Implicit Theories Shape Social Cognition

CHAPTER FIVE
Implicit Theories: Assumptions

That Shape Social and Moral
Cognition
Jason E. Plaks1
University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
1
Corresponding author: e-mail address: plaks@psych.utoronto.ca
Contents
1. Implicit Theories: A Definition 261
2. Theories of Trait Stability/Malleability: The Entity/Incremental Dimension 263
3. Part I: Attribution 265
4. Implications for Empathy 268
5. Attributions About Groups 271
6. Attributions About the Self 272
7. Implicit Theories of the Thought–Action Link 274
7.1 The Moderating Role of Implicit Theories 275
8. Interim Summary 277
9. Part II: Person Memory 278
10. The Role of Epistemic Motivations 279
11. Part III: Attention Allocation 287
12. The Double-Edged Sword of Accountability 290
14. Part IV: Encoding Processes 292
15. Theories About Genetic Variation and the Encoding of Race 292
16. Encoding of Theory-Confirming and Theory-Violating Behavior: Neural
Substrates 297
18. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Work 300
References 301
Abstract
Implicit theories are a priori beliefs about the features and properties of objects, includ-
ing humans. In this chapter, I describe research examining the effects of implicit theories
on different points of the social information processing stream. Much of this research
has focused on comparing people with an “entity theory” (the belief that human qual-
ities are fixed) to people with an “incremental theory” (the belief that human qualities
are malleable). I also review research that has focused on people’s theories about
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 56 # 2017 Elsevier Inc. 259

ISSN 0065-2601 All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.02.003
260 Jason E. Plaks
intentionality, as well as their theories about genetics. I describe each type of theory’s
influence on such processes as attention allocation, encoding, retrieval, and attribu-
tional reasoning. I also summarize evidence indicating that the activation of an implicit
theory creates a motivated bias that privileges information that is consistent with the
theory. Taken together, I suggest ways in which taking an implicit theories approach
sheds new light on foundational social information processes.
Social cognition research has yielded a rich and detailed understanding of

many of the discrete processes that comprise person perception, including
attention allocation (e.g., Hashtroudi, Mutter, Cole, & Green, 1984),
behavioral encoding (e.g., Sherman, Conrey, & Groom, 2004), causal attri-
bution (e.g., Weiner, 1985), person memory (e.g., Stangor & McMillan,
1992), and impression formation (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Less
research has investigated how such processes are meaningfully shaped
by laypeople’s a priori assumptions about human traits and behavior. In
this chapter, I will review nearly 20 years of research that has directly
investigated the relation between lay perceivers’ theories and specific
subprocesses that are hallmarks of social cognition. I will present evidence
that different starting assumptions can alter such processes in subtle, but
significant ways.
The notion that basic information processing is influenced by stored
assumptions is not a new idea. von Helmholtz (1910/1962) noted that
the human perceptual system disambiguates ambiguous stimuli with the help
of stored assumptions that yield “unconscious inferences.” For example,
people’s assumptions about color constancy lead them to perceive that snow
possesses uniform whiteness at different times of day, despite vastly differing
levels of luminance. By analogy, social psychologists have argued that when
people observe an actor, they use stored assumptions about human traits and
behavior to effortlessly disambiguate ambiguous behavior and generate
wide-ranging inferences about the actor’s goals, attitudes, beliefs, and desires
(e.g., Gilbert, 1998; Malle & Holbrook, 2012; Todd, Molden, Ham, &
Vonk, 2011; Tskhay & Rule, 2013).
In recent decades, researchers have begun to identify such cornerstone
assumptions of social cognition. Although, in theory, there is infinite variety
in the specific content of such theories, my colleagues and I have suggested
that it is possible—and helpful—to find underlying structural themes to lend
order to the dizzying array. In this respect, we have been inspired by
Weiner’s (1985, 1986) attempt to organize the potentially infinite array of
causal attributions a person might make into three core dimensions (locus,
Assumptions That Shape Social and Moral Cognition 261
stability, controllability). Whereas Weiner focused on relatively downstream

attributional processes, the implicit theories tradition begins one step earlier
by asking, “Where do attributions come from?” In other words, what prior
assumptions predict whether a given perceiver will make, for example, a
“stable” or “unstable” attribution? We have argued that by systematically
measuring and manipulating such upstream starting points, one might better
understand, organize, and predict downstream attributions and judgments
(Burton & Plaks, 2013; Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009).
1. IMPLICIT THEORIES: A DEFINITION

Although implicit theories have been defined in different ways by dif-
ferent researchers, most definitions refer to beliefs about the properties of classes of
objects, including humans. Researchers have regarded implicit theories as
both ontological assumptions and narrative frameworks that help to explain
and organize the social environment (e.g., Levy, Chiu, & Hong, 2006; Levy,
Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001; Plaks, Levy, et al., 2009). In contrast to
constructs such as attitudes and values, which are, by definition, prescriptive
or evaluative, implicit theories are often descriptive and evaluatively neutral.
In contrast to stereotypes, which are beliefs about the traits of specific
groups, implicit person theories are often operationalized as more general
assumptions that apply to most or all of humanity.
To capture these concepts, researchers have invoked a number of largely
interchangeable terms over the years, including “lay theories,” “folk
beliefs,” “naive theories,” and “mindsets.” We use the term “implicit”
because these theories tend not to be clearly developed and articulated in
people’s minds.a
We prefer the term “theory” because, like scientific theories, implicit
theories explain observable phenomena, add conceptual structure, gener-
ate hypotheses, and help to reduce “psychological entropy” (Hirsh,
Mar, & Peterson, 2012). Moreover, continuing the analogy to scientific
theories, implicit theories are rarely tested in an optimal manner. Instead,
laypeople, like scientists, often fall prey to processing biases. These biases
may be nonmotivated, in the sense that they involve ignorance of optimal
a
Our use of the term “implicit” refers to the dictionary definition (“implied though not plainly
expressed”; Implicit, 1989), rather than the technical definition used by social psychologists connoting
“automatic” or “unconscious” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
262 Jason E. Plaks
hypothesis testing procedures (e.g., Wason, 1960), or they may be moti-

vated, in the sense that they invoke defensive or compensatory processes
aimed at reaching desired conclusions (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996;
Kunda, 1990, Pyczczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Indeed, the philosopher
Feyerabend (1978) drew explicit parallels between ordinary human infor-
mation processing biases and professional scientific practices. Later,
I outline several examples of systematic processing distortions associated
with implicit theories.
A good deal of research on implicit theories has been conducted by
developmental psychologists. For example, some researchers have studied
how infants’ naı̈ve understanding of physics constrains their perception of
moving objects and, in turn, aids in the acquisition of knowledge about
the physical world (e.g., Premack, 1990; Spelke, Katz, Purcell, Ehrlich, &
Breinlinger, 1994). Others have examined children’s and adults’ conceptual
understanding of category boundaries and the essential properties of objects
(e.g., Gelman, 2003; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).
In social psychology, researchers of implicit theories have cast a wider
net. For example, investigators have studied people’s intuitive beliefs about:
cause and effect (Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013; Morris & Larrick, 1995),
intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997), justice (Hafer & Bègue, 2005), hap-
piness (Tullett & Plaks, 2016), self-control ( Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010),
catharsis (Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001), the covariation of per-
sonality traits (Schneider, 1973; Srivastava, Guglielmo, & Beer, 2010), group
essence (Haslam & Whelan, 2008; Wittenbrink, Hilton, & Gist, 1998;
Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Schadron, 1997), and even one’s own cognition
(Miele & Molden, 2010; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994).
In each of these domains, researchers have provided evidence that different
starting assumptions—whether experimentally induced or measured as indi-
vidual differences—initiate distinct cascades of processes that result in dis-
tinct sets of judgments.
Much of the work I review in this chapter has focused on people’s the-
ories about the stability/malleability of traits. I will also, however, describe
research in my laboratory that has extended the investigation to theories
about such topics as intentionality and genetics. In each of these domains,
I will provide evidence of how different theories modulate basic information
gathering, storage, retrieval, and judgment processes. I will also summarize
research demonstrating the crucial motivational role that implicit theories
play in creating and maintaining the subjective sense of prediction
competence.
2. THEORIES OF TRAIT STABILITY/MALLEABILITY:

THE ENTITY/INCREMENTAL DIMENSION
Since its introduction to the literature by Carol Dweck and col-
leagues in the mid-1980s, a large body of research has investigated
the effects of the entity and incremental theories (also referred to as the
“fixed” and “growth” mindsets; Dweck, 2006). The entity theory is
the assumption that personal qualities such as intelligence, moral character,
and self-control are largely fixed over time and across situations. According
to this perspective, although individuals may at times exhibit behavior that
is, say, more intelligent than their usual norm, their underlying level of
intelligence remains constant. The incremental theory is the assumption
that personal qualities are changeable through effort, new knowledge, or
inputs from the environment. Typically, the incremental theory assumes
that “change” takes the form of improvement—an idea captured by the
term “growth mindset” (Dweck, 2006). As I will describe later, however,
in certain cases, the change in question is assumed to be change for the
worse.
In much of this research, participants’ general preference for the entity
or incremental theory has been measured using an eight-item question-
naire (the Implicit Person Theories Measure) that operationalizes entity–
incremental endorsement as a single dimension. On this measure, participants
rate their level of agreement/disagreement with statements such as,
“People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they
are cannot really be changed.” (For the complete questionnaire and scoring
method, see Dweck, 1999.) Other researchers, however, have found it
useful to operationalize similar concepts as two independent dimensions
(e.g., “destiny” and “growth” beliefs of romantic relationships; Knee,
1998). Although data from such individual difference measures are typically
analyzed as continuous variables, researchers often use the language of two
distinct groups (“entity theorists” and “incremental theorists”) for the sake
of convenience.
Although there are reliable individual differences in entity–incremental
endorsement, either theory may be temporarily activated (McConnell,
2001; Plaks & Halvorson, 2013). Methods for priming implicit theories
include persuasive written passages (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997;
Plaks & Chasteen, 2013), self-persuasion via autobiographical memories
(Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), and exposure to proverbs reflecting either
264 Jason E. Plaks
theory (e.g., “a leopard never changes its spots”; Poon & Koehler, 2006).
Given such data, several researchers (Burns & Isbell, 2007; Plaks &
Stecher, 2007; Poon & Koehler, 2006) have conceptualized implicit theories
as knowledge structures that follow the principles of knowledge activation
(Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988). In other words, although individuals
may hold a chronic tendency to favor one theory, most people acknowledge
the plausibility of both theories. Thus, persuasive messages may encourage
people to adopt either theory as their working theory, at least temporarily.
The preponderance of evidence suggests that whether theories are measured
at the chronic level or the temporary level, the results turn out to be
equivalent.
A PsycINFO search on November 19, 2016 revealed 1067 publications
reporting effects of entity–incremental endorsement in a broad range of
important behavioral domains. Although much of the work has focused
on measures related to academic performance (e.g., Aronson, Fried, &
Good, 2002; Blackwell, Trzensniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Rattan, Savani,
Chugh, & Dweck, 2015; Yeager et al., 2016), recent entity–incremental
work has extended to such areas as mental health (Burnette, O’Boyle,
Van Epps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013; De Castella et al., 2014; Miu &
Yeager, 2015; Schroder, Dawood, Yalch, Donnellan, & Moser, 2016), con-
sumer behavior (Murphy & Dweck, 2016), organizational behavior
(Keating & Heslin, 2015; Murphy & Dweck, 2010), athletics (Kasimatis,
Miller, & Marcussen, 1996), shyness (Beer, 2002), self-regulation
(Burnette et al., 2013; Job et al., 2010), intergroup conflict (Halperin,
Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011), and sexual behavior
(Bohns, Scholer, & Rehman, 2015; Maxwell et al., 2017). In general
(though not always, see Park & Kim, 2015), endorsement of the incremental
theory is associated with more adaptive outcomes (e.g., higher academic
performance, less emotional dysfunction).
This chapter takes a more circumscribed focus: the effects of implicit the-
ories on social information processing. I will review studies demonstrating
effects of implicit theory endorsement on different points in the social infor-
mation processing stream, including attention allocation, visual encoding,
retrieval, and attributional reasoning. I will describe evidence indicating that
the activation of an implicit theory creates a bias that privileges information
that is consistent with the theory and deemphasizes information that is
inconsistent with it. The review begins with relatively downstream pro-
cesses (attribution, memory) and then progresses upstream toward processes
such as attention and encoding.
3. PART I: ATTRIBUTION
A central theme of the entity–incremental literature is that entity the-
orists are more inclined than incremental theorists to view underlying traits
as principal causes of behavior. For example, a student’s low score on a test is
presumed to be a direct consequence of his low intelligence. From the incre-
mental perspective, the causes of a given actor’s behavior are more varied
and less enduring. Candidates include intrapsychic forces such as feelings,
goals, and beliefs. From the entity perspective, such dynamic psychological
processes are mere effects or epiphenomena of underlying dispositions.
Initial evidence for these ideas came from Chiu et al. (1997, Study 3),
who asked participants to rate numerous behaviors on their moral good-
ness/badness and the degree to which each behavior reflected the actor’s
good/bad moral character. Chiu et al. found that entity theorists rated
the behaviors significantly more indicative of the actor’s true personality
than did incremental theorists. This difference was evident for both morally
positive and negative behaviors. Moreover, when the actor performed even
a single behavior, entity theorists made more extreme predictions about the
actor’s future behavior (Chiu et al., 1997, Study 2). Poon and Koehler
(2006) found similar results when the entity and incremental theories were
manipulated experimentally.
We (Molden, Plaks, & Dweck, 2006) took these ideas a step further by
pinpointing where in the process entity and incremental theorists diverge,
according to stage models of dispositional inference (e.g., Gilbert,
Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986). Participants made judgments about
a target person’s traits when provided with information about the situation
that could plausibly explain the observed behavior (e.g., a person acting anx-
iously while talking on camera about her sexual fantasies). Participants
observed the target person while memorizing an eight-digit number (high
cognitive load) or without memorizing the number (low cognitive load). As
depicted in Fig. 1A, Molden et al. (2006) found that under low cognitive
load, both entity and incremental theorists performed situational
discountingb—i.e., they took the nature of the situation (stressful vs mundane)
into account when rating the actor’s trait anxiety. Under high cognitive
b
According to Kelley (1973), people use the discounting principle when they give less weight to a particular
cause if there are other plausible causes simultaneously present. People use the augmentation principle
when they give more weight than usual to a particular cause if there are other constraints that reduce
the likelihood of the effect simultaneously present.
266 Jason E. Plaks
A
8
7.5
6.5
Mundane situation
Stressful situation
6
5.5
5
Entity—Low Entity—High Incremental—Low Incremental—High
cognitive load cognitive load cognitive load cognitive load
B
6.5
5.5
Calm actor
Anxious actor
5
4.5
4
Entity—Low Entity—High Incremental—Low Incremental—High
cognitive load cognitive load cognitive load cognitive load
Fig. 1 (A) Ratings of actor’s trait anxiety as a function of implicit theories, topic of con-
versation, and cognitive load (Molden et al., 2006, Study 1). (B) Ratings of the anxiety of
the situation as a function of implicit theories, trait anxiety of the actor, and cognitive
load (Molden et al., 2006, Study 2).
load, however, entity theorists were more likely than incremental theorists
to explain the target’s behavior in terms of her underlying trait anxiety. In
other words, high cognitive load prevented entity theorists from accessing
information about the situation, but did not impede incremental theorists,
who continued to attribute the actor’s behavior to the situation. Thus, the
pattern reported in well-known studies by Gilbert et al. (1988) was repli-
cated for entity theorists, but not for incremental theorists.
A second study (Molden et al., 2006, Study 2), however, revealed a fur-
ther complication. In this study, Molden et al. reversed the task so that par-
ticipants were asked to rate how anxious the situation was given the actor’s
high/low trait anxiety. In this case, it was the incremental theorists whose
access was blocked by cognitive load (see Fig. 1B).
These data indicated that incremental theorists are not simply more rig-
orous than entity theorists. Instead, different starting assumptions elicit dif-
ferential sensitivity to different types of information. Incremental theorists
“go the extra mile” to access information about the situation because they
consider such information more dynamic and changeable, and therefore
more diagnostic. In contrast, entity theorists go the extra mile to access
information about traits because they consider such information more fixed
and unchanging, and therefore more diagnostic.
It is a mistake, however, to assume that incremental theorists never
invoke traits. In fact, incremental theorists’ higher sensitivity to dynamic,
contextual influences on behavior may, in certain cases, lead them to make
the more extreme trait attributions. Molden et al. (2006, Study 3) hypoth-
esized that the extremity of entity and incremental theorists’ trait attributions
under high cognitive load should depend on whether the information about
the situation discounts or augments the implied trait (Kelley, 1973).
As predicted, when situational information discounted the implied trait
(e.g., anxious behavior in a stressful situation), high cognitive load incre-
mental theorists’ trait attributions were attenuated (i.e., discounted),
whereas those of high cognitive load entity theorists remained firm. How-
ever, when situational information augmented the implied trait (e.g., anxious
behavior in mundane situation), high cognitive load incremental theorists’
trait attributions were, in fact, more extreme (i.e., augmented) than those of
high cognitive load entity theorists. According to Molden et al. (2006), this
is because incremental theorists, to a greater extent than entity theorists,
acknowledge that norm-conforming behavior is not diagnostic of the indi-
vidual’s underlying character, whereas norm-violating behavior is indicative
of the individual’s personality (i.e., the Law of Noncommon Effects; Jones &
268 Jason E. Plaks
Davis, 1965). Entity theorists, in contrast, attributed the cause of the behav-
ior to the actor’s personality to an equivalent degree, regardless of whether
the situation called for discounting or augmentation.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPATHY

Does the fact that entity and incremental theorists follow different
attributional pathways translate into meaningful interpersonal conse-
quences? To begin to answer this question, recent research has examined
entity–incremental differences in cognition, emotion, and behavior associ-
ated with empathy (Schumann, Zaki, & Dweck, 2014; Tullett & Plaks,
2016).
The literature on empathy has focused on cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses that occur in the perceiver’s mind and brain after a suffering individual
has been encountered. For example, Weiner’s (1980) “cognition (attribution)–
emotion–action” model proposed that attributing the target’s plight to stable,
uncontrollable causes activates feelings of sympathy and, in turn, a higher
likelihood of helping. More recently, Gill, Andreychik, and Getty (2013)
demonstrated that external (vs internal) attributions were associated with
higher empathy toward members of an outgroup.
But what leads people to “land on” one particular attribution over
another? Much of the research on empathy has been relatively silent on this
question. Recently, researchers have suggested a potential answer: implicit
theories (Schumann et al., 2014; Tullett & Plaks, 2016). These researchers
have argued that observers bring preexisting theories with them into each
potential help-giving situation. Such theories shape observers’ attributions
and, in turn, behavior toward individuals in need. For example,
Schumann et al. (2014) found that those with an incremental theory of
empathy (i.e., one’s empathic capacity can be developed) displayed more
empathic cognitions and emotions and provided more help toward suffering
individuals than did those with an entity theory of empathy. This was the
case even when providing help required difficult emotional investment.
Why did this occur? In one study (Schumann et al., 2014, Study 7), partic-
ipants with an incremental view of empathy expressed a greater interest in
improving their empathy. According to Schumann et al.’s account, most
people acknowledge that empathy can be difficult—that one could always
empathize more. Such widespread acknowledgement of the difficulty of
empathy is evident in the literature on the “collapse of compassion,” in
which people display less compassion toward many victims than toward one
victim (Cameron & Payne, 2011). However, the belief that empathic capa-
city can be cultivated appears to encourage people to face (rather than avoid)
the difficult experience of empathy. From the incremental perspective, dif-
ficult experiences and negative emotions are sometimes necessary stepping-
stones to growth. From the entity perspective, difficult experiences and
negative emotions are a signal that one simply does not have what it takes
to empathize with the victim.
More recently, Tullett and Plaks (2016) focused not on beliefs about
empathic capacity, but beliefs about happiness. Why beliefs about happiness?
We reasoned that the empathy situation is an encounter with an unhappy
person. The perceiver’s calculation of whether providing help is a wise
expenditure of money, time, and emotional strain should be influenced
by an assessment of whether the help will, in fact, improve the target person’s
happiness. To answer that question, the perceiver needs to invoke his or her
underlying assumptions about the mutability and controllability of happiness
itself.
In this work, we expanded the palette of theories beyond the entity–
incremental dimension. Taking inspiration from Weiner (1980), we created
and validated an individual difference measure of beliefs about happiness
along three dimensions of causality: locus (internal/external), flexibility
(corresponding to entity/incremental), and controllability (controllable/
uncontrollable). Importantly, according to Weiner’s (1985, 1986) frame-
work, these three dimensions are conceptually and empirically orthogonal.
To illustrate the independence of flexibility and controllability, consider the
following examples about Bob, who works for a mean boss. If Bob’s hap-
piness level is low, it might change for the better (i.e., be flexible) due to
controllable causes (he leaves to work for another company) or to uncon-
trollable causes (the mean boss leaves the company). If Bob’s happiness level
starts high, it might remain fixed (i.e., be inflexible) due to controllable cau-
ses (he leaves to work for another company) or to uncontrollable causes (the
mean boss leaves the company).
We suspected that distinguishing among locus, flexibility, and control-
lability would yield distinct sets of empathy-related attributions. For
instance, many people subscribe to the popular notion that happiness
“comes from within.” In other words, happiness is less a question of finding
the right external circumstances (e.g., the right job, the right house) than of
adopting the right internal frame of mind. How might such a belief relate to
empathy? To the extent that an internal (vs external) theory is associated
270 Jason E. Plaks
with perceptions of target responsibility, attributing a person’s unhappiness

to an internal source should reduce observers’ willingness to help.
How might flexibility (entity–incremental) beliefs relate to empathy?
One might think that viewing happiness as fixed would predict higher
empathy. According to this logic, if a person’s level of unhappiness is ulti-
mately unalterable, there should be little grounds to blame that person for
his or her unhappiness. Data from several sources, however, provide evi-
dence for the opposite: a positive relation between flexibility beliefs and
empathy. For example, Miller, Burgoon, and Hall (2007) found that,
compared with incremental theorists, entity theorists judge wrongdoers
more harshly, due in part to their greater tendency to generate stable trait
attributions. In a similar vein, Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1999)
found that entity theorists used a more person-centered form of judgment
when determining a defendant’s guilt/innocence. Entity theorists may
believe that just as a person who commits an immoral act is a chronically
immoral person, a person who is unhappy right now is a chronically
unhappy person.
How might belief in the controllability of happiness predict empathy?
On the one hand, the association could be positive if people who consider
happiness controllable tend to believe optimistically that unhappy people
can change their emotional state through force of will. On the other hand,
the association could be negative if people who consider happiness control-
lable assign personal responsibility to people who are unhappy.
To test which of these hypotheses would be best supported by the data,
we developed and validated the Lay Theories of Happiness Scale (LTHS).
(For the scale items and validation details, see Tullett & Plaks, 2016, Studies
1a–1b.) On the LTHS, participants rate their level of agreement with state-
ments such as “In reality, happiness depends mostly on the environment a
person lives in” (locus), “Although happiness can change in the short term,
it stays pretty much the same in the long term” (flexibility), and “Everyone
has the power to make themselves happier” (controllability).
In one study, participants read a vignette describing one person’s expe-
rience with depression. We selected depression as the form of suffering
because there is no clear popular consensus about whether depression stems
from internal vs external, stable vs flexible, and controllable vs uncontrolla-
ble sources. After completing items assessing empathy toward the target, par-
ticipants were given the opportunity to donate a portion of their
participation payment (from $0.00 to $0.50 in $0.05 increments) to support
depression research.
The data revealed that belief in the flexibility of happiness was positively
correlated with perspective taking (a component of empathy; Davis, 1983)
and negatively correlated with blame of the target (associated with low
empathy; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). In contrast, belief in the controllability
of happiness was negatively correlated with perspective taking and positively
correlated with blame. Moreover, in one study (Tullett & Plaks, 2016,
Study 3), belief that happiness is controllable was associated with smaller
donations to depression research. Finally, belief that happiness is internal
was negatively associated with perspective taking.
In summary, Tullett and Plaks (2016) provided evidence that individual
differences in a priori assumptions about the properties of happiness predict
distinct patterns of empathy-related reasoning. Importantly, the data indi-
cate that when it comes to implicit theories, the three classic dimensions
of attribution (locus, flexibility, controllability) are not collapsible. Instead,
each exerts its own measure of independent, predictive power. For example,
believing that happiness is flexible is associated with higher empathy. Indeed,
such a belief might be a prerequisite for empathy; if happiness cannot change,
providing help is pointless. In contrast, believing that happiness is control-
lable predicted lower empathy. Why? It appears that people with this belief
hold that the unhappy person had the power to improve his or her emotional
state but failed to do so. Such a perception of squandered opportunity vio-
lates “just world” beliefs (Hafer & Bègue, 2005) and thus encourages moral
condemnation.
5. ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT GROUPS

Many of the attributional processes studied with respect to individual
targets apply to group targets as well. For example, Pettigrew (1979) noted
that perceivers often seek to characterize groups in terms of underlying dis-
positions with insufficient regard for situational forces, a practice he termed
“the ultimate attribution error.” Although there is clear evidence that groups
are associated with different degrees of inherent “entitativity” (Lickel et al.,
2000), studies in the entity–incremental tradition have focused on variability
between perceivers, rather than differences between targets (Plaks, Levy,
Dweck, & Stroessner, 2004).
Levy et al. (1998) were the first to document entity theorists’ greater
endorsement of ethnic and gender stereotypes, greater tendency to ascribe
group differences to biological (vs environmental) sources, and higher esti-
mates of group homogeneity. Levy et al. (1998) provided evidence that these
272 Jason E. Plaks
entity–incremental differences were not due to differential intelligence, knowl-

edge about the groups in question, or experience with the groups in question.
Moreover, Levy et al. (1998) found analogous effects when the theories
were manipulated experimentally, rather than measured at the individual
differences level.
Later work by Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, and Mackie (2007)
operationalized the entity–incremental construct explicitly with respect to
groups. In one study, they altered the wording of the entity–incremental
questionnaire so that it referred to groups, rather than individuals. They
found that, like the individual-focused measure, the group-focused measure
predicted stereotype endorsement (for lawyers and mechanics). Unlike the
individual measure, the group measure also predicted perceptions of group
entitativity (i.e., entity theorists were more likely to perceive group mem-
bers to possess shared goals). These perceptions of entitativity, in turn, medi-
ated the relation between implicit theories and stereotype endorsement.
More recently, Neel and Lassetter (2015) reported that, in general, partic-
ipants considered the target group “younger people” more malleable than
“older people.” Moreover, variation in beliefs about the malleability of older
people predicted endorsement of learning-based services for seniors.
Do different beliefs about the fixedness/malleability of groups affect atti-
tudes outside the laboratory, with participants in an ongoing intergroup
conflict? Halperin et al. (2011) collected samples of Jewish Israelis, Palestin-
ian citizens of Israel, and Palestinian West Bank residents. These researchers
found that those with incremental beliefs about groups in general (without
mentioning the groups involved in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict) expressed
more positive attitudes toward their respective outgroup and were more
willing to make compromises in the name of peace. Moreover, in two of
the studies, entity–incremental beliefs were manipulated using written text,
yielding results that were equivalent to the individual difference results.
These results were recently replicated and extended (Goldenberg et al.,
2017). These results represent a hopeful approach to making headway
toward resolving seemingly intractable intergroup conflicts.
6. ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT THE SELF

Much of the literature on attribution has focused on people’s expla-
nations for the behavior of others. One of Weiner’s (1980, 1985) insights
was that people use similar processes when analyzing the causes of their
own behavior. Many of the studies in the implicit theories tradition have
similarly found analogies between the attributions entity and incremental

theorists make about others and the attributions they make about them-
selves. Much of this work has examined how the implicit theory-to-
attribution sequence predicts the academic performance of school age and
undergraduate students (e.g., Aronson et al., 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007;
Rattan et al., 2015; Yeager et al., 2016). In recent years, my colleague
and I have, for the first time, examined whether similar processes occur with
older adults.
Plaks and Chasteen (2013) examined whether older adults’ entity/incre-
mental theories about memory would influence their memory performance.
With older adults, however, the conceptualization of “entity” and
“incremental” takes on a different form. We assumed that older adults do
not associate the future with improved cognitive performance. Instead, they
generally assume a high likelihood of cognitive decline. Thus, the entity per-
spective would hold that memory decline is a biologically based, fixed inev-
itability. In contrast, the incremental perspective would hold that the rate of
decline is modifiable via, for example, mental exercises or medical interven-
tions. Thus, it is, in fact, the entity theorists who believe that the trait in
question will change (for the worse), and it is the incremental theorists
who believe that it can remain relatively constant.
We examined whether older adults hold such notions about the modi-
fiability of the decline in their cognitive abilities. More importantly, we
examined whether variation in such beliefs would predict participants’ actual
performance on commonly used tests of memory. We hypothesized that the
entity belief in the fixedness of the downward trajectory would help to foster
a self-fulfilling prophecy of poorer memory performance, whereas the incre-
mental belief in the modifiability of that trajectory would help to foster a
comparatively positive cycle leading to higher performance.
Plaks and Chasteen (2013) tested this hypothesis with three studies. In
two of the studies, implicit theories were measured at the individual differ-
ences level. To do so, we created a modified version of the standard Implicit
Person Theories Measure that worded the items in terms of aging and mem-
ory (e.g., “No matter how old you are, you can change your memory ability
considerably”). In another study, we sought to manipulate implicit theories.
To do so, we created two versions of a mock New York Times article. The
entity version touted new research indicating evidence of neuronal degener-
ation. In other words, the brain’s tendency to deteriorate (without the cre-
ation of new neurons) suggests that cognitive decline is an inevitability. The
incremental version touted new research indicating evidence of neuronal
274 Jason E. Plaks
regeneration. In other words, the brain’s ability to create new neurons suggests
that rapid cognitive decline is not an inevitability.
In all three studies, participants completed common memory tasks such
as recall of words or digits. In all three studies, incremental theorists out-
performed entity theorists. Why did this occur? One contributing mediator
appears to be anxiety. In one study in which we measured participants’ emo-
tions, the difference between entity and incremental theorists was mediated
by self-reported anxiety.
Thus, this work may begin to provide an explanation for the stereotype
threat effects found in older adults (e.g., Chasteen, Bhattacharya, Horhota,
Tam, & Hasher, 2005; Hess, Hinson, & Hodges, 2009). As with undergrad-
uates (Aronson et al., 2002), a starting assumption of trait fixedness means
that one’s score on a test is a reflection of whether one “has it” or not. In
other words, there is more riding on each test. This introduces a degree
of anxiety that, in turn, impairs performance. In contrast, starting with
the assumption of malleability means that each test is viewed as a marker
of one’s progress. Because the test score is not taken as a deep-seated reflec-
tion of an unchangeable ability, there is less riding on each test. Thus, incre-
mental theorists adopt a comparatively serene approach to the test which, in
turn, may translate into higher performance.
7. IMPLICIT THEORIES OF THE THOUGHT–ACTION LINK

In recent years, my students and I have examined another important
but understudied element of attribution: intuitions about intentionality.
An assessment of the focal act’s degree of intentionality lies at the heart of
classic and contemporary theories of attribution (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965;
Reeder, 2009), law (e.g., Duff, 1990; Hart, 1968), and moral judgment
(e.g., Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Malle, Guglielmo, &
Monroe, 2014; Young & Saxe, 2009).
In many cases, however, the distinction between an “intentional” and
“unintentional” act is not immediately obvious. For example, imagine that
John wishes to kill his uncle. He drives his car to his uncle’s house in order to
kill him, but on the way, a pedestrian accidently strays into the path of his
car. John hits and kills the pedestrian. The pedestrian turns out to be his
uncle. How do people handle such a situation? More generally, how do peo-
ple calculate the degree to which an act was performed intentionally,
unintentionally, or somewhere in between?
We have suggested that laypeople mentally divide intentionality into two

independent dimensions: one that focuses on the means (proximal intent)
and one that focuses on the end (distal intent) (Plaks, Fortune, Liang, &
Robinson, 2016; Plaks, McNichols, et al., 2009; Plaks & Robinson,
2015). In a series of studies, we have provided evidence that laypeople con-
sider each type of intent independently. That is, “keeping one’s eye on the
prize” (distal intent) is distinct from focusing on the mechanics of successful
execution (proximal intent).
In several studies, Plaks, McNichols, et al. (2009) manipulated both
forms of intent, using between-subjects and within-subjects designs. In
one study, all participants read about an actor ( J.G.) who desired to murder
his uncle to gain inheritance money (motive), believed he could murder his
uncle, formed a plan to murder his uncle, and had the skill to murder his
uncle. In all cases, J.G. caused his uncle’s death by running over his uncle with
a car. What differed among the scenarios was the degree to which proximal
and distal intent were present in J.G.’s mind during the act. In the Both High
condition, J.G. was explicitly thinking about killing his uncle at the moment
when he pressed the accelerator with precision and control and ran over his
uncle. In the Distal Intent Higher condition, J.G. was explicitly thinking
about killing his uncle at the moment when he accidentally pressed the
accelerator instead of the brake and killed an unknown pedestrian who
turned out to be his uncle. In the Proximal Intent Higher condition, J.G.
was thinking about his favorite song at the moment when he pressed the
accelerator with precision and control, killing an unknown pedestrian
who turned out to be his uncle. In the Both Low condition, J.G. was think-
ing about his favorite song at the moment when he accidentally pressed the
accelerator instead of the brake, killing an unknown pedestrian who turned
out to be his uncle.
After reading these scenarios, participants rated J.G. on moral responsi-
bility, blame, negativity, and how intentional the action was. We found that
participants rated the Both High actor most culpable, the Both Low actor
least culpable, and the Distal Intent Higher and Proximal Intent Higher
actors partially culpable (and equivalent to each other). This general pattern
of two main effects has been replicated in all subsequent studies (N > 2000).
7.1 The Moderating Role of Implicit Theories

