DAVAO SAWMILL v.

CASTILLO
GR NO. 40411
07 August 1935

ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery in dispute is a personal property

LAW: Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point.

According to the Code, real property consists of
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;
xxx
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or
trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the
requirements of such trade of industry

APPLICATION: Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes

immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant,
but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

CONCLUSION: As connecting up with the facts, it should further be

explained that the Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., has on a number of occasions
treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages
in favor of third persons
LOPEZ v. OROSA
GR NOs. L-10817-18
28 February 1958

ISSUE: Whether or not the materialmen's lien for the value of the materials
used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and
does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to?

LAW: The law provides that the following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil

APPLICATION: The petitioner insists that materialmen's lien also extends

to the land.

CONCLUSION: A building is by itself an immovable property.

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE v. IYA

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the fact that the lot was not owned by the Valino
spouses at the time that the chattel mortgage was executed divests the
building constructed thereon of its realty

LAW:
ART. 415: The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, Buildings, Roads and Construction of all kinds

adhered to the soil;

APPLICATION:

Defendant contends that since the lot was owned by another at that
time, the lot was not owned by the spouses and so the constructed building
thereupon is a personal property

CONCLUSION:

A building cannot be divested of its realty by the mere fact that the
land it was constructed on belongs to another
TUMALAD v. VICENCIO

ISSUE: Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void because its subject is
an immovable property?

LAW: By principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a

chattel may no longer subsequently claim otherwise.

APPLICATION: In this case, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor

of Tumalad over their house of strong materials which stood on a land
which was rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc.

CONCLUSION: Parties to a contract may treat as personal property that

which by nature would be real property, thus the chattel mortgage is valid.
MERALCO SECURITIES v. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS

Issue: WON the pipe of meralco is as immovable

Law: Article 415[l] and [3] all kinds adhered to the soil and everything
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object.

Application: Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a

pipeline system buried not less than one meter below the surface along the
shoulder of the public highway.

Conclusion: the said Pipe is a Real property and may be subjected to real
property tax
MAKATI LEASING v. WEAREVER
1983

Issue: Whether or not the machinery may be considered as personal

property from the point of view of the parties. Yes.

Law: In Tumalad vs. Vicencio, a house of strong materials may be

considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel
mortgage thereon, as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby.

Application: In the case at bar, Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a

chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and Finance
Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery.

Conclusion: The decision of the CA was set aside and the order of the
lower court was reinstated.
BERKENKOTTER v. CU UNJIENG
1935

ISSUE: W/N additional machinery and equipment as an improvement incorporated with

the central are subject to the mortgage deed.

LAW: Article 334 (5), NCC in relation to Article 1877, NCC

ART. 334 (5) “machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any
building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are
expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry.”

ART. 1877. “A mortgage includes all natural accessions, improvements … whether the estate continues
in the possession of the person who mortgaged it or whether it passes into the hands of a third person.”

APPLICATION: In this case, the installation of machinery and equipment in a

mortgaged sugar central for the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the
latter and increasing production constitutes a permanent improvement.

CONCLUSION: Thus, all objects permanently attached to a mortgaged building or

land, although they may have been placed there after the mortgage was constituted, are
also included.
MANILA ELECTRIC v. CENTRAL BANK
G.R. No. L-16005
April 28, 1962

ISSUE: WON the steel towers of an electric company constitute real

property for the purposes of real property tax

LAW: Article 415 paragraph 1, 3, and 5 provides: The following are

immovable property: (1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil; (3) Everything attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object; and (5) Machinery,
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or
on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works;

APPLICATION: Meralco has constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon

City, where the City Assessor declared that the steel towers are subject for
real property tax, which required Meralco to pay the amount of P11,651.86
as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956.

CONCLUSION: The steel towers of an electric company do not constitute

real property for the purposes of real property tax. Thus, the decision
appealed in accordance with law and the evidence, is affirmed, with costs
against petitioner.
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS v. MERALCO

ISSUE: Whether or not steel towers are considered immovable property.

LAW: Under Art. 415 of the Civil Code, immovable property are, among
others, those constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and those
attached in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.

APPLICATION: In this case, the steel towers are merely attached to a

square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily
be dismantled and moved from place to place.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, the steel towers are movable property.

CALTEX vs CBAA
G.R. No. L-504666, May 31, 1982

ISSUE: Whether the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery of

Caltex are subject to realty tax.

LAW: Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due
"on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other
improvements" not specifically exempted in section 3 thereof.

APPLICATION: The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said

items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty, however,
Caltex contended that they are personal property not subject to realty tax.

CONCLUSION: Said equipment and machinery are taxable improvements

and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code because they are necessary to the operation of the gas
station.
MERALCO SECURITIES v. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
GR NO. L-46245
31 May 1982

ISSUE:
Whether the aforementioned pipelines are subject to realty tax.

LAW:
Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist of
constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.

APPLICATION:
The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction adhering to
the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form
the pipeline.

CONCLUSION:
Yes, the pipelines are subject to realty tax.
BENGUET CORP. v. CBAA

ISSUE:
Whether the tailings dam is subject to realty tax because it is an
improvement upon the land.

LAW:
Article 415 of the Civil Code, the pertinent portions: Par (1) and (3)

APPLICATION:
The law does not carry a definition of "real property" and simply says that
the realty tax is imposed on "real property, such as lands, buildings,
machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property." In
the absence of such a definition, we apply Article 415 of the Civil Code.

CONCLUSION:
The immovable nature of the dam defines its character as real property
under Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under Section
38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
SALAS v. JARENCIO
46 SCRA 734
30 August 1972

ISSUE:

Whether the lots in question are public land or patrimonial land

LAW:
As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the
land in the possession of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in
its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for
the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes and in the absence of title deed to any land claimed
by a city or municipality as its own, showing that it was acquired with its
private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the
State upon the creation of the municipality.

APPLICATION:
In the case at bar, the property was not acquired by the City of Manila
with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of
the territory of the City of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation.

CONCLUSION:
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land
belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of
Manila for municipal purposes.
GOV’T v. CABANGIS
GR NO 28379
27 March 1979

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the lands in question are public domain having been
gained from the sea (Manila Bay) by accession

LAW:
Art. 339, Property of Public Ownership is -
1.) That devoted to public use such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shorts, roadsteads, and that of similar character

APPLICATION:
The Government, By dredging of the Vitas Estuary caused the
deposits of sand and silt from the bed of the Estuary on the low lands which
gradually began to form lots

CONCLUSION:
The lots in question, having disappeared on account of the gradual
erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a
state until they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the
Government, they are public land
 PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA
GR NO. L-24440
28 March 1968

ISSUE: Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or

patrimonial property?

LAW: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is

divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.

ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

APPLICATION: RA 3039 was passed and it transferred all of the buildings

and properties of the former province of Zamboanga in favor of the City of
Zamboanga. The properties involved are patrimonial in nature and
therefore the law is unconstitutional if it would deprive the province of its
property without just compensation.

CONCLUSION: Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to

plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which
the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46
previously paid to the latter.
PEREZ v. MENDOZA

ISSUE: Whether or not the Perezes successfully proved their ownership of

the land.

LAW: Art. 433 NCC provides that actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership and the true
owner must resort to judicial process for recovery of the property, whereas
Art. 538 NCC states that the present possession is to be preferred in cases
there are conflicting claims.

