Well Engineering Guideline For Documentation of SISO-SIPROD Operations Rev 3 PDF

WELL ENGINEERING GUIDELINE
FOR DOCUMENTATION OF SISO / SIPROD OPERATIONS
PCSB – WELLS HSE
Document No
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL ENGINEERING GUIDELINE FOR
DOCUMENTATION OF SISO-SIPROD OPERATIONS/2015/Rev.3
PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHDPRELIMINARY

© 2015 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)
All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise) without the permission of the copyright owner.
PETRONAS makes no representation or warranty, whether
expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the
facts presented. PETRONAS disclaims responsibility from any
liability arising out of reliance on the contents of this presentation.
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
WELL ENGINEERING GUIDELINE FOR ENGINEERING GUIDELINE FOR
DOCUMENTATION OF SISO-SIPROD
DOCUMENTATION OF: OPERATIONS/2015/Rev.3
Specific Instructions for Simultaneous
Operations (SISO) / June 2015
Simultaneous Production and Drilling ( SIPROD)
Page 2 of 85
Document Authority
Document
Name Designation Signature Date
Authority
Prepared by Ad Theuns Sr. HSE Specialist
Head Wells Operations

Reviewed by Lawrence Umar
Malaysia
Technical Safety
Reviewed by Stephen Oliver
Specialist
Asul Kahar B Senior Manager Wells

Reviewed by
Muda HSE
Reviewed by Hisham B Basar Head Wells Malaysia
Head Wells
Reviewed by Rosli Hamzah
International
Head Wells
Reviewed by Niall Farren Superintendent
(International)
Datuk George
Approved by Head Global Wells
Ling Kien Sing
Document Asul Kahar B Senior Manager Wells

Custodian Muda HSE
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
Page 3 of 85
Document Holder
No. Title
Master Asul Kahar B Muda – Senior Manager Wells HSE
01 Lawrence Umar – Head Wells Operations Malaysia
02 Niall Farren – Head Wells Superintendent International
03 Hisham B Basar – Head Wells Malaysia
04 Rosli Hamzah – Head Wells International
05 M Arriffin B Daud – Head Global Wells Intervention & Services
06 Datuk George Ling Kien Sing – Head Global Wells
07
08
Note:
A Document Holder is responsible to communicate and ensure compliance with
the requirements of this document.
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
Page 4 of 85
Amendment Summary
The table below must be completed in detail for each revision.
Rev Chapter Description Approved By Approval Date
0 First Draft
1 First Issue See page 2 May 2015
Added positions in the Document

Authority table
Added 1.3 Validity of the Document
2 Updated the document with clearer See page 2 June 2015

guidance for Workover / Well
Intervention activities.
Reshuffled the Roles & Responsibilities
from alphabetical to hierarchical order.
Added SIMOPS requirements for

onshore Well-pad Drilling all over the
3 document June 2015
See page 2
Added separate chapter on Land
1.2 Drilling, HPHT and Deep-water Drilling
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
Page 5 of 85
Preface
PETRONAS Policy for Health, Safety and Environment states that:
“PETRONAS shall ensure continual improvement in its Health, Safety and

Environment management and performance, leveraging on people, process and
technology.”
This Well Engineering Guideline has been developed to improve uniformity in

documentation within PCSB Wells and achieve consistency in the management
of hazards during Simultaneous Drilling and Production Operations (SIPROD).
The guideline provides the standard lay-out for the SISO/SIPROD

document and must be used as the SISO/SIPROD template for all PCSB
drilling and workover operations.
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
Page 6 of 85
Table of Contents of Document Control Part + Guidance for Template
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………… 7
1.1 Objective…………………………………………………………………………….. 7
1.2 Scope…………………………………………………………………………………. 7
1.3 Adapting the Template…………………………………………………………. 7

WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
Page 7 of 85
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective
This document provides guidance for Well Engineering to document and manage
SISO/SIPROD operations. It provides a standard layout and is based on “WW
ALL O 05 001 - Rev 0, February 2013 Simultaneous Operation Guidelines”
The above document defines the minimum HSE standard when carrying out non
production activities concurrent with production activities both onshore and
offshore. ‘Production activities’ refers to the handling of hydrocarbon under
pressure.
1.2 Scope
This template shall be applicable throughout PETRONAS Carigali/Wells Global
Operations carried out for onshore/offshore drilling and workover activities and
simultaneous to production activities. It includes Contractors engaged in work
for the Company.
1.3 Adapting the Template

This document is split into two sections. This section is used to ‘document
control’ the template and describes how to use it. The second section contains
the guidance and the template itself, which is to be copied and/or completed with
the SISO/SIPROD information as appropriate to the operation.
The technical content of this Generic Document is made as a guide and

first starting point for the user. This document serves to guide the user
to items to check. If a particular statement is not correct the user should
ask himself “what is the equivalent” and “how that similar check should
be carried out”. It is at the users’ discretion to adapt the document
further and produce a customized SISO/SIPROD document that best
suits the needs of his upcoming project and rig/vessel/platform.
The text in black has to be used in the SISO/SIPROD Document and modified
as necessary (see above). Text in red or in blue is used to indicate where words
are to be replaced, inserted or verified. They should be replaced by plain black
text in the final document.
Red text should be reviewed/corrected by representatives of “Operations”.
Blue text should be reviewed/corrected by representatives of ‘Wells’.
WELLS/WHSE/GDL/WELL
Page 8 of 85
Once the template has been fully modified for use it should contain no text in red
or blue and the first part of this document (the Guideline) should be deleted.
I.e. the pages up to (including) this page shall be deleted i.e. all the pages with
the header:
The document title page and header should then be modified accordingly.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS
(SISO) AND
SIMULTANEOUS PRODUCTION AND DRILLING/WORKOVER
ACTIVITIES (SIPROD) AT (PLATFORM) WITH DRILLING RIG
(NAME)
PCSB – WELLS ENGINEERING / OPERATIONS
Document No - ***/***/***/***
© 2015 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise) without the permission of the copyright owner.
PETRONAS makes no representation or warranty, whether
expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the
facts presented. PETRONAS disclaims responsibility from any
liability arising out of reliance on the contents of this presentation.
<Document Number>
Operations (SISO) / <Date>
Page 2-2 of 85
Document Authority <update the table; if not applicable add N/A>
Document
Name Designation Signature Date
Authority
(Senior) Drilling
Prepared by
Engineer
(Senior) Operations
Prepared by
Engineer
Well Intervention
Prepared by
Engineer
Reviewed by OIM Production
Reviewed by DSV / Company Man
Endorsed by Field Supervisor
Endorsed by Drilling Superintendent

/ Workover
Superintendent
Endorsed by Well Intervention

Manager
Endorsed by Head HSE
Approved by Production Manager
Approved by Drilling Manager
Approved by Well Intervention

Manager
<Document Number>
Page 2-3 of 85
I ACCEPT THE OWNERSHIP OF THIS DOCUMENT
Document
Authority Name Designation Signature Date
Owner Platform / Field OIM

<Document Number>
Page 2-4 of 85
Document Holder / Distribution List
No. Title
Master
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Note:
A Document Holder is responsible to communicate and ensure compliance with the

requirements of this document.
<Document Number>
Page 2-5 of 85
Amendment Summary
The table below must be completed in detail for each revision. To indicate
amendments from the previous version, vertical lines in the left hand margin
shall be added at the amended section.
Rev Page Description Approved By Approval Date
0 First Issue
<Document Number>
Page 2-6 of 85
Preface
For every Simultaneous Operation, a SISO document shall be developed and

approved to ensure full HSE compliance and with that minimisation of the risks
involved.
This Simultaneous Operations document provides specific instructions that need

to be followed up to manage risks and hazards of
Simultaneous Production and Drilling Operations (SIPROD) only.
It does not describe detailed precautions of possible other activities that require
a SISO document. For the use of this document workover operations are
considered to be ‘drilling’ operations as well.
<Document Number>
Page 2-7 of 85
CONTENTS
1. Introduction 2-11
1.1 SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS 2-11
Rig / Workover Activities 2-11
Production Activities 2-11
1.2 LAND DRILLING, HPHT DRILLING AND DEEP WATER DRILLING 2-11
Land Drilling 2-11
HPHT drilling 2-12
Deep Water Development Drilling 2-12
1.3 DOCUMENT REFERENCE. 2-14
1.4 VALIDITY OF THE DOCUMENT 2-16
2 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 2-17
2.1 DESCRIPTION OF ABBREVIATIONS 2-17
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF TERMS 2-19
3 Location, Rig and Platform or Well / Well-Pad information 3-20
3.1 SCOPE OF WORK 3-20
3.2 PLATFORM OR WELL / WELL-PAD DESCRIPTION <MAKE SPECIFIC WITH NAME OF PLATFORM, WELL OR WELL-PAD> 3-
20
3.3 RIG DESCRIPTION; RIG <MAKE SPECIFIC WITH TYPE AND NAME OF RIG> 3-21
The Anchor pattern for lifting position 3-21
The Anchor pattern for drilling position 3-21
3.4 CTU / WORK BOAT - BARGE DESCRIPTION <MAKE SPECIFIC FOR THIS PROJECT> 3-22
4 Hazards and Effect Management 4-23
4.1 HAZARD AND EFFECT IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) 4-23
4.2 CONTROL MEASURES 4-24
Two Barrier Rule 4-25
Well Barriers 4-26
4.2.2.1 Overbalanced Fluid Column 4-26
4.2.2.2 BOP Stacks 4-26
4.2.2.3 Unperforated Casing / Liner 4-26
4.2.2.4 Plugs 4-27
4.2.2.5 Surface Safety Valve (SSV) 4-27
4.2.2.6 Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV) 4-27
4.2.2.7 X-mas Tree 4-28
4.2.2.8 Suspension Assembly 4-28
<Document Number>
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4.2.2.9 Barriers for Gaslift Annuli 4-28
Surface Facility Barriers 4-29

4.2.3.1 Area Classification and Simultaneous Operations Design Philosophy 4-29
4.2.3.2 Instrument Gas 4-29
4.2.3.3 Fire Water Mains 4-30
Workover Barriers 4-30
4.2.4.1 Areas of Consideration 4-30
4.2.4.2 Additional precautions during CT activities 4-30
Communications 4-31
4.2.5.1 Daily Coordination Meeting 4-31
4.2.5.2 Toolbox Meeting 4-31
Roles & Responsibilities 4-32
4.2.6.1 Head HSE Division / Country / Region (delete if not applicable) 4-32
4.2.6.2 Head Production (delete if not applicable) 4-32
4.2.6.3 Field Operations Manager / Field Maintenance Manager (delete if not applicable) 4-32
4.2.6.4 Drilling Superintendent / Workover Superintendent (delete if not applicable) 4-33
4.2.6.5 Well Intervention Manager (delete if not applicable) 4-33
4.2.6.6 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) / Terminal Superintendent (TS) (delete if not applicable) 4-33
4.2.6.7 Drilling Supervisor / Company Man (delete if not applicable) 4-33
4.2.6.8 Well Services Supervisor (delete if not applicable) 4-34
4.2.6.9 Workover Supervisor (delete if not applicable) 4-34
4.2.6.10 Production Supervisor (delete if not applicable) 4-34
4.2.6.11 Drilling Engineer (delete if not applicable) 4-34
4.2.6.12 Operation Engineer (delete if not applicable) 4-34
4.2.6.13 Well Intervention Engineer (WIE) (delete if not applicable) 4-35
4.2.6.14 Authorized Gas Tester (AGT) (delete if not applicable) 4-35
4.2.6.15 Fire Watcher (delete if not applicable) 4-35
4.2.6.16 Safety and Health Officer (SHO) (delete if not applicable) 4-36
4.2.6.17 PCSB Operations Safety and Health Officer (delete if not applicable) 4-36
PTW System demarcation during SIMOPS between Production and Drilling Activities. 4-36
4.2.7.1 Work Supervision 4-37
Positive Isolation 4-37
Platform/Well-pad Shutdown and Depressurization 4-37
4.2.9.1 Planned Shutdown and Depressurization 4-37
4.2.9.2 Emergency Shutdown and Depressurization 4-38
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) 4-38

<Document Number>
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Well Collision 4-39

4.3 RECOVERY MEASURES 4-41
Emergency Response 4-41
4.3.1.1 Fire and Safety Equipment 4-41
Evacuation 4-41
4.3.2.1 Mustering Station 4-42
4.3.2.2 Escape Routes 4-42
4.3.2.3 Life Saving Appliances 4-42
People On Board (POB) 4-43
Alarm System 4-43
4.3.4.1 Securing of Activities 4-44
ER - Roles & Responsibilities 4-44
4.3.5.1 Unmanned Installation 4-45
4.3.5.2 Manned Drilling/Production Complexes 4-45
5 Preparation prior to Rig Move / Well Intervention activities 5-47

5.1 WELL ANNULI PRESSURE 5-47
5.2 SAFETY VALVES 5-47
5.3 RIG MOVE, RIGGING UP AND DOWN 5-48
Rig Skidding 5-48
Lifts 5-48
5.3.2.1 Normal lifts 5-48
5.3.2.2 Special Lifts 5-49
5.3.2.3 Above Drill Floor 5-49
5.3.2.4 Below Drill Floor (Lifting BOP stack) 5-49
6 Pre-SPUD activities. 6-52

6.1 PRE-MOVE CHECKLISTS 6-52
6.2 SIMOPS/SIPROD MEETING 6-52
7 Deviations 7-53
8 Appendices 8-54
8.1 ATTENDANCE LIST HAZID WORKSHOP 8-54
8.2 HER 8-55
8.3 WELL BARRIER: FLUID COLUMN ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 8-56
8.4 WELL BARRIER: BOP ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 8-57
8.5 WELL BARRIER: CASING/LINER/TUBING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 8-58
8.6 WELL BARRIER: SCSSSV 8-59
<Document Number>
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8.7 PETRONAS HSE RISK MATRIX (HSERM) 8-60

8.8 PTW DEMARCATION FOR SIPROD 8-62
8.9 TYPICAL MOPO FOR SIPROD 8-67
8.10 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANISATION CHART FOR SIPROD 8-68
8.11 PCSB LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES GUIDELINE 8-69
8.12 ESCAPE ROUTES, MUSTER POINTS AND FIRE & SAFETY EQUIPMENT PLATFORM 8-73
8.13 ESCAPE ROUTES, MUSTER POINTS AND FIRE & SAFETY EQUIPMENT RIG 8-74
8.14 BOP FALL DAMAGE AREA DRAWING 8-75
8.15 PRE-MOVE CHECKLIST FOR DSV (LONG TERM CHECK) 8-76
8.16 PRE-MOVE CHECKLIST FOR PLATFORM OIM AND DSV (SHORT TERM CHECK). 8-77
<Document Number>
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1. Introduction
1.1 Simultaneous Operations
As per “WW ALL O 05 001, Rev 1, Sept 2013 – Simultaneous Operations

Guidelines”, Simultaneous operation is defined as the conduct of non-production
activities concurrent with normal production operations.
Simultaneous operations shall be limited to two (2) concurrent operations (i.e.
production and one (1) additional activity). For more than two (2) operations,
higher approval according to COMPANY LOA shall be obtained.
This document only focuses on the Simultaneous Operations between Drilling /

Workover (Rig / Workover Activities) and Production (Activities).
Rig / Workover Activities
Rig activities include:

 Rig moving (positioning of drilling tender or jack-up, rigging up/down of
a derrick equipment set).
 Surface well operations (BOP handling, moving heavy loads, skidding,
conductor driving).
 Downhole well operations (drilling, completion, work-over, well testing,
coiled tubing operations).
 Well intervention activities including slickline, electric line and coiled
tubing operation which are performed without rig that are carried out
simultaneously with the production operation.
Production Activities
Production activities refers to the handling/processing of hydrocarbons under

pressure, i.e. production facility is still alive.
1.2 Land Drilling, HPHT Drilling and Deep Water Drilling
Land Drilling
The requirements for managing simultaneous operations between production
activities and drilling activities on land can be considered the same as for offshore
operations. In the relevant paragraphs the offshore ‘platform’ should be read as
the onshore ‘well-pad’ or onshore ‘nearby well’. Where obvious in the document
<Document Number>
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the text reads ‘platform/ well / well-pad’, the user has to delete what is not
applicable.
‘Well” refers to a nearby well of which the consequences of release of a hazard
can affect the drilling operations or personnel.
“Well-pad” refers to multiple wells being drilled using a pad-based drilling

approach.
HPHT drilling
From a simultaneous operations point of view requirements for ‘conventional
drilling activities’ can be considered applicable for HPHT drilling as well.
There are no specific requirements for HPHT Drilling activities executed
simultaneous with ‘Production activities. There may be restrictions on the rigs
itself, but these should be managed on the Rig (through for instance MOPO), not
in the Simultaneous/SIPROD Operations as described in this document (see 1.1)
An example of what should be managed on the rig is connecting MPD-systems
to conventional rig drilling systems to better manage (high) downhole pressures.
HAZOP studies are typical studies that can be used to manage these two
concurrently used systems safely.
Deep Water Development Drilling

The moment Deep Water exploration wells located commercially viable natural
gas or petroleum deposits, development of a reservoir can be done by
construction of a permanent production platform or by subsea completion of the
wells.
Figure 1 shows the variety of offshore (Deep Water) production platforms.
<Document Number>
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Figure 1: Variety of offshore production platforms.
In case Deep Water wells are developed using production platforms, the surface
simultaneous activities should be managed as described in this document. The
same counts for subsea activities; the risks that one subsea activity has to
another (nearby) subsea activity should be assessed at all times. If the risk is
assessed unacceptable high (see 8.7) one activity should be stopped and
secured.
If Deep Water wells are developed through subsea completion, the hydrocarbons
from individually completed wells are directed to a storage and offloading facility
(that might be either offshore or onshore) through a system of pipes, connections
and valves that reside on the ocean bottom. In this case Simultaneous
Operations between Production and Drilling (SIPROD) can be triggered by having
to work over existing subsea facilities i.e. the rig is positioned above existing
(producing) facilities (see also 5.3). In that case the simultaneous activities
should be managed as described in this document.
<Document Number>
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1.3 Document reference.
The following documents have been used for the development of this standard
template.
Document Number Title
WWW ALL O 05 001 PETRONAS CARIGALI Simultaneous

Operations Guideline
Revision 1, September 2013
WW ALL S 05 002 PETRONAS CARIGALI Permit To Work

Procedure.
Rev. 4 July 2013
WW ALL S 02 003 PETRONAS CARIGALI Philosophy of Life

Saving Appliances for Offshore
Rev. 1 December 2010
Installations
MY ALL E 04 001 PCSB Standard Design of Facilities for

Simultaneous Production and Drilling
Revision 3, October 2000
(SIPROD) Guidelines.
HSE-430-01/2014/057(M) MEMO: PTW System Demarcation during

SIMOP between Production and Drilling
MEMO dated 31-12-2014
activities.
WMS:T 06 PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS:T

TECHNOLOGY STANDARD
October 2014
PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL
GHSED/SGM/ME/2015/0303-78 MEMORANDUM from Head, Group HSE

26th March 2015 HSE RISK MATRIX (HSERM)
PTS 80.80.00.10 Offshore Facilities Life-Saving Appliance

Requirements
December 2010
(Amendments/Supplements to SOLAS)
PTS 60.2103 Lifting

October 2011
PTS 16.71.01 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION

(SUPPLEMENTS / AMENDMENTS TO
(Based on Shell DEP 80.00.10.10)
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS)
WRM Rev.03 December 2014 PCSB - Well Risk Management

<Document Number>
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<Document Number>
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1.4 Validity of the Document
The Risk Assessment carried out to properly manage the Hazards introduced by
Simultaneous Operations dictate the validity of this document i.e. the moment
a Hazard from one operation can have a Consequence for the other
(simultaneous) operation this document becomes valid.
For offshore activities the following elements should be considered to determine
the validity of this document (i.e. when it comes into effect).
a) The complexity of the field i.e. how easy it is for the rig / workboat to
approach the platform.
b) The complexity of the anchor pattern i.e. subsurface installations.
c) The complexity of soft-pinning a jack-up rig (seabed condition etc.).
d) Presence of toxic gases and their worst case dispersion distance.
e) The weather conditions.
f) The redundancy in assisting (tow) vessels.
Examples of identified boundaries are:
Offshore:
- The rig entering the xxx meter platform perimeter.
- A jack-up having soft-pinned its’ legs.
- The Deep Water drilling rig reaching its’ final location above subsea
(production) facilities.
Onshore:
- The rig entering the zone in which the consequences from an incident on
a nearby well can have an influence on (rig move) personnel.
- Rigging-up cranes to start lifting derrick/substructure (equipment) onto
the well pad and over production facilities.
<Document Number>
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2 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

For the purpose of this SIPROD document the definitions of terms, acronyms and
abbreviations used are as follows: (update/update the table if needed!)
2.1 Description of Abbreviations
Abbreviations Description
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AGT Authorized Gas Tester
BOP Blow-Out Preventer
BPV Back Pressure Valve
CSR Company Site Representative
CSO Contractor Safety Officer
DPIC Designated Person In Charge
DS Drilling Supervisor
FOM Field Operation Manager
FW Fire Watcher
GPSO General Procedures for Simultaneous Operations
HEMP Hazard and Effects Management Process
JHA Job Hazard Analysis
LOA Level Of Accountability
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
OSC On Scene Commander
PS Production Supervisor
PTW Permit To Work
PVT Pit Volume Totalizer
PIC Person In Charge
POB Personnel on Board
PASR Pre-Activity Safety Review
PMT Project Management Team

<Document Number>
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Abbreviations Description
ROV Remote Operated Vehicle
SCSSV Surface-Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
SIPROD Simultaneous Production and Drilling
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
SOG Simultaneous Operations Guideline
SSV Surface Safety Valve
SISO Specific Instructions for Simultaneous Operation
TS Terminal Superintendent
WBE Well Barrier Element
WOS Work Over Supervisor
WIE Well Intervention Engineer
WIS Well Intervention Supervisor

<Document Number>
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2.2 Description of Terms
Term Description
Production activities Handling of hydrocarbon under pressure
Major Accident MAHs are effectively hazards that can cause an

Hazards (MAH) incident with a severity level of 5 as well as scenarios
considered to be more likely, but with a severity level
3 or 4, i.e. E4, D4 and E3.
See HSERM for PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix
Effective Successful in producing a desired or intended result.
In Risk Assessment terms:
The Barrier is effective when it prevents the

Consequence i.e. it functions as designed (big
enough, fast enough and strong enough).
Independent Free from outside control, not subject to another’s

authority.
In Risk Assessment terms:
The Barrier is independent of the Initiating Event

(Threat) and the components of any other Barrier
already validated for the same condition. The
Barriers cannot be considered independent from one
another if there is a Common Cause Failure.
Barrier A measure which reduces the probability of releasing

a threats potential for harm and/or reduces its
consequences.
<Document Number>
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3 Location, Rig and Platform or Well / Well-Pad information
The <name of field / well / well-pad> is located <exact location>. The field / well
/ well-pad covers an area of <dimensions of the field / well / well-pad> and was
discovered in <year>.
Commercial production started in <year>.
The field / well / well-pad consists of <amount of wells, platforms/satellite
jackets> in water depths of <water depths in feet>.
The main structures in the <name of field> are illustrated in the figure below
and are as follows:
 Insert a map of the field with connections between (satellite)
platform(s)/jacket(s) etc. etc. / map of the well-pad or details of the well.
 Add a list of the names (codes) of the installations
3.1 Scope of Work
Include a brief description of the Scope of Work; include as a minimum the

activities that constitute Simultaneous Operations:
 Include a timeline of the SIPROD key activities.
 Per applicable activity include a description of the activity.
 Include a detailed description of the wells that have to be worked on
and/or are adjacent to it.
 Contractors involved.
3.2 Platform or Well / Well-Pad Description <make specific with name

of platform, well or well-pad>
Provide a description of the platform / well / well-pad with as a minimum:

 The status of (all) the well(s) on the platform / well-pad. Provide the
following data of all the wells/strings on the platform / well-pad visited by
the rig in the following format:
Table 1: Production data as on: dd-mm-yy
Pressures Rates Production Mode Remarks/Status
Well / CITHP FTHP Gross Net Oil Gross Gaslift Pressure SEP e.g. E valve
String (psig) (psig) Liquid (bdp) Gas (Y/N) (LLP / LP installed
Press.
(bpd) (MMscf / HP /
/ d) HHP) (psig)
xxx
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Pressures Rates Production Mode Remarks/Status
Well / CITHP FTHP Gross Net Oil Gross Gaslift Pressure SEP e.g. E valve
String (psig) (psig) Liquid (bdp) Gas (Y/N) (LLP / LP installed
Press.
(bpd) (MMscf / HP /
/ d) HHP) (psig)
xxx
Table 2: Annular pressure data as on: dd-mm-yy
Stabilized Closed Pressures Build up rate from 0

(psig) psig
Well Remarks / Status
(psig/hr. average)
CHP CCP1 CCP2 CHP CCP1 CCP2
Xxx
 Write down here any salient points that may be relevant for simultaneous
operations e.g. fill or open annuli, H2S etc.
 Hazardous Area Classification.
 Emergency Shutdown system.
 Rig approach point i.e. area where the rig should be located (anchored,
jacked-up or rigged-up).
3.3 Rig Description; Rig <make specific with type and name of rig>
If applicable: provide a description of the type and class of rig (tender-assist,

barge or jack-up) and the name; include as a minimum:
 The lay-out of the rig equipment.
 The level of Mechanical Impact Protection of the Rig Floor
 In case of a tender-assist rig the location of the rig-equipment on the
platform.
 The Hazardous Area Classification.
 The capacity and reach of the main crane anchored in lifting position or
jacked-up next to the platform.
The Anchor pattern for lifting position

If applicable provide a drawing of the anchor pattern and describe the anchor
layout procedure for lifting position.
The Anchor pattern for drilling position

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If applicable provide a drawing of the anchor pattern and describe the anchor
layout procedure for drilling position.
3.4 CTU / Work Boat - Barge description <make specific for this
project>
If applicable provide a description of Work Boat / Barge and the name; include
as a minimum:
 The lay-out.
 The capacity and reach of the main crane anchored in lifting position or
jacked-up next to the platform.
Also provide a description of the Coiled Tubing Unit, include as a minimum:

 The lay-out of the CTU.
 The Hazardous Area Classification.
 The main components of the CTU.
<Document Number>
Page 4-23 of 85
4 Hazards and Effect Management
As per “WW ALL O 05 001, Rev 1, Sept 2013 – Simultaneous Operations

Guidelines”, a risk assessment shall be conducted and the required controls shall
be identified.
4.1 Hazard and Effect Identification (HAZID)
For each installation (production asset and drilling rig) hazards have been
identified that may lead to a Major Accident. The identification of these MAH’s,
the possible causes, consequences and barriers and recovery measures needed
to bring the residual risk to tolerable level is typically done in HSE-Cases (also
known as Safety Cases). The HSE-Case demonstrates the facility/asset can be
operated in a safe way i.e. it will not cause harm to People or the Environment.
The HSE-Case however is based on ‘stand-alone’ operations and does not
address the risks that may be introduced by simultaneous operations (see Figure
1 below).
Figure 2
1: HSE-Case of Asset (Rig + Platform) 3: Hazards are managed to tolerable.
2: Hazards are identified and assessed 4: Residual Risks are known.

<Document Number>
Page 4-24 of 85
To identify and assess the SIPROD hazards and the precautions that have to be
taken to prevent them from being released a HER workshop has been conducted
on <date>. The attendance list of the workshop can be found in appendix 8.1.
The tool used in the HER workshop is the “Standard HER for drilling operations”.
The standard HER can be found:
 On Wells-ECM
 With the Wells HSE-department
After having identified what hazards have a residual risk that need to be managed
during simultaneous operations, barriers to prevent escalation of these residual
risks have been identified as well.
A copy of the HER document for this project can be found in appendix 8.2.
<Insert the HER that has been used to identify the SISO hazards for this
project>.
The documents that have provided input for the HAZID workshop were:
 The rig HSE-Case
 The platform (operations) HSE-Case
 The HER for the onshore well and/or onshore well-pad
All hazards have been “Risk Rated” using the PETRONAS HSE Risk Matrix
(HSERM) see appendix 8.2.
4.2 Control Measures
To control the identified Hazards, control measures have been identified. All of
the control measure can be found in appendix 8.2. A summary and the most
important Simultaneous Operations Rules and SIPROD barriers that should be in
place are listed in this chapter.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Simultaneous production and rig activities will not proceed, unless:
 The rig activities are protected by a minimum of two independent and
tested well barriers.
 The producing wells are protected by a minimum of two independent and
tested well barriers.
 The integrity of the surface production system is not jeopardized by rig
activities, and
 The ASD system is operational. Note, the ASD system shall be
considered not operational if it requires or is undergoing
maintenance.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
<Document Number>
Page 4-25 of 85
Two Barrier Rule

For a SIPROD activity to proceed at least two (2) effective, independent and
tested barriers should be in place.
The underlying concept for this rule is that the probability of failure is reduced
during simultaneous operations if each of the individual activities is protected by
a minimum of two independent and tested safeguards or barriers.
Should one of the barriers fail then all other activities will be secured as soon as
practicable so that
(i) All personnel can optimally respond to a possible problem developing from
one of the activities and
(ii) Complications as a result of interaction of the activities are avoided.
In the event that one of the barriers protecting a producing well fails, and cannot
be re-established, the particular well will be shut-in by the remaining approved
barrier and any other feasible back-up that will improve the well integrity for
drilling to proceed. The failed well barrier will be re-established as soon as
possible.
Each Supervisor, either in the field or in the office, applies this concept as
generally as possible. Approved barriers are defined in this chapter, however the
list may not be exhaustive and other barriers may be proposed.
As an outline, the two barrier concept is interpreted for the four main activities
as follows:
1) Rig-assisted well operations shall be protected by two or more valid well
barriers.
2) Production operations shall be protected by two or more valid barriers for
each production or injection well on the platform / well-pad. In addition
(i) The integrity of the surface production system shall not be substantially
endangered by the other activities taking place on the same platform, and
(ii) An ‘Automatic Shut Down’ (ASD) system shall be operational which causes
ESD by automatically closing in all the wells and the production system
and initiates automatic depressurization of all surface lines and vessels on
the platform / well-pad.
3) Non rig-assisted wireline operations shall be protected by two or more valid
well barriers. The integrity of the wireline set up shall not be substantially
endangered by the other activities taking place on the same platform.
Additional requirements are specified for the ASD system on the 'wireline well'
and for the approval for wireline work in a live well. All non-rig-assisted
wireline operations shall be controlled with a Permit to Work procedure.
4) Construction and maintenance activities will only proceed when the safety of
the working area and working conditions are not substantially endangered by
the other operations on the platform/well-pad. All construction and
maintenance work will be controlled with a Permit to Work procedure.
<Document Number>
Page 4-26 of 85
Well Barriers
A well barrier is defined as a protection measure which provides control over a
well. A barrier may work by preventing influx into the well (e.g. overbalanced
fluid), or by isolating the well from the formation (e.g. unperforated casing/ liner
and cement/mechanical plugs), or by closing off the flow path of the well (e.g.
BOP, wireline plug, SCSSV, Xmas-tree valve). Specific requirements for approved
well barriers are described in the document “PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS: T
TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL” (see also
1.3).
4.2.2.1 Overbalanced Fluid Column

As per PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS:T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE
CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL the purpose of the fluid column as a well
barrier/WBE is to exert a hydrostatic pressure in the well bore that will prevent
well influx/inflow (kick) of formation fluid. Acceptance criteria for the fluid column
as a well barrier/WBE can be found in appendix 8.3.
4.2.2.2 BOP Stacks

BOP stacks conform to the requirements stipulated in PETRONAS CARIGALI
WMS: T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL.
The minimum configuration for BOP stacks from API Standard 53 2012.
See also appendix 8.4.
4.2.2.3 Unperforated Casing / Liner

Casings and liners will be tested according to relevant sections of the Drilling
Program/Manual when they are initially set. In subsequent work-over operations,
a repeat liner inflow test is not required. The casing integrity acceptance criteria
can be found in appendix 8.5.
<Document Number>
Page 4-27 of 85
4.2.2.4 Plugs
A slip-lock mechanical plug (e.g. a wireline slip-type plug or casing bridge plug)
is a Well Barrier if it is tested from below to a differential pressure at least 500psi
greater than the maximum anticipated differential pressure.
<Insert what plugs are being used (if any) and refer to PETRONAS CARIGALI
WMS: T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL for
acceptance criteria.
4.2.2.5 Surface Safety Valve (SSV)

The Xmas-tree on production or injection wells will be provided with an actuated
fail safe closing upper master valve or wing valve. Upon actuation of the wellhead
control panel, the SSV is automatically closed.
The closed SSV is regarded as a valid barrier if the valve has been checked,
within the previous one month, in accordance with the relevant Procedures.
PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS: T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE
CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL provides acceptance criteria for SSV.
See appendix 8.6 for acceptance criteria.
4.2.2.6 Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV)

Every production or injection string will be provided with an actuated fail safe
closing down-hole valve. Upon ESD, the SSV is normally closed first, followed by
the SCSSV. This sequence is built into the logic of panels to avoid unnecessary
wear and tear on the SCSSV by closing it routinely against flow, and to avoid
that the SCSSV is blown up the hole should the locking mechanism fail.
The SCSSV is therefore not tested to be sealing after each closure.
The closed SCSSV is regarded as a valid barrier, if the valve has been tested in
accordance with the relevant OPR Procedure, within the previous one month,
observing a pressure build-up not in excess of the levels defined below (when
tested to a pressure differential equal to the CITHP).
PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS: T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE
CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL provides acceptance criteria for SCSSV.
See appendix 8.6 for acceptance criteria.

<Document Number>
Page 4-28 of 85
4.2.2.7 X-mas Tree

The Xmas-tree on the well visited by the rig shall only be regarded as a barrier
after satisfactorily pressure testing the Xmas-tree on the well itself and closing
at least one master-gate.
4.2.2.8 Suspension Assembly

<Check for accuracy and applicability – strike through if not applicable>
A well suspension assembly on any casing string set through hydrocarbon
bearing zones, shall consist of a hanger, plus a back pressure valve (BPV)
installed in the hanger, and a suspension cap.
The cap shall be provided with a valve with a bore which will permit retrieval of
the BPV for vertical access into the well. The assembly shall be pressure tested
before and after installation.
4.2.2.9 Barriers for Gaslift Annuli

<Check for accuracy and applicability – strike through if not applicable>
A tubing/casing annulus (volume ca. 0.5 scf/foot) used as gaslift conduit may
contain gas at pressures of up to 800 psi. Uncontrolled release of this gas poses
a safety hazard owing to the rapid expansion of the gas to atmospheric
conditions. In the normal production mode, when gaslifting, the gaslift annuli are
protected by
(i) Pressure tested casing and surface lines.
(ii) Check valves in the gaslift valves and.
(iii) A check valve at the wellhead injection point.
In view of the limited reliability of check valves, the following shall be adhered
to for simultaneous operations:
1) The check valves shall only be regarded as a valid barrier if the
valves have been checked within the previous 60 days lay bleeding
off to achieve the maximum differential pressure that the check
valve may become exposed to.
2) An actuated fail safe closing valve shall be installed, on each gaslift
injection line, directly mounted onto the manual wellhead side
outlet valve. Gate valves are accepted for this purpose. The
actuated valve shall only be regarded as a valid barrier, if it has
been checked within the previous 60 days by bleeding off to achieve
the maximum differential pressure that the valve may become
exposed to.
<Document Number>
Page 4-29 of 85
Surface Facility Barriers
4.2.3.1 Area Classification and Simultaneous Operations Design Philosophy

Relevant Area Classification drawings for both the visiting rig and the drilling
and/or production installation complex will be available onsite at all times.
The extent of hazardous areas above shall be established in accordance with IP
code 15 and IEC 60079-10. It shall subsequently be confirmed that all equipment
in place on both the rig and drilling platform/well-pad Zone 1 and 2 areas are
suitable for the respective zones in accordance with the IP code 15 and IEC
60079-10.
Even after confirming the suitability of all the equipment within the Zones I and
2 areas, hydrocarbon gases shall not be designed to be vented in these areas
even during an emergency.
See also 1.3 PTS 16.71.01 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION (SUPPLEMENTS
/ AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS).
To perform hot-work in zone-2 classified areas PETRONAS Carigali Permit to
Work Procedure (see also 1.3) requires a Pressurized Habitat to be used.
4.2.3.2 Instrument Gas

Where hydrocarbon gas is used for instrument power and control, under SIPROD,
the pneumatic supply shall be converted to compressed air, which may be
provided ideally from a portable air compressor, or if unavailable, by a hose
connection to the drilling tender air supply.
Describe the situation for this platform or well-pad – check below for
accuracy.
Although the actual conversion from hydrocarbon to air will occur upon rig
arrival, the scope of work within this package is to build in facilities to enable the
positive segregation of hydrocarbons and air upon rig arrival, by say, the removal
of "drop out" spools. If the rig air supply is to be used, a tie in point with valve
shall be installed at this stage in readiness for the rig arrival.
In addition, a manifold of nitrogen bottles with individual regulators shall be
provided during this phase for purging and later, connected to the instrument air
system as a back-up supply.
Consideration should be given to the conversion of all pneumatic equipment from
gas to air, particular sump pumps and chemical injection pumps. While driven by
gas, these devices exhaust to vent systems. Therefore, if it is proposed that the
equipment will later be operated by air, provision should be installed during this
visit to disconnect the exhausts from the vent systems and exhaust air locally,
upon rig arrival.
<Document Number>
Page 4-30 of 85
4.2.3.3 Fire Water Mains

<Check if the below is applicable, adjust if needed>
In case the platform or well-pad is not foreseen with a fire-water pump or even
fire-water system a temporary system shall be provided during the duration of
the simultaneous operations.
The rig may be used to supply fire-water, however if the rig fire-water pump
capacity is not sufficient an independent fire-water pump should be sourced.
A (Fire) risk assessment shall be carried out to identify what fire-fighting
equipment is needed and what (water) capacity the system should have.
Objective of the risk assessment should be to provide personnel a safe
evacuation from the platform i.e. the water may not be totally effective in
controlling all hydrocarbon fires, it will contribute to cooling equipment and
provide a safe evacuation for all personnel on the platform.
Workover Barriers
4.2.4.1 Areas of Consideration
The well shall be isolated from the main platform ESD system and the SCSSV
line shall be connected before handing over for wireline operation. The SCSSV
shall be remotely operated using an independent wellhead control panel provided
by the wireline contractor.
The SSV is kept in open position during well intervention using Fusible Cap. The
use of Blank Cap shall be strictly prohibited at any time during well intervention
operations.
All wireline power packs used during operations shall be at least classified for use
in Zone 2 areas as specified in API RP 500.
4.2.4.2 Additional precautions during CT activities
The following precautions will be followed in preparing workover programs:
a) All equipment used will be certified and inspected prior to mobilisation to
location.
b) All pressurized lines and hoses will be adequate secured while pressure
testing the CTU.
c) Sufficient lighting will be provided on site if Coiled Tubing work has to be
done during the night/dark hours.
d) The CTU will be rigged up according to the procedures (lifting) specified
in this document (see also 5.3.2).
e) The injector head assembly shall be fixed directly over the wellhead on a
support frame.
f) There should not be any direct load on the well grating. Load plates or
box section support frame will be used to prevent direct load on grating.
<Document Number>
Page 4-31 of 85
g) The hydraulic power pack motor will be shut down when connecting the
hydraulic hoses to the injector head, to prevent accidental energizing of
any of the hydraulic functions of the injector head.
h) All persons climbing to reach the injector head will use properly secured
ladders, or fall protection for safe access. Climbing on the wellhead,
which may be slippery with oil, is forbidden.
Communications
4.2.5.1 Daily Coordination Meeting

Daily meetings will take place between the Supervisors of the respective
disciplines involved to discuss:
 The work that will be performed.
 The 'barriers' that provide the basic safety.
 The action(s) to take if something goes wrong.
 And the response time required.
All operations will be performed on the basis of written, approved programs.
Verbal instructions will be. Changes to programs can only be made with the
approval and signature of all parties involved.
All programs will be sent to the overall responsible party, (OIM or Drilling
Supervisor) and copied to the relevant representatives of the other departments.
4.2.5.2 Toolbox Meeting

Prior to the start of any Simultaneous Operations work a Toolbox-Talk shall be
conducted.
It is the work-supervisor’s responsibility to ensure that all personnel involved in
the job is made aware of the Simultaneous Operations risks and do understand
them.
Toolbox Meeting (Toolbox Talk) shall be repeated if:
 Circumstances change.
 Personnel involved in the task is changed out.
<Document Number>
Page 4-32 of 85
Roles & Responsibilities

The following positions are involved in developing the SISO document and/or
execution of the simultaneous operations activities: positions that are not
applicable for the SIPROD operations of this document should be crossed out by
drawing a line through it (strikethrough -> abc). This to show that these positions
have been take into consideration, but are not applicable. A check should be
done by “Wells” and “Operations”
a) Head HSE Division / Country / Region
b) Head Production
c) Field Operation Manager
d) Drilling Superintendent / Work Over Superintendent
e) Well Intervention Manager
f) Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)
g) Drilling Supervisor (DSV)
h) Well Services Supervisor (WSS)
i) Work Over Supervisor (WOS)
j) Production Supervisor
k) Drilling Engineer (DE)
l) Operation Engineer (OE)
m) Well Intervention Engineer (WIE)
n) Authorized Gas Tester (AGT)
o) Fire Watcher (FW)
p) Safety and Health Officer (SHO)
q) PCSB’s Operations SHO
4.2.6.1 Head HSE Division / Country / Region (delete if not applicable)

Head HSE Division / Country / Region is one of the endorsing authorities for the
SISO document and is responsible to review the HSE aspects of the SISO.
4.2.6.2 Head Production (delete if not applicable)

Head Production is accountable for the overall management of simultaneous
operation and is the final approval authority for SISO in the field which is under
their jurisdiction.
4.2.6.3 Field Operations Manager / Field Maintenance Manager (delete if not

applicable)
Field Operation Manager / Field Maintenance Manager shall be accountable to
review and endorse the SISO in the field which is under their jurisdiction.
<Document Number>
Page 4-33 of 85
4.2.6.4 Drilling Superintendent / Workover Superintendent (delete if not applicable)

Drilling Superintendent / Workover Superintendent is overall accountable for the
field drilling / work over activities. Drilling Superintendent / Workover
Superintendent is one of the endorsing authorities for the SISO involving
production, work over and drilling activities.
4.2.6.5 Well Intervention Manager (delete if not applicable)

Well Intervention Manager is one of the endorsing authorities for the SISO
involving production and well intervention activities.
4.2.6.6 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) / Terminal Superintendent (TS) (delete if

not applicable)
The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) / Terminal Superintendent (TS) shall be
the single point accountable party for the execution of Simultaneous Operations
at site. In addition to the normal roles and responsibilities, the OIM shall at a
minimum but not limited to:
a) Manage the conduct of the simultaneous operations activities through
Permit to Work (PTW) Procedures.
b) Implement measures for all the control and recovery barriers identified
during the risk assessment.
c) Be the On-Scene Commander in an emergency.
d) Communicate the SISO requirements to all site personnel.
4.2.6.7 Drilling Supervisor / Company Man (delete if not applicable)

The Drilling Supervisor's responsibilities are the following:
a) Designated as the CSR for drilling activities.
b) Responsible for the whole drilling operations and HSE on the drilling rig
and platform as per “PTW Demarcation for SISO/SIPROD” and to liaise
closely with the OIM / SOR / DPIC of the installation.
c) Chair the drilling daily operation meeting and is one of the signatories for
the PTW system.
d) Designated as Authorised Supervisor in PCSB PTW system for drilling
activity.
e) Manage the emergency at drilling rig and drilling platform and inform OIM
/ SOR / DPIC accordingly.
f) Ensure regular emergency drills are conducted in collaboration with the
OIM.
g) Review the drafted SISO document to ensure drilling hazards and risk are
assessed and controlled.
<Document Number>
Page 4-34 of 85
4.2.6.8 Well Services Supervisor (delete if not applicable)

The WSS's responsibilities are the following:
a) Designated as CSR for well intervention.
b) Attend daily platform coordination meetings and Shift Handover Meetings.
c) Conduct joint regular emergency drill with platform if the work boat /
barge is used.
4.2.6.9 Workover Supervisor (delete if not applicable)

The Workover Supervisor's responsibilities are the following:
a) Designated as the CSR for work over activities.
b) Chair the daily Workover Coordination Meeting and is one of the
signatories for the PTW system.
c) Manage the emergency at work over barge / rig and to inform OIM / DPIC
accordingly.
d) Conduct joint regular emergency drill with platform.
e) On satellite platform, WS may be appointed as approving authority for
PTW related to dedicated well and to acknowledge on the PTW on platform
operation related activity.
4.2.6.10 Production Supervisor (delete if not applicable)

In addition to the normal roles and responsibilities, the Production Supervisor /
Maintenance Supervisor shall at a minimum but not limited to:
a) Ensure all specific potential hazards identified in this SISO and Job Hazard
Analysis are managed ALARP.
b) Ensure that all specified safety precautions identified in this SISO, JHA and
PTW are implemented.
c) Hold kick off meeting with team to ensure positive communication of SISO.
d) Present the SISO to all personnel onboard the work barge/platforms
before commencing SISO activities.
4.2.6.11 Drilling Engineer (delete if not applicable)

Drilling Engineer is jointly responsible to prepare the SISO with the Operation
Engineer for simultaneous operations involving production and drilling.
4.2.6.12 Operation Engineer (delete if not applicable)

Operation, maintenance, discipline engineer (e.g. rotating equipment, well
services, electrical, etc.) and project engineer shall be jointly responsible to
prepare the SISO.
<Document Number>
Page 4-35 of 85
4.2.6.13 Well Intervention Engineer (WIE) (delete if not applicable)

Well Intervention Engineer is jointly responsible to prepare the SISO with the
Operation Engineer for simultaneous operations involving production and well
intervention.
4.2.6.14 Authorized Gas Tester (AGT) (delete if not applicable)

The Authorized Gas Tester is responsible for carrying out gas testing in and
around the area where any Hot Work or other designated Work is planned. For
gas tests prior vessel entry tasks (for Production Malaysia only), the AGT must
be certified by Department of Safety and Health (DOSH). Once satisfied, the AGT
shall declare the area is safe to work in the PTW.
The AGT shall carry out periodic gas tests at the Worksite as required in the PTW
and ensure that:
a) There are adequate certified portable gas detectors available onsite.
b) All requirements as specified in the PTW is adhered to, prior to
commencement of any spark producing work, e.g. welding, grinding, gas
cutting, and etc.
4.2.6.15 Fire Watcher (delete if not applicable)

A competent fire watcher shall be present at the worksite throughout the duration
of hot work, (e.g. grinding, cutting, welding, etc.) activities. Fire watchers, who
normally can be identified e.g. by wearing the Fluorescent Vest and Red Hard
Hats, shall ensure that all requirements for protection in the hot work activities
are met, such as:
a) Physical barriers have been erected and safety signage installed
b) Adequate protective covers are in place.
c) Adequate Portable Firefighting / Extinguishing Equipment are in place.
d) Fire hoses connected to portable firewater pump are in place.
e) Continually monitor the Hot Work area activities and ensure all sparks, hot
slag and hot spots at or around the area are kept safe or extinguished.
When Hot Work may affect other areas such as work on or close to a
partition/wall, another Fire Watcher shall be stationed in that area on the other
side of the partition/wall.
A Fire Watcher shall be present throughout meal break times in all areas where
Hot Work is ongoing. In the event of fire, the Fire Watcher is to raise the alarm,
advice on the location, and (if safe to do so) extinguish the fire with the portable
firefighting equipment available.
The Fire Watcher has to ensure that all Hot Work is stopped and equipment is
secured in the event of a triggered platform or rig alarm.
<Document Number>
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4.2.6.16 Safety and Health Officer (SHO) (delete if not applicable)

The Contractor's Safety and Health Officer shall report to CSR and liaise with
Work Leader (WL) for all activities. When appointed and required (project based),
Contractor's Safety and Health Officer shall be available throughout the duration
of Simultaneous Operations activity.
The Contractor's Safety and Health Officer responsibilities are at minimum but
not limited to the following:
a) POB movement supervision is carried out on the Gangway to the Work
Platform.
b) Checking and confirming that all safety equipment onboard is adequate
and certified.
c) Conduct daily PTW audit.
d) Continually monitor all activities to ensure that safe working practices are
in place.
e) Promote Safe & Unsafe Behavior & Unsafe Condition reporting.
f) Instituting follow-up action, to prevent recurrence of any unsafe act or
conditions found.
g) Attend the Daily Coordination Meeting and Shift Handover Meetings.
h) Report to CSR on daily HSE Performance.
i) Conduct weekly safety audit.
j) Checking of emergency preparedness in his area
k) Attend contractor’s daily tool box meeting.
4.2.6.17 PCSB Operations Safety and Health Officer (delete if not applicable)
The PCSB SHO’s responsibilities are as follows:
a) Implement Plant General Inspection program and record.
b) Compile and update HSE statistics.
c) Monitor and track PTW implementation and lead PTW audit.
d) Review IIR and input data into i-HSE system (if system is accessible at
worksite).
e) Conduct HSE training / awareness / program to operations and
contractors.
f) Conduct Safety Briefing to visitors / incoming POB at the worksite.
g) Plan and coordinate ER Drill / Exercise.
PTW System demarcation during SIMOPS between Production and

Drilling Activities.
As per the MEMO mentioned (see 8.8) the ultimate responsibility for the effective
management of the simultaneous operations is vested with the Platform Offshore
Installation Manager (OIM).
<Document Number>
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For satellite/unmanned platforms, the responsibility is delegated to the PCSB

Drilling Supervisor / Company Man.
Any activities carried out on the platform by PCSB Wells department e.g. riser
installation, BOP installation etc., PCSB PTW system shall be applied. The
application and approval process shall be as per PETRONAS Carigali PTW
Procedure.
For other activities the specific PTW Demarcation shall be followed; see appendix
8.8 for more detailed information.
Daily PTW Coordination Meetings shall be conducted as part of the Daily

Coordination Meeting, see 4.2.5.1.
4.2.7.1 Work Supervision

All Simultaneous Operations work will be supervised by dedicated, competent
supervisors for the job. Prior to commencement of the job, supervisors have to
inform the crew about the specific SIMOPS hazards.
Supervisors to supervise the job i.e. keep overview and correct/adjust
where needed. Supervisors are not allowed to get physical involved in
the job itself.
Positive Isolation
All process equipment will be positively isolated using spades and blinds. A
comprehensive spading list shall be prepared and used during the isolation
process and subsequent reinstatement of the process.
Only properly installed spades and blinds can be considered as a mean of positive
isolation.
Platform/Well-pad Shutdown and Depressurization
4.2.9.1 Planned Shutdown and Depressurization

As part of simultaneous operations, process shutdown and depressurization will
be carried out when the following activities are identified:
 Rig-up and/or rig-down (heavy lift of rig component).
 Skidding of drill floor onto drilling platform (for jack-up drilling rig).
 Heavy lifts over pressurized hydrocarbon systems (see also 5.3.2).
By shutting down and depressurization of the facilities the consequence will be
minimized in the event of any incidents when performing above activities.
<Document Number>
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4.2.9.2 Emergency Shutdown and Depressurization

On confirming an emergency situation, the well being worked on by the rig will
be secured immediately. ESD will be activated to shut in and depressurize all
other wells and relevant Emergency Procedures shall be followed.
The following means will trigger the ESD:
Insert a full list of the sensors that trigger the ESD system. Ensure that the
following is covered:
Kill / ESD – knob:
 One (1) kill knob shall be provided at the Drillers’ console on the rig floor.
 One (1) kill knob shall be provided near the Drilling Supervisor's office.
 One (1) kill knob shall be provided:
o For tender assisted operations installed at the bottom of the widow
maker (PAR).
o For a jack up, on the platform main deck at the start point of the
stairway leading to the wellhead area.
An audio alarm (loud horn) and/or visual alarm shall be provided at the drillers’
console which shall automatically be activated upon tripping of the ASD system.
Immediately when the alarm is activated, the Driller shall determine, with the
aid of the appropriate personnel (e.g. the Drilling Supervisor and the Operations
Supervisor or his representative), the cause for the ASD trip. Rig operations shall
be secured within 15 minutes after initiation of the alarm, unless positive
confirmation is obtained from the OIM or Drilling Supervisor that such action is
not required.
Emergency Shutdown and Depressurization system shall be commissioned and
function tested prior to spud. Depending on the length of the SIPROD the system
needs to be function tested on a regular basis.
See also 8.15 for a Pre-Move checklist, to be used by platform OIM and DSV.
For workover activities see 4.2.4.1.
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO)

As part of SISO, MOPO as specified in HSE Case/CIMAH report for the facility,
shall be used. The Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) can be prepared for
the safe execution of multiple activities during the Simultaneous Operations.
The MOPO shall be able to define:
i. Activities that may or may not be carried out.
ii. The limit of safe operation if defenses are reduced or removed. For
example, actions shall be defined if one or more safety systems fail or
are disabled for maintenance. The systems considered shall include
protection, detection, shutdown, emergency response and lifesaving
systems.
<Document Number>
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iii. The limit of safe operations permitted during the periods of escalated
risk, such as in adverse weather, limitation may be imposed on use of
crane, work above the water and etc.
The SISO document shall capture the MOPO for the safe execution of the
Simultaneous Operations activity. A typical MOPO is shown in Appendix 8.9.
The benefit of using the MOPO is to facilitate the identification of potential
hazards associated during the Simultaneous Operations activities. This will
enable sufficient measures to be taken to control Simultaneous Operations
activities.
Well Collision
If a well is being drilled in close proximity of existing wells the following
precautions will be taken to avoid a collision.
PLANNING
The Drilling Department will have the Directional Drilling Contractor prepare a
large scale surface hole-plot with all nearby existing wells showing the plan view
trace with true vertical depth marked at the magnetic multishot survey points.
The large scale plot will account for survey errors, film reading inaccuracies, etc.
by plotting survey points as ellipses of uncertainty so that each existing well will
appear as a cone below 500 meter as uncertainty increases with depth. The cone
of each well will be defined as a DANGER ZONE
The minimum safe distance above 500 meters is set at 10 meters.
The Drilling Department will prepare a separate programme that will contain a
discussion and plan on how close the planned well will come to each well that is
crossed or approached on the large scale plan, and precautions to be taken to
assure no well is hit.
This plan must be approved and signed by the Drilling Manager.
In the event the planned well cannot be designed so that the existing wells will
not give magnetic interference (assume magnetic interference occurs within 6
feet), the drill pipe gyro survey instrument will be used to obtain directional
survey.
In the event the planned well must enter into the DANGER ZONE of an existing
well the planned well must be jet drilled (down hole motor or rotary drilling is
not permitted) past the existing well. If any indication of magnetic interference
exists and conditions warrant, the rest of the surface hole will be drilled with a
down-hole motor so that the hard-banded drill pipe is not rotated against the
existing casing string while drilling below the point in question.
Down-hole tubing plugs or check valves should be set below the top packer in all
tubing strings and the casing and tubing pressures bled to zero in any existing
well if the drilling well penetrates the danger zone below the surface casing or
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intermediate shoe. Details for the above should be included in the drilling
program.
OPERATIONS
While drilling any portion of the hole in close proximity to the Danger Zone of
existing wells, the Directional Driller will remain on the floor whether drilling with
a down-hole motor, jetting assembly or rotary assembly. He will monitor drilling
parameters and pump pressures for any change that would indicate encountering
cement or metal from an existing well.
The Directional Driller will calculate, plot and project the drilling well as surveys
are taken and keep the PCSB Drilling Supervisor informed of how far the drilling
well is from the DANGER ZONE of any existing well.
Anytime the drilling well approaches an existing well within the attached DANGER
ZONE, pressurization of annuli of existing well may be considered upon
discussion with the PCSB Headquarters.
In the event the drilling well enters into the DANGER ZONE of an existing well,
only jet drilling (no motor, no rotary) will be used until the DANGER ZONE has
been passed. (If it is not possible to continue with jet drilling, the well will be
plugged.)
If it becomes evident that a collision is imminent, immediately stop drilling, pull

back the kelly, secure the well and advise the PCSB Headquarters whilst
observing the wells concerned.
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4.3 Recovery Measures
Despite all precautions taken (see 4.2) an incident may occur. To prevent
escalation the following recovery measures are taken.
Emergency Response
Every drilling rig, workboat / barge or production complex has its own
accidents/emergencies procedures. These procedures are made site specific and
will be followed in the event of accidents/emergencies.
For the <name of the rig> or <name of the workboat/barge> the following
Emergency Response Procedure is applicable <insert name of Procedure and
document number>. The <name of the platform/onshore location> uses the
following Emergency Response Procedure <insert name of Procedure and
document number>.
On confirming an emergency situation by the relevant
rig/workboat/barge/platform, the well being worked on by the rig shall be
secured immediately. ESD shall be activated to shut in and depressurize all other
wells and then relevant Emergency Procedures shall be followed.
The SIPROD Emergency Response Organisation chart, can be found in appendix
8.10.
Each facility has its own Emergency Response Plan (ERP). Regular drills,
simulating various relevant emergency scenarios related to Simultaneous
Operations activities, will be conducted in order to enhance the competency and
alertness of the personnel to respond.
At least one combined drill shall be conducted prior to spud. Regular combined
drills shall be conducted on a regular basis; depending of the length of the
SIPROD at least once per month.
4.3.1.1 Fire and Safety Equipment
A map of the location of Fire & Safety equipment of both the rig/workboat/barge
<strike through what is not applicable> and the platform can be found in
appendices 8.12 and 8.13.
Evacuation
Part of the ERP should be an evacuation analysis or evacuation plan. The
evacuation analysis should be based on the unit’s dimensioning, accidental
events and PCSB/SOLAS requirements. The analysis shall show that, after any
accident, escape routes, temporary refuges and mustering stations are
appropriately arranged so that:
a) At least one escape route is accessible from all spaces/areas to a temporary
refuge.
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b) All persons on board can be evacuated by lifeboats in the course of 15 minutes

regardless of weather conditions. The time shall be measured to the point
where the lifeboats are launched and released.
c) The location of the life-rafts is appropriate for alternative evacuation.
d) Personal life-saving appliances in sufficient numbers are suitably located for
purposes of both rescue and evacuation by sea.
The number and location of lifeboats shall be determined on the basis of the
evacuation analysis and the following considerations:
For self-elevating and semi-submersible drilling units, it shall be possible to
evacuate all persons on board by lifeboats if all lifeboats in any one location, on
any one side, any one end or any one corner are lost or unusable. I.e. there
should be a redundancy of means of safe escape available.
4.3.2.1 Mustering Station
Mustering Station or Assembly Areas are clearly sign-posted and noted on the
Location's Emergency Plans. An alternative Mustering Point is assigned as well.
Head counts will be conducted during any emergency drill or evacuation.
Personnel shall be briefed on the mustering station and lifeboat location on
arrival.
4.3.2.2 Escape Routes
Emergency situations may need personnel to evacuate onto either platform or
rig, whichever may be safer during the emergency. In this instance, all personnel
evacuated to either platform shall come under the control of the supervisor
responsible for the area (if no dedicated OIM) i.e. production personnel
evacuated to the drilling rig become under the control of the Drilling Supervisor
and similarly, drilling personnel evacuated to the production platform become
under the control of the Operations Supervisor.
Escape routes shall be marked and sign-posted. They shall be kept clear of trip
hazards and adequately lit at all times. Escape routes shall not pass through
dangerous or hazardous areas and compartments with fixed inert-gas fire
extinguishing systems. Emergency exit signs shall be positioned above doors on
escape routes.
A map of Escape Routes, Muster Points, Emergency Exits and locations of Fire &
Safety equipment can be found in appendices 8.12 and 8.13.
4.3.2.3 Life Saving Appliances
All drilling platforms/jackets will be provided with Liferafts positioned on the
wellhead deck at the end opposite to rig position. The location of the Liferaft shall
be clearly highlighted during the commissioning and site briefing prior to start of
SIPROD. The region will be responsible for the provision and administration of
life-rafts and will ascertain that life-rafts are in good condition prior to start of
SIPROD.
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The number and location of lifeboats shall be determined on the basis of the
evacuation analysis and the following considerations:
To ensure that, at times of an emergency, all personnel have a place in a Liferaft:
 The amount of Liferafts should be enough for all personnel working on
board of the platform.
 Or the amount of personnel allowed on the platform at the same time
should be managed according to spaces available in the Liferaft(s)
A protected box containing at least the same amount of Life jackets as places
available in the Liferaft(s) will be positioned next to the Liferaft. This box will also
be administered by the region.
During an emergency that prevents personnel working on the drilling installation
from getting back to the rig and evacuate by the standard Lifeboats or Liferafts,
the Liferafts on the drilling installation should provide an alternative escape
medium.
More detailed PCSB requirements for Life Saving Appliances (from WW ALL S
02.003 rev. 1, December 2010) can be found in appendix 8.11.
People On Board (POB)

Both on the platform as well as on the rig a system is established to conduct an
effective and speedy headcount of all personnel on board during an emergency.
The total number of personnel on board an offshore facility shall not exceed the
allowable number based on PCSB Philosophy of Life Saving Appliances and the
applicable SOLAS requirements.
On the platform the following POB system will be used. <Describe the POB
system used on the platform>.
On the rig/workboat/CTU <strike through what is not applicable> POB is
managed as follows. <describe the POB system used on the rig/workboat/CTU
AND describe how POB is managed for personnel working on the platform (drill-
floor etc.)>
Alarm System
See also 4.2.9.2
The driller/workover supervisor/well intervention supervisor shall be notified of
an alarm situation on the platform and on the drilling rig / workboat <describe
how the driller will be notified (audible and visible alarm?), also describe how the
driller will be notified about an alarm on the drilling rig>.
<Strike through what is not applicable>
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4.3.4.1 Securing of Activities

At any time when the Control Measures conditions in 4.2 cannot be fulfilled, or
an emergency situation is impending, activities shall be secured as follows:
4.3.4.1.1 Platform
<Operations to review/confirm the below requirement>
The ASD system will be actuated and the manual wing valves on the Xmas-trees
shall be closed. When judged necessary and when it can be safely done, as
decided by the Drilling Supervisor or OIM and the Operations Supervisor, the
casing/tubing annuli of all wells shall be manually depressurized. A tubing/casing
annulus is considered depressurized if the pressure in the annulus is 100 psig or
less.
If the ASD system is not operational, then all wells shall be closed-in by the most
feasible means and surface lines/vessels on the drilling platform manually
depressurized.
4.3.4.1.2 Rig
<Wells to review/confirm the below requirement>
The bottom of the drill or tubing string will be positioned at the last casing shoe,
top perforations or the deepest point of the well inside the casing. The rig shall
then wait while observing the well, ready to close the BOP's when necessary and
monitoring the well on the trip tank.
If an emergency situation is impending, all drilling equipment shall subsequently
be secured and shut down after the BOP is activated.
4.3.4.1.3 CTU
For CTU Catenary, in case of workboat’s emergency pull out, the emergency
disconnect on the Catenary Unit will allow the tubing to be cut at the coil feeder
to ensure safe securing at the workboat.
4.3.4.1.4 Wireline Activities
Wireline operations in a live well shall be secured by retrieving the tool string,
setting the SCSSV (if wireline retrieval), closing the SCSSV (if tubing
retrievable) or a wireline plug and closing the Xmas tree valves.
When working in a dead well, the tool string shall be pulled inside the lubricator
and the Xmas tree valves shall be closed.
ER - Roles & Responsibilities

<Both Operations and Wells to agree on below and/or adjust where they think
it is needed>
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See also appendix 8.10 for the Emergency Response Organisition Chart for
SIPROD.
4.3.5.1 Unmanned Installation
The OIM or Drilling Supervisor will be in control of all emergency situations and
procedures on the drilling platform. Alternate responsible person(s) and
assistants shall be according to the rig emergency command structure.
4.3.5.2 Manned Drilling/Production Complexes

4.3.5.2.1 Drilling Platform
The OIM or Drilling Supervisor shall be in control of all emergency situations
arising on the drilling platform/jacket and the emergency procedures applicable
to the rig shall be followed. The boundary of this responsibility shall be the
beginning of the bridge linking the drilling platform to the production complex.
In the absence of a dedicated OIM, the Drilling Supervisor shall advise the
Operations Supervisor on the complex of the development of emergency
situations as he may ultimately become involved.
4.3.5.2.2 Production Platform
All emergencies occurring from the start of the bridge to and including the
production facilities complex, shall be under the control of the OIM or Operations
Supervisor and the emergency procedures applicable to the complex shall be
followed.
In the absence of a dedicated OIM, the Operations Supervisor shall advise the
Drilling Supervisor on the rig of the development of emergency situations as he
may ultimately become involved.
4.3.5.2.3 Workboat Emergency Pull Out Procedure
Insert the procedure for pulling out the workboat
Emergency situation may be:
 Adverse weather condition
 Uncontrolled CTU operation
 Platform abandonment
 Or when deemed necessary by OIM / WS
Some of the criteria to be included in the procedure are (not limited to):
a) Work Barge / Boat Master shall advise WIS and commence to clear the
gangway and heave up Anchors.
b) Ensure tension on anchors to be paid-out to be kept at a minimum but
not in slack condition.
c) Anchor Handling Tug (AHT) shall be called in to assist concurrently until
clear from platform
d) Vessel shall continue to pullout until deemed safe from the platform.
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e) Master has overriding authority in matter concerning safety, safety of life

and safety of equipment on the vessel.
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5 Preparation prior to Rig Move / Well Intervention activities
The following precautions will be taken to ensure safer operations.
5.1 Well Annuli Pressure
Bleed off tests will be conducted by ‘Operations’ on all annuli of every well on the
platform, in order to establish pressure build up rates and maximum stabilized
pressures. Wells with a major annulus leak, after all practicable corrective actions
have been attempted, have to be killed before arrival of the rig and remain
closed-in.
According to PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS: T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD PRESSURE
CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL (see 1.3) a major annulus leak shall be defined
as any leak in excess of:
 For gas 0.42 Sm3/min (25,5 Sm3/hour) (900 scf/hour)
 For liquid 0.4 liter/min (24 liter/hour) (6.3 gallons/hour).
Until the appropriate equipment to measure these low leak volumes is available,
these leak rates shall be considered equal to a pressure build-up rate of 25 psi/hr.
See also, table in 3.2.
Casing/casing annular pressures are limited by the shoe strength of the outer
casing. The maximum allowable pressure on a given annulus shall be the
pressure that would fracture the outer casing shoe exposed to the annulus
pressure.
The conductor x surface casing annuli shall be sampled and gas tested, and
presence of oil and/or gas in any of the open annuli shall be highlighted by and
reported.
5.2 Safety Valves
See 4.2.2.5 and 4.2.2.6.

