Civil Law Tips on Persons, Family Relations and Succession

CIVIL LAW UST LAST MINUTE TIPS 2019
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 6, Civil Code
Q: When may rights be waived?
A: Rights may be waived when their waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law (Article 6, Civil Code).
Q. What is the Nationality Principle?
A: Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (NCC, Article 15)
Q. What is Lex Rei Sitae
A: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. (Article 16, par.1, Civil
Code)
Q: What are the exceptions to Lex Rei Sitae?
A: In cases of intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the (1) order of succession and (2) to the amount of
successional rights and (3) to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found (Article 16, par.2, Civil Code).
Q: What is lex loci celebrationis?
A: The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed (Article 17, par. 1, Civil Code).
Q: What law governs the execution of contracts, wills and other public instruments executed abroad before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Philippines?
A: When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution (Article 17, par. 2, Civil
Code).
Q: Will foreign laws, judgments or conventions render ineffective Philippine prohibitive laws?
A: No, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country (Article 17, par. 3, Civil Code).
Q: Norma, a Filipina married Ernst, a German. They had one son. Thereafter they got divorced in Holland. Norma and
her son returned to the Philippines. Ernst refused to give monthly support to their son despite demand from Norma
for such support. Norma filed a case against Ernst for his refusal to give support, a violation of R.A. 9262. Norma also
relied on Art. 195 of the NCC, which provides that a parent has the obligation to support his child.
a. Is Ernst obliged to support his minor child under Philippine law? Was Norma correct in relying on Art. 195
of the NCC to compel support from Ernst?
b. Assuming that German laws do not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their children, may
Ernst still be obliged to support his minor child?
A:
a. NO. Ernst does not have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law.
Norma cannot rely on Art. 195 of the NCC in demanding support from Ernst, who is a foreign citizen. Art. 15 of the
NCC stresses the Nationality Principle. Under Philippine laws, specifically the Family Code provisions on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since Ernst is a foreign
citizen, he is subject to the laws of his country, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
b. YES. Notwithstanding that the national law of Ernst states that parents have no obligation to support their children, his
national law would still not apply.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 1
When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Even if German laws neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto (Del Socorro v.
Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, Peralta, J.).
Q: Romeo and Juliet, both Filipinos', got married. After a few years. Juliet got word from her mother that she can go to
the United States for naturalization. Juliet promised she will be back the moment she becomes an American. After
sometime, Romeo learned from a friend that Juliet already became a U.S. citizen and even divorced him to marry a
wealthy American businessman. Romeo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court praying that an order be
issued authorizing him to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code. Decide the petition with reasons.
A: If the time of Juliet's acquisition of U.S. citizenship preceded the time when she obtained the divorce decree, then the
divorce decree can be given effect in the Philippines, and consequently, Romeo will be capacitated to remarry, under
Philippine law. On the other hand, if Juliet obtains the divorce decree before she acquired U.S. citizenship, then the foreign
divorce decree cannot be recognized by Philippine courts. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code provides that where
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrate and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In
Republic v. Orbecido (G.R. No. 1543380 October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114), the Supreme Court ruled that Art' 26, paragraph 2
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The reckoning point is
not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time divorce decree is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him to remarry. (2016 Bar)
Q: Mekeni offered Locsin the position of Regional Sales Manager. In addition to a compensation and benefit package, Mekeni
offered him a car plan, where it would shoulder one-half of the cost of the vehicle and the other half will be deducted to
petitioner’s salary. Subsequently, Locsin resigned and offer to purchase his service vehicle by paying the outstanding balance
thereon. The parties could not agree on the terms of the proposed purchase. Locsin then filed against Mekeni a complaint for
the recovery of monthly salary deductions sharing in the car plan. Mekeni argued that his monthly contributions to the
carplan are rentals for the use of the vehicle during Locsin’s employment, thus, the latter should not be paid. The NLRC
ordered Mekeni to pay Locsin for the reimbursement of his payment under the car plan agreement as well as the share of
Mekeni as a benefit under the car plan because it forms part of the his benefits under the car plan. Is Locsin entitled to a
refund of all the amounts applied to the cost of the service vehicle under the car plan?
A: NO. He is only entitled to the refund of his contributions. Petitioner cannot recover the monetary value of Mekeni’s
counterpart contribution to the cost of the vehicle; that is not property or money that belongs to him, nor was it intended to be
given to him in lieu of the car plan.
Article 22 of the Civil Code provides “every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.”
Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging petitioner for the use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the full
and effective promotion of its business.
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The main
objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of
another without just cause or consideration. (Antonio Locsin II vs. Mekeni Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, December
09, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Q: Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the passengers on board a commercial jet
plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean ten (10) years earlier and had never been heard of ever since. Believing
that her husband had died, Ana married Adolf Cruz Staedtler, a divorced German national born of a German father
and a Filipino mother residing in Stuttgart. To avoid being required to submit the required certificate of capacity to
marry from the German Embassy in Manila, Adolf stated in the application for marriage license that he was a Filipino
citizen. With the marriage license stating that Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got married in a ceremony officiated by
the Parish Priest of Calamba, Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu, Batangas, as the local parish priest refused to solemnize
marriages except in his church. Is the marriage valid? Explain fully.
A: No. The marriage is not valid. Art. 41 FC allows the present spouse to contract a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of the previous marriage provided that: (a) the prior spouse in the first marriage had been absent for four
consecutive years; (b) that the spouse present has a well- founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, and (C)
present spouse instituted a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of absent spouse. Otherwise, the
second marriage shall be null and void. In the instant case, the husband of Ana was among the passengers on board a
commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean. The body of the deceased husband was not recovered to confirm his
death. Thus, following Art. 41, Ana should have first secured a judicial declaration of his presumptive death before she married
Adolf. The absence of the said judicial declaration incapacitated Ana from contracting her second marriage, making it void ab
initio. (2008 BAR)

Q: Bernard and Dorothy lived together as common-law spouses although they are both capacitated to marry. After
one year of cohabitation, Dorothy went abroad to work in Dubai as a hair stylist and regularly sent money to Bernard.
With the money, Bernard bought a lot. For a good price, Bernard sold the lot. Dorothy came to know about the
acquisition and sale of the lot and filed a suit to nullify the sale because she did not give her consent to the sale.
(A) Will Dorothy's suit prosper? Decide with reasons. (2.5%)
(B) Suppose Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the lot and her efforts consisted
mainly in the care and maintenance of the family and household, is her consent to the sale prerequisite to its validity?
Explain. (2.5%)
A: (A) Yes, Dorothy's suit will prosper, unless the buyer is a buyer in go faith and for value. The rule of co-ownership governs
the property relationship in a union without marriage between a man and a worn who are capacitated to marry each other.
Article 147 of the Family Code is specifically applicable. Under this article, neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without consent of the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation - thus, Bernard may not validly dispose of the lot without the con of Dorothy as
the lot was acquired through their work during cohabitation.
(B) Yes, if Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the lot, her consent is still a prerequisite to
the validity of the sale. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and the household. In this case although the money used to buy the lot was solely from
Bernard, Dorothy's care and maintenance of the family and household are deemed contributions in the acquisition of the lot.
Article 147, 2nd paragraph is applicable, as the lot is deemed owned in common by the common-law spouses in equal shares
as the same was acquired during their cohabitation, without prejudice to the rights of a buyer in good faith and for value.
(2016 BAR)
Q: A filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against B, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The trial court in its petition, ordered that the decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
pursuant to Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. A argues that such rule does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. Is the argument of A correct?
A: Yes, the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. It is clear from
Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, A’s marriage to B was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by A and B are the rules on co-ownership under Article 147 of
the Family Code. (Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044, January 29, 2011, Carpio, J.)
Q: Differentiate Article 147 from Article 148 of the Family Code
A:
ARTICLE 147 ARTICLE 148

The wages and salaries of the parties shall be owned by them Such rule does not apply.
in equal shares and shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
There is a presumption that the property acquired during Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
cohabitation shall be owned by them in equal shares. their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
This is a disputable presumption. shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other Such rule does not apply.
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Q: In 2008-2011, Sarah Barce had two illegitimate children with Jose Tinitigan. The births of their illegitimate
children were not registered. After some time, Barce decided to register the Birth Certificates of her children.
Thereafter, Barce discovered that two birth certificates were already registered in her children’s names, bearing
the surname of their illegitimate father “Tinitigan.” Barce sought the cancellation of the birth certificates for
containing void and illegal entries because the children used the surname of Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate
of Article 176 of the Family Code stating that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. Will the
suit prosper?
A: YES, the suit will prosper. The subject birth certificates are void because such is contrary to the mandate of Article 176
of the Family Code stating that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother.
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
The use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to
use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.
Since the facts show that the two children are illegitimate children of Barce, the entry in the subject birth certificates as to
the surname of the children is incorrect; their surname should have been Barce and not Tinitigan.
Furthermore, the argument that the subject birth certificates are the express recognition of the children's filiation by
Tinitigan is incorrect because it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her
child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not.
The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child. (In The Matter
of the Petition For Cancellation of Certificate of Live Birth For Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna
Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan v. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017, Carpio, J.).
Q: Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975. On December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, left Nilda, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante
and has tried everything to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before
the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse
of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of Nilda. Is the ruling of the courts correct?
A: No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such,
the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than
making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the
AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. (Republic of the Philippines v Nilda B. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J)
Q: Luzviminda was married to Ryoji Morisono in Quezon City on December 8, 2009. Thereafter, they lived together in
Japan for 1 year and 3 months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would quarrel mainly
due to Ryoji’s philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda. As such, the two of
them submitted a “Divorce by Agreement” before the City Hall of Mizuho-ku in Nagoya, Japan, which was approved
and duly recorded. In view of this, Luzviminda filed a petition for recognition of foreign divorce decree obtained by
her and Ryoji before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her husband and be able to marry again.
The RTC denied Luzviminda’s petition, holding that while a divorce decree held that while a divorce obtained abroad
by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national
law of the alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the
same. Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the
foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines. Did the RTC correctly deny
Luzviminda’s petition for recognition of divorce decree she procured?
A: No. It had been ruled in Republic vs. Manalo that foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino
and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the
divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the
Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. a plain reading
of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this
jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino
citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been
rendered nugatory.
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as
Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with
prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an
examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court is warranted. (Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono v Ryoji
Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018 PERLAS-BERNABE, J)
Q: Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's parents without the
benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving

Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James. Ricky James alleged that, the parents of Renalyn
took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents
refused. Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody before the RTC (petition a
quo). Upon reaching the CA it remanded the case for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie. Was
such action proper?
A: NO, CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the
parents of the minor are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because
they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were
never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but
without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.
As an exception, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such as
Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently
entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. (Renalyn A. Masbate v Ricky James
Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018 PERLAS-BERNABE, J)
Q: Brad and Angelina had a secret marriage before a pastor whose office is located in Arroceros Street, City of Manila.
They paid money to the pastor who took care of all the documentation. When Angelina wanted to go to the U.S., she
found out that there was no marriage license issued to them before their marriage. Since their marriage was
solemnized in 1995 after the effectivity of the Family Code, Angelina filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity
on the strength of a certification by the Civil Registrar of Manila that, after a diligent and exhaustive search, the
alleged marriage license indicated in the marriage certificate does not appear in the records and cannot be found.
(A) Decide the case and explain.

(B) In case the marriage was solemnized in 1980 before the effectivity of the Family Code, is it required that a
judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null and void? Explain.
A: (A) I will grant the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of Brad and Angelina's marriage on the ground that there is a
lack of a marriage license. Article 3 of the Family Code provides that one of the formal requisites of marriage is a valid
marriage license and Article 4 of the same Code states that absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio. In Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 646), the Supreme Court declared the
marriage as void ab initio because there is proof of lack of record of marriage license.
The certification by the Civil Registrar of Manila that, after a diligent and exhaustive search, the alleged marriage license
indicated in the marriage certificate does not appear in the records and cannot be found proves that the marriage of Brad and
Angelina was solemnized without the requisite marriage license and is therefore void ab initio. The absence of the marriage
license was certified to by the local civil registrar who is the official custodian of these documents and who is in the best
position to certify as to the existence of these records. Also, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty (Republic v. CA and Castro, G.R. No. 103047, September 2,1994, 236 SCRA 257).
(B) No, it is not required that a judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null and void when said marriage was
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. As stated in the cases of People v. Mendoza (G.R. No. L-5877, September
28, 1954, 95 Phil. 845), and People y Arapon (G.R. No. L-10016, February 28,1957,100 Phil. 1033), the old role is that where a
marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial petition is necessary to establish its invalidity. (2016 BAR)
Masbate vs Relucio
The SC acknowledged that it be possible for the father of an illegitimate child to be given custody and be allowed to exercise
substitute parental authority. The father of an illegitimate child does not enjoy any rights except visitation rights. Visitation
rights were just given by way of jurisprudence. In Masbate vs Relucio, the flow of the organize should be as follows: the father
here had actual custody. It is his actual custody which provided for the basis for the creation of substitute parental authority.
But that was not the only hindrance that the father had to overcome because there is a hierarchy of preference. First on the
list would be the grandparents, and this necessarily, in the case of illegitimate children, refer to maternal grandparents. The
father does not figure here directly, but only by way of actual custodian. But even with that preference, they cannot be
held hostage to what has been held by law because what is paramount is always the best interest of the child. If it is
the best interest of the child to take custody from the grandparents and transfer it to the father, then it will be done.
However, a hearing must be conducted to establish the following:
1. Mother is unfit.
2. It is the best interest of the child to be in the custody of either the grandparents or actual custodian, who is in
this case, the father.
3. It is the father whom should be given custody for the betterment of the child. (Masbate v Relucio)
Republic vs Manalo
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws. AMC No. 02-11-10 SC,
which requires that motion for reconsideration, must be filed prior to an appeal, does not cover cases involving recognition of
foreign divorce-only void and voidable marriages. Void and voidable marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the
marriage as if it never existed. Divorce on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and this usually due to circumstances
arising after the marriage. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE, G.R No. 212860, March 14, 2018,
Reyes, J.)
Donation made by a spouse without the consent of the other, is valid only up to the extent of the share of the spouse who made
such donation, for the reason that as in any other property relation between husband and wife, the conjugal relation is
terminated upon the death of the spouse. (Sps. Julieta B. Carlos and Fernando P. Carlos v Juan Cruz Tolentino, G.R. No.
234533, June 27, 2018,J. Velasco Jr.)
PROPERTY
Immovable or Real Property
In general, all things susceptible of appropriation which cannot be transported from place to place without impairment of
the real property to which they are fixed.
Movable or Personal Property

In, general, all things susceptible of appropriation which can be transported from place to place without impairment of
the real property to which they are fixed.
Consumable Property
One which cannot be used according to its nature without being consumed or being eaten or used up.
Fungible Property
Those properties which can be substituted or replaced by an equal quantity and quality.
Donation Inter Vivos
It takes effect during the donor’s lifetime or independently of the donor’s death
Donation Mortis Causa