The more interesting question to us, however, was whether different
implicit theories about the link between thought and action might
276 Jason E. Plaks
systematically moderate this basic pattern. One prevalent theory in Western

culture is that people’s deepest desires inevitably become expressed in action;
there is a slippery slope between wanting and acting. This idea finds expres-
sion in laypeople’s understanding of psychoanalytic thought—e.g., the con-
cept of the “Freudian slip” or the notion that “there are no accidents.” At the
same time, an opposing theory is also commonplace: people have the power
to exert control over their desires and prevent the corresponding action from
occurring. The Western assumptions of individual autonomy and free will
most likely contribute to such a belief. Given that both beliefs are intuitive to
most people, Plaks, Levy, et al. (2009) and Plaks, McNichols, et al. (2009
Study 3) hypothesized that it would be possible to temporarily prime either
theory via persuasive written passages.
Participants randomly assigned to the Lay Psychoanalyst condition read a
passage containing text such as, “No wish or desire stays unexpressed for
long. In short order, the suppressed wish will slip out in behavior.” Partic-
ipants assigned to the Cognitive Control condition read a passage containing
text such as, “Although our desires exert a powerful pull, we are able to defer
and control our thoughts and behavior.” Next, participants read one of four
scenarios about an actor who committed a homicide with proximal and dis-
tal intent independently varied. Dependent variables included participants’
ratings of the actor’s moral responsibility and culpability.
As predicted, the two groups did not differ in the Both High and
Both Low conditions. However, in the Distal Intent Higher condition,
the lay psychoanalysts rated the target more culpable than did the cognitive
control theorists. Also as predicted, in the Proximal Intent Higher condi-
tion, the effect reversed as the cognitive control theorists rated the actor
more culpable than did the lay psychoanalysts. This pattern is presented
in Fig. 2.
In other words, priming a psychoanalytic theory appeared to activate the
notion that thoughts unavoidably spill over into action. Thus, the most
important moral consideration is whether a malevolent aim (i.e., distal
intent) was active in the actor’s mind at the moment of the act. In contrast,
priming a cognitive control theory appeared to activate the notion that,
through willpower, people can block malevolent wishes from turning into
malevolent actions. In other words, this theory holds that evil thought is not
a crime; the most important moral consideration is whether the actor pro-
duced the corresponding act with awareness and control (i.e., proximal
intent). In summary, different theories about the relation between thought
and action shifted participants’ focus to different aspects of intent. These
Both high Distal intent higher Proximal intent higher Both low
5
4.5
3.5
3
Psychodynamic theory Cognitive control theory
Fig. 2 Ratings of actor’s moral responsibility as a function of the actor’s proximal and
distal intent and observers’ implicit theories (Plaks, Levy, et al., 2009; Plaks, McNichols, &
Fortune, 2009, Study 3).
shifts led to systematic and meaningful divergences in judgment, divergences

that hold significant moral and legal implications.
8. INTERIM SUMMARY
Different implicit theories about human traits and behavior underlie
distinct patterns of attribution. For example, starting with the assumption
of trait fixedness (the entity theory) encourages the use of traits as the cur-
rency of attribution. According to the entity perspective, if traits are fixed,
they are meaningful, causal influences on behavior. In contrast, starting with
the assumption of trait malleability encourages the use of dynamic causes
such as goals, emotions, and situational cues. For incremental theorists, these
are the real causes of behavior. Similarly, starting with the assumption that
malevolent thoughts inevitably “leak out” into behavior encourages a moral
system that prioritizes those prior thoughts. In contrast, starting with the
assumption that people can, through the application of mental control, pre-
vent thoughts from turning into the corresponding behavior, encourages a
moral system that prioritizes the action itself.
Attributions are relatively downstream products of the processing chain.
What processes help to generate and sustain attributions? Do implicit theo-
ries systematically affect such intermediary processes as well? For example,
278 Jason E. Plaks
do implicit theories systematically alter the kinds of information that people

remember? Might implicit theory-related differences in memory contribute
to the differences in attribution described in Part I? We turn next to research
that addresses this question.
9. PART II: PERSON MEMORY

Jane has a reputation for being good at math. One day at a restaurant,
she expertly demonstrates an advanced mathematical proof to her friends.
Later, however, she cannot calculate how much tip to leave. Which behav-
ior will leave a greater impression on her friends: the trait-consistent behav-
ior or the trait-inconsistent behavior? Since its inception in the late 1970s,
the literature on Person Memory has used a range of methods to generate
influential models to address this question (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979;
Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998; Srull, 1981; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992). Certain approaches have suggested that people generally
display an “incongruency effect,” or a memory bias toward trait- or
stereotype-inconsistent behavior, such as an intelligent person displaying
unintelligent behavior (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Sherman et al., 1998;
Srull, 1981). According to such approaches, trait- or stereotype-inconsistent
behavior is inherently more attention-grabbing and stimulates higher effort
to verify and understand it (e.g., Sherman et al., 1998). In contrast, other
models have suggested that trait-based expectancies and stereotypes enable
consistent information to be processed more efficiently and elaborately,
while inconsistent information is “filtered” out (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988;
Miller & Turnbull, 1986). The end result of such processes is a
“congruency effect.”
With some studies pointing to an incongruency effect and others to a
congruency effect, Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, and Sherman (2001) examined
whether considering perceivers’ implicit theories might offer a measure of
reconciliation. We hypothesized that entity theorists, with their assumption
of trait fixedness, would find trait-consistent behavior to be especially mean-
ingful and diagnostic. After all, such behavior helps to maintain and solidify
both the perceived accuracy of the expectation and the larger notion that
people are, in fact, generally fixed. In contrast, we suggested that incremen-
tal theorists, with their assumption of trait malleability, would find trait-
inconsistent behavior especially meaningful and diagnostic (Bassok &
Trope, 1984). After all, scrutinizing a person’s unexpected behavior may
lend important nuance to their evolving impression of the person, an

impression that is comparatively open to change and even contradiction.
To test this hypothesis, in one study, we presented participants with a
randomized list of positive and negative behaviors about a person named
Robert who was described as either a skinhead (connoting negative moral
character) or a priest (connoting positive moral character). In another study,
participants read the same list of behaviors, but they were attributed to mem-
bers of an unnamed group that was explicitly described as either “friendly,
kind, and considerate” or “unfriendly, unkind, and inconsiderate.” In the
latter study, implicit theories were manipulated, rather than measured as
an individual difference variable. In both studies, participants later com-
pleted a surprise recognition memory test in which the task was to indicate
which behaviors had been presented previously and which were new behav-
iors. The dependent measure was recognition accuracy (the ability to dis-
criminate hits from false alarms).
In both studies, entity theorists showed a clear congruency effect: better
ability to discriminate hits from false alarms for stereotype-consistent behav-
iors than for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Incremental theorists, in
contrast, if anything, displayed an incongruency effect. [This pattern was
later replicated by Plaks, Grant, and Dweck (2005).] Of note, this pattern
was particularly evident under conditions of depleted processing capacity
(high cognitive load). According to Plaks et al. (2001), when perceivers
are operating with depleted resources, they are especially likely to draw
upon their stored theories about traits to guide their processing.
Such data suggest that when entity theorists observe a trait- or
stereotype-inconsistent act such as a skinhead behaving kindly, they repre-
sent the anomalous behavior as an uninformative aberration that is not wor-
thy of extensive cognitive elaboration. In contrast, incremental theorists
appear to be comparatively attracted to such behavior, perhaps due to its
higher informational value, or diagnosticity (e.g., Bassok & Trope, 1984).
Thus, understanding a person’s anomalous behavior as the consequence
of dynamic, mediating processes implies that closer attention to trait-or
stereotype-inconsistent information may yield a richer, context-sensitive
portrait of this particular individual.
10. THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC MOTIVATIONS

In subsequent studies, Plaks et al. (2005) examined whether these diver-
gent patterns might be due not only to “cold” processes (e.g., assumptions
280 Jason E. Plaks
about informational value), but to “warm” processes, as well. What motiva-

tions might be involved? We have argued that the fundamental need to main-
tain a sense of prediction competence may play a central role (Burton & Plaks,
2013; Plaks, Levy, et al., 2009; Plaks & Stecher, 2007).
Increasingly, social and personality psychologists have documented the
role epistemic motivations play in everyday social cognition. Updating clas-
sic concepts such as “effectance” (White, 1959), “intolerance of ambiguity”
(Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), and cognitive dissonance reduction (Festinger,
1957), contemporary researchers have demonstrated that the human need
to maintain a structured, orderly psychological environment results in mea-
surable compensatory processes when such structure is upset (e.g., Kay,
Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010; Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015;
Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; Xu, Plaks, & Peterson, 2016). Might such processes
play a role in the congruency/incongruency memory effects displayed by
entity/incremental theorists? Specifically, might all people—both entity
and incremental theorists—be highly motivated to preserve their theory
in the face of countervailing evidence? Might they engage in motivated
processing distortions to accomplish this task? If so, this would suggest that
incremental theorists are not necessarily more methodical or insightful pro-
cessors than are entity theorists. Instead, each group engages in parallel forms
of motivated processing distortions in response to information that violates
their respective theories.
We have tested these ideas in several ways. First, Plaks et al. (2005)
adapted the paradigm used in Plaks et al. (2001) by creating and validating
two varieties of stereotype-consistent behaviors and two varieties of
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. These behaviors varied along two
dimensions, labeled “trait” and “associate.” “Trait” behaviors were con-
sistent and inconsistent with the defining trait of the target. “Associate”
behaviors were consistent and inconsistent with the actor’s stereotypic pref-
erences and tendencies, without speaking to the defining trait. To illustrate,
consider Brad, a stereotypic “math geek” who is strong in math/sciences
but weak in the humanities/arts. A “consistent:trait” behavior would be
“Brad scored a 790 Math, 420 Verbal on the GRE.” An “inconsistent:
trait” behavior would be “Brad scored a 420 Math, 790 Verbal on the
GRE.” A “consistent:associate” behavior would be “Brad eagerly awaited
the Star Trek marathon on TV.” An “inconsistent:associate” behavior
would be “Brad eagerly read his volume of Shakespeare sonnets.” In sev-
eral studies, we have presented such information to participants. In addi-
tion, prior to the presentation of the behaviors, participants read that Brad
enrolled in a remedial course designed to strengthen his academic weak-

