A Comparison of the Attitudes and Tactics of Mohammad Mossadegh and Ho Chi Minh

Jason Gurtz-Cayla

HIST 328: 20th Century World

7 May 2019
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Introduction

“The struggle against colonialism demanded… …mass-mobilizing nationalism that

would eventually seem to triumph with post-1945 decolonization.”1 The details of this varied:

one country might have been under direct military-political occupation by a foreign empire,

another might have the appearance of autonomy, yet exist under cultural or economic control.

Vietnam (then known as Indochina) is an example of the former, “THE FRENCH COLONIAL

MILITARY MACHINE, organized, centralized, had little trouble with fragmented Vietnam. It

was necessary for the French to subdue only the top of the structure.”2 Iran exemplifies the later,

where the vast majority its oil profits were assured to Great Britain via the Anglo-Persian oil

company; “[in 1921] The company’s profits were reaching astronomical levels, the means by

which it calculated Iran’s 16-percent royalty were becoming more questionable, and the gap

between the living conditions of its British and Iranian employees widened steadily.”3 These two

different scenarios witnessed two accordingly different revolutionary leaders, Ho Chi Minh of

Vietnam and Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran. These leaders’ backgrounds, views, and

revolutionary methods differed and the independence of their respective countries would not

come easily or without bloodshed.

Class, Educational Background, and Views on Communism/Socialism and Nationalism

Ho Chi Minh, born in 1890, was of simple origins, of his people, “…humble,

soft-spoken, mocking his own position, always seen in the simplest garb, his dress making him

1
Carter V. Findley and John Alexander Murray Rothney, Twentieth-century World (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Cengage Learning, 2011), 17.
2
David Halberstam, Ho (New York: Random House, 1971), 7.
3
Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ:
John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 51.
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barely distinguishable from the poorest peasant…”4 Nghe Thinh province where Ho was born

“...was a traditional seat of Vietnamese learning.”5 He did have a scholarly childhood, but

learned some radical political ideas, leading to him being expelled from his first high school in

Vinh. He then entered another high school in the city of Hué, “...unique in that it blended modern

French education with Vietnamese culture.”6 The earlier influence of the nationalist Phan Boi

Chau still has root within Ho: “…Ho continued to be active in nationalist affairs and he finally

left the school without a diploma.”7 After a period of wandering outside Vietnam through WWI,

he came to rest with the left-wing intellectual community in Paris, becoming “...the first

Vietnamese member of the Young Socialists.”8 At the end of WWI, Ho went to Versailles,

hoping Vietnam would be granted independence but was not heard. Then in 1920 the French

socialist party had a meeting leading to “...the end of Ho the Socialist.”9 As well as his

nationalism, Ho hewed to the Leninist/Marxist form of communism attending “...the institute for

National and Colonial Questions and the well known graduate school for senior Communist

officials, the Lenin Institute.”10

In contrast, Mohammad Mosaddegh was decidedly not of humble origins. “His mother

was a Qajar princess from a family that had produced governors, cabinet ministers, and

ambassadors. The man she married came from the distinguished Ashtiani clan and served for

more than twenty years as Nassir al-Din Shah’s finance minister.”11 He was appointed as a tax

4
Halberstam, 13.
5
Halberstam, 18.
6
Halberstam, 24.
7
Halberstam, 24.
8
Halberstam, 29.
9
Halberstam, 34.
10
Halberstam, 57.
11
Kinzer, 53.
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auditor when he was just sixteen and went on to become well educated. “Like many Iranians of

his class, he considered Paris the center of the civilized world, and he made his way there to

study at l’Ecole de Sciences Politiques.”12 He became ill and left Paris, but soon finished his

studies in Neuchâtel, Switzerland and, “...earned his doctorate of law in 1914…”13

Like Ho, Mosaddegh was strongly nationalistic, rejecting outside control of his country.

But he operated not as a revolutionary, but instead confronted corruption within the ruling class

while in positions of power. “Mossadegh first became minister of finance… …but upon taking

office he launched an anticorruption campaign that threatened Reza and his friends, and was

soon forced to resign.”14 He gained an elected seat in the Majlis and “..he used it to denounce the

misconduct of the British…”15 “Distinguished, highly emotional, and every inch the aristocrat,

he believed so totally in his own country that his words reached out and touched the common

man. Mossadegh was Iran’s first genuinely popular leader, and he knew it.”16

Although accused as being a communist, he was really very nationalistic: “...his central

themes were always democracy and self-reliance.”17

Opinions of Modern Western Culture/Civilization

Ho was shaped by starting as a nobody, aspiring for the freedoms of democracy he had

learned about: ‘“What attracts [Ho] to these [Western] countries is their ideology of freedom, of

the sovereignty of the people, of democracy, of science and technology.”’18 He wanted these

12
Kinzer, 54.
13
Kinzer, 55.
14
Kinzer, 57.
15
Kinzer, 58.
16
Kinzer, 58.
17
Kinzer, 59.
18
Halberstam, 23.
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applied to his country, realizing “...that Vietnam must be modernized, and that his people must

understand the new science and technology.”19

Mosaddegh liked Western culture/civilization for its democracy and was also considered

to be a liberal. Only his nationalism allowed the religious to align with his cause: “The British,

by their refusal to compromise, had managed to unite a broad cross section of the politically

active population against them. They even pushed religious groups committed to Islamic law into

a coalition with Mossadegh and other secular liberals.”20

Strategies in Resisting/Removing Western Domination of their Countries

The defining strategy of Ho Chi Minh was by always being of and for the people, not an

elite or aristocrat. “...he was the beaming father figure of his people, the man of constant

simplicity, the soft-spoken Asian who seemed gentle, indeed almost sweet, sometimes

self-mocking, his humor and warmth in sharp contrast to the normal bureaucratic grimness of a

high Communist official.”21 In contrast to this he was a true revolutionary Communist, not

actually gentle, and willing to pay a price for his country’s freedom. But, “This hard and callous

side was rarely seen in public…”22 By presenting as a person not just standing for ideology, but

standing definitively indeed for his people’s freedom he was legitimized and was able to form an

army of very devoted Vietnamese. This army prevented France from regaining colonial control

and went on to repel the great forces of the U.S. in the 60’s and 70’s.

Mossadegh capitalized on his emotional nature and sickly appearance to gain popular

support and become elected to seats of power. He leveraged these positions to demand power

19
Halberstam, 22.
20
Kinzer, 75.
21
Halberstam, 70.
22
Halberstam, 71.
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from the Shah: “Mossadegh, who had mastered the art of political theater before the Shah was

born, said not a word. He paused for a few moments to reflect, then rose to walk out. The Shah

was struck with fear that the old man would take to the streets and rouse the masses against

him.”23

Opinions of the United States, and U.S. Government’s Views of Them

As previously stated, Ho liked many of the ideologies of the United states. In preparation

for Versailles Ho “...prepared his own eight-point program for freedom in Vietnam, based on

Wilson’s fourteen points.”24 Yet to Ho in the time of WWII, “The Americans were a puzzle: they

were at once imperialist and anticolonialist, a potential counterforce to the French.”25 Ho decided

to help the U.S. with intelligence and “In return they would give him arms.”26

The United States was initially friendly to indigenous people resisting colonial rule

following the war and so “In 1945 and 1946, U.S. agents encouraged Ho Chi Minh and other

Indochinese nationalists to resist the reimposition of French rule…”27 However, this kind of

friendliness and policy could not overcome the general Anti-communist agenda that surfaced in

the first half of the 1950’s in the U.S. In fact, president Lyndon Johnson boasted in 1965 “...to

white house intimates about what he had done to Ho: ‘I just cut his p---- off’...”28

During the Truman administration, Mossadegh and Iran enjoyed the diplomatic support

of the U.S. even though the U.S. and Britain were allies. “[Secretary of State Acheson] and

others in the Truman administration never stopped urging their British counterparts to turn away

23
Kinzer, 134-35
24
Halberstam, 31.
25
Halberstam, 73.
26
Halberstam, 73
27
Carter V. Findley and John Alexander Murray Rothney, 229
28
Halberstam, 116.
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from their policy of confrontation and to offer Mossadegh a legitimate compromise.”29 The

election of of President Eisenhower in 1952 marked the end of this support. Soon after the

inauguration the head of the CIA, “Allen Dulles sent [Eisenhower] an intelligence estimate

warning that ‘the Iran situation has been slowly disintegrating’ and ‘a Communist takeover is

becoming more and more of a possibility.”30

Even during this time, “despite the troubles of recent months, [Mossadegh] had a soft

spot for Americans.”31

Conclusion

There were many complications to achieving the freedoms both of these leaders wanted.

In Vietnam, this dream of Ho Chi Minh played out over many decades and in the end many

Vietnamese died in pursuit of that freedom: “Each year the Americans started out with an

estimate of enemy in the country; if it was, say, 75,000, that year they might kill 85,000, only to

find at the end of the year there were 90,000. They were fighting the birth rate of the nation.”32

For Mossadegh, legitimacy was gained through steadfast anti-corruption efforts, effective

public speaking, and the political ability to take power. As a result of the coup organized by the

CIA, a great deal of violence and suffering has been brought on the world: “Fundamentalist

clerics who consolidated power in Iran during the early 1980’s not only imposed a form of

religious fascism at home but turned their country into a center for the propagation of terror

abroad. Their support for the hostage-takers who seized American diplomats in Tehran was only

the beginning of their fierce anti-Western campaign.

29
Kinzer, 92.
30
Kinzer, 157-58
31
Kinzer, 174.
32
Halberstam, 114.
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Bibliography

Findley, Carter V., and John Alexander Murray Rothney. ​Twentieth-century World​. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011.

Halberstam, David. ​Ho.​ New York: Random House, 1971.

Kinzer, Stephen. ​All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East
Terror.​ Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.