to a plenary session, UN spokesman Farhan Haq quoted a passage from the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon, clearly troubled by the disclosures, conferred with Clinton, but both remained diplomatically
tight-lipped on the issue after the meeting.
State of Shock
The documents made their deepest impression in the Middle East, where they add credence to an
often voiced but never proven suspicion, namely that the governments of Israel and the major Arab
countries, who are traditionally hostile toward one another, are completely in agreement on one issue:
their stance toward Iran. Both sides apparently want the Americans to put an end to Tehran's nuclear
program and, contrary to their official positions, many Arab leaders are prepared to accept war as a
possible consequence. The American diplomats quote the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates
as saying that this is merely "a matter of when, not if."
Seeing words like this published for the first time made such an impression on the Arab elites that they
fell into a state of shock for three days. By Wednesday, the government-controlled newspapers in the
Gulf had not printed a word of the colossal statements their own kings, sheikhs and emirs had made.
The Arab press was silent for good reason. Arab leaders have lied to their people for years. The ca-
bles clearly demonstrate that these leaders' repeatedly voiced appeals for Muslim unity were nothing
but hollow phrases. The documents show, for example, that the Sunni Arab leaders showed their deep
aversion to the Shiite mullahs in Tehran by showering them with a wealth of insults.
The only problem is that their people, influenced by decades of propaganda, have since formed a
different opinion. According to a recent survey by the US-based Zogby opinion polling firm, only 10
percent of Egyptians, Saudi Arabians and Jordanians feel threatened by Iran, while 77 percent of
respondents fear the United States and 88 percent see Israel as a threat. The disclosures of the
embassy cables are making Arab governments in the Middle East much more nervous than
governments elsewhere in the world, because they show that at least part of their legitimacy is based
on lies.
At the end of last week, a group of diplomatic cables from an unknown source suddenly surfaced in
the Arab world. The documents had not been released on the WikiLeaks website or by the five media
partners. Their source remained unclear by Friday evening, as did the question of how responsibly
they are now likely to be treated. However, the cables appear to be authentic.
'Satanic Conspiracy'
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for his part, declared from the very beginning that the
cables were forgeries, the result of a "Satanic conspiracy" launched by Washington to harm Arab-
Iranian relations. His advisor, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, said: "America wants to portray itself as the
leader of the world, as master of the destinies of nations."
No one seems to be as comfortable with the disclosures as the Americans' worst enemy and best
friend, respectively, Iran and Israel. While Ahmadinejad sharply criticized what he called the Ameri-
cans' "psychological warfare," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was noticeably relaxed
when he spoke with the press in Jerusalem. The fact that the whole world can now read up on how
closely Arab intelligence agencies cooperate with Israel, and that the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Saudi
Arabia called for an attack on Iran -- these are unexpected gifts for Netanyahu.
For the first time in history, Netanyahu told the journalists, there is finally agreement that Iran is a
threat. He even said that he sees the leaks as a key to regional peace. "If leaders start saying openly
what they have long been saying behind closed doors, we can make a real breakthrough on the road
to peace."
A new WikiLeaks fan community emerged in Israel overnight. A columnist for the major Israeli daily
newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth wrote: "Had WikiLeaks not existed, Israel would have had to invent it."

Relaxed Reaction
And what are the British saying? They had to learn that it apparently didn't bother Prince Andrew that
the biggest British arms maker had corrupt business dealings with Saudi Arabia. They also read that
the head of their central bank, the Bank of England, voiced misgivings over Prime Minister David
Cameron's ability to survive the current financial crisis. The British are, in fact, taking a relaxed
approach. Unlike many Americans, they do not see WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange as a public
enemy. Sherard Cowper-Coles, a British diplomat who was his country's special envoy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan until recently, said that the material might be "inconvenient" but it contains "few
surprises."
Now everyone can see for themselves what a first-class job US diplomats are doing, writes historian
Timothy Garton Ash, arguing that the leaks are, in fact, good news for the Americans. Fareed Zakaria,
the chief columnist for Time, agrees. After studying the cables, Zakaria writes, he was relieved to find
that they "show an American diplomatic establishment that is pretty good at analysis."
So what exactly is the downside for the United States? Perhaps the biggest problem the cables reveal,
writes Zakaria, is that an individual soldier, sitting at his computer on a military base in Iraq, was able
to download secret reports on conversations between the French foreign minister and the US defense
secretary. For Zakaria, it was Washington's absurd data policy that made the scandal possible in the
first place, a problem the Americans have been forced to address.
Not Off-Limits
Would SPIEGEL have published these reports if they had come from a different source? Does it
consider them to be politically significant? The answer, in both cases, is yes. A newspaper or
magazine must be able to print material that state authorities wrongly exploit or keep under lock and
key, SPIEGEL founder Rudolf Augstein once wrote. "A journalist is motivated by the intention to
provide the public with the knowledge it needs to form an opinion on existential issues," the now-
deceased former publisher of SPIEGEL also wrote.
According to Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Dana Priest of the Washington Post, these documents
show how nations interact with each other, and provide "an unfiltered view" of what they think of their
enemies and allies. Priest argues that the public has a right to know what its government is up to.
But don't countries also have the right to privacy, as the Swiss weekly magazine Weltwoche asks?
It has always been SPIEGEL's view that not everything governments consider to be secret should be
off-limits to journalists. SPIEGEL's 1982 disclosure of the Flick affair, which involved questionable
political contributions by the German Flick company, was based on confidential documents from the
public prosecutor's office. The magazine's reporting on the Neue Heimat embezzlement affair was
based on internal trade union documents, while SPIEGEL obtained information on the Kunduz
bombing disaster from confidential German military documents and a classified NATO report.
"A journalist who sees the WikiLeaks data primarily as an issue of national or, even worse, Western
security, has successfully shot himself in the foot -- and dealt a blow to press freedom in the process,"
writes Jakob Augstein, son of the SPIEGEL founder and publisher of the weekly newspaper Freitag.
But even those newspapers that were critical of the publication of the cables, such as the German
tabloid Bild, which characterized the "online anarchists" as criminal, or the daily Die Welt, which wrote
of an irresponsible and immensely dangerous "summary breach of secrecy," did not refrain from
reporting on the disclosures at length last week.
Calls for Revenge
In this respect, Germany was no different from the United States, where political forces on the right are
now calling for revenge. Bloggers have used their sites to unveil their own plans for Bradley Manning,
the gay, 23-year-old private, a former military IT expert in Iraq, who allegedly downloaded the
diplomatic cables and leaked them to WikiLeaks. They want to see him stuffed into one of those
orange jumpsuits worn by the prisoners at Guantanamo, picked up by a helicopter and dragged off to
a secret camp. For days, there have been calls on the Internet for his execution. The man who said
that he copied the cables onto a CD he had disguised as one of Lady Gaga music has not become a
hero, nor has WikiLeaks founder Assange.
Last Thursday, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) criticized what it called a "political
campaign" against Assange and Manning. According to the IFJ, the "calls by right-wing commentators
for Manning to be executed and that Assange be hunted down as a spy … show a mood of
intolerance and persecution that is dangerous not just for the two men but for all journalists engaged in
investigating public affairs."
The US government is now doing its utmost to prevent the spread of the documents. The Social
Security Administration was the first government agency to warn its employees, 62,000 in all, not to
disseminate the WikiLeaks documents to others, copy them or even read them. Government workers
caught in violation of the order could face criminal consequences.

Manning, who was 22 when he copied the files, has repeatedly been accused of being motivated by a
desire for recognition. But Manning himself offered a different explanation before he was taken into
custody. He said that he had been told to cover up a lot of things during his time in Iraq, and that this
had outraged him. After seeing the now notorious Baghdad helicopter video, he apparently decided to
search for more material. When he found the cables, he said, he wanted the world to find out about
them.
In Shackles
Manning has been in a military jail at the Marine Corps Base Quantico, about an hour's drive from
Washington, for more than four months now. He gets up at 5:30 every morning and goes to bed at
8:30 every night. His attorney can see him, and an aunt visited him two weeks ago for the first time.
His immediate family, on the other hand, has not been to Quantico. When Manning has visitors, he is
brought to the visitors' area with his hands and feet in shackles. The noise of the chains can be heard
from a distance.
He takes antidepressants and sleeping pills, but he is no longer considered a suicide risk. As a
precaution, however, there are no sheets in his cell yet. He is allowed to watch television for one hour
a week.
It's quite possible, therefore, that Manning has now become aware of the storm he has unleashed out
there, beyond the gates of Quantico.
IRAN FORMS ELITE SECURITY UNIT AFTER STUXNET ASSASSINATION

► www.tgdaily.com/security-features/52875-iran-forms-elite-security-unit-after-stuxnet-assassination
► TG Daily / by Aharon Etengoff
Dec 6 2010 ► Dec 5. Tehran has formed an elite security unit to protect nuclear scientists after failing
to prevent the assassination of a high-level Stuxnet expert attempting to counter the voracious worm.
Indeed, as TG Daily previously reported, Prof. Majid Shahriari was killed in a drive-by shooting that
also involved the planting and detonation of explosives by unknown operatives on speeding
motorcycles.
According to DebkaFile, the new unit will be jointly administered by Iran's Intelligence Ministry (MOIS)
and the Quds Brigade (‫ )ق دس یروین‬of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
Iran forms elite security unit after Stuxnet assassinationIts task: To provide nuclear scientists and their
families with the same level of security offered to high-ranking leaders of the Ahmadinejad regime.
"The decision to establish an [elite] unit with upgraded security arrangements for the nuclear
program's staff and their families was taken to halt [a] stampede for [the] exits," explained DebkaFile
analysts.
"[As such], until the new unit is in place, the details guarding government and military VIPs will stand
guard over the program's staff. [In addition], top scientists are to be provided with armored-plated
vehicles [capable of] withstanding sticky bombs and RPGs."
It should also be noted that Ali Akhbar Salehi - chairman of Iran's Atomic Energy Comission - has
confirmed that a massive security shakeup is ongoing.
"We [definitely] have been pursuing serious protective measures for hundreds of our scientists and
experts since last year," he said.
"And, based on [a] recent decision, we are to increase protective measures multi-fold and take other
steps as well."
CRS BLOCKS ACCESS TO WIKILEAKS

Dec 6 2010 ► Dec 6. The Library of Congress confirmed on Friday that it had blocked access from all
Library computers to the Wikileaks web site in order to prevent unauthorized downloading of classified
records such as those in the large cache of diplomatic cables that Wikileaks began to publish on
November 28.
Since the Congressional Research Service is a component of the Library, this means that CRS re-
searchers will be unable to access or to cite the leaked materials in their research reports to Congress.
Several current and former CRS analysts expressed perplexity and dismay about the move, and they
said it could undermine the institution's research activities.

"It's a difficult situation," said one CRS analyst. "The information was released illegally, and it's not
right for government agencies to be aiding and abetting this illegal dissemination. But the information
is out there. Presumably, any Library of Congress researcher who wants to access the information that
Wikileaks illegally released will simply use their home computers or cellphones to do so. Will they be
able to refer directly to the information in their writings for the Library? Apparently not, unless a
secondary source, like a newspaper, happens to have already cited it."
"I can understand LOC blocking the public's access to Wikileaks," a former CRS analyst said. "It would
have no control over someone from the public using classified information for impermissible or im-
proper purposes. [But] the connection between LOC and CRS has always been somewhat fuzzy
because Congress intended CRS to have a certain amount of autonomy. There should be room for
CRS to adopt a different policy, particularly for specialists who have security clearances, know how to
protect classified information, and can be entrusted to use Wikileaks appropriately. To me, it is a
wrong course to simply close the door tightly without searching for a compromise needed to continue
providing Congress with high-level professional analysis."
In fact, if CRS is "Congress's brain," then the new access restrictions could mean a partial lobotomy.
"I don‘t know that you can make a credible argument that CRS reports are the gold standard of
analytical reporting, as is often claimed, when its analysts are denied access to information that
historians and public policy types call a treasure trove of data," another former CRS employee said.
"I understand the rationale behind the policy decision to preclude government agencies from making
the information available via their sites as a matter of pure principle. On the other hand (as CRS is
famous for saying), in some cases it would clearly diminish the weight of some of the analysis CRS
does on policy issues, particularly on foreign affairs and military strategy where it is widely known that
key information that would help inform thoughtful and comprehensive analysis was released on
Wikileaks."
"As an example, when [CRS Middle East analyst] Ken Katzman writes on U.S. policy towards Iran I
don‘t know how he could meet the high professional standards for completeness and accuracy he
routinely meets if he can‘t refer to the information in the [leaked] diplomatic notes that express the
thoughts of key leaders in the region on the need to strike Iran‘s nuclear program. The same with
North Korea; how do you provide Congress complete and accurate analysis to inform their decision
making that ignores the [leaked] information on China‘s increasing frustration with Pyongyang? The
examples could go on and on."
"I‘m sure public policy analysts from other organizations are going to use the [Wikileaks] information
and their reports may prove more valuable to decision makers than CRS reports," the former CRS
employee said.
Another former analyst questioned the legal basis for the Library of Congress's action.
"In its press release, LOC seems to be saying that it is following OMB advice regarding the obligation
of federal agencies and federal employees to protect classified information and to otherwise protect
the integrity of government information technology systems. But LOC is statutorily chartered as the
library of the House and the Senate. It is a legislative branch agency. I don't recall either chamber
directing the blocking of access to Wikileaks for/or by its committees, offices, agencies, or Members."
Interestingly, the OMB guidance did not require federal agencies to block access to Wikileaks, only to
warn employees against downloading classified information. So by imposing such blocks, the Library
of Congress has actually exceeded the instructions of OMB.
The Library did not reply to an inquiry from Secrecy News over the weekend concerning the impact of
its restricted access policy on CRS. If a reply is forthcoming, it will be posted on the Secrecy News
blog.
NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: HOW THE LIMITS CHANGE

Dec 6 2010 ► Dec 6. On December 3, I participated in an interesting, somewhat testy discussion
about Wikileaks on the show Democracy Now along with Glenn Greenwald of Salon.com, who is a
passionate defender of the project. The ultimate victory of Wikileaks (or something like it) is
guaranteed, Mr. Greenwald suggested, so any criticism of it is basically irrelevant.
"We can debate WikiLeaks all we want," he said, "but at the end of the day, it doesn't really matter,
because the technology that exists is inevitably going to subvert these institutions' secrecy regimes.
It's too easy to take massive amounts of secret [material] and dump it on the internet.... And I think
that what we're talking about is inevitable, whether people like Steven Aftergood or Joe Lieberman or
others like it or not."

This seems like wishful thinking. It is true that Wikileaks offers the most direct public access to the
diplomatic cables and other records that it has published, most of which could not be obtained any
time soon through normal channels. But instead of subverting secrecy regimes, Wikileaks appears to
be strengthening them, as new restrictions on information sharing are added and security measures
are tightened. (Technology can be used to bolster secrecy as well as subvert it.)
In fact, Wikileaks may deliberately be attempting, in a quasi-Marxist way, to subvert secrecy by
provoking governments to strengthen it. But please try this in your own country first.
It was ordinary political advocacy, not leaks, that produced reversals of longstanding U.S. government
secrecy policies this year on nuclear stockpile secrecy and intelligence budget secrecy. It was also
political advocacy, not leaks, that led to the declassification of more than a billion pages of classified
records since 1995. Obviously, much more remains to be done, and the tools available to transparen-
cy advocates are not as powerful as one would wish. Leaks that serve the public interest have their
honored place; more would be welcome. Advocacy may fail, and often does. Nothing is inevitable, as
far as I know. But so far it is still politics, not the subversion or repudiation of politics, that has produ-
ced the greater impact on U.S. secrecy policy. (The calculation may well be different in other coun-
tries.)
The susceptibility of secrecy policy to political action was discussed in a paper I wrote on "National
Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change". It will appear in the forthcoming Fall 2010 issue of the
journal Social Research that is devoted to the topic of "Limiting Knowledge in a Democracy."
MORE FOREIGN FIGHTERS SEEN SLIPPING BACK INTO IRAQ

►www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iPUXvyVD9cVX2Ql3-kvpvSBLV6KQ?docId=6688ea51d95642a8a8790298fd14d078
► AP
Dec 6 2010 ► Dec 6. Intelligence officials say foreign fighters have been slipping back into Iraq in
larger numbers recently and may have been behind some of the most devastating attacks this year,
reviving a threat the U.S. military believed had been almost entirely eradicated.
It is impossible to verify the actual numbers of foreign insurgents entering the country. But one Middle
Eastern intelligence official estimated recently that 250 came in October alone. U.S. officials say the
figure is far lower, but have acknowledged an increase since August.
At the same time, Iraqi officials say there has been a surge in financial aid to al-Qaida's front group in
Iraq as the U.S. military prepares to leave by the end of 2011. They said it reflects fears by Arab states
over the growing influence of Iran's Shiite-led government over Iraq and its Shiite-dominated
government.
On Sunday, security official Maj. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi said Iraqi forces are searching for six
foreign fighters who are among Iraq's most wanted terrorists.
The six are suspected of involvement in the Oct. 31 siege of a Christian church that left 68 people
dead and drew international outrage, al-Moussawi said. They are also suspected in two summertime
attacks on an Iraqi army headquarters in central Baghdad that killed a total of 73 people.
"All who committed these attacks are (non-Iraqi) Arabs," he said. "This indicates the failure of al-Qaida
leaders to recruit Iraqis to carry out suicide attacks."
Al-Moussawi said five of the six suspects are hiding in two Sunni Muslim-dominated provinces
bordering Syria, while one has fled to Syria.
U.S. officials are playing down the threat.
Army Col. Barry Johnson, a spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, said the military noticed a slight
increase in foreign fighters starting in August, but would not say how many. He said the number
remains far lower than when insurgents were rushing in from Arab states between 2005 and 2007.
"There were some indications of a flow of foreign fighters in," Johnson said. "And that is often
associated with suicide attacks, so we were anticipating something happening."
Last year, U.S. counterterrorism officials said the number of foreigners heading to Iraq had trickled
from hundreds to "tens" in what they described as a severely weakened al-Qaida in Iraq.
But a Mideast counterterrorism official said an estimated 250 foreign fighters entered Iraq in October
alone. He said they came through the Syrian city of Homs, a hub for Syrian Muslim fundamentalists
that is run mostly by Tunisians and Algerians. Other fighters have come from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Libya and Yemen.
Additionally, the official said tens of millions of foreign dollars annually are funding the Iraqi
insurgency, which has received about $5 billion in aid since 2007. The money comes from al-Qaida

leaders, Muslims who want the U.S. to leave, and so-called 'Arab nationalists' who are eager for Sunni
Muslims to regain power in Shiite-dominated Iraq.
The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media.
Even at the height of the war, foreign fighters were considered a small percentage of the total
insurgents in Iraq. But their presence encouraged donations from overseas, and they made up some
of the most hardcore jihadists who were willing to carry out suicide bombings.
Officials see the fingerprints of foreign fighters in a spate of recent attacks:
Four of the church bombers who were from Libya and Syria and carried fake ID cards that identified
them as mutes to avoid talking in foreign accents to checkpoint guards, Iraqi Deputy Interior Minister
Ahmed Abu Raghef told The Associated Press. He said $70,000 cash was seized from a western
Baghdad home where their cell's leaders were operating.
A Tunisian who was also pretending to be mute was arrested on terror charges in August in eastern
Diyala province, according to an Iraqi security official who spoke on condition of anonymity because
he was not authorized to talk to the media.
A Moroccan fighter was captured and two non-Iraqi insurgents were killed in a raid last Thursday in the
northern city of Mosul, said Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Mohammed al-Askari.
Four Jordanian fighters were killed by U.S. troops in Iraq, according to a November claim by the
Islamic State of Iraq, a front group for al-Qaida.
A Nov. 2 string of rapid-fire blasts in Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad killed 91. Iraqi counterter-
rorism commander Maj. Gen. Fadhel al-Barwari said it must have been carried out with foreign fi-
nancing to buy the explosives needed "to launch an attack with a big number of casualties."
U.S. officials and experts voiced doubt that the foreign aid is as high as Iraqi and Mideast authorities
believe.
A senior U.S. military official who spoke on condition of anonymity to talk candidly about the sensitive
issue estimated about 10 foreign fighters enter Iraq each month. Michael Knights, a Lafter Fellow at
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy predicted there are only "small cells of experienced
foreign fighters in ISI." But an analysis by private global intelligence firm Stratfor concluded that foreign
help in the church siege signals al-Qaida "may have found a new source for militants, and they may
have more resources to carry out fresh attacks."
MOSSAD: WAS THIS THE CHIEF'S LAST HIT?

