ADOLFO C.

AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,

Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
DOCTRINE:
1. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence.
2. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule
of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided
FACTS:
Deceased Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. Bu at the time of his death he was domiciled in the
Philippines
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she
is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the
form and manner he desires. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the
Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
HELD:
1. As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that
he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon
his California citizenship by acquiring another.
2. The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about
the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of
the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this
age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but
little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein,
and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article
16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the
express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer
the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.
IN RE ANNESLEY: DAVIDSON v. ANNESLEY
FACTS:
Sybil Annesley, a British woman, married James O’Donel Annesley whose domicile
was English and lived in France. After her husband’s death, she resided continuously
there until her death in 1924. She never took steps prescribed by Art. 13 of the French
Civil Code to obtain a formal French domicile.
At the time of her death, she owned an immovable property in France (Chateau de
Quillebaudy), and movable property (trust money) both in France and in England.
On November 1919, she executed a holograph will in French language, stating that
her two daughters had their share of her property.
On December 1919, she likewise executed in France a will in English form, revoking
all former testamentary dispositions. The will also provide that after all dispositions of
her real and personal estate, the ultimate residue is given to her daughter, Miss
Annesly, absolutely. In addition, the will also contained provisions wherein Sybil
stated that she has no intention of abandoning her England domicile, and that she
intend to remain a British subject. On July 1921, she executed also in France a codicil
in English form, confirming her dispositions in the will.
BASED ON: BRITISH LAW (ENGLAND)- Testatrix is domiciled in France; No law on
how to dispose estate.
BASED ON: FRENCH LAW (FRANCE)- Testatrix should comply with Art. 13 to acquire
French domicile. (England is still her domicile) ;Testatrix could only dispose of 1/3 of
her personal property.
Probate proceedings on the will were made before the English Courts.
ISSUE: What law will govern, as to the determination of the testatrix’ domicile which
will affect the dispositions of the will: French or English law?
RULING: Domicile flows from the combination of fact and intention, the fact of
residence and the intention of remaining for an unlimited time. The intention required
is not an intention specifically directed to a change of domicile, but an intention of
residing in a country for an unlimited time. The Court here conceded that domicile
cannot depend upon mere declaration, though the fact of the declaration having been
made must be one of the elements to be weighed in arriving at a conclusion on the
question of domicile.
The question whether Sybil Annesley died domiciled in France must be answered by
ascertaining whether she had abandoned her English domicile and had acquired a
French domicile of choice in accordance with the requirements of the English law –
namely, by the 1. Factum of residence coupled with animus manendi, and 2. That
regardless of the question whether she had not complied with the formalities required
by French law to be carried out by her before she could rank as a domiciled French
woman. Testatrix’ domicile at the time of her death was French.
French Law accordingly applies, but the question remains: what French law?
According to French municipal law, the law applicable in the case of a foreigner not
legally domiciled in France is the law of that person’s nationality, in this case is
British. But the law of that nationality refers the question back to French law, the law
of the domicile; and the question arises, will the French law accept this reference
back, or renvoi, and apply French municipal law?
After careful consideration of the evidences, it was ruled that according to French law,
in administering the movable property of the deceased foreigner who, according to the
law of his country, is domiciled in France, and whose property must, according to that
law, be applied in accordance with the law of the country in which she was domiciled,
will apply French municipal law, even though the deceased had not complied with Art.
13 of the French Civil Code.
Regards her English personal estate and her French movable property the testatrix in
this case had power only to dispose of 1/3 by her will.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO vs DATER 270 N.W. 175 (Mich. 1936)