APPLICATION: The Perezes brought an action against the Mendozas for

quieting of title, alleging that the latter leased the lot from them and refused
to return it when the lease ended.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, the Mendozas are presently in possession of

the property and the presumption of ownership in their favor has not been
successfully rebutted by evidence the they are mere lessees as the
Perezes claimed.
DIZON v. CA and GALANG
GR NO.101929
06 January 1993

ISSUE: Whether or not, the properties in question owned in common

by the predecessors-in-interest of appellants and appellees?

LAW:
“Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud
therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been
extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive
prescription.”

APPLICATION:
None of Galang’s co-heirs asserted claims over the said lands
and only after 61 years that they protested their issuance. Hence, the
titles of the subject properties in this case became indefeasible and
incontrovertible

CONCLUSION:
While it is true that Galang executed an affidavit that states
petitioners as “co-heirs” therein, there is no reference to the said lots
and cannot, therefore, be a sufficient basis a partition between
Dionisio and his now deceased sisters

UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY

328 US 256 (1946)
ISSUE: Whether or not Causby's property has been taken by the petitioner

LAW: ARTICLE 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its
surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works
or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances.
He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

APPLICATION: Respondent's chicken farm production had to stop

because of the loud noises made by the United States' four motored
bombers when flying above the property.

CONCLUSION: The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to

have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.

LUNOD v. MENESES
GR NO. 4223
19 August 1908

ISSUE:

Whether or not Defendant herein, Meneses may construct a man-

made dam in his estate which could impede the statutory easement
imposed upon his estate

LAW:
Art. 111 (in relation to Art. 563):

“Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the

waters that flow naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands
together with the stone or earth which they carry with them”

APPLICATION:
 Defendant herein constructed a dam to construct a fish pond in his
estate that resulted in the flooding of the upper estates

CONCLUSION:
Defendant has the strict and necessary obligation to respect the
statutory easement of waters charged upon his property and had no right to
close the passage and outlet of waters flowing from the land of the
plaintiff’s upper estates
BACHRACH v. SEIFERT
GR NO. L-1592
20 September 1949

ISSUE: Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the

usufructuary, or is it capital or part of the corpus of the estate, which
pertains to the remainderman?

LAW: In Hite vs. Hite, where a dividend, although declared in stock, is

based upon the earnings of the company, it is in reality, whether called by
one name or another, the income of the capital invested in it.

APPLICATION: In this case, deceased Bachrach bequeathed and devised

to his wife Mary McDonald Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the
remainder of all his estate and she may enjoy said usufruct and use or
spend such fruits as she may in any manner wish.

CONCLUSION: Thus, Mary McDonald Bachrach is entitled to receive and

enjoy the stock dividends, the latter being the income and fruits of the
estate of deceased Bachrach.
BACHRACH v. TALISAY-SILAY MINING
GR NO. 35223
17 September 1931

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bonus in question are civil fruits

LAW:
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits; (1)
rents from. buildings, (2) proceeds from leases of lands, and (3) the income
from perpetual or life annuities or similar sources of revenue.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the bonus which the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had
'to pay the planters who had mortgaged their lands to the Philippine
National Bank in order to- secure the payment of the company's debt to the
bank is not based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of
the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt secured, which
is something quite distinct from and independent of the property referred to.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the bonus not obtained from the land is not civil fruits of
that land.
BERNARDO v. BATACLAN
GR NO. 44606
28 November 1938

ISSUE: WON the defendant lost his right to retain the property pending
payment for indemnity

LAW: Art. 448 provides that the owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.

APPLICATION: In this case, upon Bernardo’s entry into the premises of

the property purchased from Samonte the former learned that the latter
authorized Bataclan, a builder and possesor in good faith, to make
improvements thereon.

CONCLUSION: Thus, the right to retain the property has been lost due to
the failure and inability of defendant to pay the purchase price.
IGNACIO v. HILARIO
GR NO. L-175
30 April 1946

Issue: Whether or not the builder in good faith to the land owned by
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the
value of his building or to sell the land to the owner of the building. Yes.

Law: Under Art. 361, the owner of land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the work of sowing or planting, after the payment of indemnity stated in
articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.

Application: In the case at bar, the Hilarios are the owners of the whole
property of a parcel of land while the Ignacios are builders in good faith of
the houses and granaries.

Conclusion: The Hilarios were ordered to sell the land to the Ignacios or to
pay the buildings and improvements thereon.
SARMIENTO v. AGANA
GR NO. 57288
30 April 1984

ISSUE: W/N the land owner is compelled to exercise option to buy the
building or to sell the land.
LAW:
Article 546 “The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another,
is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building.”
Article 448 “The owner of the land has the option either to pay for the building or to sell
his land to the owner of the building.”
APPLICATION: In this case, ERNESTO and wife were builders in good
faith. They constructed their RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND they
believed owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they
could build on the property, could reasonably be expected to later give
them the LAND.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the owner of the land has the option either to pay for
the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot
refuse both and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
DEPRA v. DUMLAO
GR NO. L-57348
16 May 1985

ISSUE: Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent
payments by the court (with both LO and BPS being in good faith)?

LAW: Article 448 of the Civil Code provides: The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.c

APPLICATION: Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while

Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao in good faith, built his house on
his own land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depra’s
property. Upon finding this, Depra’s mom ordered Dumlao to move back
from his encroachment, then subsequently filed an action for unlawful
detainer against Dumlao.

CONCLUSION: The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the
fair price of the land, the expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the
increase in value of the land, and whether the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the kitchen built on it. The RTC shall
then give Depra 15 days to exercise such option.

FILIPINAS COLLEGES v. TIMBANG

GR NO. L-12812
29 September 1959

ISSUE: Whether or not the landowner gains ownership of the

improvements in the property upon the builder-in-good-faith’s failure to pay
the value demanded

LAW: Under the law, in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the
value of the land after the owner thereof has chosen such alternative, the
builder’s right of retention is lost.

APPLICATION: In this case, nothing was mentioned that as a

consequence, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building and
the builder has the right to retain the land on which he has built in good
faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, the landowner does not automatically gain

ownership of the improvements.
ORTIZ v. KAYANAN
GR NO. L-32974
30 July 1979

ISSUE: Whether petitioner after the final judgment is still entitled to retain
for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property.

LAW: The law provides that possession in good faith ceases or is legally
interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by
the true owner for the recovery of the property.

APPLICATION: When his ward died, Ortiz continued to cultivate and

possess the latter’s property, which was formerly a subject of homestead
application, which, the ward’s uncle was named as his heir and successor
in interest. Consequently, the uncle executed an affidavit relinquishing his
rights over the property and final judgment was obtained in his favor.

CONCLUSION: All the fruits that Ortiz received from the time he is
summoned in court, or when he answers the complaint, must be delivered
and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
FLOREZA v. EVANGELISTA
GR NO. L-25462
21 February 1980

Issue: WON Florenza should be entitled to reimbursement under Art.448

as he built a house on the land of Evangelista

Law: Art.448 of the civil code

Application: Florenza built a house knowing that it belongs to another

evidenced by a contract

Conclusion: Art.448 is only applicable when the builder, planter, or sower

believes that he has title to the land.
PECSON v. CA
GR NO. 115814
26 May 1995

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar

LAW:
With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in
analogy. Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has
been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not
apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his
own land who later on loses ownership by sale or donation.
Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be
refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it
does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement.

APPLICATION:
The respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as
sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is
contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed
should be the present market value of said improvements so as not to
unjustly enrich either of the parties.

CONCLUSION:
The law shall apply.
REPUBLIC v. CA
GR NO. L-61647
12 October 1984

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands sought to be registered by the plaintiffs were
caused by accretion

LAW:
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters. The Article requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion is said to have taken place:

1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible

2) That it be made through the effects of the current of river

3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers

APPLICATION:
In the case at bar, the alleged alluvial deposits came into being not
because of the effect of the current of rivers but as a result of the transfer of
dikes towards the river and encroaching upon it. The lands sought to be
registered are not even dry lands cast imperceptibly and gradually by the
river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it.

CONCLUSION:
There is no accretion.
GOV’T v. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE
GR NO. 30829
28 August 1929

ISSUE:
Whether or not the two parcels of land in question claimed by the
Colegio de San Jose belongs to the public domain

LAW:
Art. 84 of the Law of Waters (in relation to Art. 407)

“Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to

creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owner of
such lands.”

APPLICATION:
The two parcels of land have been formed by accession or deposits
of sediments by waters of said Laguna de Bay by having been inundated
by the same

CONCLUSION:

Colegio San Jose, being the owners of the land of the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan bordering said body of water owns the parcels of land
in question.
MENESES v. CA
GR NO. 82220
14 July 1995

ISSUE: Whether or not the lands in question were not accretion lands but
lands of the public domain

LAW: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters. (336)

APPLICATION: Pablito Meneses acquired land. On the other hand,

Quisumbing filed a case claiming that the land belonged to them and that it
was private accression land.

CONCLUSION: The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed
or basin of Laguna de Bay is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he
has a registerable title.
BAES v. CA
GR NO. 108065
06 July 1993

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners own the dried-up portion of the creek.

LAW:
Article 461 CC states that river beds which are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters belong to the owners whose
lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the law does not apply because the government
compensated the petitioners for the lost property.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the petitioners do not own the dried-up portion of the
creek.
SANTOS v. BERNABE
GR NO. L-31163
06 November 1929

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiongson may claim 924 cavans of palay from the warehouse when
Santos had cavans of palay depsosited in the warehouse of Bernabe

LAW:
Art. 381 CC states that, “if by the will of their owners, two things of identical or
dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the
things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.”

APPLICATION:
In this case, the law applies because the cavans of rice owned by Santos and
respondent Tiongson mixed and have no mark.

CONCLUSION:
In this case, the law applies because the cavans of rice owned by Santos and
respondent Tiongson mixed and have no mark.
SIARI VALLEY v. LUCASAN
GR NO. L-13281
31 August 1960

ISSUE: Whether or not Lucasan was in bad faith thus should lose his share
in the commixtion

LAW: Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that “if the commingling of 2
things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share”

APPLICATION: Petitioner brought an action to recover 200 heads of cattle

that were driven from its land to that of Lucasan's, but the latter argued that
although there was commixtion of cattle, Siari already retrieved its animals.

CONCLUSION: Lucasan is in bad faith and therefore, should lose his

share in the commixtion.
 HEIRS OF OLVIGA v. CA
GR NO. 104813
21 October 1993

ISSUE:
Whether or not, actions to quiet title to property in possession of the
plaintiff is imprescriptible

LAW:
Art.480: The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are
hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with this code

APPLICATION:
Since the plaintiffs are in actual possession of the said property, the
action for the quieting of title is imprescriptible

CONCLUSION:
The action for conveyance was one to quiet title i.e. to remove the
cloud cast upon appellee’s ownership by the refusal of the appellants to
recognize the sale made by their predecessors and that actions to quiet
title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible
PINGOL v. CA
GR NO. 102909
06 September 1993

ISSUE: Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title?

LAW: Under the law, it is not necessary that the vendee should have an
absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with
personality to bring an action to quiet title.

APPLICATION: The heirs of Donasco, having in their possession the lot

subject of the Deed of Absolute sale, filed an action for specific
performance with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol,the
vendor,were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot.

CONCLUSION: Donasco, who had made partial payments and

improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title
against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him.
SANTOS v. BERNABE
GR NO. L-31163
06 November 1929

ISSUE:

LAW:

APPLICATION:

CONCLUSION:
PUNSALAN v. BOON LIAT
GR NO. 18009
10 January 1923

ISSUE: WON an action for recovery may be filed by a co-owner against a

co-owner with respect to the thing they held in common?

LAW: The action for recovery which each coöwner has, derived from the
right of ownership inherent in the coöwnership, may be exercised not only
against strangers but against the coöwners themselves, when the latter
perform, with respect to the thing held in common, acts for their exclusive
benefit, or of exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in
violation of, the right of the community.

APPLICATION: The ambergris which is the subject-matter of this litigation

was the undivided common property of the plaintiffs and one of the
defendants. This common ownership was acquired by occupancy.

CONCLUSION: Hence, court ordered defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs

20/21 of the amber in question.
NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. v. HIDALGO
GR NO. 42334
31 October 1936

Issue: Whether or not North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) can enjoin Hidalgo
from passing the property. No.

Law: Art. 594 states, “The owner of an estate may burden it with such
easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may
consider desirable, provided he does not violate the law or public order.”

Application: In the case at bar, NNSC voluntarily constituted an easement

in favor of the community, so while the road is thrown open, NNSC may not
capriciously exclude Hidalgo from its use.

Conclusion: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

GATCHALIAN v. COLLECTOR
GR NO. 45425
29 April 1939

ISSUE: W/N petitioners formed Co-ownership when they purchased the winning
sweepstakes ticket.
LAW: Article 484, NCC
Art. 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons.”
APPLICATION: In this case, each of the plaintiffs put up money to buy a sweepstakes
ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win. Jose
Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, in
his capacity as co-partner, as such collected the prize and check.
CONCLUSION: All these circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffs organized and
formed a community of property only.
DIVERSIFIED CREDIT v. ROSADO
G.R. No. L-27933
December 24, 1968

ISSUE: WON Rosado may claim as conjugal property of the undivided

portion share of land of his wife

LAW: In the case of Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567 it was held that that no
individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing
owned in common until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the
co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the
entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners.

APPLICATION: Rosado contends that as the building of the house at the

expense of the conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share on
his wife in Lot 62-B into property of the community, the deed of sale in favor
of the appellee corporation was void in so far as said 1/13 share is
concerned, because his wife, Luz Jayme, had ceased to own such share
from and after the building of the house; and Rosado, as manager of the
conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor subsequently
ratified the same.

CONCLUSION: Lower court did not err in holding that the appellant was
bound to vacate the land without reimbursement, since he knew that the
land occupied by the house did not belong exclusively to his wife, but to the
other owners as well, and there is no proof on record that the house
occupied only 1/13 of the total area.
PARDELL v. BARTOLOME
GR NO. L-4656
18 November 1912

ISSUE: Whether or not defendants are obliged to pay rent for the
occupation as co-owner of the property

LAW: Under the law, co-owners have the right to use such property as long
as it does not injure the interest of the other co-owners.

APPLICATION: In this case, defendant spouses merely exercised their

right to use the property and the petitioner has failed to prove that in
defendant spouses’ occupation of the property, petitioner is prevented from
utilizing the same.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, defendant spouses are not liable for rent.

LAVADIA v. COSME
GR NO. 47996
09 May 1941

ISSUES: Whether Rosario was a depositary and therefore obligated to

return the jewelry to the owners even if she is a co-owner.

LAW: Article 1766 of the Civil Code provides that the depositary is obliged
to keep the thing and restore it, when so requested, to the depositor, or his
successors, or the person who has been designated in the contract.

APPLICATION: Rosario, being a descendant of Pia, received and

possessed the jewels in question only for purposes of custody or such that
she must not use them for their own benefit.

CONCLUSION: Hence, Rosario as a depositary is obligated to return the

jewelry to the owners, subject to its preservation with the care, diligence
and interest of a good father.
MELENCIO v. DY TIAO LAY
GR NO. 32047
01 November 1930

Issue: WON the contract of lease to a third person is void, due to its term
of 60 years without the consent of all the co-owners

Law: According to jurisprudence, the part owners representing the greater

portion of the property held in common have no power to lease said
property for a longer period than six years without the consent of all the co-
owners.

Application: In this case, not only that the contract lacked the signature of
all co-owners, it also went beyond the 6-year limit set by the Civil Code,
since the contract was for 20 years extendible by 40 more years (60 years
total).

Conclusion: The contract is void.

TUASON v. TUASON
G.R. No. L-3404
April 2, 1951

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract should be declared null and void because of its
terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15, which violate the provisions of
Art. 400 of the Civil Code

LAW:
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the
community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in
common.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the contract has, for its purpose and object, the dissolution of
the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in
common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the contract should not be declared null and void.
MARIANO v. CA
G.R. No. 101522
28 May 1993

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her
own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and
terminates the existing state of co-ownership

LAW:
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

APPLICATION:
In the case at bar, the property in question was mortgaged by the
decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given
by law to redeem the foreclosed property and redemption of the whole
property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said
property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners.

CONCLUSION:
It will not end to the existing state of co-ownership.
Reyes vs. Judge Concepcion
G.R. No. 56550
01 October 1990

ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner can be obliged to remain in a co-

ownership and the former be barred from demanding a partition at any time
he so pleases.

LAW:
Co-owners have a pro-indiviso share of the property owned in common and
that their right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, shall go only so far as their
pro-indiviso share is concerned.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the private respondents plans to have the property partitioned
by virtue of an injunction and have it sold to a third person so that they may
sell the entire property to the intervenor.

CONCLUSION:
Thus, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in a co-ownership and the
former may demand a partition at any time.
Ramirez vs. Ramirez
G.R. No. L-22621
29 September 1967

ISSUE: WON usufruct over real properties by a foreigner is void because it

violates the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring land in the
Philippines.

LAW: 1935 Constitution provides that: Save in cases of hereditary

succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold public land in the Philippines.

APPLICATION: Jose Ramirez died and left his property to his sons while
his wife, a Frenchwoman, had usufruct over ⅔ of the free portion of his
property.

CONCLUSION: The usufruct given to the foreign wife was upheld because
usufruct does not vest title, but merely the use and enjoyment of the
property.
Halili vs. CA
G.R. No. 113539
March 12, 1998

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be granted the right of redemption
under Art. 1621

LAW:
Art. 1621 CC states that, “the owners of adjoining lands shall also
have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which
does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not
own any rural land.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the law does not apply since the land in question is
urban.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the petitioners cannot be granted the right of redemption.
Pilapil vs. CA
G.R. No. 55134
04 December 1995

(how is this compliant with the 4-sentence digest????)

ISSUE: WON H. Serafica & Sons Corporation is a buyer in good faith,

when it was "at least negligent in not verifying or inspecting the land
or title of its vendors.

LAW: The purpose of the registration is to give notice to third

persons. And, privies are not third persons. The vendor's heirs are his
privies. Against them, failure to register will not vitiate or annul the
vendee's right of ownership conferred by such unregistered deed of
sale.

APPLICATION: When Carmen sold the property to H. Serafica and

Sons Corporation, she no longer had any rights of dominion to
transmit, since her own father who sold to her the property had
himself earlier relinquished his ownership rights in favor of the
petitioners. Accordingly, Carmen transmitted no right to the
corporation.

CONCLUSION: Needless to say, the corporation may file a case

against the assurance funder under Section 101 of the Land
Registration Act and Section 95 of P.D. No. 1529; but to obviate
multiplicity of suits, the award of damages in its favor should now be
upheld.
Heirs of Maningding vs. CA
G.R. No. 121157
31 July 1997

ISSUE: Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject
properties by acquisitive prescription

LAW: Art. 494. “xxx No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.”

APPLICATION: Roque Bauzon and his heirs had been in continuous,

adverse and public possession of the property since 1948 up to 1986, or a
period of thirty-six (36) years, which is more than the required thirty-year
extraordinary prescription.

CONCLUSION: While prescription among co-owners cannot take place

when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such
prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership
do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-
owners.
Aguilar v. CA
G.R. No. 116895
7 July 2000

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Presumption of Constructive Delivery is
applicable to the case at bar it being a Contract of Lease and not of a
Contract of Sale

LAW:
Art. 1654, Par. 1 & 3:
"to deliver the thing which is the subject of the contract in such
a condition as to render it fit for the use intended" and “to maintain the
lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract.

APPLICATION:
Considering that there was a constructive delivery of the subject
leased premises upon the execution of the contract, petitioner was already
in a position to exercise his right to the use and enjoyment of the property
according to the lease contract

CONCLUSION:
The lessee undertook to construct not more than a three-storey
framed building for physical facilities of the commercial establishments and
business, showing that it was the intention of the parties that a single
building should occupy the entire leased premises
Carvajal v. CA and Solid Homes, Inc.
G.R. No. 98328
October 9, 1997

ISSUE: WON respondents are the lawful owners of the land in question.

LAW: Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, An individual co- owner
cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land
or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial
decree.

APPLICATION: The land subject of the controversy is the most southern

portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children which petitioner
claims he had bought from Estefanio on and which respondents claim they
had bought from Evaristo; both sales were made while the petition for
partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.

CONCLUSION: The action for ejectment and recovery of possession

instituted by herein respondents in the lower court is premature, for what
must be settled first is the action for partition.
CARVAJAL v. CA, CAMARILLOS & CACABELOS
G.R. No. L-44426
25 February 1982

ISSUE:
Whether or not the co-owners may sell a specific part of the co-
owned property without partition

LAW:
Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and
he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in
favor of respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor
of petitioner were made before the partition of the property among the co-
heirs are valid but the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and
respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to
Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the co-owners no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the
other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an
abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication
 Pamplona v. Moreto
G.R. No. L-33187
March 31, 1980

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same?

LAW: Art. 776 stated that the inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.

APPLICATION: Moreto sold a part of hislot to petitioner Sps. Pamplona,

upon his death respondents as heirs, demanded from Sps. Pamlona to
vacate the premises on the ground that Moreto had no right to sell the lot
as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Moreto and his wife.

CONCLUSION: Hence, Full-ownership of the property was given to

petitioner, as respondents were barred by estoppel by laches in claiming
said property.
Castro v. Atienza
G.R. No. L-25014
October 17, 1973

Issue: (1) Whether or not a co-owner could validly lease his half-interest to
a third party independently of his co-owner and (2) in case other co-owner
leased his other half interest to a third party, could a co-owner cancel his
own lease agreement with said third party. Yes to both.

Law: Art. 493 provides: “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.”

Application: In the case at bar, Arsenio is a co-owner of the fishpond

owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa
Vda. de Castro), Arsenio validly leased his half-interest to a third party
(respondent Atienza) independently of his co-owner, and the consent of
Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the
lease of Arsenio’s one-half undivided share in the fishpond to Atienza.

Conclusion: Appealed judgment is affirmed.

Estoque v. Pajimula
G.R. No. L-24419
July 15, 1968

ISSUE: W/N right of legal redemption can be exercised.

LAW: Article 1434. “When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto,
such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.”

APPLICATION: In this case, on the date of the sale to Estoque said contract may have
been ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in
the deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day
the vendor, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners and thereby became
the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey.

CONCLUSION: Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802
and never acquired an undivided interest in the said lot when eight years later Crispina
Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot, appellant
did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective portions
were distinct and separate.
PNB v. CA G.R. No. L-34404. June 25, 1980

ISSUE: WON Rosa Ver could really mortgage the entire lot to PNB.

LAW: Article 777, New Civil Code; Article 657, old Civil Code provides that
“The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.”

APPLICATION: After the death of Inigo Bitanga, Rosa mortgaged the

entire property in favour of PNB on October 20, 1936 for the sum of 500
pesos, by which the property in question originally belonged to the conjugal
property of Inigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver.

CONCLUSION: When Inigo died, a co-ownership was established between

the heirs and Rosa Ver. Hence, Rosa cannot validly mortgage the whole lot
since it would prejudice the rights of her co-owners, the heirs.
Sunset View v. Campos, G.R. No. L-52361. April 27, 1981

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is the owner of the

condominium and holder of a separate interest which would make her a
stockholder.

LAW: Under the law, ownership is conveyed only upon full payment of the
purchase price.

APPLICATION: In this case, private respondent has not yet paid the
condominium unit in full.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, private respondent is neither the owner of the

condominium unit, nor a stockholder in the condominium corporation.
Heirs of Jumero v. Lizares (G.R. No. L-5051; September 27, 1910)

ISSUE: Whether the purchase verbally made gives a perfect title which,
with the occupation or possession of the thing, confers ownership upon the
possessor.

LAW: The law provides that a possessor by virtue or ownership has in his
favor the legal presumption that he holds possession by reason of a
sufficient title and he cannot be forced to show it.

APPLICATION: The defendant, Lizares, who possessed the land in

litigation for forty years, alleges that he is in possession thereof by virtue of
a title of purchase and sale, which is a title of transfer of ownership; he is,
consequently, the possessor under title of ownership.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, the defendant as possessor of the land for 40

years, has the better right over the property.
Banco Espanol vs. Peterson (G.R. No. L-3088; February 6, 1907)

Issue: WON Reyes is still in possession of the property thus no pledge was
created as delivery is an essential element of pledge

Law: Art.1316

Application: both the debtor and creditor agreed to deliver the goods to a
third person

Conclusion: delivery to a third person agreed by both parties is

constructive delivery to the creditor, thus possession is now in the hands of
the creditor.
Astudillo v. PHHC (G.R. No. L-28066; September 22, 1976)

ISSUE:
Whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot
16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her

LAW:
Those respondents did not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her
rights because, in the first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being
principally or subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and
the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its annulment Art. 1397, Civil Code

APPLICATION:
She has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and to require that
she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory
rights over the lot. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did not
prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which
could have been impaired by that award

CONCLUSION:
the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed.
Peran vs. CFI (G.R. No. L-57259; October 13, 1983)

ISSUE:
Whether or not possession of the property by mere tolerance vests
the private respondents with a right of possession which they can assert
against the petitioner

LAW:
In decided cases, the court has held that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the
owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand; a possessor by
tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him.

APPLICATION:
In the case at bar, Encarnacion was in possession but they have not
proved their title to the land nor their right to possess the same; her
possession was by mere tolerance of Peran’s predecessors in interest.

CONCLUSION:
Tolerance of lawful owner’s predecessors-in-interest cannot vest a
right to said lot which the possessor by tolerance can assert.
Fabie v. David, G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the usufructuary has the right to administer the
property and as such, has the right to bring the action to oust tenant Ngo
Boo from the property

LAW:
Art 572.

“The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct,

lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by
gratuitous title...xxx”

APPLICATION:
The usufructuary enjoys the right to administer property and may
lease the property to another

CONCLUSION:
The usufructuary has the right to bring the action to oust the tenant
Ngo Boo because only he may lease the property to another
Amor v. Florentino (G.R. No. 48384; October 11, 1943)

ISSUE: WON the easement of light and view under review has been
established in favor of the property of respondents through prescription

LAW: Art. 541. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between

two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if
one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue
actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates
is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them,
or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.

APPLICATION: Maria Florentino owned a house and a warehouse to Amor

in which he demolished the latter to create a 2 story structure which
blocked the light and air coming through the window of the neighbour,
Jose.

CONCLUSION: Petitioner continued the construction of the structure even

though there was an injunction and therefore cannot complain if he is
ordered to tear the structure down again.
Encarnacion v. CA (G.R. No. 77628; March 11, 1991)

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of

an already existing easement of right-of-way.

LAW: Under the law, right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is
absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is
one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.

APPLICATION: In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a

semi-concrete bridge and there is neither ingress nor egress from the
highway.

CONCLUSION: Petitioner Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of the

existing easement of right of way.
Ramos vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No. L-13298. November 19, 1918)

ISSUE: WON actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the

instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract
of land?

LAW: The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer.

The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of
a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of
all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

APPLICATION: When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest,
the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof
that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes.

CONCLUSION: Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that
a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in
interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that
he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
Director vs. CA, (G.R. No. L-25723. June 29, 1984)

ISSUE: Whether or not constructive possession applies in this case?

LAW: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a

tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession
of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

APPLICATION: The major portion of the disputed 128 hectares has been
in the adverse possession of homesteaders and their heirs and is still part
of the public domain until the patents are issued.
n
CONCLUSION: When a portion of a land is in the adverse possession of
another, constructive possession does not apply.
Pleasantville Dev't Corp. vs. CA (G.R. No. 79688; February 1, 1996)

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Kee is a builder in good faith

LAW:
Art. 448 (in relation to Arts. 546 and 548):

“The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent…xxx”

APPLICATION:
Kee was declared as a builder in good faith by the court but held that
CTTEI and Pleasantville Dev’t Corp. would pay for the removal of the
structures, demolition expenses, and value of the improvements thus
destroyed or rendered useless instead of Kee because of their negligence

CONCLUSION:
Kee is a builder in good faith because he introduced the
improvements and built the structures believing that he had constructed the
same in the lot that he bought from Pleasantville
ORTIZ v. FUENTEBELLA

ISSUE: WON Asuncion Fuentebella possesses the land in good faith?

LAW: Jurisprudence tells us that possession acquired having knowledge of

certain facts that put in doubt the title of the assignees must be regarded as
bad faith.

APPLICATION: In this case, Fuentebella's bad faith began after the

warning given in a letter, for having received it she then had ground to
doubt Sotera and Cano could transfer the title.

CONCLUSION: Thus, Fuentebella is in bad faith and that the title of

possession be restored to Ortiz.
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez (see also dissents of Moran and Concepcion)
(G.R. No. 46623; December 7, 1939)

ISSUE:WON petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in

good faith being unaware of the flaw in his title?

LAW: Art. 433 provides that every person who is unaware of any glaw in
his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be
deemed a possessor of good faith.

APPLICATION: Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in

the alienation of lands petitioner acting in good faith took possession of the
land, without knowing that the enjoyment of the fruits of the subject land is
an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.