nesses. This added information allowed for a potential violation of the
incremental theory. (No previous studies in the Person Memory litera-
ture, to our knowledge, had included this element of potential improvement
in the expectation setup for the target.) If participants read that Brad
sincerely underwent the remedial course, but showed no improvement,
this would violate the incremental theory’s assumption that abilities are
changeable.
We hypothesized that if the divergent congruency/incongruency effects
of entity and incremental theorists described by Plaks et al. (2001) are driven
in part by motivated processes, then such effects should be more pronounced
for behaviors that directly support or contradict their respective assumptions
about trait fixedness or malleability (the “trait” behaviors) than for behaviors
that do not (the “associate” behaviors). This is what we found. For example,
in one study (Plaks et al., 2005, Study 2), under high cognitive load, entity
theorists displayed greater recognition sensitivity to consistent:trait behav-
iors than to inconsistent:trait behaviors, but no preference for consistent:
associate behaviors vs inconsistent:associate behaviors. At the same time,
incremental theorists displayed greater recognition sensitivity to inconsis-
tent:trait behaviors than to consistent:trait behaviors, but no preference
for consistent:associate behaviors vs inconsistent:associate behaviors. In
other words, as depicted in Fig. 3A, each group displayed memory distor-
tions only toward information that directly confirmed/violated their respec-
tive theories.
At times, however, theory-violating information may be too clear and
emphatic to plausibly avoid. In such cases, perceivers may adopt an alterna-
tive means of motivated processing: debunking (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, &
Chen, 1996; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998).
Attitudes researchers have raised the distinction between approach and
avoidance forms of defense (e.g., Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes,
1999). Building on data indicating that passive, attentional avoidance strat-
egies are more resource independent (MacLeod, Matthews, & Tata, 1986)
than active, debunking strategies (Ditto et al., 1998; F€ orster,Higgins, &
Strack, 2000), we hypothesized that if perceivers were provided with clear,
unambiguous, theory-violating information and plentiful processing
resources, they would intensify their scrutiny of such information. This
added scrutiny would translate into added memorability. The result would
be a reversal of the typical effect: an incongruency effect for entity theorists
and a congruency effects for entity theorists.
282 Jason E. Plaks
A
6
0
Entity theorists Incremental theorists
Trait:consistent Trait:inconsistent Associate:consistent Associate:inconsistent
0
Entity theorists Incremental theorists
Trait:consistent Trait:inconsistent Associate:consistent Associate:inconsistent

0
Fig. 3 (A) High cognitive load recognition accuracy (d ) as function of type of informa-
tion and perceivers’ implicit theory (Plaks et al., 2005, Study 2). (B) Low cognitive load
recognition accuracy (d0 ) as function of type of information and perceivers’ implicit the-
ory (Plaks et al., 2005, Study 2).
In one study (Plaks et al., 2005, Study 2), we tested this idea by adding an
extremely low cognitive load condition. Sentences in this condition were
presented for eight seconds at a time (compared to four seconds plus a con-
current eight-digit memorization task in the high load condition). We found
that in the low load condition, the effects reversed, as predicted (See
Fig. 3B). In other words, when afforded the time and opportunity, partic-
ipants did not avoid information that violated their theory, but instead
devoted extra scrutiny to such information, presumably with the intent of
verifying or debunking such information. (Compare Fig. 3B to A.)
In another study (Plaks et al., 2005, Study 3), we approached the ques-
tion of motivated responses to theory violation from a different angle. Mul-
tiple research groups have demonstrated that when people experience a loss
in subjective prediction confidence, they engage in more thorough
information-gathering processes in order to restore their sense of prediction
and control mastery (e.g., Pittman & D’Agostino, 1989; Weary, Jacobson,
Edwards, & Tobin, 2001). We argued that if implicit theories truly are cen-
tral to people’s subjective sense of prediction mastery, when their operating
theory has been contradicted, they should initiate rigorous processing aimed
at restoring this sense of mastery.
To test this idea, we adapted a paradigm used by previous researchers to
assess the efforts of control-deprived participants to regain a subjective sense
of mastery (D’Agostino & Pittman, 1982). In this task, participants’ task is to
estimate the proportion of trials on which their button press controls
whether the stimulus on the screen (a row of As) changes (to a row of
Bs). Participants are permitted to observe as many trials as they wish before
making their estimate. According to the logic of the task, forming an accu-
rate prediction should be particularly important to control-deprived people,
given that detecting patterns of covariation represents a central piece of pre-
diction and control mastery (Anderson, 1995; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000).
Thus, the experience of control deprivation should lead participants to
engage in more methodical and systematic information gathering as a means
of restoring subjective prediction competence.
We reasoned that if theory violation undermines subjective prediction
competence, then when incremental theorists, for example, learn that a
math geek, after taking a rigorous remedial course, still scored a 420 on
the Verbal GRE (reflecting an inability to learn new skills), they should take
more trials before rendering their estimate. Similarly, when entity theorists
learn that a math geek scored poorly on the Math GRE (reflecting incon-
sistency in his core, defining trait), they should intensify their compensatory
effort on the control estimation task.
Participants were informed that “Brad” was either a math/sciences geek
or an “artsy/humanities type.” Participants were also informed that Brad
enrolled in a remedial course to improve his academic weaknesses. This
284 Jason E. Plaks
established the possibility of improvement or nonimprovement that would

confirm or violate the incremental theory. Participants were randomly
assigned to read one of four behaviors performed by Brad (consistent:trait,
inconsistent:trait, consistent:associate, inconsistent:associate).
Next, they performed the control estimation task, the main dependent
measure. Participants were instructed that after viewing a number of trials,
their task was to estimate the percentage of trials on which they had control
over whether the As turned into Bs. (The actual percentage was 35%.) Par-
ticipants were instructed to sample both the “press” and “not-press” options.
They were told that they could take as few or as many trials as they wished.
Once they felt they had collected enough information, they could feel
free to press the Esc key to end the program. The program recorded the
number of trials taken by each participant before providing an estimate
(on a 0%–100% scale).
As predicted, entity theorists took more trials when faced with inconsis-
tent:trait behavior than with consistent:trait behavior. Also as predicted,
incremental theorists took more trials when faced with consistent:trait
behavior than with inconsistent:trait behavior. In this case, because the pro-
tagonist in the vignette was given an opportunity to change, consistent:trait
behavior indicated a failure to change (e.g., Brad the math geek who failed to
improve his English writing skills). In other words, a failure to change,
despite the desire and opportunity, would represent evidence of “too much”
trait consistency—a state of affairs that violates the incremental theory’s
assumption that people can alter their abilities. Finally, neither entity nor incre-
mental theorists exhibited differences in trials taken after reading associate:
consistent vs associate:inconsistent behaviors. Thus, both groups showed
motivated responses only toward information that directly supported or
violated their respective theories.
Additional data indicated that both entity and incremental theorists
reported corresponding increases in anxiety only in their respective
theory-violating conditions, and in no other conditions. These data demon-
strated that motivated processing distortions are not limited to entity theo-
rists. Instead, both entity and incremental theorists appear to be bothered by
information that violates their respective theories.
In subsequent work, Plaks and Stecher (2007) found an analogous pat-
tern when the target person was not “Brad” the fictional math geek/artsy
type, but the participant him or herself. In three studies, participants took
three iterations of a short “intelligence test” (actually the Remote Associa-
tions test; Mednick, 1962). The aim on this task is to find the commonality
among three words (e.g., BOOK-HOOK-APPLE [answer: WORM]).

Between Test 1 and Test 2, participants were given a lesson filled with help-
ful pointers on how to improve at the task. Then participants were randomly
assigned to one of three false-feedback conditions. In the “decline” condi-
tion, participants’ percentile performance declined from Test 1 to Test 2
(62%–29%). In the “no change” condition, participants’ performance
remained static (62%–61%). In the “improve” condition, participants’ perfor-
mance improved from 62% to 91%. Dependent measures included number
of trials taken on the control estimation task described earlier, self-reported
affect (including anxiety), and performance on Test 3.
Plaks and Stecher (2007) found that both entity and incremental theorists
reacted strongly—and predictably—to feedback that violated their respec-
tive theories. As presented in Fig. 4A, when entity theorists were faced with
A B
40 4
Entity Entity
Incremental Incremental
3.5
30
3
20 2.5
2
10
1.5
0 1
Decline No change Improve Decline No change Improve
C
10
9
8
7
Entity
6 Incremental
5
4
3
2
1
0
Decline No change Improve
Fig. 4 (A) Mean trials taken on control estimation task as a function of type of feedback
and implicit theories (Plaks & Stecher, 2007, Study 1). (B) Self-reported anxiety as a func-
tion of type of feedback and implicit theories (Plaks & Stecher, 2007, Study 1). (C) Test 3
performance as a function of type of feedback and implicit theories (Plaks & Stecher,
2007, Study 3).
286 Jason E. Plaks
evidence of declining performance, they (compared to incremental theo-

rists) took more trials on the control estimation task. In addition, they
reported a greater rise in anxiety (Fig. 4B). Moreover, in one study
(Plaks & Stecher, 2007, Study 3), these affective and cognitive consequences
influenced participants’ subsequent behavior; entity theorists in this condi-
tion performed worse than incremental theorists on a third iteration of the
test (Fig. 4C). This is consistent with previous studies demonstrating entity
theorists’ plunging affect and expectations following poor academic perfor-
mance (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; Mueller & Dweck, 1998).
However, when participants’ performance remained static despite the
lesson aimed at improvement, it was incremental theorists who took more
trials on the control estimation task, felt more anxiety, and ultimately per-
formed worse on a third iteration of the test. Why? Relentlessly unchanging
performance, even despite the effort and opportunity to improve, violates
the incremental theory’s assumption that people can improve their skills
and talents. Indeed, incremental theorists reported feeling more anxious
after unchanging performance than after declining performance. These data
suggest that the most troubling state of affairs to an incremental theorist is to
be “stuck in a rut.”
Finally, for participants in the improvement condition, entity theorists
(relative to incremental theorists) again displayed greater anxiety, took more
trials on the control estimation task, and performed worse on the next test.
Note that this does not mean that entity theorists prefer not to improve.
Indeed, their rise in self-reported anxiety was accompanied by a parallel rise
in self-reported happiness. However, unexpected improvement can be truly
destabilizing as the individual attempts to understand how the success
occurred in order to maintain the new performance level going forward
(Where did I go right?). Such results find echoes in research demonstrating
that individuals often display surprising resistance to good news about them-
selves or their group (e.g., Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007; Swann,
Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992).
To summarize, these data speak to the power of the fundamental human
drive to maintain a subjective sense of order, predictability, and control
(Landau et al., 2015; White, 1959; Xu et al., 2016). The Plaks and
Stecher (2007) data suggest that terms such as “improvement,” “stasis,”
and “decline” are not objective, numeric givens. Instead, the meaning of
different performance trajectories over time is shaped by each individual’s
implicit theoretical framework. For example, no change in performance
may be subjectively viewed as either theory-confirming stasis (for entity
theorists) or theory-violating failure to change (for incremental theorists).

Even improvement may be viewed as theory-confirming (for incremental
theorists) or theory-violating (for entity theorists).
The Plaks et al. (2005, 2001) data also suggest significant ways of recon-
ceptualizing the literature on Person Memory. First, moving beyond main
effects (i.e., a general congruency effect or incongruency effect), this work
suggests that it is useful to consider consistency implicit theory interac-
tions. That is, different starting assumptions about the mutability of human
traits effectively predict who will exhibit a congruency effect and who will
exhibit an incongruency effect. Second, these data suggest that laypeople do
not necessarily define behavioral consistency with respect to the expectancy
or stereotype furnished by the experimenters. Instead, they define consis-
tency with respect to their own intuitive theories of human behavior. That
is, theory-consistent/inconsistent behavior is more motivationally engaging
than garden variety, stereotype-consistent/inconsistent behavior (Plaks
et al., 2005). As I describe next, this phenomenon extends to earlier points
in the processing stream.
11. PART III: ATTENTION ALLOCATION

In order to be encoded and remembered, behavior must be attended
to. However, with a virtually infinite array of potential targets of attention at
any given moment, people’s cognitive system must make difficult decisions
about where to shine the attentional spotlight. How do people make such
decisions? To be sure, inherent features of a stimulus (e.g., size, brightness,
novelty) can make it more vs less attention-grabbing. However, there is
increasing evidence that motivational variables on the perceiver end also
play an important role in directing the spotlight toward certain types of
information and away from others (e.g., Calcott & Berkman, 2014;
Friedman & F€ orster, 2005; Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008).
In several studies, we have investigated whether the motivation to confirm
one’s active theory (entity or incremental) might similarly bias attention in
systematic ways.
In one early study (Plaks et al., 2001, Study 1), we assessed attention allo-
cation using an attentional probe paradigm (Hashtroudi et al., 1984;
Sherman et al., 1998). Participants read a randomized series of kind, unkind,
and neutral behaviors performed by someone identified as either a skinhead
or a priest. During the presentation of nine of the sentences (three from each
type), the computer emitted a tone. Participants’ task was to press the
288 Jason E. Plaks
spacebar as quickly as possible upon hearing each tone. According to the

logic of this task, when people are highly engaged with the stimulus on
the screen (the actor’s behavior) at the moment of the tone, their reaction
time is slower than that of people who are not as engaged. This task assumes
that when perceivers are highly engaged with a stimulus, it requires more
effort (and time) to disengage and redirect one’s attention elsewhere.
Plaks et al. (2001, Study 1) found that entity theorists’ reaction times to
the tone were slower when the tone sounded during trait-consistent
behaviors than during trait-inconsistent behaviors. In other words, entity
theorists’ congruency effect extended to the attention allocation stage. In
contrast, incremental theorists’ reaction times were slower when the tone
sounded during trait-inconsistent behaviors than during trait-consistent
behaviors. In other words, incremental theorists’ incongruency effect
manifested itself at attention allocation as well. This pattern was later
replicated using different target groups (Plaks et al., 2005; Plaks &
Halvorson, 2013).
Plaks et al. (2001, Study 3) attempted a conceptual replication of this
effect using a classic attention allocation paradigm: dichotic listening
(Cherry, 1953). To set up the initial expectations about the target’s traits,
participants were provided with information about two 10-year-old boys.
One boy’s grades and teachers’ comments suggested low intelligence, the
other suggested average intelligence. Participants were told that they would
hear the boys simultaneously taking an oral exam in geography, one child in
each ear of headphones. The cover story stated that the task was meant to
simulate the real-life attention demands of a teacher in a crowded classroom.
Participants’ task was to accurately track the performance of each child by
ticking marks in the appropriate column on a piece of paper. Participants
were told to skip questions that they did not hear.
All of the questions on the oral exam had clear, objective answers that
undergraduates would be expected to easily know (e.g., “Is Georgia in
the north or south of United States?”). One advantage of this paradigm is
that it involved direct attention to the target’s ongoing stream of behavior,
rather than the impoverished, secondhand behavioral descriptions typically
provided in studies of this nature. Afterward, participants answered several
questions assessing their impressions of the boys.
The performance of the target child (with the poor prior track record)
was varied across three conditions. In one condition, he answered 13 of
20 correct (moderate performance), in a second condition, he answered
16 of 20 correct (good performance), and in the third, he answered 19 of
the 20 items correctly (outstanding performance). In all conditions, the neu-

tral boy (left ear) answered 14 of 20 items correctly. In other words, in the
moderate and good conditions, participants heard the target boy provide a
mix of trait-consistent and -inconsistent behavior. In the outstanding con-
dition, however, they heard almost exclusively trait-inconsistent behavior.
The primary dependent variable was the number of checkmarks partic-
ipants made in the column representing the target child. More marks were
taken to indicate greater attention. The second dependent variable was par-
ticipants’ rating of the target’s academic potential on a 1–12 scale.
The results revealed a clear divergence between entity and incremental
theorists. Entity theorists’ attention to the target displayed a linear decline as
his performance became increasingly trait-inconsistent. In contrast, incre-
mental theorists’ attention to the target remained constant regardless of
his performance. How did this difference in attention translate into judg-
ments of the target’s ability? Incremental theorists’ judgments of the target’s
intelligence became gradually more favorable, commensurate with his
improving performance. In contrast, entity theorists’ judgments of the target
remained static across the moderate and good conditions (Ms ¼ 6.67 and
6.53, respectively), before increasing significantly in the outstanding condi-
tion (M ¼ 9.28), P < 0.001.
This pattern suggests that entity theorists attempted to preserve their ini-
tial (low) opinion of the target for longer than incremental theorists did. Spe-
cifically, when the target scored 16/20, entity theorists paid less attention
than incremental theorists to his performance and rated him less positively.
However, it is also clear that entity theorists were not delusional. When
faced with a critical mass of counter-expectant information (19/20), they
evinced a willingness to revise their initial, negative impression.
These data shed light on how people’s largely unconscious decisions
about attention allocation help to actively shape the pool of evidence avail-
able for making person judgments. For entity theorists, trait-consistent
information (Brad scored a 790 on the math GRE and 460 on the verbal)
is also theory-consistent information (i.e., a confirmation of the assumption
that people’s intelligence does not vary). But when incremental theorists
learn about someone who sincerely wishes to improve, has the opportunity
to improve, but still remains the same, such trait-consistent information is
theory-inconsistent. These data suggest that what truly engages people’s
motivated processing is not so much a desire to confirm a narrower stereo-
type, but a desire to confirm their broader theories of human traits. In sub-
sequent studies, my colleagues and I found that, in certain cases, exposure to
290 Jason E. Plaks
theory-inconsistent information may, in fact, lead people to “double down”

on their theory. One such case involves accountability.
12. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability refers to the expectation that one will be called upon to
explain or justify a decision or conclusion. Accountability is widely assumed
to induce more careful, systematic decision-making procedures that result in
less bias. Indeed, early studies provided evidence for accountability’s
debiasing effect. For example, Tetlock reported that accountability reduced
primacy effects in impression formation (Tetlock, 1983) and the magnitude
of the fundamental attribution error (Tetlock, 1985). Subsequent work,
however, revealed a more complex picture as studies reported evidence that
accountability can exacerbate certain processing biases (Bodenhausen,
Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Lambert, Cronen, & Chasteen, 1996; Lambert
et al., 2003).
Plaks and Halvorson (2013) hypothesized that an analysis that included
perceivers’ implicit theories might provide some measure of reconciliation
to the conflicting findings. In particular, we examined whether accountabil-
ity would differentially influence the way entity and incremental theorists’
process stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information. Do
the congruency and incongruency effects revealed by Plaks et al. (2005,
2001) disappear when there is a mandate to process each incoming piece
of information rigorously and even-handedly? Alternatively, do perceivers
engage in subtle, motivated processing strategies that “tip one’s hat” toward
objectivity while at the same time preserving or even strengthening their
processing preferences?
To test which hypothesis would be better supported by the data, Plaks
and Halvorson (2013) used the attentional probe task used in Plaks et al.
(2001), but with an accountability manipulation included. Half of the par-
ticipants were instructed that after reading the target’s behaviors, they would
be asked to state and justify their opinion of the target in a conversation with
other people. The other half received no such instructions. As in previous
studies, participants responded to a tone that sounded during randomly
selected stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors per-
formed by “Brad,” a stereotypic “math geek.” After reading all of the behav-
iors, participants rated Brad’s mathematical and verbal intelligence (among
14 other traits).
First, in the nonaccountable condition, Plaks and Halvorson (2013) rep-

licated the attention allocation pattern of Plaks et al. (2005, 2001): a congru-
ency effect for entity theorists and an incongruency effect for incremental
theorists. What happened when accountability instructions were intro-
duced? Entity theorists’ congruency effect was eliminated, while incremen-
tal theorists’ incongruency effect remained. Thus far, the data might seem to
suggest that accountability reduced bias for entity theorists, but not incre-
mental theorists.
When we examined participants’ judgments of Brad’s traits and abilities,
however, the picture became more complicated. Accountability led entity
theorists to a more stereotypic judgment of the target, whereas incremental
theorists’ judgments remained equivalent whether they were accountable or
nonaccountable. Thus, taken together, accountability led entity theorists to
pay more attention than they otherwise would have to information that was
inconsistent with the stereotype and, in turn, their theory of trait fixedness.
However, this added attention did not lead them to attenuate their impres-
sions of the target. In fact, it made their impressions more extreme. Why
might this be?
In a second study, Plaks and Halvorson (2013) investigated a possible
mechanism: social judgeability, or the metacognitive sense of feeling entitled
to judge a person (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992). Several studies have
demonstrated that people generally believe that person judgments are more
valid when they are based on at least a minimum quantity of specific, indi-
viduating information (Leyens et al., 1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Corneille,
1998). We suspected that to the extent that accountable entity theorists sense
that they have acknowledged the existence of stereotype-inconsistent infor-
mation, this activates a subjective sense of legitimacy for stereotype-driven
judgments. Thus, in Study 2, we measured social judgeability by asking par-
ticipants questions such as: “To what extent do you feel that you are making
an informed judgment about Brad?” and “To what extent do you feel enti-
tled to make judgments about Brad’s traits based on the information you
have received?”
The pattern of participants’ judgments of Brad replicated the pattern in
Study 1: The introduction of accountability led entity theorists’ judgments
to become more extreme but did not affect the judgments of incremental
theorists. As predicted, this effect was mediated by social judgeability: the
more entitled entity theorists felt to judge the target, the more extreme their
judgments became. This pattern suggested that accountability caused more
(rather than less) bias in entity theorists’ judgments because it encouraged a
292 Jason E. Plaks
superficial form of attention to stereotype-inconsistent information. At the

same time, the metacognitive experience of having done their due diligence
strengthened their sense that the judgment was based on evenhanded data-
gathering procedures. This sort of increased judgmental extremity due to
increased self-credibility has been documented in the literature on attitudes
(e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Williams, Bourgeois, & Croyle, 1993;
Wood & Eagly, 1981) and other areas of motivated cognition (e.g.,
Ditto & Lopez, 1992; F€ orster et al., 2000; Sherman, Stroessner,
Conrey, & Azam, 2005). Put differently, “preemptive self-criticism” may
have disguised “defensive bolstering” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
13. INTERIM SUMMARY

Implicit theories help the attentional system to identify which pieces
of information to approach and to avoid. As such, people are able to shape
the pool of “data” about a target person from which to generate judgments.
However, these studies also demonstrate that the relation between attention
and judgment is subtle and complex. Attentional exposure to theory-
violating information can at times strengthen the conviction with which
one holds one’s theory.
14. PART IV: ENCODING PROCESSES

People are often forced to face stimuli that are not easy to avoid
through shifting attention. In this section, I describe research on how
implicit theories influence encoding processes once the spotlight of attention
has landed on a particular stimulus. I will provide evidence that implicit the-
ories systematically shift processes at this stage, as well. In so doing, I will
continue to describe research with the entity and incremental theories.
But I will begin with research on a related lay theory construct: beliefs about
genetics.
15. THEORIES ABOUT GENETIC VARIATION AND THE

ENCODING OF RACE
In recent years, my collaborators and I have begun further explora-
tions of intuitions that may be associated with—and may even help to
buttress—the entity and incremental theories. Several researchers have
reported that laypeople find fixedness rooted in biological/genetic
explanations to be particularly compelling (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine,

2006; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; for a recent review, see Heine,
Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, & Proulx, 2017). We have conducted a research
program that seeks to uncover in more detail what people believe about
genetics and race and how such beliefs may come to influence basic encoding
and memory processes.
The complete mapping of the human genome in 2001 enabled scientists
to measure human genomic variability with unprecedented precision. Ana-
lyses of large data sets containing human genomic data from around the
world have yielded between-group genomic variability estimates as low
as 0.1% (see Fujimura et al., 2014; Ossorio & Duster, 2005). Such findings
have led many geneticists to question the usefulness of race as a biological
construct.
Laypeople often see things differently. My colleagues and I have found
that laypeople’s estimates of between-group genetic variability tend to aver-
age around 45% (Kang, Plaks, & Remedios, 2015; Plaks, Malahy, Sedlins, &
Shoda, 2012). This is consistent with the well-documented tendency to
view racial groups as “natural kinds” (Keller, 2005; Rothbart & Taylor,
1992). It appears that people view DNA as a, if not the, mechanism through
which racial essences are created (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Heine et al.,
2017). In many respects, DNA has replaced medieval notions of blood as the
transmitter of biological information across generations (Fredrickson, 2002).
We have found that people possess widely differing theories about what
the genomic record actually says about human genetic variation. A “low
genetic overlap” theory holds that although people with different ancestral
origins may share enough DNA to qualify as members of the same species,
the genetic differences are significant and meaningful. These differences are
assumed to be expressed across a range of physical traits (e.g., skin and hair
color) and personality traits (e.g., intelligence, aggression). In contrast,
others hold the “high genetic overlap” theory. According to this theory,
genetic similarity between individuals is already so close to the 100% ceiling
that any added effect of group membership is inconsequential. Thus, those
with the high genetic overlap theory consider traditional race categories to
be of little use when it comes to understanding specific individuals.
We typically assess genetic overlap beliefs (GOBs) by asking participants
to provide a numeric estimate between 0% and 100% on questions such as,
“If you were to draw two people at random from the whole world’s pop-
ulation, what percentage of genetic material would they have in common?”
In all studies conducted so far, the distribution of estimates of genetic overlap
294 Jason E. Plaks
tends to be bimodal with a mean around 55%. We have investigated whether

variability in these genetic overlap estimates predicts differential encoding of
monoracial and biracial human faces (Kang et al., 2015; Plaks et al., 2012).
A target person’s racial identity can often be ambiguous. How do per-
ceivers deal with such ambiguity? There is evidence that perceivers often
treat racially ambiguous faces like they treat any other kind of perceptually
ambiguous stimulus (e.g., a Necker cube); by rapidly and efficiently slot-
ting such faces into one of the two competing racial categories (e.g.,
Halberstadt, Sherman, & Sherman, 2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008).
At the same time, the data also reveal significant individual differences
in this tendency (e.g., Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003;
Malahy, Sedlins, Plaks, & Shoda, 2010). Some perceivers, it appears, oper-
ate with a less binary, either/or form of racial categorization, one that
allows for incremental gradations.
Rather than treating such individual difference variation as noise, my
colleagues and I examined whether implicit theories about genetic overlap
would predict participants’ continuous vs discrete racial categorization. In
Plaks et al. (2012, Study 1), we collected participants’ estimates of intergroup
genetic overlap and presented them with a series of faces that had been dig-
itally morphed to vary continuously between Black and White. We tested
whether GOBs would predict the degree to which subjective racial catego-
rization conformed to the objective change in racial composition.
Why might different assumptions about genetic overlap predict differ-
ences in the racial categorization of faces? Plaks et al. (2012) suggested that
the assumption that races are genetically distinct (low genetic overlap) cre-
ates a perceptual expectancy of clear boundaries between categories. This
either/or threshold encourages perceivers to “shoehorn” ambiguous targets
into one category or the other. In contrast, the high overlap theory assumes
that racial categories are comparatively permeable. Thus, high overlap par-
ticipants should be less inclined to assimilate ambiguous faces into a defined
category.
We tested this hypothesis by using a version of the “two-back,” short-
term memory task (Smith, Jonides, Marshuetz, & Koeppe, 1998). This task
assumes that once a face has been encoded as a member of one category, it
becomes more easily confusable with same-category faces than with cross-
category faces. Thus, the dependent measure was participants’ pattern of
confusion rates.
Participants were presented with two types of stimuli, faces and numbers.
The faces were randomly drawn from a continuum of digitally morphed
faces: 0% Black–100% White, 16.67% Black–83.33% White, 33.33% Black–

66.67% White, 50% Black–50% White, 66.67% Black–33.33% White,
83.33% Black–16.67% White, and 100% Black–0% White. On the first trial,
a randomly selected stimulus (e.g., a 66.67% Black face) was presented for
1000 ms. On the next trial, a randomly selected stimulus of the other type
(e.g., the number 3) was presented for 1000 ms. This alternating sequence
continued for an average of 93.13 trials per participant. (The total number of
trials varied slightly from participant to participant, because we set the pro-
gram to conclude only after each participant had viewed all of the 49 possible
sequences of faces at least once.) On each trial, the target (either a number or
a face) remained on the screen until the participant pressed a key indicating
whether it was the same as the previous stimulus of that type. For example, if
the stimulus on a given trial was a face, participants’ task was to indicate
whether it was identical to the last face presented. We calculated confus-
ion rates for each of the six pairs of neighboring faces on the continuum
(e.g., confusions between 100% Black and 83.33% Black, confusions
between 83.33% Black and 66.67% Black, etc.).
The results revealed, first of all, that participants gave widely varying esti-
mates of genetic overlap (range ¼ 5%–100%) with a mean of 56.01%
(SD ¼ 41.62). We found that this variable predicted striking differences in
where along the Black–White continuum participants made their confusion
errors. The error rate of the low overlap group was highly influenced by the
racial composition of the faces [quadratic contrast: F ¼ 79.41, P < 0.001,
η2 p ¼ 0:68]. In contrast, this effect was significantly smaller for the high
overlap group [quadratic contrast: F ¼ 9.38, P < 0.01, η2 p ¼ 0:18]. In other
words, the lower the estimate of genetic overlap, the more likely participants
were to confuse perceived Black faces with other perceived Black faces and
perceived White faces with other perceived White faces. They were less
likely to confuse perceived Blacks with perceived Whites. This suggests that
these participants’ short-term memory for a given face was meaningfully
influenced by racial cues. This pattern reflects a more dichotomous represen-
tation of the categories Black and White. In contrast, high overlap partici-
pants’ confusion rates were not as strongly affected by the faces’ racial
percentage. This suggests that their memory for each face was (compared
to low overlap participants) based less on racial cues and more on individu-
ating features. It should be added that these results could not be explained by a
relation between participants’ estimates of genetic overlap and other predic-
tors of stereotyping such as political orientation and Need for Cognition.
296 Jason E. Plaks
In another study (Kang et al., 2015, Study 2), we addressed this idea from
a different angle, using a paradigm reported by Halberstadt and Winkielman
(2014). Halberstadt and Winkielman found that, in general, people are
slower to classify biracial faces than monoracial faces. We suspected that this
effect would be especially strong for people with low GOBs (relative to peo-
ple with high GOBs). Presumably, the expectation of clear-cut category dif-
ferences established by the assumption of low genetic overlap would render
biracial faces more of a challenge to processing fluency—one that would
translate into longer reaction times as participants attempted to solve the cat-
egorization puzzle.
Participants viewed a series of faces on the computer screen. Some of the
faces were monoracial (White or East Asian), some were biracial morphs.
Participants in one condition (the Race Classification condition) were
instructed on each trial to press one key if the face was Caucasian and another
key if the face was Asian. Those in the Emotion Classification condition
were instructed on each trial to press one key if the person presented on
the screen was “feeling positive” and the other key if the person was
“feeling negative.” Immediately after each classification, participants were
asked to rate the attractiveness of the face just presented (1 “not
attractive”…9 “very attractive”). Half of the participants completed the
genetic overlap questionnaire prior to the session, half completed the ques-
tionnaire at the end.
We again found a high degree of variability in participants’ estimates of
genetic overlap (M ¼ 51.28%, SD ¼ 35.78). How did this variability affect
response times on the classification task? As presented in Fig. 5, when
1900
1800
1700
1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
Biracial targets Monoracial targets
High overlap belief Low overlap belief

Fig. 5 Mean response times in milliseconds to categorize biracial and monoracial faces
as a function of genetic overlap beliefs (Kang et al., 2015, Study 2).
the task was to classify the target’s race, we found that the lower the estimate
of genetic overlap between two humans randomly selected from the whole
world, the higher the response time to classify biracial faces. Genetic overlap
estimates did not influence response times to categorize the monoracial faces.
Also as predicted, genetic overlap estimates did not predict response
times to categorize the faces’ emotional states. Finally, genetic overlap esti-
mates did not predict differences in ratings of the faces’ attractiveness. In
other words, as hypothesized, the effect of GOBs was restricted to racial clas-
sification. Belief in lower genetic overlap was associated with experiencing
greater difficulty when racially classifying biracial (but not monoracial) faces.
In other studies (Plaks et al., 2012, Study 2; Kang et al., 2015, Study 3),
we successfully manipulated GOBs using mock scientific articles that partic-
ipants read with a reading comprehension cover story. The high overlap
article described evidence indicating that humans share 99.9% of their
genome. The low overlap article described evidence indicating that humans
share 21.4% of their genome. The results in both studies hewed closely to the
results we obtained with the individual differences measure.
The finding that GOBs are rather easily manipulable suggests that lay-
people’s intuitions about genetics and race are not firm. Because people gen-
erally recognize their lack of knowledge about genetics, they appear
receptive to material that teaches principles and findings of population
genetics. These data suggest a promising approach to reducing racial bias.
For example, media reports about genetics typically report the discovery
of a “gene for X.” Such reports place the focus on interindividual and inter-
group differences (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). They typically fail, how-
ever, to report that such differences occur within the minuscule portion of
the genetic spectrum that is nonoverlapping. Thus, an intervention that
focuses participants on the high degree of human genetic overlap, rather
than the small amount of difference, may promote the tendency to classify
all humans in the same biological category. More generally, these studies
indicate that laypeople’s quantitative theories about the genetics of race
are an important predictor of early, largely implicit categorization and
encoding processes.
16. ENCODING OF THEORY-CONFIRMING AND THEORY-

VIOLATING BEHAVIOR: NEURAL SUBSTRATES
Thus far, I have described behavioral evidence, using a wide range of
paradigms, for the powerful effects of implicit theories on basic attention,
298 Jason E. Plaks
encoding, retrieval, and judgment processes. In recent years, we have

increasingly turned to the neurophysiological level of analysis to shed further
insight on specific microprocesses underlying such effects.
For example, Xu and Plaks (2015) adapted the paradigm of Plaks et al.
(2005) to fit the specifications of electroencephalography (EEG). An advan-
tage of EEG over traditional social cognition paradigms is its temporal acu-
ity; it can register brain activity occurring as little as 10 ms after stimulus
onset. As such, it is ideal for assessing instantaneous responses to expectancy
violations, including implicit theory violations.
An important question left unanswered by Plaks et al. (2005) and Plaks
and Stecher (2007) concerned the specific cognitive processes that people
marshal when faced with theory-violating information. Specifically, do peo-
ple attempt to fit the incoming information into their theory (akin to the
Piagetian concept of “assimilation”) or do they attempt to adjust their theory
to fit the incoming information (akin to “accommodation”)? Fortunately,
decades of research on EEG has established reliable associations between
specific classes of waveforms and specific integrative processes. For example,
the N400, a negative-going waveform peaking around 400 ms after stimulus
that is primarily found in frontal regions, is commonly taken as a marker of
effort to integrate incoming inconsistent information into existing schemas
(e.g., Debruille, 2007; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011)—i.e., assimilation.
In contrast, the P300 is often linked with “context updating” processes, in
which the individual’s schema is updated in working memory in light of new
information (Coulson, King, & Kutas, 1998; Donchin & Coles, 1988;
Osterhout, Kim, & Kuperberg, 2012)—i.e., accommodation.
Xu and Plaks (2015) presented participants with the expectation that
“Brad” was a math geek. Participants were further informed that Brad sin-
cerely put high effort into a remedial course aimed at improving his reading
and writing skills. Then participants read a randomized list of 200 behaviors
performed by Brad, while an EEG system recorded their continuous neural
activity. The behaviors were divided into four types: stereotype-consistent
(e.g., “Brad developed plans to create a robot last year”), stereotype-
inconsistent (e.g., “Brad enjoys discussing literature at parties),” neutral
(e.g., “Brad ate lunch in the school cafeteria”), and semantically anomalous
(e.g., “Brad reads the hamburger every morning before he goes to school”).
Xu and Plaks found that, compared to incremental theorists, entity the-
orists displayed more pronounced frontal N400 responses to stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors. In contrast, incremental theorists exhibited more
pronounced frontal N400 responses than entity theorists to stereotype-

consistent behaviors. The two groups did not differ in their responses to
neutral or semantically anomalous behaviors. Nor did the two groups
exhibit differences in P300 activity in response to any type of behaviors.
In other words, entity and incremental theorists exhibited differential
N400 responses only toward information that directly violated their respec-
tive theories. These data provided no evidence of P300 effects despite a sam-
ple large enough to detect a small effect with 90% power. Taken together,
this pattern suggests more evidence for the “assimilation” route than the
“accommodation” route. Most perceivers—whether incremental or entity
theorists—appear to confront theory-violating information by activating
processes aimed at shoehorning such information into the confines of their
theory.
What would it take to activate processes involving actual change in one’s
theory? Although people are generally resistant to theory change, a critical
mass of irrefutable theory-violating information can weaken such resistance.
This is evident in the Plaks et al. (2001, Study 4) data in which entity the-
orists were ready and willing to abandon their fixed view of the target’s low
intelligence in the condition when he scored 19/20 on a test. Such counter-
theoretical behavior may exert even greater impact if linked with an alter-
native theory that provides an intuitive explanation for the new data. In
other words, lay scientists may behave much the way professional scientists
behave. As the philosopher Kuhn (1962) noted in his work on “paradigm
shifts,” scientific communities are generally hostile to new data that contra-
dict the prevailing paradigm, but often come to accept the new data once a
plausible, intuitive, theoretical alternative emerges.
In addition to a sincere desire to hold the “correct” theory, people may
selectively adopt either the entity or the incremental theory for self-
enhancing reasons. For example, Leith et al. (2014) reported that partici-
pants’ responses on entity–incremental measures shifted toward the incre-
mental end of the scale following threatening performance feedback or
recall of a failure episode. Presumably, shifting toward a more malleable view
cushions the blow of negative feedback by implying that improvement is
possible. More recently, Steimer and Mata (2016) reported that participants
rated a personal quality as more malleable if it was described in an unfavor-
able (vs favorable) manner. Such data indicating that implicit theory
endorsement has a motivated component can further enhance the litera-
ture’s understanding of theory activation.
300 Jason E. Plaks
17. INTERIM SUMMARY

Implicit theories affect not only perceivers’ placement of the atten-
tional spotlight but also the labels perceivers affix to a stimulus as it is
encoded into memory. Given the tight linkages between encoding and
retrieval (e.g., Tulving & Thompson, 1973), differences at the encoding
stage most likely contribute to parallel differences that emerge at later stages
(memory, attribution).
18. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

FOR FUTURE WORK
Implicit theories systematically shape information processing at mul-
tiple points along the processing stream, ranging from the earliest processes
such as attention and encoding to later processes such as attribution and
memory. I have presented evidence for this idea using implicit theories
regarding the fixedness–malleability of human attributes (the entity–
incremental dimension), as well as theories regarding the controllability
of happiness (Tullett & Plaks, 2016), human genetic variation (Kang et al.,
2015; Plaks et al., 2012), and the thought–action link (Plaks, McNichols,
et al., 2009).
Although this body of work has advanced the field’s understanding of the
interplay between perceivers’ a priori assumptions and basic social informa-
tion processing, there remain numerous important avenues for future
research. First, researchers should conduct a more comprehensive examina-
tion of how individual differences in entity–incremental endorsement relate
to other important individual difference variables, such as personality traits,
intelligence, socioeconomic status, and political orientation. Although there
has been some work in this regard (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000;
Church et al., 2003), more rigorous replications and extensions are needed.
Moreover, although there have been a handful of cross-cultural examina-
tions of implicit theories (Chiu et al., 2000; Church et al., 2003), this liter-
ature is comparatively small, leaving many unanswered questions about
(a) which theories different cultures adhere to and (b) how different cultures
may differentially express the same theory.
On the dependent variable side, researchers should continue to add
to the list of processes that may be susceptible to influence from implicit
theories. For example, no work, to my knowledge, has examined effects
of implicit theories on spontaneous trait inference (e.g., Carlston &

Skowronski, 1994; Winter & Uleman, 1984). If entity theorists truly traffic
in the currency of traits, a reasonable hypothesis is that they will be quicker
to go beyond the behavioral information given and infer traits as the invisible
structure that explains the behavior. Moreover, no work, to my knowledge,
has examined effects of implicit theories on trait inferences based on
rapid “thin slice” presentations of human faces. There is growing evidence
that perceivers quickly and effortlessly glean surprisingly rich inferences
about a target’s personality based on the most impoverished of stimuli
(e.g., presentation of a face for 50 ms; Tskhay & Rule, 2013). Might entity
theorists be more inclined to do this? Finally, no work, to my knowledge,
has examined the role of implicit theories in behavioral confirmation effects
(e.g., Jussim & Harber, 2005). Does entity theorists’ readiness to make trait
inferences translate into behavior that increases the likelihood of self-
fulfilling prophecies?
Historically, much of the social cognition literature has adopted some-
thing of a “content-free” approach. For example, processes related to
stereotyping have often been assumed to be largely identical regardless of
whether the perceiver is using an ethnic stereotype, a gender stereotype,
or an occupational stereotype. A “next-generation” approach has increas-
ingly sought to inject content into the social-cognitive machinery. For
example, several studies have documented that different stereotypes exert
differential effects on processing, sometimes in an interactive fashion with
other stereotypes (e.g., Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013; Kang &
Chasteen, 2009). I view the work described here as advancing an approach
that integrates specific cognitive processes with specific content. I believe
there is much value in this approach and encourage psychologists to con-
tinue to develop this synthesis between content and process.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Implicit Theories: Assumptions

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 56 # 2017 Elsevier Inc. 259

Social cognition research has yielded a rich and detailed understanding of

stability, controllability). Whereas Weiner focused on relatively downstream

1. IMPLICIT THEORIES: A DEFINITION

hypothesis testing procedures (e.g., Wason, 1960), or they may be moti-

2. THEORIES OF TRAIT STABILITY/MALLEABILITY:

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPATHY

with perceptions of target responsibility, attributing a person’s unhappiness

5. ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT GROUPS

entity–incremental differences were not due to differential intelligence, knowl-

6. ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT THE SELF

similarly found analogies between the attributions entity and incremental

7. IMPLICIT THEORIES OF THE THOUGHT–ACTION LINK

We have suggested that laypeople mentally divide intentionality into two

7.1 The Moderating Role of Implicit Theories

systematically moderate this basic pattern. One prevalent theory in Western

shifts led to systematic and meaningful divergences in judgment, divergences

do implicit theories systematically alter the kinds of information that people

9. PART II: PERSON MEMORY

lend important nuance to their evolving impression of the person, an

10. THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC MOTIVATIONS

about informational value), but to “warm” processes, as well. What motiva-

enrolled in a remedial course designed to strengthen his academic weak-

Trait:consistent Trait:inconsistent Associate:consistent Associate:inconsistent

Trait:consistent Trait:inconsistent Associate:consistent Associate:inconsistent

established the possibility of improvement or nonimprovement that would

among three words (e.g., BOOK-HOOK-APPLE [answer: WORM]).

evidence of declining performance, they (compared to incremental theo-

theorists) or theory-violating failure to change (for incremental theorists).

11. PART III: ATTENTION ALLOCATION

spacebar as quickly as possible upon hearing each tone. According to the

the 20 items correctly (outstanding performance). In all conditions, the neu-

theory-inconsistent information may, in fact, lead people to “double down”

12. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF ACCOUNTABILITY

First, in the nonaccountable condition, Plaks and Halvorson (2013) rep-

superficial form of attention to stereotype-inconsistent information. At the

13. INTERIM SUMMARY

14. PART IV: ENCODING PROCESSES

15. THEORIES ABOUT GENETIC VARIATION AND THE

explanations to be particularly compelling (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine,

tends to be bimodal with a mean around 55%. We have investigated whether

faces: 0% Black–100% White, 16.67% Black–83.33% White, 33.33% Black–

High overlap belief Low overlap belief

16. ENCODING OF THEORY-CONFIRMING AND THEORY-

encoding, retrieval, and judgment processes. In recent years, we have

pronounced frontal N400 responses than entity theorists to stereotype-

17. INTERIM SUMMARY

18. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

of implicit theories on spontaneous trait inference (e.g., Carlston &

Gilbert, D. T. (1998). Ordinary personology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey

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