Self-Deselection: Technopsychotic Annihilation Via Cyborg PDF

Self-Deselection: Technopsychotic Annihilation via Cyborg
Author(s): Chris Crittenden

Source: Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 127-152
Published by: Indiana University Press
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SELF-DESELECTION
TECHNOPSYCHOTIC ANNIHILATION VIA

CYBORG
CHRIS CRITTENDEN
ABSTRACT
The cry that advanced machines will come to dominate human beings
resounds from the time of the Luddites up to the current consternation by
the chief scientist of Sun Microsystems, Bill Joy. My theme is a twist on
this fear: self-deselection, the possibility that humans will voluntarily com-
bine their own bodies with technological additions to the point where it
could reasonably be said that our species has been replaced by another
kind of entity, a hybrid of human and radical enhancement, whether that
enhancement stems from genetic alteration or the affixing of robotic parts.
The paper discusses why this danger exists, focusing mainly on perilous
psychological and cultural tendencies (though the amazing rate of tech-
nological change and its likely course are discussed). It then proceeds
with arguments as to why such deselection is a kind of suicide and why
this suicide would be a bad thing in the context of early twenty-first-
century society. In the last section, ecofeminist theory is employed to gen-
erate a therapeutic ethic of social and political relationship that contrasts
with a patriarchal model of dominative control through aggressive sci-
ence.
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002 ISSN: 1085-6633

©Indiana University Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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SELF-DESELECTION1
TECHNOPSYCHOTIC ANNIHILATION VIA CYBORG
The central theme of this paper is self-deselection, which is a twis

the Darwinian concept of natural selection. Unlike natural selection, w
for time untold proceeded outside of conscious manipulation to pr
species that efficiently adapted to the environment, self-deselection r
to the looming possibility that humanity will voluntarily replace itself
a new kind of entity, a cyborg, a hybrid of flesh and technological m
lation that differs so radically from the sort of creature we are now
could no longer be said to be human2. Although many scholars see pos
uses of the cyborg imagery, I argue that they downplay or in many c
entirely ignore the dangers, dangers that, if they come to pass, are a
lyptic. The bulk of my paper is devoted to explaining, first, why
deselection is feasible, second, given that it is feasible, why humans m
enact it, and third, why self-deselection arising from the current
political context would be a bad thing. In the last section, I propo
ecological feminist ethic as an appropriate means of dealing with t
cial problems we face today, unlike futuristic solutions that carry the
borg metaphor to its dark extremes.
Uses of Cyborg Imagery in the Literature

According to Chris Gray, one of the most published researchers in
area, there is no consensus on how to define a "cyborg." The two aero
researchers who coined the term in 1960 combined the words "cybern
and "organism," and proposed an opaque and imprecise definition that
the stage for a diversity of alternative meanings (Gray 1993, 16, 142)
the word "cyborg" enjoys a spectrum of uses from the benign to the
rightly malevolent. Donna Haraway claims that almost all Americans a
ready cyborgs due to our everyday dependence on advanced techno
machinery (Haraway 1997, 503). Some military applications, such as th
teraction between the fighter pilot and the combat plane, also employ
relatively gentle definition. The military, however, is willing to go muc
ther. For example, military research in the 1970s successfully fused the
connections of rats to silicon chips (Gray 1993, 150). Clearly, there is in
in fusing the brains of soldiers within the encompassment of overarching
ons systems. At the far extreme of cyborg imagery is the Schwartzene
ian Terminator' model, which is merely a film of flesh over sentient ste
128 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002
The Possibility of Replacers
It is important to note that cyborgs are not limited to the relatively
benign sense in which you and I could be said to be complex enmeshments
of human and machine. Even scholars who use the term in this way are
aware that it has more sinister connotations. Haraway writes that cyborg
discourse is "about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and danger-
ous possibilities" (Haraway 1997, 506). She suggests that the "transgressed
boundaries" might help liberate women from the grip of sexism by shat-
tering traditional modes of dualistic thinking that create two classes, one
of the dominated (women, animals, nature) and one of the dominators
(i.e., men). Unlike Haraway, and some military and aerospace researchers,
who focus on the usefulness of the new model, I focus on the dangerous
possibilities.
The sort of cyborg I have in mind as a threat to the existence of hu-
manity is much more than a teenager with a cell phone, or a grandmother
with an artificial hip and a pacemaker. What I envision is an entity that is
smarter, stronger, longer-lived, and in possession of more constitutional
energy than any human that ever lived. This sort of cyborg, which I will
call a Replacer, is more capable of making a profit for a corporation, more
likely to get into Yale or Harvard, more likely to succeed in combat, and in
general more likely to win the sorts of competitions that we see as crucial
in our society, competitions for jobs, money, and security.
There appear to be two technological routes toward Replacement (i.e.,
self-deselection into Replacers). Here I make use of Jennifer Gonzalez's
distinction between machine cyborgs and the organic or transgenetic vari-
ety (1995). The machine cyborg is a combination of synthetic material
such as silicon chips and human-body material such as neurons. An ap-
propriate image is that of a computer implanted directly into the brain or
a half robot/half human such as the Borg from Star Trek. The organic
Replacer, on the other hand, has a modified DNA structure and perhaps
biological enhancements or additions. Such a creature might have a DNA
structure that is different from anything that could be generated by the
old-fashioned method of combining sperm and egg. It might also possess
an extra brain lobe or an extra arm.
The technology to create Replacers of either the organic or machine
variety is looming. A New York Times article (March 2000) highlighted
three areas of advancement that could be the source of great upheaval.
CHRIS CRITTENDEN SELF-DESELECTION 129
Exponential progress in these fields signals the inchoate potential for self-
deselection: (a) nanotechnology, (b) molecular circuitry, (c) genetic engi-
neering. Nanotechnology and molecular circuitry introduce the possibility
that computers will not only be millions of times faster than those of today
but also capable of such minuscule size as to flow within the circulatory
system or permeate the brain at the cellular level (sec. 4, p. 1). Genetic
engineering might soon allow humans, or Replacers, to live indefinitely
without the fear of natural aging. It also offers a wealth of possibilities for
modifying the standard human-body prototype. Imagine a biblical demon
and realize that the potential to create such a horror is imminent within a
minute period of geological time.
Why Humans Might Self-Deselect

Given that Replacers are radically different from anything that has
ever graced this planet, one might wonder why humans would self-dese-
lect into them. What could drive us to initiate the elimination of our spe-
cies for something entirely new and to many persons abominable? The
process is likely to be gradual though also accelerative, given the rate of
technological change we've witnessed in going from, say, the 1800s up to
the present. The first step toward self-deselection has already been taken
by the creation of an economic and political climate conducive to space-
age transformation driven not primarily by the motives of virtue and recti-
tude but by assumptions about human nature that label us homo economicus,
that is, as materialistic and combative. What I call the paradigm of envy,
callous competition, and (in)security is mainly an ideological mixture of
the catalytic forces apparent in global capitalism and modern militarism.
It is this paradigm, which I explore in more detail below, and the phenom-
enon of the gradual accelerating slide that provide the initial basis for my
concerns.
In the following discussion, I am not arguing for entailme

claiming that negative forces, such as greed and a fear of los
pervasive scramble for materialistic supremacy, will neces
into self-deselection. The emphasis is on the dangerous tende
by the powerful social motivators present in global capitalism
tality of domination. Countervailing forces, such as tradition
mores, could act as stabilizers, resulting in a kind of mor
the various thematic movements present in Western cultu
bine to delimit a conceptual and psychological space that effe
nates the worst possibilities. It would be naive, however, to assume that all
will be well because the postmodern liberal is clear-headed enough to make
sensible decisions concerning health, whether such decisions concern the
personal sphere or the environment, whether they apply to the present day
and age or to the well-being of future generations. The following three
points bring out my concerns.
First, we are currently in the grips of a serious environmental crisis,
one fomented by dysfunction and denial. Generations of modern liberal
thinkers have maintained this pathology through the narrowness of their
thought. This mirrors a standard theme throughout the history of western
civilization: the bulk of the leadership and educated citizenry selfishly ad-
vance a political agenda that is in their short-term best interest, which is
usually measured in terms of wealth or military power. So, for example, it
took thousands of years to challenge slavery, sexism, and naturism, thou-
sands of years to inject notions of equality and universal decency into the
mainstream power discussions where they sit only precariously today. We
must face the dull, thickheaded, plodding history of ethical reform and
accept its indictment, that humans at all levels of echelon are more psycho-
logically and selfishly situated than empathically aware and reasonably
considerate, and we must work against such tendencies in ourselves, armed
as we are with the knowledge of the phlegmatic resistance of preceding
generations.
Second, it is not evident that individuals, whether clear-headed or not,
are making the key decisions about our collective welfare; rather, certain
corporate and governmental entities, which are tightly interwoven in terms
of power connections and interlocking goals, are more likely candidates
for the driver's seat, if there could be said to be one at all (Bowman 1996,
16). Corporate and governmental entities are not individuals, per se, but
collections of individuals and habitual ideologies interacting in holistic
ways that tend toward conformity and thus the discouragement of serious
dissent. "Groupthink," a tendency for individuals in groups to dampen
their creative and critical reactions due to pressure to conform to dog-
matic procedure, represents the kind of hazard that can result when hu-
mans collect into hierarchical systems (Janis 1982; Moorehead, Ference,
and Neck 1991). Another hazard is the tendency of dysfunctional groups
faced with a crisis to avoid acknowledgement of the crisis and proceed as
if all were well. Some researchers have applied this denial-of-crisis phe-
nomenon directly to capitalism, claiming that capitalism itself has created
CHRIS CR1TTENDEN SELF-DESELECTION 131
a crisis and an accompanying reaction of disavowal (Richardson and
Curwen 1995). In the social chemistry of the distressed group many sub-
liminal and ritualized factors come into play that undercut the free-flow of
ideas and awareness, and we are all members of many groups of sundry
kinds that directly or indirectly feed into our global crisis of environmen-
tal degradation.
Third, cultures are being rapidly assimilated into the vast machine of
consumerist culture, which indicates that this machine is not easily re-
sisted, not by religion, not by morality, not by traditions that existed for
thousands of years, not by the most dedicated, intelligent objectors, not by
the dictates of an honest conscience, not by anything that groups or indi-
viduals without huge amounts of money or political clout or allies with the
same can do (Myers 1984; Durning 1993). In the last two hundred years,
conquest and capitalism have been spearheading an unprecedently mas-
sive expropriation of nature and a homogenization of culture. The values
of these disturbingly awesome forces are virtually fanatic in their drive
and cannot be easily stopped; indeed, they are probably not the sorts of
things that can be 'stopped' at all, but only slowly sapped of transforma-
tive power over a considerable period of time.
The tendencies inherent in a program of hedonistic consumption
coupled with a mantra of capitalist 'growth' are at the nucleus of my con-
cern. The idea that our buying practices are likely to foster a deepseated
neurosis (indeed, Lacan writes that capitalism fosters psychosis (Brennan
1993, 4)) cannot, given space considerations, receive full treatment here.
But we need look no further than the advertisements that assail us daily to
glimpse the psycho-economic system that encompasses our lives. Here the
essence of the dogma is revealed: the consumer should never be content
but rather always wanting more, whether it concerns body image, financial
image, sexual image, whatever image - the very emphasis on image is det-
rimental in its transportation of matters of health from the realm of who
you are to the realm of how you appear. In psychological jargon, this en-
genders a shift from an "internal locus of control" to an "external locus of
control" where the ad companies gain access to the volume knob of self-
esteem.
In addition to the principle of promoting discontent, there is the pri