CONCLUSION: Thus, petitioner not being conversant with the law bec he
is not a lawyer, his ignorance of the provisions of Sec. 116 is excusable
and may be the basis of his good faith.
Muyco v. Montilla

Issue: Whether or not Muyco’s complaint against Montilla to return the

possession of land is proper. No

Law: Article 460 of the Civil Code provides: "The possessor may lose his
possession: By the possession of another even against the will of the
former possessor, if the new possession has lasted more than one year.”

Application: In the case at bar, Muyco, after Infante and Montilla had
obtained judicial possession in due form of the land of the hacienda, more
than a year having elapsed, lost his right to the possession of the parcels of
land which he claims belong to him and which were alleged to be included
within the boundaries of the said hacienda.

Conclusion: Judgment of the lower court is reversed.

MACASAET v. MACASAET

ISSUE: W/N petitioners occupied the subject lots based on mere tolerance.

LAW: Toleration is defined as the act or practice of permitting or enduring

something not wholly approved of.

APPLICATION: In this case, petitioners possession was upon the invitation

of and with the complete approval of respondents, who desired that their
children would occupy the premises. It arose from familial love and a desire
for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.

CONCLUSION: Thus, those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are
necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand.
Cuaycong vs. Benedicto (G.R. No. 9989; March 13, 1918)

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject road was a public highway

LAW: Article 536 of the New Civil Code states that: “In no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”

APPLICATION: Defendants are the owner of Nanca-Victorias road

situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the
barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental (new
name of Seravia Municipality), and the appellees are the lessees of part of
said haciendas, by which was used for all purposes of transportation and
other conveyances without break or interruption for 40 years until two or
three years ago when the defendants announced that the road was private
and that those who wished to pass over it with sugar carts would be obliged
to pay a toll of ten centavos but all other vehicles are free of charge.

CONCLUSION: The subject passage was not a public highway due for
being no evidence of a direct grant to the government of the land occupied
by the road in question or that any Government funds or labor were
expended upon it, the question presents itself whether the use to which the
road has been put was such as to justify the conclusion of the lower court
that it has become public property.
Cordero v. Cabral (G.R. No. L-36789; July 25, 1983)

ISSUE: Whether or not defendants are in possessors in good faith.

LAW: Under Art. 528, possession acquired ceases to be in good faith upon
notice that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.

APPLICATION: In this case, defendants were served with summons to

answer the complaint against them with regard to the possession of the
property.

CONCLUSION: Hence, the defendants are not possessors in good faith

and should reimburse the fruits they have received from such possession.
Valderrama v. North Negros Sugar Co., Inc
G.R. No. L-23810 18 December 1925

ISSUE: Whether the easement of way established was restricted to

transporting only sugar cane from the hacienda owners’ lands.

LAW: Art. 543 of The Civil Code Provides that each one of the participants
of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to have exclusively
possessed the part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof,
for the entire period during which the co-possession lasted.

APPLICATION: The hacienda owners allege ambiguity on the contract that

granted North Negros an easement of way upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad, since it could permit the transportation of sugar
cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent.

CONCLUSION: Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous

easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is contrary to the nature of
the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates
since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by reason of easement.
Ongsiako v. Ongsiako
GR. No. 7510
March 30, 1957

Issue: WON the plaintiffs have a cause of action for their right of easement
of drainage was violated due to construction of a dike.

Law: Art. 552 of 1889 Civil Code (The Old Civil Code) and Art. 615 of the
new civil code

Application: Since according to plaintiffs’ own evidence, the dikes

obstructing the overflow from their land were built in 1937 or 1938, and the
present action for their destruction was filed in 1951, the plaintiffs’ action is
barred by prescription. The period is ten years from their violation.

Conclusion: plaintiffs action is barred by prescription.

Ronquillo v. Roco
G.R. No. L-10619
February 28, 1958

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by
prescription?

LAW:
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements
may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be
considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on
the acts of man.

APPLICATION:
Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least
since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription
through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190.

CONCLUSION:
No. The easement of a right of way may not be acquired by prescription.
Caram v. Laureta (G.R. No. L-28740; February 24, 1981)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner acted in good faith through the actions
of his agents

LAW:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.

APPLICATION:

In the case at bar, Attorneys Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of

the circumstances, knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other
papers pertaining to the land was taken by soldiers under the command of
Col. Claro L. Laureta and that at the time of the second sale Laureta was
already in possession of the land; Irespe and Aportadera should have
investigated the nature of Laureta's possession.

CONCLUSION:
Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no
registration at all.
Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles
66 SCRA 481
29 August 1975

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the sale of the abandoned road, having been
declared abandoned is valid?

LAW:
Art. 422
“Property of Public Dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State”

APPLICATION:
The road in question, having been declared abandoned by the
City Council of Cebu, can be sold to a private person

CONCLUSION:
Power to vacate or abandon a patrimonial property is
discretionary and will not be ordinarily controlled or interfered with by
the courts. Moreso, if the property is no longer intended to for public
use or service
VDA. DE TAN TOCO v. MUN. COUNCIL OF ILOILO
49 PHIL 52
25 March 1926

ISSUE: WON municipal properties can be executed in lieu of unsatisfied

obligations?

LAW: Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets,
the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be

governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws

APPLICATION: It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had
sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the
purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of
592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square
meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said
street.

CONCLUSION: The principle is that the property for public use of the State
is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and
not subject to prescription.
MUN. OF SAN MIGUEL v. FERNANDEZ
GR NO. L-61744
25 June 1984

ISSUE: Whether or not public property of municipal corporations are

exempt from execution.

LAW: According to jurisprudence, not only the public property but also the
taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under
execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it.

APPLICATION: In this case, the public funds are public property of the
petitioner municipality.

CONCLUSION: Hence, the public funds are not subject to levy and
execution.
Tuason v. Jurilla (G.R. No. L-19998; April 22, 1977)

ISSUE: - WON THE SPOUSES VICENTE JURILLA AND ESTER L.

JURILLA, POSSESSORS IN GOOD FAITH OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
AND BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH OF THE PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT
INTRODUCED THEREIN

LAW: That a Torrens title is indefeasible and incontrovertible as against

any right or title in favor of any party existing prior to the issuance thereof
no annotated on the title.

APPLICATION: - In fact, in their answer filed in the court below, appellants,

by making a general denial of the appellee's allegation that it is the holder
of a Torrens title over the land in dispute, have virtually admitted the
ownership thereof in appellee, albeit they claimed that they had acquired
the same for valuable consideration from Florencio Deudor whose right
over the same, according to them, was recognized by appellee in the
compromise settlement

CONCLUSION: - The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs

against appellants.
STA. MARIA v. CA
285 SCRA 357 (1998)

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT

OF WAY CAN BE ESTABLISHED

LAW: Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

APPLICATION: Where there are several tenements surrounding the

dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the
one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen.

CONCLUSION: The contention does not impress because even without

the fences private respondents' property remains landlocked by
neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
FLORA v. LLENADO
G.R. NO. 75723 02 JUNE 1995

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to

allow Llenado to claim the same against Mr. Floro

LAW: Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is
entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.

APPLICATION: Ms. Ipapo and Llenado agreed to create a right of way

through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. However, Llenado pursued
easement claim over the Floro property on the ground that it is convenient.

CONCLUSION: A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience

of the dominant estate. The owner must prove that the easement is
absolutely necessary and least restrictive on the servient estate.
QUIMEN v. CA
G.R. NO. 112331 29 MAY 1996

ISSUE: Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolanda is the least
onerous/prejudicial to the parties.

LAW: Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.

APPLICATION: The property of Quimen were totally isolated from the

public highway and there appears to be an imperative need for an
easement of right of way to the public highway

CONCLUSION: When the easement may be established on any of several

tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is
shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as
elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even
if it will not be the shortest.
DAVID CHAN v. CA
268 SCRA 677

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Easement of Right of Way can be imposed
upon the estate of the prospective servient estate of the Singian
Brothers Corporation

LAW:
Art. 649 of the Civil Code: “the owner of an estate may claim a
compulsory right of way only after he/she has established the existence of
four requisites namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables
and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is
paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (4) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest

APPLICATION:
Plaintiff claims her right to compulsory easement be imposed on the
Singian Brothers Corporations estate when the fence which separates her
property from the Pineda Family’s estate isolates her estate and impedes
her way to the National Highway

CONCLUSION:

The plaintiff cannot avail of the right to claim a compulsory right of

way because she herself constructed the fence which caused her property
to be isolated and lose access to the National Highway.
LA VISTA ASSN. v. CA
G.R. NO. 95252 05 SEPTEMBER 1997

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

LAW:
Jurisprudence provides that like any other contractual stipulation, a
voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession
of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of
the dominant lots.

APPLICATION:
In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties
recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement
yet to revoke the same.

CONCLUSION:
Thus, there is an easement of right of way.
VDA. DE BALTAZAR v. CA
245 SCRA 333

Issue:
Whether or not there is compulsory easement of right of way and
Panganiban is entitled to it?

Law:
Jurisprudence provides the following requisites before the grant of
compulsory easement of right of way: (1) the property is surrounded by
estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) it
must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest; (3) there must be payment
of the proper indemnity; and (4) the isolation should not be due to the
proprietor’s own acts.

Application:
In the case at bar, Panganiban’s property was surrounded by Baltazar’s in
front, and Calimon’s and Legazpi’s on the left and right, respectively.

Conclusion:
The requisites are met and Panganiban is entitled to a compulsory
easement of right of way.
SPS. DE LA CRUZ v. RAMISCAL
G.R. NO. 137882 04 FEBRUARY 2005

ISSUE: WON Sps De La Cruz are entitled to legal easement of right of

way?

LAW: Art. 649 states that it is the owner or any person who by virtue of a
realright may cultivate/use, who is entitled to demand a right of way in the
neighboring estates

APPLICATION: In this case, Sps De La Cruz did not fall under either of the
2 classifications, since the title to both lots are still registered under the
name of Concepcion De La Peña.

CONCLUSION:Hence, Sps. De La Cruz are not entitled to the right of way.

CORTES v. YU-TIBO
2 PHIL. 24 (1903)

ISSUE: WON plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?

LAW: As a general rule, no partowner can, without the consent of the other
l, make in a party wall a window or opening of any kind, EXCEPT when the
windows are not opened on the neighbor’s side, there is need of a
prohibition from exercising the neighbo’s right to build on his land or cover
the closed window on the party wall.

APPLICATION: In this case, what is concerned is a party wall and there

was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the
Cortes’ window.

CONCLUSION:Thus, there was no easement through prescription.

PURUGGANAN v. PARADES
68 SCRA 69 (1976)

Issue: Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of

the roofing. (No)

Law: The phrase "servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados" means the

easement of receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance
imposed on the land.

Application: The roof of the defendants-appellants protrudes by 98

centimeters over the property of plaintiff-appellee, so that during a heavy
rainfall the propulsion of the water would go as far as one meter over the
property of the latter.

Conclusion: The distances prescribed in the Decree of Registration should

not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the defendants-
appellants' house but to the distance of the rain water falling inside the land
of the plaintiff-appellee because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but
the rain water falling inside the property of the plaintiff-appellee.
GARCIA v. CA
95 SCRA 380 (1980)

Issue: Whether or not the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera
title and subsequent titles derived from it. (Yes)

Law: Because of the maxim “prior est in tempore, potior est in jure” (he
who is first in time is preferred in right), the general rule is that in cases of
two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails.

Application: This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer

certificates of title to different persons for the same lot, or subdivisions
thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly not cancelled
when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the original
title.

Conclusion: The Lapus title could not be nullified or defeated by the

issuance 43 years later to other persons of another title over the same lots
due to the failure of the Register of Deeds to cancel the title preceding the
title issued to Lapus because he and his successors-in-interest remained in
possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never possessed the
same
SANTOS v. ROBLEDO
28 PHIL. 245

ISSUE:

Whether or not, levy and sale of the lot and improvements in dispute,
effected on petition of the creditor, Miguel Robledo, can prevail
against the right of ownership she acquired by virtue of the gift made
in her favor by the spouses Santiago Herrera and Basilia Tolentino.

LAW:

Article 643 of the Civil Code prescribes:

Should there be no stipulation as to the payment of debts, the donee shall

be liable for them only if the gift has been made to defraud creditors.

The gift shall always be presumed as having been made to defraud

creditors when, at the time of bestowing it, the donor has not reserved to
himself property sufficient to pay the debts contracted prior thereto.

APPLICATION:

The property in question has been donated by the plaintiff to Santiago

Herrera thereby making him the owner thereof making the claim of the
debtor, Miguel Robledo, tenable.

CONCLUSION:
The donation is nonetheless valid there being a 3rd person or creditor
whose rights may be impaired. In this case, the donation is not made to
defraud the creditor but rather, only strengthens the claim of the latter.
AVILA v. TAPUCAR
201 SCRA 148

ISSUE:
Whether or not, registration is a mode of ownership?

LAW:

(Miranda v. Court of Appeals, supra citing De Guzman v. CA, 156 SCRA

701). I'm too tired to find the provision. Kindly include it should you find it

APPLICATION:

The Free Patent no. 552571 issued is erroneous and is not a mode of
ownership. Registration does not vest a title. It does not give the
holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the
registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no
registration was made at all

CONCLUSION:
The Judge erred in holding that the Free Patent is indefeasible and
incontestable. It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that "while land registration
is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of
a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make
the holder a true owner of all the property described therein.
EMBRADO v. CA
233 SCRA 335 (1994)

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot was paraphernal property of Lucia or a

conjugal property

LAW: Art. 158, the land becomes conjugal upon 2 conditions: Construction
of building was at the expense of the partnership and the land is owned by
one of the spouses.

APPLICATION: Spouses Carpitanos sold a lot to Lucia Embrado. Lucia

married Oreste Torregiani which they build their home to the lot. Lucia sold
the lot to her adopted child Eda Jimenez who in return sold the lot to
Cimafranca and Salimbagat and then Petitioner filed for nullity of contract
and sales alleging that the sale of Lucia to Eda was void as Oreste did not
consent to the sale which is conjugal property.

CONCLUSION: The land being conjugal needed the consent of Oreste

hence, the sale is void.
PEARL AND DEAN v. SHOEMART
G.R. NO. 148222 15 AUGUST 2003

ISSUE: Whether there was a patent and copyright infringement

LAW: P.D. No. 49 Sec. 2: The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the
moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following works:
class (O): that Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags,
and box wraps;

APPLICATION:Petitioner requested SMI and NEMI to put down their

installations of the light boxes, and payment of compensatory damages
worth P20M while claiming if that respondents failed to comply, they will file
a case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair competition and
damages due to the installation of lightboxes in different SM city branches,
including Cubao and Makati, with association with North Edsa Marketing
Inc (NEMI), SMI's sister company.

