PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO

Facts: 4 counts of robbery with homicide were filed against De Leon and his companions. The information was
based on the testimony of the Zulueta (gasoline boy) that when De Leon et. al, riding a Tamaraw FX, arrived at the
gas station, they declared the hold-up after refueling their gas tank. On the other hand, De Leon argues that on
that day he hitches a ride from his friend and he did not know that they would commit the crime and that due to
his fear he never left the vehicle. Hence, he should not be held criminally liable since he is not a co-conspirator and
the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy among them. RTC rendered a decision finding De Leon
guilty of the crimes charged. However, CA modify the decision to one count of robbery with homicide.

Issue: Whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime? Yes

Ruling: Yes, If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be
termed an implied conspiracy. The prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The
witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness Zulueta testified that appellant was one
of the robbers who poked a gun at him.

Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy
existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he
need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality
of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

Granting that he was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself
from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. Appellant offered no evidence that he
performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery from taking
place. His denial, therefore, is of no value.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE BUTIONG

Facts: This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a
mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-time
neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon
as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa,
where he had carnal knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the police
station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AAA underwent a series of Psychological Test
with result showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child
aged from six to seven years.

Issue: Whether proof of date of the commission of the offense is not necessary in order to convict the appellant?
Yes

Whether or not the crime of rape is committed? Yes

Ruling: Yes, Exact date of rape and absence of spermatozoa from victim’s genitalia are not elements of rape.

Yes, One of Butiong’s contentions is that having sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, did not amount
to a rape, because it could not be considered as carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason or of a female
under twelve years of age as provided under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The contention
cannot be sustained.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code,29 Justice Aquino discusses the concept of committing rape against
the female’s will or without her consent, to wit:

In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity of proving
real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed against her will. On
the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of
will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or
totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will.
In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual
intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape.
Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her
failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.

Yet, Butiong’s contention is that his case did not come under any of the four modes due to carnal knowledge of a
mental retardate not being either carnal knowledge of a female deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or of
a female under 12 years of age or demented.

The contention is unwarranted.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. ̶ Rape is committed –

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act.
Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress
between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim.31 It should no longer be
debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the
provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency
or retardation.

In People v. Dalandas,33 the Court renders the following exposition on mental retardation and its various levels,
viz: Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired
intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of
maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.

Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term is usually
reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their
level of intellectual function are illustrated, thus:

Mental Retardation

LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT

(IQ RANGE)

I Profound Below 20

II Severe 20-35

III Moderate 36-52

IV Mild 53-68

The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an
IQ of 0 to 19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child;
(b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average
seven-year old child; moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in
adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and psychologists apply the term
"borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. In People vs. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of
rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a "borderline mental deficiency.

Considering the findings of psychologist de Guzman to the effect that AAA had the mental age of a six- to seven-
year old, an age equated with imbecility under the previous classification, her mental age was even lower than that
of a borderline mental deficiency within the context of that term as characterized in People v. Dalandas, supra. As
such, Butiong’s carnal knowledge of AAA amounted to rape of a person deprived of reason.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS

Facts: On the night of September 1996, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus, drove the
bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the
regular conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the
bus, including accused-appellant Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr., was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his
service gun.

When the bus was travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped
out their handguns and announced a holdup. Juan and Victor fired their gun upward to awaken and scare off the
passengers. Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables. The
felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his identification card and
wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card. Juan and Victor took the identification card of the police
officer as well as his service gun and told him: Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay
sa iyo. The police officer pleaded for mercy: Pare maawa ka sa akin : May pamilya ako. However, Victor and Juan
ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Manio,
Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver
Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one
of the felons saying: Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok. Victor and Juan further told
Rodolfo that after they shall have alighted from the bus, he should continue driving the bus and not report the
incident along the way. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga
where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes. RTC and CA found accused-appellants
guilty of the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide? Yes

Whether treachery may be appreciated against accused-appellants? No

Ruling: Yes, Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with
homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.

This Court has ruled over the years that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide
when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery, a special complex crime and at the same time a single and
indivisible offense.

Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime,
aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves
constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing
a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.70 Under paragraph 2
of the law, the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a
degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by
law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty
therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper
penalty for the crime.

In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law
looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of
robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the
constituent crime of robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special
complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.

No, Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same
was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures
which reads:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in the
Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to the
accused. Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty
for the crime. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with homicide,
Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF TIIE PHILIPPINES v. TIRSO SIBBU

Facts: Accused Sibbu Benny and others were charged for murder and attempted murder to which three (3)
Informations were filed. Private Complainant testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he
was with his three year old daughter, Trisha May Julian, his mother Ofelia Julian; and his father, Warlito Julian the
victim in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents’ house in Baranga, Elizabeth, Marcos, llocos Norte
when he saw from a distance of about five meters a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across
his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his
bonnet thereby providing Bryan (witness) the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the armed man
because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the
accused. Bryan also saw two men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from the appellant.
Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Accused then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and
Warlito.

Accused denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 2004, he never left the house of his in-
laws because he was taking care of his sick son. He claimed to have heard the explosions but thought that those
were so of firecrackers since it was nearing Christmas. Appellant-accused denied having any misunderstanding
with the Julian family, or knowing Bryan and Benny personally, or possessing camouflage clothing. RTC found
accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA with modifications on the penalty
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the alleged eyewitness Bryan;
and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged? No

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and use of disguise were not sufficiently
established? No

Ruling: No. Bryan positively identified appellant-accused as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia,
and Trisha. Bryan, the witness was able to identify the appellant as the assailant in shooting incident; there is no
reason to doubt his positive testimony. As observed by the RTC, Bryan’s narration of how he was able to recognize
the appellant was credible and convincing, to wit: From Bryan’s testimony above, it is clear that he was only five
meters away from the appellant when the shooting incident happened. While the appellant was seen wearing a
bonnet over his head, Bryan was able to get a glimpse of appellant’s face when the latter fixed his bonnet. In
addition,Christmas lights hanging from the roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to identify the
appellant. Moreover, Bryan is familiar with the appellant’s built, height, and body movements.

Appellant also questions the RTC’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling and use of
disguise. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying circumstance in the instant case. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or fonns in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.

In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and
Bryan were at the porch of their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In addition, they were all unarmed
thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his cohorts were
armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. Appellant, in particular, wore
camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Brian was able to warn his family about the impending attack, it
was too late for the victims to scamper for safety or to defend themselves. At the time Bryan became aware of
appellant’s presence, the latter was already in the vicinity of about five meters.

In fine, appellant employed deliberate means to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose of killing his victims
with minimal risk to his safety. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant’s attack was treacherous.

The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan testified
that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident. There could be no other possible
purpose forwearing a bonnet over appellant’s face but to conceal his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant
live in the same barangay and are familiar with each other.

As for the defense put up by the appellant that he was inside the house of his in-laws during the shooting, the
Court is unconvinced by his denial and alibi. Aside from being the weakest of all defenses, appellant was not able
to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting
incident happened. The SC ruled for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing. Verily, appellant’s alibi must fail for
failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.

The Court also upholds appellant’s conviction for attempted murder. Appellant commenced the commission of
murder through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not perfom all the acts
of execution which should produce murder by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Appellant simply missed his target; he failed to perform all the acts of execution to kill Bryan, Appellant is
therefore guilty of attempted murder, Unfortunately, Warlito, Ofelia and Trisha had to bear the brunt of
appellant’s firearm.

All told, appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and one count of attempted murder. Since two aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of
disguise attended the commission of the crime of murder, appellant should be sentenced to death in accordance
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM SABALBERINO Y ABULENCIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Facts: The City Prosecutor of Tacloban filed an Information with the RTC of Tacloban City, charging accused-
appellant with the crime of Parricide. William Sabalberino and the victim, Delia Fernandez-Sabalberino were
husband and wife who used to live together at Tacloban City.

Angela and Jessica were roused from their sleep when they heard their parents shouting at each other. They were
prompted to get out of bed and stood by the door of their room while witnessing their parents argue with each
other. While in the middle of their quarrel, William punched Delia hitting her face. Angela and Jessica then rushed
to their mother and embraced her. Thereafter, William went to the kitchen to get a knife and proceeded to stab
Delia hitting her chest below the armpit while the latter was holding Angela and Jessica. Delia managed to stand
and walk towards the door of their house. However, before reaching the door, she decided to walk back towards
the bed but before she could make it to the bed she collapsed. William then went to her aid, embraced her and
cried. He asked his children to call for help, but Delia died soon thereafter.

On his defense, William did not deny having stabbed Delia. However, he claimed that the stabbing was accidental.
He argues that he should be exempt from liability (Art 247) since he saw his wife half naked with a completely
naked man on top of her. Angry at what he saw, he went to the kitchen to get a knife and approached the two.
When William was able to take control of the knife, he tried to stab the man but, unfortunately, he accidentally hit
his wife who at that time stood between him and the man. RTC rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant
as charged.

In his Appellant's Brief, accused-appellant reiterated his defense that the stabbing of his wife was accidental,
reiterating the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Accused-appellant also contends that,
even granting that he failed to prove his innocence under Article 247 of the RPC, the trial court, nonetheless, erred
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua as it failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of: (1) having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation; (2) voluntary surrender;
and (3) lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. CA affirmed the convicition.

Issue: Whether or not CA correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for parricide? Yes

Whether or not the mitigating circumstances can be appreciated? No

Ruling: Yes, Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or
other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

The prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that it was herein appellant who stabbed and killed Delia based
on the eyewitnesses' account. Appellant and the victim's thirteen-year-old daughter, Angela, narrated the details
of the stabbing incident. Thus, the outright admission of accused-appellant in open court, that he delivered the
fatal stabbing blow that ended Delia's life, established the second element of the crime.

Among the three elements enumerated above, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most
crucial. This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide involving
spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral
evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not
contested.

In the present case, the spousal relationship between Delia and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. The
defense has admitted, during the preliminary conference, that Delia was the legitimate wife of the accused-
appellant. Clearly, thus, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.

In his defense, accused-appellant cites Article 247 of the RPC as an absolutory and exempting cause. However, in
the present case, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the RTC and the CA that accused-
appellant failed to prove his allegation to the satisfaction of both courts that he indeed chanced upon his wife in
the vilest act of infidelity and that he was blinded by impulse and acted out of rage when he stabbed the victim.
Both courts held that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim pales in comparison to the consistent testimonies
of their daughters, Angela and Jessica, that at the time of the stabbing incident, and immediately prior thereto, no
person, other than the family members, was inside their house and that the killing of the victim was immediately
preceded by an argument between her and accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant also invokes the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender, which the court finds to be unavailing.

It has been held that there is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason. The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from
a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or
offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement which is inherent in all
persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation. In the present case, the prosecution was
able to establish that the crime was precipitated by a quarrel between accused-appellant and the victim. However,
such kind of argument, no matter how heated or serious it was, is not the kind that would cause the passion or
obfuscation contemplated under the law.

As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same can be appreciated if the accused satisfactorily
complies with three requisites, to wit: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person
in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and
an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. In the instant case, there was no
showing of spontaneity on the part of accused-appellant as it was not he who asked for the police to go to their
house. Neither was there proof that he acknowledged his guilt when apprehended by the police authorities. While
it appears that he did not resist when the police officers brought him to the police station for questioning, such
lack of resistance does not necessarily equate to his voluntary surrender. The voluntariness of one's surrender
should denote a positive act and not a mere compliant or submissive behavior in the presence of authorities.

