WEE

CASE NO. 1
RULE 39, SEC. 4
Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc, et al. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, et al. ǀ G.R. 135630, 26 September 2000

FACTS: Private respondent Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) owns the Victoria Tennis Courts in Intramuros, Manila by virtue of PD
1763. In a Memorandum of Agreement executed in 1987, Tourism Authority transferred its management, operation, administration
and development to petitioner Philippine Tennis Association (PHILTA) for a period of 10 years. Petitioner Intramuros Tennis Club
(ITC) is an affiliate of PHILTA and has for its members tennis players and enthusiasts who regularly use the facilities of the Victoria
Tennis Courts. Eventually, the PTA wrote to PHILTA alleging violations of the terms and conditions of the MOA. The former
demanded the surrender of the possession of the disputed property. PTA wrote a second letter demanding PHILTA to vacate the
premises and to give way to the PTA’s golf course expansion program. Petitioners instituted a case for preliminary injunction,
damages and prayer for TRO with the RTC. Among others, it alleged that by complying with the demand to vacate, ITC stands to
sustain liability because it had prior commitments to use the Victoria Tennis Courts for two activities. The TRO was granted as well as
the preliminary injunction. PTA filed a motion to dismiss stating that in view of the expiration of the MOA, petitioner’s cause of
action was moot and academic. Motion to Dismiss was granted. Petitioners appealed. While the appeal was pending, PTA filed a
motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. It alleged that there was an urgent necessity on the part of respondents to
immediately take possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts by reason of its being heavily deteriorated and un-sanitized because of
petitioner’s failure to maintain its good condition. Court granted the motion for execution. In their MR, petitioners argue that under
Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the ROC, respondent Court should have conducted hearings to ascertain whether there were good reasons to issue
the writ of execution pending appeal. Such was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court gravely abused its discretion in finding good reasons to grant private respondents’ motion
for execution pending appeal.

RULING: NO. Execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment may be
executed. Thus, the existence of "good reasons" is essential for it is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal. These reasons must be stated in a special order — for unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to
determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised in the case.
In the present case, we find that respondent court was well within its discretion in issuing its questioned resolutions. The
observation on the deteriorating and unsanitary conditions of the Victoria Tennis Courts came from tennis players who regularly use
the said courts, and there is no indication that the letter was contrived or fabricated simply to procure for private respondents the
restoration of possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts. More importantly, PHILTA no longer had any legal right to the possession and
management of the Victoria Tennis Courts because the lease agreement had already expired. Obviously, PTA as the lessor and
owner of the tennis courts had every right to regain possession thereof — and it also had every reason to be alarmed at the
complaint filed by the tennis players with the Department of Tourism because it would be held accountable as owner and
administrator of the tennis courts for the ill conditions of the said tennis courts.
Moreover, judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by the pendency of an appeal taken therefrom. This rule has been held
to extend to judgments decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction, which are immediately executory.

CHAM
Case No. 2
Rule 39, Section 4
Gan vs. Hon. Reyes (RTC 61)/Pondevida
FACTS
Private respondent Poniveda wrote to petitioner Gan demanding support for their “love child” where she filed a complaint
against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there
was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. This was denied by RTC. Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his
answer within the reglementary period, leading RTC to declare him in default.

RTC - After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, RTC ordering petitioner to recognize Franchezka
Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month. Poniveda moved for execution of the judgment of
support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need
for schooling. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle and a Honda vehicle.
CA - petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for
ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a
good reason for immediate enforcement. He insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there
should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. CA dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal

ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC and acted with GAOD
RULING/MAIN POINT
No. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that
the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent
reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no
distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that
there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule
mandating immediate execution.

COELI
CASE NO. 3
RULE 39, SEC 4
LITTON V. CA & SYQUIA
G.R. No. 102713 October 9, 1996

FACTS:
 RTC Manila approved the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case executed by petitioner Litton and PR Syquia. Petitioner Litton
filed a Motion for Immediate Writ of Execution to enforce compliance with the aforesaid Agreement, and then filed a
Supplemental Motion for Execution praying that PR Syquia pay the rental. Syquia filed his Opposition to the Motion. RTC
granted the motions.
 PR filed MR. Denied. He filed his notice of appeal. RTC denied. He filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA.
 CA: ruled in favor of PR, resolved that the orders of the RTC in the supplemental motion were no longer covered by the
Compromise Agreement and therefore, not include in the judgment sought to be executed, and thus, subject to appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the orders on the supplemental motion of the RTC were unappealable and imediately executory.

RULING: NO. It is a rule that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is
no appeal from such judgment. 
However, what is only unappealable is the original compromise agreement itself and not any supplement thereto.

Undoubtedly, RTC’s order imposed upon PR additional obligations which were not included or contemplated in the compromise
agreement. Thus, any modification or supplement thereto necessarily involves facts which were not agreed or covered by the
compromise agreement by the parties. Consequently, the consent of both parties are needed and when one as in this case is not in
conformity with it, the matter can be the subject of appeal

jAn Soriano
CASE NO. 4
Rule 39, Sec. 4 (Compromise Agreement)
AFPMBAI v. CA

FACTS: A complaint was filed by respondent EBR Realty, Inc (EBRRI) against B.E. Ritz Mansion International Corporation ("B.E. Ritz")
for specific performance, rescission and damages for the latter’s failure to finish a building on the date agreed upon for its
completion. Meanwhile, EBRRI assigned all rights, interest and participation of the building to the petitioner. A civil case was then
instituted by AFPMBAI but ended up with a compromise agreement. Petitioner filed with the RTC an omnibus motion praying for the
approval of the compromise agreement and was approved. EBRRI was not furnished with a copy of the agreement nor was notified
of the decision. He then moved to dismiss the agreement upon learning that it was unfavorable to him. RTC dismissed the motion
but was approved by the CA upon appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is unappealable.

RULING (IN BOLD): No. Adjective law governing judicial compromises annunciate that once approved by the court, a judicial
compromise is not appealable and it thereby becomes immediately executory but this rule must be understood to refer and apply
only to those who are bound by the compromise and, on the assumption that they are the only parties to the case, the litigation
comes to an end except only as regards to its compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations
thereunder.
Where there are, along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken
part in concluding the compromise agreement but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from
invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor. A motion to set aside the judgment to the extent he might feel
aggrieved or might justifiably fear to be at risk by acquiescence unless timely invoked, is such a remedy. A denial of the motion to set
aside the judgment on the compromise agreement opens the door for its possible elevation to a higher court. If the motion is
denied, he may, considering the special finality feature of the compromise judgment, albeit partial, and its susceptibility to
execution, take an appeal from the order of denial under Rule 45 or even, when circumstances particularly warrant, the
extraordinary remedy prescribed in Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.

AREEJ
CASE NO. 5
Rule 39 Sec 6
Laperal v. Ocampo

FACTS: Ocampo sold to Industrial Horizons, Inc. (Industrial Horizons), through its president, herein petitioner, all his shares of stock
in the Offshore Resources for P4M. Before the third installment became due, Industrial Horizons notified respondent that it was
suspending payment of the unpaid installments due to the governments suit for reversion and cancellation of TCTs. According to
Industrial Horizons, should the action instituted by the government succeed, the shares of Offshore Resources, which it purchased
from respondent, would be invalidated and worthless. Thus, Ocampo filed with the CFI a case (Ocampo v. Industrial Horizons), which
was decided in his favor. CA affirmed and CA’s decision (CA-G.R. CV No. 65913-R) became final and executory. 4 years, 8 months and
23 days from the finality of the CA decision, Ocampo filed a case against Laperal himself for the recovery of the balance. Trial court
ruled in favor of Ocampo. CA affirmed. Hence, the petition. Ocampo maintains that the petition should be dismissed outright on the
ground that the issue being raised, i.e., whether Industrial Horizons is an alter-ego or business conduit of petitioner, has been
resolved with finality in CA-G.R. CV No. 65913-R. Consequently, petitioner can be held liable for the payment to him of the balance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

RULING: Yes. Ocampo’s second complaint was instituted within the 5-year period from the finality of the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
65913-R. Thus, respondents present recourse is actually a motion for revival of judgment under Section 6, Rule 39 of the same Rules,
which provides: Petitioner raises the defense that Industrial Horizons is not his  alter ego, hence, he is not liable to respondent for
the unpaid balance This issue has been resolved by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65913-R, which has become final and
executory. It follows that the issue involved can no longer be litigated. An action to revive judgment is not meant to retry the case all
over again.14 Its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the merits of the original action.

AYEH
Case No. 6
Cortes v Dela Costa (G.R. No. L-46065, August 9, 1938)
RULE 39, Section 6
Sa lecture ni Judge 1939 ang case pero di ko yun mahanap at iba talaga yung 1938. 1 page lang ang case at walang revival of
judgement na nabanggit. ☹
FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the
hearing of the election contest filed against the other respondents by the petitioners herein.
The other petitioners and the other respondents, except the respondent judge, were candidates, in the same elections, for the office
of councilor, in the same municipality and province. A motion of protest was filed in time by the petitioners herein but was dismissed
by the respondent judge, upon motion by the protestees (the other respondent herein), on the ground of failure to allege the
jurisdictional fact that the said protestees were proclaimed elected candidates. Reconsideration of the order of dismissal was sought
but was refused.

ISSUE: WON dismissal was proper.

RULING: NO. The respondent judge correctly states that failure to allege in the motion of protest that the protestees were
proclaimed elected candidates is fatal to the protest. An examination of the motion of protest, however, shows that it contains
allegations from which the jurisdictional fact of proclamation may be clearly inferred. The language used could have been clearer
and more precise but the fact of proclamation of the protestees is there. Precision in pleadings is desirable but it is not to be
strictly required. A single fact may be alleged in different ways with the same effect.

Alcala
Rule 39 Section 6 – Revival of Judgment
7. Adelaida Infante v. Aran Builders Inc. GR No. 156596 (2007)

Facts: Aran Builders went before the Muntinlupa RTC for action for revival of judgement against Adelaida Infante. The judgement
sought to be revived was rendered by the Makati RTC in an action for specific performance and damages. The Makati RTC ruled in
favor of Aran Builders which ordered Infante to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of
Aran Builders, pay all pertinent taxes, register the deed of sale and deliver the certificate of title.
Infante filed a motion to dismiss (for revival of judgement) on the ground that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the
person of the parties. The motion to dismiss was denied. Muntinlupa RTC rationed that it is because at the time decision was
rendered by the Makati RTC, there was no RTC yet in Muntinlupa. Since now there is an RTC in Muntinlupa and the subject property
is located therein, Muntinlupa is a proper venue to file the complaint for revival of a judgement. Infante’s motion to dismiss was
denied, she now claims that CA acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action, therefor the suit to revive judgement is also personal
therefore jurisdiction lies in either Makati or Paranaque where they reside, at the election of the respondent.
Aran Builders claims that it is quasi in rem because it involves real property, thus venue lies in Muntinlupa
CA ruled in favor of Aran Builders, thus an appeal by Infante.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Muntinlupa is the proper venue for the present action for revival of judgment.

RULING: YES. Section 6, Rule 39 provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of judgement and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The rule however does not specific in
which court the action should be filed. Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present actions for
revival of judgement is a real action or a personal action. If it affects title or possession of real property or interest therein it is a
real action to be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located, if it does not fall under such category of real
actions, then it is a personal action to be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The allegations in the complaint will determine whether it is a real or personal action. The previous judgment has conclusively
declared Aran Builder’s right to have title over the property. The sole reason for the action is the enforcement of her rights over
the piece of realty, thus it falls under the category of a real action, and thus should be filed with the RTC of where the realty is
located. The RTC of Muntinlupa therefore has valid jurisdiction over the subject property and the revival of judgement.

Martin
Case No. 8
Rule 39, Sec. 8: Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. LIBERATO, JARAMILLO, ET AL.|G.R. Nos. L-18932-33-34; September 30, 1963

Facts: Petitioner initially filed before the CFI a complaint against respondent to recover possession of portions of a parcel of land
covered by a TCT. Respondents did not appeal in the said case hence it became final and executory. However, because of another
case where the CA granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition in favor of respondents due to the claim that they were among the
buyers in a compromise agreement executed with the original owner of the lot, thus they cannot be ejected from premises occupied
by them, notwithstanding the final decision the ejectment suits filed against them (suspension of execution). Thus, this petition for
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the CA has the power to suspend writs of execution already final and executory.

Ruling/Main Point: No. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, injunction and prohibition, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. But this is not the case, because the judgments in ejectment were already final and executory; and as
to the orders and writs of execution of said final judgments, the same are, likewise, not appealable. Having no jurisdiction over the
cases, the Court of Appeals' consolidated decision now before us is without authority in law; hence, it is null and void. Furthermore,
whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to order that its ejectment decisions executed, and whether the facts alleged
were sufficient causes for suspending the execution of the judgments ejectment, even if already final, and whether the Court of
First Instance abused its discretion in refusing to suspend execution, are pure questions of law that lay within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

AR
CASE NO. 9
SECTION 8 RULE 39 (REMEDY IN CASE OF DENIAL OF WRIT OF EXECUTION)
ARTURO DELA CRUZ, SR. VS. MARTIN AND FLORA FANKHAUSER

FACTS: Petitioner dela Cruz entered into a contract of lease with option to buy with respondents over a parcel of residential land in
Puerto Princesa City. The respondents did not advance the monthly amount of P18,000.00. Hence, petitioner sought the rescission
of the contract, which was granted by the RTC. On appeal, the CA found that petitioner's claim for rescission was premature. CA set
aside the decision of the RTC.

The CA Decision became final and executory. Respondents communicated to petitioner that 2 checks covering the balance of the
price and the rental arrears were already ready for petitioner to claim. Petitioner did not claim the checks but instead moved for the
execution of the CA Decision. RTC granted the motion for execution.

Petitioner elevated to the CA by notice of appeal. He claimed that the order of execution issued by the RTC varied the judgment of
the CA. CA dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy because no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.

RULING: YES.
General Rule:
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court indeed states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.