Full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the done because of the donor;s death.
Inofficious Donation
No person may give or receive by way of donation more than he may give or receive by will which simply means no one
can impair the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Q: Pangilinan acquired a parcel of land from Abby through a Waiver of Rights. Apparently, Abby also executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of Alvarez covering the same land prior to the Waiver. Thereafter, Pangilinan learned that
certain Spouses Bach were occupying the subject lot and refused to vacate. Hence, Pangilinan filed a forcible entry
case against the spouses. The spouses argued that – First, the subject land they are occupying is owned and
possessed not by Pangilinan but of Alvarez and second, that Pangilinan never physically possessed the subject
land nor introduced improvements thereto. On the other hand, Pangilinan argued that she often visited the
property during weekends and holidays.
a) Is Pangilinan considered in prior possession of the subject land despite lack of physical possession over
it?
b) Should the Spouses’ possession be considered for purposes of taking such onto Alvarez’ possession?
A:
a) YES. In this case, Pangilinan sufficiently proved her prior possession de facto of the subject land by evidence that
she often visited the property during weekends and holidays. Jurisprudence states that the law does not
require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in
possession thereof. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of
possession of the subject property.
b) NO. Tacking of possession only applies to possession de jure, or that possession which has for its purpose
the claim of ownership. Forcible entry cases, however, involve only possession de facto, as in the case at bar
(Spouses Fahrenbach v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 224549, August 7, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.).
Q: Anthony bought a piece of untitled agricultural land from Bert, Bert, in turn, acquired the property by
forging Carlo’s signature in a deed of sale over the property. Carlo had been in possession of the property for 8
years, declared it for tax purposes, and religiously paid all taxes due on the property. Anthony is not aware of
the defect in Bert’s title, but has been in actual physical possession of the property from the time he bought it
from Bert, who had never been in possession. Anthony has since then been in possession of the property for one
year.
a. If Carlo is able to legally recover his property, can he require Anthony to account for all the fruits he has
harvested from the property while in possession?
b. If there are standing crops on the property when Carlo recovers possession, can Carlo appropriate
them? (2008 BAR)
A:
a. NO. Since Anthony is a possessor in good faith, Anthony cannot be made to account for the fruits he gathered
before he was served with summons. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession was legally interrupted by the service of summons (Art. 544, CC). After Anthony was served with
summons, he became a possessor in bad faith and a builder, planter, sower in bad faith. He can also be made to
account for the fruits but he may deduct expenses for production gathering and preservation of the fruits (Art.
443, CC).
b. YES. The value of the standing crops must be prorated depending upon the period of possession and the period
of growing and producing the fruits. Anthony is entitled to a part of the net harvest and a part of the expenses of
cultivation in proportion to his period of possession. Carlo may appropriate the respective parts subject to
prorating the respective periods of possession. However, Carlo may allow Anthony to gather these growing fruits
as an indemnity for the expenses of cultivation. If Anthony refuses to accept this concession, he shall lose the right
to indemnity under Art. 443 (Art. 545, par. 3, CC).
Q: Alex died without a will leaving an untitled lot. He is survived by his wife and 4 children. His wife waived her
share in the property, and allowed Bobby, the eldest son to construct his house on ¼ of the lot, without however
obtaining the consent of his siblings. After settlement of Alex's estate and partition among the heirs, it was
discovered that Bobby's house was constructed on the portion allocated to his sister. Cathy asked Bobby to
demolish his house and vacate the portion alloted to her. In lieu of demolition, Bobby offered to purchase from
Cathy the lot portion on which his house was constructed.
a. Can Cathy lawfully ask for demolition of Bobby's house?
b. Can Bobby legally insist on purchasing the land? (2008 BAR)
A:
a. YES. Upon Alex’s death, there was created a co-ownership by operation of law among the widow and four
children (Art. 1078, CC). Bobby’s share is only an undivided interest of 1/10 of the entire lot. Bobby’s act
of building on ¼ of the lot is an act requiring the unanimous consent of all the co-owners since it is an
act of alteration. The consent given by the widow to Bobby’s act of building his house was legally insufficient.
The widow’s share in the co-ownership is 6/10 of the entire lot, 1/2 of the lot being her share in the community
property and 1/5 of Alex’s share in the other half, because she has the same share as one of the four children.
She has the financial majority or majority interest of the co-ownership. As a matter of right, Cathy can ask for
the demolition of the house and the payment of damages.
b. NO. The rules on building, planting and sowing are not applicable to co-ownership. The rules applicable
to co-ownership are acts of alteration or acts of ownership on one hand and acts of mere administration
on the other. Even if it were applicable, Bobby acted in bad faith and hence, demolition is one of the three
options open to an owner. It is the owner of the land, not the builder, planter or sower who has the options,
even if both acted in bad faith or good faith.
Q: The First Accretion adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. Decades later, the Second Accretion abutted
the First Accretion on its southern portion. OCT was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second
Accretion. Petitioners alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano,
with respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally
registered the said accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners. Are the
petitioners the exclusive owners of the First and Second Accretion?
A: No. Petitioners are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot
assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion,
they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties through
prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of them. Being the owner of the land adjoining the
foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area. Accordingly,
therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. (Heirs of Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr. et. al v. Emiliana
Imbornal et. al,G.R. No. 182908,August 6, 2014, J. Perlas Bernabe)
Q: In 2005, Andres built a residential house on a lot whose only access to the national highway was a pathway
crossing Brando's property. Andres and others have been using this pathway (pathway A) since 1980. In 2006,
Brando fenced off his property, thereby blocking Andres' access to the national highway. Andres demanded that part

