JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC., vs . HON.

COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on
January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the
constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of
their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB)
was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP
prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a
motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on
February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however,
dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision
and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

Issue:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

Ruling:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary
of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state
particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the
legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own
property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed
at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a
wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory
powers. Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (89 Phil. 660, 708, [1919]) wrote: "The police power of the State," one court has
said . . . 'is a power coexistensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It
may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature. the judiciary rarely attempts
to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great
principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."

Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling business or trade has always
been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their
conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public
health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of
course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may
so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process
clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of
various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical
exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their
seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and
other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing
education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other
workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As
this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon , in reference to the recurring
problems faced by our overseas workers: what concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an
employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances,
the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our
constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because
these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong.

It is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support
their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the
freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "(t)he non-
impairment clause of the Constitution . . . must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally
important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for
so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is
to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection
clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is
germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.

Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against defendant-appellee Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. on Jan. 17, 1963 alleging that the latter as the registered owner of motor vehicles, paid to the Motor
Vehicles Office in Baguio the amount of P78,636.17, for the second installment of registration fees for 1959, not in
cash but in the form of negotiable backpay certificates of indebtedness. Thus, it sought the payment of such
amount with surcharges plus the legal rate of interest from the filing thereof and a declaration of the nullity of the
use of such negotiable certificate of indebtedness to satisfy its obligation. The defendant-appellee, countered that
what it did was in accordance with the Backpay Law, both the Treasurer of the Philippines and the General
Auditing Office having signified their conformity to such a mode of payment. It then sought the dismissal of the
complaint.

Issues:
whether or not the acceptance of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness tendered by defendant bus firms to
and accepted by the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio City and the corresponding issuance of official receipts
therefor acknowledging such payment by said office is valid and binding on plaintiff Republic

Ruling:
It therefore rendered judgment in favor of defendant-appellee "upholding the validity and efficacy" of such
payment made and dismissing the complaint. Hence this appeal which, on the decisive legal issue already set forth
at the
outset, we find meritorious

A tax refers to a financial obligation imposed by a state on persons, whether natural or juridical, within its
jurisdiction, for property owned, income earned, business or profession engaged in, or any such activity analogous
in character for raising the necessary revenues to take care of the responsibilities of government. According to
Cooley: "taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the state by virtue
of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs."

The differentiating factor between a tax and other pecuniary burdens is the purpose to be subserved. Taxes are for
the purpose of raising of revenue. Unlike a tax, other pecuniary burdens like regulatory fees have not for its object
the raising of revenue but looks rather to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as
between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. A tax is neither a penalty that
must be satisfied nor a liability arising from contract. Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a
fee as a manifestation of an exercise of the police power.

Clearly the Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment not of a tax but of a registration fee under the police power.
Hence, the inapplicability of the section relied upon by defendant-appellee under the Back Pay Law for the
payment of a liability of a registration fee with Backpay Certificates.

A statute is meaningful not only by what it includes but also by what it omits. What is left out is not devoid of
significance. As observed by Frankfurter: "An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated,
cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion."

The written approval of the National Treasurer, concurred in by the Auditor General, of the procedure to accept in
payment of registration fees Backpay Certificates of Indebtedness do not constitute estoppel on the part of the
government. For, the government is not estopped by error or mistake committed by its agents.
EVANGELISTA vs. JARENCIO

Facts:
The President of the Philippines under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966 created the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO). He charged the agency with the responsibility to investigate all
activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruption, smuggling, lawlessness, subversion, and all
other activities which are prejudicial to the government.

The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, takes testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.

On June 7, 1968, pursuant to the powers vested in the Agency, petitioner Quirico Evangelista as Undersecretary of
the agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad terstificandum commanding him to be and appear as witness at the office of the PARGO. Instead of
obeying the subpoena, Manalastas filed a Petition for prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order which was granted by the CFI of Manila, hence, this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the Agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court, set respondent court's order aside and held that the
disputed subpoena is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

It has been essayed that the lifeblood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general
policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find
out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only
in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain
information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils
calling for correction, and to report 􀀾ndings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO), created to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service, draws its subpoena power from the Executive Order creating
it. Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the agency and is not bordered by nor is it
merely exercisable in its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. To hold that the subpoena power of the agency is
confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory function would imperil or inactive its investigatory functions. More
than that, the enabling authority itself fixes no distinction when and in what function should be subpoena power
be exercised. Similarly, there is no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the
law itself makes none.

The proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the subpoena power of an administrative
agency shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of
a similar character" could refer to restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is
unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. The
strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court, namely, that a specific case must be pending before a
court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial
or adjudicatory functions, cannot apply to a non-judicial subpoena issued by an administrative agency. An
administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a
competent court, and not an administrative subpoena.
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication
is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not
necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the
order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.

The purpose of an administrative subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which
to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony
sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed
witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.

An administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order
to get evidence, but an investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not. When investigate and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative
body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. In sum, it may be
stated that subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the
agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.

The privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings. Thus, in an administrative charge of unexplained wealth under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, it was held that since the proceedings is criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the
respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self incrimination.
This same approach was later followed in an administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could
possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, where the person cited
in the subpoena is not facing any administrative charge, but is merely cited as a witness in connection with the
fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in a government office with the object of submitting the
assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges, any unnecessary extension
of the privilege would be unwise since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future
action. Anyway, by all means, the person so cited may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to
disregard his privilege against self-discrimination.

For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force
and effect of statutes cannot be collaterally impeached. Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the
lower court as to be acceptable for adjudication in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court. The settled
rule is that the Supreme Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.
PEOPLE V. VERA

Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is
stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are
covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of
the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Ruling:

An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in
the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal protection, to
be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of
the class.
Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and
conclusions of the Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, especially where from its own admission reliance
was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the par ties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey
( [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could
enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial
chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.

In vetoing a bill, the President may express the reasons which he may deem proper, but his reasons are not binding
upon the Supreme Court in the determination of actual controversies submitted to it for determination. Whether
or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his
broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination before the
Supreme Court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is
expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the judgment of the court one way or another
and prevent it from taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case.
If it is ever necessary to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is
that the judiciary is independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government —
independent in the performance of its functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of its sworn duty as it sees it and understands it.

The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

The question of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary
course of law, even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42
Phil., 818), the Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the
petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see also 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S., 189;
72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto
brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a
statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97,
117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the
challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931] 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for
preliminary in junction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the
case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to
an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the writ of prohibition will notice
where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned,
because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute,
and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate
remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from
enforcing that statute.

A Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such
proceeding is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.

As a general rule, the question constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by
the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the
time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at
any stage of the ù proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is
the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears
that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. And it has been held that a
constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of
the court below.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act
No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound infliicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now as sailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is
held void by the courts in proper cases.

While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom,
and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points. (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9
Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is, necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of
which is attacked.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang
Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is
limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations
to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.

" . . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." This basic individual right sheltered by the
Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

In the case of Act No. 4221, the resultant inequality may be said to 􀁌ow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may
be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality
are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal
protection of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but
premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which
denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination. it is within the constitutional
prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law
has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.

Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in
force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year
— and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no
probation in subsequent years. While this situation, goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation
implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a
government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a
rope of sand."
EDU V. ERICTA

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the
constitutionally of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the
Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his
order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner
for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by
the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing
what was set forth in the Act. Thus: “No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall
be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial
glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible
and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night.” 35 Then came
a section on dimensions, placement and color.

As to dimensions the following is provided for: “Glass reflectors – Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less
than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape – At least 3 inches and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be
bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner.” Provisions is then made as to how such reflectors are to be “placed,
installed, pasted or painted.”

There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four
reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the
rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass,
reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and
those placed on the side and the rear shall be red.

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: “Non-compliance with the requirements
contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already
registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Sec 16 of RA 4136; Provided,
however, that in the case of the violation of Section 1 (a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not
less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 is contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power

Ruling:
No. It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public
safety.

There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars the Supreme Court from passing upon the question of
the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding for certiorari before it to test the propriety of the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.

Police power is the authority of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. In negative terms, it is that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable with the totality of legislative power.

It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefit. The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men
in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

It would be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain
the attack on the Reflector Law (Republic Act No. 5715) ostensibly for disregarding the due process safeguard. It
would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an
attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the
product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand
the test of the most unsympathetic appraisal.

The Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our
government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of
control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through
state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so
when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there maybe declaration of nullity, not because the
laissez-faire principle was disregarded, but because the due process, equal protection or non-impairment
guarantees would call for vindication.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution
to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute all its term and provision
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enactment. The legislative does
not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative o􀁂ce designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.

Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, issued pursuant to the authority granted
him to promulgate rules and regulations, giving life to and translating into actuality the fundamental purpose of
the Reflector Law to promote public safety, is not invalid as an undue exercise of legislative power.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs . HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

Facts:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. On various dates, the
Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" cigarettes. 

The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World
Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope
Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Fortune
also submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original register and therefore a local brand. Ad Valorem
taxes were imposed on these brands. 

RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands carrying a foreign
name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93,  in
which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three brands classifying them as local brands carrying
a foreign name.

Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was also denied.

Issue:
Whether the RMC was valid.

Ruling:
No. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
have them covered by RA 7654.

Let us distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances — a legislative rule and an interpretative rule. In
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders , Inc. , vs. Department of Finance Secretary, (238 SCRA 63) the Court
expressed: ". . . a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing . In this connection, the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides: "Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as
far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. "(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon. "(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed. "In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to
provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing." It should be
understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increase the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us
that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure(revoking in the process the previous holdings of
past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the
classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA
7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes
which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the
questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally
manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the
enactment, of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products. Evidently,
in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the amendatory
law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR
not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and equitable.
Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on
equal footing both in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class must
be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject may be found. Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and
"Champion" cigarettes and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submission of private respondent
that the circular should, as in fact my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate
opinion, be considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process following the Ang Tibay doctrine,
the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation.
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Facts:
In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged with black market of electric meters and that its meters were
installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner received a communication from General Auditing Office
(GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce
before PSC, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash
such subpoena. The conference was postponed twice until it was finally cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an
order, which after finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter rates of
petitioner. Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted.

Issues:
Whether or not notice and hearing is required

Ruling:
Yes.When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines — they may partake of a legislative character.

Where the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency applies exclusively to a particular party,
predicated upon a finding of fact, based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office, which fact is
denied by said party, it is held that in making said finding of fact said agency performed a function partaking of a
quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Where the determination of the issue complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function of the
Public Service Commission and its order was issued without previous notice and hearing of the party affected, it is
held that said order is null and void for violation of the due process clause.
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

Facts:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all employers to include in
the Employee’s remuneration (salary) all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration (service).

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victoria’s Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social
Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated
October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and employees’
respective monthly premium contributions.

Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.

Issues:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act”

Ruling:
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake
of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This
is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often
times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement.

A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within
the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., pp. 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the
law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

Circular No. 22 of the Social Security Commission purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of
their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. It did not add any duty or detail that
was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how
the law should be construed. Such circular, therefore, did not require presidential approval and publication in the
Official Gazette for its effectivity.

While the rule is that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law,
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be
adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gain said that a particular phrase or term may have one
meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE ,

Facts:
Petitioner cornoration was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from
foreign corporations not engaged intrade or business within the Philippines, for which petitioner paid rentals after
withholding and turning over to the Bureau of Internal Revenue income tax of 30% of one-half of the film rentals
pursuant to Section 24(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2343 and the
Implementing General Circular No. V-334 issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on April 12, 1961. For
the years 1963 through 1968, petitioner dutifully observed the practice. With the amendment of Section 24(b) of
the Tax Code by Rep. Act No. 5431 on June 27, 1968, increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35%, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue revoked, for being "erroneous for lack of legal basis" Gen. Circular No. V-334, by issuing Revised
Memo-Circular No. 471, basing the tax therein prescribed on gross income. Pursuant thereto, respondent
Commissioner issued against petitioner a letter of assessment and demand requiring the latter to pay deficiency
with holding income tax on the remitted film rentals for the years 1965 to 1968 in the total amount of
P525,897.06. Without acting on petitioner's request for a reconsideration and withdrawal of the assessment,
respondent Commissioner issued a warrant of distraint and levy over the former's personal and real property. On
petition for review filed with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, the latter dismissed it and affirmed the questioned
assessment. Petitioner appealed contesting the retroactivity of Revised Memo-Circular 471 and averring
prescription of the right of respondent Commissioner to assess the deficiency with holding income tax.

Issue:
Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied.

Ruling:
Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them
would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of
Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year
that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to
pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in
1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had
already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as
the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.

It is clear from Sec. 338-A (now Sec. 327) of the Tax Code as insisted by Rep. Act No. 6110 on August 9, 1969 that
rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application where to
so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The prejudice to petitioner of the retroactive application of
Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last
year that petitioner had with held taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on
petitioner to pay deficiency `withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time
commencing in 1963. Petitioner was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control over them when the new circular was
issued. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the enumerated exceptions stated in the Section.

The Court is not unaware of the well-entrenched principle that the Government is never estopped from collecting
taxes because of mistakes or errors on the part of its agents. In fact, utmost caution should be taken in this regard.
But, like other principles of law, this also admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and fairplay. The insertion
of Sec. 338-A into the National Internal Revenue Code, as held in the case of Tuason, Jr., v. Lingad, 58 SCRA
170(1974) is indicative of legislative intention to support the principle of good faith. In fact, in the United States,
from where Sec. 24 (b) was patterned, it has been held that the Commissioner or Collector is precluded from
adopting a position inconsistent with one previously taken where injustice would result therefrom, or where there
has been a misrepresentation to the taxpayer.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals further requiring the petitioner to pay interest and surcharge as provided
for in Sec. 51(e) of the Tax Code in addition to the deficiency withholding tax of P525,897.06 is much less called for
because the petitioner relied in good faith and religiously complied with no less than a Circular issued "to all
internal revenue officials" by the highest official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and approved by the then
Secretary of Finance.

Republic Act No. 2343, dated June 20, 1939, which was the basis of General Circular No. V-334, was just one in a
series of enactments regarding Sec. 24(b) of the Tax Code. Republic Act No. 3825 came next on June 22, 1963
without changing the basis but merely adding a proviso. Republic Act No. 3841, — dated likewise on June 22, 1963,
followed later, omitting the proviso and inserting some words. It was only on June 27, 1968 under Republic Act No.
5431, which became the basis of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 471, that Sec. 24(b) was amended to refer
specifically to 35% of the "grass income." The principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by
reenactment clearly obtains in this case. It provides that "the reenactment of a statute substantially unchanged is
persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction." Note should be taken of the
fact that this case involves not a mere opinion of the Commissioner or ruling rendered on a mere query, but a
Circular formally issued to "all internal revenue officials" by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
LORENZO M.TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. 

Issue:
Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. 

Ruling:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. 

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. 

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. 

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the
law. 

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of
a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. 

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. 

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to
prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due
process and to information on matter of public concern. Cda
MONETARY BOARD and GAIL U. FULE, Director, Supervision and Examination Department II, and BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS, petitioners, vs . PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

Facts:
The Philippine Veterans Bank, pursuant to its mandate to provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers
under Republic Acts 3518 and 7169 established pension loans for bona fide veterans and beneficiaries, as well as
salary loan products for teachers. As these clientele do not have security other than their continuing good health
or employment, to secure their loans, the PVB devised a program by charging a premium, a higher fee known as
Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from the borrowers. Special Trust Funds were established by PVB for the loans of its
clientele and in case of death of the borrower, the fees charged from him and credited to the trust funds will be
used to fully pay the loan

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas found that PVB’s collection of the CRF violated Section 54 of R.A. 8791 which prohibited
banks from directly engaging in insurance business as insurer. Thus, it wrote the PVB to inform it that CRF is a form
of insurance, based on opinion by the Insurance Commission and should be continued. PVB then stopped collecting
the fees

The Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1139 directing the PVB’s Trust and Investment Department to
return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF; and to preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted
CRF pending resolution of ruling of the office of the General Counsel of the BSP. The BSP denied PVB’s request for
reconsideration, hence it filed a petition for declamatory relief before the RTC of Makati City

The Monetary Board moved to dismiss the petition, citing that the petition should not prosper because of the prior
breach of PVB by Section 54 of RA 8791. The RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief, ruling that the issue
of whether or not PVB violated Section 54 of Republic Act 8791 should be resolved in an ordinary civil action, not a
declaratory relief

Almost years later, it filed a Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration, stating that it did not receive a copy of
the order until Sept. 3, 2008, which the Monetary Board opposed, alleging that per certification by the Philippine
Postal Corporation, the order was served on respondent on Oct. 17, 2007.

The RTC ruling on the motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and ruled that the collection of the CRF by PVB
did not constitute engaging in the issuance business as an insurer, hence not a violation of Sec. 54 of RA 8791.
Accordingly, it declared MB Resolution No. 1189 null and void. Its motion for reconsideration denied, it filed before
the SC a petition for review on certiorari to contest the RTC decision, on the issue of whether or not the petition
for declaratory relief is proper.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper?

Ruling:
We rule in the negative.

The Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,[10] held that in the same manner that
court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies... cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not
agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the
Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition
for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or
functions.
The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the character of its determination of
whether or not appropriate sanctions may be imposed upon erring banks, as an exercise of quasi-judicial function

A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot be the proper subject of declaratory relief.

Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a quo's Order dated September 24, 2007, which dismissed
respondent's petition for declaratory relief, had long become final and executory.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for declaratory relief, viz.:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or... violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute;... and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute.[9]

Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or functions. As
aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and
a body corporate with fiscal and administrative... autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of
money, banking, and credit. It has the power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the
subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and... others,
needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of
Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in
determining whether administrative... sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily
implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same.
DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs . COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
(COSLAP)

Facts:
A huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Niño, Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion
of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine
Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings,
consolidated its ownership over the property and subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered
by TCT No. T-162663; and the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property subject of the instant
dispute ("Cuison property").

Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private respondents who
are members of the Sto. Niño Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA)
and Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents were individually issued with
certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After compulsory acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the
names of the aforesaid organizations.

Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing" and therefore beyond the
coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. Named respondents
were the Regional Director for Region XI of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register of Deeds of Davao City, SNFC, ARBA and
NAMAR-FADC-KMP.

Respondent officials contends that the Cuison property was agricultural as per certification issued by the Regional
Officer of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city zoning
ordinance classifying the Cuison property as "urban/urbanizing" for being without the approval of the HLURB.

Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision finding that the Cuison property was not agricultural land and,
therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP because as early as 1982, it had already been classified as
"urban/urbanizing." The Provincial Adjudicator granted the Bank’s prayer to nullify the compulsory acquisition
proceedings with respect to the Cuison property and directed the Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel the
CLOAs issued to the beneficiaries and to reinstate TCT No. T-162664 in the name of the Bank. After reinstatement
of the Bank’s title over the Cuison property, herein petitioner Davao New Town Development Corporation
acquired the property. Subsequently, the Cuison property was further subdivided into seven (7) parcels now
covered by TCT Nos. T-224628 to 224634 all registered in the name of petitioner.

Respondents appealed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB, where petitioner intervened as the
new owner of the Cuison property.

While the appeal was pending, private respondents filed an unnumbered case with the Provincial Adjudicator
against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction and the
restoration of their CLOAs and of TCT No. CL-850. They alleged that while the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator
in DARAB Case was seasonably appealed, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. CL-850 and reinstated the Bank’s
certificate of title to the Cuison property. They also claimed that petitioner had introduced preliminary works on
the Cuison property and was poised to forcibly eject private respondents from the premises.

DARAB partially affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision. The DARAB also ordered the Bank and petitioner to
solidarily pay the disturbance compensation in favor of the beneficiaries. According to the DARAB, since the Cuison
property had been classified by the city government as a site for human settlements and relocation prior to June
15, 1988, the Cuison property cannot be categorized as an agricultural land.
Petitioner filed a manifestation to bring to the DARAB’s attention a compromise agreement executed by the
parties. The compromise agreement stated, among others, that petitioner had agreed to give the beneficiaries
disturbance compensation and to process the titling of beneficiaries’ home lots in exchange for the latter’s
peaceful evacuation of the Cuison property and non-interference with petitioner’s projects in the area.

DARAB issued a Resolution denying private respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the DARAB decision and
considered the case closed and terminated. Private respondents filed a complaint for Injunction With Prayer for
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, Damages, and Restraining Order with the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The second complaint, alleged that the decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case was null and void for failure to implead the Republic of the Philippines as the
real party-in-interest in a suit for cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic. Private
respondents also claimed that they were not made parties to the proceedings in DARAB Case and to the execution
of the compromise agreement.

Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in the second DARAB case and ordered petitioner to pay herein private
respondents disturbance compensation. Both parties appealed to the DARAB, which appeal remains unresolved to
date.

Herein private respondents, who are members of SNFC, again referred their complaint with another agency, this
time, COSLAP. On December 10, 1998, COSLAP issued a subpoena on petitioner directing the latter and PBC to
appear for an investigation on the case docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-343. At the scheduled investigation no
representative from COSLAP appeared. On January 18, 1999, COSLAP issued another subpoena on petitioner
directing the latter to appear for another investigation. In light of the opposition raised by petitioner that it was not
served a written complaint, the scheduled investigation was deferred for the second time.

Upon urgent ex-parte motion by private respondents, COSLAP issued a status quo order on January 14, 1999
enjoining petitioner from disturbing the peaceful possession of private respondents in the Cuison property.
Petitioner filed a motion on January 25, 1999, seeking the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction of COSLAP
and the lifting of the status quo order. Without ruling on petitioner’s motion, COSLAP issued an order directing the
parties to submit their respective position papers. Only private respondents complied, after which the case was
deemed submitted for decision. COSLAP issued the assailed Resolution upholding its jurisdiction over the case and
declaring the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in the second DARAB case as not binding upon the Republic and
private respondents who were not impleaded in said case.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refrained from passing upon
the jurisdictional questions raised by petitioner.
Whether or not whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over this case
Direct vs. Collateral Attack

Ruling:
No, Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refrained from
passing upon the jurisdictional questions raised in its motion to dismiss and that respondent Commission had
threatened to immediately enforce said patently void resolution, thereby rendering petitioner without any plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, in view of the nullity of the assailed
Resolution, the Court may entertain the petition notwithstanding the failure of petitioner to appeal the Resolution
to the Court of Appeals. If a decision is rendered without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity, the same may be
attacked anytime. While certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost
appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. The Court has given due
course to petitions for certiorari although appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted
such action, mindful that dismissals based on technicalities are looked upon with disfavor.

No, Petitioner mainly argues that respondent Commission was without jurisdiction in entertaining private
respondents’ complaint and in promulgating the assailed Resolution because the matter falls within the primary
and exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB

COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial Adjudicator or any other quasi-
judicial agency for that matter. In their Position Paper, private respondents questioned the validity of the DARAB
and the Provincial Adjudicator’s order of cancellation of private respondents’ CLOAs and of the government’s
certificate of title over the Cuison property on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines was not impleaded
in those cases. Private respondents’ recourse from the decision of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362, affirming
the Provincial Adjudicator’s order of cancellation of the compulsory acquisition proceedings, is to appeal the
decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Respondent COSLAP cannot
arrogate the duty of directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs of private respondents because the same falls within
the competence of the DAR subject to the appellate review of the Court of Appeals. Insofar as the
assailed Resolution delved on the propriety of the rulings of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362 and of the
Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93, the Court finds COSLAP to have exceeded its quasi-
judicial functions.

COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of the government’s title over the Cuison property.
Well-settled is the rule that a torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No.
1529, Sec. 48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding.

When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and
thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an
action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. As noted by private respondents in their Position Paper, COSLAP
directed the Register of Deeds to reinstate the certificate of title on the Cuison property in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, the complaint of private respondents before COSLAP sought an alteration
petitioner’s certificate of title which COSLAP has no authority to order pursuant to Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM (DAR), vs . JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA

Facts:
This case is an appeal for certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, granting the
respondent’s petition for prohibition and the Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Federico Suntay filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation against the DAR, DAR Region IV
Director and the Land Bank of the Philippines for his land which was valuated by the land bank as P4,251,141,68,
which, according to Suntay was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of land without process of law.

The RARAD ruled in favor of Suntay and ordered that Land Bank pay the P157,541,951.30 as just compensation.
Consequently, Land Bank filed a petition to the RTC praying that just compensation be declared at P4,251,141.68.
The Court dismissed the petition for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period.

While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the
RARAD issued an Order declaring its Decision as final and executory after noting that Land Bank’s petition for just
compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of
Sec. 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. The RARAD issued a Writ of Execution, directing the Regional
Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its Decision.

Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition,
impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No.
0252, mainly on the theory that R.A. 6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. The Court of Appeals granted Lubrica’s prayer for a temporary
restraining order. This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, directing RARAD not to
implement its Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubrica’s petition for
prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and could file a comment only
when specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled that DARAB’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARAB’s contention
that the issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional supervision over the RARAD.
In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252
and issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering
its dismissal

Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over DSCA No. 0252

Ruling:
This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Bank’s
petition for certiorari.

This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
33 In the instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the writ of execution upon the belief that its
decision had become final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
It is worth noting that in its petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the RARAD from implementing its
decision, it merely "exercised its residual power of supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within the bounds
of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her from committing grave and serious disservice to the Program." 34
DARAB's action, therefore, is a recti􀀽cation of what it perceived as an abuse of the RARAD's jurisdiction. By its own
admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct errors of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the
regular courts by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments.

This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs,
but the same should be exercised within the context of administrative supervision and/or control. In the event that
the RARADs or PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents the aggrieved party from availing of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled
discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as
distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class
of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on
pleadings and practice.

While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not have participated in the proceedings before said court
by 􀀽ling a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court considers satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it
has a peculiar interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at
the same time not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the senior officials of the DAR, who are
guided by the State's main policy in agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the DARAB. The DARAB's
interest in the case is not purely legal but also a matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly considered as a
nominal party which must refrain from taking an active part in the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA , vs . POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA

Facts:
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044 on Sept. 9, 1998 dropping Montoya, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), from the rolls, effective Aug. 15, 1998, for failure to attend the
Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC). He had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period
of 67 days, from Jan. 23, 1998 to Mar. 31, 1998.

Four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof addressed
to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on Jan. 22, 1998, he went to the
Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly
due to the fact that his name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not
approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from
arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a certification simply
dated 1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP).
Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD. The Special Order 990 was cancelled.

Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police Superintendent, and
based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision on Jun. 23, 2000 dismissing Montoya from
the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy of
said Decision on Jul. 20, 2000.

Montoya filed a motion. Montoya’s Petition/Motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action
involving demotion or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director may only be appealed to the
Regional Appellate Board (RAB).

Montoya next filed before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack of due process
considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of
the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal
Proceeding against him recommended his dismissal from police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC,
without even looking into his side of the controversy

On Dec. 11 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision granting Montoya’s appeal and ordering his reinstatement.
The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating Montoya in the police service.

On Aug. 8, 2003, Montoya, together with the other police personnel reinstated in the service by RAB-NCR
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or
Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director. On Nov. 10, 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an
Order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional Director. The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere,
appealed the Order dated Nov. 10, 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On Marc. 23,
2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et al., without prejudice to the
pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the CSC

Issue:
Whether or not the right to due process of petition was violated

Ruling:
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural
requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process.
Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter
in any administrative or judicial proceedings. 19 In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to
be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the very beginning
when these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR Regional Director, through Manere, never
contested the fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice to Montoya.
Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings, present written or oral arguments, and submit
evidence in his favor; he was completely deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges
against him and was irrefragably denied due process.

Obviously, Montoya's appeal on 2 September 2002 with the RAB-NCR, the appellate body with jurisdiction, was
􀁄led way beyond 10 days from his receipt of a copy of the NCR Regional Director's decision on 20 July 2000.

As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and
executory. 22 The Court, however, reiterates its previous pronouncements herein that the Summary Dismissal
Proceedings were conducted without notice to Montoya and in violation of his right to
due process. The violation of Montoya's fundamental constitutional right deprived the NCR Regional Director of
jurisdiction over Montoya's administrative case; and the decision rendered by the NCR Regional Director therein
was void. A void judgment does not become final and executory and may be challenged at any time.

A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial administrative body) without jurisdiction is null and void;
hence, it can never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.
23 Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of due process may be regarded as a "lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head."

The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny Montoya's Petition/Motion before it, even though
the PNP Chief manifestly did not have jurisdiction over the same. While Montoya did err in first filing his appeal
with the PNP Chief, the prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to re-file his appeal sooner before the
appropriate forum, the RAB-NCR.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION

Facts:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
unthreatened wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-
Tinejeros River. On Sept. 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on 2
findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportion’s plant, directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from
utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982
Effluent Regulations.

Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a
temporary operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the Board
but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the
case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Sec. 7(a), it has legal authority to issue exparte orders to suspend
the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC
(now, the Board.) Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board’s own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public health, safter or welfare,
or to animal and plant life” and argued that there were no findings that Solar’s wastewater discharged posed such
a threat.

Issue:
Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and Writ of Execution
against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation

Ruling:
Yes. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders. An ex parte
cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose
an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that
the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists
before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged
do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable
standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is
prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or
discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board
may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved
presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the
applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or
imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise
of that persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as
well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power.

It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie
findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity
to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is
required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that Order and Writ of Execution
were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's
petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
as Solar did in fact appeal.
FRANCISCO C. CALO vs. DELFIN G. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES

Facts:
This is an administrative land case wherein the appellant lost in his claim and contest on getting a homestead
patent for a certain piece of land; instead awarding such to Delfin C. Fuertes. Francisco C. Calo now filed an appeal
within 30 days. However, the appeal was not perfected because the appeal bond was not given until the 31 st day.
As a result, the appeal was denied. Calo then proceeded to submitting an appeal to the President of the Philippines
as a last resort in an administrative case. However, after 7 days he withdrew it before the President could even act
on it and instead went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan to file a petition for writs of certiorari. The Court
denied the petition. Thus, he submitted a petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is correct in denying Francisco Calo’s appeal and;
Whether the Court of First Instance is correct in denying abovementioned petition

Ruling:
Yes. The Secretary of DANR and the CFI is correct in denying Francisco Calo’s appeal.

Although the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period, the appeal has not been perfected where
the appeal bond was filed on the 31st day after notice of the judgment. In the appeal with the Secretary of DANR,
the petitioner failed to perfect his appeal by giving the appeal bond within 30 days. As to the appeal with the CFI,
he failed to exhaust all remedies available in an administrative case. In his situation, he failed to exhaust the last
remedy that is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.

In an administrative case, appeal to the President of the Philippines is the last step that the aggrieved party should
take. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal.

A civil action for certiorari and prohibition lies only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, appeal from the opinion of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to
the petitioner.
GODELIVA S. DULAY vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Facts:
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to confine public respondent Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of res judicata in administrative
proceeding by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of private
respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs. Angeles Dico against
Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease
Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" and (2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order "cannot be entertained" and
advising petitioner of the continuation of the formal investigation of the private respondent's letter-petition
scheduled for September 4, to 9, 1978.

By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-petition of respondent Angeles Dico dated
October 28, 1977 but also the denial 4 of her motion for
reconsideration 5 and the insistence of respondent Director in conducting his investigation on September 4 to 9,
1978 at the Bacolod City Fisheries Office, 6 the situation had become urgent for petitioner. Thus, she filed the
instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order claiming that unless
one is immediately issued, respondent will proceed with the investigation as scheduled, and if petitioner refuses or
fails to appear in said investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will proceed with the investigation
and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly threatened by the respondent Director in his telegrams to the
petitioner and his counsel, marked as Annexes 'I', 'U', 'W' and 'W-1' herein.

Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case of "Dico vs. Quibete, et al.," and the
cancellation of the Fishpond Lease Agreement of petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud committed by
Juan Quibete and Petronila Retirado is anchored, allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered evidence.

After an exhaustive review of the records of the case, We grant the petition and make permanent the temporary
restraining order issued earlier on September 7, 1978.

Private respondent's letter-petition, 9 filed October 28, 1977, states clearly that it is a
"Request for Reopening of Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete,
Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on New Discovered Evidence . . . ." prLL

Issue:
Whether or not decisions and orders of administrative agencies, upon their finality, have the force of a final
judgment under the doctrines of Res Judicata
Whether or not Respondent Director of the Bureau gravely abused his discretion when he allowed the re-opening
of the fishpond conflict involved herein

Ruling:
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction. DANR Case No. 2898, entitled
"Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete," was decided by the Office of the President on November 14, 1969. Since the same
was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has long become final and executory. DANR Case No.
3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No. V-3-385 of private respondent
Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. The findings of fact in said DANR case, which were found
by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed conclusive by operation of law. Said
DANR case, not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial review, has also become final and executory.
Private respondent points out that the Director of Lands, Ramon N. Casanova, treated her motion for
reconsideration as a petition for relief from judgment. That may be so but Director Casanova's action was not in
accord with the administrative rules on appeal. Actually, the next step that private respondent should have taken
from the July 9, 1970 Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was to appeal the same to the
Office of the President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision. Private respondent received the Decision on
September 21, 1970 and should have appealed the same by October 24, 1970, the last day of filing. Instead she
filed a motion for reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had become final and executory. The matter having
become final as of August or September 1970, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give due course to private-respondent's letter-petition
of October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.

To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights he sold to Retirado was
investigated TWICE after the Philippine Fisheries Commission reinstated private respondent's Fishpond Application
No. 18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both investigations — more than three years apart with investigators from
different offices — showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the different
documents, including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus, no merit can be given to
private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence, number 2 and 5 (page 7-8, supra) as all these HAD already been
studied thoroughly by both Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate investigations.

The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27 it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give due course to private-
respondent's letter-petition of October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved
herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.