Republic of the Philippines

Manila

SEVENTEENTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE CA-G.R. CR No. 36343

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Members:
-versus-
GARCIA, R. R.,
Chairperson,
JAY LAUZON y FARRALES DIMAGIBA, L. R., and
and JOMAR ABLAZA y *
SADANG, M. Q. C., JJ.
CAPARAS,
Accused,

Promulgated:
JOMAR ABLAZA y CAPARAS,
Accused-Appellant. M\rch 20, 2015
x--------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, R. R., J.:

Before Us is an appeal from the Judgment 1 dated December 3,

2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City in
Criminal Case No. 384-10 finding herein accused-appellant Jomar
Ablaza y Caparas and accused Jay Lauzon y Farrales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with force and by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, and imposing upon him
the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days, as maximum, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds JAY LAUZON y

FARRALES and JOMAR ABLAZA y CAPARAS guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery defined and
penalized under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentences them to each suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2)

*
Acting Junior Member per Office Order No. 82-15-ABR dated March 16, 2015.
1
Penned by Judge Raymond C. Viray; Rollo, pp 54-57.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 2 of 15
Decision

months as minimum to eight (8) years and twenty

(20) days as maximum.

The accused are also ordered solidarily to pay

Rosario Snyder the amount of Php70,100.00 with
interest at 6% per annum until the full amount is
paid; and to pay the cost of suit.

SO DECIDED.2

THE FACTS

In an Information3 dated October 27, 2010, appellant Jomar

Ablaza y Caparas and accused Jay Lauzon y Farrales were charged
with robbery by means of force and violence upon persons committed
as follows:

That on or about the twenty-[ninth] (29th) of

July, 2010, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain, and by means of force and violence
against the person of Rosario S. Snyder, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly
grab, take, steal and carry away three (3) pcs. of
necklaces worth P43,800.00, P12,8000 and P13,500,
respectively, or in the total amount of P70,100.00,
Pesos, Philippine Currency, belonging to said
complainant, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During the arraignment on February 17, 2011, appellant, with

the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.5 On the other hand,
accused Lauzon was arraigned on September 20, 2011 wherein he
also pleaded not guilty.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

2
Id., p 57.
3
Records, pp 1-2.
4
Id, p 1.
5
Order dated February 17, 2011, Records, p 30; Certificate of Arraignment,
Records, p 28; Minutes of the Hearing Held on February 17, 2011, Records, p
29.
6
Order dated September 20, 2011, Records, p 127; Certificate of Arraignment,
Records, p 125; Minutes of the Hearing Held on September 20, 2011, Records, p
126.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 3 of 15
Decision

The version of the prosecution, as narrated by private

complainant Rosario Snyder7, may be summarized as follows:

On July 29, 2010, at around 8:30 a.m., private complainant

Rosario Snyder was walking along Jolo St., Barangay Barretto,
Olangapo City. While she was talking on her cellular phone, a
motorcycle with two (2) male passengers stopped beside her.
Without any warning, the male riding at the back of the motorcycle
grabbed the three (3) necklaces private complainant was wearing
before speeding off. However, they stopped a few meters away from
private complainant to make sure they had taken all of her valuables.
Since both men were not wearing helmets, she was able to take a good
look on their faces. Private complainant was shocked by the incident,
but she was able to shout at a passing tricycle to go after the
motorcycle. However, the tricycle driver returned moments later to
tell her that he was unable to surpass the motorcycle.

Private complainant immediately went to the police station to

report the incident. She told the investigating officer that while she
did not know the names of the men who robbed her, she clearly saw
their faces and would be able to identify them. The investigating
officer then showed her numerous photographs, from which she was
able to pick out the picture of the driver of the motorcycle, who was
identified as herein appellant.

On that same day of July 29, 2010, the police took private
complainant to the house of appellant for further investigation. Once
there, private complainant confirmed that appellant was the
motorcycle driver earlier. The police then asked appellant where his
companion was. Appellant backed away from the policemen until he
reached the kitchen sink. When they checked underneath, the
policemen found accused Lauzon hiding behind a basin. Private
complainant identified accused Lauzon as the one who was riding at
the back of appellant's motorcycle and who grabbed her three (3)
necklaces earlier that day. When confronted, appellant and accused
Lauzon denied private complainant's accusations and instead alleged
that they were sleeping inside appellant's house. Later, appellant and
accused Lauzon admitted that they gave the stolen necklaces to a
certain JR.

Private complainant further testified that she bought the three

(3) necklaces stolen from her at P43,800.00, P13,500.00, and

7
TSN dated June 2, 2011; TSN dated March 8, 2012.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 4 of 15
Decision

P12,800.00, respectively, from a jewelry store, as evidenced by the

two (2) receipts8 therefor. None of the necklaces were recovered.

For the defense, appellant9 was the only witness presented.

Appellant raised the defense of denial. He denied that he stole

the necklaces of private complainant. On July 29, 2010, at around
8:00 a.m., he was sleeping inside his house at Purok 6, lower
Kalaklan. With him was his friend, accused Lauzon, who stayed
overnight because they had a drinking session the night before. Later
that morning, policemen arrived with a woman asking for him. The
woman then told the police that appellant was not the only one and
that he had a companion who was a tisoy with a tattoo. The
policemen then left. Two months later, appellant was arrested
because of the instant case.

In the assailed Judgment10 dated December 3, 2013, the court a

quo found appellant and his co-accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery. It gave credence to the testimony of
private complainant that appellant and accused Lauzon, both on
board a single motorcycle, stopped beside her. Accused Lauzon then
reached out and grabbed the three (3) necklaces private complainant
was wearing before making their escape. The positive statements of
the prosecution eyewitness prevail over appellant's bare denial. The
pertinent portions of the decision are quoted:
And after a judicious consideration of the
evidence on record, the court is persuaded that the
Prosecution ably proved the guilt of both accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The case for the
Prosecution is built primarily on the testimony of its
lone witness – Rosario Snyder. The court finds no
reason to disbelieve or discredit her testimony against
the accused. For one, she had no reason or ill motive
to lie in court and implicate them. She did not even
know the accused before this incident.

For another, her identification of the criminal

is reliable. The robbery happened in the morning at
around 8:30 a.m. There were no other people on the
street to distract Snyder's observation. The accused
were not wearing helmets while mounted on the
motorbike, and they even stopped and looked back at
her. She had no difficulty identifying Ablaza among

8
Records, p 85.
9
TSN dated September 5, 2013.
10
Supra, at note 1.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 5 of 15
Decision

the pictures shown to her at the police station; and

hardly balked upon seeing Lauzon hiding in the sink.
In other words, Snyder was positive in her
identification of the suspects right from the start. She
even had no difficulty identifying the accused in court.
In fact, she emphasized in her testimony that she told
the police she could identify the accused if she saw
them again; and honest enough to admit to the
investigator she did not know their names.

Snyder's demeanor in court reveals her

candidness. Her testimony is unwavering, clear and
coherent. There is no serious inconsistency in her
testimony. She had no reason to lie; and her
persistence in this case speaks more eloquently of her
desire to exact justice for depriving her of her
property. The court rules, and so holds, that all
elements of the crime were alleged and proved. The
accused are guilty as charged.

There is taking for sure. The act of the accused

in riding in tandem and forcibly grabbing the
necklaces of Snyder from her neck exhibits not only
animus lucrandi, but also violent taking. The accused
did not simply “snatch” the necklaces; they grabbed
them from Snyder's neck. The accused ran away with
the necklaces in an arrogant display of their intention
to deprive Snyder of possession and dominion of her
necklaces. And finally, the necklaces belonged to
Snyder. She had receipts to prove her ownership. She
bought them at a jewelry store.

Conspiracy between the two accused is evident

from the overt acts they exhibited during and after the
robbery. The presence of conspiracy between the two
accused is too obvious from the facts of the case to
require extended discussion. A conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist
that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective. Direct proof is not
essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy it can rarely
be proved by direct evidence x x x.