of the fence be removed to maintain his old access route to the highway (pathway A), but Brando refused, claiming
that there was another available pathway (pathway B) for ingress and egress to the highway. Andres countered that
pathway B has defects, is circuitous, and is extremely inconvenient to use. To settle their dispute, Andres and Brando
hired Damian, a geodetic and civil engineer, to survey and examine the two pathways and the surrounding areas, and
to determine the shortest and the least prejudicial way through the servient estates. After the survey, the engineer
concluded that pathway B is the longer route and will need improvements and repairs, but will not significantly affect
the use of Brando's property. On the other hand, pathway A that had long been in place, is the shorter route but would
significantly affect the use of Brando's property. In light of the engineer's findings and the circumstances of the case,
resolve the parties' right of way dispute. (1996, 2013 BAR)
A: Andres is not entitled to the easement of right of way for Pathway A. Pathway B must be used. When there is already an
existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or
another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified (Costabella Corp. v. CA, G.R. No.
80511, January 25, 1991). The rule that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate is controlling.
ALLUVIUM
Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoin the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the natural action of the current of the waters. The accretion however, does not automatically become registered
land. It must be brought under the Torrens system of registration by the riparian owner. (Grande v. CA; Bar 2001, 2003,
2008, 2009, 2016)
CO-OWNERSHIP
There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing ir right belongs to different persons.
Requisites/Elements:
1. Plurality of Subjects
2. Unity of object
3. Recognition of the co-ownership on the part of the co-owners
Joint accounts are co-owned properties
An instance where co-ownership is manifested is in a joint account. A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more
natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-
owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to
Article 485 of the Civil Code. Thus, one co-owner may validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-
depositor. His authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose for which the
subject account was opened. (DOMINADOR M. APIQUE, v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH, G.R. No. 205705 | August 05,
2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)
POSSESSION OF MOVABLES (Art. 559)
General Rule: Possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Exception: One who has lost any movable or has been lawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession
of the same. However, when the thing was acquired by the possessor in good faith or at a public sale, the owner can only
obtain its return after reimbursement of the price paid therefor. (Bar 1991, 1993, 1998, 2013)
WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Q: State the rules in revocation of wills.
A: If revocation takes place in the Philippines, whether the testator is domiciled in the Philippines or in some other
country, it is valid if in accordance with Philippine laws.
If revocation takes place outside the Philippines by a testator domiciled in the Philippines, it is valid when it is in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.
Revocation done outside the Philippines, by a testator who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is
done according to the:
a. Law of the place where the will was made;
b. Law of the place where the testator had his domicile at the time of revocation; or
c. Philippine law. (Article 829, NCC)
Q: Arthur executed a will which contained only: (i) a provision disinheriting his daughter Bernice for running
off with a married man, and (ii) a provision disposing of his share in the family house and lot in favor of his
other children Connie and Dora. He did not make any provisions in favor of his wife, Erica, because as the will
stated, she would anyway get ½ of the house and lot as her conjugal share. The will was very brief and
straightforward and both the above provisions were contained in page 1, which Arthur and his instrumental
witness signed at the bottom. Page 2 contained the attestation clause and the signatures at the bottom thereof of
the 3 instrumental witnesses which included Lambert, the driver of Arthur; Yoly, the family cook, and Attorney
Zorba, the lawyer who prepared the will. There was a 3 rd page, but this only contained the notarial
acknowledgement. The attestation clause stated that the will was signed on the same occasion by Arthur and
his instrumental witnesses who all signed in the presence of each other, and the notary public who notarized
the will. There are no marginal signatures or pagination appearing on any of the 3 pages. Upon his death, it was
discovered that apart from the house and lot, he had a P 1million account deposited with ABC Bank. cook, and
Attorney Zorba, the lawyer who prepared the will. There was a 3rd page, but this only contained the notarial
acknowledgement. The attestation clause stated that the will was signed on the same occasion by Arthur and
his instrumental witnesses who all signed in the presence of each other, and the notary public who notarized
the will. There are no marginal signatures or pagination appearing on any of the 3 pages. Upon his death, it was
discovered that apart from the house and lot, he had a P 1million account deposited with ABC Bank.
Was Erica Preterited?
A:
NO, Erica was not preterited under Art. 854 of the New Civil Code because she was not related in the direct line.
Moreover, since there is an intestate portion in Arthur’s estate from which Erica will inherit as an intestate heir,
she was not totally excluded or omitted from the inheritance of Arthur. To be preterited, the heir who must be a
compulsory heir in the direct line should be totally excluded from the inheritance, i.e., the heir will not receive
anything by will, or by intestacy, and has not received any advance by way of donation inter vivos.
Even assuming that Erica was preterited, her preterition will not have any effect on the provisions of the will. The
effect of preterition is simply to annul the institution of an heir made in the will. Legacies and devises are respected
unless they are inofficious. In the problem, since the will contains nothing but a devise, there is no institution that
will be annulled even on the assumption that there was preterition.
What other defects of the will, if any, can cause denial of probate?
A:
There are no other defects of the will that can cause denial of probate. Art. 805 of the Civil Code provides
that the will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator, and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The driver, the cook and the lawyer who prepared
the will are credible witnesses. The testator and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, each and
every page of the will proper, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
It has been held, however, that the testator’s signature is not necessary in the attestation clause, and that if a will
consists of two sheets, the first of which contains the testamentary dispositions, and is signed at the bottom by
the testator and the three witnesses, and the second sheet contains the attestation clause, as in this case, signed
by 3 witnesses, marginal signatures and paging are not necessary. After all, the object of the law is to avoid
substitution of any of the sheets of the will.(Abangan v Abangan (1919); In Re: Will of Tan Diuc (1924)
Was the disinheritance valid?
A:
The fact that the daughter disinherited ran off with a married man is a valid ground for disinheritance
under the Civil Code. One ground for disinheritance of a descendant is when the descendant leads a dishonarable
or disgraceful life (Art.919(7) CC). Running away with a married man leads to a dishonorable or disgraceful life.
How should the house and lot, and the cash be distributed?
A:
On the assumption that the House and Lot and the Cash were all conjugal property, the distribution will be as
follows:
House and Lot
One half of the house shall be the conjugal share of Erica. The other half is the conjugal share of Arthur which
was inherited by Eric, Connie and Dora in equal shares. Hence Eric, Connie and Dora will be undivided co-owners
of the house and lot with Erica getting 2/3 share thereof and Connie and Dora with 1/6 share each.
Cash
The one million cash shall be divided in the same manner. ½ thereof or 500,000 shall be the conjugal share of
Erica while 500,000 shall be the share of Arthur. This amount shall be divided in 3 equal shares, or 166,666.66
per share. Erica will get 166,666.66 as her share while Dora and Connie will get 166,666.66 each as their
inheritance. The one million cash will be distributed as follows:
Erica --------- 666,666.66
Dora --------- 166,666.66
Connie ------- 166,666.66
Q: Pedro had worked for 15 years in Saudi Arabia when he finally decided to engage in farming in his home province
where his 10- hectare farmland valued at ₱2,000,000.00 was located. He had already ₱3,000,000.00 savings from his
long stint in Saudi Arabia.
Eagerly awaiting Pedro's arrival at the NAIA were his aging parents Modesto and Jacinta, his common-law spouse
Veneranda, their three children, and Alex, his child by Carol, his departed legal wife. Sadly for all of them, Pedro
suffered a stroke because of his overexcitement just as the plane was about to land, and died without seeing any of
them.
The farmland and the savings were all the properties he left.
(a) State who are Pedro's legal heirs, and the shares of each legal heir to the estate? Explain your answer.
(b) Assuming that Pedro's will is discovered soon after his funeral. In the will, he disposed of half of his estate
in favor of Veneranda, and the other half in favor of his children and his parents in equal shares. Assuming
also that the will is admitted to probate by the proper court. Are the testamentary dispositions valid and
effective under the law on succession? Explain your answer. (2017 BAR)
A: (A) Pedro’s legal heirs are Alex, who is his legitimate child by his deceased wife (Article 979 NCC) and his three children by
Veneranda, who are his illegitimate children (Article 873 NCC). Modesto and Jacinta, his parents, are excluded by Alex, his
legitimate child. Veneranda, as a common-law spouse, is not among Pedro’s legal heirs. Assuming that the farmland and
savings are the exclusive properties of Pedro, Pedro’s estate amounts to P5,000,000. Alex is entitled to one-half of Pedro’s
estate, amounting to P2,500,000, while three illegitimate children divide the remaining one-half equally, such that each will
receive P833,333.33.
(B) The testamentary dispositions are invalid insofar as they impair the legitimes of Pedro’s compulsory heirs. Pedro’s
compulsory heirs are Alex and his three illegitimate children. Alex, as Pedro’s sole legitimate child, is entitled to a legitime
equal to one-half of his father’s estate, amounting to P3,750,000 total, but as this exceeds the balance of the estate amounting
to P2,500,000, the latter amount must be divided equally among the three, amounting to P833,333.33 each. The other
testamentary dispositions to Veneranda and Pedro’s parents, may not be given effect, as there is nothing left of the estate to
distribute.
Q; Don Ricardo had 2 legitimate children—Tomas and Tristan. Tristan has 3 children. Meanwhile, Tomas had a
relationship with Nancy, who was also single and had the legal capacity to marry. Nancy became pregnant and gave
birth to Tomas, Jr. Afterihe birth of Tomas, Jr., his father, Tomas, died. Later, Don Ricardo died without a will and
Tristan opposed the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared an heir of the deceased since he is an illegitimate child.
Tomas, Jr. countered that Article 992 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the
laws. He explained that an illegitimate child of an illegitimate parent is allowed to inherit under Articles 902,982 and
990 of the Civil Code while he—an illegitimate child of a legitimate father—cannot. Civil Law commentator Arturo
Tolentino opined that Article 992 created an absurdity and committed an injustice because while the illegitimate
descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. Decide the
case and explain.
A: I will deny the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared as an heir of the deceased, Tomas Jr., being an illegitimate child of the
deceased legitimate son, Tomas, cannot inherit intestate from the deceased, Don Ricardo, because of the iron curtain rule
under Article 992 of the Civil Code.
Tomas cannot argue that Article 992 is violative of the equal protection clause because equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed
(Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 101 Phil. 1155). It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. (2016 BAR)
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Kinds of Delay “Mora”
1. Mora Solvendi (default on the part of the debtor)
-the delay, contrary to law, in the fulfilment of the prestation by reason of a cause imputable to the former.
Presupposes a prestation that is due and enforceable.
2. Mora Accipiendi (default on the part of the creditor)

