INTRODUCTION

The word limitation itself says the meaning. The word limitation in its literal term means a
restriction or the rule or circumstances which are limited. The law of limitation has been
prescribed as the time limit which is given for different suits to the aggrieved person within
which they can approach the court for redress or justice. The basic concept of limitation is
relating to fixing or prescribing of the time period for barring legal actions.

According to Section 2 (j) of the Limitation Act, 1963 1, ‘period of limitation’ means the
period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and
‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the
provisions of this Act. The main and the fundamental aim of the law of limitation is to
protect the lengthy process of penalizing a person indirectly without doing any offence In
India, the Limitation Act, 1963 is the legislation that governs the period within which suits
are to be filed, with relevant provisions for delay, condonation thereof etc. The principle that
pervades statutes of limitation at common law is that ‘limitation extinguishes the remedy, but
not the right' this means that the legal right itself is not defeated, but only the right to claim it
in a court of law is extinguished.2

The Limitation Act is a Procedural Act and not a substantive piece of Law. 3 An exception to
this general rule is the law of prescriptive rights, whereby the right itself is destroyed.
Section 27 of the limitation Act, 1963 proclaims: “Section 27: Extinguishment of Right to
Property at the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit
for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” This
provision, in Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 establishes the law of adverse
possession as it stands in India today. These two Articles both prescribe a period of twelve
years within which the right to claim a particular property is extinguished, but the two differ
in so far as the date on which such period of limitation begins to run. Article 64 deals with
cases where the dispute is over possession not necessarily based title, and in such cases the
period of limitation runs from the time when the plaintiff was dispossessed of the property.
Article 65 deals with cases where the dispute is over title as such also, and in such cases the
period of limitation runs from the time when the defendant becomes adverse to that of
plaintiff.

1
Section 2 (j), Limitation Act,1963
2
LS Synthetics Ltd v Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd, 2004 (SCC).
3
ASK Krihnappa Chettair v SVV Somiah, AIR 1964 SC.
APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ACT

The Limitation Act,1963 has 32 sections and 137 articles. Article 1 to 113 deals with suits.
114 to 117 with appeals and 118 to 137 with applications.

Limitation Act is applicable in the following situations

Suits relating to accounts, contracts, declarations, decrees & instruments, movable property,
torts, trust and trust property, immovable property. Further, it is applicable to appeal of order
of acquittal from sec. 417 of Code of Criminal Procedure, appeal of sentence of death passed
by a Court of High Court or other Court, appeal from decree or order passed by the High
Court or other code under Civil Procedure Code. The limitation act is also applicable in
Application for leave to appeal as a pauper to High Court or any other court, application to
leave to defend the issue under summary proceedings and Application of leave for review of
the judgment of the Court.

Limitation Act is not applicable in the following situations

Filing of Writ petition under Article 32 and Art 226 4 , application of a final decree in a suit
fro partition, application for a revocation of probate or application under Section 151 of Civil
Procedure Code, in cases of criminal proceeding unless applicable by express provisions.
Article 133 of the Limitation Act prescribes for a period of limitation of 90 days for filing a
special leave petition to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Retrospective Operation of the Code

Limitation Code is retrospective in nature as it is a Code of Procedure. 5 The act is exhaustive

in nature as it govern the law of limitation in respect of all matters specifically dealt by it,
and the Indian Court are not permitted to travel beyond its provisions to add or supplement
them.6 The limitation act applies to only such applications as party is bound to make for
securing the relief he requires and does not apply when the application relates to an action
which the court ought to take its own motion whether he applies for it or not.

Public Policy behind the Law of Limitation

4
Rajamata VR Scindia v State of UP, AIR 1986 SC 756.
5
FV Mathapati v Achappanaik Desai, AIR 1956 Bom.
6
AS Krishnappa Chettiar v Nachipappa Chettiar, AIR 1964 SC 227.
 1. Long Dormant Claim have more cruelty than justice in them7 ;
2. The defendant might have lost the evidence to the disputed claim;
3. The person with good cause of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence.

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to
ensure that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 8 The law
of limitation bars the action and not the defence. It is, therefore, open to the defendant in a
suit filed by the plaintiff to set up a plea in defence which he may not be able to enforce by
filing suits.9 In Rajendra Singh v Santa Singh10, the court held that the object of the law of
limitation was to prevent disturbance and deprivation of rights what may have been acquired
by equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own
indignation, negligence or laches. In Balakrishnan v MA Krishnamurthy11, the Act is
based on the Statute, “interest republicae ut sit finus litium.”

Limitation Act is Lex Fori

It is lex fori as remedies on contracts are to be regulated and pursued according to the law of
the place where the action is instituted and not by the law of the place of contract.

Enlargement of Time

The judge cannot on equitable grounds enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its
operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by it.12

Application of the Act over the Territory of India

In Syndicate Bank v Parbha D Naik,13 the court held that there is only one Law of
Limitation for the entire territory of India.

The act applies to Courts only

7
MP Raghavan Nair v State Insurance Officer, 1971 Ker LJ 583 (FB).
8
S. Ganesharaju v Narasamma, (2013) 11 SCC 341.
9
Kishan Lal v Kashmiro, AIR 1916 PC 172.
10
AIR 1973 SC 2537.
11
(1998) 7 SCC 123.
12
Kirpa Shah Sant Singh v Sri Harikishan Das, AIR 1957 Punj 273.
13
AIR 2001 SC.
The Limitation Act applies to court only. IT applies to proceeding which can be initiated in a
court of law.14 Tribunals, Quasi Tribunals are not covered by the Act. 15 Thus the proceeding
do not apply before the labour court,16 arbitration court17 or Election Tribunal.18

Application to Criminal Proceedings

As a general rule, “the crime never die”. Lapse of time does not bar the crown to prosecute
an offender. The provisions of the Limitation Act does not apply to criminal proceedings,
except when the express provisions has been made for that purpose.

CONDONATION OF DELAY

Section 3- Bar of limitation.—Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24

(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed
period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. For the
purposes of this Act, (a) a suit is instituted, (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to
sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being
wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;

In Noharlal Verma v District Co-op Central Bank Ltd,19 the SC observed that if a suit,
appeal or application is barred by limitation, a court or an adjudicating authority has no
jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and decide it on
merits. Even in the absence of such plea by the defendant , respondent or opponent, the court
or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that same is barred
by limitation. This general rule is stated in Section 3 (1).

Section 3 bars the legal remedy, the enforceability of the right accrued whether under a
contract or under another situation.20 Section 3 only bars the remedy but not does not destroy

14
MP Steel Corpn v CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58.
15
Sushila Devi v Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 1 SCC 361.
16
Nityananda v LIC, (1969) 2 SCC 199.
17
Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewage Board v Subhash Project & Marketing Ltd, (2005) 30 AIC 891.
18
KV Rao v BN Reddi, AIR 1969 SC 872.
19
2008, SC.
20
Soic Southern Petrochemicals Inds Corpn Ltd v M/S AK Jajee, Distributor of Seeds Fertilizers and
Agricultural Equipment, 2012 (3) Civil LJ 96 (Kant).
the right tow which the remedy relates.21 Section 3 requires that every suit filed after the
period of limitation shall be dismissed, and the same for application also.22

The limitation has to be computed from the date when the suit is filed and not from any other
previous date. In the case of Bhabani Sahankar Agarwal v State of West Bengal,23 it was
held that the complaint sent a demand notice but was not able to know whether it was served
upon the accused or not. The postal authority initiated the date of delivery of the demand
notice. Limitation begins to run from the date of postal authority intimation.

Generally, defence of limitation mist be raised in pleadings so that the other party may also
note the basis and the facts by reasons of which the suit is sought to be dismissed. In Food
Corporation of India v Babulal Agarwal24, it was held that it observed that it is well settled
that a suit filed beyond limitation is liable to be dismissed eventhough limitation may not be
set up as defence.

Section 4- This section is limited in its applicability to the institution, preferring or making
of suits, appeal or applications where a period of limitation has been prescribed therefore.
Thus, the Limitation Act encompasses not only the suits or appeals, but the applications also.
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the
court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the
day when the court re-opens. A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the
meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on
that day.

Principle behind Section 4 is

i. The law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform;
ii. An act of court shall not prejudice anyone.

The section 4 of the Limitation Act does not extends the period of limitation. It provides for
the contingency when the prescribed period expires on a holiday and the only contingency
contemplated is “when the court is closed”.

Section 5- The section applies only to

i. Appeals;
21
Palai Central Bank v Joseph Augusti, AIR 1966 Ker 121.
22
Rameshwar Bux v Ganga Bux, AIR 1950 All 598.
23
AIR 2007 (DOC) 204 (Cal).
24
(2004) 2 SCC 712.
 ii. Application other than execution application under Order XXI , CPC.

The section applies only to an application for leave to the Supreme Court.25 This section
applies to criminal appeals and the criminal appellant court have the power to excuse delay
and admit a time barred appeal, if the court is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient reason
for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time.26

In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v Katiji,27 the court laid down the principles for
Section 5. 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit from an late appeal; 2. There is no
resumption that delay is to be necessarily caused by mala fides of litigant; 3. Refusing to
condone delay can cause a meritorious matter to be thrown out at the very threshold and
cause justice to be defeated.