A personal insight into Mossad and the murder of a top Iranian nuclear scientist
► www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/8182126/Mossad-was-this-the-chiefs-last-hit.html
► Sunday Telegraph / by Gordon Thomas
► Stringer: Martin Rudner [ret.] / Carleton University / Ottawa / www.carleton.ca/cciss
Dec 5 2010 ► Dec 5. Inside a secret bomb-proof building in a Tel Aviv suburb, which Google Earth
does not include on its website, some of the occupants last week exchanged high-fives at their work
stations. According to insiders, several sent each other the same message: The Chief‘s Last Hit.
That ―chief‖ was Meir Dagan, the outgoing head of Mossad. On his first day in office eight years ago,
Mr Dagan had stood on a table in the organisation‘s canteen and promised to support any operation
against any of Israel‘s enemies, with every means he had — legal or illegal.
He could allow his field agents to use prescribed nerve toxins, dumdum bullets and methods of killing
that even the Russian or Chinese secret services would not use.
―We are like the hangman, or the doctor on Death Row who administers the lethal injection,‖ he said,
as – by his own account – his agents listened, enthralled.
―Our actions are all endorsed by the state of Israel. When we kill we are not breaking the law. We are
fulfilling a sentence sanctioned by the prime minister of the day.‖
Earlier this month, ―the chief‖ and a small team of specialists — analysts, weapons experts and
psychologists – met in a conference room adjoining his office. With them was a brigadier-general, the
head of the kidon. Named after the Hebrew word for bayonet, the kidon is a unit with 38 elite
assassins at its disposal, including five women.
Operating out of a military base in the Negev Desert, all are in their twenties, and trained both as
expert killers and as expert linguists: a number are fluent in Persian.
Last Monday, a thousand miles further east in the Iranian capital, Tehran, it appears that the kidon put
both of those skills into practice, killing a top nuclear scientist and critically injuring a second as they
drove through the rush-hour traffic.
Both were key figures in the Iranian nuclear programme, which Tehran insists is for civilian use only,
but which Mossad has long perceived as the ultimate expression of President Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad‘s threat to ―wipe Israel off the map‖.
In one car was 45-year-old Majid Shahriyari, Iran‘s leading expert in designing nuclear switches, a key
part in the construction of nuclear weapons. Ali Alker Saler, an Iranian nuclear official, has described
Shahriyari‘s work as ―only handling the big projects‖.
The week before he was assassinated, the nuclear scientist had returned from North Korea.
Intelligence sources in Seoul have suggested that Mr Shahriyari had gone to Pyongyang to discuss a
co-production deal over nuclear centrifuges.
Claims have also emerged that on his flight home via Syria, a Mossad deep cover agent had spotted
Mr Shahriyari at Damascus International Airport as he waited for a connecting flight to Tehran.
In another quarter of Tehran, another top nuclear scientist, Fareydoun Abbasi-Davani, was also on his
way to work at his laboratory at Shahid Beheshti University.
A world expert on isotope separation, he was routinely driven around by a member of the
Revolutionary Guards and, like Mr Shahriyari, had a phone link on his car to Tehran‘s security
headquarters. That, however, was the only protection the car had.
To assist in the attack, Persian-speaking Mossad deep cover agents have been steadily infiltrating
Iran for years. How exactly they helped the hitmen flit in and out of the country remains a secret.
But clues to their methods have been provided by Hossein Sajedina, Tehran‘s police chief. He
confirmed last week how Shahriyari was killed and Abbasi-Davani seriously injured. ―Two
motorcyclists had approached their cars and attached bombs on the vehicle which exploded at once,‖
he said.
There have been unconfirmed reports that the bombs had suction pads fitted to them which had
enabled them to be attached to the windscreen of each car.
Within hours Mr Sajedina had accused Mossad of the crimes. In Tel Aviv a government spokesman
said Israel had not been involved.
When the news reached Mossad headquarters, the high-fives started, I am told. Yet the day the attack
was carried out had also been chosen by ―the chief‖ to formally announce his resignation.
For despite enjoying the admiration and loyalty of his agents, Mr Dagan‘s leadership of Mossad had
been as controversial as it had been effective.
From that same Tel Aviv office last February, he had sent a hit squad into Dubai carrying fake British
passports to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a top Hamas commander.
The mission had succeeded. But the use of the faked passports had led to a diplomatic row with
Britain, culminating in Mossad‘s station chief in London being expelled.
Then, in May, Mossad intelligence officers based in Turkey failed to warn that a ―peace flotilla‖ bound
for Gaza with goods and medicines, was not carrying arms. Israel‘s Flotilla-13 of sea-borne
commandos attacked the ships, killing nine activists.
Mr Dagan offered to resign back then, but was told by Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, to
remain in post and help to devise a plan to stop Iran‘s efforts to create a nuclear bomb.
In Geneva tomorrow, Baroness Ashton, the EU‘s top diplomat, and members of the UN Security
Council will meet Iranian officials in an attempt to kick-start nuclear talks after a halt of more than a
year.
Yet while the talks themselves are hailed a sign of progress, many believe Tehran is playing for extra
time. It has continued its proscribed uranium enrichment programme regardless, and the suspicion is
that Iranian hardliners believe they are now so close to having nuclear weapons that the threat of
increased international sanctions can simply be ridden out.
During the weeks that Mr Dagan was hatching the Tehran operation, Tamir Pardo, his deputy, was
told by Mr Netanyahu that he had been chosen to take over.
Last weekend, with the Tehran operation set at ―go‖, Mr Pardo had been in the office with Mr Dagan,
where a photograph on the wall reflected his outgoing boss‘s style over the past eight years.
It showed an SS officer aiming his rifle at an old man‘s head. Mr Dagan had once explained what the
picture meant to him.
―The old Jew was my grandfather,‖ he said. ―He represents my own philosophy of Jewish self-defence
and survival. We should be strong, use our brains and defend ourselves so that the Holocaust never
happens again.‖
A Mossad source said last week that Mr Pardo had cited the moment captured in that photograph as
sufficient justification for continuing to use all means possible to defend Israel against Iran.
Mr Pardo is now 57 and a grandfather, having played a part in the 1976 operation to rescue Jewish
hostages on the hijacked Air France plane in Entebbe, Uganda.
Last week, as he contemplated taking over the top job in protecting Israel from its most serious threat,
Mr Pardo remarked: ―I have big shoes to fill and a lot of work to do.‖

VAST HACKING BY A CHINA THAT FEARS THE WEB
► www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/world/asia/05wikileaks-china.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print
► NY Times / by James Glanz and John Markoff
Dec 5 2010 ► Dec 4. As China ratcheted up the pressure on Google to censor its Internet searches
last year, the American Embassy sent a secret cable to Washington detailing one reason top Chinese
leaders had become so obsessed with the Internet search company: they were Googling themselves.
The May 18, 2009, cable, titled Google China Paying Price for Resisting Censorship, quoted a well-
placed source as saying that Li Changchun, a member of China‘s top ruling body, the Politburo
Standing Committee, and the country‘s senior propaganda official, was taken aback to discover that
he could conduct Chinese-language searches on Google‘s main international Web site. When Mr. Li
typed his name into the search engine at google.com, he found results critical of him.
That cable from American diplomats was one of many made public by WikiLeaks that portray China‘s
leadership as nearly obsessed with the threat posed by the Internet to their grip on power and, the
reverse, by the opportunities it offered them, through hacking, to obtain secrets stored in computers of
its rivals, especially the United States.
Extensive hacking operations suspected of originating in China, including one leveled at Google, are a
central theme in the cables. The operations began earlier and were aimed at a wider array of
American government and military data than generally known, including on the computers of United
States diplomats involved in climate change talks with China.
One cable, dated early this year, quoted a Chinese person with family connections to the elite as
saying that Mr. Li himself directed an attack on Google‘s servers in the United States, though that
claim has been called into question. In an interview with The New York Times, the person cited in the
cable said that Mr. Li personally oversaw a campaign against Google‘s operations in China but the
person did not know who directed the hacking attack.
The cables catalog the heavy pressure that was placed on Google to comply with local censorship
laws, as well as Google‘s willingness to comply up to a point. That coercion began building years
before the company finally decided to pull its search engine out of China last spring in the wake of the
successful hacking attack on its home servers, which yielded Chinese dissidents e-mail accounts as
well as Google‘s proprietary source code.
The demands on Google went well beyond removing material on subjects like the Dalai Lama or the
1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Chinese officials also put pressure on the United States
government to censor the Google Earth satellite imaging service by lowering the resolution of images
of Chinese government facilities, warning that Washington could be held responsible if terrorists used
that information to attack government or military facilities, the cables show. An American diplomat
replied that Google was a private company and that he would report the request to Washington but
that he had no sense about how the government would act.
Yet despite the hints of paranoia that appear in some cables, there are also clear signs that Chinese
leaders do not consider the Internet an unstoppable force for openness and democracy, as some
Americans believe.
In fact, this spring, around the time of the Google pullout, China‘s State Council Information Office
delivered a triumphant report to the leadership on its work to regulate traffic online, according to a
crucial Chinese contact cited by the State Department in a cable in early 2010, when contacted
directly by The Times.
The message delivered by the office, the person said, was that in the past, a lot of officials worried that
the Web could not be controlled.
But through the Google incident and other increased controls and surveillance, like real-name
registration, they reached a conclusion: the Web is fundamentally controllable, the person said.
That confidence may also reflect what the cables show are repeated and often successful hacking
attacks from China on the United States government, private enterprises and Western allies that
began by 2002, several years before such intrusions were widely reported in the United States.
At least one previously unreported attack in 2008, code-named Byzantine Candor by American
investigators, yielded more than 50 megabytes of e-mails and a complete list of user names and
passwords from an American government agency, a Nov. 3, 2008, cable revealed for the first time.
Precisely how these hacking attacks are coordinated is not clear. Many appear to rely on Chinese
freelancers and an irregular army of patriotic hackers who operate with the support of civilian or
military authorities, but not directly under their day-to-day control, the cables and interviews suggest.
But the cables also appear to contain some suppositions by Chinese and Americans passed along by
diplomats. For example, the cable dated earlier this year referring to the hacking attack on Google
said: A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government coordinated the recent intrusions of

Google systems. According to our contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo
Standing Committee level.
The cable goes on to quote this person as saying that the hacking of Google had been coordinated
out of the State Council Information Office with the oversight of Mr. Li and another Politburo member,
Zhou Yongkang. Mr. Zhou is China‘s top security official.
But the person cited in the cable gave a divergent account. He detailed a campaign to press Google
coordinated by the Propaganda Department‘s director, Liu Yunshan. Mr. Li and Mr. Zhou issued
approvals in several instances, he said, but he had no direct knowledge linking them to the hacking
attack aimed at securing commercial secrets or dissidents e-mail accounts considered the purview of
security officials.
Still, the cables provide a patchwork of detail about cyberattacks that American officials believe
originated in China with either the assistance or knowledge of the Chinese military.
For example, in 2008 Chinese intruders based in Shanghai and linked to the People‘s Liberation Army
used a computer document labeled salary increase survey and forecast as bait as part of the sophis-
ticated intrusion scheme that yielded more than 50 megabytes of e-mails and a complete list of user
names and passwords from a United States government agency that was not identified.
The cables indicate that the American government has been fighting a pitched battle with intruders
who have been clearly identified as using Chinese-language keyboards and physically located in
China. In most cases the intruders took great pains to conceal their identities, but occasionally they let
their guard down. In one case described in the documents, investigators tracked one of the intruders
who was surfing the Web in Taiwan for personal use.
In June 2009 during climate change talks between the United States and China, the secretary of
state‘s office sent a secret cable warning about e-mail spear phishing attacks directed at five State
Department employees in the Division of Ocean Affairs of the Office of the Special Envoy for Climate
Change.
The messages, which purport to come from a National Journal columnist, had the subject line China
and Climate Change. The e-mail contained a PDF file that was intended to install a malicious software
program known as Poison Ivy, which was meant to give an intruder complete control of the victim‘s
computer. That attack failed.
The cables also reveal that a surveillance system dubbed Ghostnet that stole information from the
computers used by the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and South Asian governments
and was uncovered in 2009 was linked to a second broad series of break-ins into American govern-
ment computers code-named Byzantine Hades. Government investigators were able to make a
tenuous connection between those break-ins and the People‘s Liberation Army.
The documents also reveal that in 2008 German intelligence briefed American officials on similar
attacks beginning in 2006 against the German government, including military, economic, science and
technology, commercial, diplomatic, and research and development targets. The Germans described
the attacks as preceding events like the German government?s meetings with the Chinese
government.
Even as such attacks were occurring, Google made a corporate decision in 2006, controversial even
within the company, to establish a domestic Chinese version of its search engine, called google.cn. In
doing so, it agreed to comply with China‘s censorship laws.
But despite that concession, Chinese officials were never comfortable with Google, the cables and
interviews show.
The Chinese claimed that Google Earth, the company‘s satellite mapping software, offered detailed
images of China‘s military, nuclear, space, energy and other sensitive government agency installa-
tions that would be an asset to terrorists. A cable sent on Nov. 7, 2006, reported that Liu Jieyi, an
assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned the American Embassy in Beijing that there would be
grave consequences if terrorists exploited the imagery.
A year later, another cable pointed out that Google searches for politically delicate terms would
sometimes be automatically redirected to Baidu, the Chinese company that was Google‘s main
competitor in China. Baidu is known for scrubbing its own search engine of results that might be
unwelcome to government censors.
Google conducted numerous negotiations with officials in the State Council Information Office and
other departments involved in censorship, propaganda and media licensing, the cables show. The
May 18, 2009, cable that revealed pressure on the company by Mr. Li, the propaganda chief, said
Google had taken some measures to try and placate the government. The cable also noted that
Google had asked the American government to intervene with China on its behalf.
But Chinese officials became alarmed that Google still did less than its Chinese rivals to remove mate-
rial Chinese officials considered offensive. Such material included information about Chinese dissi-

dents and human rights issues, but also about central and provincial Chinese leaders and their chil-
dren considered an especially taboo topic, interviews with people quoted in the cables reveal.
Mr. Li, after apparently searching for information online on himself and his children, was reported to
have stepped up pressure on Google. He also took steps to punish Google commercially, according to
the May 18 cable.
The propaganda chief ordered three big state-owned Chinese telecommunications companies to stop
doing business with Google. Mr. Li also demanded that Google executives remove any link between
its sanitized Chinese Web site and its main international one, which he deemed an illegal site, the
cable said.
Google ultimately stopped complying with repeated censorship requests. It stopped offering a
censored version of its search engine in China earlier this year, citing both the hacking attacks and its
unwillingness to continue obeying censorship orders.
RUSSIAN MOLE INSIDE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

► www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/1/inside-the-ring-843880610/?s=al&promo_code=B3D1-1
► The Washington Times / by Bill Gertz
Dec 4 2010 ► Dec 1. The National Security Agency (NSA) is conducting a counterintelligence probe
at its Fort Meade, Md., headquarters in a top-secret hunt for a Russian agent, according to a former
intelligence official close to the agency.
The former official said the probe grew out of the case of 10 Russian "illegals," or deep-cover spies,
who were uncovered last summer and sent back to Moscow after the defection of Col. Alexander
Poteyev, a former SVR foreign intelligence officer who reportedly fled to the U.S. shortly before
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited here in June.
Col. Poteyev is believed to be the source who disclosed the U.S.-based agent network.
NSA counterintelligence officials suspect that members of the illegals network were used by Russia's
SVR spy agency to communicate with one or more agents inside the agency, which conducts
electronic intelligence gathering and code-breaking.
One sign that the probe is fairly advanced is that FBI counterintelligence agents are involved in the
search.
"They are looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA is convinced reside at Fort Meade and
possibly other DoD intel offices, like DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]," the former official said. "NSA
is convinced that at least one is at NSA."
Some of the 10 illegals who were posing as U.S. citizens helped service Russian agents working
inside the U.S. intelligence community, the former official said.
No other details of the investigation could be learned.
NSA spokeswoman Vanee Vines said in e-mail: "I don't have any information to provide regarding
your query."
An FBI spokesman had no immediate comment.
NSA has been the victim of several damaging spy cases dating back to the 1960s, when two officials
defected to the Soviet Union.
In 1985, NSA analyst Ronald Pelton was caught spying for Moscow. He had provided the Soviets with
extremely damaging secrets, including details of an underwater electronic eavesdropping program on
Russian military cables called "Operation Ivy Bells."
China in Kyrgyzstan
A confidential State Department cable made public this week highlights China's role in the U.S.-led
war on terrorism.
The U.S. ambassador in far-off Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, confronted China's ambassador about a covert
attempt by Beijing to bribe the government there to shut down the strategic U.S. military transit base at
Manas in exchange for $3 billion in cash.
The Feb. 13, 2009, cable signed by Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller revealed that Chinese
Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Zhang Yannian "did not deny categorically" the covert cash offer to close
the base, which is a major transit and refueling point for U.S. troops and supplies heading into
northern Afghanistan.
"After opening pleasantries, the ambassador mentioned that Kyrgyz officials had told her that China
had offered a $3 billion financial package to close Manas Air Base and asked for the ambassador's
reaction to such an allegation," the cable stated.

"Visibly flustered, Zhang temporarily lost the ability to speak Russian and began spluttering in Chinese
to the silent aide diligently taking notes right behind him. Once he had recovered the power of Russian
speech, he inveighed against such a calumny, claiming that such an idea was impossible, China was
a staunch opponent of terrorism, and China's attitude toward Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas
was one of 'respect and understanding.'
The cable highlights what observers say has been China's behind-the-scenes, anti-U.S. strategy of
seeking to undermine U.S. global counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. Zhang insisted that China's interest in Kyrgyzstan, which shares a border with China's restive
Xinjiang province, is purely commercial. He then said China rejected calls by "some Kyrgyz" for China
to set up a military base there to counterbalance Russian and U.S. influence.
"We want no military or political advantage. Therefore, we wouldn't pay $3 billion for Manas," Mr.
Zhang was quoted as saying.
Chinese intelligence personnel, however, are another story, according to U.S. officials who have said
Beijing's intelligence presence is very large in the country.
Mr. Zhang advised the U.S. ambassador on how to keep the base. "Just give them $150 million in
cash [per year, and] you will have the base," he said.
The Chinese official also said several times during the meeting that a "revolution in China" is possible
if the economy failed to improve and millions remain unemployed.
"In our experience, talk of revolution at home is taboo for Chinese," the cable said.
However, observers have noted that Chinese diplomats used similar language in meetings with U.S.
officials as scare tactics, warning of a coming Chinese collapse as a way to stave off political pressure
for democratic change.
Braced for attack
Amid high tensions, U.S. and allied militaries are braced for another North Korean attack - more
artillery shelling, missile test launches or possibly another underground nuclear blast.
The next incident is expected in coming days after U.S.-South Korean joint naval exercises in the
Yellow Sea that ended on Wednesday, said intelligence sources familiar with the region.
North Korean military forces remain on heightened alert, as do South Korean forces, and the sources
said the South Korean military is set to counter any further artillery strikes.
One possible target being watched closely is the northernmost of South Korea's five northwest islands,
called Baengnyeong Island, a major intelligence base that has been a safe harbor for North Korean
defectors fleeing the communist state in the past.
South Korea's military is prepared to carry out aggressive counterattacks against any new strikes.
Intelligence analysis of the Nov. 23 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, which killed four people and
wounded 17, indicates that the surprise bombardment is connected to the ongoing leadership
succession of Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-un, as well as to the recent disclosure by the North
Koreans of a covert uranium-enrichment program.
Kim Jong-un was recently promoted and has aligned himself with North Korean generals involved in
artillery forces, according to the intelligence sources. Reports from North Korea indicated that both
Kims visited the 4th Corps, whose unit carried out an artillery barrage before the Yeonpyeong attack.
Gay training
The Pentagon working group on open gays in the military sets out an ambitious training program to
ensure that troops treat their colleagues, gay or straight, with dignity.
The group, led by Army Gen. Carter Ham and Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson, appears to
shy away from what some might call "sensitively training."
The report's implementation plan states that "service members are not expected to change their
personal religious or moral beliefs; however, they are expected to treat all others with dignity and
respect, consistent with the core values that already exist within each service."
But objections to homosexuality are not grounds to request a transfer, reports special correspondent
Rowan Scarborough.
Says the report: Service "members do not have the right to refuse duty or duty assignments based on
a moral objection to another's sexual orientation. Service members remain obligated to follow orders
that involve interaction with others who are gay or lesbian, even if an unwillingness to do so is based
on strong, sincerely held, moral or religious beliefs."
And it states that "harassment or abuse based on sexual orientation is unacceptable. All service
members are to treat one another with dignity and respect regardless of sexual orientation."
Gay survey
While the Pentagon working group concluded the negative impact on the force would be "low" if gays
serve openly, its survey results present a different story.

Republicans likely will cite some of these numbers in arguing in the Senate, where a vote on repeal is
pending, that now is not the time to end the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, as two wars are being fought.
The most striking number is that nearly 60 percent of combat soldiers and Marines believe open gays
will hurt unit readiness.
There are other similar findings, reports special correspondent Mr. Scarborough.
Of respondents who said they served under a leader they believed to be gay, 46 percent said it had a
"mostly negative" effect on the unit's performance. Only 8 percent termed it "mostly positive."
Of all troops asked how repeal will affect their future, 23 percent said they will either leave the military
sooner than planned or think about leaving. For Marines, the percentage was nearly 40 percent.
If the figures are accurate, repeal would result in a surge of troop departures and leave the military
scrambling to fill the ranks.
A quarter of those surveyed also said they would shower at a different time if someone they believed
to be gay were using the facility.
Gay-rights advocates cite the survey's most publicized result: Seventy percent of all troops - support
and combat - say repeal will have a positive, mixed or no effect on the force.
NORWEGIAN FIRM WINS NATO INTEL CONTRACT

► http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5157002&c=EUR
► Defense News / by Tim Mahon
Dec 4 2010 ► Dec 3. Norwegian software engineering and systems integration company Teleplan
Globe has won a contract valued at about 2 million euros ($2.65 million) for the supply of a new
intelligence requirement and collection management system for the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
Acquisition is being handled by NATO's C3 Agency (NC3A) in The Hague, Netherlands, and the
system is due to be fielded in the first half of 2011.
ISAF's operational requirement covers computer-based tools supporting the entire intelligence cycle,
including planning, collection, analysis and distribution. With local commanders having access to
information from an increasingly wide range of intelligence sources, including manned and unmanned
aircraft, satellite imagery and ground sensors, efficient use of intelligence becomes vital.
Teleplan Globe, based at Lysaker, near Oslo, has developed similar tools and systems for the Norwe-
gian armed forces, according to the company's director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissan-
ce (ISR), John Vestengen.
"We have invested heavily in building a strong company competence within the intelligence domain,
including a continuous participation in the NATO MAJIIC program from the very beginning," he added.
MAJIIC, or Multisensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition, is a nine-nation effort,
coordinated by NC3A, to maximize use of ISR assets. The idea is to develop and evaluate the
technical and operational means for interoperability of a wide range of such national assets.
The system to be fielded by Teleplan Globe is one of several components of NATO's latest strategy
for Joint ISR, according to NC3A.
WIKILEAKS WAR ROOM - REVISITED

WikiLeaks site poised to release documents
► Associated Press / by Pauline Jelinek and Raphael G. Satter
► http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/10/ap-wikileaks-expected-to-post-more-documents-102110/
► Army Times
► Comment by Roger Vleugels: In this 2 month old article information on the Information Review
Task Force first presented to you in Fringe Intelligence No 218. I used there this official name
and the alias used in the intelligence community: the WikiLeaks War Room. In that article
less on the review task and some information on the counterinsurgency task of that WikiLeaks
War Room.
Dec 3 2010 ► Oct 22. The WikiLeaks website is poised to release what the Pentagon fears is the
largest cache of secret U.S. documents in history — hundreds of thousands of intelligence reports that
could amount to a classified history of the war in Iraq.

U.S. officials condemned the move and said Friday they were racing to contain the damage from the
imminent release, while NATO's top official told reporters he feared that lives could be put at risk by
the mammoth disclosure.
NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said any release would create "a very unfortunate situation."
"I can't comment on the details of the exact impact on security, but in general I can tell you that such
leaks ... may have a very negative security impact for people involved," he told reporters Friday in
Berlin following a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In a posting to Twitter, the secret-spilling website said there would be a "major WikiLeaks
announcement in Europe" at 9 a.m. Saturday. The group has revealed almost nothing publicly about
the nature of the announcement.
U.S. Defense Department spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan echoed Rasmussen's stance,
urging WikiLeaks to return the stolen material.
"We deplore WikiLeaks for inducing individuals to break the law, leak classified documents and then
cavalierly share that secret information with the world, including our enemies," Lapan said. "By
disclosing such sensitive information, WikiLeaks continues to put at risk the lives of our troops, their
coalition partners and those Iraqis and Afghans working with us."
Meanwhile, a team of more than a hundred analysts from across the U.S. military, led by the Defense
Intelligence Agency, has been combing through the Iraq documents they think will be released in
anticipation of the leak.
Called the Information Review Task Force, its analysts have pored over the documents and used word
searches to try to pull out names and other issues that would be particularly sensitive, officials have
said.
The task force has informed U.S. Central Command of some of the names of Iraqis and allies and
other information they believe might be released that could present a danger, officials have said. They
noted that — unlike the WikiLeaks previous disclosure of some 77,000 documents from Afghanistan
— in this case they had advance notice that names may be exposed.
Once officials see what is publicly released, the command "can quickly push the information down" to
forces in Iraq, Lapan said Friday in Washington. "CENTOM can jump into action and take whatever
mitigating steps" might be needed, he said.
Throughout the conflict, the U.S. and its allies have relied heavily on Iraqis as translators and support
workers, who were frequently targeted by insurgents. The Iraqis often hid their identities to avoid
revealing their links to the Western forces and many emigrated to other nations to flee the threat of
violence.
While the latest WikiLeaks revelations may not change public perceptions of the Iraq war — it has
been extremely unpopular in Europe and divides opinion in the United States — they could provide
new insight about a conflict that seemed headed for success after the invasion in 2003 before
descending into a yearslong, blood-soaked struggle.
The documents could shed light on the root causes of the insurgency, for instance, or the growth of
sectarian violence that blighted Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. It may also give a behind-the-scenes
glimpse at some of the major episodes of the war — like the manhunt for insurgent chief Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, or the killing of U.S. security contractors on March 31, 2004, by a mob in Fallujah, an
incident that led to the U.S. assault on the Iraqi city.
The release of the documents would come at a pivotal time for the U.S. in Iraq as the military prepares
to withdraw all 50,000 remaining troops from the country by the end of next year, raising questions
about the future of relations between the two countries. The U.S. military had as many as 170,000
troops in Iraq in 2007.
Violence has declined sharply over the past two years, but near-daily bombings and shootings
continue, casting doubt on the ability of Iraqi forces to protect the people.
The situation has been exacerbated by growing frustration among the public over the failure of Iraqi
politicians to unite and form a new government more than seven months after inconclusive
parliamentary elections.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is struggling to remain in power since his Shiite alliance narrowly lost the
March 7 vote to a Sunni-backed bloc led by rival Ayad Allawi.
Wikileaks' previous release in July of secret war documents from Iraq and Afghanistan outraged the
Pentagon, which accused the group of being irresponsible. Fogh Rasmussen said Friday that leaks of
this nature "may put soldiers as well as civilians at risk."
It appears that those fears — which the military has invoked in its appeal to WikiLeaks and the media
not to publish the documents — have yet to materialize. A Pentagon letter obtained by The Associated
Press reported that no U.S. intelligence sources or practices were compromised by the Afghan war
logs' disclosure.

Still, the military feels any classified documents release can harm national security and raise fears for
people who might consider cooperating with the U.S. in the future, Lapan said.
Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq in 2007-08, said the disclosures would be more worrisome if
the U.S. were still fully engaged in combat in Iraq — but he still sees it as a major problem.
"I'd really be worried if — as looks to be the case — you have Iraqi political figures named in a context
or a connection that can make them politically and physically vulnerable to their adversaries," he told a
conference Friday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
"That has an utterly chilling effect on the willingness of political figures to talk to us — not just in Iraq
but anywhere in the world," he said.
JTF2: CANADIAN SECRET UNIT

More oversight needed for secret military unit: MPs
► http://www.thestar.com/printarticle/900329
► Toronto Star / by Joanna Smith
Doc 3 2010 ► Dec 2. There should be a better way to get to the bottom of allegations involving a
shadowy elite Canadian military unit than allowing the force to investigate itself, opposition critics say.
―An elementary principle of natural justice is you can‘t be the judge in your own case,‖ Liberal MP and
defence critic Dominic LeBlanc said Thursday.
LeBlanc was responding to a report by CBC-Radio Canada that revealed the actions of secret
commandos known as Joint Task Force 2 are being probed behind closed doors in Ottawa.
The investigation, known as Sand Trap 2, is examining allegations that JTF2 members witnessed an
American soldier killing an unarmed man during a joint mission, CBC reported.
That follows an earlier investigation, called Sand Trap, into allegations that a member of JTF2 shot
and skilled an Afghan who was surrendering four years ago. That investigation ended without any
charges being laid.
CBC reported the Canadian military is also probing how the chain of command reacted and responded
to the allegations.
Maj. Doug MacNair, a spokesman for the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command that
includes JTF2, said he could not comment on the ongoing investigation but said they are cooperating
fully.
The commander of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service, which is conducting the probe
alongside a Board of Inquiry, said there is already enough oversight.
―I am independent. There is no interference,‖ Lt.-Col. Gilles Sansterre said Thursday, adding that the
Military Police Complaints Commission provides a further level of accountability. ―We have enough
oversight.‖
Sansterre said he could not comment on an ongoing investigation, but noted information will be made
public if charges are laid.
Defence Minister Peter MacKay said he is ―concerned whenever allegations are made‖ but also
dismissed the suggestion there is not enough oversight, adding that even civilians hold the process to
account through Parliament.
―There is also civilian oversight directly, through the chain of command, to me, to Parliament, to
parliamentary committees, and that process has worked quite well,‖ MacKay told reporters outside the
Commons Thursday.
Defence critics suggested civilian oversight could be more effective by setting up something along the
lines of what is done in the United States, where the Department of Defence is accountable to a
civilian Inspector General and a senate committee whose members have clearance to examine these
sensitive matters.
―There‘s no transparency here,‖ said NDP defence critic Jack Harris.
―(MPs) should look at what is going on,‖ said Bloc Québécois defence critic Claude Bachand. ―They
should have briefings regularly and they should have input, which is not the case now.‖
SYRIAN SPY CHIEFS DEPLOYED TO FOREIGN CAPITALS

► http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/12/syrian_spy_chiefs_deployed_to.html?referrer=emaillink
► The Washington Post / by Jeff Stein

Dec 3 2010 ► Dec 2. Syrian intelligence chiefs made discreet visits to London, Rome, Paris, Beijing
and possibly Pyongyang in recent days, according to a new report, a development all the more intri-
guing in light of WikiLeaks' disclosures this week that President Bashar Assad might be willing to
distance himself from Hamas.
The reasons for dispatching his senior intelligence officials abroad are not clear, but according to the
Paris-based Intelligence Online newsletter, ―Syrian intelligence services have been engaged in
intensive diplomatic activity of late.‖
Gen. Ali Mamlouk, an Assad intimate and head of Syria‘s General Intelligence service, made an
unannounced trip to London from Nov. 16 through 20, said the subscription-only newsletter. At his
side was Gen. Tha‘er al-Omar, described as head of the service‘s antiterrorism component, and Gen.
Hafez Makhlouf, the head if its internal branch, ―who was traveling outside Syria for the first time.‖
U.K. officials ―shrouded the visit in absolute secrecy,‖ IO reported, citing sources in Damascus.
Mamlouk went on to Paris on Nov. 22 to lay the groundwork for an upcoming visit by Assad.
In London, presumably, the Syrians met with their U.K. counterparts who, like the CIA, have found
common ground with Damascus in combating al-Qaeda and its allies.
Mamlouk was said to have also met with lawyers from Matrix Chambers, who have been defending
the regime during the U.N. inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic
Hariri. A final report in the long-running probe is considered imminent.
Assad described Hamas as an "uninvited guest" in a 2009 meeting with a U.S. congressional
delegation, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, and likened its presence in
Syria to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which his father crushed in the 1980s. Assad hinted that he
might be willing to break with Hamas in exchange for ―incentives,‖ such as being allowed to buy U.S.
commercial aircraft and parts.
Mamlouk was in Rome on Oct. 19 signing an anti-terrorism agreement, IO also reported, accompanied
by his top foreign intelligence official, Zouheir Hamad, and his Brussels station chief, Fou‘ad Fadel.
Just as Mamlouk was leaving London, meanwhile, another General Intelligence official, Gen. Bassam
Merhej, described as ―director of Assad‘s security and military bureau,‖ was arriving in China.
―His real destination was probably Pyongyang, with whom Syria has a nuclear co-operation program,‖
IO reported. A heavy water reactor obtained from North Korea was destroyed in September 2007.
A former deputy general director of air force intelligence, Mamlouk was appointed head of the General
Intelligence service by Assad in June 2005 and is in frequent contact with his Gulf States counterparts,
according to reports.
GOVT REPORTS VIOLATIONS OF LIMITS ON SPYING AIMED AT US CITIZENS

► www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/02/AR2010120206052.html?wpisrc=nl_headline
► Washington Post / by Spencer S. Hsu
Dec 3 2010 ► Dec 3. The federal government has repeatedly violated legal limits governing the
surveillance of U.S. citizens, according to previously secret internal documents obtained through a
court battle by the American Civil Liberties Union.
In releasing 900 pages of documents, U.S. government agencies refused to say how many Americans'
telephone, e-mail or other communications have been intercepted under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act - or FISA - Amendments Act of 2008, or to discuss any specific abuses, the ACLU
said. Most of the documents were heavily redacted.
However, semiannual internal oversight reports by the offices of the attorney general and director of
national intelligence identify ongoing breaches of legal requirements that limit when Americans are
targeted and minimize the amount of data collected.
The documents note that although oversight teams did not find evidence of "intentional or willful
attempts to violate or circumvent the law . . . certain types of compliance incidents continue to occur,"
as a March 2009 report stated.
The unredacted portions of the reports refer only elliptically to what those actions were, but the March
2009 report stated that "information collected as a result of these incidents has been or is being
purged from data repositories."
All three reports released so far note that the number of violations "remains small, particularly when
compared with the total amount of activity." However, as some variously put it, "each [incident] -
individually or collectively - may be indicative of patterns, trends, or underlying causes, that might have
broader implications." and underscore "the need for continued focus on measures to address
underlying causes." The most recent report was issued in May.

In a statement Thursday, the ACLU said that violations of the FISA Amendments Act's "targeting and
minimization procedures . . . likely means that citizens and residents' communications were either
being improperly collected or 'targeted' or improperly retained and disseminated." The ACLU has
posted the documents on its Web site.
A spokesmen for Director of National Intelligence James Clapper did not immediately comment on the
ACLU statement.
In an e-mailed statement late Thursday, a spokesman for Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., Dean
Boyd, said the new law "put in place unprecedented oversight measures, reporting requirements and
safeguards to protect privacy and civil liberties," and that the reports cited by the ACLU were the
product of "rigorous oversight" by the Justice Department and intelligence community. "In short,
foreign intelligence surveillance is today carefully regulated by a combination of legislative, judicial,
and executive-branch checks and balances designed to ensure strong and scrupulous protection of
both national security and civil liberties," Boyd's e-mail said.
Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project, said, "It is imperative that
there be more public disclosure about the FAA [FISA Amendments Act] violations described in these
documents . . . as Congress begins to debate whether the FAA should expire or be amended in
advance of its 2012 sunset."
Congress passed FISA in 1978 to prevent Americans' communications from being tapped without a
warrant. Lawmakers amended the law in 2008 to broaden and clarify legal authorities after the Sept.
11, 2001, terrorist attacks and advances in Internet communications prompted fresh concerns over
expanded surveillance powers.
The ACLU, human rights activists and other parties sued, charging that the new law violates the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. A U.S. district judge tossed out the case,
which remains on appeal, and the ACLU has pursued a related Freedom of Information Act request.
THE MIDDLE EAST FALLOUT COULD BE GRAVE

The disclosure of Arab views on Iran's nuclear plans has made a military strike more likely
► http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/02/wikileaks-arab-iran-nuclear
► The Guardian / by Alan Dershowitz
Dec 3 2010 ► Dec 2. Former US secretary of state Henry Stimson famously declared that "gentlemen
do not read each other's mail", referring to Japanese diplomatic cables the US had uncovered by
breaking Japan's military code. Today, everybody reads everybody else's diplomatic mail, if they can
get their hands on it.
Mostly, this is a bad thing because secrecy - when properly used - can serve the interest of peace and
security. Nations have the right to keep secrets from other nations, although they generally overdo it.
But individuals do not have the right to decide for themselves when to reveal state secrets. The soldier
who broke into governmental computers committed a serious crime and will be punished for it. The
question is whether those who released the secrets to the press, namely WikiLeaks, are complicit in
the crime.
The newspapers that published leaked material make a compelling case for the decision to select
certain items for publication while withholding others. The press is, after all, part of our informal system
of checks and balances.
But secretary of state Hillary Clinton is surely correct when she warns that WikiLeaks poses a danger
not only to the US but to international diplomacy, while at the same time trying to minimize the actual
harm done by these particular disclosures.
The disclosure that virtually every Arab country, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would favour a
military attack, as a last resort, to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons could have a
discernible effect on the policies of several countries. Israel, of course, has long insisted that the
military option be kept on the table. The disclosure that North Korea has delivered missiles to Iran may
well frighten European countries into considering the option of military action, if sanctions don't work.
There is additional information, not revealed by WikiLeaks, suggesting that although sanctions are
having some effect on Iran's economy, Tehran has decided to move forward with its nuclear weapons
programme. Computer bugs and the assassination of nuclear scientists may be slowing the process,
but are not likely to stop it.
The leaks confirm the US has made two disastrous decisions in dealing with Iran. The first came in
2007, when it released a misleading National Intelligence Estimate conveying the impression Iran had
stopped its nuclear weapons programme. The second was the more recent statements by secretary of

defence Robert Gates that appear to have taken any military option off the table. These mistakes have
encouraged Iran to move ahead with its programme.
A third mistake is to believe that there can be real peace in the Middle East with an Iranian nuclear
sword of Damocles hanging over the head of Israel. Even if Israel were to continue the settlement
freeze and negotiate borders with the Palestinian Authority, the Iranians could ruin any prospect of
permanent peace by unleashing Hezbollah and Hamas - which oppose any peace with Israel - to
target Israeli civilians.
President Obama understated the threat when he said a nuclear Iran would be "a game changer". It
would be a disaster, threatening Middle East peace, putting an end to any hope of nuclear non-
proliferation, and engendering the greatest arms race in modern history.
Now that it has been made public that Arab nations favour a military attack, it will become more
difficult for these countries to condemn Israel if it was to decide on a surgical strike. This public
disclosure might embolden Israel to consider such a strike as a last resort.
So the leaking of secret information may have grave, even if unintended, consequences. We need
new laws and new technologies to cope with the apparent ease with which low-level functionaries can
access and download the most secret of information. But there will always be those willing to break the
law and suffer the consequences for what they believe is a higher purpose; and it is always just a
matter of time until the techno-thieves catch up to the techno-cops. We will have to learn to live with
the reality that there is no absolute assurance that "gentlemen" (and others) will not be reading each
other's mail.
OBSTRUCTIONISTS HINDER WIKILEAKS PROBE

Lawmakers cite lax controls on access to intelligence
► http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/2/obstructionists-hinder-wikileaks-probe
► The Washington Times / by Shaun Waterman
Dec 3 2010 ► Dec 2. The State Department and other U.S. agencies are not fully cooperating with
lawmakers' efforts to probe the WikiLeaks security breach, according to the Republican likely to be the
next chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Rep. Mike Rogers, Michigan Republican and a senior member of the intelligence committee, said
government officials seem "more concerned about their department's reputation than the
consequences [of the leak], and that is a big problem."
"They've been obstructionist up to this point," Mr. Rogers told The Washington Times. "They need an
attitude adjustment."
He joins a growing chorus of Democrats and Republicans who are finding fault with the government's
post-Sept. 11 information-sharing system, which aims to push intelligence reporting toward the front
lines of the war on terrorism.
"Clearly, the rush to share everything with everyone has gone too far," Mr. Rogers said. "Clearly,
there'll be changes."
That sentiment was echoed by Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Maryland Democrat, who chaired part
of the intelligence committee briefing on the WikiLeaks breach this week that Mr. Rogers attended.
Mr. Ruppersberger noted that a half-million people have access to the network that was reportedly
compromised - a classified Pentagon computer system called SIPRNet.
"How did we get to the point where a private with a questionable background has that kind of access?"
he said. "We members of Congress ... don't have that kind of access."
He was referring to a low-level military analyst, Army Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, who has been charged
in connection with the breach and is accused of downloading hundreds of thousands of secret
documents from SIPRNet.
Pfc. Manning has been in solitary confinement at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, Va., since July.
His attorney has said that before the breach, Pfc. Manning's superiors were so concerned about his
mental health that they disabled his weapon. He also was admonished while a trainee for
inappropriately referencing classified material in personal videos he posted on the Web.
Neither incident appears to have restricted his top-secret clearance or his access to SIPRNet.
Former users of SIPRNet say the network is set up very much like the Internet, with users employing a
Web browser to visit sites maintained by different U.S. agencies on which they display material
classified up to the lowest level - secret.
"It is basically a parallel Internet, classified at the secret level," said Adam Rice, a security specialist
who used the network when he was in the Army Special Forces.