- it is the delay in the performance based on the omission on the part of the creditor of the necessary
cooperation, especially acceptance on his part.
3. Compensation Morae (default of both parties in reciprocal obligations)

- it is the default of both parties in reciprocal obligations. The effect is the default of one party neutralizes the
default of the other they guilty of mutual guilt. Their respective liabilities shall be offset equitably.

Solidary Obligation
An obligation is joint when each of the debtor is liable only for a proportional part of the debt, and each creditor
is entitled only to partial part of the credit. Also called, mancomunada, pro rata, mancomunada simple.
Joint Obligation
An obligation is solidary when any of the debtors be held liable for the entire obligation, and any of the creditors
is entitled to demand the entire obligation. The words, “individually and collectively” and “individually liable” or
“individually and jointly liable” give rise to an individual or solidary liability.
Period vs Condition
1. As to fulfillment:
 A period is a future and certain event
 A condition is an uncertain event
2. As to time
 A period refers only top the future
 A condition may refer also to the past
3. As to terms of influence on the obligation

 A period fixes the time for the performance of an obligation. It does prevent its existence and conception in due
time
 • A condition causes the existence or the extinguishment of an obligation
Q: Chan, owner of a three-story commercial building, entered into a lease contract with Philippine National
Bank for five years. Upon expiration of the lease, PNB continued to lease the property on a monthly basis. Chan
executed a Deed of Assignment over the rental payments in favor of PNB. However, PNB failed to pay its monthly
rentals and it also explained that it received a demand letter from a certain Chua who claimed to be the new
owner of the leased property and requested that the rentals be paid directly to him. PNB thus deposited the
rentals in a separate non-drawing savings account for the benefit of the rightful party. Is there a proper
consignation made by PNB?
A: NO. The requisites of consignation are as follows:

1. There was a debt due;
2. The consignation of due obligation was made because of some legal cause provided under NCC, Art. 1256;
3. The previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the
obligation;
4. The amount or thing due was placed at the disposal of the court; and
5. That after the consignation had been made the persons interested were notified thereof. (Soledad Dalton v. FGR
Realty and Development Corporation, Felix Ng, Nenita Ng, and Flora R. Dayrit,
G.R. No. 172577, January 19, 2011, Carpio, J.)
Q: What are the requisites of compensation?
A: The requisites are as follows:

1) Each one of the obligors must be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other except guarantor who may set up compensation as regards what the creditor may owe the
principal (NCC, Art. 1279, 1280);
2) Both debts consist in sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind and also of the
same quality if the latter has been stated;
3) Both debts are due;
4) Both debts are liquidated and demandable; and
5) Neither debt must be retained in a controversy commenced by third person and communicated in due time to the
debtor (neither debt is garnished) (NCC, Art. 1279).
Q: Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid, when is the obligation demandable in each case?
a) If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay;

b) If the debtor promises to pay when he likes;
c) If the debtor promises to pay when he becomes a lawyer;
d) If the debtor promises to pay if his son, who is sick with cancer, does not die within one year. (2003 BAR)
A:
a) The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period because the debtor binds himself to pay
when his means permit him to do so (Article 1180, NCC). When the creditor knows that the debtor already has
the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix the period, and when the definite period as set by the
court arrives, the obligation to pay becomes demandable (Article 1197, NCC).
b) The obligation “to pay when he likes” is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is subject to the sole will