Exception:
HOWEVER, there are certain instances when an appeal from an order of execution should be allowed, to wit:
1. Where such order of execution in the opinion of the defeated party varies the terms of the judgment and does not
conform to the essence thereof, or
2. When the terms of the judgment are not clear and there is room for interpretation and the interpretation given by the trial
court as contained in its order of execution is wrong in the opinion of the defeated party,

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the appeal made by petitioner from the RTC order of execution, on the ground that it varied
the judgment, is permissible and the CA should not have perfunctorily dismissed it.

EC
CASE NO. 10
BINAY vs. ODEÑA | RULE 39, SEC. 8

FACTS: in a Decision dated 08 June 2007 (hereinafter, the 2007 Decision)— SC ruled therein that respondent had been illegally
dismissed and was thus ordered to be reinstated and paid her backwages computed from date of dismissal up to date of
reinstatement, but in no case to exceed five (5) years. After the promulgation of the 2007 Decision, CSC, upon motion of
respondent, directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate respondent to her former position and cause the
payment of all her salaries and other benefits. The directive, however, was not complied with. A letter complaint was filed by
respondent to the CSC. CSC ruled in favor of respondent, and directed petitioner to pay her backwages and other. CSC, in its
Resolution No. 082264, stated that the 5-year limit was inequitable. Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA and argued in
the main that the CSC Resolutions were violative of the doctrine of res judicata. CA dismissed the Rule 43 Petition. The CA regarded
the CSC Resolutions, issued in relation to respondent’s Letter-Complaint, as orders of execution of the final and executor. Thus,
petitioner’s recourse to a Rule 43 Petition was unavailing, because orders of execution cannot be the subject of appeal, the proper
remedy being a Rule 65 petition.

ISSUE: Whether CA committed grave error when it denied petitioner’s appeal for being the wrong remedy.

RULING: YES. Athough the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, there are exceptions. A writ of execution is
a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate of the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment.
By analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in connection with the implementation of this Court’s
2007 Decision.

The enumerated the exceptions as follows:

(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

xxxx

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party
aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari),
or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

In the instant case, the appeal of the CSC Resolutions under Rule 43 is proper on two (2) points: (1) they varied the 2007 Decision
and (2) the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied.

First, the CSC Resolutions have varied the 2007 Decision, considering that instead of directing the payment of backwages for a period
not exceeding five (5) years, the CSC ordered petitioner to pay an amount equivalent to almost eight (8) years.

Second, the judgment debt arising from the 2007 Decision has been satisfied as respondent has already received payment from
petitioner the amount of ₱558,944.19, representing her back salaries not exceeding five (5) years, as computed by petitioner.

All these circumstances require a factual review of the manner of the execution of the 2007 Decision, which should have prompted
the CA to take cognizance of the appeal. Clearly, these circumstances fall under the above-quoted enumeration of the exceptions to
the general rule that an order of execution is not subject to appeal. Thus, the CA committed grave error when it denied petitioner’s
appeal for being the wrong remedy.

ARZHY
Case No. 11
Section 8 Rule 39: Issuance, Form, and Content of Writ of Execution
Socorro v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-23608, December 24, 1964

FACTS: While petitioner’s appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
dividing the subject forest area between them. Not furnished with the copy of the compromise agreement, CA rendered a Decision
awarding the forest area to petitioner. This decision was in conflict with the Resolution subsequently issued by SC approving the
compromise agreement. When petitioner filed a motion for execution of the Decision of CA, CFI denied. CFI was of the view that as
between the decision of the CA and the SC approving the compromise agreement, SC should prevail. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before CA which dismissed the petition on two grounds: 1) appeal and not certiorari was the remedy available to
petitioner; and 2) petition filed was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari to review the
decision of CA.

ISSUE: W/N a petition for certiorari filed before CA is the proper remedy for the denial of CFI of a motion for execution

(1964 one-liner decision of SC

RULING: NO. From a denial of a motion for execution of a judgment, appeal not certiorari is the proper remedy.
after the sangkatutak na facts)

The lower court was correct in refusing to order the execution of the Court of Appeals decision which would have run counter to SC’s
resolution approving the compromise agreement. DISMISSED.

FRED CASE 12
Rule 141, Sec. 10 (duty of Sheriff) was correlated with Rule 39, Sec 9
Aranda v. Alvarez, A.M. No. P-04-1889
FACTS: This case involves an ejectment suit granted in favour of plaintiff Aranda. MTC then issued a writ of demolition ordering
sheriff Abaigar to destroy the improvements. Later a complaint was filed against Abaigar charging him with grave misconduct for his
act of demanding P 40K for the execution of the writ.

ISSUE: w/n Sheriffs can unilaterally demand and receive payments from parties for the execution of the writ absent court
approval?

RULING: NO. Under Section 10 of Rule 141, the sheriff is required to secure the court’s prior approval of the estimated expenses
and fees needed to implement the court process. 

13. CEBU INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. vs CA

GR 123031 (1999)
RULE 39, SEC 9

FACTS: Cebu International Finance Corporation (CIFC), a quasi-banking institution, is engaged in money market operations.
Vicente Alegre invested with CIFC P500,000 in cash. CIFC issued promissory note which covered private respondent’s placement,
then issued BPI Check No. 513397 (the subject check) in favor of private respondent as proceeds of his matured investment. Mrs.
Alegre deposited the Check with RCBC but BPI dishonored it, annotating therein that the “Check is subject of an investigation”. BPI
took possession of the Check pending investigation of several counterfeit checks drawn against CIFC’s checking account. Private
respondent demanded from CIFC that he be paid in cash but the latter refused, prompting him to file a case for recovery of a sum of
money against CIFC; and formally filed against BPI a separate civil action for collection of a sum of money. It alleged that BPI
unlawfully deducted from CIFC’s checking account counterfeit checks.

CIFC in its response to Alegre’s complaint, filed for leave of court and impleaded BPI to enforce a right, for contribution and
indemnity. (GRANTED BUT LATER ON DISMISSED UPON MOTION OF BPI)

During the hearing, BPI through its Manager, testified that BPI encashed and deducted the said amount from the account of CIFC,
but the proceeds, as well as the check remained in BPI’s custody. This was alleged in accordance with the Compromise Agreement
it entered with CIFC to end the litigation in RTC-Makati Branch.

RTC: rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent. CA affirmed. Thus this petition.

CIFC asserts that since BPI accepted the instrument, the bank became primarily liable for the payment of the Check. When BPI offset
the value of the Check against the losses from the forged checks allegedly committed by private respondent, the Check was deemed
paid.

ISSUE: W/N “BPI Check No. 513397” was validly discharged

RULING: NO. When the bank deducted the amount of the CHECK from CIFC’s current account, this did not ipso facto operate as a
discharge or payment of the instrument. Although the value of the CHECK was deducted from the funds of CIFC, it was not delivered
to the payee, Vicente Alegre. Instead, BPI offset the amount against the losses it incurred from forgeries of CIFC checks, allegedly
committed by Alegre. The confiscation of the value of the check was agreed upon by CIFC and BPI. The parties intended to
amicably settle the collection suit filed by CIFC with the RTC-Makati, Branch 147, by entering into a compromise agreement. A
compromise is a contract/ an agreement between two or more persons who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust
their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers in the hope of gaining,
balanced by the danger of losing. The compromise agreement could not bind a party who did not sign the compromise agreement
nor avail of its benefits.

Thus, the stipulations in the compromise agreement is unenforceable against Vicente Alegre, not a party thereto. His money
could not be the subject of an agreement between CIFC and BPI. Although Alegre’s money was in custody of the bank, the bank’s
possession of it was not in the concept of an owner. BPI cannot validly appropriate the money as its own.

BPI’s confiscation of Alegre’s money constitutes garnishment without the parties going through a valid proceeding in court.
Garnishment is an attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim the property of the defendant in the
hands of a third person or money owed to such third person or a garnishee to the defendant. The garnishment procedure must be
upon proper order of RTC-Makati, Branch 62, the court who had jurisdiction over the collection suit filed by BPI against Alegre.

In effect, CIFC has not yet tendered a valid payment of its obligation to the private respondent. Tender of payment involves a
positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender currency as payment to the obligee for the former’s
obligation and demanding that the latter accept the same. Tender of payment cannot be presumed by a mere inference from
surrounding circumstances. Hence, CIFC is still liable for the payment of the check. 

AIRA
CASE NO. 14
RULE 39, SEC. 9
PNB MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORP. (PNB MADECOR) vs. R&R METAL CASTING and FABRICATING, INC., 373 SCRA 1,
January 02, 2002

FACTS: R&R Metal Casting and Fabricating, Inc. (R&R) obtained a judgment in its favor against Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI).
PNEI was then ordered to pay respondent. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied since PNEI did not have enough
property to cover the execution. Subsequently, R&R filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of subpoenae duces tecum
and ad testificandum requiring PNB MADECOR to produce and testify on certain documents pertaining to transactions between
petitioner and PNEI from 1981 to 1995. From this, it was discovered that petitioner executed a promissory note in favor of PNEI for
P7.8 million, and that PNB MADECOR also had receivables from PNEI in the form of unpaid rentals amounting to more than P7.5
million. On the basis of said testimony, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the application of funds or properties of
PNEI, its judgment debtor, in the hands of PNB MADECOR for the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of respondent. The trial court
issued an order garnishing the amount owed by petitioner to PNEI under the promissory note, to satisfy the judgment against PNEI
and in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner became a forced intervenor in this case.

RULING: YES. Garnishment consists in the citation of some stranger to the litigation, who is debtor to one of the parties to the
action. By this means such debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor; and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over his person
by means of citation, requires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main
litigation. It is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another. Upon principle the remedy is a
species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to a judgment debtor which may be found owing to such
debtor by a third person.

ANGELO
Case No. 15
RULE 39. EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

CASE NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. GRANTED.

FACTS: Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, a domestic corporation obtained from Maceren a loan. As security for the loan, petitioner
executed a promissory note and a mortgage. The loan, together with the promissory note and the mortgage, were later assigned by
Maceren to the Commercial Credit Corporation of Cagayan de Oro (Commercial Credit).

Petitioner failed to pay the loan when it became due, hence, the Commercial Credit commenced foreclosure proceedings. Five
stockholders of Cagayan de Oro Coliseum sought to enjoin the public sale of the corporate property alleging that the loan was
contracted by Imperio, the president of the corporation, without authority from the stockholders; and that the creditor, Maceren,
was corporate treasurer and a member of the Board of Directors of petitioner corporation at the time the loan was obtained.

Commercial Credit filed with now RTC Cagayan De Oro City, an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution on the ground
of the failure of Coliseum to pay several installments on its loan.

Branch Clerk of Court issued a Writ of Execution the. The deputy sheriff filed a notice of levy on Coliseum’s title with the Register of
Deeds of CDO. HOWEVER, the execution order was not filed with the Register of Deeds prior to the execution sale.

ISSUE: Whether the execution proceedings and the auction sale were null and void for failure to comply with the levy and notice
requirements of the Rules of Court.

RULING: YES. In executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff shall LEVY on all property
belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and SELL the same paying to the judgment
creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.
To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific things: (1) file with the register of deeds a copy of the order
of attachment or execution, together with the description of the attached property and notice of attachment or execution; and (2)
leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice. These are prerequisites to a valid levy,
non-compliance with any of which is fatal.

In the instant case, the execution sale of the subject property was made pursuant to the order of execution of November 26, 1986
and the writ of execution of December 4, 1986. The November 26, 1986 execution order and the corresponding writ of execution
were not filed with the Register of Deeds before the auction sale of February 13, 1987. The order of November 26, 1986 was filed
and inscribed on petitioner's title only on December 7, 1988 — exactly one (1) year and ten (10) months after the execution sale of
February 13, 1987.

Since this order was not filed with the Register of Deeds prior to the execution sale, it follows that the levy was not effected and
the execution sale of February 13, 1987 proceeded without a levy. A lawful levy on execution is indispensable to a valid sale on
execution. In other words, a sale, unless preceded by a valid levy, is void, and the purchaser acquires no title to the property sold.
Without a proper levy, the property is not placed under the authority of the court. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the property subject of execution; hence, it could not transmit title thereto at the time of the sale. Where in the instant case no
jurisdiction was acquired over the subject property, the execution sale was void and of no legal effect.

LEVY means the essential act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the property of the
judgment debtor for purposes of the prospective execution sale. The OBJECT OF A LEVY is to take property into the custody of the
law, and thereby renders it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any
other use or purpose. A valid levy on execution places the property subject of execution under the jurisdiction and authority of the
court. It also creates a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property
at the time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing.

Just
Case No. 16
Rule 39; Section 10
San Manuel Wood Products (SMWPI) INC vs Judge Tupas A.M. No. MTJ-93-892

FACTS: Complainant  San Manuel Wood Products, Inc., (a losing defendant in  Civil Case No. 424-B-92 ) charged Judge Ramon B.
Tupas and the sheriff with GAD. While the motion for immediate execution was pending in the MTCC, complainant filed a "Notice of
Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond to stay the execution of the June 3, 1993 Decision. The notice of appeal and the
supersedeas bond were approved by respondent judge.

On August 11, 1993, respondent judge issued a special order granting plaintiffs’ motion for a writ of execution pending appeal. The
August 11, 1993 Special Order, was received by complainant on September 7, 1993. The writ of execution was issued on September
9, 1993.18 the following day, the writ was served by respondent sheriff against the complainant.

Issue: W/N or not sheriff committed an error for immediately serving the writ of execution the day after the judgment was rendered
since it doesn’t fall within a reasonable time?

Ruling:Yes We have ruled that “the immediate enforcement of a writ of ejectment execution is carried out by giving the defendant a
notice of such writ and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a reasonable period, normally from three (3) to
five (5) days, and it is only after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant and his
personal belongings.” This was disregarded by respondent sheriff. Thus,respondent sheriff should be sternly warned for his
infraction to avoid a repetition of similar arbitrariness on his part.

MACY
17. Rule 39 Section 10
A.M. No. P-99-1293 or Dilan v Sherif Dulfo

FACTS: An Administrative Complaint is filed by Emilio Dilan and Lucila Cadalin-Dilan against Juan R. Dulfo, Sheriff IV of the Regional
Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Alleging that respondent sheriff had failed to implement the Writ of Execution issued in their
favor, complainants now charge him with dereliction of duty.
Office of the Court Administrator: found the Complaint meritorious and recommended that a fine of P10,000 be imposed upon the
respondent. Although respondent sheriff executed a Document of Delivery attesting to the fact that complainants were place in
actual possession of the property in question, the defendants were still not removed from the subject premises because of their
adamant refusal to vacate. Based RULE 39 respondent sheriff is duty bound to fully enforce the writ by placing the judgment obligee
in possession of the property involved and causing the judgment obligor to pay the monthly rentals as mandated in the decision
concerned. Respondent sheriff should have continued to implement the writ of execution despite the adamant refusal of the parties
to vacate the premises in question.

ISSUE: WON the recommendation of the OCA must be given merit

RULING: Yes. Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice, because they are tasked to execute the final
judgments of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are empty victories on the part of the prevailing parties. Indeed, the
execution of a final judgment is "the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law." Thus, the sheriff charged with this task
must act with considerable dispatch, so as not to delay the administration of justice.
Pursuant to the Writ and the Rules of Court, respondent should have ousted the Basada spouses from the subject house and lot. This
he did not do. That they "adamantly refused" to vacate the premises was not an adequate excuse. Indeed, it was incumbent upon
him to employ such means as may be reasonably necessary to enforce the Writ. The records show that he was accompanied and
assisted by SPO3 Gregorio Almejas 17 and, together, they could have taken the necessary steps to implement the order fully. That it
remained unenforced despite the presence of the police officer is a further testament to his dereliction of duty.

The fact that he himself handed a copy of the Writ to the defendants and filed his Return of Service does not mean that he had
discharged his duty. The essence of his job was to give the complainants full control and possession of the subject house and lot. But
he miserably failed to do this. Furthermore, he failed to utilize the aid of the police officer, who was with him at the time for the
specific purpose of enforcing the Writ. Worse, respondent has the temerity to declare that it was "returned satisfied." Not only did
he fail to enforce it; he also revealed a faulty grasp of the basic concepts and duties of his office.

Gomez
Case no. 18
Failure of Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution
Legaspi v. Tobillo
A.M. P-05-1978, March 31, 2005

FACTS: This is an administrative case against respondent Sheriff-Tovillo for its alleged grave neglect to execute the writ of possession
in a Civil Case R-4240.

Complainant-Petitioner was the counsel of Sps. Panganiban under Civil Case of R-4240, wherein a writ of attachment was ordered
against the property of therein defendant, Sps. Bautista. The RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Panganiban and ordered Sheriff Latorza to
execute the decision through a writ of execution, which involves the payment of sum of money in favor of the Sps. Panganiban

In conforming with the order, Sheriff Latorza sold the property through an execution sale, wherein the Sps. Panganiban obtained the
highest bid. The Sps. Bautista failed to redeem the property within the 1 year redemption period.

Sps. Panganiban, through Petitioner Counsel, asked the court for the writ of possession of the land. This now has been referred to
Respondent Sheriff Tobillo, who replaced Sheriff Latorza. Respondent then served this writ of possession to Sps. Bautista but the
latter failed to conform with it as there was another party who is claiming the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Sheriff is not administratively liable for its failure to execute the writ of possession, on such
reason that there is a 3rd party intervenor.

RULING: NO. The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no discretion on whether
or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" its implementation.

Sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed
in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with
their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible.Their unreasonable failure or neglect to
perform such function constitutes inefficiency and gross neglect of duty.

Pastor
 Case No. 19
Rule 39, Section 10
Alvarez vs. Diaz
424 SCRA 213, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283 March 3, 2004

FACTS: On October 27, 1995, spouses Domingo and Celia Garcia filed a complaint for forcible entry against the tenants of
complainant Alvarez before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC). The case was raffled to Branch 37 presided over by
herein respondent Judge Diaz. Respondent Judge Diaz rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering complainant Alvarez
and his co-defendants, Charlie Robles and Marlyn Cortez to (a) immediately vacate the subject premises. Respondent deputy sheriff
submitted to the MeTC his Sheriff’s Report stating that he had served copies of the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate on the
defendants but they refused to vacate, insisting that they owned the houses and other structures erected thereon. The following
day, plaintiffs filed an ex parte Motion for Demolition. The notice of hearing of the motion for execution, however, was addressed
only to the clerk of court and not to the parties. Respondent sheriff, with the help of several men, demolished all the houses,
structures and improvements on the subject premises, and turned over its possession to the plaintiffs. Feeling that an injustice had
been done to him, complainant Alvarez filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge Diaz questioning the order granting
plaintiff’s Motion for Execution despite a perfected notice of appeal filed by complainant and failure to furnish a copy of the same to
the complainant.

ISSUE: Should Judge Diaz have acted upon the motion for execution?

HELD: No. Even if there was no perfected Notice of Appeal and payment of the supersedeas bond, respondent judge should not have
granted plaintiff's Motion for Execution because it was fatally defective. Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 5. Notice of Hearing. ― The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of
the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

It is well-settled that any motion with a notice of hearing that is not addressed to all parties, in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, is a mere scrap of paper which should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance.

If personal service of the motion was made upon complainant's counsel, then proof of service thereof consisting of any of the
following should have been presented to the court, together with the Motion for Execution:

Section 13. Proof of service. ― x x x [1] a written admission of the party served, [2] the official return of the server, or [3] the
affidavit of the party serving containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service x x x.

None of the above was presented. Thus, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which mandates the "no written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof," the motion for execution should not have
been acted upon by the respondent judge.

The above-stated rule is clear and requires no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must first be a hearing, upon motion
and with due notice, for the issuance of a special order for demolition. In the present case, respondent judge immediately granted
plaintiff’s Motion for Demolition without any notice and hearing. Clearly, his actuation amounted to gross ignorance of the law.

RYLE
CASE 20
RULE 39, SEC. 10 (EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR SPECIFIC ACT)
CAMAROTE V. GLORIOSO

FACTS: Camarote, GM of KCW Plastics complained about the act of respondent Sheriff Glorioso when he headed the dismantling of
the former’s machineries pursuant to a Notice of Execution involving a civil case concerning CWB Plastics. Despite being informed
that KCW was not a party of said case, the Sheriff still had their machineries levied. Respondent denied the allegations claiming that
one of the defendants in the civil case, Soon Weon Seo, stated his address to be at KCW Plastics, and went there to execute the Writ
of Execution. The machinery/equipment attached by him were covered by a contract to sell executed by BJ Plastics in favor of Soon.
Office of the Court Administrator found respondent sheriff guilty of abuse of authority and serious misconduct.

ISSUE: W/N the Sheriff can be held liable for such actions.

RULING: No. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs of execution is ministerial and not discretionary. However, alleged errors in the
levy of properties do not necessarily give rise to liability if circumstances exist showing that the erroneous levy was done in good
faith. Respondent sheriff had basis for believing that KCW Plastics and Soon Weon Seo, the judgment debtor in another Civil Case,
had identical interest in the machinery/equipment levied by him. It cannot be said that, in levying on the properties in question to
enforce the writ of execution in Civil Case against Soon Weon Seo, respondent sheriff acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
authority. Contrary to complainants claim, the fact that the machinery/equipment in question were subsequently attached by virtue
of a writ of preliminary attachment issued by Branch 14 in Civil Case No. 692-M-2000 in which Soon Weon Seo and/or KCW Plastics
Corporation are defendants underscores their common interest on the said machinery/equipment.

Execution of judgment may be done when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of
the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after the hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a
reasonable time fixed by the court.

RECHINE
CASE NO. 21.
RULE 39: SECTION 10
Vda. De TISADO v. TABLIZO, A.M. No. P-94-1025

FACTS: complainant and her now deceased-husband were the plaintiffs in an Agrarian Case, in which a decision was rendered
ordering defendants-spouses to reinstate plaintiffs to the land holding in question and for the other defendants not to interfere.

Complainant alleged that in spite of several alias writs of execution, the foregoing decision was not enforced. Hence, after the lapse
of five years, an action for revival of judgment was filed with the RTC, 

Consequently, respondent Tablizo, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff, issued a writ of execution on November 4, 1992.

Complainant insisted that said respondent was not serious in performing his duties, but instead, was persistently convincing her to
give up the land in favor of defendants. 

Respondent alleged that after the turn-over and while the property was being fenced, defendant (who allegedly had refused to sign
the turn over certificate), armed with a bolo, together with his wife, entered the land, destroyed the fence and prohibited all those
present including respondent sheriff and complainant from entering the land. To avoid any untoward incident, he (Trampe) decided
to leave the premises. 

ISSUE: W/N Sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement the writ.

RULING: YES. The mere fact that defendants, in a threatening manner, prohibited respondent Trampe from entering the premises is
no excuse for him to retreat and refuse to enforce the writ of execution. A deputy sheriff is a front-line representative of the justice
system in this country. If he shows fear, or worse, is cowed by mere threats from enforcing the legitimate orders of courts, then
by his cowardly act, he diminishes the judiciary. He erodes the faith and trust of the citizenry in the ability and capacity of the
courts to settle disputes and to safeguard their rights. Specifically, he breaches his sworn duty to uphold the majesty of the law and
the integrity of the justice system.

WEE
CASE NO. 22
RULE 39, SEC. 13
Gomez, et al. v. Gealone, et al. ǀ G.R. L-58281, 13 November 1991

FACTS: Plaintiffs-appellees Gomez, et al. filed a complaint to recover from defendants-appellants Gealone, et al. a parcel of land.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs-appellees which became final and executory. Upon defendants-appellants failure
to pay the actual damages and their shares in the costs of the suit, the Provincial Sheriff levied the following properties: (1) an
agricultural land; and (2) a residential land, including the residential house. The Provincial Sheriff issued a Notice of Public Auction
Sale. Plaintiffs-appellees were the highest bidders. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
Final Bill of Sale in favor of the highest bidders. Plaintiffs-appellees filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Defendants-
appellants filed with the trial court an "Appearance and Manifestations" taking exceptions "on the proceedings in this case from the
levy on execution of the real properties owned by the defendants arguing that the residential house and the land (on) which the
building was constructed is a family home or homestead exempt from execution. Consequently, defendants-appellants filed a
Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale assailing that the property is exempt from execution. Plaintiffs-appellees opposed alleging
therein that the failure to assert or claim the right to the exemption granted under Section 12 (a) of Rule 39 of the Revised RoC
within a reasonable time constituted an abandonment or waiver thereof, and that there is no merit to the other contentions of
defendants.

ISSUE: May a sheriffs sale on execution of properties of a judgment debtor be set aside after the period of redemption had expired
on the ground that the properties are exempt from execution?

RULING: Consequently, it should have been excluded from execution. Unfortunately, they did not assert their right to claim
exemption until six (6) months after the lapse of the one-year period to redeem the property. Although the Rules of Court does
not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the
time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter:
In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim [for exemption] must be made at the time of the levy if
the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step
involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale,
or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority.
It is now ruled that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be
presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.

CHAM
Case No. 23
Rule 39, Section 13
Ibasco/Tampingco vs. Hon. Caguioa/Cruz
FACTS
Petitioners are the lessees of a residential house which they had leased from the spouses Garcia. They had been paying
monthly rentals religiously and were unaware of the fact that the Garcias had mortgaged the property with respondent Banco
Filipino Savings and that because of non-payment, the mortgage had been foreclosed, and that the redemption period had already
expired.
The petitioners elevated the case, claiming that the RTC had abused its discretion in issuing the writ of possession.
Petitioners raise that:

a. (1) Act 3135 (re the grant of the writ of possession) was impliedly repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 (the House Rental
Law);

b. (2) The writ of possession may be granted only in a land registration case, not in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage.

c. (3) Their petition is the only adequate remedy for them in this case

ISSUE
whether or not a mortgage, who has foreclosed upon the mortgaged real property of a delinquent debtor and has
purchased the same at the foreclosure sale, can be granted a writ of possession over the property  despite the fact that the premises
are in the possession of a lessee thereof and whose lease has not as yet been terminated.

RULING/MAIN POINT
Yes. unless the lease had been previously registered in the Registry of Property or unless despite non-registration, the
mortgagee had prior knowledge of the existence and duration of the lease (actual knowledge being equivalent to registration).

With reference to the alleged repeal, SC says there is no such repeal, there being nothing inconsistent between the two
laws. Act 3135 provides for the procedure in extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages, while Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 refers to the
maximum rent in certain leases and to grounds for ejectment. While it is true that under the latter law, there can be no ejectment of
the lessee simply because the property has been sold or mortgaged to another, it is different if as a result of said mortgage, the
same has been foreclosed upon, as provided for in Act 3135 which expressly grants the issuance of a writ of possession (without
prejudice to the rights of a lessee under the Civil Code). Besides, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 can in no case apply here because the
rental of the property is P1,500.00 monthly (far in excess of the P300.00 rent regulated by the Batas).
 Anent the contention that the writ of possession can be obtained only in a land registration case, suffice it to say that in
Section 7 of Act 3135, the writ of possession will be issued only in the land registration or cadastral proceedings of the property
involved. This is precisely what has been done in the instant case. Section 7, hereinabove referred to, reads as follows:

In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the
province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve
months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without complying with the
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made oath and filed in form of an ex-parte motion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is  registered. ...

Lastly, by virtue of Article 1648 of the Civil Code, the petitioners herein could have continued in their possession as lessees
if the lease had been registered in the Registry of Property, or if the existence and duration of the lease had been known to Banco
Filipino.

COELI
CASE NO. 24
RULE 39, SEC. 14: RETURN OF WRIT
SPS. BIGLETE vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MAPUTI, JR.

FACTS: (yung petitioners ata sumalo ng bond sa isang criminal case. kulang details ng full text, di sinabi kung anong connect nila sa
criminal case)
 Sps. Biglete alleged that the RTC Dumaguete City issued a "Subsidiary Writ of Execution" in Criminal Case "People v. Joseph
Cabrera," for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
 Respondent sheriff garnished complainants' deposit with the Chinabank. However, instead of turning over the amount to the
Clerk of Court as mandated by the Rules, respondent misappropriated the same for his own benefit. Worse, he failed to make a
return of the writ within the required 30-day period as shown by the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court.
 Since the money judgment was not satisfied in full, respondent sent a notice to the complainants that their parcel of land is
being levied upon. He then conducted a public auction sale.
 Court Administrator: ruled that respondent violated the procedure on execution provided for in the Rules of Court. First,
respondent failed to turn over the money garnished for deposit with the Clerk of Court who issued the writ. Second, he did not
make a return of service of the writ to the Court. These are basic procedures which herein respondent failed to follow in the
execution of the judgment.

ISSUE: W/N respondent is liable for serious misconduct in office, gross neglect of duty.

RULING: YES. Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the sheriff is mandated, not only to make a
return of the writ to the court immediately upon satisfaction of the judgment, but also to report, within thirty (30) days after his
receipt of the writ, the reason why the judgment cannot be satisfied in full. The sheriff shall continue making a report every thirty
(30) days on the execution proceedings until the judgment is fully satisfied.
The raison d' etre behind this requirement is to update the court on the status of the execution and to take necessary steps to
ensure the speedy execution of decisions.
Here, respondent sheriff admitted that he failed to make a return of the writ and to submit a periodic report to the court every thirty
(30) days.

jAn Soriano
CASE NO. 25
Rule 39, Sec. 14
Escobar v. Luna, Hernandez | AM No. P-04-1786

FACTS: After gaining a favorable judgement in filing a complaint for easement of way, Escobar sought the execution thereof pending
appeal complying with the required posting of bond. 2 months later, she inquired with the Clerk of Court, Luna, about the execution.
The latter responded that the writ of execution was not issued because Escobar wasn’t able to pay the docket fees. After paying the
docket fees, Escobar called the Sherriff, Hernandez, upon knowing from Luna that the writ of execution was already with him. She
contacted the Sherriff but was told to contact him after one week because he was busy with other legal documents. Subsequently,
Luna informed Escobar that the writ of execution cannot be issued since a TRO was issued by the CA. After the TRO had expired,
Luna still refused to implement the writ without any order from the court. Escobar then filed a complaint against Luna and
Hernandez for her believed that the writ of execution was already made and issued to the sheriff for implementation when in fact
they delayed the same so that it will be overtaken by a TRO to the prejudice and damage of the complainant. RTC judge ruled in
favor of Escobar,

ISSUE: W/N respondents were negligent in the performance of their duties.

RULING (IN BOLD): Yes. While it may be true that under Rule 141, Sec. 9, the payment of One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱150.00) is
necessary "for executing a writ or process to place a party in possession of real estates," the same is not sine qua non requirement in
the issuance of the writ of execution. As can be noted from the above cited rule, the same is addressed to "Sheriffs and other
persons serving processes." Atty. Luna should have at least notified and/or informed the complainant or her lawyer of the necessity
of the payment if she believed it to be so.
With regards to the Sheriff, his duty is ministerial. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff it is his duty, in the
absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. He is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion, much less authority to grant a
judgment debtor a grace period within which to settle his obligation.

AREEJ

CASE NO. 26

RULE 39 SEC 14

Sandoval v. Ignacio | A.M. No. P-04-1878

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against Alfonso H. Ignacio, Jr., Sheriff IV of RTC Dumaguete. Sandol charges Ignacio with
Dereliction of Duty and Grave Misconduct because in the MCTC’s decision on a Civil Case where Sandoval was a plaintiff, an order for
the issuance of a writ of execution was issued on July 7, 1995. Accordingly, Ignacio wrote a letter to Sandoval’s counsel requesting
money to be used for the service of the writ, for which Sandoval gave P1200. The writ was served but Ignacio was not able to
enforce the writ and judgment was not fully executed. Ignacio denying that he failed to serve the  Writ of Execution  and to submit a
return therefor. According to him, he filed a return on February 9, 1996 handwritten at the bottom the writ itself. Considering that
the lifetime of writs of execution under the old Rules of Court was sixty (60) days, the writ expired on February 25, 1996, as it was
received by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on December 27, 1995. Upon investigation the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) acknowledges that Ignacio made a handwritten return but that he failed to file the same within the time fixed by the old Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ignacio is guilty of grave misconduct and dereliction of duty.

RULING: YES. Section 11, Rule 39 of the old Rules of Court requires the officer making the return to do two things: 1) to make a
return setting forth the whole of the proceedings taken by virtue of the writ of execution; and 2) to file the same with the clerk of
court or the judge who issued the writ. The Court finds that the Writ of Execution  was returned unsatisfied. Ignacio testified that he
gave the defendants (in the civil case involving Sandoval) a grace period within which to vacate, and that full implementation of the
Writ of Execution was not served because several motions were unresolved by the Court. Firstly, he is to execute the order of the
court strictly to the letter. Secondly, assuming that there were unresolved motions was still duty bound to execute the writ according
to its mandate, in the absence of a restraining order or any instructions to the contrary. Further, Ignacio received the amount
of P1,200.00 from Sandoval without issuing an official receipt therefor, depositing the amount with the clerk of court and making a
liquidation or accounting thereof up to the present. The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the
expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the
Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within
the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the
deposit. Here, Ignacio did not make an estimate of the expenses and issued a mere handwritten Temporary Receipt.

AYEH
Case No. 27
Pasok v Diaz (A.M. No. P-07-2300 December 12, 2011)
RULE 39, Section 14
FACTS: Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok (complainant) against respondent Carlos P. Diaz
(respondent), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacurong City, Branch 20 for Dishonesty, Gross Inefficiency, Abuse of
Authority and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The charges stemmed from numerous cases wherein respondent sheriff allegedly extorted money from winning litigants on the
pretext that said amounts will cover the costs of implementing writs of execution. Complainant averred that if parties failed to pay
the amounts demanded, respondent would also refuse to perform his duty. OCA recommended that Diaz be dismissed from service
for having been found guilty of grave misconduct. It further recommended the filing of corresponding criminal charges against Diaz
for violation of R.A. 3019.

ISSUE: WON the respondent should be dismissed.

RULING: YES. Sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their
duties. Furthermore, it must be stressed anew that the duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial.
Sheriffs have no discretion on whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" its
implementation. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the
execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
It is imperative that a sheriff shall observe the following: (1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by
him; (2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the
interested party with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing
sheriff; and (5) the executing sheriff shall disburse/liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the
writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.

Alcala
Rule 39 Section 14 - Return of writ of execution.
28. GARCIA v. YAREDAM (MTC Sheriff) AM No P-01-1492
FACTS: Complainant is the President and Manager of the Rural Bank of Negros Oriental, Inc., which is the plaintiff and prevailing
party in the Civil Cases Nos. 334, 328, 352 and 367, all for collection of sum of money and damages. He claims that the judgments in
said civil cases remain unsatisfied since the writs of execution therein are not being implemented properly and efficiently by
respondent sheriff. OCA recommends that respondent be reprimanded for his failure to serve the alias writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 328. Court agrees with the conclusion of the OCA that respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and grave abuse of authority for his
failure to serve the alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 328 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 334, 352 and 367.
ISSUE: W/N respondent sheriff is guilty of neglect of duty and grave abuse of authority for his failure to serve the alias writ of
execution.
RULING: YES. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly mandates the manner in which a writ of execution
is to be returned to court, as well as the requisite reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, should the judgment be returned
unsatisfied or only partially satisfied. In any case, every 30 days until the full satisfaction of a judgment, the sheriff or officer must
make a periodic report to the court on the proceedings taken in connection with the writ.
Respondent grievously failed to comply with the mandate of the Rules on periodic reporting. His reports were submitted
sporadically such that the plaintiff bank in Civil Cases Nos. 334, 328, 352 and 367 was not regularly informed of the actions taken
to satisfy the judgment in its favor. Therefore, the presumption of regularity of performance of duty cannot be considered in favor
of respondent. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Unless restrained by a
court order to the contrary, sheriffs should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
A sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no
discretion whether to execute the judgment or not.

Martin
Case No. 29
 Rule 39, Sec. 14: Return of writ of execution
MARIÑAS vs. FLORENDO| A.M. No. P-07-2304; February 12, 2009

Facts: Petitioner charged respondent (sheriff assigned to implement the writ) with neglect of duty relative to the implementation of
the writ of execution issued by the RTC in a civil case the former filed against a certain Zaplan. Respondent allegedly failed to
implement the writ for about three (3) years at the time of the filing of her complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the Sheriff failed to enforce the writ of execution without delay.

Ruling: Yes. A review of the records of this case reveals that the Writ of Execution was issued on May 19, 2003 and has not yet been
implemented up to this day, more than three (3) years after the date of issuance. It is the duty of the sheriff to enforce the writ of
execution without delay once it is given to him unless restrained. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides the manner
by which the execution is to be implemented. Pursuant to the rule, respondent sheriff should report to the court within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the writ of execution dated May 19, 2003, the reasons why the judgment obligation has not been satisfied.
Moreover, he should submit reports every thirty (30) days thereafter until such time that the judgment obligation has been fully
satisfied. It does not appear that respondent rendered these reports. Instead, respondent sought to avoid administrative liability by
commissioning the services of Sheriff Viñez A. Hortaleza, RTC, Dagupan City, to conduct surveillance on the judgment defendant’s
assets. Respondent sheriff cannot rely solely on the surveillance he requested to be conducted by Sheriff Hortaleza as respondent is
tasked to personally implement the writ. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Evidently, respondent was not only
remiss in his implementation of the writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereon.

AR

CASE NO. 30

SECTION 14 RULE 39 (EXPIRY OF WRIT OF EXECUTION)

WINNIE BAJET VS. JUDGE VIVENCIO BACLIG

FACTS: MeTC of Quezon City rendered a decision against the defendants in a case for forcible entry. The defendants elevated the
case to the RTC. Plaintiff-appellees filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal, alleging that the defendants-appellants failed to file
a supersedeas bond and to deposit with the RTC the amount of rent due. Judge issued an Order  directing the issuance of a writ of
execution.

Defendants-appellants Winnie Bajet filed an Urgent MR. Denied. Subsequently, defendants-appellants filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a TRO. CA dismissed the petition.

Plaintiffs-appellees filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution, which respondent judge granted. Office of the
Ombudsman received a criminal complaint from Winnie Bajet charging Judge Baclig with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Complainant faults respondent judge for entertaining the ex parte motion for issuance of alias writ of execution
despite lack of proof of service.

ISSUE: W/N respondent judge must be held liable in issuing the alias writ of execution.
RULING: NO. It bears clarifying that respondent judge is charged not with entertaining the motion for the original issuance of a writ
of execution but with issuing the alias writ of execution, the motion for which did not contain any proof of service.

Alias writs of execution are usually issued in lieu of the original writ of execution that had already lapsed. Before the 1997 revision to
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the lifetime of a writ of execution, was 60 days from its receipt by the officer required to enforce the
same and after said period, the writ becomes functus officio. HOWEVER, it must be noted that under the present Section 14, Rule
39, the lifetime of the writ of execution is no longer 60 days but "during the period within which the judgment may be enforced
by motion, that is, within 5 years from entry thereof."

EC
CASE NO. 31 | RULE 39
JEANIFER BUENVIAJE and BLESILDA RECUENCO v. ARTURO ANATALIO

FACTS: Complainants accuse Arturo Anatalio, Deputy Sheriff of the MTC-San Juan, Metro Manila for Gross Misconduct and Conduct
Unbecoming as an Officer of the Court and for violations of the Code of Conduct of Professional Responsibility. Court issued a
Resolution referring the case to the Executive Judge of the RTC-Pasig for investigation. After investigation, Judge Villasor reported
that: 'Since the writ was received by Respondent Sheriff on April 23, 1997, he had sixty (60) days, or up to June 23, 1997, within
which to implement the same. However, the record shows that he was able to do so only on June 30, 1997. The fact that
Respondent Sheriff was not able to implement the writ due to extensions requested by the Complainants does not justify his actions.
His admission that he implemented the writ only on June 30, 1997 is proof of his not having complied with the rules then regarding
the enforcement of a writ. Respondent Sheriff's duty was purely ministerial, that is, he had to execute the writ within the period
provided.
Judge Villasor then recommended that respondent Deputy Sheriff Arturo Anatalio be REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) AFFIRMED, stated:
“Indeed, the writ of execution was not timely enforced within the mandated 60-day period pursuant to Section 11, Rule 39, Rules of
Court which is the pertinent rule then prevailing. That the delay was allegedly caused by the two extensions granted does not excuse
respondent. His duty is purely ministerial, and he has no discretion whether or not to enforce the writ of execution, much less to
delay its enforcement beyond the period fixed under the rules within which to implement the same.”

ISSUE: Whether SC should uphold the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.

RULING: YES. It is basic that when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. This duty, in the proper execution of a valid
writ, is not just directory, but mandatory. The sheriff has no discretion whether to execute the writ or not, and good faith on his
part, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his mandate would be of no moment for he is chargeable with the knowledge
that being an officer of the court tasked therefor, it behooves him to make due compliance.

In this case, the writ of execution was implemented seven days beyond the date of its effectivity. Under the old rules, which was
in effect at the time the incident took place, the lifetime of a writ of execution was 60 days from its receipt by the officer required
to enforce the same. After said period, the writ becomes functus officio. Thus, for failure to implement the writ on time,
respondent should be held administratively liable.

We note however that the delay was only seven days from the date of its expiration and was due to the repeated pleas of herein
complainants for extensions of time, which was allowed by the plaintiff a quo. These circumstances, coupled with the fact that no
considerable damage was done to any party, should be appreciated in respondent's favor.

The allegation of complainants that their properties were damaged in the course of respondent's implementation of the writ was
also not substantiated and should therefore fail. As we repeatedly state, complainants bear the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in their complaint. Failing to do so, the presumption will be that the sheriffs performed their official
duties.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo Anatalio, Deputy Sheriff of the MTC-San Juan, Branch, is found guilty of simple neglect of duty and
hereby REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.