FACTS:
- In November, 1928, negotiations were commenced to secure a loan in the sum of
$75,000 on a piece of property in Chicago owned by George R. Dater and John R. Price
of Benton Harbor, Michigan, and they appointed H.S. Gray, an attorney of Benton
Harbor, as their agent in the matter.
- Plaintiff agreed to make the loan if it could be assured that the title was good. - A
trust deed and certain PNs were drawn up with Sps. Dater and Sps. Price, as parties
of the first part and the Chicago Title Trust Company, as trustee as party of the
second part.
- The notes were payable in the city of Chicago and at such place as the legal holder
might appoint.
- The trust mortgage and notes were sent by mail to the Benton Harbor State Bank for
the signature of the parties involved.
- The papers were signed in Benton Harbor, Michigan, about December 8, 1928, and
mailed to plaintiff's agent in the city of Chicago where the trust deed was placed on
record, then it was found that there were some objections to certain delinquent taxes
of 1927.
- Further negotiations followed and finally on January 3, 1929, and after the tax
objections were cleared in the title, the loan was actually made and the money paid
over by check made payable Sps. Dater and Sps. Price and cashed in Chicago, Illinois.
- January 29, 1929, John R. Price died and it is conceded that Mrs. Price became the
actual and record owner of at least one-half of the property after the death of her
husband. - Subsequent to December 1, 1933, foreclosure proceedings were
commenced on the property and the property purchased at chancery sale.
- Suit was filed in Michigan before the foreclosure suit was completed in Chicago.
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff against George R. Dater in the amount of
$15,536.32 and from which no appeal has been taken. On the same date judgment
was entered in favor of Clara Price of no cause for action, from which judgment
plaintiff appeals. - In Illinois a married woman is as free to contract as a man, while in
Michigan a married woman has not the legal capacity to bind herself or her separate
estate by signing these notes.
- Contention of the Plaintiff: The contract was an Illinois contract; that the signing of
the notes in Michigan was not the final act in the making of the contract, but rather a
preliminary step, the delivery of the note being conditional upon defendant's
producing a satisfactory title, the approval of the title in Illinois was the last act
necessary to make a legal delivery.
ISSUE: WON Mrs. Price has the capacity to enter into an obligation in the state of
Michigan so as to make her liable
HELD: NO RATIONALE: The obligation in suit was executed in Michigan by defendant
Clara A. Price, a married woman, and bore no relation to her separate estate and,
without more, carried no personal liability when sued upon in Michigan’s jurisdiction.
But, it is claimed, that the obligation was accepted in the State of Illinois, and was
there payable and, by the law of that State, Mrs. Price is not saved from liability by
reason of want of capacity under the Michigan law of coverture.
As pointed out later in this opinion personal liability of Mrs. Price could not be
enforced in Illinois under the theory of an Illinois contract.
In the case at bar negotiations for the loan, to be secured by mortgage, had reached
the stage where the lender prepared the note and mortgage in Illinois and sent the
same to an agent in Michigan, with direction as to execution by defendants in
Michigan and, when executed, to be returned by such agent to the mortgagee in
Illinois. Mrs. Price, at the request of the agent, executed the instruments and the
agent mailed the same to the mortgagee.
The instant case does not involve conflict of laws relative to the construction, force and
effect of the instruments, signed or executed in one State to be performed in another,
but that of capacity of Mrs. Price to enter into such an obligation in Michigan. “xxx
where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in some place other
than that where it is made, the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed
intention of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and
interpretation, is to be governed by the law of the place of performance, none of them
can be regarded as express authority for the application of that rule to the question of
the capacity of a married woman to contract. xxx"
It must be agreed that this case is governed by the law of Michigan or of Illinois. If by
the law of Michigan, it is clear, and is not disputed, that defendant has no personal
liability on the note, recoverable from her separate estate.
Assuming, however, that by the Michigan law of the forum the case is governed by the
law of Illinois, it presents the unique situation in the realm of conflict of laws that by
the law of Illinois, Burr v. Beckler, the case is governed by the law of Michigan.
In Burr v. Beckler, the wife, a resident of Illinois, was sojourning temporarily in
Florida. Her husband owed a concern in Illinois, of which he was treasurer, on an
overdraft. He informed his wife that he could borrow the necessary money to pay the
overdraft from an estate of which he was trustee. The wife executed a note and trust
deed in Florida and mailed them to her husband, as trustee, at Chicago, Illinois, as he
had directed her to do. The husband also signed the trust deed but the opinion does
not state when. The court held that delivery of the note and trust deed by the wife was
complete in Florida, the law of that State governed her capacity to contract and,
because she was not competent to enter into a contract under the law of Florida, her
note and trust deed were void.
The question is not whether the decision is in harmony with the law of Michigan but
whether it governs this case. Here, manual delivery was as complete as in the Burr
Case because it was made to a bank which had been designated by the mortgagee for
that purpose. In neither case had there been a binding engagement by the mortgagee
to make the loan prior to the delivery.
In neither case had the money been paid in advance of the delivery or
contemporaneously therewith. There is nothing in the Burr Case to indicate that the
mortgagee could not have refused to make the loan or that the mortgagors could not
have refused to take the money or could not have abandoned the matter after the wife
deposited the papers in the mail. The Burr opinion indicates no circumstance fixing
the effect of the manual delivery which is not present here. The Burr Case is directly
applicable and, consequently, under the law of Illinois it must be held that the
capacity of defendant Clara A. Price is governed by the law of Michigan. Under the law
of Michigan, a married woman cannot bind her separate estate through personal
engagement for the benefit of others. Defendant Price is not liable.

Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.

Facts: Steven Pfau (plaintiff) and Bruce Trent (defendant) attended the same college in
Iowa. Pfau was a domiciliary of Connecticut, Trent of New Jersey. While on campus,
Trent operated a vehicle owned by his father’s company, Trent Aluminum Co.
(defendant), a New Jersey corporation. Pfau was a passenger in Trent’s vehicle when
Trent got into an accident in Iowa. Pfau was injured. He sued Trent and Trent Aluminum
in a New Jersey court for negligence. Defendants asserted, as a defense, application of
Iowa’s guest statute, which precluded a guest-passenger from suing the host-driver for
ordinary negligence. Neither Connecticut nor New Jersey law contained a guest statute.
In favor of Pfau, the trial court struck the guest statute defense. An appellate court
reversed. Pfau appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Defendants argued that if
Connecticut law rather than Iowa law should apply, the court should then also apply
Connecticut’s conflict-of-law rules, which designated the lex loci delicti—Iowa in this
case—as the governing law for torts.
Issue: Whether or not the Plaintiff have the right to maintain action in New Jersey
Court.
Ruling: Yes.
Iowa has no interest in this suit. Recovery for negligence in this action will not transgress
any of the purposes behind Iowa's guest statute as enunciated by that state's courts or
legislature, and will not in the slightest impair traffic safety in Iowa. Nor do we believe
that the reasons urged by defendants for applying Iowa law are valid. We are convinced
that if the plaintiff were a New Jersey domiciliary Iowa's guest statute would be
inapplicable.
Connecticut and New Jersey law both allow passenger-guest recovery. It appears that
Connecticut’s substantive law allowing a guest to recover form his host’s ordinary
negligence would give it a significant interest in having that law applied to this case.
Since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and since the substantive laws of
Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this case presents a false conflict and the
Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to maintain an action for ordinary negligence
in New Jersey.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY,executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy),
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will
was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00.

Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Lower Court: issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's
final account, report and administration and project of partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination
of the illegitimate children’s successional rights. NO

HELD: ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the renvoi doctrine is applicable. NO

HELD: Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.
So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof
as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.

Phil Commercial and Industrial bank vs Escolin

n November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In
May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges.
Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate
shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon
Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an
ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the
Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will
but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like
to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the
motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said
will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of
Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was
appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to
Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.
Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien
testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by
Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless
of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because
Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi
doctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties
failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what
the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that
would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized
that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at
any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON

G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918

Facts:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen
of the United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with
an estimated amount of P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three
witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore,
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under
section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1)
Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of
America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State;
and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his father’s will

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition
Held: No.

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-
week publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted
that in view of the statute concerned which reads as “A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and
which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect
as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not capitalized,
does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because during this time,
Philippines was still a territory of the US).

WALTON vs. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO.

233 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956)

When, under the forum's choice of law rules, some or all of the substantive issues
in a case are governed by the law of another country, but the parties fail to give timely
notice of the foreign law or to show what it is, how is the court to arrive at a decision?

FACTS:

Leo Walton was an American citizen who was temporarily in Saudi Arabia. While
there, he suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident when his car collided with
one of the defendant's trucks. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant, an American
corporation, attempted to prove the applicable law of Saudi Arabia.

ISSUE:
Given the facts as stated above, can the employer defendant corporation be held
liable for respondeat superior1 for the automobile accident in Saudi Arabia?

RULING:

No.

Under the New York conflict of laws rules, the “substantive law” applicable to an
alleged tort is the “law” of the place where the alleged tort occurred. Thus, the burden
was on the plaintiff to prove the applicable Saudi Arabian law. Because he did not do
so, the trial judge dismissed the action. The Second Circuit affirmed.

