Legal ethics case digests (set 3)

I. Lawyer’s fiduciary obligations

II. Lawyer’s fiduciary obligations II
III. Lawyer’s duties in handling client’s case
1. Santiago v. Fojas
2. Cantiller v Potenciano
3. 180 SCRA 246 – Legal Ethics – Lawyer’s Duties to His Client – Due
Diligence
In 1987, the sisters Ma. Libertad Cantiller and Peregrina Cantiller lost an
ejectment case. The two were later introduced by a friend to Atty.
Humberto Potenciano. Potenciano said he can help the sisters because
the judge handling the case was his close friend. Potenciano, with the
little time he got, immediately filed a petition to counter the order to
vacate issued against the sisters. He asked for P1,000.00 for his fees from
the sisters.
But later on, the judge handling the case asked Potenciano to inhibit
because of the fact that they are friends. Potenciano then asked an
additional P2,000.00 from the sisters. He said he needs to find another
judge who can rule in their favor. He also asked another P10,000.00 from
the sisters. He said this amount is needed in order for them to re-acquire
their apartment. On top of the P10k, he also asked for another P1k for
additional expenses. The sisters were able to pool resources from friends
just to raise the amount asked for by Potenciano.
It turned out however that the court never asked P10k from the parties
nor was the additional P1k asked by the court. Worse, said amount (P11k)
was never deposited in court. The sisters demanded Potenciano to return
the said amount but he failed to do so hence they filed an administrative
case against him. In his defense, Potenciano claimed that the sister were
merely harassing him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Potenciano should be subjected to
disciplinary actions.
HELD: Yes. From the records, it appears that Potenciano haphazardly
prepared the pleadings he wrote for the sisters. In fact, the cases he filed
for the sisters were all dismissed for lack of cause of action. Worse, he got
P11k from the sisters but never used the same for the case instead he
pocketed it for himself. When he contracted the sisters, Potenciano, as a
lawyer, bound himself to undertake his legal services with maximum
effort until the conclusion of the case. The failure to exercise due diligence
or the abandonment of a client’s cause makes such lawyer unworthy of
the trust which the client had reposed on him.
It is also of no moment that Potenciano had little time to prepare for the
pleading. When he accepted the case, his clients reposed full faith in him.
But he never complemented the trust and faith reposed in him. He even
bragged his closeness with the judge and even intimated the need to
“buy” another judge. Such actions are reprehensible.
Potenciano was suspended indefinitely until he can show to the court that
he is fit to practice law.
4. Millare v. Montero
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, 
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which

ordered respondent’s client to vacate the premises subject of the
ejectment case. respondent as counsel, appealed the decision. CA
dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to
comply with the proper procedures. Respondent thereafter resorted to
devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment
rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. 

Held: SUSPENDED for (1) year. Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file
multiple actions arising from the same cause. Rule 12.04. — A lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is

required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The
Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to
allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule
19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial

process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and
frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgment.

A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment
is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b)
that it has been obtained by fraud.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the

 execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum
shopping. Forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse
decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more
favorable resolution of his case.
5. Choa v. Chiongson

Complainant: Alfonso C. Chua

Respondent: Judge Roberto S. Chiongson
Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Alfonso Choa for making untruthful
statements or falsehoods in his Petition for Naturalization. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City Branch III presided by the
respondent Judge Roberto Chiongson. On February 21, 1995, respondent
Judge found the complainant guilty of the crime of perjury and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional
and to pay the costs. The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the
judgment but was subsequently denied for lack of merit. He then filed the
instant complaint against the respondent Judge and prayed for the latter’s
removal from office alleging, inter alia, that he was sentenced to suffer a
penalty higher than that provided by law, without applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in not applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in the crime of perjury. 

HELD:
No. Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law)
substantially provides that the Act shall not apply to those penalties whose
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. The penalty
for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor
in its maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months to prision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. The
complainant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six months and one
 day of prision correccional. Thus, the respondent Judge was correct in not
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

FACTS:

Judge Chiongson rendered judgment and found Alfonso Chua to be guilty of perjury upo
n material matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law. When the motion for rec
onsideration was denied, Choa filed instant complaint and prayed for the removal of the 
respondent judge from office. Some of the allegations were that the Judge was bias bein
g a neighbor of Choa’s wife who initiated the case for perjury, which the judge denied as 
there was a house between his and chua’s wife’s. also that the allegations in the Informat
ion do not constitute the offense of perjury,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint praying for the removal of the judge will prosper.

RULING:

No. Granting that they are indeed next-door neighbors does not necessarily mean that r
espondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for Disqualification of Judg
es. Nowhere in said Rule is it ordained that being the neighbor of a party-litigant is reas
on enough for the Judge to disqualify himself from hearing the formers case.

As regards the claim that the allegations in the information did not constitute an offense 
for perjury, if the complainant and his counsel honestly believed that it did not, they sho
uld have filed a motion to quash. But they did not.

As to Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, he must have been aware 
of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a Member of the Phili
ppine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any g
roundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(
c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings onl
y as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and proba
ble results of the complainants case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional Respon
sibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes (Cano
n 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action sho
uld be taken against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and res
ponsibilities

6. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union v. Lo Bu

G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975
COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners, 
vs.
LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners. 

Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.

FERNANDO, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition

proceeding. It is taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a
replevin suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was
resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice
controversy, one moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court. Petitioner Cosmos
Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute which unfortunately had
dragged on since 1961, all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered illusory through
the machinations of a certain Ong Ting, now deceased, and the private respondent Lo Bu. The
lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. It is
about time that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner labor union, so long set
at naught and disregarded, by the employment of techniques, which certainly deserve no
encouragement, much less approval. There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals
having dismissed the appeal, reinstating it in its resolution of December 19, 1974. Certiorari and
prohibition lie. 

The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union
was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for
the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor.  Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff
1

Mario Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to serve the writ, did so on January 17
and 18, 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New
Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.  It was then that
2

respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of

jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, a point stressed in another motion dated
February 2, 1973, on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers
Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated
February 23, 1973 denied his motions. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration, as
shown in its order dated March 23, 1973. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such
order to this Court. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-36636. This Court, in its resolution dated
3

July 17, 1973, denied the petition for certiorari of private respondent.  In the meanwhile, there
4

was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the
same properties. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari, petitioner labor
 union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It was therein alleged that private
respondent has no cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the
Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22, 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme
Court in its resolution dated July 17, 1973. The lower court dismissed the complaint.  That is
5

the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals, and it is precisely because of its obvious
character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed. 
Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. 
1. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June
27, 1970  for the satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was
6

issued in favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This concerns
complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, dated March 12, 1970,
"allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should
be directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d)
by the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos Foundry Shop ... The original writ of execution had
been returned wholly unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in their
names, and the foundry shop where Mrs. Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan,
Valenzuela, Bulacan, is the "New Century Foundry Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan, dated March 11, 1970). Consequently, in its Order of March 19, 1970, the
Court directed the examination of Mrs. Ong Ting and the Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning
the latter's and Ong Ting's property and income. Extensive hearings were conducted." 7

Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records, the Court finds that
after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned, Ong Ting established the New Century
Foundry Shop. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road,
Valenzuela, Bulacan. After his proposals to settle the present case for P5,000.00 in
September 1968, for P25,000.00 in October 1968, and for P40,000.00 on December 22,
1968, were successively rejected by complainant's counsel, Ong Ting, after hinting of taking
measures to avoid liability, soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31, 1968,
selling all his business, including equipment, machineries, improvements, materials, supplies
and rights, in the New Century Foundry Shop, to his compadre Lo Bu, for P20,000.00, which
he acknowledged so fully paid ... The deed does not bear the conformity of Mrs. Ong Ting.
On January 7, 1969, when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm name, he
gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30,000.00 ...
Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu, Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the
case on January 25, 1969, and a verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May
12, 1969. In the latter motion, it was alleged that as a result of the fire, "Ong Ting lost
everything; we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing ... " This allegation was made despite
the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu, from which he realized P20,000.00."  The absence of good
8

faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There
was no actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu, the alleged manager in absentia. At the
time Ong Ting died, he was still residing in the premises of the shop ... His family continued
to reside therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. His young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong
became in-charge of the shop and the workers. His daughter Gloria Ong became the
cashier. Mrs. Ong Ting became the manager and she supervised the work. .. The alleged
sale was no doubt intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable
to respondents. It is clearly fictitious. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its
jurisdiction because what is being sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order.
Having acquired jurisdiction, the Court may employ means to carry it into effect (Sec. 6, Rule
135, Rules of Court)." 9

That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order, an alias writ of execution was
issued against the properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan
Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor practice
proceeding. As noted, there was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the meanwhile the
finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court issued its resolution of
July 17, 1973.   It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent, Lo Bu, for the
10

purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the dispositive portion
of the order of the Court of June 22, 1970. 

2. To all intents and purposes then, that is the law of the case. What is worse, private
respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance, as he himself was the petitioner in the
certiorari proceeding before this Court. He failed, and ii was not surprising, for on the facts as
found, he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of petitioner
labor union. There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his pretension of
being the alleged vendee. In Cruz v. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions   it was
11

shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice, there was a fictitious
sale resorted to, as in this case. Under the circumstances, the bad faith being evident, the
ostensible vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation. So it must be here.
Moreover, that is merely, as stated earlier, to accord deference to the fundamental principle
of the law of the case, his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court. There is
this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v. De Guzman:   "The latest case in point
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as of the time the order complained of was issued is Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons,
a 1962 decision. As emphasized by the ponente, the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the
final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any give
case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding
on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. If
petitioner had any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No.
12276 should further be reviewed his remedy was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. In fact
he did file two motions for that purpose, both of which were denied. A new petition before an
inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified. As much, indeed, was clearly indicated
by this Court in its resolution of April 3, 1959, herein above reproduced in its entirety. The
import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood.' So it has been from 1919, when in
Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, this
Court, through Justice Street, categorically declared that a decision that has become the law
of the case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court." What is more, in 1967, there is
a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal in People v. Olarte where it was stressed by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the case, "even if erroneous, ... may
no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final ... " Then, in Sanchez v. Court
of Industrial Relations, promulgated in 1969, there is the pronouncement that the law of the
case 'does not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but likewise to its
implementation carried out in fealty to what has been ... decreed.'"  13

3. Private respondent, in his special and affirmative defenses, alleged that petitioners have a
plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending
case in the Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari. As a general
rule, such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. That is the ordinary course of judicial
procedure. There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. It is
not so however in this case. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously
noted. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his
far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. It would be repugnant to the
principle of social justice   and the mandate of protection to labor   if there be further delay in
14 15

the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. 
4. One last point. It was set forth in the Petition   that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent
16

motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of
his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century
Foundry Shop, followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this
 time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third,
this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were
denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the certiorari
proceeding, dismissed by this Court for lack of merit.   Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his
17

Answer to this petition, filed on February 20, 1975, had the temerity to deny such allegations.
He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu, petitioner in L-36636, he
did specifically maintain: "On January 26, 1973, in order to vindicate his rights over the levied
properties, in an expeditious or less expensive manner, herein appellant voluntarily
submitted himself, as a forced intervenor, to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR, by filing an
urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution,' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court
to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him,
without the latter being made a party to the case, as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to
enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. 3021-ULP, by means of
an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry
Shop;' ... ; Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5,
1973, and inasmuch as the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31, 1973, the
CIR issued an order on January 30, 1973, one day before the schedule sale, ordering the
Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the auction sale; ... ; On February 3, 1973, herein
petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2, 1973, praying for
the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee)
failed to put up an indemnity bond, pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court; ... On February 10, 1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers
Union interposed its opposition to herein petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January
26, 1973 and February 2, 1973, ... ; On February 27, 1973, herein petitioner-appellant
received an order from respondent CIR, dated February 25, 1973, denying his urgent
motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties
"in accordance with law;" ... "   Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from
18

commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the
paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and
awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due
regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to
be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously
admitted. That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For
even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course
expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in
defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as
an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not
act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every
bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his
good standing in the bar. 
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19, 1974 of
respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained
from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of dismissing it. Triple costs.

7. Gamalinda v. Alcantara

In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991,   complainant Domingo Gamalinda
1

charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their
profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats, dishonoring
and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about the loss of his land.
The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them.

The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile attempt to
resurrect the charges filed against him in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were
dismissed by this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1988 for having become moot and
academic. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22, 1987, or five (5) months
after the respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for
reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has become
final and executory. It serves as a bar to a relitigation of the same charges against
respondent judge.   That those charges are now being brought against respondent judge in
2

his capacity as an attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in the
form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata.  3

On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as
counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of.  4

In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and
Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda   for reconveyance, with 5

damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria, Tarlac,
which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of Apolinario
Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary
injunction against the "defendants, their agents, representatives or other persons acting in
their behalf, ordering them to desist from threshing and carting away the palay harvest on
Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral Survey of Victoria, . . . until further order of this
Court. . . ."   This injunction was made permanent in the decision of the lower court rendered
6

on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.

Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a portion of the area in
dispute, in the belief that the whole of Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim  executed in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario
7

Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time title to Lot No. 3217 was still in
the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano Tiburcio, Protacio Cabatino and
Maximo Mateo, tenants of Salud Balot, entered the portion being cultivated by complainant,
the latter reported the incident to the police.

From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying
therefore on the injunction issued by the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a
motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in contempt of court.

Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case No. 3827 was
different from the area occupied by him. To resolve the issue, the lower court with his
agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The result of the resurvey showed that
contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very same land involved in
Civil Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower court declared complainant in contempt in an
order dated July 24, 1986 which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in a
decision rendered on March 21, 1998. 8

Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot and complainant is the successor-in-interest of the heirs
of Apolinario Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for complainant to claim that neither he nor
Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case. Being privies to the parties, they are necessarily bound by
the orders rendered in said case.
 On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming in toto the
judgment of the lower court in Civil Case No. 3827.   After the appellate court's decision had
9

become final, Atty. Lim moved for the execution of the affirmed judgment,   and when the
10

writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion to Require Domingo
Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of Court and to Authorize the Latter to
Execute Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A in Favor of Plaintiffs."   That motion was granted by
11

the lower court, but complainant refused to surrender the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299,
prompting Atty. Lim to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT 186299
Null and Void,"   which the lower court granted on July 31, 1989.
12

It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with
his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to
protect his clients' possessory rights over the property in dispute while the second motion
was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.  He shall serve his client with competence and diligence,   and
13 14

his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ
every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every
defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed.   An attorney's duty to
15

safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until the effective release from
the case   or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation.   During that
16 17

period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's
interests may require.

This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He
should be commended, not condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties
as an attorney;

With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land
relied upon by the lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake
instrument, suffice it to say that this is a matter that should have been litigated in said case
instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any case, there being no
showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception against
him will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the
preparation of the criminal information, and for the same reason he cannot be called to
account for it.

ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and
Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

8. J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc.

J. P. JUAN & SONS, INC., herein duly represented by its Treasurer, Rodolfo S.
Juan, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
LIANGA INDUSTRIES, INC., defendant-appellant.
Magsarili, Muro and Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose M. Luison for defendant-appellant.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving an issue of law, we
are called upon once more to reiterate the established doctrine first enunciated by this Court
in 1943 1 that a general denial in an answer, although termed a "specific denial", fails to
tender an issue and entitles plaintiff to a judgment on the pleadings.

In a complaint originally filed with the City Court of Manila on October 30, 1963, plaintiff
sought recovery from defendant of the sum of P900.00, representing the unpaid balance of
office equipment amounting to P1,890.00 sold and delivered on October 15, 1962 by plaintiff
to defendant under a purchase order, copy of which was duly annexed to the complaint.
Plaintiff also asked for the payment of legal interests and costs and P200.00 for attorney's
fees. Judgment was rendered on December 9, 1963 by the City Court in favor of plaintiff and
defendant appealed the same to the Court of First Instance of Manila. 2 Defendant filed its
Answer on January 27, 1964, where it "denied specifically all the allegations of paragraphs 2
and 3 of the complaint", which are the material allegations referring to its purchase of the
office equipment, its partial payment and refusal and failure to pay the unpaid balance of
P900.00 despite repeated demands of plaintiff and alleged as a "special and affirmative
defense" that "defendant has no obligation to pay to the plaintiff the amount or sum of money
claimed in the complaint." 3 Defendant did not deny under oath the authenticity of the
purchase order annexed to the complaint, as required by Rule 8, section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Plaintiff, in its Manifestation submitted at the pretrial conference held by the lower Court on
June 15, 1964, stated that its documentary evidence consisted of:

a-1. Purchase order between plaintiff and defendant already marked Exh. 'A' in the Inferior
Court.

a-2. Demand letter dated August 16, 1963 already marked Exh. 'B' in the Inferior Court.

a-3. Demand letter dated October 24, 1963, already marked Exh. 'C' in the Inferior Court.

a-4. Charge invoice dated October 16, 1962, marked Exh 'D' in the Inferior Court.

and that "defendant refused amicable settlement on the case," 4 and moved for judgment on
the pleadings. The Record on Appeal does not show that defendant submitted any
manifestation in turn as to its evidence or defenses. 1äwphï1.ñët

The lower Court thereafter rendered its decision granting plaintiff's motion for judgment on
the pleadings and upholding plaintiff's position that "when defendant's answer denies the
allegations of the complaint because the defendant 'has no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief' and 'specifically denies' other allegations, 'the real fact being those
hereunder stated', said denials are in fact mere general denials amounting to admissions of
the material allegations of the complaint." It held that "The facts alleged in plaintiff's
complaint are of the kind that plainly and necessarily must be within defendant's knowledge,
and of which the defendant cannot logically pretend ignorance, ..." and that "The material
allegations of the complaint must, therefore, be deemed as admitted by the defendant ..."
Summing up, the lower Court found that "Said material allegations deemed admitted by the
defendant establish that on October 15, 1962, the defendant purchased from the plaintiff
office equipment listed in the Purchase Order No. 001/62, a photostatic copy of which was
attached to the complaint as Annex A, the authenticity of which has not been denied under
oath. The equipments therein listed, with a total selling price of P1,890.00, were delivered to
the defendant which paid only the amount of P990.00, thereby leaving an unpaid balance of
P900.00. Notwithstanding the fact that said purchase was payable in thirty days from
October 15, 1962, the defendant failed and refused to pay the outstanding balance of
P900.00 despite repeated demands for payment." 5 It therefore rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff, although it made no award for attorney's fees for lack of proof.

Defendant filed its notice of appeal from the lower Court's decision, on the ground that the
same is 'contrary to law and the evidence" and asked that its appeal be elevated to the Court
of Appeals, resulting in further delay in the resolution of this simple collection case, for as
noted by the appellate Court in its Resolution certifying the appeal to this Court "No facts as
facts are disputed in this appeal. The defendant-appellant simply insists that it had tendered
issues of fact and the Court a quo thus erroneously rendered judgment on the pleadings.
The questions presented are issues only of law. Consequently, the power of appellate review
in this instance belongs to the Supreme Court. (Sec. 17, R.A. 296, as amended)."

We find defendant's appeal to be frivolous. No error was committed by the Court below in
ruling that defendant-appellant's "specific denials" are in law general denials amounting to
admissions of the material allegations of the complaint and in rendering judgment on the
pleadings, in accordance with the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction based on the provisions
of Rule 8, section 10 and Rule 9, section 1 in relation to Rule 19, section 1 and Rule 20,
section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

SEC. 10. Specific denial. — The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of
the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial. Where a pleader desires to deny
only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny only the remainder. Where the defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. (Rule 8, Sec. 10, Rules
of Court) .

SEC. 1. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when
not specifically denied. Allegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically
and under oath. (Rule 9, Sec. 1, Rules of Court).

SEC 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. (Rule 19, Sec. 1, Rules of Court).

SEC. 3. Judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment at the pre-trial. — If at the pre-
trial the court finds that facts exist upon which a judgment on the pleadings or a summary
judgment may be made, it may render judgment on the pleadings of a summary judgment as
justice may require. (Rule 20, Sec. 3, Rules of Court).
This doctrine was first established by the Court twenty-six years ago in the case of El Hogar
Filipino vs. Santos Investments, Inc., 6 where this Court, in applying the provisions on specific
denials required of the defendant in Rule 9, section 7 of the then new Rules of Court, now
found in Rule 8, section 10 of the Revised Rules of Court above-quoted, held that
"Defendant's answer wherein it merely 'denies generally and specifically each and every
allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint,' is but a general denial. It
is not a specific denial under section 7 of Rule 9, because it does not deal specifically with
each material allegation of fact, nor does it set forth the substance of the matters upon which
the defendant relies to support his denial. It does not serve the purpose of requiring the
defendant to make a specific denial, which is to compel him to specify the matters which he
intends to disprove and disclose the matters upon which he relies to support his denial,
thereby limiting the issues and avoiding unnecessary delays and surprises. Under the old
procedure the plaintiff was compelled by defendant's mere general denial to prove facts
alleged in the complaint which the defendant did not even attempt to dispute. The new
procedure does away with that unnecessary burden. (Moran on the Rules of Court, volume
1, page 93.)" 7 This doctrine has since been applied uniformly in a long line of cases. 8 

Time and again, this Court has stressed that "An unexplained denial of information and belief
of a matter of records, the means of information concerning which are within the control of
the pleader, or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial. ..." 9 and that "the form of denial ... adopted by the appellants, although
allowed by the Rules of Court (referring to lack of sufficient knowledge or information) must
be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, — certainly neither for the purpose of confusing
the adverse party as to what allegations of the complaint are really put in issue nor for the
purpose of delay."  10 

Defendant-appellant has no cause to complain of the judgment appealed from. Its claim that
it tendered an issue with its "affirmative defense" of "having no obligation to pay to the
plaintiff the amount or sum of money claimed in the complaint" was correctly held by the
Court below to be a mere conclusion not premised on an allegation of material facts. Its
"specific denial" of the material allegations of the complaint as to its purchase of the office
equipment from plaintiff under the purchase order annexed to the complaint and refusal to
pay the unpaid balance of P900.00 due thereon, without setting forth the substance of the
matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its
knowledge and it could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to
properly tender an issue. Furthermore, its failure to deny under oath the authenticity of the
purchase order annexed to the complaint, as required by Rule 8, section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court 11 was properly deemed an admission of the genuineness and due execution
thereof. There is nothing in the record to justify defendant's pretense in its brief (p. 13) that
the said purchase order "merely shows the defendant's offer to buy the (articles) from the
plaintiff," as against the material averments of the complaint, deemed admitted by it, that the
articles were delivered to it, and that it paid an amount of P990.00 on account of the
purchase price, leaving an unpaid balance of P900.00, which it had failed and refused to pay
all this time. Verily, as this Court pointed out in the Sy-quia vs. Marsman case, supra, fn. 8,
the Court will not sanction a strategy of evasion systematically adopted by a defendant of
trapping and confusing the plaintiff as to what facts the plaintiff has to prove or what issues
must be met, for "it is violative of fair disclosure of facts required by the Rules."

Cases such as this contribute to the needless clogging of the court dockets. The Rules of
Court were devised to limit the issues and avoid unnecessary delays and surprises. Hence,
the mandatory provisions of Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court for a pre-trial conference
for the simplification of the issues and the consideration of all matters which may aid in the
prompt disposition of an action. The Rules further require in Rule 7 section 5 that "every
 pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name" and that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" with the
express admonition that "for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action." The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that the
salutary objectives of these Rules may be attained. 1äwphï1.ñët

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with treble costs against
defendant-appellant.

9. Azor v. Beltran
https://www.scribd.com/document/231822392/Azor-v-Beltran
10. Visitacion v. Manit

11. De Roy v. Court of Appeals

The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis
Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of Bernal’s daughter. De
Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was
ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed
but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a
motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed a motion for extension.
It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case
of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period
for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be
applicable because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in
such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
12. Cuaresma v. Daquis
An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was
issued by a trial judge pursuant to a civil case filed by Daquis. Cuaresma’s
lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court where he alleged that they had no knowledge of the said
civil case hence the order of demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court
 however later found out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the
existence of said civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to
show cause why he should not be disciplined.
In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his
client belatedly learned  of the civil case; that had there been a mistake
committed, “it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that
there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this
Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in
the petition.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions.
HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court gave Directo the benefit of the doubt although it did say that
Directo’s reasoning could very well be just an afterthought. The Supreme
Court also stated that Directo is presumed to be in good faith especially
so that the misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to his
carelessness or his lack of English proficiency. The Supreme Court
admonished Directo to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that
the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every
member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the
Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession.

13. Vda. De Zubiri v. Zubiri

AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, ET AL., defendants. 
WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, defendant-appellant. 

C. Jumapao for plaintiff and appellee.

L. E. Petilla and Napoleon Dejores for defendant and appellant. 

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte in Civil
Case No. IL-219, dated September 15, 1959 denying the defendant-appellant's motion to
postpone, and from its order of the same date denying the latter's petition to set aside
judgment. 

On April 17, 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, Aurora Camara Vda. de Zubiri, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte a complaint for the recovery of her alleged share in two
commercial lots situated in Iligan City against the herein defendant-appellant, Wenceslao
Ben Zubiri, and the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the occupant of portions of the said
properties. The plaintiff alleged that the said lots were conjugal, having been purchased by
her and her late husband during their marriage, so that at least one-half of the same
belonged to her "plus the equal share of the heir or heirs of the decedent." Moreover, the
plaintiff claimed that the said parcels were in the possession of the defendant who, "unless
he can prove before this Honorable Court that he is a duly recognized natural child of the
late Jesus Zubiri, [he] has no right, interest, and participation whatsoever over the
abovementioned two lots."

On May 5, 1959, four (4) pleadings were filed in the aforementioned case, namely: 1) the
herein appellant's answer which showed on its face that it was signed by the latter in his own
behalf and unassisted by counsel; 2) a Stipulation of Facts, signed by the plaintiff, assisted
by counsel, and the defendant, without such assistance; 3) a motion to render judgment on
the pleadings, again signed by the plaintiff, duly assisted by counsel, and the defendant-
appellant herein, signing alone, without benefit of counsel; and 4) the defendant Standard
Vacuum Oil Company's answer to the above complaint. 

On May 6, 1959, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the aforementioned
Stipulation of Facts. Since in both the answer of the herein defendant-appellant and the
stipulation of facts the latter admitted practically all the allegations of the complaint, the
decision rendered in accordance therewith was actually in favor of the plaintiff.

On June 5, 1959, the defendant-appellant, for the first time thru counsel, filed with the trial
court a petition to set aside judgment upon two grounds, to wit: first, the three pleadings filed
on May 5, 1959, namely: appellant's answer, the stipulation of facts and the motion to render
judgment on the pleadings were all prepared by the plaintiff's counsel and that he, the
appellant, was made to sign all of them when he was ill and, therefore, incapable of realizing
the full consequences of the act; and, second, that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred
by a prior judgment. Under this latter ground, the appellant represented that the properties
claimed by the plaintiff had already been determined and adjudicated to him in a previous
decisions, under Special Proceedings No. IL-2 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte, which has since become final. Attached to this petition to set aside judgment were two
affidavits of merit executed by the defendant-appellant himself and Vicente A. Miranda, the
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Cebu before whom the three pleadings
repudiated in the petition were subscribed. In the affidavit of Vicente A. Miranda, it was
recited that the said pleadings were sworn to before him "at the resident of the affiant
[defendant-appellant] at F. Ramos Street [Cebu City] because he was then sick and confined
in bed and "suffering from fever, with an ice cap on his head and profusely perspiring."

On June 12, 1959, the trial court required the plaintiff to answer the abovementioned petition
to set aside judgment within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof and, thereafter, the
said petition was set for hearing on August 29, 1959. 

On August 22, 1959, or a week before the scheduled hearing, the counsel for the defendant-
appellant filed with the trial court a motion to postpone the hearing set for the 29th on the
ground that he, the defendant's counsel, could not release himself from his current
employment as to be free to attend the said hearing. On August 29, 1959, however, the court
denied the motion to postpone and proceeded with the scheduled hearing despite the
absence of the defendant's counsel and, after hearing the plaintiff's argument, likewise
denied the petition to set aside judgment. The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof
having been denied too, the defendant-appellant interposed the present appeal. 

Although the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement and the setting aside of
previous duly issued orders rest principally upon the sound discretion of the magistrate to
whom they are addressed (Tell v. Tell, 48 Phil. 70; Macke v. Camps, 5 Phil. 185; Salva v.
Palacio, et al., G.R. No. L-4247, January 30, 1952), the exercise of this power, however,
ought to be prudent and just. It should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and
fairness would be served thereby. In the case at bar, this consideration seems to have been
incompletely observed. 

In the first place, the motion for postponement under consideration was the very first filed by
the counsel for the appellant. It was filed with the court a full week prior to the scheduled
hearing, with due and proper notice to the opposing party. Its ground was not unreasonable
and hardly flimsy since it is not denied that then, the counsel for the appellant was under
some contractual commitments from which he needed time to be release. Under these
circumstances, it does seem that the denial of the motion prevented rather than serve the
ends of justice. 

Secondly, the appellant's petition to set aside judgment, which was verified and duly
supported by two affidavits of merit, was grounded on very serious allegations, to wit: that it
was the plaintiff's counsel who prepared and induced the defendant to sign all the pleadings
upon which the assailed decision was based, including and particularly the said defendant's
answer, that the dismissal of the same, in the absence of the petitioner and without affording
him the chance to be heard thereon, indeed was incompatible with the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. This Court is gravely concerned with the truth of the above accusation —
something which, on account of the lower court's precipitate dismissal of the appellant's
petition to set aside judgment is now hidden and undeterminable — particularly because the
very face, tenor, and form of the appellant's alleged answer established a prima facie case,
so to speak, for the petitioner. Thus, the said alleged answer reads in full:

ANSWER

Comes now the defendant, Wenceslao Zubiri alias Ben in his own behalf, and to this
Honorable Court most respectfully states:

1. That the defendant admits the allegations contained in the complaint of the case. 

2. That upon the request and suggestion of the defendant and with the conformity of the
plaintiff and her lawyer, both parties, plaintiff and defendant have agreed to settle the above
entitled case amicably and to submit a STIPULATION OF FACTS for the corresponding
decision, with the aim in view to finish this case as soon as possible, and to avoid troubles in
coming to Iligan City from Cebu City, losing precious time of this Hon. Court and
unnecessary expenses in the future.

Cebu City (for Iligan City) Philippines, May 2, 1959.

(SGD.) Wenceslao (Ben) Zubiri

WENCESLAO ZUBIRI
alias Ben
defendant

A copy of this ANSWER was delivered personally to Atty. C. Jumapao, counsel for the
Plaintiff at Mango Avenue, 470, Cebu City, and another copy was served personally to
defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company, Cebu City, this 2nd day of May, 1959.

(SGD.) Wenceslao (Ben) Zubiri

WENCESLAO ZUBIRI
alias Ben
A mere glance at the above-quoted two-paragraph Answer should have prompted the trial
court to wonder and inquire if the defendant was aware of what he was committing thereby.
The admission in paragraph 1 of the same was so total and unqualified a repudiation of the
defendant's own interest that indeed, especially as it was avowed in the said pleading that
the defendant was unassisted by counsel, the trial court should have insisted upon some
assurance that the defendant was solely and fully accountable therefor. After the defendant
represented under oath that the plaintiff's counsel was the principal author of the same, and
the one who talked him into participating in it, the intervention of the lower court became an
absolute necessity. 

To be sure, the active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending
case in which the said lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical to
say the least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to
represent conflicting interests" (No. 6), and command that —

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel
and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law. (No. 9)

As we have already said in the case of Cantorne v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23, the simultaneous
representation by a lawyer of both parties to a suit constitutes malpractice which should be
severely condemned and the lawyer corrected by disciplinary action. If but for this
consideration alone, the court below should have allowed the motion for postponement
pleaded by the appellant and heard the merits of the latter's petition to set aside judgment. 

Moreover, the affidavits of merit appended to the petition to set aside judgment recited that
the defendant-appellant was seriously sick at the time he was made to sign and swear to the
above three repudiated pleadings. To be sure, no less than the officer before whom the said
pleadings were subscribed and sworn to admitted that this verification was conducted at the
appellant's residence in Cebu where the latter was confined "suffering from fever, with an ice
cap on his head and profusely perspiring." Under the circumstances, therefore, the mental
capacity of the appellant to responsibly assent to commitments set forth in the same three
pleadings became doubtful and the trial court should have exerted its earnest efforts to
resolve the doubt. Especially so when account is taken of the fact that the subject matter of
the suit was not just an insubstantial sum but properties allegedly worth some P165,000.00. 