DISABILITY

Section 6 deals with Legal Disability

i. Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the

execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be
reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would
otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column
of the Schedule;
ii. Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be
reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has
ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would
otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified;
iii. Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal
representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same
period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so
specified;

25
Ramesh Prasad v UOI, AIR 1973 Cal 12.
26
Harihar Das v kokanath, (1970)
27
AIR 1987 SC 1353.
 iv. Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the
death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules
contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply;
v. Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the
period allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute
the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would
otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.

The combined effect of section 6 and Section 8 being that would be to enable the person,
who has been disposed of during his minority, to file a suit within 3 years of his attaining
majority or within the usual period of time ordinarily allowable to a major, whichever is
longer. The benefit of Section 6 applies to the person who is entitled to sue or apply for the
execution of decree at the commencement of the limitation. Thus, this section is only
applicable only to cases where the person who makes the application is labouring under
disability. Onus of proof lies on the person who relies on the provision. 28 He must allege in
the plaint that his case comes within one of them and then prove the facts on the strength of
which he is entitled to rely upon those provisions.

Section 7 deal with Disability of one of several persons

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge
can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of
giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has
ceased.

This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in
respect of any immovable property.

For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the
Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence
of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint family property.

Section 7 applies to cases of persons whose substantive rights is joint, and not to to persons
whose rights are several though they may join together under Order I, Rule 1 of Civil

28
Gopi Nath v Satish Chandra, AIR 1964 All 53.
Procedure Code for the purpose of instituting a suit. 29 The principle underlying section 7 is
that when one of the several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit under disability and if
there is any other member, who can give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the
person under disability, the time will begin to run from the date when that member
competent to give a discharge can institute a suit. Under section 7, the capacity or incapacity
to give discharge is intended to relate to legal capacity or incapacity. In order to attract the
terms of section 7, it is necessarily that one of the several persons jointly entitled to institute
a suit under disability and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person
by the other person jointly entitled to institute the suit.

Section 8 deals with Special exceptions Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits
to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years
from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of
limitation for any suit or application.

The provisions of this section are not applicable to cases, to which a period of limitations is
prescribed by special or local law. This section refers to periods of limitations prescribed by
the Act itself and has no application to a case where the decree is barred by other special or
local law.

Thus section 8 imposes a limitation on the concession provided under section 6 or section 7
of the act to a maximum of three years after the cessation of disability. 30 Section 8 is a
proviso to section 6 or section 7.

Section 9 deals with Continuous running of time.

Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or
make an application stops it: Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a
creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to
recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.

Thus section 8 states that once a limitation has commenced to run it would continue to run
unless it is stopped by virtue of any express any statutory provisions. Section 9 applies to
cases where the cause action persists, no cases where cause of action is cancelled by
subsequent events.31

29
Ponnamma v Padmanabham, AIR 1969 Ker 163.
30
Kolandavai v Chinnapan, AIR 1965 Mad 541.
31
SR Goel v Municipal Board, Kanpur, AIR 1985 SC 1036
SUITS AGAINST TRUSTEES AND CONTRACTS ENTERED OUTSIDE
TERRITORIES

Section 10 deals with suits against trustees and their representatives Notwithstanding
anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom
property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal
representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of
following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of
such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time. For the purposes of this
section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable
endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose and the
manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.

The object behind the section is that the trust should not suffer from misfeasance or non-
misfeasance or non-misfeasance of a trustee.32 Section 10 grants a total exemption in regard
to suits mentioned in the section.33 A guardian under Guardians and Wards Act is not
covered by the section.34 The word, “trust” used in Section 10 of the Limitation Act us held
to carry the same meaning as in the Trusts Act.35

Section 11 deals with suits on contracts entered into outside the territories to which the Act
extends. (1) Suits instituted in the territories to which this Act extends on contracts entered
into in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in a foreign country shall be subject to the rules
of limitation contained in this Act. (2) No rule of limitation in force in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir or in a foreign country shall be a defence to a suit instituted in the said
territories on a contract entered into in that State on in a foreign country unless (a) the rule
has extinguished the contract; and (b) the parties were domiciled in that State or in the
foreign country during the period prescribed by such rule.

The principles laid down in Section 11 are based on both the English law of remedies and the
general principle of international law. The reasons for this principle are found in Huber v
Steiner36, which was cited in Ruckmaboye v Lulloobh Mottichund.37 It is a general
principle of international law that a contract regarding its form, validity, interpretation and

32
A. Pillai v State, AIR 1972 Ker 39.
33
Beli Ram and Brothers v Md. Afzal, AIR 1948 PC 168.
34
Mirabai v Kaushalyabai, AIR 1949 Nag 235.
35
Chidambara Vinayagar Bevasthanam c Chidambaran Chettiar, (1943) 2 MLJ 389.
36
(1835) 2 Bing NC 202.
37
(1835) 5 MIA 234.
the rights and liabilities of parties to it, is governed by lex loci contractus, that is the law of
the place where the contract is made or the law which the parties have agreed or intended
shall govern the contract or which they may be so presumed to have intended while all
matters of procedure are governed only by lex fori or the law of forum inn which the action
is brought.38 Section 11 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to suits.

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN TERMS OF EXCLUSION OF

TIME

Section 12 deals with Exclusion of time in legal proceedings. (1) In computing the period of
limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be
reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an
application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which
the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of
the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be
excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed,
or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the
period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining
a copy of the award shall be excluded. In computing under this section the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree
or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.

The object and scope of section 12 are;

i. To include application for revision within its scope;

ii. To provide expressly that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment
in the case of an application for leave to appeal is excluded;
iii. Any delay in the office of the court in drawing a decree or roder before the
application for a copy shall not be excluded.

The section does not deal with the starting point of limitation for filing a suit, appeal or
application. It deals only with exclusion of certain period of limitation inter alia for appeal.
This section cannot be applied for proceedings in foreign court. This section does not require
any prayer or application on the part of the party for the exclusion of time spent. It is the duty

38
Muthukanni v Andappa, AIR 1955 Mad 96.
of the court itself to exclude such time.39 While excluding the time, the date of the delivery of
the copy to the applicant is not material but the date when the copy is ready. The provision of
section 12 and section 14 are applicable to arbitration proceedings.

Section 13 deals with exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is
applied for. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or appeal in any
case where an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper has been made and
rejected, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting in good faith his
application for such leave shall be excluded, and the court may, on payment of the court fees
prescribed for such suit or appeal, treat the suit or appeal as having the same force and
effect as if the court fees had been paid in the first instance.

Section 13 deals with cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for. The
section covers not only the rejection of an application under under Order XXXIII, Rule 5,
Code of Civil Procedure, but also the refusal to allow the application to sue as a pauper under
Order XXXIII, Rule 7, CPC. Section 13 of the Limitation Act has two parts. The cumulative
effect of the two parts which are interconnected is that the period between the date of the
application to sue or appeal and the date on which it was rejected shall be excluded if the
prosecution was in good faith and the court fee paid. No time limit is set out in section 13
and it is a matter of discretion of the court as “may” indicates. Court can extend the time.40

Section 14 deals with Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the
plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a
court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded,
where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a
court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain
it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the
applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a
court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief
shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from
defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3)
Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit
39
Mehar Singh v Bladev Singh, AIR 1955 HP 12.
40
P.Sreedevi v P. Appu, AIR 1991 Ker 76.
instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such
permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the
jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. For the purposes of this section, (a)
in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which
that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a
plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature
with defect of jurisdiction.

The principle behind section 14 is to protect a person against the bar of limitation of a person
honestly doing his best to get his case tried on the basis of merits, but failing to through the
court being unable to give him such trial. 41 The section is applicable to cases where persons
where the persons brings his suit in the wrong court,. Further, the section is applicable to
cases where he brings his suit in the right court, but is prevented from getting a trial on the
merits by a defect.61 The following conditions need to fulfilled to apply section 14-:

i. The plaintiff must be prosecuting Civil Procedure which he relies with due
diligence;
ii. The earlier and latter proceeding must be founded on the same cause of action;
iii. The former proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith in a court from
which a defect of jurisdiction or other cause is unable to entertain it.42

The question of bona fide intention and good faith needs to be determined by the court
before the benefit under section 14 can be conferred on a party for subsequent proceedings. 43
The burden of proof of the person claiming that due diligence was applied in the prior
proceedings lies on the person claiming the benefit. 44 The section applies only where a period
of limitation has been prescribed.45 Article 14 applies to suits and applications. It also applies
to

i. Writ petition under Article 22646;

ii. Execution proceedings47;

41
Narain Das v Banarsi Lal, AIR 1970 Pat 50.
42
India Electric Works v James Mantesh, AIR 1971 SC 231.
43
State of West Bengal v M/s BBJ Construction Co. Ltd, AIR 2013 Cal 186.
44
Madhavrao v Ram Kishna, AIR 1958 SC 767.
45
Rahmetulla v Hariprasad, AIR 1956 Bom 650.
46
State v Satyanarayan Rice Mill, AIR 1985 Cal 391.
47
Syed Taimur v HAr Deo, AIR 1960 All 375.
However, this section is not applicable to appeals. 48 The power to grant an extension of time
under section 5 is discretionary, wherelse under section 14 it is mandatory if the requisite
conditions are fulfilled.49 Section 4 of the limitation act does not extend the time prescribed,
wherelse section 14 in effect extends the period of limitation. Exclusion of limitation of
under section 13 is different from section 14 as section 14 excludes time during which
another civil proceedings was prosecuted with due diligence relating to the same matter in
issue in good faith in a court which form the defect of jurisdiction or other causes of like
nature become unable to entertain it. This provision is not applicable in cases coming under
section 13 which does not involve any inability of the court to entertain it.50

Section 15 deals with Exclusion of time in certain other cases. (1) In computing the period of
limitation of any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution
of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction
or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn,
shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has
been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other
authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in
force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such
consent or sanction shall be excluded. In excluding the time required for obtaining the
consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the
application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the
order of the Government or other authority shall both be counted. (3) In computing the
period of limitation for any suit or application for execution of a decree by any receiver or
interim receiver appointed in proceedings for the adjudication of a person as an insolvent or
by any liquidator or provisional liquidator appointed in proceedings for the winding up of a
company, the period beginning with the date of institution of such proceeding and ending
with the expiry of three months from the date of appointment of such receiver or liquidator,
as the case may be, shall be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation for a suit for
possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which a
proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded. (5) In computing the
period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has been absent from
India and from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central

48
ST Commr, UP v Parsons Tools & Plants, AIR 1975 SC 1039.
49
Bansi Dhar v Alopi Pershad, AIR 1963 Punj 55.
50
P Sreedev v P Appu, AIR 1991 Ker 76.
Government, shall be excluded. This section covers only suits and applications for execution
of decree.

An application for delivery or possession by the auction-purchaser under Order 21, Rule 97
of the CPC is not an application for execution, and hence is not covered under this section. A
party seeking to take advantage of section 15 must show that he was earlier restrained by an
order from making the prayer, which he is trying to do now, he cannot move the application
of section 15.51 Where any procedure are stayed by the court or an injunction is given by the
court, that period should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. These provisions
are applicable to all proceedings under the limitation act,1963.52 While calculating the period
during which the award remained in custody is to be excluded.53

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN TERMS OF EFFECTS

Section 16 deals with effect of death on or before the accrual of the right to sue.—(1) Where
a person who would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application
dies before the right accrues, or where a right to institute a suit or make an application
accrues only on the death of a person, the period of limitation shall be computed from the
time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting such suit or
making such application. (2) Where a person against whom, if he were living, a right to
institute a suit or make an application would have accrued dies before the right accrues, or
where a right to institute a suit or make an application against any person accrues on the
death of such person, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is
a legal representative of the deceased against whom the plaintiff may institute such suit or
make such application. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) applies to suits to
enforce rights of pre-emption or to suits for the possession of immovable property or of a
hereditary office.

This section provides a purely personal exemption which cannot be claimed by an assignee
of the property.54 This section has no application in suits for possession of immovable
property in view of sub section (3). If the cause of action accrues before the death of the
person to whose estate the right relates , this section has no application to such a situation. In
view of section 16 (3) of the Limitation Act, held that section 16 (1) does not apply to suits

51
Tribeni Prasad Dhandhania v Sita Ram Poddar, AIR 1980 Pat 135
52
Director of Inspection, IT v Pooran Mall & Sons,, AIR 1975SC 67.
53
Raj Kumar v Tarapada, AIR 1987 SC 2195.
54
Thayammal v Rangaswami, AIR 1956 Mad 15.
for possession of immovable property.55 As a general rule, unless a statute provides
otherwise, statute of limitation begins to run at the time when complete cause or right of
action accrues liable to an action. Cause of action arises when the aggrieved person has the
right to the proper court or Tribunal for relief. The accrual of cause of action depends on two
elements; Injury and Damages. In computing the period, the day on which the cause of action
arose, is excluded. Apart from any special provision, a cause of action normally accrues
when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when
there are present all the facts which are materials to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to
succeed.

Section 17 deals with effect of fraud or mistake. (1) Where, in the case of any suit or
application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, (a) the suit or
application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or (b) the
knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the
fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the suit or application is for relief from the
consequences of a mistake; or (d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the
plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him, the period of limitation
shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake
or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed
document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable
any suit to be instituted or application to be made to recover or enforce any charge against,
or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which— (i) in the case of fraud, has been
purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did
not at the time of the purchase know, or have reason to believe, that any fraud had been
committed, or (ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration
subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by a person who did not
know, or have reason to believe, that the mistake had been made, or (iii) in the case of a
concealed document, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was
not a party to the concealment and, did not at the time of purchase know, or have reason to
believe, that the document had been concealed. (2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud
or force, prevented the execution of a decree or order within the period of limitation, the
court may, on the application of the judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the said

55
Lakhmir Singh v Sucha Singh, 1990 (1) Civ LJ 708 (P&H).
period extend the period for execution of the decree or order: Provided that such application
is made within one year from the date of the discovery of the fraud or the cessation of force,
as the case may be.

Section 17 provides that where in the case of any suit or application for which the period of
limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which the suit or
application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent [section 17(1)
(d)] or where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has
been fraudulently concealed from him [section 17 (1)(d)], the period of limitation shall not
begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake which
could not be discovered with reasonable diligence. On order to claim the benefit, the party
has to show that due to the fraud of the other party, the knowledge of his right was concealed
and he could not know his right. Section 17 applies only when a party is kept from the
knowledge of right to do a certain thing by the fraud of the other party but now where he is
kept from exercising his right. Section 17(1)(c) provides that in a case for suit of relief on the
ground of mistake, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers
the mistake or could with reasonable diligence discovered it. Thus, Section 17 is an enabling
provision which postpones the starting point of limitation for suits and applications like an
application to set aside execution sale where the plaintiffs or the applicants right to seek
relief is kept from his knowledge by means of fraud. 56 The provision can be further invoked
to suits and applications for relief from the consequences of mistake, but difference of
opinion of valuers cannot furnish ground of mistake to evoke section 17(1)(c).57 Protection
has also been extended to purchaser for valuable consideration, who was not a party to the
fraud, mistake or concealment and had no knowledge about it, in place of a person
“claiming… in good faith and for a valuable consideration.” The knowledge of the right and
title on which the suit or application is founded is different from “sufficient cause” within the
meaning of section 5, otherwise the party failing to comply with the requirements of section
17(1)(b) would be entitled to the same benefit sought for under section 17(1)(b) by invoking
section 5 and it cannot be the intention of the legislature to nullify the effect of section 17(1)
(b) by section 5.58

Section 18 deals with the effect of acknowledgment in writing.—(1) Where, before the
expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or
56
In re: Marappa Goundar, AIR 1959 Mad 26.
57
Krishna Kumar v JN Bhan, AIR 1971 Cal 322.
58
S. Devi v RL PIllai, 1981 Ker LT 120.
right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in
writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person
through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed
from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the
acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but
subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its
contents shall not be received. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) an
acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property
or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet
come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is
coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the
property or right, (b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly
authorised in this behalf, and (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall
not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right.

Section 18 deals with the effect of acknowledgement in writing on limitation. Under this
section, where before the expiration prescribed period for the suit or application in respect of
any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability with respect to such property or right
has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such right or property is claimed,
or by any person though whom he derives his right or title, a fresh period of limitation shall
be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Such
acknowledgement can be with respect to right, property or liability. Requirement for an
authority of acknowledgement-:

i. An admission of the acknowledgment;

ii. Such acknowledgement must be with respect of liability in property or right;
iii. It must be made before the expiry of period of limitation;
iv. It should be in writing and signed by the party against whom such property or
right is claimed. Letters exchanged between parties cannot be held as
acknowledgment under section 18.

Section- 19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.—Where payment

on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the
prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly
authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when
the payment was made: Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before
the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting
of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. Explanation.—For the
purposes of this section,— (a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee,
the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment; (b) “debt”
does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.

This section extends the benefit of extension period of limitation when payment is made by
the debtor to a creditor irrespective whether the payment is made towards the interest
amount., but the only requirement is that on the date on which part payment is made, both
principal and interest should be due. The acknowledgement as prescribed under section 19
merely renews debt. It does not create a new right of action and it is a mere acknowledgment
of liability in respect of the right in question and it needed to be accompanied by promise to
pay either expressly or even by implication. Further, this section provides that payment on
account of debt or of interest on legacy shall give afresh period of limitation for suits and
legacies. This section is restricted to suits for debts and legacies. So far as debts are
concerned this section applies to all kind of debts whether secured or unsecured. However,
this section has no application in suits for redemption.

Section 20- Effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person.—(1) The expression

“agent duly authorised in this behalf” in sections 18 and 19 shall, in the case of a person
under disability, include his lawful guardian, committee or manager or an agent duly
authorised by such guardian, committee or manager to sign the acknowledgment or make
the payment. (2) Nothing in the said sections renders one of several joint contractors,
partners, executors or mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment
signed by, or of a payment made by, or by the agent of, any other or others of them. (3) For
the purposes of the said sections,— (a) an acknowledgment signed or a payment made in
respect of any liability by, or by the duly authorised agent of, any limited owner of property
who is governed by Hindu law, shall be a valid acknowledgment or payment, as the case
may be, against a reversioner succeeding to such liability; and (b) where a liability has been
incurred by, or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family as such, an acknowledgment or
payment made by, or by the duly authorised agent of, the manager of the family for the time
being shall be deemed to have been made on behalf of the whole family.
This section is an explanation to section 18 and section 19. 59 This section deals with the
question as to who can keep alive a right which is not time-barred. Section 20 (1) include; i.
Lawful guardian, committee or manager; ii. An agent duly authorized by such guardian,
committee or manager; iii. An unqualified acknowledgment of liability by a party saves
limitation and alos give rise to a cause of action.

Section 21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant.—(1) Where after the
institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as
regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party: Provided that
where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due
to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or
defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date.(2) Nothing in sub-
section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment
or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a
defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff.

Section 21 refers to the case where the suit is bought by or against parties other than those
originally on the record, i.e. where the new plaintiff or defendant is suitable or added thus if
certain defendants are used as under a certain designation but are at a later stage stated
individually, there is no addition or substitution of new defendants; if at all it is a correction
of the misdescription, the suit would not be barred. Section 21 contemplates substitution or
addition of nee parties after institution of the suit. It cannot be said that by merely invoking
Order I, Rule 8, CPC any person can be substituted or added as a party. In each case the
court has to determine whether the plaintiff intended to sue originally a party which was
substituted or added at a later stage. Under section 21 a suit is deemed to have instituted
against the arrayed defendant from the date if the order. Under the garb of Order I, Rule 10,
no party can extend the period of limitation.

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION

Section 22- Continuing breaches and torts.—In the case of a continuing breach of contract
or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment
of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.

Section 22 deals with contracts and torts in which there is a continuing breach of contract or
the violation of ten right which constitutes the tort. In such cases, a right to sue arises at
59
Naziruddin Ahmad v Parmanand, AIR 1948 Oudh 193
every moment of the time during which the breaches continues. The cause of action in such
cases is said to be renewed de die in diem (from day to day). This section applies to cases
which have not been expressly provided for in the schedule to the Act. In cases provided for
in the schedule, time begins to run from the dates shown in the schedule for the periods laid
down there. The criterion of the application of this section, both in cases of contract as well
as torts, is not whether the right or its corresponding obligation is a continuing one, but
whether the wrong is continuing one. This section applies to contracts which oblige the party
to them during the continuance of the relation covered by the contract. Section 22 lays down
that in the case of continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment
of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be , continues.

Section 23- Suits for compensation for acts not actionable without special damage.—In the
case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action
unless some specific injury actually results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be
computed from the time when the injury results.

This section is not based in its application to suits based on torts. This section also applies in
cases of ex-contractu in proper cases. It cannot however apply to cases in which there is a
definite breach of an obligation under the contract and complete loss occurs on such breach,
without the possibility of any further injury. This section deals with cases where the cause of
action is based not upon the act done but upon the injury resulting from it. The section lays
down that in case of suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action unless some specific injury results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be
computed from the time when the injury results. The principle of this section is where the
cause of action lies not in specific act or omission, but in the resulting damage, the period of
limitation runs from the time when the plaintiff sustained the loss.

Section 24- Computation of time mentioned in instruments.—All instruments shall for the
purposes of this Act be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar.

ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSION

Section 25. Acquisition of easements by prescription.—(1) Where the access and use of light
or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as
of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or watercourse or
the use of any water or any other easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been
peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of
right without interruption and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or
air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute and indefeasible.
(2) Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two
years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is
contested. (3) Where the property over which a right is claimed under sub-section (1)
belongs to the Government that sub-section shall be read as if for the words “twenty years”
the words “thirty years” were substituted. Explanation.—Nothing is an interruption within
the meaning of this section, unless where there is an actual discontinuance of the possession
or enjoyment by reason of an obstruction by the act of some person other than the claimant,
and unless such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant
has notice thereof and of the person making or authorising the same to be made.

Section 25 and section 26 deal with acquisition of rights under easement by prescription.
Section 27 deals with the extinguishment of right to property. It is now possible to extend the
provisions of section 25 and section 26 to those parts of India to which the Indian Easements
Act, 1882 applies. Section 25 and section 26 of the limitation act corresponds to section 15
and section 16 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Section 15 and section 26 deals with
direct acquisition of rights to easements by adverse possessions. Section 27 deals with
indirect acquisition of ownership of corporeal property by possession. This section is only
applicable only to easementary right and to natural right. The exercise of this section must be
within two years of the suit. If not exercised within the period, the suit would be time barred.
The stature is remedial, and not prohibitory or exhaustive. These rights are not exhaustive as
such right is acquired by long enjoyment which in certain circumstances lead to a
presumption of lost grant or agreement. A person may acquire under this section a right of
easement which he did not have originally , but it does not prevent or exclude the acquiring
the easement right in other modes. The word “as of right” does not mean user without
trespass; they simply mean enjoyment in the assertion of the right. The enjoyment must be
open and peaceful and manifest and not clandestine, surreptious or invisible. This section
does not mean that there should be actual or physical use. It is sufficient that the dominant
owner has the amenity or advantage of using wherever he chooses to do it. The use of “other
easement” in this section has made it clear that this section is not exhaustive and other
easements not specifically mentioned can be acquired such a right to store manure on land
belonging to another.60

60
Ladha v Mahi, AIR 1947 Lah 79.
Section 26- Exclusion in favour of reversioner of serivent tenement.—Where any land or
water upon, over or from, which any easement has been enjoyed or derived has been held
under or by virtue of any interest for life or in terms of years exceeding three years from the
granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of such easement during the continuance of such
interest or term shall be excluded in the computation of the period twenty years in case the
claim is, within three years next after the determination of such interest or term resisted by
the person entitled on such determination to the said land or water.

In a suit by the owner of the servient land for declaration that the defendant had not acquired
any right of easement of light and air over his land, the plaintiff contended that the period
during which his tenants and their predecessors were occupying the land should be excluded
in computing the prescribed period in such a case, it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and
prove the lease and their term and determination within there years of the suit.

Section 27- Extinguishment of right to property.—At the determination of the period hereby
limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such
property shall be extinguished.

The general rule is that the Limitation Act only bars the remedy and does not extinguish the
right. Section 27 is an expression to this general principle so far as suits fro possession of
property are concerned and lays down that after the expiry of the period thus prescribed for
instituting the suit for possession of any property the person should have instituted such suit
but failed to do so, shall cease to have any right over the property. After the expiry of its
period, the law declares not simply that the remedy is barred but that the title is extinct in
favour of the possessor. This section is confined to suits for possession only.

CONCLUSION

In India, the Limitation Act, 1963 is the legislation that governs the period within which
suits are to be filed, with relevant provisions for delay, condonation thereof etc. The principle
that pervades statutes of limitation at common law is that ‘limitation extinguishes the
remedy, but not the right' this means that the legal right itself is not defeated, but only the
right to claim it in a court of law is extinguished. The Limitation Act, 1963, prescribed
limitation with a view to see that a litigant does not drag on the litigation. Section 5 gives an
opportunity to a litigant to file applications beyond the prescribed period of limitation
provided; he is able to establish that he was prevented by sufficient cause from approaching
the Court within the said period. Even though explanation for day- to-day delay is not being
insisted by the Courts, the litigant has to nevertheless furnish the satisfactory explanation for
filing the application beyond the prescribed period of limitation. This responsibility on the
part of the litigant is much more in cases of abnormal delays, for by such delays right came
to be vested in his adversary and such a right cannot be easily taken away by making unduly
liberal approach by the Court. Limitation and compensation of Delay are two effective
implementations in the quick disposal of cases and effective litigation. The law on limitation
keeps a check on pulling of cases and prescribes time period within which the suit can be
filed and the time available within which the person can get the remedy conveniently. The
law of compensation of delay keeps a check on the pulling of cases and prescribes a time
period within which the suit can be filed and the time available within which the person can
get the remedy conveniently. The law compensation of delay keeps the principle of natural
justice alive and also states the fact that different people might have different problem as and
the same sentence or a singular rule may not apply to all of them in the same way. Thus it is
essential to hear them and decide accordingly whether they fit in the criteria of the judgment
or whether they deserve a second chance. The hypothesis of the researcher has been proven
true that the Limitation Act bars the remedy and not the right.