In countries where the common law does not prevail such as in Saudi Arabia,
doctrines relative to negligence, and to a master’s liability for his servant’s acts, may

1
Respondeat superior refers to a doctrine in American law whereby the negligence of an employee is conclusively
presumed to be the negligence of the employer. See Poblete vs. Fabros, 93 SCRA 204.
well not exist or be vastly different. Hence, the court cannot take judicial notice that
common law doctrines on negligence involves rudimentary tort principles such that it
should be presumed that said principles ARE recognized in Saudi Arabia.
THOMAS A. LEARY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WILLIAM L. GLEDHILL,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Facts:

Leary and Gledhill were friends who had become acquainted while in the military
service, and in the past one of their correspondence resulted in Leary purchasing $
1,000 worth of stock from Gledhill. The former at the latter’s invitation visited him in
France. In a conversation in a hotel in Paris, Gledhill told Leary that he needed about
$4,000 and that he could raise about $2,000 by asking his wife to sell the automobile
in the United States.

Gledhill asked Leary to help him, but did not mention anything about selling Leary
any shares of stock. Upon Leary’s return to Germany, he mailed Gledhill a check
payable to the latter's order for $1,500 without indicating on the check or in the
accompanying letter what the money was for. Gledhill endorsed the check and
converted it into traveller's checks.

They did not see each other again until the day of the trial.

Leary then instituted a suit against Gledhill to recover the alleged loan, testifying that
the check for $1,500 was a personal loan to Gledhill, but this the latter denied,
contending that he had never borrowed any money from Leary.

Gledhill moved for an involuntary dismissal on the ground that Leary’s proofs were
insufficient, there being no promise to repay, no demand for repayment, and no
pleading or proof of the law of France where the transaction occurred.

These motions were denied, the trial court holding that while it would not take judicial
notice of the law of France it would proceed, first, on the presumption that the law
involving loans is the same there as in other civilized countries.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Leary in the sum of $1,500, and from the
judgment entered thereon Gledhill took this appeal.

It is significant that the defendant never proved or even attempted to prove either the
delivery of any stock to the plaintiff or a tender thereof. Neither did the defendant
attempt to prove or even suggest that the law of France was such as to preclude
recovery in the circumstances.

Issue: WON Leary’s proof were insufficient as there is no pleading or proof of the law
of France where the transaction occurred.

Held:
No. In the instant case the transaction occurred in France. Our courts may properly
take judicial knowledge that France is not a common law, but rather a civil
jurisdiction. It would, therefore, be inappropriate and indeed contrary to elementary
knowledge to presume that the principles of the common law prevail there. This does
not mean, however, that the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action because of the
absence of any proof at the trial as to the applicable law of France. In these
circumstances any one of the other three presumptions may be indulged in, i.e.,
that the law of France is the same as the law of the forum; that the law of
France, like all civilized countries, recognizes certain fundamental principles, as,
e.g., that the taking of a loan creates an obligation upon the borrower to make
repayment; that the parties by failing to prove the law of France have acquiesced
in having their dispute determined by the law of the forum.

The court below based its decision upon the presumption that the law of France in
common with that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability to make repayment
under the facts here present, and its decision is not without substantial merit in
reason and support in the authorities.

The utilization of this presumption has decided limitations, however, for in many cases
it would be difficult to determine whether or not the question presented was of such a
fundamental nature as reasonably to warrant the assumption that it would be
similarly treated by the laws of all civilized countries. The presumption that in the
absence of proof the parties acquiesce in the application of the law of the forum, be it
statutory law or common law, does not present any such difficulties for it may be
universally applied regardless of the nature of the controversy.

We are of the opinion, therefore, that in the instant case the rights of the parties are to
be determined by the law of New Jersey which unquestionably permits recovery on the
facts proven.

The judgment below is affirmed.

ZALAMEA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.

(G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993)
By: Ma. Criste Giesel H. Misalang

FACTS:
• Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,
Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA for brevity) for a flight to New York to
Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased
at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three
tickets represented confirmed reservations.

• While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the

reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date,
however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled
flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of
 passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.

• Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other
Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on
the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand,
at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. Those holding full-
fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr.
Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to
board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted
tickets were denied boarding.

• Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could
not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American
Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

• Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based
on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners and awarded moral damages.

• On appeal, the CA modified its decision. The award of moral damages was deleted
since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code
of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that there was no
fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA because it has a right to overbook flights.

RULING:

NO. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office.

In this case, The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has
never been proved. TWA relied solely on the statement of its customer service
agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official
publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
 Regulations has no basis in fact. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that
overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an
award of moral damages. Hence, TWA is guilty of bad faith as contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Miciano vs. Brimo

50 SCRA 867 | November 1, 1924

Facts:

FACTS:

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, made a will:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice,
nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of
my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.

The judicial administrator MICIANO of this estate filed a scheme of partition for the
estate of Joseph Brimo.

Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it. Hence the appeal.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws
of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article
16 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the approval of the scheme of partition of the decedent’s estates,
governed by Philippine law, and not Turkish law, was erroneous

2) Whether or not Andre Brimo, as a legatee who fails to comply with the conditions set
forth in the will by Joseph G. Brimo, is prevented from receiving his legacy

Held:

1) NO. The approval of the scheme of partition in such respect was not erroneous.
The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Art 10 (now
Art 16) of the Civil Code, providing:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines (Doctrine
of Processual Presumption).

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to
our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
Suntay vs Suntay
95 Phil. 500
Facts:
Jose Suntay executed two wills one here in the Philippines and the other in Fookien
Amoy in China. The probate for the will that was executed in the Philippines was
denied due to the will being lost. Silvino Suntay then stated that he found the will of
Jose Suntay among his documents and it was written in Chinese characters. He also
stated that this will was filed, recorded and probated in Amoy District of China.
Issue:
Whether or not the will that was probated in China according to Silvino Suntay may
be probated here in the Philippines.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that the will allegedly executed in China cannot be
probated in this case. Under Rule 78 of Rules of Court section 1 wills proved and
allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed,
filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines. Section 2
of Rule 78 provides that when a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor
or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time
and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance. Section 3 provides that if it appears at the hearing that
the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the court,
to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk,
and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such
court.
In this case the Supreme Court stated that the Municipal district court in China must
be proven to be a probate court and that the laws for the procedure of probate,
allowance and execution in China must also be proven by competent evidence. This
was not done in this case. But the order from the Municipal district court of Amoy
does not purport for the will to be probated rather it only takes the testimony of two
attesting witnesses. The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem thus personal notice
must be given to interested parties in order for it to be valid. No personal notice was
given to the interested parties here in the Philippines for the probate of the subject will
and also the proceedings in China does not purport the probate of the said will
therefore it cannot be probated.
Since there was no proof of the Municipal district court in China being a probate court
and of its probate procedures it may be presumed that the proceedings for the probate
and allowance of wills in Chinese courts is the same in Philippines Courts.

CIR vs FISHER
Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa
197 SCRA 853
G.R. Nos. 95122-23
Proof of Foreign Laws – Processual Presumption
Facts:
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified
that he has 5 children.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila
and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of
special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside
all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was
allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian.

Plus, petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of
their position, petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian’s marriage with Chu Gim
Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong
Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own
self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the
postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country,
it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same
were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages
cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago’s children, including Francisco, followed
the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly,
the validity of the Francisco’s marriage not having been demonstrated, William and
Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law?
Whether their son, William Gatchalian, is also a Filipino Citizen?

HELD:
Both in affirmative.The Supreme Court held relying on the case of Miciano vs. Brimo
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
This is known as Processual Presumption. In the case at bar, there being no proof of
Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as
that of Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed
on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
twelve-year old minor. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his
father is a Filipino citizen. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by
the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was
lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE,

in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity
as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG

FACTS:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2
separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other
with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9
January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent
of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.
Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing
training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the
Middle East and Europe.
After 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA
through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent
separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1,
1980 by virtue of clause 6 in their employment contract.
As a result, Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there
claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the
habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs
officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed
that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.
Favorable decision for the respondents: The Regional Director ordered the
reinstatement of the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had
attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of
continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract
to 3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the
dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE,
was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?
HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection
with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest
and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the
Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting
parties.
Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the
multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on
the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract
was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;
private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although
a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and
hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the
Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the
above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper
forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be
given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon
them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake
to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the
applicable provisions of Philippine law.