For the 500,000-plus cleared users of SIPRNet, there are few barriers to access once they are logged
on, said Mr. Rice, now the head of security for a global Internet firm. "Once you're in ... you basically
have access to anything in there."
When Mr. Rice was a user, "I was amazed at the information that was out there," he said, declining to
give any specifics. He was especially surprised, given the size of the user base with access. "It is too
big, too uncontrolled," he said.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, California Democrat and chairwoman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, agreed that "part of the problem" is the broad distribution of intelligence that has been
promoted since Sept. 11, with intelligence agencies urged to replace their traditional reliance on "need
to know" with a new focus on "need to share."
"Both concepts - 'need to know' and 'need to share' - must be carefully reviewed and changed," she
said in a statement, adding that at present, "hundreds of thousands of individuals receive intelligence"
that they do not need.
Mr. Rice noted the fact that Pfc. Manning was caught only after he confessed in an online chat to a
former hacker who turned him in to the authorities. "If he wasn't such a braggart, he'd have gotten
clean away," he said.
This was especially alarming because it indicated that there was no monitoring of downloading by
SIPRNet users.
"Who was watching the stable door before the horse was stolen?" Mr. Rice said. "How could that
much data leave SIPRNet without anyone knowing about it?"
Simple precautions could easily have prevented the massive security breach Pfc. Manning is charged
with, Mr. Rice said. "At bottom this problem is just sloppy management."
Mr. Rogers agreed: "The way they handled this was negligent. ... It is mind-boggling because we know
the technology exists to prevent this."
He added that he is "concerned" about what he described as "almost a cavalier attitude" among
officials towards the details of information-sharing policy.
But other lawmakers were pushing back this week against what they saw as an overreaction – presa-
ging possible conflict about the issue across party lines and complicated by the jurisdictional issues
involved between the intelligence, armed services and government oversight committees.
"There was no 'rush' to increase information-sharing after Sept. 11," Sen. Christopher S. Bond,
Missouri Republican, said in an e-mailed statement.
"It has been a long, painstaking process to increase information to those who need to have it," Mr.
Bond said. "I think the solution is not to share less, but to improve auditing and control of the
information so that this kind of mass download cannot happen again."
But even those critical of SIPRNet access arrangements cautioned against congressional over-
reaction. "We've got to get the information into the right hands," Mr. Ruppersberger said. "We can't go
back to the stovepipes we had before Sept. 11."
Mr. Ruppersberger said that establishing accountability for the breach is important.
"Was there a lack of leadership?" he said. "I am sure we will find people who didn't do their jobs."
But he observed that many mitigation measures had been taken, including barring downloads to
removable media, like the CDs Pfc. Manning boasted of using to steal the data, and improved
management oversight.
Mr. Rogers, however, was more skeptical. "I am not convinced that the problems are fixed," he said.
"If they are, they haven't demonstrated that."
THE NOT SO SECRET US WAR IN PAKISTAN

► http://www.thenation.com/blog/156765/not-so-secret-anymore-us-war-pakistan
► The Nation / by Jeremy Scahill
Dec 3 2010 ► Dec 1. Despite sustained denials by US officials spanning more than a year, US milita-
ry Special Operations Forces have been conducting offensive operations inside Pakistan, helping di-
rect US drone strikes and conducting joint operations with Pakistani forces against Al Qaeda and Tali-
ban forces in north and south Waziristan and elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
according to secret cables released as part of the Wikileaks document dump. According to an October
9, 2009 cable classified by Anne Patterson, the US ambassador to Pakistan, the operations were "al-
most certainly [conducted] with the personal consent of [Pakistan's] Chief of Army Staff General Kaya-
ni." The operations were coordinated with the US Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan. A
US special operations source told The Nation that the US forces described in the cable as SOC(FWD)

-PAK were "forward operating troops" from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the most
elite force within the US military made up of Navy SEALs, Delta Force and Army Rangers.
The cables also confirm aspects of a Nation story from November 2009, "The Secret US War in
Pakistan," which detailed offensive combat operations by JSOC in Pakistan. In response to the Nation
story, Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell called it "conspiratorial" and explicitly denied that US
special operations forces were doing anything other than "training" in Pakistan. More than a month
after the October 2009 cable from the US embassy in Pakistan confirming JSOC combat missions,
Morrell told reporters: "We have basically, I think, a few dozen forces on the ground in Pakistan who
are involved in a train-the-trainer mission. These are Special Operations Forces. We've been very
candid about this. They are—they have been for months, if not years now, training Pakistani forces so
that they can in turn train other Pakistani military on how to—on certain skills and operational
techniques. And that's the extent of our—our, you know, military boots on the ground in Pakistan."
According to the October 2009 cable, Morrell's statement was false.
In one operation in September 2009, four US special operations forces personnel "embedded with the
[Pakistani] Frontier Corps (FC)…in the FATA," where the Americans are described as providing "ISR":
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The support from the US forces, according to the cable,
"was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy
location." A month later, according to the cable, the Pakistan Army again "approved deployment of US
special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations." To the embassy staff, this was
documented in the cable as a "sea change" in Pakistan's military leaders' thinking, saying they had
previously been "adamantly opposed [to] letting us embed" US special ops forces with Pakistani
forces. According to the cable, "US special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a
year, but were largely limited to a training role," adding that the Pakistani units that received training
from US special operations forces "appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing US
SOF personnel into the field with them."
In another operation cited in the cables, the US teams, led by JSOC, were described as providing
support to the Pakistani Army's 11th Corp and included "a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) full motion video." Whether the drones were used for surveillance or as part of a joint offensive
is unclear from the documents. While the US government will not confirm US drone strikes inside the
country and Pakistani officials regularly deride the strikes, the issue of the drones was discussed in
another cable from August 2008. That cable describes a meeting between Ambassador Patterson and
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani. When the issue of US drone strikes came up, according
to the cable, Gillani said, "I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We'll protest in
the National Assembly and then ignore it."
The ability of US special operations forces to operate in Pakistan is clearly viewed as a major
development by the US embassy. "Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that
has brought us to this point," according to the October 2009 cable. It also notes the potential
consequences of the activities leaking: "These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of
widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign
military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related
matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop
making requests for such assistance."
Such statements might help explain why Ambassador Richard Holbrooke lied to the world when he
said bluntly in July 2010: "People think that the US has troops in Pakistan, well, we don't."
A US special operations veteran who worked on Pakistan issues in 2009 reviewed the Wikileaks
cables for The Nation. He said he was taken aback that the cable was not classified higher than
"SECRET" given that it confirms the active involvement of US soldiers from the highly-secretive, elite
Joint Special Operations Command engaging in combat—not just training—in Pakistan. And offensive
combat at that. JSOC operations are compartmentalized and highly classified.
Pentagon spokespeople have repeatedly insisted that the US military's activities in Pakistan are
restricted to training operations. Even after the October 2009 cable and multiple JSOC operations in
Pakistan, US and Pakistani officials continued to hold official meetings to discuss "potential" joint
operations. In January 2010 in Washington DC, US and Pakistani military officials gathered under the
umbrella of the "US-Pakistan Land Forces Military Consultative Committee." According to notes from
the meeting, they discussed US military operations in Pakistan aiming to "enhance both US and
Pakistan Army COIN [counterinsurgency] capabilities" and "potential US COIN Center/Pakistan Army
interactions." Among the participants were representatives of the Special Operations Command, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs' Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell, the Office of Defense
representative-Pakistan and a Pakistan delegation led by Brigadier General Muhammad Azam Agha,
Pakistan's director of military training.

A special operations veteran and a former CIA operative with direct experience in Pakistan have told
The Nation that JSOC has long engaged in combat in Pakistan—which raises a question: How in-the-
loop is the US embassy about the activities of JSOC in Pakistan? Just because Ambassador Anne
Patterson approves a cable saying that US special ops forces have only done two operations with
Pakistani forces and plays this up as a major-league development doesn't make it true. JSOC has
conducted operations across the globe without the direct knowledge of the US ambassador. In 2006,
the US military and Pakistan struck a deal that authorized JSOC to enter Pakistan to hunt Osama bin
Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders with the understanding that Pakistan would deny it had given
permission. JSOC has struck multiple times inside Pakistan over the years, regardless of what
Ambassador Patterson's cables may say.
In 2006, twelve "tactical action operatives" from Blackwater were recruited for a secret JSOC raid
inside Pakistan, targeting an Al Qaeda facility. The operation was code-named "Vibrant Fury." Which
raises another issue: the activities described in the October 2009 cable very closely align with what a
US military intelligence source, a US special forces source and a former Blackwater executive told The
Nation in November 2009, namely that JSOC was running an operation in Pakistan where "members
of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted
assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, 'snatch and grabs' of high-value targets
and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan.… The Blackwater operatives also assist in
gathering intelligence and help direct a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel
to the well- documented CIA predator strikes." The arrangement, which involved a web of
subcontractors, allowed the Pakistani Frontier Corps—the force cited in the cable—to work with JSOC
operators while simultaneously denying that Americans were involved. From the Nation article, "The
Secret US War in Pakistan," in November 2009:
A former senior executive at Blackwater confirmed the military intelligence source's claim that the
company is working in Pakistan for the CIA and JSOC, the premier counterterrorism and covert
operations force within the military. He said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani
government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater
operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids
and border interdictions, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. This
arrangement, the former executive said, allows the Pakistani government to utilize former US Special
Operations forces who now work for Blackwater while denying an official US military presence in the
country. He also confirmed that Blackwater has a facility in Karachi and has personnel deployed
elsewhere in Pakistan. The former executive spoke on condition of anonymity.
According to the executive, Blackwater works on a subcontract for Kestral Logistics, a powerful
Pakistani firm, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence
consulting. It is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. While
Kestral's main offices are in Pakistan, it also has branches in several other countries.
Blackwater operatives also integrate with Kestral's forces in sensitive counterterrorism operations in
the North-West Frontier Province, where they work in conjunction with the Pakistani Interior Ministry's
paramilitary force, known as the Frontier Corps (alternately referred to as "frontier scouts"). The
Blackwater personnel are technically advisers, but the former executive said that the line often gets
blurred in the field. Blackwater "is providing the actual guidance on how to do [counterterrorism
operations] and Kestral's folks are carrying a lot of them out, but they're having the guidance and the
overwatch from some BW guys that will actually go out with the teams when they're executing the job,"
he said. "You can see how that can lead to other things in the border areas." He said that when
Blackwater personnel are out with the Pakistani teams, sometimes its men engage in operations
against suspected terrorists. "You've got BW guys that are assisting...and they're all going to want to
go on the jobs—so they're going to go with them," he said. "So, the things that you're seeing in the
news about how this Pakistani military group came in and raided this house or did this or did that—in
some of those cases, you're going to have Western folks that are right there at the house, if not in the
house." Blackwater, he said, is paid by the Pakistani government through Kestral for consulting
services. "That gives the Pakistani government the cover to say, 'Hey, no, we don't have any
Westerners doing this. It's all local and our people are doing it.' But it gets them the expertise that
Westerners provide for [counterterrorism]-related work."
The military intelligence source confirmed Blackwater works with the Frontier Corps, saying,
"There's no real oversight. It's not really on people's radar screen."
In November 2009, Capt. John Kirby, the spokesperson for Adm. Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, told The Nation, "We do not discuss current operations one way or the other,
regardless of their nature." A defense official, on background, specifically denied that Blackwater
performs work on drone strikes or intelligence for JSOC in Pakistan. Captain Kirby told The Nation if it

published the story it would "be on thin ice." The US embassy and Pakistan's interior Minister Rehman
Malik both denied Blackwater was operating in Pakistan.
In January 2010, on a visit to Pakistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, appeared to contradict that
line, telling a Pakistani TV station, "They [Blackwater and another private security firm, DynCorp] are
operating as individual companies here in Pakistan," according to a DoD transcript of the interview. As
Gates's comments began to make huge news in Pakistan, US defense officials tried to retract his
statement. As the Wall Street Journal reported, "Defense officials tried to clarify the comment…telling
reporters that Mr. Gates had been speaking about contractor oversight more generally and that the
Pentagon didn't employ [Blackwater] in Pakistan." The next day, Pakistan's senior minister for the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Bashir Bilour, said that Blackwater was operating in Pakistan's
frontier areas. Bilour told Pakistan's Express News TV that Blackwater's activities were taking place
with the "consent and permission" of the Pakistani government, saying he had discussed the issue
with officials at the US Consulate in Peshawar, who told him that Blackwater was training Pakistani
forces.
Since the Nation story originally ran, Blackwater has continued to work under the Obama administra-
tion. In June, the company won a $100 million global contract with the CIA and continues to operate in
Afghanistan, where it protects senior US officials and trains Afghan forces. Earlier this year, Blackwa-
ter's owner, Erik Prince, put the company up for sale and moved to the Abu Dhabi in the United Arab
Emirates. Whether Blackwater or former Blackwater operatives continue to work in Pakistan is not
known. What is clear is that there is great reason to believe that the October 2009 cable from Ambas-
sador Anne Patterson describing US special operations forces activities in Pakistan represents only a
tiny glimpse into one of the darkest corners of current US policy in Pakistan.
ARMY WITHHOLDS RESULTS OF LEWIS SPY PROBE

► Associated Press / by Gene Johnson
► www.armytimes.com/news/2010/12/ap-army-lewis-mcchord-army-withholds-spy-probe-results-120210/
► Army Times
Dec 3 2010 ► Dec 3. The Army is still refusing to release the results of its investigation into spying on
anti-war activists by a civilian intelligence specialist at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle.
Officials released more than 100 pages of records this week to The Associated Press in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request, most with names redacted. The Army withheld the results and
recommendations made by an investigating officer, citing law enforcement and privacy exemptions.
Col. John Wells of the Army‘s Litigation Division noted an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit brought
by the activists and the possibility of criminal charges against Army employees, and said release of the
documents could impair the rights of those involved to fair trials or disciplinary proceedings.
The documents outline the scope of the inquiry, which was initially completed in mid-2009 and then
reopened early this year to determine whether military legal advisors were given complete and
accurate information about the protest group‘s infiltration.
They also show that before the story broke, senior officials at the base were concerned about bad
publicity ―should mainstream media decide to report U.S. ‗spying‘ on protesters,‖ and they were upset
that local agencies, including the city of Tacoma, had turned over documents to the protesters
revealing the intelligence specialist‘s involvement.
―Future information sharing operations with local agencies are at risk because we cannot depend on
them to comply with FOIA restrictions and/or our dissemination guidance,‖ said a ―point paper‖ dated
March 2, 2009.
The base‘s leadership should ―express their displeasure with their Tacoma counterparts [for] the
mishandling of this FOIA request,‖ the paper said.
Anti-war activists with a group called Olympia Port Militarization Resistance discovered in early 2009
that the administrator of their e-mail list-serve, whom they knew as John Jacob, was actually John
Jacob Towery, then an employee of the Force Protection Division at Lewis- McChord. The Force
Protection Division includes civilian and military workers who support law enforcement and security
operations to ensure the security of Fort Lewis personnel.
Towery had been attending the group‘s meetings for two years, and information he collected about the
protesters appears to have been passed to his superiors on base as well as local law enforcement,
documents released to AP show.
The Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army from directly engaging in domestic
law enforcement.

The Army launched its investigation in July 2009, after members of the group complained. The
investigating officer‘s marching orders said the inquiry should focus on Towery‘s actions, whether he
undertook them at the behest of civilian law enforcement, whether he was paid by any civilian police
agency, what his supervisors knew of his activities, and whether he might have violated federal law or
Army directives.
The highest-ranking person interviewed for the investigation appears to have been a colonel, whose
name is redacted.
One of the documents provided to AP, an ―information paper‖ apparently prepared by the Force
Protection Division, says: ―Information provided by [redacted] and a law enforcement official with the
Pierce County Sheriff‘s Office (PCSO) indicate that the activities alleged by the Olympia activist were
done in support of the PCSO and Tacoma Police Department as a confidential informant/source and
not as a member of the FP Division.‖
The protest group, which formed in 2006, was one of several in the region opposed to the use of
civilian ports for shipping military items, such as Stryker vehicles, overseas. They claim that thanks to
Towery‘s infiltration, police knew where they were going to protest in advance — sometimes arresting
them before their civil disobedience even began.
Having a spy among them chilled their First Amendment and other rights, they argued.
About 200 people were arrested over a two-week period in November 2007, but only about three
dozen were charged.
IS KILLING OUR ONLY OPTION FOR TERRORISTS?

► Washington Post / by David Ignatius
Dec 2 2010 ► Dec 2. Every war brings its own deformations, but consider this disturbing fact about
America's war against al-Qaeda: It has become easier, politically and legally, for the United States to
kill suspected terrorists than to capture and interrogate them.
Predator and Reaper drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, have become the weapons of choice
against al-Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They have also been used in Yemen, and
the demand for these efficient tools of war, which target enemies from 10,000 feet, is likely to grow.
The pace of drone attacks on the tribal areas has increased sharply during the Obama presidency,
with more assaults in September and October of this year than in all of 2008. At the same time, efforts
to capture al-Qaeda suspects have virtually stopped. Indeed, if CIA operatives were to snatch a
terrorist tomorrow, the agency wouldn't be sure where it could detain him for interrogation.
Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA, frames the puzzle this way: "Have we made detention
and interrogation so legally difficult and politically risky that our default option is to kill our adversaries
rather than capture and interrogate them?"
It's curious why the American public seems so comfortable with a tactic that arguably is a form of long-
range assassination, after the furor about the CIA's use of nonlethal methods known as "enhanced
interrogation." When Israel adopted an approach of "targeted killing" against Hamas and other terrorist
adversaries, it provoked an extensive debate there and abroad.
"For reasons that defy logic, people are more comfortable with drone attacks" than with killings at
close range, says Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism officer who now is a consultant
with ERG Partners. "It's something that seems so clean and antiseptic, but the moral issues are the
same."
Firing a missile from 10,000 feet is certainly a lower risk for the attackers than an assault on the
ground. "The U.S. is reluctant to mount such capture-or-kill operations in the tribal areas for the same
reason that the Pakistanis are: They fear that an elite team might be surrounded by hundreds of
tribesmen," says Grenier.
Though the Pakistani government publicly denounces the drone attacks, it privately condones them.
That's in part because the drones provide a military punch that the Pakistani military is unwilling or
unable to match with conventional forces. But legal challenges are beginning, as in a $500 million
lawsuit planned by a Pakistani man who told reporters this week that two of his relatives had been
killed in a drone strike.
The reluctance to chase al-Qaeda on the ground, and perhaps capture its operatives alive, also
comes with an intelligence cost. The United States and its allies lose the information that could come
from interrogation, along with the cellphones, computers and other communications gear that could be

seized in a successful raid. One reason that counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda were so
effective in Iraq was that they utilized this cycle of raid, capture, interrogate, analyze, raid again.
The CIA began getting out of the detention business when the infamous "black sites" overseas were
closed in 2006. At that time, 14 CIA detainees were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, but since then,
only two more have been caught and transferred there; agency officials have been advised that
Guantanamo is closed for new business. The only alternatives are Bagram air base in Afghanistan, for
al-Qaeda operatives caught in the war zone, or detention and trial in the United States.
Don't misunderstand me: It's not that the Obama administration's limits on detention and interrogation
are wrong. They have applied clear guidelines to what had been, before 2006, a murky area. The
problem is that these rules, and the wariness of getting into more trouble, have had the perverse effect
of encouraging the CIA to adopt a more lethal and less supple policy than before.
U.S. and Pakistani officials support drone attacks because they don't see a good alternative to combat
al-Qaeda's operations in the tribal areas. I don't disagree with that view. But this policy needs a clearer
foundation in law and public understanding than it has today. Otherwise, when the pendulum swings,
the CIA officers who ran these supposedly clandestine missions may be left holding the bag.
So ask yourself: If you don't like the CIA tactics that led to the capture and interrogation of al-Qaeda
operatives, do you think it's better to vaporize the militants from 10,000 feet? And if this bothers you,
what's the alternative?
ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS IN TEHRAN

►www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101201_attacks_nuclear_scientists_tehran?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_med
ium=email&utm_campaign=101202&utm_content=readmore&elq=56d68dff6b464e148e0e65ee77070860
► Startfor / by Ben West
Dec 2 2010 ► Dec 1. On the morning of Nov. 29, two Iranian scientists involved in Iran's nuclear
development program were attacked. One was killed, and the other was injured. According to Iranian
media, the deceased, Dr. Majid Shahriari, was heading the team responsible for developing the
technology to design a nuclear reactor core, and Time magazine referred to him as the highest-
ranking non-appointed individual working on the project.
Official reports indicate that Shahriari was killed when assailants on motorcycles attached a "sticky
bomb" to his vehicle and detonated it seconds later. However, the Time magazine report says that an
explosive device concealed inside the car detonated and killed him. Shahriari's driver and wife, both of
whom were in the car at the time, were injured.
Meanwhile, on the opposite side of town, Dr. Fereidoon Abassi was injured in a sticky-bomb attack
reportedly identical to the one officials said killed Shahriari. His wife was accompanying him and was
also injured (some reports indicate that a driver was also in the car at the time of the attack). Abassi
and his wife are said to be in stable condition. Abassi is perhaps even more closely linked to Iran's
nuclear program than Shahriari was, since he was a member of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps and was named in a 2007 U.N. resolution that sanctioned high-ranking members of Iran's
defense and military agencies believed to be trying to obtain nuclear weapons.
Monday's incidents occurred at a time of uncertainty over how global powers and Iran's neighbors will
handle an Iran apparently pursuing nuclear weapons despite its claims of developing only a civilian
nuclear program and asserting itself as a regional power in the Middle East. Through economic
sanctions that went into effect last year, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China
and Germany (known as the "P-5+1") have been pressuring Iran to enter negotiations over its nuclear
program and outsource the most sensitive aspects the program, such as higher levels of uranium
enrichment.
he Nov. 29 attacks came about a week before Saeed Jalili, Iran's national security chief, will be
leading a delegation to meet with the P-5+1 from Dec. 6-7 in Vienna, the first such meeting in more
than a year. The attacks also came within hours of the WikiLeaks release of classified U.S. State
Department cables, which are filled with international concerns about Iran's controversial nuclear
program.
Because of the international scrutiny and sanctions on just about any hardware required to develop a
nuclear program, Iran has focused on developing domestic technologies that can fill the gaps. This
has required a national initiative coordinated by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to build
the country's nuclear program from scratch, an endeavor that requires thousands of experts from
various fields of the physical sciences as well as the requisite technologies.

And it was the leader of the AEOI, Ali Akhbar Salehi, who told media Nov. 29 that Shahriari was "in
charge of one of the great projects" at the agency. Salehi also issued a warning to Iran's enemies "not
to play with fire." Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elaborated on the warning, accusing
"Zionist" and "Western regimes" of being behind the coordinated attacks against Shahriari and Abassi.
The desire of the U.N. Security Council (along with Israel and Germany) to stop Iran's nuclear program
and the apparent involvement of the targeted scientists in that program has led many Iranian officials
to quickly blame the United States, United Kingdom and Israel for the attacks, since those countries
have been the loudest in condemning Iran for its nuclear ambitions.
It seems that certain domestic rivals of the Iranian regime would also benefit from these attacks. Any
one of numerous Iranian militant groups throughout the country may have been involved in one way or
another, perhaps with the assistance of a foreign power. A look at the tactics used in the attacks could
shed some light on the perpetrators.
Modus Operandi
According to official Iranian reports, Abassi was driving to work at Shahid Beheshti University in
northern Tehran from his residence in southern Tehran. When the car in which he and his wife were
traveling was on Artash Street, assailants on at least two motorcycles approached the vehicle and
attached an improvised explosive device (IED) to the driver's-side door. The device exploded shortly
thereafter, injuring Abassi and his wife.
Images reportedly of Abassi's vehicle show that the driver's side door was destroyed, but the rest of
the vehicle and the surrounding surfaces show very little damage. A few pockmarks can be seen on
the vehicle behind Abassi's car but little else to indicate that a bomb had gone off in the vicinity.
(Earlier reports indicating that this was Shahriari's vehicle proved erroneous.) This indicates that the
IED was a shaped charge with a very specific target. Evidence of both the shaped charge and the
utilization of projectiles in the device suggests that the device was put together by a competent and
experienced bomb-maker.
An eyewitness account of the attack offers one explanation why the device did not kill Abassi.
According to the man who was driving immediately behind Abassi's car, the car abruptly stopped in
traffic, then Abassi got out and went to the passenger side where his wife was sitting. The eyewitness
said Abassi and his wife were about 2 meters from the car, on the opposite side when the IED
exploded. Abassi appears to have been aware of the attack as it was under way, which apparently
saved his life. The eyewitness did not mention whether he saw the motorcyclists attach the device to
the car before it went off, but that could have been what tipped Abassi off. If this was the case, the
bomb-maker may have done his job well in building the device but the assailants gave themselves
away when they planted it.
In the fatal attack against Shahriari, he also was on his way to work at Shahid Beheshti University in
northern Tehran in his vehicle with his wife, according to official reports. These reports indicate that he
definitely had a driver, which would suggest that Shahriari was considered a person of importance.
Their car was traveling through a parking lot in northern Tehran when assailants on at least two
motorcycles approached the vehicle and attached an IED to the car. Eyewitnesses say that the IED
exploded seconds later and that the motorcyclists escaped. Shahriari was presumably killed in the
explosion while his wife and driver were injured.
The official account of the attack is contradicted by the Time magazine report, which cites a "Western
intelligence source with knowledge of the operation" as saying that the IED that killed Shahriari
detonated from inside the vehicle. Images of what appears to be Shahriari's vehicle are much poorer
quality than the images of Abassi's vehicle, but they do appear to show damage to the windshield and
other car windows. The car is still very much intact, though, and the fact that Shahriari's driver and
wife escaped with only injuries suggests that the device used against Shahriari was also a shaped
charge, specifically targeting him.
Capabilities
Attacks like the two carried out against Abassi and Shahriari require a high level of tradecraft that is
available only to well-trained operatives. There is much more going on below the surface in attacks
like these that is not immediately obvious when reading media reports. First, the team of assailants
that attacked Abassi and Shahriari had to identify their targets and confirm that the men they were
attacking were indeed high-level scientists involved in Iran's nuclear program. The fact that Abassi and
Shahriari held such high positions indicates they were specifically selected as targets and not the
victims of a lucky, opportunistic attack.
Second, the team had to conduct surveillance of the two scientists. The team had to positively identify
their vehicles and determine their schedules and routes in order to know when and how to launch their
attacks. Both attacks targeted the scientists as they traveled to work, likely a time when they were
most vulnerable, an MO commonly used by assassins worldwide.

Third, someone with sufficient expertise had to build IEDs that would kill their targets. Both devices
appear to have been relatively small IEDs that were aimed precisely at the scientists, which may have
been an attempt to limit collateral damage (their small size may also have been due to efforts to
conceal the device). Both devices seem to have been adequate to kill their intended targets, and
judging by the damage to his vehicle, it appears that Abassi would have received mortal wounds had
he stayed in the driver's seat.
The deployment stage seems to be where things went wrong for the assailants, at least in the Abassi
attack. It is unclear exactly what alerted him, but it appears that he was exercising some level of
situational awareness and was able to determine that an attack was under way.
It is not at all surprising that someone like Abassi would have been practicing situational awareness.
This is not the first time that scientists linked to Iran's nuclear program have been attacked, and
Iranian agencies linked to the nuclear program have probably issued general security guidance to their
employees (especially high-ranking ones like Abassi and Shahriari). In 2007, Ardeshir Hassanpour
was killed in an alleged poisoning that STRATFOR sources attributed to an Israeli operation. Again, in
January 2010, Massoud Ali-Mohammadi, another Iranian scientist who taught at Tehran University,
was killed in an IED attack that also targeted him as he was driving to work in the morning. While
some suspected that Ali-Mohammadi may have been targeted by the Iranian regime due to his
connections with the opposition, Abassi and Shahriari appear much too close to the regime to be
targets of their own government (however, nothing can be ruled out in politically volatile Tehran). The
similarities between the Ali-Mohammadi assassination and the attacks against Abassi and Shahriari
suggest that a covert campaign to attack Iranian scientists could well be under way.
There is little doubt that the Nov. 29 attacks struck a greater blow to the development of Iran's nuclear
program than the previous two attacks. Shahriari appears to have had an integral role in the program.
While he will likely be replaced and work will go on, his death could slow the program's progress (at
least temporarily) and further stoke security fears in Iran's nuclear development community. The
attacks come amid WikiLeaks revelations that Saudi King Abdullah and U.S. officials discussed
assassinating Iranian leaders, accusations that the United States or Israel was behind the Stuxnet
computer worm that allegedly targeted the computer systems running Iran's nuclear program and the
return home of Shahram Amiri, an Iranian scientist who alleged that the United States held him against
his will earlier in the summer.
The evidence suggests that foreign powers are actively trying to probe and sabotage Iran's nuclear
program. However, doing so is not that simple. Tehran is not nearly as open a city as Dubai, where
Israeli operatives are suspected of assassinating a high-level Hamas leader in January 2010. It is
unlikely that the United States, Israel or any other foreign power could deploy its own team of
assassins into Tehran to Carry out a lengthy targeting, surveillance and attack operation without some
on-the-ground help.
And there is certainly plenty of help on the ground in Iran. Kurdish militants like the Party of Free Life
of Kurdistan have conducted numerous assassinations against Iranian clerics and officials in Iran's
western province of Kordestan. Sunni separatist militants in the southeast province of Sistan-
Balochistan, represented by the Group Jundallah, have also targeted Iranian interests in eastern Iran
in recent years. Other regional militant opposition groups like Mujahideen-e Khalq, which has offered
intelligence on Iran's nuclear program to the United States, and Azeri separatists pose marginal
threats to the Iranian regime. However, none of these groups has demonstrated the ability to strike
such high-level officials in the heart of Tehran with such a degree of professionalism. While that is
unlikely, they have the capability and a history of eliminating dissidents through assassinations.
Furthermore, the spuriousness of many contradictory media reports makes the attacks suspicious.
It is unlikely that any foreign power was able to conduct this operation by itself and equally unlikely that
any indigenous militant group was able to pull off an attack like this without some assistance. The
combination of the two, however, could provide an explanation of how the attacks targeting Shariari
and Abassi got so close to complete success.
ANTI-TERROR EXPERT TO PREVENT NEW LEAKS

► AFP
► http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/World/Story/A1Story20101202-250330.html
► Asia One
Dec 2 2010 ► Dec 2. President Barack Obama on Wednesday named an anti-terrorism expert to lead

US efforts to mitigate the damage of the WikiLeaks breach and prevent future illegal data disclosures,
the White House said.
Russell Travers, deputy director of information sharing at the National Counterrorism Center, "will lead
a comprehensive effort to identify and develop the structural reforms needed in light of the WikiLeaks
breach," the White House said in a statement.
Washington has been in damage control mode ever since the whistleblower website last weekend
began publicly disclosing some 250,000 secret US diplomatic cables, many of which revealed
embarrassing assessments of foreign leaders.
While the White House was seeking to downplay the impact of the security violations as late as
Wednesday, the Travers appointment was among the clearest signs that the Obama administration
was seriously stung by the data dump and was taking substantive steps to avoid a repeat.
Among his new duties, Travers will be advising national security staff on "corrective actions, mitigation
measures, and policy recommendations related to the breach," according to the White House.
He will also coordinate interagency discussions on developing actions "regarding technological and/or
policy changes to limit the likelihood of such a leak reoccurring."
Travers has been tasked with collating the stream of terrorism-related information pouring into US
agencies since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
The Washington Post describes him as the maintainer of the government database of terrorist entities
and a coordinator of terrorism information-sharing initiatives.
The National Counter-Terrorism Center where he works was among several agencies blamed for
failing to uncover a plot to blow up a US airliner on Christmas Day last year.
The vast majority of the cables revealed by WikiLeaks in its latest document dump originated from the
State Department or its diplomats in overseas missions, and State has launched a review of its
security procedures.
"The department will also deploy an automated tool that will continuously monitor the classified
network to detect anomalies that would not be readily apparent," as well as staff who will analyze the
anomalies "to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system," the White House said.
The president's intelligence advisory board (PIAB) will look at ways the executive branch shares and
protects classified data, and will work "with departments and agencies across the government to
ensure they gain a comprehensive appreciation of all relevant challenges and requirements necessary
to safeguard classified information and networks."
PIAB will "examine the current posture of the whole of government" in terms of leaks of classified data
and will "examine the balance between the need to share information and the need to protect
information."
WIKILEAKS AND RENDITION

UK overruled on Lebanon spy flights from Cyprus, WikiLeaks cables reveal
Americans dismissed 'bureaucratic' Foreign Office concern that Lebanese Hezbollah suspects
might be tortured
► http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cables-cyprus-rendition-torture
► The Guardian / by David Leigh
Dec 2 2010 ► Dec 2. American officials swept aside objections that secret US spy flights from Bri-
tain's Cyprus airbase risked making the UK an unwitting accomplice to torture, the leaked diplomatic
cables reveal.
The use of RAF Akrotiri for U2 spy plane missions over Lebanon – missions that have never been
disclosed until now – prompted an increasingly acrimonious series of exchanges between British
officials and the US embassy in London, according to the cables.
Labour ministers demanded a full "audit trail" of the covert operation, codenamed Cedar Sweep, in
1998 amid growing public concern in the UK about CIA rendition flights and complicity in torture. The
planes gathered intelligence that was then passed to the Lebanese authorities to help them track
down Hezbollah militants.
As the row escalated, the US rejected the British concerns over torture in unequivocal terms, with one
senior official at the embassy in London baldly stating in one cable: "We cannot take a risk-avoidance
approach to CT [counter terrorism] in which the fear of potentially violating human rights allows
terrorism to proliferate in Lebanon."
The cables disclose that as well as the Lebanon missions, U2s from Akrotiri were gathering
intelligence over Turkey and northern Iraq. The information was secretly supplied to the Turkish

authorities in an operation codenamed Highland Warrior. The British protested that "in both cases,
intelligence product is intended to be passed to third-party governments".
On 18 April 2008, Britain demanded the US embassy provide full details of all flights so ministers could
tell whether they "put the UK at risk of being complicit in unlawful acts … This is a very important point
for ministers".
A US diplomat, Maura Connelly, cabled: "We understand that these additional precautionary
measures stem from the February revelation that the US government transited renditioned persons
through Diego Garcia without UK permission and HMG's resultant need to ensure it is not similarly
blindsided in the future."
She complained the demands were "burdensome" and "an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy".
A letter from Will Jessett, then director of counter-terrorism at the Ministry of Defence, said "the use of
UK bases for covert or potentially controversial missions" on behalf of Lebanon or Turkey meant it was
"important for us to be satisfied that HMG is not indirectly aiding the commission of unlawful acts by
those governments".
The letter said other states, particularly Cyprus, might well object should they find out. Ministers
therefore wanted the US to submit each time "an assessment of any legal or human rights
implications".
On 24 April, the embassy sent a cable back to Washington entitled: "Houston, we have a problem." It
stated: "HMG ministers are adamant."
The embassy "pushed back hard" on demands for a full "audit trail" of spy flights. But in what appears
to have been a heated dispute, the British detailed other US "oversights".
"Contacts cited instances in which operations Highland Warrior and Cedar Sweep had been
conducted from the UK sovereign base areas of Akrotiri without the proper ministerial approvals … In
addition, Highland Warrior had raised tensions with the Cypriots, jeopardising the UK's hold on
Akrotiri."
There were "other lapses that proved embarrassing to HMG (ie renditions through Diego Garcia and
improperly documented shipments of weaponry through Prestwick airport".
The US used Prestwick in 2006 as a staging post to ship laser-guided bombs to Israel, causing British
protests. The Israelis wanted the munitions to attack Hezbollah bunkers in Lebanon.
The US embassy concluded: "A new element of distrust has crept into the US-UK mil-mil relationship.
"The renditions revelation proved highly embarrassing for the Brown government. The British proposal
… may be disproportionate but is almost certainly an indication of the Brown government's sensitivity
… at a time Brown is facing increasing domestic political woes."
A month later Britain was still "piling on concerns and conditions" about human rights, saying that
although junior minister Kim Howells was making the decisions, the foreign secretary, David Miliband,
was being kept informed.
British officials warned that ministerial concerns "could jeopardise future use of British territory".
US patience snapped when a Foreign Office official, John Hillman, passed on the message that "even
the [US] state department's own human rights report had documented cases of torture and arbitrary
arrest by the Lebanese armed forces".
Hillman urged the US to ensure the welfare of prisoners in Lebanon "if there were any risk that
detainees captured with the help of Cedar Sweep intel could be tortured".
It was at this point that Richard LeBaron, charges d'affaires at the London embassy, cabled
Washington that human rights concerns could not be allowed to get in the way of counter-terrorism
operations. Britain's demands were "not only burdensome but unrealistic", he said, proposing "high-
level approaches" to call the British to heel.
"Excessive conditions such as described above will hinder, if not obstruct, our co-operative counter-
terrorism efforts," he said.
Senior Bush administration official John Rood stepped in and the foreign office's director general for
defence and intelligence, Mariot Leslie, hastened to placate him.
The clash had been "unnecessarily confrontational", she told him. "Leslie expressed annoyance at the
additional conditions conveyed by the FCO working level," the cable states. "She had not been aware
beforehand that such a message would be conveyed. In fact she regretted the tenor of the discussions
had turned prickly, and underscored HMG appreciation for US-UK military and intelligence co-
operation."
The US was not actually expected to check on detained terrorists, she reassured him. "Ministers had
merely wanted to impress upon the US government that they take the human rights considerations
seriously.
"She noted that HMG 'desperately needs' [Cyprus] for its own intelligence gathering and operations
and was committed to keeping them available to the US (and France).

"However, the Cypriots are hypersensitive about the British presence there and, she said, could 'turn
off the utilities at any time'. That, combined with the 'toxic mix' of the rendition flights through Diego
Garcia, has resulted in tremendous parliamentary, public and media pressure on HMG."
Leslie stuck to her guns on one point, saying the US embassy would still have to put in full written
applications for future spy missions because "Miliband believed that 'policymakers needed to get
control of the military'." The cable stated: "Leslie … was very frank that HMG did object to some of
what the US government does (eg renditions)."
SIFTING THROUGH THE WIKILEAKS FALLOUT

Dec 1 2010 ► Dec 1. The ongoing release of U.S. diplomatic communications by the Wikileaks
organization is "embarrassing" and "awkward," said Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates yesterday,
but its consequences for U.S. foreign policy are likely to be "fairly modest."
"I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-
changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is,
governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not
because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets... Other nations will continue
to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with
one another."
Coming from the Secretary of Defense, that measured statement should help to deflate some of the
more extreme reactions to the Wikileaks action.
The Obama Administration should "use all legal means necessary to shut down Wikileaks before it
can do more damage by releasing additional cables," said Sen. Joe Lieberman on November 28.
Wikileaks leader Julian Assange should be designated an enemy combatant, suggested Rep. Steve
King (R-IA) on the House floor yesterday. Then he could be "moved over to a place offshore of the
United States outside of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts..., and adjudicated under a military
tribunal in a fashion that was designed by this Congress and directed by this Congress. That's what
I'm hopeful that we'll be able to do."
Such fantastic notions probably cannot survive the judgment of the U.S. Secretary of Defense that
what is at stake is "embarrassment" and "awkwardness," not the defense of the realm.
That does not mean that the policy consequences of the latest Wikileaks release will be insignificant.
Information sharing within the government is already being curtailed, and avenues of public disclosure
may be adversely affected by the Wikileaks controversy. In a November 28 email message to
reporters, the Pentagon spelled out several security measures that have already been implemented to
restrict and monitor the dissemination of classification information in DoD networks.
"Bottom line: It is now much more difficult for a determined actor to get access to and move informa-
tion outside of authorized channels," wrote Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.
Meanwhile, the Office of Management and Budget ordered (pdf) each agency that handles classified
information to perform a security review of its procedures and to reinforce the traditional "need to
know" requirements that strictly limit individual access to classified information.
"Any failure by agencies to safeguard classified information pursuant to relevant laws, including but
not limited to Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information (December 29, 2009), is
unacceptable and will not be tolerated," the OMB memo stated.
The possibility of prosecuting Wikileaks as a criminal enterprise is reportedly under consideration, and
has been publicly urged by some members of Congress and others. The feasibilty of such a
prosecution is uncertain, and nothing quite like it has been attempted before. The most "promising"
legal avenue of attack against Wikileaks would seem to be a charge of conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act (under 18 USC 793g), based on the allegation that Wikileaks encouraged and
collaborated with others in violating the terms of the Act. But these are dangerous legal waters,
fraught with undesirable consequences for other publishers of controversial information.
KIM PHILBY ON TRUTH IN DIPLOMATIC CABLES

Dec 1 2010 ► Dec 1. As confidential U.S. diplomatic documents continue to enter the public domain,
it is worth remembering that not everything that is written down in a government document, even (or
especially) in a classified document, is necessarily true. "Truth telling" involves a bit more than

trafficking in official records. Any historian or archival researcher knows that. So did the Soviet agent
Kim Philby, who addressed the issue in his 1968 book "My Silent War" (p. 255): "It is difficult, though
by no means impossible, for a journalist to obtain access to original documents. But these are often a
snare and a delusion. Just because a document is a document, it has a glamour which tempts the
reader to give it more weight than it deserves. This document from the United States Embassy in
Amman, for example. Is it a first draft, a second draft or the finished memorandum? Was it written by
an official of standing, or by some dogsbody with a bright idea? Was it written with serious intent or
just to enhance the writer's reputation? Even if it is unmistakably a direct instruction to the United
States Ambassador from the Secretary of State dated last Tuesday, is it still valid today? In short,
documentary intelligence, to be really valuable, must come as a steady stream, embellished with an
awful lot of explanatory annotation. An hour's serious discussion with a trustworthy informant is often
more valuable than any number of original documents."
"Of course, it is best to have both," he added.
US FOCUSES ON PAKISTAN'S MILITARY, NUCLEAR MATERIAL

► http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/30/AR2010113007718_pf.html
► Washington Post / by Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller
Dec 1 2010 ► Dec 1. During a visit to Pakistan barely a week before Barack Obama's inauguration,
Vice President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. sought reassurance from Pakistan's military and intelligence
chiefs that they "had the same enemy" as the United States and were prepared to take action against
insurgent sanctuaries inside their border.
The head of Pakistan's army, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, told Biden that the two countries were "on the
same page," although there would inevitably be "tactical differences" in their approaches. Lt. Gen.
Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the intelligence chief, said he was hurt that the CIA did not appear to trust him,
according to one of dozens of private U.S. diplomatic cables released Tuesday by the Web site
WikiLeaks.
Nearly two years later, the administration is still asking the same questions. In the meantime, it has
plied Pakistan with aid, worried about the safety of its nuclear arsenal, and tried to keep its civilian
government from falling or being overthrown by the military.
The documents, most of which date from 2009, revealed some new elements of the always fraught
relationship. Pakistan, which has publicly rejected any U.S. military presence beyond trainers
restricted to specified bases, secretly authorized as many as 12 U.S. Special Operations commandos
to work as advisers to conventional army units in operations last year against insurgents in the tribal
belt along the border with Afghanistan.
A Oct. 9, 2009, cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad described the arrangement as a "sea
change" in Pakistani military attitudes. It noted that "previously, the Pakistani military leadership
adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces."
It is not clear from the cable how many, if any, of the special forces advisers were put in place.
The security of Pakistan's nuclear arms was a recurring theme in the released cables, beginning with
a December 2008 U.S. intelligence briefing to NATO noting, "Despite pending economic catastrophe,
Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world."
In a cable to brief the new Obama administration before Kayani's February 2009 visit to Washington,
U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson said that "our major concern has not been that an Islamic militant
could steal an entire weapon, but rather the chance someone working in [government weapons]
facilities could gradually smuggle enough fissile material out to eventually make a weapon and the
vulnerability of weapons in transit."
In May of last year, Patterson reported that Pakistan had reneged on an agreement to allow the United
States to remove an aging stockpile of highly enriched uranium at a research nuclear reactor. The
Pakistanis worried, she said, that the media would get wind of the removal and "portray it as the
United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons."
The following month, in a briefing prepared for a visit by then-national security adviser James L.
Jones, Patterson said Pakistan had gone "on the defensive" about its arsenal after international
media's reporting about U.S. concerns.The Pakistani government, she wrote, "is particularly neuralgic
to suggestions that its nuclear weapons could fall into terrorist hands and to reports of U.S. plans to
seize the weapons in case of emergency."
In the cables, Pakistani officials complain about a U.S. civil nuclear accord with India, their traditional
adversary, and note that its provisions will allow Indians to divert materials to their own weapons

program.
Administration officials noted that the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons had been extensively
discussed during a White House strategy review last fall. Although President Obama has made
repeated public expressions of confidence in Pakistani safeguards, the issue remains one of high
concern.
"Why is it that we're trying to prevent the Pakistani government from collapsing?" one administration
official said. "Because we fundamentally believe that we cannot afford a country with 80 to 100 nuclear
weapons becoming the Congo."
"Shoring up Pakistan, helping it fight extremism, trying to improve its institutions are not just a
humanitarian effort or some naive public diplomacy gambit," the official said. "There is a sense that
other places in the world can go to hell, but not this one."
The cables portrayed a weak civilian government under President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister
Yousaf Raza Gillani that has supported U.S. aims but is fearful of the powerful Pakistani military.
When Patterson, who also served as ambassador in George W. Bush's administration, met with
Zardari in August 2008, the new president brushed aside concerns raised by his interior minister about
attacks within Pakistani territory by unmanned U.S. drone aircraft. The government, then and now,
publicly rejected the attacks and denied approving them.
"I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people," Zardari said. "We'll protest in the
National Assembly and then ignore it."
But Zardari's bravado often apparently lapsed into anxiety. Zardari, Biden told then-British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown in March 2009, had confided to him that he feared Kayani would "take me out."
Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, told U.S. emissary Richard C.
Holbrooke in January that Zardari had been "in better shape" than expected during a recent visit to
Abu Dhabi. But Zardari had also asked "that his family be allowed to live in the UAE in the event of his
death," bin Zayed reported, according to the U.S. account of the meeting.
DOUBT ON IRAN MISSILE CACHE

► Washington Post / by John Pomfret and Walter Pincus
Dec 1 2010 ► Dec 1. On Oct. 10, to celebrate its 65th anniversary as a one-party state, North Korea
unveiled a new missile in the type of military parade that for decades has been a hallmark of authori-
tarian regimes. The North Koreans call the missile the Musudan.
The Musudan is now playing a starring role in reports this week prompted by WikiLeaks' release of
U.S. diplomatic cables. One of the documents says that Iran has obtained 19 of the missiles from
North Korea, prompting news reports suggesting that the Islamic republic can hit targets in Western
Europe and deep into Russia - farther than Iran's existing missiles can strike.
The problem, however, is that there is no indication that the Musudan, also known as the BM-25, is
operational or that it has ever been tested. Iran has never publicly displayed the missiles, according to
experts and a senior U.S. intelligence official, some of whom doubt the missiles were ever transferred
to Iran. Experts who analyzed Oct. 10 photographs of the Musudan said it appeared to be a mock-up.
The snapshot provided by the cable illustrates how such documents - based on one meeting or a
single source - can muddy an issue as much as it can clarify it. In this case, experts said, the inference
that Iran can strike Western Europe with a new missile is unjustified.
The 19-page document, labeled "secret," summarized a Dec. 22, 2009, meeting between 15 U.S. and
14 Russian officials who gathered as part of a bilateral program to monitor missile threats from Iran
and North Korea. The two sides clashed repeatedly and agreed occasionally. The Russians claimed
the Iranian missile program was not as much of a threat as the Americans feared and argued that the
BM-25 might not even exist, dubbing it a "mysterious missile." Americans at the meeting
acknowledged never seeing the new missile in Iran.
According to experts who are familiar with the Iranian program, the Americans and the Russians came
to the meeting with competing agendas. The Americans were intent on emphasizing the Iranian threat
because of their fears about Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programs and their support for a
multibillion-dollar missile defense shield that is a priority of the Obama administration. The Russians
focused on playing down the threat because they opposed the missile shield and because of their
embarrassment that Russian technology was showing up in North Korean and Iranian missile
systems.
At one point, the U.S. side said it believed the BM-25 "was sold to Iran by North Korea." The American

team cited news reports as proof. But the main news source on the issue, a story by the German
newspaper Bild Zeitung in 2005, quoted German intelligence sources as saying only that Iran had
purchased 18 kits made up of missile components for the BM-25 from North Korea - not 19 of the
missiles themselves.
"The U.S. side does not firmly say we have evidence that the BM-25 is in Iran," said Michael Elleman,
a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, referring to the discussion described
in the document. "They don't present anything. I was a little surprised that they didn't come out more
definitely."
"If you're claiming that there's a missile that can reach Western Europe from Iran, then you should be
able to produce evidence," said Theodore Postol, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor
and a former Pentagon official. "But they can't. The Iranians love to show photographs of what they
have because part of their game is to appear bigger than they are. There is no reason for the Iranians
to keep it secret. I am kind of surprised at the American side's assertions."
A senior U.S. intelligence official said Tuesday that he was unaware of any sale of a complete BM-25,
although there was probably a transfer of kits.
"There has been a flow of knowledge and missile parts" from North Korea to Iran, he said, "but sale of
such an actual missile does not fully check out."
The presence of those "missile parts" explains why the Russians were also on edge and eager to deny
that the BM-25 was real.
"References to the missile's existence are more in the domain of political literature than technical fact,"
the document quoted the Russian delegation as saying. "In short, for Russia, there is a question about
the existence of this system."
But there is evidence that the origin of the Musudan was Soviet. According to missile experts and U.S.
officials, a large quantity of Soviet naval ballistic missile parts were shipped to North Korea during the
Soviet collapse of the 1990s. Russia has never acknowledged this transfer, Postol and Elleman said,
because it would tarnish Russia's reputation as a country that claims to have never sold technology
that could be used in an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Over time, however, parts that appeared to be from the ballistic missiles - known as the R-27 and in
the West as the SS-N-6 - began showing up on North Korean and Iranian missile systems, according
to U.S. officials quoted in the document and to Postol. When Iran launched a satellite in February
2009, experts noticed a steering engine on the Iranian Safir rocket that was the same as one that
appeared on the R-27.
Postol said that other components from the R-27 that have surfaced in recent years went unmentioned
by the Americans in the meeting described in the secret document. For example, when North Korea
apparently tested its Taepodong-2 missile last year, Postol said, the evidence was strong that the
rocket's second stage was from an R-27, potentially boosting its range above 2,500 miles.
North Korea also began building a variant of the R-27 that they call the Musudan. Postol said the
program hasn't gotten very far. In the October parade, it showcased the missile on top of launcher. It
was about six feet longer than the original R-27.
"But they were mock-ups," he said. "So it's unclear what it can do. It's not a weapon yet."
That, he said, was at least three to five years away.
HAFTSTRAFE FÜR TELEKOM-MITARBEITER

Spitzelaffäre Ehemaliger Sicherheitschef übernimmt alleinige Verantwortung für Bespitzelung
von Journalisten
► www.taz.de/1/archiv/digitaz/artikel/?ressort=a2&dig=2010%2F12%2F01%2Fa0040&cHash=2b16625a24
► Die Tageszeitung / by Pascal Beucker
Dec 1 2010 ► Dec 1. Das strafrechtliche Nachspiel des Bespitzelungsskandals bei der Telekom endet
mit der Verhängung einer mehrjährigen Haftstrafe. Das Bonner Landgericht verurteilte gestern den
früheren Sicherheitschef des Konzerns zu einer Freiheitsstrafe von dreieinhalb Jahren. Klaus T. habe
gegen das Fernmeldegeheimnis verstoßen und sich zudem des Betrugs und der Untreue schuldig
gemacht.
Mit ihrer Entscheidung folgten die Richter dem Antrag der Staatsanwaltschaft. Die Verteidigung
plädierte demgegenüber für eine Geldstrafe. T. hatte im Prozess die alleinige Verantwortung für das
illegale Ausspionieren übernommen. Der 60-jährige Ex- Abteilungsleiter für Konzernsicherheit war der
letzte noch verbliebene Beschuldigte in der seit September laufenden Verhandlung. Gegen zwei
weitere ehemalige Telekom-Beschäftigte wurde der Prozess wegen geringer Schuld gegen Zahlung

einer Geldbuße eingestellt. Zuvor war das Verfahren gegen den Berliner Unternehmer Ralph Kühn
aus gesundheitlichen Gründen abgetrennt worden.
Kühn hatte mit einem Fax an die Telekom im April 2008 den Skandal ins Rollen gebracht. In dem
Schreiben forderte er die Begleichung noch offener Rechnungen und pries die Arbeit seiner EDV-
Firma: "Die Projekte können selbst im nachrichtendienstlichen Maßstab nur als ungewöhnlich
flächendeckend und ausgefeilt bezeichnet werden." Doch statt zu zahlen, entschied Telekom-
Vorstandschef René Obermann, die Altlast aus der Zeit seines Vorgängers Kai-Uwe Ricke der
Staatsanwaltschaft zu übergeben.
So kam heraus, dass die Sicherheitsabteilung der Telekom in den Jahren 2005 und 2006 mehrere
Dutzend Aufsichtsräte, Gewerkschafter und Journalisten ausspioniert hatte. Systematisch wurden
Telefon- und Handyverbindungsdaten erfasst und ausgewertet. Zu den Ausgespähten gehörten auch
hochrangige Gewerkschafter wie Ver.di-Chef Frank Bsirske.
Auslöser der illegalen Operationen, die unter den Namen "Rheingold" und "Clipper" firmierten, war ein
Bericht des damaligen Capital-Redakteurs Reinhard Kowalewsky über vertrauliche Planungen der
Telekom. Während mit "Rheingold" die Quelle Kowalewskys ausfindig gemacht werden sollte, ging es
anschließend bei "Clipper" um eine Art Vorbeugemaßnahme: Um eine undichte Stelle künftig
einfacher ausfindig zu machen, wurden die Verbindungsdaten von fünf Journalisten, die häufig über
die Telekom berichteten, auf Vorrat gespeichert.
Dieser zweite Vorgang sei "noch ungeheuerlicher" als der erste, sagte der Vorsitzende Richter
Reinhoff. Denn bei "Rheingold" habe es sich um unzulässige "reine Selbstjustiz" gehandelt, bei
"Clipper" hingegen um eine Überwachungsmaßnahme, "die nicht einmal dem Staat zusteht". "Was
hier passiert ist, ist keine Affäre, sondern sind massive Straftaten", sagte Reinhoff.
Das Gericht zeichnete das Bild eines erschreckend autoritätshörigen Unternehmens. Es habe
offenkundig an Zivilcourage gemangelt. "Wenn Sie bei der Telekom sagen, das kommt vom
Vorstandsvorsitzenden, dann klappt alles", konstatierte Reinhoff. Egal, ob die entsprechende
Anweisung nun tatsächlich "von oben" gekommen sei oder nicht.
Immer wieder hätten sich Mitarbeiter darauf zurückgezogen, nicht gewusst zu haben, was sie
unterschrieben hätten - auch wenn es sich um Anweisungen größerer Beträge gehandelt hätte.
Mehrfach betonte der Richter, die Telekom habe es T. einfach gemacht. Zunächst hatte die
Staatsanwaltschaft auch gegen Ex-Konzernchef Ricke und Ex-Aufsichtsratschef Klaus Zumwinkel
ermittelt. Doch im Juni stellte sie das Verfahren gegen die beiden Topmanager ein. Als Zeuge hatte
Ricke im Prozess ausgesagt, dass er zwar die Anweisung gegeben hatte, das Informationsleck zu
schließen. Aber Gedanken darüber, wie das funktionieren sollte, will er sich nicht gemacht haben.
Auch habe er nicht gewusst, dass illegale Methoden angewandt worden seien. Zumwinkel hatte sich
auf sein Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht berufen, um sich nicht möglicherweise selbst zu belasten.
"Es ist enttäuschend, dass die größte Spitzelaffäre in Deutschland mit einem Angeklagten zu Ende
geht", kommentierte der ehemalige Bundesinnenminister und Opferanwalt Gerhart R. Baum das
Urteil. Baum, der bei der Urteilsverkündung anwesend war, ist überzeugt: "Er hat nicht auf eigene
Faust gehandelt."
►►►►►►►►► FRINGE NARINT
CONFERENCE: THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE: THREATS,

CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES
Organised by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association / 27‐28 May 2011 / The Hague
► http://www.nisa-intelligence.nl/conferences.htm
► Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA)
► Comment by Laetitia Baars and Roger Vleugels: This conference is among others focusing on
NARINT-like topics. Please visit the Dutch section in this issue of Fringe Intelligence with a profile of
the conference and details on registration, fees, etc.

US MONITORS 'AGGRESSIVE' CHINA IN AFRICA
► http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11955516
► BBC
Dec 15 2010 ► Dec 9. The US is closely monitoring China's expanding role in Africa, the latest secret
US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks reveal. A cable from February quotes a senior US official
in Nigeria's main city, Lagos, describing China as "aggressive and pernicious". US diplomatic cables
from Africa also reveal claims by oil giant Shell that it infiltrated Nigerian ministries. Wikileaks has so
far released more than 1,100 of 251,000 secret US cables. The BBC's diplomatic correspondent
Jonathan Marcus says the latest documents provide a fascinating insight into Washington's rivalry with
Beijing in Africa.
China has massively expanded its economic ties to countries across Africa in recent years, sparking
criticism from human rights groups, who accuse Beijing of helping some of Africa's worst governments
stay in power.
China adopts a policy of not interfering in domestic politics, while Western countries sometimes make
aid conditional on "good governance".
The cable, published by the Guardian newspaper, quotes Johnnie Carson, US Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, who had been meeting oil company representatives in Lagos.
He describes China as "a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals".
"China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons," he says. "China is in Africa primarily for China."
He adds: "A secondary reason for China's presence is to secure votes in the United Nations from
African countries."
He argues that China is not seen in Washington as a military or security threat at the moment. But he
says there are, what he calls "tripwires" in Africa for the US when it comes to China.
"Have they signed military base agreements? Are they training armies? Have they developed
intelligence operations? Once these areas start developing then the US will start worrying," he says.
"The United States will continue to push democracy and capitalism while Chinese authoritarian
capitalism is politically challenging. The Chinese are dealing with the [Zimbabwean president]
Mugabe's and [Sudanese president] Bashir's of the world, which is a contrarian political model."
'Bribes'
Another US cable talks about China's military and intelligence support for the government of Kenya.
A Chinese enterprise is said to have won a contract to supply telephone monitoring equipment to
Kenya after bribes were paid while on a trip to China.
The name of the individual concerned has been edited out.
Our diplomatic correspondent says the cable provides a case study of China's role in Africa.
Its influence in Kenya is said to have grown rapidly, with Chinese involvement in a host of
infrastructure projects as well as collaboration with Kenya's National Security and Intelligence Service.
'Secondments'
The secret cables also say that Shell's top executive in Nigeria at the time, Ann Pickard, told US
diplomats that the oil company had good access to government information.
A cable dated 20 October 2009 outlines a conversation Ms Pickard had with the then US ambassador
to Nigeria, Robin Renee Sanders.
When Ms Sanders asked the Shell executive about Chinese business interests in Nigeria, Ms Pickard
told her that she knew that Nigerian officials had found Chinese offers not good enough.
"She said the [government of Nigeria] had forgotten that Shell had seconded people to all the relevant
ministries and that Shell consequently had access to everything that was being done in those
ministries," Ms Sanders reported.
The dispatches also show that Shell exchanged intelligence with the US about militant activity in the
oil-rich Niger Delta, where activists say local people have suffered environmental damage because of
the oil industry without reaping its economic rewards.
The BBC's Caroline Duffield in Lagos says the picture of Shell's tentacles reaching into government
and accessing secret documents will shock ordinary Nigerians.
Environmentalists have long claimed the oil giant exerts a powerful political grip on Nigeria's
government. Our correspondent says they will see these cables as evidence supporting that
argument.
A Shell spokesman told the BBC the company could not comment on a leaked cable containing the
views of a private conversation.
Wikileaks says it intends to release all the secret US cables in its possession, although it could take
months to do so.
The move has been strongly condemned by the US and other countries.

SOMALIA'S PIRATES TAKE TO THE HIGH SEAS
► www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/12/09/Somalias-pirates-take-to-the-high-seas/UPI-39451291930728/
► UPI
Dec 10 2010 ► Dec 9. Somali pirates who have plagued the shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden for the
last few years have been steadily moving eastward to evade international naval forces protecting
maritime traffic.
The pirates' latest strike was off the coast of India, hundreds of miles from their usual haunts.
On Dec. 5, sea bandits hijacked the MV Jahan Mori, a Bangladeshi freighter carrying 41,000 tons of
nickel ore from Indonesia bound for Greece. The pirates seized the 25 Bangladeshis, including the
wife of one of the crewmen, aboard. The hijacked vessel was seen heading toward Somalia.
The Somali marauders currently hold 23 ships and 531 crewmembers, the EU Naval Force, one of the
international units patrolling the Gulf of Aden, says.
The seizure of the Jahan Mori was the furthest east the pirates have been reported, apparently driven
from home waters by the naval task forces that usually number around 40 warships and supply
vessels from 30 countries.
But it's a process that's been under way for more than a year after several pirate teams were captured
by international forces.
Hijackings have been reported off the Seychelles and Madagascar 1,000 miles south of the Gulf of
Aden. One ship was seized 1,300 nautical miles east of Somalia earlier this year.
These days, the pirates also prey on shipping in the Red Sea, north of the Gulf of Aden, where
international naval forces lack clear authority to go after the marauders.
Foreign navies have U.N. Security Council mandates to hunt pirates in Somalia's territorial waters with
advance notice using "all necessary means." But the Red Sea is beyond their jurisdiction.
"Despite an unprecedented deployment of international naval assets, this year has once again seen a
record number of successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean," said Christian
Le Miere of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think tank.
"The attacks have been displaced further out into the ocean, at times 1,000 nautical miles from the
coast of Somalia, stretching the resources of the international naval deployers."
"What's allowed them to do this is the acquisition of larger mother ships, such as large fishing trawlers
and midsize cargo ships," said analyst Ben West of the Texas global security consultancy Stratfor.
"We've also noticed more recently they've been leapfrogging. For example, they can hijack a fishing
vessel or a cargo ship maybe 500 or 600 miles from the coast of Somalia, and instead of taking it back
to Somalia, they . go further east."
Adm. Hank Ort of the Netherlands navy, who commanded the NATO naval force earlier this year, said
the lack of employment prospects in war-torn Somalia and the lure of easy money led many men to
join the pirates.
The ransoms demanded by the pirates are increasing. The average is around $12 million per ship and
crew. Ship owners pay an average of $10 million per ship, usually in deals brokered through
middlemen in Kenya and the United Arab Emirates.
According to Clayton Consultants, a U.S. security firm, the negotiations now last twice as long as they
did in 2009.
The number of ship hijackings in the Gulf of Aden has fallen over the last year or so, with U.S. and
European warships driving off pirate attacks or rescuing crews aboard pirate-held vessels.
U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded the German-owned MV Magellan Star
container ship in the gulf Sept. 9, capturing nine pirates who had seized it the day before off Yemen.
Russian naval infantry recaptured a Russian-owned oil tanker, the Moscow University, May 6 after a
short firefight.
But ship owners are increasingly opting to take the protection of their vessels into their own hands
rather than rely on the international armada in the Gulf of Aden and turn their ships in floating
fortresses.
This is particularly true of the Germans, who own the world's third-largest commercial fleet. They
drape razor wire around the ships to deter boarders, install sonar cannons or laser guns to deafen and
blind attackers.
But the favored tactic seems to be a steel-walled safe room, or "citadel," where crewmen can hide and
control the vessel while radioing for help.

►►►► FRINGE NETHERLANDS
WHY HOLLAND IS SO IMPORTANT TO US

► http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/38987
► The Guardian
Dec 15 2010 ► Summary
A departing US ambassador offers his thoughts on how the US could develop its relations with
the Dutch, saying the country is a "vital transatlantic anchor" but could also help counter Ve-
nezuelan "meddling" in the Caribbean.
Monday, 22 August 2005, 17:01
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 002309
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2025
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, EAID, NL, EUN, USUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH TO THE NEXT LEVEl
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (S) SUMMARY: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital trans-
atlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to
counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course. The Netherlands' solid Euro-
pean and international credentials create a powerful "multiplier" effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided
the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using their NATO Training Mis-
sion commitment to push others to do more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III
planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat operations for the first time in more than 30
years. The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen international counterterro-
rism cooperation, and initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the groundwork
for a proposed major international Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006.
2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their leadership beyond Europe. Dutch
strategic interests in the Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the
region. They are expanding their military involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure environment
for their robust development assistance program, and in part to add "eyes and ears" on the ground. In
the Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and would welcome a
more active role; they quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO)
and might, under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas where we disagree, such as
drugs and trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major internatio-
nal legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far
beyond Dutch borders.
3. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The coalition government, headed by PM Balkenende, is naturally
inclined to work closely with the U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a center-left
government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as predicted by most polls. The nearly one million
Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the Dutch to question long-standing
assumptions about Dutch "tolerance" and "identity." The murder of Theo van Gogh focused attention
on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing
problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the
Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-
military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced
pursuit of U.S. interests.
LEADERS IN EUROPE
4. (S) Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe. As a
founding member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU, and Britain's strongest ally on
continent, the Dutch are an influential voice in Europe despite having a population of just under 16
million. Prime Minister Balkenende states often that the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously"
and therefore expect to be heard. While the Dutch "no" to the EU's constitutional treaty embarrassed
Balkenende, the vote revealed that the search for EU integration and consensus has its limits, capping

a trend that started in the 90's with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU Commissioner) Fritz Bolke-
stein's proposals to redefine the scope of European integration to protect Dutch national interests.
5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration stalled, German elections pending, and
the EU unable to agree on finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are growing. This trend is
enhanced by the gravitation of EU decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can make
or break internal groupings. The Dutch and Italian refusal to attend a "group of six" meeting recently
proposed by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his initiative. The British Ambassador here
recently confided that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his European objectives and en-
suring that transatlantic relations remain high on the European agenda. The leaders of the Nether-
lands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet quietly several times a year to coordinate
positions prior to EU Council and other high-level EU meetings.
6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are
"go-to guys" for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, sup-
port for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their com-
mitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren,
which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging
ESDP capabilities. Foreign Minister Bot recently proposed restructuring NATO's decision-making and
funding mechanisms to make them more effective. The appointment of Herman Schaper, the former
deputy director general of political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the U.S., as the new
Dutch permrep to NATO should create more opportunities for productive cooperation.
POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU
7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic interests outside Europe warrant their attention
and leadership, especially in the political-military sphere. For example:
- Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba) and are deeply concerned about Chavez' meddling in the region. As a Caribbean power, the
Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin
American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push them to take this role. The Dutch
are active partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated their ability to
deploy military forces (F-16's) on short notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez's
destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable European partner in the region.
- Afghanistan: According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong lead in organizing and soliciting
forces to staff ISAF Phase III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in conjunction
with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian forces. Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special
Forces in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities away from peace-keeping to
combat missions for the first time since the 1960's. The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the war on
terrorism in Afghanistan. We should encourage them both to continue to make significant
contributions, and to push others to do more.
- Africa: Senior Dutch military officials say they are considering expanding their military presence in
Africa to include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and Ivory Coast, adding new
"eyes and ears" on the ground. The Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to that
already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their actions with the U.S. and other allies. One objecti-
ve of the Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment for what is already one of the
most ambitious assistance programs in the world. The Dutch are the fourth largest provider of assis-
tance to Africa world-wide. In 2005 they established a 110 million Euro Stability Fund for security sec-
tor reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as well as Afghanistan and Iraq.) Dutch de-
ployments in Africa have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security as an aspect of de-
velopment provides an attractive justification for potential European partners. We should not only
encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch
could act as a "clearinghouse" for other interested parties. - Iraq: The Dutch were instrumental in pro-
viding early logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting transshipments through Rotter-
dam when other ports in Europe would not.) The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the southern
province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two controversial extensions. Although the Dutch
have since withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the political and military cover ne-
cessary for Japan to commit forces. The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training Mission in
Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if other countries would make comparable contributions.
We should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO partners to do more in Iraq.
- Middle East: The Dutch enjoy a reputation for "balance" almost unique in Europe, as they are strong
supporters of Israel, yet trusted by Arabs. Given Foreign Minister Bot's expressed willingness to take a
more active regional role. We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest through participa-
tion in the Forum for the Future and other initiatives. The Dutch have already promised to make a fi-

nancial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right
circumstances, might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well.
8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously" in practice
by committing real resources -- money, troops, hardware, and political capital -- to tackle real pro-
blems, as well as their "multiplier" effect in the political-military realm. The fact that the Dutch are
providing the head (Peter Feith) and observers to the EU's new monitoring mission in Aceh is the
latest example of their assuming leadership of an important international mission in a region where
they feel special ties (as witnessed by FM Bot's historic decision this year to attend the commemora-
tion of Indonesian independence, the first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian
independence).
9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in
the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. Defense
Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers of bureau-
cracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby creating a leaner, more deployable force. Kamp
and Berlijn believe firmly in the "use or lose" principle, and have accordingly sought increasingly chal-
lenging operations -- such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and potential operations
in sub-Saharan Africa. Their desire to maximize the military's capabilities and their preference for U.S.
equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Dutch are one of only two countries (Italy is the other) whose
financial contributions merit Tier II status in JSF development. Berlijn is pushing to lock in an early
commitment for 50 planes (out of a total of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007
elections. The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity
(CH-47, C-130, KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining hardware (AH-64D, F-16's,
Patriot Missile System, etc.) all of which are focused on meeting their Prague Capability Commitment
objectives as well as their ability to sustain extended expeditionary operations outside the European
theater.
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh
in November 2004, the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with regard to counterterro-
rism, arguing that legislation and other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being consi-
dered in countries like the UK and Italy. Led by Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm,
the Dutch were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Radiological
Gates, DOE's Megaports program, U.S. Customs' Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted Flyers.
China has engaged the Dutch on next generation protocols and standards for transport security,
includng RFID technology. It will be important to monitor and work with the Dutch as they work with
China. The Dutch have also expressed an interest to participate in DHS's "Centers of Excellence."
While the EU was arguing with us and itself over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch
allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol airport. The Dutch were instrumental in
pushing the EU in 2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist entity; an EU-wide designation
of the Dutch branch of the Al-Aqsa followed. During their EU Presidency the Dutch hosted an EU-wide
seminar to raise awareness of terrorist financing issues and have offered to host a major international
conference on the same subject in 2006. The Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah
in its entirety and to strengthen the EU's "Clearinghouse" designation process. Given their record, we
should continue to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in Europe, and, more generally, to
push counterterrorism issues to the top of the European agenda more generally.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
11. (S) The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion
(0.74 percent of GDP, with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 2004. It is a top donor
of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian programs. In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a more
focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid programs in wealthier countries. Dutch bilateral aid
is now directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa. In 2003, President Bush and Prime
Minister Balkenende signed an MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda
and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships. Balkenende recently expressed interest in
using the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting public-private partnerships
world-wide. USAID's involvement with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in Rwanda
has been particularly successful, and the World Bank has adopted it as a model. Dutch creativity and
credibility in development makes them good potential partners for future joint initiatives with the U.S.
We should also take advantage of their experience and insights to help shift global aid efforts in the
direction of sustainable long-term development.
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international legal institutions all located in The Hague,
our ability to have an impact in the Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the
Balkans is unique. With a historical interest in international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view
themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms and practices. This tradition made them
the perfect hosts for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and has pushed them to the
forefront of international efforts to train a new generation of Iraqi jurists. While their legalistic approach
can be frustrating, they are flexible. Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Protocols
have not prevented their Special Forces from deploying in Afghanistan. The Dutch also helped sway
the EU to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo at the Human Rights
Commission last year despite concerns about the treatment of detainees. But, as Foreign Minister Bot
told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long run Dutch human rights concerns must be
addressed to ensure that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and the Dutch need to
work together to resolve this concern. Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions
while remaining true to their legal principles could make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our
differences with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right circumstances.
ECONOMICS AND TRADE
13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open international trading system and has
been an ally in U.S.-EU trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax.
The Dutch share with the British a vision of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade. They are the
third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest recipient of U.S. investment world-wide. Their
efforts to shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and to promote innovation and com-
petition are creating additional opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe. Because the Netherlands
has one of the highest broadband penetrations in Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of
nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S.
companies an important gateway into Europe. If consulted early and regularly, the Netherlands can
also be an important ally in navigating the EU's regulatory environment and removing obstacles.
DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of difficulty. Despite fundamental differences
regarding "soft drugs" and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government has worked to prevent
these differences from defining our relationship. There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may be
shifting. The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic drugs. On the other hand, Dutch Health
Minister Hoogevorst recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to share information on
the health risks of new strains of marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may convince
the Dutch to rethink their approach to "soft drugs" in general. The Dutch are addressing drug tourism --
a recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch passport holders in Maastricht, for example,
could cut down on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime. We should support such
initiatives actively.
BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY...
15. (S) We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende government an outward-looking partner for whom
working with the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally. Balkenende and FM Bot take pride in building
bridges between the U.S. and Europe. Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch presi-
dency of the EU. On two issues of great importance to the U.S. -- the China Arms Embargo and ac-
cession talks for Turkey -- the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from following an EU "consensus"
set by others to redefining the issue on their, and our, terms. In both cases, Bot and Balkenende
overcame initial skepticism and concluded that Dutch and U.S. interests coincided -- a pattern we
have seen repeated on other less important issues. FM Bot began the EU presidency telling us that
lifting the Arms Embargo was a "done deal." Later, however, he actively intervened to prevent a lift on
"his" watch, saying that he did not want the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU. Despite
Balkenende's personal skepticism about bringing Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassa-
dor to Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to start accession talks with the EU du-
ring the Dutch presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped negotiate successfully imple-
mented. We will want the Dutch to continue to draw on the relationships they developed during the
presidency to coax both sides to move in the right direction as October 3 approaches.
16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and frustration here, but President Bush's visit
to the Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch American Cemetery at
Margraten was met with universal acclaim and provoked remarkably little protest. Even Dutch opposed
to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of enduring, shared values forged in the
crucibles of World War II and the Cold War. This mission has pursued an ambitious program of

outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that these emotions are passed to the next generation. In
this effort, the President's youth roundtable in Maastricht and former Secretary of State Powell's town
hall meeting with young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can serve as models for
future efforts. Given the disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in international fora, we
should expand our active exchange programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor
Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation.
...BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES
17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset
domestically by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. This division will become
more pronounced as the parties prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national elections in
May 2007. Current polls show that Balkenende's center-right coalition (his second government) is
falling in the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party (PvdA) and fringes on the right
and left are gaining. Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will pay dividends in
time for the 2007 elections, but that is uncertain. There is a strong chance that a center-left govern-
ment dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007 -- or earlier if the 2006 local election results
prompt national elections.
18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-
left, a PvdA-led government would present new challenges. PvdA leader Wouter Bos has made clear
his tendency to look to Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities. He sees the Netherlands
less as a transatlantic "bridge builder" than as a follower of EU consensus. As with Schroeder in
Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical attitude toward the U.S. during elections to
lock in his left flank. The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. abuses to challenge the rationale
for Dutch deployments in Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program. It is in our interest both
to support the current government's transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the opposition
to shift them in a favorable direction.
THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated
Muslim population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 percent of the population. USG-
sponsored polls show that 83 percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with their religion
than with their host country, while 51 percent have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an
institution. While the problems of Dutch integration captured international headlines following the van
Gogh murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the rest of Europe in seeking creative
ways to address these concerns. Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting ideas has opened up
opportunities for Embassy and USG outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society, providing
insights into a growing problem throughout Europe. We expect our experiences here will provide good
indications of broader European trends as well as opportunities to influence their direction.
CONCLUSIONS
20. (S) The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered society. Prevailing myths about the Dutch --
e.g., they are homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.-- do not accurately gauge differences
within society or reflect Dutch potential to influence international events. While the Dutch prefer to see
themselves as "balancing" between Europe and the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and
international factors.
21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to involve them early through high-level
consultations and exchanges. Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make the Netherlands
fertile ground for initiatives others in Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace.
22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to play an increasingly prominent role on the
global stage. Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but pays off royally. Dutch
credentials, credibility, and capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range of geographic
regions and substantive issues.
23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the
Balkans, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in developing pilot
projects in the counterterrorism area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, international
law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we
should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to the "next level."

CONFERENCE: THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE: THREATS,
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES
Organised by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association / 27‐28 May 2011 / The Hague
► http://www.nisa-intelligence.nl/conferences.htm
► Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA)
Dec 15 2010 ► ‗The Future of Intelligence: Threats, Challenges, Opportunities‘
Conference organised by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association / 27‐28 May 2011 at the
Netherlands Defence Academy / Brasserskade 227a, 2497 NX The Hague / The Netherlands.
At the conference, present and future developments in the field of intelligence and security will be
discussed by an array of well‐known experts in the field and other participants. There will be plenary
sessions and workshops with a focus on specific intelligence, counterintelligence and global security
challenges.
Chair Day 1: Arthur Docters van Leeuwen (NL)
Threats
The Future of Terrorism and Conflict
The 'securitization' of global society
Consequences for Civil Liberties
Future threats and organizational implications
Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity
Challenges
The Future of (Counter)-Intelligence
Globalization and Energy Security
The end of the classical Intelligence Cycle?
An Intelligence Revolution?
Dependency on a limited number of technology suppliers
Chair Day 2: John Morrison (UK)
Opportunities
The Future of Security Cooperation
Lisbon as an opportunity?
A shift to human security
Public/private cooperation in intelligence and security
The impact of technology
List of speakers (confirmed)
Willy Bruggeman (BE)
Dancho Danchev (NL)
Th. Darnstädt (GE)
Mark Duffield (UK)
Björn Fägersten (SWE)
Stuart Farson (CA)
Herman van Gunsteren (NL)
Koen Gijsbers (NL)
Lex Holst (NL)
Arthur Hulnick (US)
Bart Jacobs (NL)
Mark Lowenthal (US)
Chris Pyle (US)
Bruce Riedel (US)
Tim Shorrock (US)
Jennifer Sims (US)
Greg Treverton (US)
Conference Fee
Standard Fee: € 150
Student Fee: € 65 (proof of status required)
Fee covers registration, one dinner, two lunches and drinks.
To complete registration, payment in advance is required by transferring the amount to bank account
725980 of
Stichting Inlichtingenstudies Nederland, Amsterdam
IBAN: NL64INGB0000725980
BIC: INGBNL2A
Please mention ‗Conference 27‐28 May 2011‘ and name of the participant(s) with transfer.

To Register
For registration please use the electronic form at
www.nisa‐intelligence.nl
When unable to register electronically, download the form and send your application by regular mail to:
Ms. Gerda Randsdorp, P.O. Box 638, 2600 AP Delft, Netherlands.
Email: nisa.seminar@gmail.com
Phone: +31 624 256 992
Registration for the conference will close on 13 May 2011.
OM HIELD STUKKEN ACHTER IN ZAAK-KOUWENHOVEN

► http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/2402800/om-hield-stukken-achter-in-zaak-kouwenhoven.html
► NU. nl
Dec 15 2010 ► Dec 15. Aan het dossier in de heropende strafzaak tegen de Nederlandse zakenman
Guus Kouwenhoven wegens oorlogsmisdaden en wapensmokkel in Liberia zijn stukken toegevoegd
die aantonen dat verklaringen van twee veelbesproken anonieme getuigen onbetrouwbaar en
irrelevant zijn.
Het gaat om documenten die justitie tot dusver geheim heeft gehouden voor rechters en verdediging.
Advocate Inez Weski heeft dat woensdag gezegd naar aanleiding van een eerste regiezitting
volgende week bij het gerechtshof in Den Bosch. Ze noemt de gang van zaken 'onthutsend'.
Justitie gaat voorafgaand aan de regiezitting, dinsdag, niet in op het verhaal van de raadsvrouw.
Kouwenhoven (inmiddels 68 jaar) stond eerder bij de rechtbank en het gerechtshof terecht voor
oorlogsmisdaden en illegale wapenhandel in het West-Afrikaanse Liberia in de periode 2000-2003.
Dat land werd toen verscheurd door een bloedige burgeroorlog.
Acht jaar cel
De rechtbank veroordeelde hem tot acht jaar cel. Het hof sprak hem vrij wegens een ''groot gebrek
aan bewijs''. De rechters van het gerechtshof benadrukten dat het OM zelf ook had kunnen weten dat
de belastende verklaringen tegen Kouwenhoven veel tegenstellingen en objectief vast te stellen
onwaarheden bevatten.
De Hoge Raad haalde in april in streep door de vrijspraak omdat het hof in Den Haag het OM aan het
einde van de behandeling van de zaak nog ruimte had moeten geven om twee anonieme getuigen bij
de onderzoeksrechter te laten horen. Het gaat om twee getuigen van het Siera Leone-tribunaal.
Anonieme getuigen
Het is nog onduidelijk in hoeverre het hof in Den Bosch de zaak helemaal gaat overdoen. Justitie wil in
ieder geval de twee anonieme getuigen laten verklaren en heeft ook nog andere getuigen op haar
wensenlijst staan, maar het is onduidelijk om wie het gaat. Advocate Weski stelt dat heropening van
de strafzaak een nodeloze operatie is.
BOSTON – CHILD ABUSE - NETHERLANDS

Boston-area child sexual exploitation investigation leads to arrests in the Netherlands
► ice.dhs@service.govdelivery.com
► US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Dec 13 2010 ► Dec 13. Special agents with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Office of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in Boston, along with Massachusetts State Police
(MSP) detectives assigned to the Worcester District Attorney's Office, conducted advanced computer
forensics on a computer seized in a child sexual exploitation investigation in the Boston-area. After
intensive investigative work, HSI special agents and the MSP, working with Interpol and Dutch
authorities, were able to track these photos to the Netherlands. Dutch officials consequently arrested a
27-year-old daycare center employee who confessed to dozens of sex crimes with children.
During their search of computer files, HSI special agents in Boston discovered a series of child sexual
exploitation files. These files are known to include pictures, and videos of an adult male who is
sexually abusing two-year-old boy. Special agents determined that the photos did not appear to be
from the United States.
In coordination with the ICE HSI Cyber Crimes Center (C3), HSI agents shared an edited image on
INTERPOL's secure system for law enforcement officials in order to solicit assistance to identify the
origin of the photo. As a result, the National Police Services Agency (KLPD-Ipol) in the Netherlands

recognized the photos of being Dutch in origin. Additional photos were securely shared with KLPD-Ipol
officials, who positively confirmed that these images originated from their country.
On Dec. 7, 2010, the national television station in the Netherlands ran a story seeking public
assistance to identify the two-year-old child. KLPD-Ipol immediately received a call identifying the
child.
Shortly thereafter, on the same evening, KLPD-Ipol, along with Amsterdam Police, arrested a 27-year-
old suspect. The suspect had babysat the victim and had worked at at least two daycare centers in
Amsterdam. He also offered his services online as a babysitter.
The man's computers were seized and will be searched for evidence of child sexual exploitation and
he has since confessed to dozens of sex crimes allegedly committed over the past year and a half. On
Sunday, more than 50 parents were also informed that the suspect has either confessed to abusing
their children or was thought to have done so.
KLPD-Ipol also arrested the suspect's 37-year-old partner on suspicion of possession of child
pornography. He is not suspected of physically molesting children. A 39-year-old employee of one of
the daycare centers where the suspect worked was also arrested after allegedly attempting an
"indecent" online chat.
"This arrest underlines the fact that there will be no refuge for child sexual predators who believe that
they pursue their perverse behavior with impunity online," said Bruce M. Foucart, special agent in
charge of ICE HSI in Boston. Foucart oversees ICE HSI throughout New England. "Law enforcement
agencies will continue to work tirelessly across jurisdictions and national boundaries to protect children
anywhere in the world. I commend the collaboration of our agents and our law enforcement partners
who were able to track down this child predator."
ICE HSI in Boston, C3, Interpol, KLPD-Ipol, Amsterdam Police and ICE‘s attaché office in The Hague
continue to follow-up on all investigative leads in this case.
C3's Child Exploitation Section (CES) investigates the trans-border large scale production and
distribution of images of child abuse, as well as individuals who travel abroad to engage in sex with
minors. The CES employs the latest technology to collect evidence and track the activities of
individuals and organized groups who sexually exploit children through the use of websites, chat
rooms, newsgroups and peer-to-peer trading. These investigative activities are organized under
Operation Predator, a program managed by the CES.
Operation Predator is a nationwide ICE initiative to protect children from sexual predators, including
those who travel overseas for sex with minors, Internet child pornographers, criminal alien sex
offenders, and child sex traffickers.
ICE encourages the public to report suspected child predators and any suspicious activity through its
toll-free hotline at 1-866-DHS-2ICE. This hotline is staffed around the clock by investigators.
FOUTE JURIST BLIJKT LEK FIOD