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5.3 Rig Move, Rigging Up and Down
The operations in these phases comprise:

 Positioning of rig at the platform
 Jacking operations for a jack-up rig
 Lifting derrick equipment set and rig equipment for a tender assisted rig
or land-rig
 General rigging up/down.
During these operations the rig is not involved in well activities. However, the
surface production system may become damaged as a result of collision with the
platform or dropping a heavy load onto the platform or subsea installation.
To prevent a major loss of containment of incident:
 All wells will be closed in at the SSV, the Xmas-tree valve and the SCSSV.
 All surface lines will be depressurized.
 Tubing/casing annuli of all wells will be depressurized.
Rig Skidding
During skidding, there is a possibility that heavy items could fall off the derrick
equipment set and damage the surface production system.
The Drilling Supervisor is responsible for ensuring that all equipment and pipe in
the derrick have been adequately secured and that all precautions have been
taken to prevent accidental dropping of objects while skidding. With these
precautions taken, it is not required to close in production/injection wells.
Lifts
According to WW ALL S 05 002 Rev. 4 July 2013 (PETRONAS Carigali PTW
Procedure) and PTS 60.2103 October 2011 (Lifting) the following requirements
are needed when equipment has to be lifted.
5.3.2.1 Normal lifts
A Lifting Certificate as part of the PTW for the following (not limited to) situations:
a) Lifting over unprotected process equipment or wellheads;
b) Lifting dangerous goods;
c) Lifting exceeding 8 tonnes;
d) Lifting inside confined spaces;
e) Lifting with sling not made of wire rope;
f) Lifting with greater than four leg;
g) Multiple crane lifts;
h) Failure to fully illuminate load;
i) Failure to fully illuminate path of load;
j) When removing or installing well head hatch cover/grating; and
k) When a safety device is bypassed
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5.3.2.2 Special Lifts

A Lifting Plan shall be prepared for critical lifting operations using cranes or other
lifting appliances or equipment in order to manage the risks. These operations
include, but are not limited to:
a) Lifting more than 20 tons of load.
b) Lifting over live or critical/sensitive process equipment or facility.
c) Lifting load of weight more than 80% of rated capacity of the lifting
equipment at the specified working radius and boom angle as per crane
load chart.
d) Personnel transport using lifting appliance.
e) Lift of special loads such as structures, mobile cranes, boiler and vessel.
5.3.2.3 Above Drill Floor

Above the rig floor heavy items such as drill collars, and various drilling tools,
are regularly being handled. Significant damage may result from dropping any
of these heavy items through rig floor level onto the platform below. Whilst the
weight of most of these items is normally less than 5 metric tonnes, dropping
can result in extremely high point loads.
The rig floor should be impact resistant i.e. the rig floor should have the capability
of withstanding the impact of a stand (3 joints) of 9-½" drill collars free falling
from a height of 1 meter.
An impact resistant rig floor is regarded as a fully effective barrier and therefore
no special precautions are required, except that the mouse hole and rat holes in
the rig floor shall be kept covered at all times when not in use.
If the rig floor is not an impact resistant one, then all wells and lines within the
impact area shall be closed in and depressurized. <A drawing should be added
to this chapter to show which wells and lines will be effected>
5.3.2.4 Below Drill Floor (Lifting BOP stack)

Hydraulic or chain hoists are used for vertical movements of the BOP stacks.
Horizontal movement is achieved mainly by means of a trolley system
underneath the rig floor, but also by skidding the derrick with the BOP stack
suspended below the rotary table.
Depending on the design of the lifting facility, permanent lifting eyes are attached
to the BOP stacks itself, or to a lifting frame around the BOP stacks.
The risk of dropping or toppling over of the BOP stack during handling exists
when the stack is neither clamped to the storage stump nor the wellhead. A
particularly critical phase is picking up the stack with newly attached
slings/chains.
A falling load (e.g. BOP stack) has the potential of seriously harming or killing
personnel and, if the top deck of the platform is not sufficiently strong to avoid
<Document Number>
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penetration by the load, the wells and production facilities in the line of fall are
also in serious jeopardy. In relation to the latter, gaslift lines constitute the most
hazard as their rupture will result in the discharge of significant gas volumes at
high pressure from the liftgas grid.
Since the BOP is the known heavy lift below the rig floor, its fall area shall be
defined and marked on relevant drawings and attached to this document. The
area with the highest risk for damage by a falling BOP stack is referred to as the
'BOP fall damage area' and is defined as an area with a radius of the height of
the BOP (bottom flange of lowest BOP to top flange of upper BOP, excluding the
riser), plus 3 feet. BOP heights range from 12 to 15 ft. Therefore the BOP fall
area ranges between 15 and 18 ft. This 'BOP fall damage area' shall be projected
on the top deck of the platform and on any decks below.
See appendix 8.14

5.3.2.4.1 Precautions/Constraints
a) Securing of BOP Stacks
BOP stacks shall be secured with a properly made up clamp either on a

storage/test stump or on the wellhead at all times, unless:
 Lifting chains/slings are attached to the regular lifting points on the BOP
stack and pulled in tension (min. 25% of the weight of the stack), or
 The BOP is partially suspended with the block (min. 25% of the weight of
the stack) with a lifting sub locked in one of the pipe rams.
b) Certification of BOP Lifting Systems
The lifting systems in use for the BOP's shall be certified, by an approved
institution, for a lifting capacity of 150% of the weight of the heaviest BOP stack
to be handled and re-certification will be done annually. Any load bearing part of
the lifting system (for example, but not limited to, slings and shackles) shall only
be replaced with certified parts. The entire lifting system shall be re-certified
after any modification.
See also next page ‘d) Waivers’ on Double Redundancy BOP Lifting
Systems.
c) Securing of Wells in BOP Fall Area
When any of the BOPs is not secured on the storage/test stump or on the
wellhead, unless a special waiver is given, the following shall apply:
1) All production/injection wells in the BOP fall damage area shall be closed
in at the SSV, the Xmas-tree flowline valve and the SCSSV.
2) The gaslift supply line shall be closed-in at the wellhead of all wells within
the BOP fall damage area and at distribution header.
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3) All pressurised lines and vessels, including gaslift lines, within the BOP fall
damage area shall be closed-in and depressurised in compliance with
section 5.1 and 3.2.
4) The casing tubing annulus of all wells within the BOP fall damage area
shall be depressurised to 100 psig or less.
5) The Drilling Supervisor shall give ca. 12 hrs. advance notice to the
Operations Supervisor of the shut-in requirements, which is to be
reconfirmed just prior to lifting the BOPs.
Immediately after securing the BOP, the Drilling Supervisor shall notify the
Operations Supervisor that the wells may be opened up. The Operations
Supervisor shall keep the Drilling Supervisor informed of the status of the wells
at all stages of this procedure.
Certified lifting equipment must be used for heavy loads. Heavy loads shall not
be lifted over the wellhead area, unless the wells and lines are closed in and
depressurised as outlined in 1) to 5) above. Crane drivers shall be specifically
instructed to avoid crossing the wellhead area with a heavy load. In this case,
the restricted area shall be the area that will be covered by the movements of
the heavy load, plus 3 ft. on all sides.
d) Waivers
Impact Resistant Top Deck <check if applicable and adapt accordingly>
Should a review conclusively indicate that a falling BOP stack will not pass
through the top deck of the platform or jacket and will not deform the deck to a
degree that any facility below the deck will be damaged, then all requirements
mentioned in (c) may be waived on an exception basis supported by the approval
from relevant parties. All relevant documentation shall be included in this
document.
Double Redundancy BOP Lifting System <check if applicable and adapt

accordingly>
The risks for dropping of the BOP stack can be reduced to a very low level if a 4
(four) - point lifting system is used. Each chain of the 4 (four)-point lifting (chain
hoist) system shall have a lifting capacity of 50% of the weight of the heaviest
BOP stack to be handled, so that in the event that one of the chains would fail,
the other chain will fully support the BOP stack. Similar certification as for a
single system is mandatory.
With a 4 (four) point (chain hoist) lifting system, total dispensation from the
shut-in and depressurisation requirements listed before may be granted. This is
regardless of the construction and condition of the top deck of the platform.
Dispensation is on an exception basis for the operations on a specific platform
and shall be stated in the SPG together with detailed BOP handling procedures.
<Document Number>
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6 Pre-SPUD activities.
No simultaneous operations may be initiated offshore unless the following have

been fulfilled:
1. The SISO/SIPROD document (this document) has been approved, is on site

and has been shared with all involved in SIMOPS.
2. All engineering fabrication and essential instrumentation as stipulated in this
document is in place, has been function tested and confirmed by the Drilling
Supervisor or OIM.
6.1 Pre-Move Checklists
To ensure there’s enough time to prepare the platform for Simultaneous

Operations a check on the status of the platform should be carried long before
the actual activities take place.
A checklist that can be used to identify the actions that have to be taken to bring
the platform in ‘SIMOPS-mode’ can be found in appendix 8.15.
It’s the Drilling Supervisors responsibility to carry out that survey and identify
remedial actions in time, so ‘Operations’ have time to follow-up on it.
The checklist in 8.16 can be used to verify the platform is brought into ‘SIMOPS-
mode’ and all remedial actions identified have been closed.
6.2 SIMOPS/SIPROD meeting
Prior to the start of simultaneous operations the following topics should be shared
with all personnel on board:
a) Generic and typical SIMOPS Hazards.
b) The organisation with respect to SIMOPS (PTW and Responsibilities)
c) Emergency Response arrangements.
The above topics should also be embedded in the Rig/Platform induction to
ensure that all arrivals (‘new’ as well as ‘returners’) are aware of the specific
simultaneous operations arrangements.
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7 Deviations
<To be filled in by Operations and/or Wells>
In this chapter deviations from the in this document mentioned requirements
should be listed. The deviations should be signed off (approved) by the
functional line manager and Operations Manager.
Requirement Deviation Mitigation (if any) Approval

(refer to chapter of this
document)
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8 Appendices
8.1 Attendance List HAZID Workshop
<Insert a copy of the attendance list>

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8.2 HER
<Insert a copy of the HAZID/HER conducted>

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8.3 Well Barrier: Fluid Column Acceptance Criteria
The below table is from PETRONAS CARIGALI WMS:T TECHNOLOGY STANDARD

PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL (version October 2014).
The document should be referenced for accuracy of the below table and
additional information on this particular WBE.
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8.4 Well Barrier: BOP Acceptance Criteria

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8.5 Well Barrier: Casing/Liner/Tubing Acceptance Criteria

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8.6 Well Barrier: SCSSSV

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8.7 PETRONAS HSE RISK MATRIX (HSERM)
PETRONAS HSE RISK

MATRIX (HSERM).pdf
MAHs are effectively any incident with a severity level of 5 as well as scenarios
considered to be more likely, but with a severity level 3 or 4, i.e. E4, D4 and
E3.
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Below snip is from the MEMO “HSE RISK MATRIX (HSERM)”

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8.8 PTW Demarcation for SIPROD
Memo(PTW System PTW

Demarcation)_PI.pdf Demarcation-Rev 1.pdf
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8.9 Typical MOPO for SIPROD
Emergencies, Barriers and Communications
One of the minimum two barriers not present

Diving Support activities inside 500m zone
Non routine / manual hydrocarbon venting

Maintenance of emergency power supply
Platform / Production
ESD system (kill knobs) not functioning.

Personnel transfer (swing rope)
Non routine lifts above drill floor

Hot work on mobile installation
Communications down (radio)

Coiled tubing on wells from rig
Visibility low / Working at night
Start / Stop Fuel gas systems

Maintenance on F&G system
Maintenance on ESD system

Hot work on fixed installation
Personnel transfer (basket)
Maintenance on Fire-main
Bunkering / Fuel transfers
Supply Vessel Operations
Xmas tree commissioning

Concurrent Operations
Supply Chain activities
Start / Stop Export pump

Medic / Dr. not available
Working below drill floor
Changing Orifice plates
X-ray NDT on platform

Platform Operations
Confined Space Entry
Production operations
Weather Conditions
Flowing nearby wells.
Topsides leak testing

Helicopter operations
Pipeline hydrotesting
Monsoon / Typhoon
Working Outboard
Flowline hook-up
Wind > 45 knots
Alarm activated
Swell > 2 meter
Water transfer
Well Servicing
Plant start-up
Flare ignition
Simultaneous Operations MOPO
Well Testing
Personnel
Workover
(Matrix Of Permitted Operations)
Drilling Rig
Weather Conditions
Wind > 45 knots NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sw ell > 2 meter NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Visibility low / Working at night NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Monsoon / Typhoon NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Supply Chain activities
Bunkering / Fuel transfers
Supply Vessel Operations
Water transfer
Personnel
Medic / Dr. not available NA NA NA NA
Helicopter operations
Personnel transfer (basket)
Personnel transfer (sw ing-rope)
Working Outboard
Diving Support activities inside 500m zone
Working below drill floor
Confined Space Entry
Pre-spud operations
Rig / Tender approaching platform NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Running anchors NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Jack-up / Jack-dow n NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Cantilever / Derrick Skidding NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Drilling operations
Driving Conductor NA NA NA NA
Drilling Top Hole NA NA NA NA
Making up stands NA NA NA NA
Drilling Reservoir (Overbalance) NA NA NA NA
Drilling Reservoir (Underbalance) NA NA NA NA
Pressure testing NA NA NA NA
Running casing NA NA NA NA
Cementing activities NA NA NA NA
Lifting BOP NA NA NA NA
Lifting BOP w ith Double Redundancy NA NA NA NA
Install NU/ND BOP NA NA NA NA
Tripping NA NA NA NA
Fishing NA NA NA NA
Jarring NA NA NA NA
Reaming NA NA NA NA
Well Completion Running NA NA NA NA
Concurrent Operations
Hot w ork on fixed installation
Hot w ork on mobile installation
Coiled tubing on w ells from rig
Xmas tree commissioning
X-ray NDT on rig
Routine lifts below cantilever
Non routine lifts above drill floor
Maintenance of emergency pow er supply
Maintenance on F&G system
Maintenance on Fire-main
Maintenance on ESD system
Flare ignition
Non routine / manual hydrocarbon venting
Well Servicing
Well Testing
Workover
Em ergencies, Barriers and Com m unications
Communications dow n (radio) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
ESD system (kill knobs) not functioning. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Alarm activated NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
One of the minimum tw o barriers not present NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Simultaneous Operation is permitted.
Simultaneous Operation needs to be risk assessed, using PETRONAS HSERM.

Simultaneous Operation only allowed if residual risk for PEAR is classified Low or Medium. PEAR = People, Environment, Assets, Reputation
Simultaneous Operation not allowed.
NA Not Applicable.
<Document Number>
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8.10 Emergency Response Organisation Chart for SIPROD
<Insert chart>
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8.11 PCSB Life Saving Appliances Guideline

<Document Number>
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<Document Number>
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8.12 Escape Routes, Muster Points and Fire & Safety Equipment Platform
<Insert chart/map>
<Document Number>
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8.13 Escape Routes, Muster Points and Fire & Safety Equipment Rig
<Insert chart/map>
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8.14 BOP Fall Damage Area Drawing
<Insert chart/map>
<Document Number>
Page 8-76 of 85
8.15 Pre-move Checklist for DSV (Long term check)
Drilling Design Checklist 27 (from Carigali Drilling Design Checklists)

PLATFORM ARRIVAL/SIMOPS
Applicability
Fully applicable Platforms with producing wells
Partly applicable Platforms with no SIMOPS
Background Information
1. Safe and efficient operations are dependent on the host platform being prepared and checked thoroughly prior to
the rig arrives.
2. Sufficient time must be allowed for remedial actions to be carried out.
3. A platform inspection shall be performed by the Drilling Supervisor and Drilling Contractor Representative
Responsibilities of Drilling Supervisor
1. Prepare rig/tender arrival and rig/tender departure checklists based on those below and ensure that the checks
are carried out
2. Ensure that remedial actions are implemented with sufficient time for completion prior to the arrival of the
rig/tender.
3. Liaise with facilities engineering to ensure platform modifications and interface requirements are carried out.
Planning and Design Considerations Checklist
Mustering
Alternate muster station assigned Location of lifeboats( rafts) for staff identified
Telephone working at alternate muster station Muster control in emergency agreed.
General Platform Condition - Main Deck
Handrails and sockets in place and secure Skid beams clean and clear
Stairs and steps secure, safe for use and well lit Obstacles cleared for rig operation
Deck gratings secure and safe for use Service lines platform safe for work
Hole covers in place and secure Cable harness clamps secured and safe for use
Lights and obstacles clear for lifting operations Drains clean and clear
Lighting on all decks and stairs adequate
Safety Equipment
Life rafts locations identified and in good condition Platform phone system fully operational
Fire-fighting equipment in place and in good condition Muster point identified
Life rings in place and in good condition Escape routes clear and well lit
Platform depressurisation
Platform shut down / wells shut-in can be achieved Location and bleeding down of HP. HHP gas pipelines
identified
All leak rates below 175 kPa/hr (25 psi/hr)
Production Area
Handrails and sockets secure Good access for wellhead work (including escape
route)
All gratings secure and in place Trip hazards removed, marked or barriered-off
Gratings condition safe Drains clean and clear
Stairs/ladders secure for use and well lit Drip trays clean
HP-lines in good condition Hole covers in good condition and secured (won’t fall
through)
Wellhead area hazard free Escape routes clear
All wellhead valves foreseen with handles Hydrocarbon disposal means identified and available
Boat Landing Deck Area
General condition acceptable for use Ropes secure and in good condition
Handrails and sockets secure and in place Area well lit
Gratings condition safe Stairs/ladders secure for use and well lit
SIMOPS
Signed copies of SISO/SIPROD document available PTW procedures, filing and signatures agreed.
HER document available and followed up with Emergency Response Procedures discussed and
agreed.
Radio Channels and telephone numbers agreed and Incident notification procedures discussed and
available agreed.
SIMOPS meeting held with all involved (rig + platform) Gas tester available (day and night)
Data Requirement Checklist
Hazardous Area Classification drawings of rig and Planned work on platform during campaign
platform
Location of Local Flares and Vent Stacks and present Number of personnel on complex for normal
use operations
Location of Control Room Location and types of pipelines in/out
Names of stand-by vessels Fire water and air supply.
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8.16 Pre-move Checklist for platform OIM and DSV (Short term check).
Nr. Item Check

1. Platform ESD and fire and gas detection system operates properly and is
in service.
2. Platform drains and drip pans are open and free of oil and trash.
3. Automatic drains operate properly (if available).
4. Portable fire extinguishers are in proper location and required inspections
have been performed.
5. Fire water system operates properly.
6. ESD, gas detector and fire-fighting system drawings are posted.
7. Navigational aids operate properly.
8. Platform hoisting equipment is operable and has been inspected and
undergone preventive maintenance (particularly limit switches, swing
circle bolts and hoisting ropes).
9. Give the Drilling Supervisor a schedule of performance tests or
inspections on platform / well safety equipment which will be performed
by production during the drilling phase.
10. Survival craft and life raft capacities can accommodate maximum
number of personnel anticipated on platform during drilling and
completion and workover phases.
11. Medical equipment and stocks are property labeled and maintained.
12. Helicopter "landing/take off" procedures are implemented.
13. Platform structural integrity assessment carried out.
14. Subsea lines and control cables location marked for safe anchoring or
vessel movement.
15. All wells are shut-in and made safe.
16. Production platforms had been converted to SIPROD mode.
Date: ……… - ……… - ………
OIM – Platform Drilling Supervisor

Well Engineering Guideline For Documentation of SISO-SIPROD Operations Rev 3 PDF

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WELL ENGINEERING GUIDELINE

FOR DOCUMENTATION OF SISO / SIPROD OPERATIONS

PCSB – WELLS HSE

PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHDPRELIMINARY

Prepared by Ad Theuns Sr. HSE Specialist

Head Wells Operations

Asul Kahar B Senior Manager Wells

Reviewed by Hisham B Basar Head Wells Malaysia

Document Asul Kahar B Senior Manager Wells

Master Asul Kahar B Muda – Senior Manager Wells HSE

01 Lawrence Umar – Head Wells Operations Malaysia

02 Niall Farren – Head Wells Superintendent International

03 Hisham B Basar – Head Wells Malaysia

04 Rosli Hamzah – Head Wells International

05 M Arriffin B Daud – Head Global Wells Intervention & Services

06 Datuk George Ling Kien Sing – Head Global Wells

The table below must be completed in detail for each revision.

Rev Chapter Description Approved By Approval Date

1 First Issue See page 2 May 2015

Added positions in the Document

2 Updated the document with clearer See page 2 June 2015

Added SIMOPS requirements for

PETRONAS Policy for Health, Safety and Environment states that:

“PETRONAS shall ensure continual improvement in its Health, Safety and

This Well Engineering Guideline has been developed to improve uniformity in

The guideline provides the standard lay-out for the SISO/SIPROD

Table of Contents of Document Control Part + Guidance for Template

1.3 Adapting the Template…………………………………………………………. 7

1.3 Adapting the Template

The technical content of this Generic Document is made as a guide and

PCSB – WELLS ENGINEERING / OPERATIONS

© 2015 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

Document Authority <update the table; if not applicable add N/A>

Reviewed by OIM Production

Reviewed by DSV / Company Man

Endorsed by Field Supervisor

Endorsed by Drilling Superintendent

Endorsed by Well Intervention

Endorsed by Head HSE

Approved by Production Manager

Approved by Drilling Manager

Approved by Well Intervention

I ACCEPT THE OWNERSHIP OF THIS DOCUMENT

Owner Platform / Field OIM

Document Holder / Distribution List

A Document Holder is responsible to communicate and ensure compliance with the

Rev Page Description Approved By Approval Date

For every Simultaneous Operation, a SISO document shall be developed and

This Simultaneous Operations document provides specific instructions that need

4.2.2.9 Barriers for Gaslift Annuli 4-28

Surface Facility Barriers 4-29

Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) 4-38

Well Collision 4-39

5 Preparation prior to Rig Move / Well Intervention activities 5-47

6 Pre-SPUD activities. 6-52

8.7 PETRONAS HSE RISK MATRIX (HSERM) 8-60

1.1 Simultaneous Operations

As per “WW ALL O 05 001, Rev 1, Sept 2013 – Simultaneous Operations

This document only focuses on the Simultaneous Operations between Drilling /

Rig / Workover Activities

Rig activities include:

Production activities refers to the handling/processing of hydrocarbons under

1.2 Land Drilling, HPHT Drilling and Deep Water Drilling