Anent the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, this
circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when such offender
executes or commits the criminal act. In the instant case, the undeniable fact is that when accused-appellant
attacked the victim, the former used a deadly weapon and inflicted a mortal wound on the latter. While intent to
kill is purely a mental process, it may be inferred from the weapon used, the extent of the injuries sustained by the
offended party and the circumstances of the aggression, as well as the fact that the accused performed all the acts
that should have resulted in the death of the victim. Indeed the location and nature of Delia's stab wound belie
accused-appellant's claim of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong against the victim

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ,

Facts: Accused-appellant Roxas was charged of five counts of rape against AAA, a minor who was 9 years old at the
time of the first rape and 10 years old at the time of the succeeding four rapes. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found him guilty as charged hence this instant appeal.

AAA testified that the appellant who was her uncle raped her in five different occasions. The fist one was
committed when she was only 9 years old and the subsequent rapes were committed on the months of March,
May, July and August of the year 1998. On those five instances, the appellant employed the same method of
blindfolding AAA and turning her around three times, after which, he would lay her down in bed and have carnal
knowledge with her. She tried to push him and raise her shorts and panty, but she did not succeed because he
poked a pointed instrument on her neck. She did not report the incident because she was threatened by the
accused-appellant not to tell anybody or else he would cut her tongue and kill her and her mother.

Accused-appellant Roxas points out that under Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006, minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility. He claims that since he has a
mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal liability although his chronological age at
the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old.”

Issues: Are all the elements of rape present in the case? Yes

Is accused-appellant Roxas exempt from the crime charged? No

Ruling: Yes, All the elements of rape are present. Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party
is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. The prosecution having established all the elements of rape, accused-appellant is guilty of the same.

No, Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with inconsistencies and narrations that
are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of things.

On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA's testimony and found ourselves in agreement
with the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As observed by the appellate court:

We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, without any
artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony. She recalled the tragic experience
and positively identified... accused-appellant as the one who ravished her on five occasions. Her testimony was
unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is no impression whatsoever that the same is a mere
fabrication. For her to come out in the open and publicly describe her harrowing... experience at a trial can only be
taken as a badge of her sincerity and the truth of her claims.

Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that under RA 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims
that since he has a mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal liability although his
chronological age at the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old."

Accused-appellant Roxas is NOT exempt from criminal liability. In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility,
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as
determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas.
When the law is clear and free from any doubt or... ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.

ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Rosal Hubille was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson Espinola with a knife. He was
charged with Homicide. Petitioner was over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC
on July 19, 2006.

RTC - convicted him of homicide and imposed the penalty of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four
years and one day of prision correctional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was sentenced to six months and one day of prision correctional as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. The civil aspect was also modified. On motion
for reconsideration, the CA partially granted the appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six months and one day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of
prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.

Issue: Whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act
No. 9344? No
Ruling: No, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years,
minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six
years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period – eight years and one
day to 10 years – was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly,
the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor
any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to
deliberately violate the law.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial
and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in
conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the
indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344
nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the
sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the
law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age. We
note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July
19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child in conflict
with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements. A review of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means
prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not
to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly
recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest
appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic
Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed
as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and
the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may
serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a
manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the
regular penal institution.
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect
the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and
programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.

The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever
warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G.
MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the
mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3
May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of
the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the
material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court
questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

Issues: Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused? Yes

Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution of the
crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law? No

Whether the accused can assail the information at any time before entering a plea? Yes

Ruling: Yes, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against
respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a
settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of
the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when
the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal. Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the
trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the
alleged principal.

We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the
case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged
principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the
case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment
without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.

The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a person is placed
in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2)
these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization. In the crime
of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons is the infliction by a person of
physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements,
occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization. Under the
Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities,
sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies,
partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose
of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law.

We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for failure to
allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly recommended and
approved “testing and training procedure and practices” for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP.
This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an
assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the
accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the
requirements thereof. Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the exception is
inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information.

Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.

The informatio merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no
allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization.
Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term – in this
case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus
a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must
include, inter alia, both “the designation of the offense given by the statute” and “the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense.” The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument in his Petition that the
successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued
admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect in the
Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime
of accomplice to hazing.

Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no
defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the
eventual dismissal of the case.

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another information.
Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another
prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached