JUANA CAGUIOA, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE

OF THE DECEASED EMIGDIO ZARATE

V.
MARIA CALDERON
G.R. No. 6625, October 24, 1911
JOHNSON, J.

DIGESTED BY: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

DOCTRINE: WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE; MENTAL CAPACITY; LAWFUL WILL -

Under the facts stated in the opinion, that the will in question, was duly and legally
authorized by the deceased, he being of sound mind and memory, and that the same
was not executed under threats or fear.

FACTS:
Caguioa presented a petition in the CFI of the Province of Pangasinan, praying
for the probation of the last will and testament of Emigdio Zarate, deceased, in
conformity with section 630 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.
Due notice of said petition was given in accordance with law, and the hearing for
the probation of said will was fixed. Subsequently, said Maria Calderon appeared, by
her attorney, and opposed the probation of said will upon one of the following grounds:
“That the said Emigdio Zarate was mentally incapacitated at the time he
authorized and signed his will.”
Caguioa prays the court to annul the will alleged to have been executed by
Zarate, and to order that its probate be disallowed. Thereafter, the court overruled the
opposition, sustained the petition, and held that the same is legal in all its parts as the
last will and testament of the deceased Zarate.

ISSUE: Was Emigdio Zarate in the full possession of his mental faculties at the time of
the execution of his will?
RULING: YES.
After hearing the evidence, the lower court found that Emigdio Zarate, at the time
of the execution of the said will, was in the possession of his faculties. Two of the
witnesses who signed the will, as well as others who were present in the house at the
time the said will was executed, testified that in their opinion Emigdio Zarate was of
sound mind and memory at the time he signed the said will.
The appellant attempted to show that Emigdio Zarate for some months prior to
his death had been troubled with insomnia, as well as some other physical infirmities.
The two doctors who appeared on behalf of the opponents testified that insomnia
tended to destroy the mental capacity, but that there were times, even during the period
while they were suffering from insomnia, when they would be perfectly rational.
Even admitting that there was some foundation for the supposition that Emigdio
Zarate had suffered from the alleged infirmities, we do not believe that the testimony
was sufficiently direct and positive, based upon the hypothetical questions, to overcome
the positive and direct testimony of the witnesses who were present at the time of the
execution of the will in question.
The evidence adduced during the trial of the case, shows a large preponderance
of proof in favor of the fact that Emigdio Zarate was in the full possession of his mental
faculties at the time he executed his last will and testament.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO
JOSE H. JUNQUERA
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL.,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18498, March 30, 1967
DIZON, J.

DIGESTED BY: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

DOCTRINE: The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as the best
witnesses in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true, however, that to
deserve full credit, their test, testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as
in the case of any other witness, their testimony may be overcome by any competent
evidence - direct or circumstantial.

FACTS:
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88
years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Junquera, filed with the CFI of said province a petition for the probate of a one
page document as the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares,
and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of the will based on several
grounds, one of which is that the testator was mentally incapable of making a will at the
time of its execution. Subsequently, the Court removed Junquera as special
administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.
On October 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the ground
that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to collect a
considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes.
After a prolonged trial, the Court rendered a decision denying the probate of the
will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the question of ownership over
the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed as its own.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three
attesting witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna,
sought to prove the following facts:
Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F", witnessed by Gandionco
and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind, and without
pressure or influence exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will to Tomas
Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in proper legal language. The document was then
read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumbmarked it.
The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as
a result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared not to be
"wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious discrepancies in their
testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed document.
The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at the time of
the execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if not
impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures on the documents in the spontaneous
and excellent manner they appear to have been written. Thus, the court was also led to
believe the testimony of the handwriting experts for oppositors, - adverse to the
genuineness of the signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned document - more
than that of the handwriting expert presented by the proponents of the will.

ISSUE: Is the evidence of record sufficient to prove the due execution of the will in
question?

RULING: NO.
The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as the best witnesses
in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve full
credit, their test, testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case
of any other witness, their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence —
direct or circumstantial.
We cannot see our way clear to holding that the trial court erred in refusing to
give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses.
 It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or
did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor
one party to the prejudice of the other.
This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned
document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing,
forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this reason, independently of the
conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting experts called to the witness stand by
the parties, we have carefully examined and considered the physical appearance and
condition of the original and two copies of the questioned will found in the record —
particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have come to the
conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.
 MANUEL TORRES and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
GR No. 24569, February 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.

DIGESTED BY: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the

transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.

FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez died on February 25, 1924 leaving all his estate to
Vicente Lopez. Subsequently, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente Lopez as
administrator of his property due to his feeble health, such was opposed by Margarita
Lopez, CFI of Manila concluded Vicente Lopez as Tomas Rodriguez’s guardian.
Tomas Rodriguez voiced out the need to form a will, and Vicente Lopez has
procured Judge Maximino Mina. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will,
asked the will to be allowed. Such was contested by Manuel Lopez on the grounds that
the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of institution he was suffering
“senile dementia” and was under guardianship; that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited; and that the signature of Rodriguez was obtained
through fraud and deceit.
Luz Lopez allegedly deceived Tomas Rodriguez to sign by stating that such
document he was about to sign was in connection with a complaint against Dr. Boanan,
one of the witness of the signing of the will.
The trial court denied legalization of the will on the ground of “lack of mental
capacity” at the signing of the will by the testator.
ISSUE: Did Tomas Rodriguez possessed the sufficient mentality to make a will which
would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity?

RULING: YES.
Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Drs. Calderon,
Domingo, Herrera claimed that testator had full understanding of the acts he was
performing and that they were witnesses in the said signing of the will.
Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically
decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may
have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed
the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to
summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
"testamentary capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an
exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence for the
oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it deserves.
The Code of Civil procedure prescribes a requisite that the testator be of “sound
mind”, a sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds of disallowing a will is if
the testator is insane or otherwise incapable of the execution.
The Court has adopted a definition of “testamentary capacity” as the capacity to
comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the
courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE
GARNIER GARREAU. LIRIO PFANNENSCHMIDT
RAMIREZ
v.
JOSE MA. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-19910, May 31, 1971
MAKALINTAL, J.
DIGESTED BY: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao

DOCTRINE: Pre-senile Dementia incapacitated testator from making a will. The

evidence hereinabove discussed, cumulatively considered, leads to the definite
conclusion that Marie Garnier Garreau was indeed mentally incapacitated to make a
will, that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
(her) bounty, and the character of the testamentary act" (Art. 799. Civil Code).

FACTS:
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Paris, France,
but a Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she died childless at the age of 84
on January 11, 1959.
The will in question was an "open" one, executed before a notary public in
Madrid on May 24, 1958, and instituting her niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt now
appellant, as sole and universal heir. Lirio is one of the four children of Jose Ramirez,
brother of the testatrix husband Ramon, the other three being Elsa, Esperanza and
Horacio.
Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez,
now appellee, opposed the petition for probate filed by Urio, alleging in his opposition,
inter alia, that there was a prior will executed by the testatrix in Manila in 1949.
Even before then, however, the testatrix' mental condition was already the object
of serious concern among her close relatives. Depositions were taken from by Julio
Escribano Langa, a resident of Madrid who had known the spouses Ramon Ramirez
and Maria Gamier Garreau for about nine years, testified to the same mental condition
of the testatrix: her susceptibility to another person's influence; her lack of memory for
recent events, her lack of understanding of, or volition for deciding, certain matters such
as the making of a last will.
The most pertinent evidence in behalf of appellant is the testimony of the notary
public before whom the will in question was executed and the testimony of two of the
three instrumental witnesses. As may be noted, the foregoing statements of the notary
public are far from satisfactory. They are vague and evasive and tend to beg the very
issue.

ISSUE: Are the testimonies rendered in court sufficient to establish the testamentary
capacity?

RULING: NO.
We find no ground to disregard such evidence in favor of the vague, inconclusive
statements of the notary public who authenticated the will and of the two instrumental
witnesses, nor even of the testimony of the rebuttal witnesses, the more categorical
character of whose affirmations only serve to weaken their credibility, conflicting as they
do not only with the evidence for appellee but also with that given by the other
witnesses for appellant.
The Supreme Court did not give much credit to the testimony of the notary public
because the statements were far from satisfactory, vague, evasive, and tend to beg the
very issue. The notary public could not say with certainty but could merely suppose that
the testator possessed the requisite qualifications that she had a recollection of her
properties or the relatives that would logically inherit from her.
As early as 1955, when she was examined by the family physician. Dr. Romero
de Arcos, and by a qualified psychiatrist. Dr. Jose Garmain she was already suffering
from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative mental infirmity that was described by them
as "a progressive and irreversible process." The manifestations of this condition are
amply illustrated in the letters written by appellant herself as well as in the testimony of
her uncle. Jose Eugenio Ramirez: In fact, these two were convinced that the testatrix
should be placed under judicial guardianship and actually took the initial steps towards
that end.
The issue here is essentially one of fact and involves an appraisal of the
conflicting evidence presented by the parties. That issue was addressed in the first
instance to the trial Judge, and we cannot say that his conclusion as to the testamentary
incapacity of the testatrix is erroneous.
It is based mainly on expert medical testimony to the effect that her mental
infirmity was observed by the family physician as far back as 1953 and confirmed in
1955 by a competent psychiatrist, who described the process of the mental
degeneration as progressive and irreversible; on the written admissions and
declarations of appellant herself, who would have no motive then to falsify the facts; and
on the testimony of the testatrix' brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez.