Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

METROPOLITAN CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691

WATERWORKS AND
SEWERAGE SYSTEM, Members:
Plaintiff-Appellant, PJ. REYES, A.B., JR., Chairperson,
BATO, JR., and
- versus - ZALAMEDA, JJ.

ANTONIO L. LAVARES,
SOFIA L. HERIOS,
EDGARDO L. LAVARES,
FERMIN L. LAVARES,
DIANA L. MERCADO,
MELECIO L. LAVARES,
JR., JULIO L. LAVARES,
MAY ANN L. TOROBA,
SEVERO L. LAVARES,
JOSEPH L. LAVARES,
REMEDIOS L. LAVARES,
ALFONSO L. LAVARES
and the REGISTER OF Promulgated:
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
JUL 31, 2013
Defendants-Appellees.1 ___________________
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BATO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision2 dated January 20, 2011, of

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No.
Q-00-40301 which dismissed plaintiff-appellant's complaint for
quieting of title with damages and which declared Transfer Certificate
1
The original party defendant was Melecio Lavares but he was substituted by his heirs upon his
death on July 14, 2008.
2
Record, Vol. 2, p. 727.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 2
DECISION

of Title (TCT) No. RT-51030 (308461), in the name of Melecio

Lavares, valid.

As culled from the records, the antecedent facts follow.

In its Complaint3 dated October 19, 1999, the Metropolitan

Waterworks and Sewerage System (“MWSS”) alleged that it is the
absolute owner of a 24,200 square-meter parcel of land in North
Fairview, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 378154 (T-78933). The
said property was purchased by MWSS from the Philippine National
Bank on June 18, 1987, as a proposed site of the MWSS Pumping
Station and Reservoir.

Furthermore, according to the complaint, a certain Atty. Oscar

Diokno Perez wrote MWSS a letter on January 23, 1997, informing
MWSS that Melecio Lavares (“Lavares”) was claiming ownership of a
24,760 square-meter parcel of land in Barrio Pasong Putik, Quezon
City, covered by TCT No. RT-51020 (308641). This title was
reconstituted by virtue of the Orders dated September 26, 1991,
February 16, 1996 and July 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in LRC Case No. Q-4756(91). When the
claim was verified by MWSS, it was learned that the land claimed by
Lavares is the same land registered in the name of MWSS under
TCT No. 378154 (T-78933).

Thus, according to MWSS, the existence of TCT No. 308461

(RT-51020) is questionable and its reconstitution was highly irregular
as there was an existing certificate of title covering the same land and
for which reason such reconstituted title should be cancelled as it
cast a cloud of doubt into the certificate of title of MWSS. In the same
complaint, MWSS prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction enjoining Lavares
from occupying and laying markers on the land pending final
resolution of the complaint.

In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim4 dated November

21, 2000, Lavares alleged that he acquired the property in question
from one Perseo Gamboa through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
3
Record, Vol. 1, p. 2.
4
Record, Vol. 1, p. 184.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 3
DECISION

on October 23, 1983. He immediately took possession and control of

the premises by putting a fence around the perimeter and
constructing a house thereon. His ownership and possession was
judicially upheld by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87, in LRC Case No. Q-4756 (a reconstitution case) and by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38, in Civil Case No.
17548 (an ejectment case). Thus, Lavares prayed that the complaint
be dismissed as MWSS's claim of title and ownership is invalid and
cannot affect Lavares's rights.

In an Order5 dated December 20, 2001, the court a quo denied

MWSS's application for a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground
that injunction, as a rule, cannot be granted to take property out of the
possession and contract of one party and place it into that of another
whose title has not been clearly established by law, citing Heirs of
Joaquin Asuncion vs. Hon. Margarito Gervacio, Jr.6

During the trial, the issues that were resolved were (a) whether
or not the complaint present a valid cause of action for quieting of
title, and (b) if so, who as between the plaintiff and the defendant
Lavares has a better title or right of ownership over the property in
question.7

MWSS sought to present National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

Document Examiner Zenaida Torres (“Torres”) for the purpose of
proving that the title of Lavares is spurious and, therefore, null and
void. This was objected to by Lavares who claimed that said
testimony would constitute a collateral attack on the title of Lavares.
Also, Lavares claimed that the subject of the testimony was not
alleged in the complaint.

In an Order dated April 19, 2006, the court a quo barred the
intended testimony of Torres. This Order, however, was annulled by
this Court in a Decision8 dated March 11, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
96127, wherein it was ruled that MWSS's action for quieting of title is
not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title of Lavares. The
5
Record, Vol. 1, p. 193.
6
304 SCRA 322 (1999).
7
Decision, p. 4.
8
Record, Vol. 2, p. 553.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 4
DECISION

complaint of MWSS also sufficiently alleged that the title of Lavares is

spurious. Thus, this Court ordered the trial court to allow Torres to
testify on the matter.

When the court a quo resumed trial, MWSS moved to amend its
complaint, which was granted by the trial court. As amended, the
complaint alleged that:

8. Further investigation by the plaintiff revealed that TCT No.

RT-51020 (308461) of the defendant is a reconstituted Title that
emanated from TCT No. 308461 which was declared spurious per
Resolution dated June 26, 1992 of the Land Registration Authority
of Deeds, Quezon City. Thus, registration of the reconstituted title
was denied by the Land Registration Authority. x x x

xxx

8.1. The findings that TCT No. 308461 is spurious is

based on the Questioned Document Report No. 329-692 dated
June 17, 1992 issued by the National Bureau of Investigation upon
request for investigation by the Land Registration Authority. x x x

On the witness stand, Torres testified that:

Q Madam Witness, you said that you examined TCT No.

308461, what was the process you used in examining this
document?

A The duplicate copy of TCT 308461 was the one examined

and method used was scientific comparative examination.

Q Which part of this document did you examine Madam

Witness?

A The signature. May I refer to the record your Honor, Vicente

M. Coloyan supposed to be the signatory on the owner's
duplicate copy.

Q And in you[r] examination Madam Witness, what did you find

out?

A Yes, sir. The conclusion the finding and conclusion as a

result of scientific comparative examination was a report
dated June 17, 1992, under Questioned Documents No.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 5
DECISION

329-692 and I quote “the conclusion the questioned and

standard sample signature [of] Vicente M. Coloyan were not
written by one and the same person, the questioned
signatures are traced forgeries.9

After presenting Torres, MWSS rested its case.

For his part, Lavares adopted the testimonial and documentary

evidence adduced during the hearing on the prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Among those marked in evidence were
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-4756 (91), entitled In Re: Petition for Reconstitution of
T.C.T. No. 308461, Melecio L. Lavares, petitioner.

On January 20, 2011, the court a quo issued its now assailed
Decision dismissing MWSS's complaint on the ground that it failed to
establish its case by preponderance of evidence. From the said
decision, MWSS filed the instant appeal, assigning a lone error, viz.:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING MELECIO

LAVARES' TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (TCT) AND
RECONSTITUTED TITLE SPURIOUS.10

According to MWSS, the court a quo erred in disregarding the

testimony of Torres who identified and affirmed her findings in her
Questioned Documents Report 329-692 dated June 17, 1992 and
also in disregarding the Land Registration Authority (LRA)'s Consulta
dated June 26, 1992, entitled Melecio Lavares vs. Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, which held that Lavares's reconstituted title is
spurious.

Lavares opposes the appeal, claiming that the trial court did not
err in finding that plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that the certificate
of title in the name of Lavares is spurious and in thus declaring that
the same is valid.11

Thus, the issue in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo
committed a reversible error in dismissing MWSS's action for quieting
9
TSN dated December 9, 2010, p. 4.
10
Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 27.
11
Appellee's Brief, p. 16; Rollo, p. 78.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 6
DECISION

of title and in declaring the title of Lavares as valid.

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any

cloud upon, or doubt or uncertainty with respect to, title to real
property.12 The remedy is authorized under Article 476 of the Civil
Code which provides that:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property

or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being

cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

The first requisite for the remedy is that the plaintiff must have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action, although he may not be in possession of
said property.13 The second requisite is that the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on the plaintiff's
title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.14

After a careful evaluation of the arguments and the evidence,

this Court finds and so rules that the court a quo committed reversible
error when it dismissed the complaint of MWSS for quieting of title
and in upholding the reconstituted certificate of title of Lavares.

As to the first requisite of an action for quieting of title, MWSS

was able to show that it has a legal title to the property in question. It
is the registered owner of the property by virtue of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 37815415 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City.
MWSS acquired the property from the Philippine National Bank
12
Vda. de Aviles vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996.
13
Art. 477, Civil Code; Calacala vs. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005.
14
Secuya vs. Vda. De Selma, G.R. No. 136021, February 22, 2000.
15
Exhibit “A”; Record, Vol. 1, p. 92.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 7
DECISION

through a Deed of Absolute Sale16 dated June 18, 1987.

This legal title in the name of MWSS has not been rebutted by
Lavares either in the proceedings below or in this appeal.

Now, to the second requisite, MWSS sought to show that

Lavares's Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-51020 (308461) is
merely reconstituted and is spurious because the signature of Vicente
Coloyan, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City, is a forgery, and
because the LRA had ruled in a Consulta that the owner's duplicate
upon which the reconstituted title was based is spurious.

That Lavares's certificate of title is a reconstituted one is not in

dispute. At the dorsal portion of TCT No. RT-51020 (308461), the
following has been annotated:

PE-9273-75/T-308461 – ORDER – By virtue of a court order

issued by the RTC, Branch 78,17 Quezon City, dated September
26, 1991 and pursuant to the Writ of Execution under PE-9274/V-
46 dated Feb. 23, 1996; and by virtue further of another court order
under PE-9275/V-46 dated Feb. 26, 1996, issued by Judge Elsie L.
Telan, RTC, Branch 78,18 Quezon City, this title is judicially
reconstituted on the basis of the owner's duplicate copy, a
reconstituted title is hereby issued in the name of same registered
owner hereof, with Serial No. 160347, as to other conditions, see
court Orders above-mentioned.

Date of Instrument – Sept. 26, 1991 & Feb. 26, 1996

Date of Inscription – Sept. 4, 1996

According to Lavares, the original copy of TCT No. 308461

which was on file with the Office of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City was destroyed when a fire broke out at the building of the Office
of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City on June 11, 1988.

To prove that the reconstituted title was the fruit of forgery,

MWSS presented NBI's Zenaida Torres to the witness stand. She
identified Questioned Documents Report No. 329-69219 dated June
16
Annex “B” of the Complaint; Record, Vol. 1, p. 11.
17
Should be “87”.
18
Should be “87”.
19
Exhibit “I”, Record, Vol. 2, p. 724.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 8
DECISION

17, 1992 in which she reported that:

FINDINGS:

Comparative examination made on the specimens submitted

under magnification, with the aid of photographic
enlargement and transparent prints reveal the following:

1. Fundamental differences in the writing characteristics

and habits existing between the questioned and the
standards/sample signatures VICENTE N. COLOYAN,
such as:

- Consistent alignment characteristics.

- Unique and habitual proportion characteristics.
- Movement impulse.
- Minute details of element formation.
- Manner of execution.

2. Evidences of tracing process in the preparation of the

questioned signatures as shown by:

a) Exactness of the following characteristics:

- Size and proportion

- Letter form
- Alignment and/or arrangement of letters
- Form and placement of “i-dot”
- Spacing and lateral expansion between letters

b) The questioned signatures exhibit slow, drawing,

conscious manner of execution with the presence
of suspicious pen stops and hesitations, tremors,
abrupt changes in the direction of strokes and
hidden joinings indicating unusual care and effort in
following an unfamiliar pattern.

CONCLUSION:

The questioned and the standards/sample signatures

VICENTE N. COLOYAN were NOT WRITTEN by one and
the same person.

The questioned signatures ARE TRACED FORGERIES.

CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 9
DECISION

However, the court a quo disregarded the testimony of Torres,

ruling that:

Plaintiff's case hinges principally and relies so much on the

expert testimony of Zenaida Torres, a former NBI document
examiner, to prove that the signatures of “VICENTE COLOYAN” on
TCT No. 308461 are “traced forgeries” and that, therefore, TCT No.
308461 is spurious.

The Court is not persuaded by the testimony of Zenaida

Torres.

The technical process by which the expert testimony arrived

at the conclusion that the signatures on the questioned document
vis-a-vis the standard/sample signatures of Vicente Coloyan
“traced forgeries” was not fully explained to convince the Court of
the accuracy of the expert's conclusion. It is worthy to note that the
direct examination of Zenaida Torres was completely silent on and
did not elicit detailed explanation of the process she conducted. It
was only upon questioning of the Court, in its quest for the truth,
that the witness testified that she conducted a “scientific
comparative examination”, using “stereoscope microscope x x x to
see clearly and eligibly how the signature was written” (TSN
December 9, 2010, pp. 8-10). And it was only upon examination by
counsel for the private defendant that she disclosed that
questioned signature was compared to “specimen signature”.
However, the process of identification, which should establish
the determination of the extent, kind and significance of
differences and the variation of the signatures was not
testified on (Rivera v. Turiano, 517 SCRA 668). Moreover the
specimen signatures were never marked and offered in
evidence in order to give the Court itself the opportunity to
analyze and compare the questioned signature with the
specimen signatures.

It is basic that courts are not bound by expert

testimonies, [e]specially so when, as in this case, the
testimony is lacking in material details to prove that the
questioned signature is a forgery.20

We also examined the records and agree that MWSS failed to

mark and offer in evidence the specimen signatures and the alleged
forged signatures of Vicente Coloyan. Not only that, MWSS failed to
20
Emphasis ours.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 10
DECISION

mark and offer in evidence the owner's duplicate of the reconstituted

TCT No. RT-51020 (308461) which was allegedly signed by an
impostor. Thus, there is nothing for the court to examine.
Elementary is the rule that the best evidence of a forged signature in
an instrument is the instrument itself showing the alleged forgeries.21
As held in Bautista vs. Court of Appeals:22

Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the

testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be
useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he
cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.

The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue

in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum
physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters
of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert
on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly
much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered
by a specialist on a highly technical issue.23

Lastly, to show that Lavares's title is spurious, MWSS offered

and marked in evidence the Resolution24 of the Administrator of the
LRA dated June 26, 1992, in Consulta No. 2000, entitled Melecio L.
Lavares vs. The Register of Deeds for Quezon City, wherein he
opined that the Order dated September 26, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in LRC Case No. Q-4756(91),
granting the reconstitution of Lavares's title, is not registrable
because Lavares's title is spurious.

Unfortunately, the court a quo's Decision is silent on this matter;

the trial court having focused solely on the issue of forgery. This
Court, however, believes that had the court a quo considered this
evidence, a different outcome might have been had. Thus, while,
generally, findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the
highest degree of respect by this Court,25 this Court may disregard
said findings when the lower court failed to notice certain relevant
21
Jimenez vs. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, G.R. No. 140472, June 10, 2002.
22
G.R. No. 158015.
23
Emphasis ours.
24
Exhibit “C”; Record, Vol. 1, p. 96.
25
Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105213, December 4, 1996.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 11
DECISION

facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different

conclusion.26

It is noteworthy that, in his Resolution, the Administrator of the

LRA ruled that:

From the foregoing findings of the NBI, it is evident that the

owner's duplicate certificate of TCT No. 308461 in the name of
Melecio L. Lavares was not regularly issued by the Register of
Deeds in the ordinary course of business. It was therefore
confirmed to be spurious. Under the given situation, the principle of
indefeasibility which presupposes an initially valid and legal title to
the land finds no application. The doctrine that a Torrens certificate
of title is entitled to full faith and credit cannot be invoked where the
title itself is spurious.

This ruling was affirmed in the Order27 dated September 25,

1992, which denied Lavares's motion for reconsideration. In denying
the motion, the Administrator of the LRA emphasized that the
supposedly ministerial function of the Register of Deeds cannot be
taken to mean that he can sanction what in his conscience will work
injustice, for he cannot be a party to the consummation of such an
injustice.

This opinion should have swayed the court a quo in resolving

the issue of whether or not Lavares's title is a cloud that should be
removed. Settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative
agencies are accorded not only respect but finality because of the
special knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial
tribunals from handling specific matters falling under their
jurisdiction.28 This rule applies in the case at bar because, according
to P.D. 1529,29 the Administrator of the LRA (formerly the
Commissioner of Land Registration) has the following functions:

(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments

of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the
issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding
26
Local Superior of the Servants of Charity vs. Jody King Construction, G.R. No. 141715,
October 12, 2005.
27
Exhibit “D”; Record, Vol. 1, p. 100.
28
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99357, January 27, 1992.
29
“Property Registration Decree”.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 12
DECISION

certificates of title;

(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of

Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;

(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal

from decision of, Registers of Deeds;

(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court

and personnel of the Courts of First Instance throughout the
Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and
functions in relation to the registration of lands;

(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees

promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and
regulations therefor;

(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and

consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act
No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.

Lavares, however, claims that the opinion of the Administrator

of the LRA was disregarded by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87, in its Order30 dated February 16, 1996 in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-4756 (91), granting Lavares's motion for issuance of writ of
execution.

Admittedly, the land registration court which granted the

reconstitution of Lavares's title ordered the Administrator of the LRA
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cause the registration of
Lavares's reconstituted title. However, a close examination of the
said Order dated February 16, 1996 shows that the reason for the
order was the failure of the State to adduce opposing evidence during
the reconstitution proceedings. Thus, the said court held that:

As to the grounds relied upon by the Register of Deeds in

denying reconstitution:

1. That the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 308461 is of

doubtful authenticity:

30
Exhibit “9”; Record, Vol. 1, p. 167.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 13
DECISION

It is not in the order of this Court dated September 26, 1991

that the Register of Deeds determine whether the owner's duplicate
copy of said certificate of title No. 308461 is authentic or not. If it is
of doubtful authenticity, the Solicitor representing the State,
particularly the Register of Deeds of Quezon City should have said
so when the case was being heard. But, as already pointed out,
the Assistant Solicitor who appeared in this case expressly stated
he did not oppose the petition; much less did he object to the
petitioner's formal offer of evidence consisting, among others, of
the Owner's duplicate of the Transfer Certificate of Title in question.
The said ground, therefore, is not a valid basis for the Register of
Deeds to deny the reconstitution as ordered by this Court.

2. That TCT No. 378153 overlaps the property x x x.

There is no evidence submitted by the Solicitor General to

show that TCT No. 378153 covers the property described in the
title in question. While a xerox copy of said alleged title is annexed
to one of the affidavits on final and executory judgment of this court
submitted by petitioner, the original owner's duplicate copy was not
presented formally or informally by said Solicitor. Even granting
that it was presented, the technical description appearing therein is
far different and dissimilar from that of TCT No. 308461. For
instance, the latter title TCT 378153 is described to cover an area
of 127,000 square meters, while TCT 308461 is described to cover
an area of 24,760 square meters. It is significant that TCT, the title
sought to be reconstituted, bears a lower number, so that, if at all
TCT 378153 was issued later. TCT 308461 was issued on
December 13, 1983, whereas the alleged TCT No. 378153 was
supposed to have been issued on March 9, 1998.

3. That the order provides that no certificate of title covering

the said parcel of land actually exists in that office.

The discussion under No. 2 provides the resolution of this

issue. It bears repetition and emphasis that there is entirely no
evidence formally offered in this incident to prove that another title
covering the same piece of land exists in the office of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. In fact, the Solicitor presented only two
documents in its Formal Offer, dated December 18, 1995, the
purpose of which is to prove that TCT No. 308461 is spurious.

Without unnecessarily reviewing the findings of the land

registration court, the court a quo could properly consider the
evidence of MWSS and give probative value to the opinion of the
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 14
DECISION

Administrator of the LRA. The doctrine of res judicata would not

apply in the case. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements
must be satisfied: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; (d) and there
must be between the first and second actions identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.31

What immediately differentiates the reconstitution case and the

case at bar is the lack of identity of parties and cause of action
(although the subject property may be the same). First, in the former
case, MWSS was not a party. It was an ex parte proceeding initiated
by Lavares. Second, in the former case, Lavares sought to have his
certificate of title reconstituted because the original thereof was
allegedly lost or destroyed, while in the case at bar, MWSS sought to
show that its title is valid and superior than that of Lavares.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the Order32 dated

September 26, 1991 of the land registration court which granted the
reconstitution of Lavares's title imposed a condition in its dispositive
portion, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Once the

Register of Deeds of Quezon City is certain that the land covered
by Certificate of Title No. 308461 properly belongs to its
jurisdictional area, that is Quezon City, he shall reconstitute by
virtue of this order the original of said Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 308461, upon the presentation of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, subject to encumbrances, if any, and provided
that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land
actually exists in the office of the said Registry of Deeds.33

It has been shown that the condition imposed in the Order

granting the reconstitution of Lavares's title was not complied with
because, in truth and in fact, another certificate of title was already
existing covering the same parcel of land. MWSS's TCT No. 378154
was already in existence as of September 26, 1991 when the Order
granting the reconstitution was promulgated. In fact, TCT No.
31
Saura vs. Saura, G.R. No. 136159, September 1, 1999.
32
Exhibit “7”, Record, Vol. 1, p. 158.
33
Emphasis ours.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 15
DECISION

378154 was issued on March 9, 1988, or more than two years before
the issuance of the said Order. Thus, the condition for the
reconstitution of Lavares's TCT No. 308461 was not satisfied. This is
reason enough to consider the reconstituted TCT No. RT-51020
(308461) as invalid or ineffective.

It is sad to note that even though the court a quo is aware of the
undesirable situation of two certificates of title covering the same
piece of land,34 it decided to let the controversy go unresolved and
leave the true ownership of the property in limbo. The court a quo
limited itself to the issue of forgery, without considering the other
evidence on record and, more importantly, the impact on the Torrens
system of the present controversy.

Thus, this Court shall now put an end to the controversy.

First, Lavares's reconstituted title did not vest in him an

incontrovertible right to the subject property. As held in Alonso vs.
Cebu Country Club,35 the reconstitution of a title is simply the re-
issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition, that it does not determine or resolve the ownership of the
land covered by the lost or destroyed title, and that a reconstituted
title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

Second, Lavares's reconstituted title cannot defeat MWSS's

existing certificate of title covering the same land. In Manotok vs.
Barque,36 the Supreme Court, citing Alabang Development vs.
Valenzuela,37 held that:

The Court stresses once more that lands already

covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their
issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act)
cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without
first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
34
Decision, p. 9.
35
G.R. No. 130876, December 5, 2003.
36
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 12, 2005.
37
L-54094, August 30, 1982.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 16
DECISION

existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of

Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in cases of annulment and/or
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely
by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing
evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts
simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are
already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of
their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and
indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of
registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates
of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A
fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual
notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens
Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and
judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will
be held duly accountable therefor.38

Finally, Lavares's reconstituted title may be attacked any time

because it covers a property already titled in the name of another
person. Thus, in Serra Serra vs. Court of Appeals,39 it was ruled that:

Thus, if no original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is

a nullity and the order for its reconstitution does not become final
because the court rendering the order has not acquired jurisdiction.
It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if in fact
there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in
the possession of another person/s.40

Thus, it is clear that the court a quo seriously erred when it

dismissed the complaint of MWSS and in declaring Lavares's
reconstituted title as valid. MWSS had established that Lavares's title
is a cloud that must be removed because, as already discussed, it is
invalid and ineffective, and should immediately be cancelled.

Furthermore, possession and full enjoyment of the subject

property must be adjudged in favor of MWSS. It would fall short of
our duty as a court of justice if We declare MWSS as the lawful owner
of the property but We leave the issue of possession unresolved,
especially so that Lavares alleged that he fenced portions of the
38
Emphasis ours.
39
G.R. No. 34080, March 22, 1991; 195 SCRA 482 (1991).
40
Emphasis ours.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 17
DECISION

property and exercised control over the same. As held in Toledo-

Banaga vs. Court of Appeals:41

With respect to the issue of possession, such right is a

necessary incident of ownership. The adjudication of ownership to
private respondent includes the delivery of possession since the
defeated parties in this case has not shown by what right to retain
possession of the land independently of their claim of ownership
which was rejected. Otherwise, it would be unjust if petitioners who
has no valid right over the property will retain the same.

As Article 428 of the Civil Code provides, the owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. The owner also has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, according to
Article 429 of the Civil Code.

We have examined the complaint of MWSS and, in its prayer, it

prayed for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.42
Thus, although possession is not specifically prayed for, MWSS's
prayer for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises justifies
the grant of the relief with respect to the issue of possession. It has
been consistently ruled that it is the allegations in the pleading which
determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed
for, that it is the material allegations of the fact in the complaint, not
the legal conclusions made in the prayer, that determine the relief to
which the plaintiff is entitled.43

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated January 20, 2011,

of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case
No. Q-00-40301 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The reconstituted
TCT No. RT-51020 (308461) in the name of Melecio L. Lavares
declared NULL and VOID, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
is ORDERED to CANCEL the same. Moreover, the heirs, assigns,
successors of Melecio L. Lavares, and all other persons claiming
rights under him/them, are hereby ORDERED to immediately
VACATE the premises and TURNOVER the possession and control
41
G.R. No. 127941, January 28, 1999.
42
Complaint, p. 6.
43
Juaban vs. Espina, G.R. No. 170049, March 14, 2008.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96691 18
DECISION

thereof to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System.

Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED the Land

Registration Authority.

SO ORDERED.

RAMON M. BATO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANDRES B. REYES, JR. RODIL V. ZALAMEDA

Presiding Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Presiding Justice
Chairperson, First Division