ciple of insatiable need and its corollaries of envy and competition. Hedo
nistic capitalism, so excellent at fostering expansion and scient
breakthrough, does so in part through the auspices of desire in the form
rampant expenditure and insatiable need for ever greater thrill and mate-
rial accomplishment. Inherent in this drive to get more and enjoy more is a
fierce competition to outdo others and also a biting envy that is its inevi-
table accouterment. Some writers have gone so far as to claim that we are
an addicted citizenry, and I will have to stand here with their expertise.
Chellis Glendinning, for example, argues that we exhibit telltale symp-
toms that indicate our enslavement to technology - denial, dishonesty,
obsessive need for control, thought disorders, grandiosity, and disconnec-
tion from feelings, and she explains in some detail the interrelations be-
tween these symptoms and our pathological fixation (1995, 44). It is relevant
that Al Gore, a highly public figure reliant on public opinion for his con-
tinuing political career, writes that Americans are addicted to consump-
tion and display the dynamic of a dysfunctional family (1992). Apparently,
such a blatantly condemnatory claim is 'safe' for a politician of national
reputation; enough people find Gore's jeremiad sufficiently plausible and
so he safely skirts the danger of being labelled an extremist beyond the
pale of political legitimacy, despite Republican efforts to lampoon his radi-
cal stance.
A comprehensive scenario of dysfunctional self-identity is readily dis-
tilled from the themes of envy, callous competition, and the intentional
advancement of discontent. In this scenario, social problems are personal-
ized in order to maintain the status quo, thereby avoiding the psychic pain
of radical upheaval and maintaining the monetary and political fortunes
of the privileged classes (e.g., the top 1 percent who own 90 percent of the
wealth, males in traditional family and corporate hierarchies). For example,
instead of challenging the existence of beauty norms so exacting and de-
manding that they promote incessant opportunities for anxiety and self-
surveillance, women opt for expensive remedies, including plastic surgery
(while countless children languish malnourished across the Earth), encour-
aged in this direction by sophisticated advertising campaigns and an es-
tablishment of respected medical professionals. In short, the competition
for success, which requires frequent and repeated victory if one is to re-
main successful, is so intense that guilt and insecurity are manipulated to
invoke body hatred, which in turn motivates behavior that profits those
who feed off anxious consumers. If we live in a society where someone will
pay several thousand dollars for a cosmetic surgery, driven to such a task
by an encompassing, multifaceted environment of socioeconomic pres-
sures - all the while ignoring the suffering of fellow human beings, chil-
CHR1S CRITTENDEN SELF-DESELECTION 133
dren no less - then we live in a society psychologically ready for the road
to dysfunctional self-deselection.
There is also a 'conquer' side of the conquer/capitalism ideology that I
think is at the root of the danger of self-deselection. In the last section of
the paper an ecofeminist alternative to the mindset of domination is pre-
sented. For now, assume the problem with the conquer/dominative mode
lies in the historical propensity for the 'Rational' members of society -
those at the top end in the hierarchy of all things, traditionally the 'civi-
lized' male gentry - to control those elements in the non-'RationaP
categories, whether they be women, or animals, or nature, or 'primitive'
culture or race, or some other unruly force. Perhaps most relevant is the
tendency for the Western elite to try to bring 'Emotion', associated with
the impractical, inefficient, and chaotic, under the control of 'Rationality',
associated with the scientific and political, a theme that precedes the En-
lightenment, going back at least to Plato.
The Argument for the Danger of Self-Deselection

With a preliminary framework set, one that underscores the weakness
of the individual and the monstrous influence of the cultural themes of
capitalism and conquest, the heart of the argument can be developed. Con-
sider the following questions, and try to answer not from your own per-
spective but from the perspective of the many in the sense that in any
group of citizens there are a few who are no less intelligent than the rest
yet more inclined to take risks or sacrifice their well-being at some level to
get ahead. Also remember my claim that the kind of sociological factors
made relevant by consumerism and a mentality of domination are strongly
influential in shaping behavior, factors like the envy to own what your
neighbor owns, to compete successfully along scales that require ever more
cognitive and physical skill to get ahead, to conquer unruly emotion with
the rational tools of science and thereby achieve greater truth, excellence,
and efficient use of resource. With this framework in mind, it is very plau-
sible to see intelligent, mainstream persons or agencies answering yes to
these kinds of questions:
If you could make your children tremendously smarter by implanting

computer chips into their brains, would you do it? If a corporation
could vastly increase its profit by hiring employees with mind- and
body-enhancing genetic alterations, would it encourage the creation
of such employees? If you could feel safe walking down the street at
night by becoming part machine, would you? If you could avoid lone-
liness by directly linking your cerebral cortex to the Internet, is that an
option? If a country could win a war by turning its soldiers into neu-
trally fused components of a sentient weapon system, would it? If a
church could win more adherents by the proselytizing excellence of
cybernetic missionaries, would it?
To answer yes to such questions is not to assert 'yes, I want to promote

Replacement.' It is not even to be aware that yes answers move us along
the path toward Replacement. To say yes is to act innocently in terms of
advancing goals that seemingly conduce to well-being such as greater profit
or more impressive performance on cognitive tests. There is nothing, in
fact, inherently wrong in accepting technological enhancement. I raise a
cry of alarm not because I am a neo-Luddite but because of the cultural
ambience in which we approach questions of employing advanced tech-
nology.
In the next section, 'why self-deselection is a bad thing', I elaborate
and extend my line of thought. I want to summarize this section by sketch-
ing the process that could lead us toward Replacement, a kind of socially
transformative process that I provocatively call the algorithm for annihila-
tion. It is an algorithm only in the basic sense of combining a few steps in
a repetitive process and thereby initiating and maintaining a gradual accel-
erating slide from humanity to nonhumanity. The simplicity of the cycle
no doubt leaves out important complication, but I only claim to be a her-
ald of possibility, and this article is meant as an introduction and not a
final statement of all the relevant relationships:
addictive need
/ \
habituation A
The 'need for more' could be the need for economic growth, or greater
mental or physical capability as pertains to such growth, or to success
along other scales measured in terms of efficient or dominative needs. Note
that this grasping for more is by definition neurotic or addiction-driven3.
It takes place in the context of crisis and denial of crisis. Cyborg-relevant
enhancement that helps get more is accepted (out of envy, out of fear of
failure, out of competitive drive, out of the unthinking motation of the 'rat
race'), thereby permitting achievement of goals and consequently separat-
ing the haves from the have nots (again, this could be defined in terms of
wealth, or military power, or psychological positions of superiority and
inferiority, all of the above, etc.). Finally, the habituation stage indicates
that what was satisfactory for growth or excellence becomes unsatisfac-
tory - the ephemeral euphoria of the fix, the dulling of the technological
edge, the fading glory of yesterday's profits - and so the push for more
reactivates. All three of these stages and the interrelations between them
should be elaborated, but I think even a cursory look at the interactions
between consumerism, technology, and competition, whether financial or
political, since the Industrial Revolution validates the basic contours of
the model. For example, with the military mind, the relationship is simple:
possess whatever purchasable technology is necessary to insure superiority
over the enemy. The recent creation of the most ultimately horrible weapon
has not undercut the tenacity of this thinking, and if our military and
political leaders constructed and employed such a weapon despite Einstein's
pleas, there is no reason to think that they would not do the same when it
comes time for cyborg soldiers. Who is going to stop them? Young women
and men will line up to volunteer for the first stage of enhancement, which
will make then stronger, faster, and more frightening as fighters and inflictors
of death, a prowess we have been trained to value highly by movies star-
ring actors like Schwartzennegger, Stallone, Norris, Willis, Chan, and many
others.
Why Self-Deselection Is a Bad Thing

Why is the path to self-deselection the wrong path to take in the con-
text of early twenty-first- century social conditioning - the time of the "cul-
ture of narcissism," according to Christopher Lasch (1979)? First, I should
acknowledge that criticisms of technology and machinery are nothing new.
The Luddites smashed looms in the early nineteenth century, fearing for
their livelihood and ability to subsist. Samuel Butler, in his famous novel
136 ETHICS fr THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002
published in 1879, speaks of Erewhon, a society in which machinery has
been forsaken because of the danger that it will advance to the point where
humans become its slaves. Chapters 24 through 26 are titled aThe Book of
the Machines" and contain a series of arguments supporting the rejection
of a life of dependence on even such basic items as the pocket watch and,
the nineteenth-century precursor of the automobile, the carriage (1932).
As Hans Achterhuis points out, a central and enduring worry in the face of
rapid scientific progress is that we humans will create monsters that even-
tually destroy us, either sentient machines or massive complexes of gad-
gets and engines that require so much energy to maintain that life becomes
a dreary orbit around their upkeep (1998). The latest incarnation of this
kind of consternation perhaps comes from Bill Joy, chief scientist at Sun
Microsystems, who worries about astounding rates of advancement in the
computer sciences and the artificial sentience he thinks will most likely be
produced (2000). There is, additionally, the less fantastic though more
pressing possibility of Armageddon-quality destruction in the course of
nuclear, genetic, or biological warfare.
My thesis, however, deviates somewhat from the frightening possibil-
ity that we will create robotic monstrosities that obliterate us. My conten-
tion is that we might well, consciously and with frantic abandon, choose
to turn ourselves into monsters. The danger is not that the machines will
conquer us, but that we will conquer ourselves by choosing a machine
existence. This version of technology's danger is not mentioned by Butler,
Heidegger, or most other referenced critics, though it occurs in the science
fiction literature most freely. In any case, the problem of self-deselection
lacks a rigorous philosophical framework that brings out its various as-
pects - why it is a salient problem, why we might choose it, and, the topic
of the current section of this paper, why it is a terrible mistake.
Recklessness
There are several reasons why self-deselection is a foolhardy enter-

prise. The first is that the march to self-deselection is simply reckless. We
are currently altering the globe at an amazing rate, through such alarming
processes as population expansion, global warming, acid rain, ozone deple-
tion, rapid extinction of species, elimination of rainforests, damage to
marine ecosystems such as coral reefs, drastic reduction in the number of
free-roaming fish, generation of industrial and nuclear pollutants, and the
genetic manipulation of agricultural products. The world of today is not
the world of even our near ancestors. Our great- great-grandparents would
be just as amazed at our manipulations as their great- great-grandparents
would be at theirs.
My point is simply that we don't know where we're going in terms of
global upheaval and we don't know why. Free-market mantras about the
goodness of growth and the innate selfishness of the human condition are
not reassuring. If one is to initiate drastic and enduring changes in the very
structure of the living environment and, even more intimately, in the very
nature of one's essence, there should be careful study, sound argument,
and general learned acceptance of the procedures undertaken. There is
none of that to support our current vector toward self-deselection. We are
engaged in a precipitous gamble that is driven by anxiety and avarice.
These are not good reasons for the radical transformation of our life form,
nor are they accepted, either by religious or secular institutions, as salu-
tary foundations for the cause of happy endings.
Self-Destruction as a Positive?
In addition to recklessness, there is the problem of justifying our own

self-destruction. It is strange to think of self-destruction as a positive re-
sult, but this is just what a proponent of self-deselection would argue. One
can imagine an extreme technophile arguing for the total integration of
the human body with synthetic or genetic enhancement. When asked
whether it is upsetting that this might mean the end of humanity as we
know it, the technophile might shrug and point to efficiencies of various
sorts: a more energetic mind, greater endurance, the power to advance
research even further into the space age, and the various increases in plea-
sure associated with virtual world existence.
What such a person is claiming is that self-destruction is not a bad
thing. But it would be, in fact, a kind of suicide for humanity to deselect
itself, suicide because the human species would be gone, replaced by an-
other kind of being that does not feel or think in the same way as Homo
sapiens sapiens. What would make us believe that collective suicide is a
positive? What kind of statement is this about our self-esteem, both indi-
vidually and as a society? If we are to regard our humanity as something
more than a burden to be dissolved at the first opportunity, we should step
back from the arguments for greater power and knowledge and ask if
these are truly worth the condemnation of our nature that self-deselection
represents.
Pro-Replacement technophiles could argue that I am overstating the
case. They might insist that all they want is a few computer chips in the
head, a few wires out the temples, a few alterations to the chromosomes.
It is not the end of humanity they would argue but only an upgrade. It is
not collective suicide but rather minor corrective surgery for the better-
ment of all.
My problem with this line of reasoning is that it runs afoul of the
algorithm for annihilation. If we are driven by envy, callous competition,
and (in)security, when will we know that enough is enough? What will
stop pre-Replacer cyborgs with a few wires in their heads from adding
more? The dynamic of the gradual accelerating slide only makes the argu-
ment for upgrading all the more dubious. At the very least, the technophiles
who want to plant wires in their heads should gravely consider the possi-
bility that the next generation will take things one step further. Enthusias-
tically pushing ahead, usually with an eye for profit and production, has
been the modus operandi for at least the last two hundred years, and we
should not expect the next generation to miraculously halt the trans-
mogrification if our own absolutely failed to set an example in that direc-
tion.
The technophile might now counter that self-deselection is a way to
high ideals such as the end of war, the end of cruelty, or the beginning of a
new epoch in which we eliminate the worst in ourselves and enhance the
best. But, contra the technophile, an atmosphere of envy, callous competi-
tion, and (in)security coupled with a need for ever greater power and knowl-
edge is more likely to lead to war than peace, shallow hedonism than
entrenched virtue, instability than stability as creatures no longer sure that
they are human add ever more supplements to their bodies, resulting in
identity disorders that could culminate in a kind of psychosis, which I
discuss below.
The final objection by the technophile is that no one can say exactly
when the line between humanity and nonhumanity is crossed by cyber-
netic enhancement and, given that there is no simple answer, we have no
reason to adhere to a simple injunction against cybernetic additions. An-
other way to phrase the objection is this: perhaps worries about collective
suicide are inaccurate because we cannot be sure exactly when the combi-
nation of human and machine, or human and genetic enhancement, sig-
nals the end of humanity. Perhaps, so the argument goes, it is not appropriate
to talk of suicide if we cannot be sure when the human species has actually
been Replaced. Do a few computer chips in the cerebellum mark the end?
Does the addition of metal limbs? What about a creature that has a human
brain but an entirely artificial body?
This objection broaches the complicated topic of the nature of a spe-
cies and perhaps the nature of self. Fortunately, the need to give exacting
definitions can be circumvented by pointing out that indeed there are grey
areas in which we cannot say whether the addition of cybernetic enhance-
ments has removed the cyborg from the class of things that are Homo
sapiens sapiens, but there are also areas that are not grey. At some point,
most everyone will agree that an enhanced individual is no longer a human
being4. Just as there are shades of uncertainty between the colors of blue
and purple, there is a fuzzy zone between human and Replacer. Neverthe-
less, one inevitably travels from blue to purple, and also, just as assuredly,
from human to Replacer. When purple is achieved, blue is gone. When
Replacer is achieved, humanity is absent. Consequently, a discourse of sui-
cide makes sense in the context of self-deselection, for the lacuna between
the human and the Replacer is the lacuna in which the suicidal task is in
progress, although not yet drawn out to completion.
Haves vs. Have-Nots
Since the dawn of civilization there has existed a gap between the haves
and the have-nots, a sizeable gap in wealth, education, freedom, well-be-
ing, and the benefits associated with these. The difference in the various
talents between humans and Replacers, however; will most likely exacer-
bate the ambient social inequalities. The current debate about the power
offered by the Internet and the unequal access accorded to the affluent is a
miniature model that must be expanded tremendously to get at the sort of
division Replacer technology renders conceivable. Children with laptops
have advantages over those who don't, but children with computer-jacked
brains and accompanying IQs of 200 have even more. With advanced cy-
bernetics, the issue is not simply who has the better tools, but rather who
has the better inherent capability to achieve. Humans cannot successfully
compete with Replacers who have twice the mental power, twice the en-
durance, twice the strength, and so on, even if they have access to the same
learning environment.
One acute danger is that poor humans who cannot afford to graft
circuitry onto their brains will become servants to those who successfully
deselect. In any case, the presence of two intelligent life forms on the planet,
both capable of speech and widely creative adaptation, yet nonetheless
separated by a large divide in capacity, would herald the beginning of an
unprecedented experiment in social dynamics. Although probabilities are
difficult to calculate, the potentials for abuse of the poor and the disadvan-
taged are vast. We should take seriously the possibility that the Replacers
will enslave humans or vice versa out of jealousy or fear. Racism, sexism,
and other forms of oppression are still rampant today and could infect the
future when humans face that daunting moment when they begin to coex-
ist with a life form that is more impressive along many cognitive and physical
scales.
Control and Surveillance
Another problem with self-deselection (and its precursor stages) is the

potential it offers for increased control and surveillance. Winston Smith,
the main character in George Orwell's dystopic 1984, fretted because ev-
erywhere he went cameras watched from the walls (1977). Yet even worse
is the invasion of privacy that results from a camera implanted within the
head. Or imagine the power to change people's mood by sending radio
signals to molecule-sized wires that nest in their brains. The permutations
on this sort of theme are endless. In the not-so-distant future, instead of
worrying simply about the Internet crashing, Replacers might worry about
crashes within their own minds. Someone might object that I am painting
the worst-case scenario, one that is unlikely to manifest. Yet we live in a
world where monitoring is routine and pervasive. Los Angeles and other
large cities have already installed cameras on telephone poles above some
urban areas; employee email is commonly and increasingly checked by
supervisors using programs such as Spector and Websense; urinalysis and
lie detector tests are fairly common business tools. Foucault argues that
"panopticon" techniques, that is, surveillance techniques which encom-
pass their subject, are common control mechanisms of the modern era
(1979). In the future, there will be new methods of monitoring that in-
volve direct infiltration of the body by nanominiaturized communications;
indeed, in a Replacer society, the body itself could be plugged into a larger
unit and thereby double as a kind of information storage unit.
Cyberpsychosis
The term "cyberpsychosis" has emerged in science-fiction circles (origi-
nating, perhaps, with the role-playing game CyberPunk produced by R.
Talsorian Games, Inc.) to designate a state of mental illness that results
from sacrificing too much of one's humanity in the course of cybernetic
modification. When the brain becomes embossed by computer chips, or
the body drastically redirected from normal chromosomal development,
the question of self-identity takes on new existential urgency. The cyber-
netically infiltrated person can no longer cling to even the simple protec-
tive assertion, "I am human." The sense of dependency on the machine,
already the origin of much anxiety in today's world, as Alvin Toffler and
W. H. Auden exhort in their separate writings, can hardly cease from
magnification when the machine literally penetrates the body and mind
(Toffler 1970; Auden 1948). We should not, then, lightly dismiss the pos-
sibility that the crisis of identity rendered more likely by the cyborg lifestyle
might lead some hybridized persons to experience crippling neurosis or
even madness.
The danger is exacerbated because a human being is a complex sys-
tem, much like an ecosystem or a nation in possessing many layers that
interact holistically. Tinkering with such multifaceted systems can have
unexpected side effects.
CONCLUSIONS
Here I introduce two contrasting models of management that c

very wide application, pertaining to the management of societ
tems, the psychological realm of the mind, and relationships betw
political regions.
A Colonization Model
The foregoing arguments reveal a colonizing modus operandi. This

model is one of subjugation, the optimization of influence so that the con-
trolled can be efficiently harnessed as a resource for the betterment of the
conquerors. In terms of ecosystems, hedonistic capitalism follows a colo-
nizing model by exploiting animals, plants, and geographical structures
for the voracity of the consumer. In terms of social groups, a representative
colonizing model is the Imperialism of the late nineteenth-century super-
powers, who fanned across the globe, using the force of superior weap-
onry to leash Africans, Latin Americans, and other native peoples to
European economic prerogatives.
When we choose cybernetic enhancement, at least in the extreme form
that leads to Replacement, we choose a colonizing model5. When we in-
sert, graft, or inject technology into ourselves in order to augment and
harness certain cognitive powers without intensive regard for the effects
on our humanity or the psychological disequilibrium that results, we act
as obtusely as the timber baron who clear-cuts old growth forest in disdain
of heartfelt protest and broad ecological effects. In short, when we act to
achieve imperious authority for the purposes of exploitation, whether over
peoples, ecosystems, or the human mind, the result is a haughty disregard
for the complexity of existence and in many cases a dismal failure of em-
pathy. Hedonistic capitalism enslaves the environment, imperialist gov-
ernors enslaved Africans and Latin Americans, and the movement to
cybernetically alter humanity leads toward a Replacer syndrome that en-
slaves the mind.
An Ecofeminist Model
The second model of management is ecofeminist. Ecofeminism offers

an alternative platform from which many forms of oppression and coloni-
zation can be challenged. It draws from the insights of the larger body of
feminist work, while adding its own philosophical innovations.
In a recent article, Stacy Alaimo sets up a contrast between ecofeminism
and postmodern usages of the cyborg metaphor, fashioning them as two
extremes of a polarity. She asserts that ecofeminist thought gravitates to-
ward stereotypically feminine and idealistic figurations of nature whereas
'cyborgism' gravitates toward dedication to militaristic (masculine) tech-
nology and its powers to meliorate (1994). A balanced environmental femi-
nism, she says, can be forged in the conceptual space between these
antipodes. Specifically, Alaimo suggests positing political rather than es-
sentialist connections between women and nature:
The dangers of ecofeminism seem to result from a positive alliance

that depends upon the very associations that are detrimental to both
women and the earth - woman and nature as victims, women as ma-
ternal, nature as a mystified pure realm . . . [Yet] by envisioning women
and nature as political allies, an environmental feminism would em-
phasize the importance of women as political activists, and stress the
agency of nature. (1994, 150)
While not disputing that hyper-feminization of nature and hyper-mascu-

linization of technology are invalid routes to progress, I do question a
rather quick categorization of ecofeminism as a kind of "Mother Earth"
worship that glorifies the traditional feminine. Much of the work done by
ecofeminists shelves the question of goddess religion and highlights the
conceptual interactions between women, men, and nature and how these
have played into the "oppressive conceptual framework" of patriarchy,
both Western and non-Western (Warren 1990; Plumwood 1993). Addi-
tionally, and this is separate from the previous point, I question, as does
Laurie Cook, whether a spirituality resulting from ecofeminist concerns
must necessarily produce a negative gender-role effect (1998). A re-sacra-
lization of nature and the accompanying psychological benefits thus en-
tailed might be just what our materialistic, spiritually bankrupt culture
needs. In any case, it is not clear how Alaimo's 'political alliance5 between
women and nature is going to distance itself from the sorts of connections
she criticizes. Ecofeminist movements are already highly political (Miles
and Shiva 1993), so a simple division between the political and the ideo-
logical is suspicious if not untenable.
Since the early 1990s, ecofeminism has become even more diverse,
with the publication of wide-ranging anthologies (Warren 1996, 1997).
Although there are a great many uses of the term " ecofeminism, " none of
them adequately representing the crucial themes inherent in all the others
(Merchant 1992), I extract a theme from the literature that concerns a
model of cooperative interaction encompassing relationships between hu-
mans, humans and the environment, and also the conscious and the un-
conscious. I draw here on a developing position in feminist theory that
ecofeminism is a kind of care ethic, which in turn is a sophisticated virtue
theory that demands a psychological orientation of situated judgment
empathically engaged and liberated of defense mechanisms, such as de-
nial, that support a mentality of domination (Gaard 1993).
What we have, then, is a fundamentally anti-domination stance: the
other that exists in contrast to the subject, whether person, animal, ecosys-
tem, or the unconscious ought to be perceived as intrinsically valuable,
and so cannot be treated as an exploitable resource or object. An example
of a pure object is the pen in my hand. I move and manipulate it as I want
without consideration except for my own comforts. This is a normal and
daily attitude, but its extension to other people (e.g., slavery), animals (e.g.,
factory farming), nature (e.g., rainforest destruction), or the unconscious
(e.g., a compartmentalizing control of emotion by 'rationality') is unethi-
cal and pathological.
To objectify our own humanity in this way is the ultimate stage in an
endemic delusion of mastery. But this is just where a colonizing model of
144 ETHICS b THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002
cybernetic 'progress' takes us. It is as much a mode of forceful implemen-
tation as the 'development' of an old-growth forest in that it intrudes into
a rich, multi-levelled system and disrupts it with goals and values likely to
deteriorate the complex dynamic that exists. What, for example, happens
to the empathic faculty when the brain is augmented by a computer meant
to multiply intelligence in a way eerily similar to that in which a sawmill is
added to a forest in order to boost output of timber? What happens to the
unconscious when circuitry snakes through the brain in service to goals
that care little for the broader mental landscape excepting insofar as it can
be tapped to produce a boost in memory or quickened reflex?
Rather than subject-object (manipulator-manipulated), the mutuality
model proposed in feminist analysis emphasizes a mindset of subject-sub-
ject (Benjamin 1989). The point is to attain a world of reciprocity and
balance, moral agents validating the intrinsic value of others as they, in
turn, are validated by them. In this scheme, the psychoanalytic notion of
"mutual recognition" is the touchstone of proper moral relationship.
Ecofeminist Val Plumwood states the position:
The individual conceived in terms of mutuality is formed by, bound to

and in interaction with others through a rich set of relationships which
are essential to and not incidental to his or her projects. Nevertheless,
he or she can and must remain a distinct individual, separated but not
hyperseparated. He or she is not simply at the mercy of these relation-
ships, dissolved, passive and defined by others . . . but is an active par-
ticipant in them and determinant of them. The reciprocity and mutuality
which form such a self are not only compatible with but actually re-
quire the existence of others who are distinct and not merged, making
possible the 'combination of resonance and difference.' (1993, 156)
An Ecofeminist Ethical Framework
The ecofeminist model informs a full-blown ecofeminist ethic, which

in turn provides a contrast to the paradigm of envy, callous competition,
and (in)security6. There is no general agreement on what constitutes an
ethic, but I have written elsewhere that there are at least four components:
(a) a worldview, (b) a psychology and corresponding sense of self, (c) a
moral decision-making procedure, and (d) actual kinds of behavior and
lifestyle motivated by these (2001). A contrast can be set up along all these
scales between capitalism/conquer models and the mutuality model sug-
gested in the Plumwood citation, but for the sake of space I will focus on
self-identity, which is a kind of intersection for ideology, problem solving,
psychology, and the practices that result. Obviously, I am taking a broad
view of what an ethic can and should be, but given that our beliefs, chan-
neled through the workings of our minds and bodies out into the world via
the great power to manipulate the Earth that we currently possess, affect
the quality of life not just for humans but most all living things and hence
directly relate to ultimate matters of suffering and weal, a broad approach
seems appropriate and even necessary.
Recall that we live in a society that would be most happy, at least from
certain potent economic vantages (which virtually equate to potent politi-
cal vantages) to induce an agitating body hatred in a large portion of the
populace if such extreme insecurity could be channeled into a steady stream
of purchases that pump the GDP, stock values, or other indicators of wealth.
People are pitted against each other but perhaps even more importantly
against themselves; they seek to conquer and control elements of their own
nature that another part of their nature finds distasteful or hampering.
The result is a personalization of social ills that effectively results in a blind
eye toward those ills; it is an acceptance of the status game and its oppres-
sive rules and invidious social divides rather than a protest against the very
game itself. The core trope involved here is one of polarization: me and my
group versus you and your group, one of us will be the victor, the other
will become dominated (or monetarily deficient, which is in our global
marketplace effectively the same thing).
But the ecofeminist ethic, in its aspect as a kind of self-identity (as well
as its other aspects) shatters the trope because it embraces mutuality, mu-
tual respect, and accordingly a mutually beneficial process of creativity
and growth. This apparently simplistic theme is actually revolutionary
because it takes a stance against the inevitability of war and colonization
and other cruel practices of reducing others (or parts of the self) to com-
petitors or inferiors that need to be defeated by self-serving means or
outraced in a scramble to earn more money (in third- world countries, this
is often a scramble simply to eat).
Mutuality, then, entails a code of acceptance, and yet it is more com-
plicated than this due to the "combination of resonance and difference"
which Plumwood borrows from Jessica Benjamin's work (1989). Accept-
ing the other does not mean assimilating the other and therefore invalidat-
ing the other's point of view. The need for "coalition," to use Catriona
Sandilands's terminology, should not overwhelm the need for "transgres-
sion," that is, "the desire to subvert dominant identity categories" (1999).
Subversion/transgression or "dissident speech" (Meyers 1994), or "a logic
of curdling" (Lugones, cited in Cuomo 1998) or the "rejection of the ana-
lyst" (Murphy 1995, 74) or other figurations of rebellion against tech-
niques of precise categorization and ideological harmony are as important
to the ecofeminist movement as Benjamin's "recognition" of the other's
intrinsic moral worth and claim to respect. In the tension between the
requirement to validate diverse beings, on one hand, and the need to rebel
against conformity to the standards of power, on the other, lies the difficult
journey toward mutually beneficial interactions.
In this context of mutuality, envy cannot thrive, competition is moder-
ated by cooperation, and greed becomes antithetical to rather than conso-
nant with social definitions of success and well-being. When working
together with another for the purposes of mutual health and flourishing, it
becomes illogical to denigrate, manipulate, or dominate because such acts
are deleterious to the essential goal of mutual enhancement. The other is
not a prop or resource but a rich and complex entity who adds to the
richness and complexity of the relationship, which partially defines the
self-identity of its members (Held 1993).
Mutuality and Self-Fulfillment

It is a millennia-spanning patriarchal bromide that the rational should
master the emotional/animal/biological side of the self. Such simplistic ar-
rogation is extremely dangerous when 'the rational' is provided by eco-
nomic imperatives and 'the emotional' turns out to be whatever resists
such imperatives. Here the model of domination splits the mind itself into
two forces, one to be obeyed, the other to be rendered obedient or at least
restrained so as to prevent any interference (Plato's chariot metaphor in
the Phaedrus comes to mind).
But, in keeping with the mutuality dynamic, feminists are overthrow-
ing the very idea that the mind can be categorized in terms of a homoge-
neous self with one rationality pitted against unruly emotions and primitive
biological drives. Scholars such as Kristeva and Lugones see the self as
"heterogeneous." A person, for example, takes on different roles in differ-
ent social contexts, and these roles might not be compatible within the
bounds of a consistent core identity; moreover any such identity faces the
lacuna between the intelligences of the conscious and the unconscious
(Oliver 1997, 264).
The heterogeneous self and the mutuality model at the heart of an
ecofeminist ethic provide an entirely different way of approaching issues
of progress and self-fulfillment than one that applauds the suppression of
emotionality (irrational biology) by rationality in pursuit of wealth or its
surrogates, such as fashionable beauty, prestige, luxury items, or vaca-
tions, or even an educated bourgeoisie wit. Self-fulfillment comes no longer
from success or applause or materialism but from internal relationships
between various aspects of self that encompass realms conscious, uncon-
scious, and in-between (subconscious). This is an extension of empathetic
democracy, which Sandilands sees as a method for maintaining the re-
quired tension of constant validation, openmindedness, and listening be-
tween self and other, to the individual mind, a place of voices, perspectives,
and corresponding pluralities of belief, sentiment, and passion (1999).
If the self is seen as a collection of voices, rather than a battlefield of
rationality vs. biology, the goal is no longer to acquiesce to computer im-
plants in the brain to palliate nail-biting stress and perform better on the
MCAT, LSAT, or GRE. Rather the goal is to come to a deep concordance
between elements of the self, which allows satisfaction and fulfillment given
who one is and not who one should be according to capitalist standards,
standards in which both victory and defeat readily become ways to scar
and limit ego, trap it within a framework of early twenty-first- century
hedonism and hierarchy.
The paradigm of envy, callous competition, and (in)security can never
allow an enduring self-acceptance - it depends too much on people want-
ing what they don't have to permit a deep psychological peace. This is the
crucial danger, the need to make people unhappy with themselves so that
they will buy the latest fix, whether it is a pharmaceutical company's pill, a
Mercedes, a candy bar, a computer game, whatever. The way out of self-
replacement and into self-acceptance is to reject the progression toward
de-selection and embrace who we are at all levels of being through anti-
domination tactics such as empathetic listening, validation, and the nur-
turance of a joyful mind.
NOTES
1. 1 would like to thank the participants of the "Taking Nature Seriously" conf
ence, held at the University of Oregon in February 2001, for enlightening feed
back. Also, and just as crucially, the anonymous referees assigned by the edit
were exceptional. Although it is fairly common to thank referees, I want
underscore my appreciation in this case. The content, style, and readability of
this paper have all been magnified considerably through their efforts.
2. The term "self-deselection" applies to a process that in itself, without contex-
tual and other modifiers, is intended to be morally neutral, that is, neither
inherently wrong nor inherently proper. I am not, then, in my initial activation
of this term, begging important questions of moral analysis. This paper does
strenuously argue that, given our early twenty-first- century capitalist culture,
self-deselection is egregiously wrong; this is not, however, a blanket condem-
nation meant to span all possibilities and futures.
3. The matter of social addiction is the focus of a wide-ranging scholarly pursuit
that I have barely broached here. I have mentioned both Gore and Glendinning
in reference to this matter (1992; 1995), and Richardson et al. in relation to
capitalism and denial of crisis (1995). Trenchant and convincing studies have
come out in most all disciplines of the humanities. One example is sociologist
Stanley Cohen's States of Denial (2001). There are, similarly, no lack of reli-
gion-based analyses here (i.e., the Buddhist stance that attachment to worldly
goods, epitomized by Western culture's consumption frenzy, should be tran-
scended). In short, the hypothesis that we are in a common social state of
addiction and denial should be taken very seriously, given the insistence by so
many academics and writers that we are.
4. One could challenge the efficacy of 'most everyone will agree' as an indicator of
when Replacement has been attained on the grounds that it is a false appeal to
the majority and also on the grounds that 'most everyone' represents only one
perspective whereas in postmodern relativistic society there are many valid
perspectives regardless of what 'most everyone' says. My basic response is an
appeal to what has been called 'common sense realism', which is well repre-
sented by the fact that people adhering to diverse cultures, perspectives and
worldviews have no problem recognizing and discoursing together on the ma-
jor objects or events of life such as love, happiness, the sun, walking, human,
bird, and so on. My second line of defense is to claim that I am speaking of
'most everyone' in terms of a Western perspective which, for good or ill, has
become an insidious, pervasive and dominant perspective throughout the world
and thereby claims a large share of most anyone's reality these days. Note also
that my use of common sense realism and a Western framework are not neces-
sarily incompatible and rather can be mutually reinforcing elements of a single
thesis.
5. Too large to seriously engage here is the question of choice. What does it mean
to say, for example, that we have chosen a colonizing model? How would we
go about choosing to switch to an ecofeminist one? Complicating the matter of
choice is the multilayered and multi-conscious nature of both minds and soci-
eties. It is obviously possible to have a muddled belief system rife with wres-
tling tensions and tendencies, one that yields no simple categorization or ethical
analysis. In light of this intricacy, we should shy away from both fatalistic
determinism and simple solutions. We should not, however, shy away from our
power to shape the world, the responsibility that entails, or our capacity to
make responsible choices.
6. The ecofeminist ethical framework could be contrasted with a colonist ethical
framework. The latter would employ atomism instead of mutuality in venues
metaphysical, political, and economic, and is well reflected in current Western
practices. Cartesian consciousness - the epitome of isolated rational being -
combines with the Hobbesian bellicose and laissez-faire economics to engen-
der a world of realpolitik and plutocracy. The essential theme is that hierarchy
will be established by competition, something of a corporate chess game, within
the boundaries of rules established by military strength. A military-corporate
alliance insures that those with the biggest guns also have the best situation for
making money. The whole is theoretically defended by a neoliberal distortion
of utilitarianism, a claim that what's best for the rich and powerful is also best
for all if 'rational' (Hobbesian/free market) dictates are maintained.
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Self-Deselection: Technopsychotic Annihilation via Cyborg

Author(s): Chris Crittenden

TECHNOPSYCHOTIC ANNIHILATION VIA

ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002 ISSN: 1085-6633

The central theme of this paper is self-deselection, which is a twis

Uses of Cyborg Imagery in the Literature

128 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002

CHRIS CRITTENDEN SELF-DESELECTION 129

Why Humans Might Self-Deselect

In the following discussion, I am not arguing for entailme

130 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002

CHRIS CR1TTENDEN SELF-DESELECTION 131

In addition to the principle of promoting discontent, there is the pri

132 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002

CHR1S CRITTENDEN SELF-DESELECTION 133

The Argument for the Danger of Self-Deselection

If you could make your children tremendously smarter by implanting

134 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 7(2) 2002

To answer yes to such questions is not to assert 'yes, I want to promote

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Why Self-Deselection Is a Bad Thing

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There are several reasons why self-deselection is a foolhardy enter-

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In addition to recklessness, there is the problem of justifying our own

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Haves vs. Have-Nots

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Control and Surveillance

Another problem with self-deselection (and its precursor stages) is the

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Here I introduce two contrasting models of management that c

The foregoing arguments reveal a colonizing modus operandi. This

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The second model of management is ecofeminist. Ecofeminism offers

The dangers of ecofeminism seem to result from a positive alliance

While not disputing that hyper-feminization of nature and hyper-mascu-

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The individual conceived in terms of mutuality is formed by, bound to

An Ecofeminist Ethical Framework

The ecofeminist model informs a full-blown ecofeminist ethic, which

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Mutuality and Self-Fulfillment

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Achterhuis, Hans. 1998. "The Courage to be a Cyborg," Research in Philos

Cuomo, Chris. 1998. Ecofeminist Communities. New York: Routledge.

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