Finally, one of the grounds invoked by the defendant-appellant in his petition to set aside
judgment was the alleged finality of a judicial decision in which the properties involved in the
above complaint were involved in Special Proceedings No. IL-2 of the Court of First Instance
of Lanao and that the decision in the said case declaring him as the sole heir of his
deceased father, had since become final. In brief, the appellant maintained that inasmuch as
the plaintiff-appellee's claim under her complaint was predicated upon her alleged right as an
heir of the late Jesus Zubiri, the same was barred by the aforesaid judgment which, to
repeat, allegedly held that the defendant-appellant was the sole and only heir of the same
decedent. 

By denying the appellant's petition to set aside judgment, therefore, the lower court failed to
determine the truth and validity of the aforementioned ground. And yet, if it was true that the
plaintiff's complaint was barred by a prior judgment then the order denying the petition to set
aside judgment — in other words, maintaining the decision rendered upon the alleged
 stipulation of another decision that was totally inconsistent and irreconcilable with what was
held, and had become final, under the decision in Special Proceedings No. IL-2, considering
that in this latter case it was held that only the herein appellant was entitled to participate in
the decedent's estate while in the decision upon the alleged stipulation of facts, the appellee
as well was determined to be so entitled to participate. 

Of course, the appellee assails the proceedings under Special Proceedings No. IL-2 as void
on the ground of fraud. She claims that the herein appellant misrepresented in the said case
that the late Jesus Zubiri had no other heir save him even as he knew that she, the plaintiff-
appellee, was another such heir and that she was still living. This does not alter nor diminish
the need for granting the appellant's petition to set aside judgment, however, and hearing the
plaintiff's complaint upon its merits. The vice, if any, in Special Proceedings No. IL-2 may
well be determined at such hearing. 

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below denying the appellant's
petition to set aside judgment is hereby revoked and set aside. Let the said petition be
granted and the plaintiff-appellee's complaint under Civil Case No. IL-219 be heard or tried
on its merits, after the herein appellant shall have been allowed to file his answer or the
necessary responsive pleading thereto. No pronouncement as to costs.

14. Deluao v. Castel

DELUAO v. CASTEEL
G.R. No. L-21906; December 24, 1968
Ponente: J. Castro

FACTS:

In 1940 Nicanor Casteel unsuccessfully registered a fishpond in a big tract of swampy land,
178.76 hectares, in the then sitio of Malalag, municipality of Padada, Davao for 3 consecutive
times because the Bureau of Fisheries did not act upon his previous applications.
  Despite the said rejection, Casteel did not lose interest. Because of the threat poised upon his
position by the other applicants who entered upon and spread themselves within the area,
Casteel realized the urgent necessity of expanding his occupation thereof by constructing dikes
and cultivating marketable fishes. But lacking financial resources at that time, he sought financial
aid from his uncle Felipe Deluao.
Moreover, upon learning that portions of the area applied for by him were already occupied by
rival applicants, Casteel immediately filed a protest. Consequently, two administrative cases
ensued involving the area in question.

However, despite the finding made in the investigation of the above administrative cases, the
Director of Fisheries nevertheless rejected Casteel's application on October 25, 1949, required
him to remove all the improvements which he had introduced on the land, and ordered that the
land be leased through public auction

On November 25, 1949 Inocencia Deluao (wife of Felipe Deluao) as party of the first part, and
Nicanor Casteel as party of the second part, executed a contract — denominated a "contract of
service". On the same date the above contract was entered into, Inocencia Deluao executed a
special power of attorney in favor of Jesus Donesa

On November 29, 1949 the Director of Fisheries rejected the application filed by Felipe Deluao on
November 17, 1948. Unfazed by this rejection, Deluao reiterated his claim over the same area in
 the two administrative cases and asked for reinvestigation of the application of Nicanor Casteel
over the subject fishpond.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources rendered a decision ordering Casteel to be
reinstated in the area and that he shall pay for the improvement made thereupon.
Sometime in January 1951 Nicanor Casteel forbade Inocencia Deluao from further administering
the fishpond, and ejected the latter's representative (encargado), Jesus Donesa, from the
premises.

ISSUE:
Whether the reinstatement of Casteel over the subject land constitute a dissolution of the
partnership between him and Deluao

HELD:

Yes, the reinstatement of Casteel dissolved his partnership with Deluao.

The Supreme Court ruled that the arrangement under the so-called "contract of service"
continued until the decision both dated Sept. 15, 1950 were issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Cases 353 and 353-B. 

This development, by itself, brought about the dissolution of the partnership. Since the
partnership had for its object the division into two equal parts of the fishpond between the
appellees and the appellant after it shall have been awarded to the latter, and therefore it
envisaged the unauthorized transfer of one half thereof to parties other than the applicant
Casteel, it was dissolved by the approval of his application and the award to him of the fishpond.

The approval was an event which made it unlawful for the members to carry it on in partnership.
Moreover, subsequent events likewise reveal the intent of both parties to terminate the
partnership because each refused to share the fishpond with the other.

15. Heirs of Elias Lorilla v. CA

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_118655_2000.html
16. Avelino v. Palaña
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/may1971/am_405_1971.html
17. Diman v. Alumbres

18. Saulog v. Custombuilt Manufacturing Corp.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/nov1968/gr_l-29612_1968.html
19. People v. Casimiro

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 6, Baguio City finding accused-appellant  ALBERT
CASIMIRO guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, §4, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.

The information against accused-appellant alleged that on or about the 17th day of August 1999, the accused (Casimiro), did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2 DOROTHEO SUPA, posing as buyer, about nine
hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Three witnesses’ testimonies (PO2 Supa, Alma Margarita D. Villaseñor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.), established the following:
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of the 14th Regional Narcotics Office in Baguio City
and informed Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng and PO3 Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro was engaged in the
distribution or sale of marijuana. Police Chief Inspector Leleng then formed a buy-bust team with PO2 Supa as poseur-buyer and
PO3 Piggangay, Jr. as one of back-up men.

The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics agents to wait for a call from Casimiro.   True enough, at
around 4:00 p.m., the telephone rang. When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he found that it was accused-appellant
Casimiro. Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa as someone who wanted to buy marijuana. Casimiro allegedly agreed to
meet PO2 Supa at around 1:00 p.m. at Anthony’s Wine and Grocery the following day.   PO2 Supa said he wanted to buy one
kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said it would cost P1,500.00.  Accused-appellant said he would wear white pants
and a black leather jacket to their meeting the following day.

On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went to the grocery store while SPO2 Madlon and PO3
Piggangay waited secretly across the street, where they could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At around 1:30 p.m., Casimiro
arrived.  Rose greeted him, “O Bert, heto na yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer.  Bahala na kayong mag-usap.  Aalis na ako”.
Rose then left the two men alone.

PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana.  Casimiro gave the poseur-buyer a paper bag, which
contained an object wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After determining from its appearance and smell that the object inside
was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up team to make an arrest by combing his hair.  He testified that he no
longer gave the marked money to accused-appellant because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to him his rights, while
the back-up team ran from across the street.

After arresting Casimiro, the policemen took him to the Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay
wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian.  The policemen prepared a booking sheet
and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also prepared a
“receipt of property seized,” dated August 18, 1999.

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. The dried leaves were then examined by forensic
chemist Alma Margarita Villaseñor of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. The chemistry report dated August 20, 1999, signed by
Villaseñor, stated that the leaves were positive for marijuana. 

During trial, the defense alleged that on August 17, 1999, Casimiro received a call from Rose, an acquaintance, and offered to
help him find a better job and asked that they meet at Anthony’s Wine and Grocery.  In the past, Rose had offered to sell him
shabu or marijuana, but he refused to buy from her as he had no money. At around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., he met Rose in front of the
grocery store.  While she talked to him about a job opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay grabbed his hands from
behind even  as he shouted “I-handcuff, i-handcuff. Casimiro was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the policemen,
accompanied by Rose.

At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted Casimiro about the marijuana allegedly seized from him.  Casimiro denied
having carried the bag of marijuana, which he had seen Rose carrying earlier. After taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the
policemen threatened to shoot him if he did not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership of the
marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release Casimiro if he gave them money. When Casimiro replied that he had no money,
PO3 Piggangay said, “If you have no money, then we will work on your papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa.” The policemen
then took accused-appellant to a hospital for a physical examination and afterwards asked him to sign a receipt of property, a
booking sheet, and an arrest report without explaining their contents or allowing him to read them.

On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.   Hence, this
appeal.  

ISSUE: WON the evidence against accused-appellant is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is entitled to great respect, the rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of weight and substance has been overlooked,
 misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. In this case, several such circumstances stand out as having been overlooked
or misapprehended by the lower court which entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.

First.  With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the lower court declared:

The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does not affect the
liability of the accused.  The receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating
procedure in a buy-bust operation to show what property was seized.  The receipt should not be treated as an admission or
confession.

Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was signed by him without the
assistance of counsel. The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer
and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as “suspect/ owner.” In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a
prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the law.   Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be
accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him.  It is inadmissible in evidence. 

In People v. Obrero, this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed by the Constitution to be psychologically
coerced.  Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of a police
interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.

PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while he was being arrested outside the
grocery:

Q:    What else happened after the two members of the team rushed to your place?
A:     We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and brought him to our Narcotics office.

Q:     How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?
A:     Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, “You are under arrest for violation of 6425.  You have the right to remain silent.  You have the rights to
call for a lawyer of your own choice.  Anything you say may be used as evidence in favor or against you.”  And we brought him to the office, sir.

The warning was incomplete.  It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford counsel, one would be
assigned to him.  The warning was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it.  It was
merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the
receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely.  What is more, the police investigators did not
pause long enough and wait for Casimiro to say whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of
counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.

Second.  Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant.  As he points out, he could not have been so
careless as to call the telephone number of the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to the policemen there . Nor
can we believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed place, Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as
the one who wanted to buy marijuana as if the latter were buying something not prohibited or illegal.  While drugs may indeed be
sold to police officers, these transactions are usually done face-to face.  

Third.  The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the  corpus delicti of the
offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related case.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody.  The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa,
SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of marijuana immediately after allegedly
seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did so in their headquarters. The narcotics field test, which
initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics
office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.

Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a buy-bust operation. The government’s drive
against illegal drugs deserves everybody’s support.  But it is precisely when the government’s purposes are beneficent that we
should be most on our guard to protect these rights.  As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, “the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.” Our desire to stamp out criminality cannot
be achieved at the expense of constitutional rights.  For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.

The decision of the RTC Branch 6, Baguio City is REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt. 

20. People v. Nadera, Jr.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/feb2000/gr_131384_2000.html
21. Topacio Nueno v. Santos

http://docshare.tips/lawyers-duties-in-handling-clients-cause-santiago-v-fojas-up-to-visitacion-
v-manit-2_574cb013b6d87fb10a8b5543.html