CONCLUSION: Since the copyright was classified under class "O" works,
which includes "prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags
and box wraps," and does not include the light box itself. A lightbox, even
admitted by the president of petitioner company, was neither a literary nor
an artistic work but an engineering or marketing invention, thus not
included under a copyright.
KHO v. CA
G.R. NO. 115758, 19 MARCH 2002

ISSUE:
Whether or not the copyright and patent over the name and container of a
beauty cream would entitle the registrant to the use and ownership over the
same to the exclusion of others.

LAW:
According to jurisprudence, a trade name means the name or designation
identifying or distinguishing an enterprise while the scope of a copyright is
confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual
creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of
their creation and patentable inventions, on the other hand , refer to any
technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new,
involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable.

APPLICATION:
In this case, petitioner claims to have patent rights on Chin Chun Su and
Device and Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, petitioner has no right to claim the exclusive use of the subject
trade name and its container since the name and container of a beauty
cream product are proper subjects of a trademark which are not under the
patent rights that she has acquired.
LAGAZO v. CA
287 SCRA 18 (issue under mixed donations)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was a simple donation.

LAW:
According to jurisprudence, a simple or pure donation is one whose cause
is pure liberality or without any strings attached.

APPLICATION:
In this case, it is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or
charge petitioner as the donee such that the words in the deed are in fact
typical of a pure donation.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the donation is simple and not onerous.
HEIRS OF BONSATO v. CA
95 PHIL 481

ISSUE: Whether the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation

inter vivos.

LAW: The law provides that donations which are to become effective upon
the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will
and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary
successions.

APPLICATION: Respondents sought the annulment of the deeds of

donation on the ground that it wasn’t in compliance with the formalities of a
will. The petitioners on the other hand claim that they are valid donations
and that they were not donations mortis causa.

CONCLUSION: If there has been no badge that it is a donation mortis

causa, it should be considered as a donation inter vivos.
SPS. GESTOPA v. CA
342 SCRA 105

ISSUE: Whether the second donation was a donation inter vivos.

LAW: The law provides that acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter
vivos; Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required
to be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.

APPLICATION: Spouses Danlag executed a donation of six parcels of land

in favor of respondents, subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein
petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation.

CONCLUSION: It was a donation inter vivos, as evidenced by respondent's

acceptance, contained in the deed of donation
AUSTRIA-MAGAT v. CA
G.R. NO. 106755 01 FEBRUARY 2002

ISSUE: WON the donation is a donation inter vivos

LAW: Under Art 729 of the Civil Code, when the donor intends that the
donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the
property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a
donation inter vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the
acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor
provides otherwise.

APPLICATION: when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not
dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation
irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos.

CONCLUSION: the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a

quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa
where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator
can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation.
VITUG v. CA
183 SCRA 755

ISSUE: WON the agreement is a donation mortis causa between spouses,

thus is considered as void.

LAW: a donation between spouses is void

APPLICATION: executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It

provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong
exclusively to the survivor.

CONCLUSION: the executed survivorship agreement is not a donation

because it is a mere reiteration of the law on property relations.
HEMEDES v. CA
316 SCRA 347

ISSUE:

LAW:

APPLICATION:

CONCLUSION:
LAGAZO v. CA
287 SCRA 18 (issue under time of acceptance of donation inter vivos)

ISSUE:
Whether or not acceptance of the donation is indispensible in simple
donations

LAW:
“Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and
the donee.”
“Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must
be made in a public instrument, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the deed of donation does not show any indication that
petitioner-donee accepted the gift and during the trial, he did not present
any instrument evidencing such acceptance.

CONCLUSION:
Absence of an acceptance of the donation makes it null and void and even
though the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the
lifetime, the last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation
and acceptance was not fulfilled by petitioner.

SUMIPAT v. BANGA
G.R. NO. 155810 13 AUGUST 2004

ISSUE:
 Whether or not, the deed of Donation is valid?

LAW:
Art. 749 (2) of the Civil Code: If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authenticated form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments

APPLICATION:
The respondent herein, signed the deed without knowledge of the
contents thereof and therefore, there is a complete absence of consent
which renders the donation void. Furthermore, petitioner Sumipat not only
failed to notify the respondent, she did so intentionally by taking advantage
of the latter’s lack of education.

CONCLUSION:

No, the Deed of Donation is not valid having there, not only vitiation
of consent, but a complete lack of consent as was shown on Respondent’s
testimony that had she known that the document would transfer their
conjugal property to the petitioners, she would have not signed it.
CALICDAN v. CENDARIA
G.R. NO. 155080 05 FEBRUARY 2004

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.

LAW: Article 1127 : The good faith of the possessor consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the
owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

APPLICATION: Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby

she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendana, who immediately
entered into possession of the land, build a fence around the land and
constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime 1949, where
he resided until his death in 1998.

CONCLUSION: Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, Silverio

Cendana became the owner of the land through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
SHOPPER'S PARADISE REALTY v. ROQUE
G.R. NO. 148775 13 JANUARY 2004

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is bound by the contract between the
petitioner and his father, Dr. Roque considering the latter donated the land
involved in the contract was donated to the former.

LAW:
The law provides that for the donation of immovable property to affect
third persons, it must be registered in the Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds, however, the knowledge of that third person of the donation of an
immovable property would have the effect of a registration as regards to
him.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the petitioner knew of the donation of the land in
question by Dr. Roque to his son, the respondent.

CONCLUSION:

Therefore, the respondent is not bound by the contract between the

petitioner and his father.
EDUARTE v. CA
G.R. No. No. 105944 February 9, 1996

ISSUE:
Whether or not the falsification of public document committed by Helen
is an act of ingratitude against Pedro.

LAW:
The law provides that all crimes which offend the donor show
ingratitude and are causes of revocation.

APPLICATION:
In this case, Pedro claimed that the signature on the second deed was a
forgery and that Helen was unworthy of his liberality.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, there was a valid ground to revoke the donation.
NOCEDA v. CA
G.R. No. 178495 July 26, 2010

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act
of ingratitude sufficient to grant the revocation of the donation.

LAW:
The law does not require conviction in order to revoke the donation;
only preponderance of evidence is needed in an action to revoke instituted
by the donor.

APPLICATION:
In this case, petitioner occupied not only the portion donated to him by
private respondent but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which
belongs to the latter.

CONCLUSION:

Therefore, petitioner’s act is an act of usurpation which is an offense

against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of
a donee against the donor.
YULO v. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLObisho
G.R. NO. 133705 31 MARCH 2005

ISSUE: Whether or not the condition was violated

LAW: In the case of Republic vs. Silim, the condition for the donation was
not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another
one and the purpose for the donation remains the same.

APPLICATION: In this case the purpose for the donation was the
construction of the home for the aged and infirm however due to the
industrialization of the property's surrounding, the Bishop asked permission
from the donor for a possible exchange or sale of the donated property to
ultimately pursue the purpose for which the donation was intended in
another location that is more appropriate.

RULING: Therefore, there was no violation of conditions.

CHUA TEE DEE v. CA
G.R. NO. 157568 18 MAY 2004

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of the payment of rent is valid.

LAW: Art. 1658. The lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case
the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased.

APPLICATION: In this case, the duty "to maintain the lessee in the
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the duration of the
contract" is merely a warranty that the lessee shall not be disturbed in his
legal, and not physical, possession. Patently, the petitioner had not been
disturbed in her legal possession of the property.

RULING: Therefore, the suspension of payment of rentals was not valid