The necklaces were never recovered. Hence,

the court must impose civil liability on the accused.
They ought to be adjudged to pay solidarily the
amount of Php70,100.00 representing the value of the
necklaces with interest at 6% per annum as the
obligation arose from delict.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 6 of 15
Decision

Against this backdrop, the denial of Ablaza

must fail. In the hierarchy of evidence, denial is the
least valued vis-a-vis positive identification.

Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code fixes

the penalty for simple robbery at prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, the range of which is from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. There being no aggravating circumstances, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is arresto mayor, maximum to
prision correccional medium in any of its periods, the
range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months.11

Hence, this appeal in which appellant raised the following

ARGUMENTS12, to wit:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY;

II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT; AND

III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
APPELLANT COMMITTED THE
ALLEGED ACTS, THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HIM
LIABLE FOR ROBBERY INSTEAD OF
THEFT.

11
Id., pp 56-57.
12
Rollo, p 42.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 7 of 15
Decision

Records show that accused Lauzon failed to appear during the

promulgation of judgment despite notice. Consequently, in an Order 13
dated December 12, 2013, the bail bond issued in his favor was
forfeited and an alias warrant of arrest14 was issued against him for
service of sentence.

THE ISSUE

The sole issue in the instant case is whether or not the court a
quo correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons.

THE RULING

The instant appeal is not impressed with merit.

Appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in

convicting him of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons on the basis of the incredible testimony of private
complainant. It was improbable for the robbers to stop and look at
her after taking her pieces of jewelry when they could have easily
made their escape. Moreover, she could not possibly remember the
faces of her attackers considering that she was using her cellular
phone at the time of the attack and that she was admittedly in shock.

We are not persuaded.

After a thorough and careful review of the records, this Court is

convinced that the prosecution has sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt appellant's guilt of robbery.

To sustain a conviction for robbery by means of violence against

or intimidation of persons, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b)
that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with
intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.15

13
Records, p 234.
14
Records, p 236.
15
Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009; Diamante vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180992, September 4, 2009.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 8 of 15
Decision

Here, private complainant proved all the above-mentioned

elements of robbery. She testified that on July 29, 2010, at around
8:30 a.m., while she was walking along Jolo Street while talking on
her cellular phone, a motorcycle with two (2) riders, later identified as
appellant and accused Lauzon, stopped beside her. Accused Lauzon
suddenly grabbed the three (3) pieces of necklace private complainant
was wearing. The men then sped off, but not before stopping a short
distance away from private complainant, giving her the opportunity
to see their faces. She immediately reported the matter to the police
where she was able to identify appellant from a set of photographs
shown to her by the policemen. Later, she was also able to identify
accused Lauzon as the person with appellant who took her necklaces.
The pertinent portions of private complainant's testimony are
quoted:
Q Do you recall where were you on June 29, 2010 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where?
A I was walking along Jolo Street.

xxx

Q Who were with you at that time?

A I was [alone].

Q Do you recall of any untoward incident that

happened while walking on that date?
A Yes, sir?

Q What is that incident?

A Suddenly somebody approached me and took my
necklace.

COURT (to witness)

Q Only one person?
A They were two.

FISCAL (to witness)

Q Can you tell us how these two persons approached
you?
A While I was walking, a motorcycle stopped and
one is the driver and a backrider.

Q Where did this motorcycle stop?

A [Besides] me.

xxx

Q Were you able to have a good look of their faces?

CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 9 of 15
Decision

A Yes, sir.

Q How did these persons grab your necklace?

A They suddenly grabbed my necklace and I was
shocked.

Q You said these persons were in the motorcycle,

who was the one who grabbed your necklace, the
driver or the backrider?
A The backrider.

Q How many necklace were grabbed from you?

A Three.

xxx

Q What did the two persons do?

A They stopped besides me and they looked at me to
be sure that all my necklaces were taken.

xxx

Q x x x what did you do after the incident?

A I reported the incident to Police Station 6.

xxx

Q What did they tell you after you said that?

A They showed to me pictures, that is why I
recognized these persons.

Q Whose picture?
A Ablaza.

xxx

Q You said two persons riding in a motorcycle, the

driver or the backrider?
A Driver.

Q How sure are you that he was the one driving the
motorcycle that stopped besides you?
A Because I saw him when they looked back at me.

Q Was he wearing a helmet at that time?

A No, sir.16

The court a quo correctly accorded credence to the testimony of

private complainant after finding her answers to the questions on

16
TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp 3-12.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 10 of 15
Decision

direct and cross-examination to be intelligible, candid and

unwavering. Being in the best position to discriminate between the
truth and falsehood, the court a quo's assignment of values and
weight on the testimonies of the witnesses should be respected. It is
an oft-repeated rule that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of a
clear showing that the trial judge had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance.17

It is also erroneous for appellant to claim that it was not

possible for private complainant to identify the persons who took her
necklaces considering the abruptness of the incident. According to
private complainant, she was able to see the faces of her robbers since
they stopped in front of her and that they were not wearing helmet.
This afforded her the opportunity to scrutinize their faces.
Additionally, the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to
strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and
observe the manner in which the crime is being committed. 18 Thus, in
Coscolla vs. People of the Philippines19, the Supreme Court ruled that:
x x x Under emotional stress, however, when
the human body's adrenaline surges, it is highly
inconceivable that the mind could not even manage to
register the face of the person who threatened bodily
harm. As a matter of fact, it is natural, if not
instinctive, for the victims to look at the face of
the felon. The production of sketches of criminals
who were able to flee from authorities is borne out by
this human experience x x x. [Emphasis supplied]

It is also not difficult to believe private complainant when she

claimed that appellant and accused Lauzon stopped a few meters
away from her to ensure that she no longer had anything of value for
them to take instead of immediately making their escape. It must be
recalled that the street was deserted save for the private complainant
and her attackers; appellant and accused Lauzon were on board a
motorcycle while private complainant was on foot; and that appellant
and accused Lauzon were two (2) young males while private
complainant was a middle-aged woman.

In another unsuccessful attempt to discredit the testimony of

private complainant, appellant points out that in the Sinumpaang
17
People of the Philippines vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998; Gamboa
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014.
18
People of the Philippines vs. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014.
19
G.R. No. 176566, April 16, 2009.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 11 of 15
Decision

Salaysay dated August 2, 2010, private complainant narrated that

she was brought by the police to the house of appellant where she saw
him standing up. In contrast, during her testimony, appellant was
seated. Additionally, in her testimony, private complainant first
claimed that appellant denied having robbed her of her necklaces, but
later she contradicted herself by saying that appellant admitted
possession of the necklaces, but later gave them to someone else.

Contrary to appellant's asseveration, private complainant's

testimony does not suffer from any serious and material
inconsistency that could possibly detract from her credibility. The
portions pointed out by appellant as inconsistent refer to immaterial
details that do not tend to diminish private complainant's testimony.
It is well-settled that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimony of a witness referring to minor details and not actually
touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair credibility.
Such minor inconsistencies even enhance its veracity as the variances
erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 20 It may also be well to
add that if there is any inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since
affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and
inaccurate.21

Neither is there merit in appellant's bare allegation that private

complainant, after seeing appellant, told the police officers that he
was not the one who robbed her but a tisoy sporting tattoos. This was
belied by the consistent and convincing identification made by
private complainant that appellant was the driver of the motorcycle
and one of the co-conspirators in the stealing of her necklaces.
Private complainant not only picked out the photograph of appellant
from a set of pictures, she also verified appellant's identity during the
police investigation, as well as positively identified appellant in open
court.

It may also be well to state that private complainant has no

motive to testify falsely against appellant. As admitted by appellant
himself, he does not know private complainant before the incident. 22
Settled is the rule that where no evidence exists to show any
convincing reason or improper motive for a witness to falsely testify
against an accused, the testimony deserves faith and credit. 23

20
People of the Philippines vs. Tobias, G.R. No. 193478, June 23, 2014.
21
People of the Philippines vs. Manigo, G.R. No. 194612, January 27, 2014.
22
TSN dated September 5, 2013, p 6.
23
People of the Philippines vs. Delen, G.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 12 of 15
Decision

It may also be well to stress that the fact that appellant was not
immediately arrested after the police investigation, is of no moment.
Suffice it to state that considering that the instant case does not fall
under any of the instance where a warrantless arrest is allowed, the
police officers properly waited for the court a quo's issuance of a
warrant before arresting appellant and accused Lauzon.

The court a quo was correct in characterizing the instant case as

robbery in the presence of the element of violence against or
intimidation of person. The Office of the Solicitor General was correct
in pointing out that the only way the necklaces could be taken from
private complainant was through the use of violence and physical
force.

The court a quo likewise correctly ruled that there was

conspiracy in the commission of the offense. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 24 To hold an accused
liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
conspiracy which may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself; moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the
crime; or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
conspiracy.25

Here, the circumstances show that appellant and accused

Lauzon acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design. They
were riding a single motorcycle when they stopped beside private
complainant. While it was only accused Lauzon who took the
necklaces of private complainant, appellant's participation consisted
in serving as the driver of the motorcycle so that they may make a
quick getaway. Immediately after the taking of private complainant's
necklaces, the two fled together. There being conspiracy, appellant is
liable as a principal perpetrator of the crime even if he did not
personally take the necklaces of private complainant.

Amidst the convincing narration of the prosecution witness,

appellant offered nothing but the defense of denial. It is an
elementary rule of evidence that denial cannot prevail over the

24
People of the Philippines vs. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014 citing People
of the Philippines vs. Peralta, G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
759.
25
People of the Philippines vs. Guittap, et al., G.R. No. 144621, May 9, 2003.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 13 of 15
Decision

positive and categorical testimony of the eyewitness and his

identification of the accused. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense
which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility.26 Here, not a shred of competent proof was adduced
by appellant to corroborate his denial as the same is supported only
by his self-serving testimony. Hence, it does not merit any evidentiary
value.

Anent the penalty imposed by the court a quo, that is,

imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of
prision mayor, as maximum, there is a need to modify the same.
While the court a quo correctly set the minimum period, the
maximum period should be decreased to eight (8) years.

Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the

penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period in cases of simple robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of person. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the minimum imposable penalty should
range from four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months. On the other hand, the maximum term should range
from six (6) years, one (1) day to eight (8) years. 27

Based on the foregoing discussion, this Court finds it proper to

impose the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum.

The award of P70,100.00 as civil liability is likewise sustained.

Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual
or compensatory damages only for such loss as he has duly proved.
Here, competent proof was sufficiently adduced by the prosecution to
show the value of the three (3) necklaces private complainant lost.

In addition and in conformity with current policy, an interest at

the legal rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the monetary award for
damages from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.28

26
People of the Philippines vs. Baturi, G.R. No. 189812, September 1, 2014;
People of the Philippines vs. Alhambra, G.R. No. 207774, June 30, 2014.
27
See People of the Philippines vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24,
2008.
28
Espineli vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014.
 CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 14 of 15
Decision

The modifications of the penalty and of the award of damages

herein, however, would not affect the penalty imposed on accused
Lauzon because insofar as he is concerned, the judgment against him
became final and executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment. His act of jumping bail and his
unexplained absence during the promulgation of the decision
convicting him of the crime charged has divested him of the right to
avail himself of any remedy that may be available to him, including
his right to appeal. In People of the Philippines vs. Madasali 29, the
Supreme Court held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from it.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby

DENIED. The Judgment30 dated December 3, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Jomar Ablaza y Caparas
is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay private
complainant Rosario Snyder interest on the award of civil liability
assessed at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

RAMON R. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA MELCHOR QUIRINO C. SADANG

Associate Justice Associate Justice

29
G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010.
30
Supra at note 1.
CA-G.R. CR No. 36343 Page 15 of 15
Decision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

RAMON R. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Seventeeth Division