► www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/8435161/__FIOD-lek_liep_via_foute_jurist__.html?sn=binnenland,buitenland
► De Telegraaf / by Martijn Koolhoven
Dec 8 2010 ► Dec 8. De rijksrecherche voert een onderzoek uit naar lekken bij opsporingsdienst
FIOD/ECD. In enkele geruchtmakende FIOD-zaken blijken verdachten er namelijk vooraf van op de
hoogte te zijn geweest dat er een inval van de fiscale politie op komst was.
Het uitlekken is uiterst pijnlijk omdat de fiscale politie haar onderzoeken altijd in het diepste geheim
uitvoert.
Zo wijst rijksrecherche-onderzoek nu uit dat het tijdens de VIP-avond van de Miljonair Fair 2009 al
bekend was dat vastgoedmagnaat Evert Kroon enkele maanden later een inval en zijn aanhouding
kon verwachten. 2 maart dit jaar werd Kroon inderdaad aangehouden op verdenking van
belastingontduiking. Ook in andere onderzoeken zijn nu aanwijzingen dat er vooraf is gelekt.
Pikant is het dat de rijksrecherche de afgelopen maanden via enkele prominenten de bron van het lek
heeft herleid. In dit onderzoek zijn o.a. ook de baas van de Miljonairsbeurs, ondernemer Yves Gijrath,
en botenondernemer Bas Lengers, directeur van Lengers Yachts in Muiden, als getuigen gehoord.
Gijrath en Lengers hadden het nieuws over de op handen zijnde aanhouding van Kroon vernomen
van de geschorste advocaat mr. Dion Bartels. Deze voormalige vastgoed-advocaat was jaren dik
bevriend met een teamleider van FIOD/ECD.
In een verhoor bij de rechter-commissaris in de geruchtmakende Palminvest-affaire verklaarde Bartels
eerder al dat hij jarenlang als informant was ―gerund‖ door de fiscale politie. Bartels maakte er ook in
andere fraudezaken (zoals o.a. de Palm Invest-zaak) geen geheim van als hij er vooraf van op de

hoogte was als er een actie van FIOD/ECD te verwachten viel. Dit tot grote verbazing van vriend en
vijand, die zich afvroegen hoe hij dat kon weten.
In een reactie op het rijksrecherche-onderzoek stelt Kroon‘s advocaat mr. F. Sijbers dat zijn cliënt
geen enkel voordeel heeft gehad van de voorkennis. ―Hij nam de geruchten niet serieus‖, aldus
Sijbers. ―Hij was volop in gesprek met de fiscus over een aantal vragen die ze hadden. Op het
moment dat hij hoorde dat ik aangehouden zou gaan worden, was alles al bij hen bekend. Hij had
niets te verbergen‖, aldus de advocaat van Kroon.
Het openbaar ministerie in Utrecht, dat leiding geeft aan het rijksrecherche-onderzoek, wil alleen
bevestigen dat het onderzoek loopt. De woordvoerder van FIOD/ECD wil geen enkel commentaar
geven. Het is niet bekend op hangende het onderzoek er disciplinaire maatregelen zijn getroffen tegen
betrokkenen.
NCTB KRIJGT OOK RAMPEN EN CRISES ERBIJ

► http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2646302.ece/Chique_terreurclubje_NCTb_straks_ook_rampenbestrijder
► NRC / by Barbara Rijlaarsdam and Jos Verlaan
Dec 2 2010 ► Dec 2. De Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb) krijgt er een groot
aantal taken bij. Vanaf 1 januari is de landelijke anti-terrorismeorganisatie ook verantwoordelijk voor
rampen- en calamiteitenbestrijding.
Dat blijkt uit een interne e-mail van secretaris-generaal Joris Demmink aan de medewerkers van het
ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie. Bij rampen en crises is de NCTb voortaan de instantie die de
politie, brandweer en ambulancediensten aanstuurt.
Met de komst van het ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie in oktober verloor Binnenlandse Zaken zijn
centrale taken op het gebied van openbare orde en veiligheid en crisisbeheersing. Daarmee komt een
einde aan de klassieke stammenstrijd tussen de departementen van Binnenlandse Zaken en Justitie
als het gaat om terrorismebeleid en veiligheid.
De NCTb werd in 2004 juist opgericht om een einde te maken aan de lappendeken van opsporings-
en inlichtingendiensten die elkaar eerder tegenwerkten dan dat zij samenwerkten bij de bestrijding van
terrorisme. Arrestatieteams van politie en defensie, essentieel om snel in te kunnen grijpen bij een
aanslag, waren verwikkeld in een interne machtsstrijd en onvoldoende op hun taak toegerust.
De afgelopen jaren groeide de NCTb uit tot een organisatie van circa honderd professionals die
werden geworven bij de inlichtingendiensten, de recherche, de marechaussee en de douane. De
ministers van Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken kregen de politieke verantwoordelijk over de organisatie,
maar bleken in de praktijk slecht samen te werken.
Vanaf volgende maand houdt de NCTb zich niet meer uitsluitend bezig met terreurbestrijding en
persoonsbeveiliging. De dienst wordt dan uitgebreid met de crisis- en rampenbestrijding en is
daarmee verantwoordelijk voor de ‗nationale veiligheid‘ in het algemeen. Hoe deze twee onderdelen
precies worden geïntegreerd in de nieuwe organisatie moet de huidige NCTb, Erik Akerboom, de
komende maanden gaan bedenken. Vóór 1 juli 2011 moet hij met een plan komen.
Volgens ingewijden hebben de voorgenomen veranderingen gezorgd voor onrust op de werkvloer.
„De NCTb ziet zichzelf als een chique terreurclubje‖, zegt een betrokkene. „Medewerkers willen zich
echt niet bezighouden met, bijvoorbeeld, de aanrijtijden van de lokale brandweer.‖
Het lijkt erop dat binnen de nieuwe organisatie een aparte coördinator voor terrorisme blijft bestaan. In
de Tweede Kamer is daar de afgelopen jaren veel waarde aan gehecht.
De woordvoerder van de NCTb wil nog niet reageren op de reorganisatieplannen. „We moeten nu
bekijken hoe de nieuwe organisatie eruit komt te zien. Het is te voorbarig om daar nu iets over te
zeggen.‖

►►►►►►►►►► in the Fringe
DE ROY VAN ZUYDEWIJN IN HET GELIJK TEGEN PRIVÉDETECTIVES

► http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/2402352/roy-van-zuydewijn-in-gelijk-privedetectives.html
► NU.nl / by Kemal Rijken
Dec 15 2010 ► Dec 15. Recherchebureaus Santema en Goderie van Groen moeten voor 23
december aantonen wie hen opdracht gaf om de privéadministratie van Edwin de Roy van Zuydewijn
door te lichten.
Als de namen niet loskomen, volgt er een dwangsom van 2.500 euro per dag. Dat blijkt uit een
gerechtelijk vonnis dat in handen is van NU.nl.
De Roy van Zuydewijn noemt de gerechtelijke uitspraak ‗een enorme opsteker‘ in zijn juridische
gevecht tegen de twee detectivebureaus.
―Ik ben zeer tevreden. Dit is fantastische winst. De rechtbank kan niet anders dan tot deze conclusie
komen omdat ze er goed mee bezig is geweest‖, aldus de ex-man van prinses Margarita.
Bankgegevens
In maart 2003 werden de bureaus verzocht om de privéadministratie van De Roy van Zuydewijn te
onderzoeken. Zo werden onder meer zijn bankgegevens en Sociale Dienst-dossier doorgelicht. Het
geheime speurwerk kwam echter pas in 2009 aan het licht nadat privédetective Michel Kraay er op
zijn website melding over maakte.
Vervolgens spande De Roy van Zuydewijn een kort geding aan om te achterhalen wie achter de
opdracht zat. In 2003 was namelijk al bekend dat zijn toenmalige schoonvader, de onlangs overleden
prins Hugo Carlos, in het bezit bleek te zijn van zijn Sociale Dienstgegevens. Het zou volgens Van
Zuydewijn kunnen dat hij de opdracht zou hebben gegeven.
Duidelijkheid
Santema en Goderie van Groen vertelden voor de rechter dat ze niet meer wisten wie de opdracht
had gegeven.
Omdat het kort geding geen duidelijkheid bood, begon De Roy van Zuydewijn een bodemprocedure
waarin de bureaus opnieuw verzaakten om onder ede een naam prijs te geven. Afgelopen augustus
concludeerde de rechter dat zij onrechtmatig hadden gehandeld. Eveneens stelde hij een
onafhankelijk onderzoek in naar de administratie van de bureaus.
Tijdens dat onderzoek, in oktober, kwam Santema met een naam: Cameo Support BV zou voor het
SBS-programma ‗Stem van Nederland‘ de zoekopdracht hebben gegeven. Daar nam De Roy van
Zuydewijn geen genoegen mee. ―Ze kunnen zoveel zeggen als ze willen, maar ik en mijn advocaat
willen het bewijs eerst zwart-op-wit hebben."
Namen
In navolging daarvan wilde ook de rechter niet zondermeer aannemen dat het programma de
opdrachtgever was. In zijn vonnis van 8 december, dat in handen is van NU.nl, oordeelde hij dat de
detectivebureaus de namen voor 23 december schriftelijk moeten doorgeven aan de advocaat van De
Roy van Zuydewijn.
Blij
De Roy van Zuydewijn is blij met de uitspraak. Over de bureaus is hij duidelijk. ―Santema en Goderie
van Groen hebben zich volledig vergaloppeerd totdat ze er bij neer vielen. Dit laat weer eens zien
waar de ethiek van dit soort detectivebureaus ligt. En trouwens, wie zegt dat het slechts gaat om één
opdrachtgever? Misschien zijn het er wel meer.‖
Als voor 23 december bewezen is dat Cameo Support BV inderdaad de opdrachtgever is, overweegt
hij een nieuwe gang naar de rechter. ―Het geven van de opdracht om mijn privégegevens te
achterhalen, dat is diefstal. Ik overweeg een eis tot schadevergoeding en ga door tot het gaatje.‖
Advocaat
Volgens advocaat Dick Kant van recherchebureau Santema is er niet zoveel aan de hand. ―Nou ja,
goed, de naam van de opdrachtgever is gevraagd. Die is gegeven en is dus al bekend. We zullen het
nog een keertje doorgeven‖, zegt hij.

De raadsman benadrukt dat zijn cliënt reëel is geweest. ―Het was een heel onbetekenend iets van
zeven jaar geleden. Mijn cliënt heeft veel grotere opdrachten, maar er is geen enkele reden om het
niet nogmaals aan te tonen wie de opdracht gaf.‖
Goderie van Groen was onbereikbaar voor commentaar.
►►►►►►►► Fringe Colophon

Fringe is a project of Roger Vleugels
In 1986 I started my own office and my work as legal advisor and lecturer specialized in freedom of information and intelligence.
Next to this regular work I publish since 2001 the Fringe journals.
I lecture on journalism basics, investigative journalism and FOIAs on journalism schools, universities and in company for stu-
dents in or from Aruba, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Iran, Ireland, Mace-
donia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and UK.
As legal advisor I filed since 1988 more than 3,500 FOIA requests for and with my clients, most of them press organizations and
journalists but also, special interest groups, NGOs, researchers and private persons.
At the beginning my work was focused on forensic intelligence research only. In other words I started at the climax of non-trans-
parency. As intelligence specialist I research, lecture, comment in the press, brief members of parliament and give advice to
journalists and lawyers.
The format of the Fringe journals

The goals of the Fringe journals are not being a regular magazine. The journals are purely a research tool. Articles are not
selected for their content but for the facts or trends within them. One of the consequences is that Fringe does not dis-
criminate between information and disinformation. Other goals are trying to publish news in early stages, before the news is
established with an overall focus on next to mainstream. After doing so Fringe will not cover such a topic further, unless there is
again something special, and above all: Fringe hopes to be a bit wayward.
The Fringe article gathering & The Fringe Stringers

Fringe would not be possible without a fine network of a couple of dozen, Dutch and foreign, overt and covert stringers. Second
to that is Fringe based on active surfing; on lots of subscriptions and on feeds and alerts.
In this way Fringe tries to cover a substantial part of the intelligence and foia sites and of a representative part of the major
newspapers and other periodicals worldwide.
Two Fringe Journals

Fringe Intelligence offers not yet established intelligence news and intelligence articles next to mainstream, while Fringe Spitting
provides news and tools for investigative journalists, researchers and freedom of information specialists.
Fringe Intelligence tries to focus on forensic and/or operational information. In other words tries not to publish about bureaucratic
information and not about politics or formal and legal aspects. Fringe Intelligence does not focus on terrorism. In every issue of
Fringe Intelligence 50+ articles ranging from intelligence and counterintelligence, via criminal intelligence and counter terrorism
to parapolitics and other topics with intelligence aspects.
Fringe Spitting is oriented on FOIA practitioners. In each issue of Spitting 20+ articles about news on laws, litigation, remarkable
disclosures [among others about new old news with a bit a focus on intelligence matters]. And lots of tips, tricks and tools.
Both are biweeklies [an article will never appear in both]. Occasionally Fringe publishes Specials, like the Index Dutch Intelligen-
ce, the Overview of FOIA Countries or Spying the Press. If there is a lot of news, for instance after a terror attack, Fringe Intelli-
gence changes into a more frequent, if necessary daily, published journal.
Almost all articles are internet downloads. 90+% English. Less than 10% is about or related to The Netherlands. The quality is
the quality of the source.
The Natural Resources Intelligence section of Fringe Intelligence: NARINT

Governments, parliaments, the military as well as the intelligence communities are often accused of fighting the previous war or
threat.
Fringe Intelligence tries to focus on not yet established news, like upcoming intelligence tasks and the next wars. This section of
Fringe was launched in November 2010 as an experiment and lists articles on NARINT; that is information on energy, metals
and water intelligence and related geopolitics. As a consequence NARINT will also focus on oil wars, Africa, China, etc.
NARINT is about the next enemy, the one beyond jihad & cyber threats. [Jihad is losing ground as an enemy and intelligence
priority. Cyber threats are entering the mainstream stage, but will always be crippled because they are more a tool than an
enemy.]
Beyond the usual sometimes sexed up, hyped and above all more or less temporarily enemies and threats NARINT is about a
threat at another level.
CALL FOR HELP: Help us finding articles, sources, stringers. For all NARINT questions and remarks you can contact Laetitia
Baars directly: Error! Hyperlink reference not valid..
NARINT Co-editor: Laetitia Baars

To support the gathering and selecting of articles the NARINT section of Fringe Intelligence has a co-editor: Laetitia Baars, a
Dutch freelance journalist, specialising in intelligence.

2,400 subscribers
This circulation means that both Fringe journals have each in their own sector, respectively OSINT and FOIA, worldwide a top
five ranking.
60% of the subscribers are intelligence specialists, 25% journalists, 15% FOIA specialists and a lot do have mixed specialisms.
They live in 95 countries: 35% in NL, 10% in UK, 25% in US and 30% in the rest of the world. 15% of the subscribers are em-
ployees of government bodies [50% of them of services in the intelligence communities] and 15% of universities and colleges.
Questions direct or via Linked In, Twitter [& Facebook]

Please feel free to mail me direct. Another contact option is via one of the social and/or professional networks on which I am
present. On NARINT related topics you can also mail direct with Laetitia Baars.
On Linked In, Twitter and Facebook I am direct connected with more than 50% of the subscribers. Several hundred them joined
one or more of groups managed by me: on Linked In: FOIA Specialists or Wob Specialists or NARINT or Dutch Intelligence
Watch Specialists; and on Facebook: FOIA Specialist. Feel free to join these groups.
[I put Facebook between square brackets because, for privacy and usability reasons, I do not like that network.]
Fringe is solely a research tool

All articles [re]published in Fringe are solely meant for research by the subscribers themselves. It is not allowed to [re]publish or
[re]circulate, parts of, articles. Because Fringe is a free of charge research tool Fringe itself is allowed to recirculate copyrighted
material according to the fair use notice. [More on that at the bottom of this colophon.]
The meaning of the ►

At the start of an article you will find several ►. They identify the source and the age of the article.
The source: after one or more ► you will find the source [the first source mentioned is the most original one, the last one is the
source or stringer via which/whom Fringe received the article].
The age: before ► the date on which Fringe received the article; after ► the original publication date [if known].
Subscriptions are free of charge [voluntary contributions very are welcome] and enclose both journals
The journals are and will stay free of charge. This is for two reasons:
- I started, eight years ago, the Fringe project as a kind of service to my clients and relations.
- For legal reasons the journals have to be free of charge. It is forbidden to ask a mandatory contribution for publishing
copyrighted material [the US fair use restrictions, more on them at the bottom of this colophon].
To start a subscription email: Start Fringe in the subject line, to roger.vleugels@planet.nl
To stop a subscription email: Stop Fringe in the subject line, to roger.vleugels@planet.nl
Donations
Fringe is a very time consuming project. Each year in January I ask the subscribers for a voluntary contribution. The percentage
of subscribers who pays yearly is rising but still less than 10%. [Due to legal, copyright, reasons it is not allowed to charge for
journals like Fringe. This means that the only way to collect money is via voluntary contribution or via donations.]
In order to give Fringe a more solid fundament every donation is welcome.
Voluntary contributions
Voluntary contributions are welcome. Once a year, in January, you will be asked to pay a voluntary contribution. My suggestion:
48.00 euro per year for individual subscribers [48,00 euro a year is 1.00 euro per issue]
24.00 euro per year for students and others with modest means
200.00 euro per year for an editorial office or other organization for multiple subscriptions
Payments from the Netherlands

ING Bank no. 3432010 in the name of Roger Vleugels, in Utrecht
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owner. The material is being made available for purposes of education and research of the subscribers themselves. This
constitutes a "fair use" of such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on these journals are distributed without profit to those who have
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FRINGE INTELLIGENCE

* Wayward biweekly journal focusing on not yet established intelligence news *

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 1

CLUMSY VATICAN DIPLOMACY

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 2

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 3

TAKING STOCK OF WIKILEAKS

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 4

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 5

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 6

JASON: SCIENCE OF CYBER SECURITY NEEDS MORE WORK

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 7

HOW MANY PEOPLE HAVE SECURITY CLEARANCES?

THE SHADOW WAR IN IRAN

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 8

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 9

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 10

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 11

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 12

WIKILEAKS CABLES ON LITVINENKO

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 13

SWEDEN MILITARY STAFFER KNEW ABOUT ATTACKS

FOCUS ON THE POLICY, NOT WIKILEAKS

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 14

WL IMPLICATIONS FOR "THE CLOUD"

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 15

EUROPEAN INVESTIGATION ORDER

JAILED AFGHAN DRUG LORD WAS US SPY

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 16

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 17

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 18

THE CIA'S EL-MASRI ABDUCTION

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 19

BELGIË EN VS AKKOORD OVER UITWISSELING VINGERAFDRUKKEN

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 20

GOVT RESPONSE TO WIKILEAKS PROBLEMATIC

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 21

EX-INTEL OFFICERS, OTHERS SEE PLUSSES IN WIKILEAKS DISCLOSURES

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 22

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 23

CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REGARDING WIKILEAKS

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 24

US PRESSED GERMANY ON CIA KIDNAPPING

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 25

PUBLISHING CLASSIFIED INFO

GUIDANCE ON USING LEAKED DOCS

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 26

SELLING CLASSIFIED US DOCS

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 27

THE MANY HEADED HYDRA

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 28

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 29

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 30

US USED ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE TO STIFLE ARMS TRADE

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 31

US GOVT FORCED TO RELEASE SPY DOCS

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 32

WASHINGTON FIGHTS TO REBUILD BATTERED REPUTATION

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 33

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 34

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 35

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 36

FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.219 – Dec 16 – 2010 - page 37