of the debtor and, therefore, the conditional obligation is void. (Article 1182, NCC).
c) The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the future and uncertain event of his becoming
a lawyer. The performance of this obligation does not depend solely on the will of the debtor but also on other
factors outside the debtor's control.
d) The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is made a negative suspensive condition
to his making the payment. The obligation is demandable if the son does not die within one year (Article 1185,
NCC)
Q: Jerico, the project owner, entered into a Construction Contract with Ivan for the latter to construct his house. Jojo
executed a Surety undertaking to guarantee the performance of the work by Ivan. Jerico and Ivan later entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) revising the work schedule of Ivan and the subcontractors. The MOA stated that
all the stipulations of the original contract not in conflict with said agreement shall remain valid and legally effective.
Jojo filed a suit to declare him relieved of his undertaking as a result of the MOA because of the change in the work
schedule. Jericho claims there is no novation of the Construction Contract. Decide the case and explain. (5%)
A: I will decide in favour of Jericho as there is no novation of the Construction Contract. Novation is never presumed, and may
only take place when the following are present: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new
contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and, (4) validity of the new one. There must be consent of all the parties to
the substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the creation of a new valid one. In this case, the revision of
the work schedule of Ivan and the subcontractors is not shown to be so substantial as to extinguish the old contract, and there
was also no irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and new obligations. It has also been held in jurisprudence that a
surety may only be relieved of his undertaking if there is a material change in the principal contract and such would make the
obligation of the surety onerous. The principal contract subject of the surety agreement still exists, and Jojo is still bound as a
surety. (BAR 2016)
Q: Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC “to use an automated election system (AES) xxx for the
voting, counting and canvassing for the national and local elections.” Smartmaatik won the public bidding for
the AES contract. Later, COMELEC issued a resolution
approving Smartmaatik’s PCOS Extended Warranty Proposal through direct contracting in view of the reason
that time is of the essence since the Commission is constrained by tight time schedule if public bidding are to be
conducted in the refurbishment and/or repair of the machines considering all procurement activities are lined
up. COMELEC and Smartmaatik entered into the Extended Contract Warranty. Is the Extended Warrant Contract
valid?
A: NO. The principle of autonomy of contracts cannot preclude the Extended Waranty Contract from scrutiny. The
principle is not a safe haven to just leave the parties to their agreement – it bears a sharp limitation that although
parties may agree to stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deemed appropriate, they should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. “Government contracts shall be void as against
the law and public policy, where a statutory requirement of open competitive bidding has been ignored. As a
corollary, agreements directly tending to prevent bidding for covered government contracts may violate public policy.” The
exhortation holds true with respect to the Extended Warranty Contract which is unquestionably a government contract
imbued with public interest (Pabillo v. COMELEC, GR No. 216562, April 21, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.).
Q: Foodmasters, Inc. (FI) had outstanding loan obligations to both Union Bank’s predecessor-in-interest, Bancom
Development Corporation (Bancom), and to DBP.On May 21, 1979, FI and DBP, among others, entered into a Deed of
Cession of Property In Payment of Debt (dacion en pago) whereby the former ceded in favor of the latter certain
properties (including a processing plant in Marilao, Bulacan [processing plant]) in consideration of the following: (a)
the full and complete satisfaction of FI’s loan obligations to DBP; and (b) the direct assumption by DBP of FI’s
obligations to Bancom in the amount of ₱17,000,000.00 (assumed obligations). On the same day, DBP, as the new
owner of the processing plant, leased back for 20 years the said property to FI (Lease Agreement) which was, in turn,
obliged to pay monthly rentals to be shared by DBP and Bancom.. DBP also entered into a separate agreement with
Bancom (Assumption Agreement) whereby the former: (a) confirmed its assumption of FI’s obligations to Bancom;
and (b) undertook to remit up to 30% of any and all rentals due from FI to Bancom (subject rentals) which would
serve as payment of the assumed obligations, to be paid in monthly installments. Claiming that the subject rentals
have not been duly remitted despite its repeated demands, Union Bank filed, on June 20, 1984, a collection case
against DBP before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 7648. In opposition, DBP countered, among others, that the
obligations it assumed were payable only out of the rental payments made by FI. Thus, since FI had yet to pay the
same, DBP’s obligation to Union Bank had not arisen. In addition, DBP sought to implead FW as third party-
defendant in its capacity as FI’s assignee and, thus, should be held liable to Union Bank. Was there leagal
compensation?
A: NONE. The rule on legal compensation is stated in Article 1290 of the Civil Code which provides that "when all the
requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both debts
to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation."
Therefore, compensation could not have taken place between these debts for the apparent reason that requisites 3 and 4
under Article 1279 of the Civil Code are not present. Since DBP’s assumed obligations to Union Bank for remittance of the
lease payments are – in the Court’s words – "contingent on the prior payment thereof by FW to DBP," it cannot be said that

both debts are due (requisite 3 of Article 1279 of the Civil Code). Also, the Court observed that any deficiency that DBP had to
make up for the full satisfaction of the assumed obligations "cannot be determined until after the satisfaction of FW’s
obligation to DBP." In this regard, it cannot be concluded that the same debt had already been liquidated, and thereby became
demandable (requisite 4 of Article 1279 of the Civil Code). Thus, CA correctly upheld the denial of Union Bank’s motion to
affirm legal compensation (Union Bank of the Philippines v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191555,
January 20, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.).
Where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. (GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION AND NISSIN UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016, Del Castillo, J.)
SALES
Q: What is the order of preference in case of Double Sales? (2001, 2004, 2008 BAR)
A: Movable Property
1. Ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith.
Immovable Property
1. To the person acquiring it in good faith first registered it in the Registry of Property.
2. In default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession.
3. In default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
*NOTE: An improper registration under Act 3344 is no registration. Registration must be done with Land Registration
Act or the Property Registration Decree of 1978.
Q: What are the so-called "Maceda" and "Recto" laws in connection with sales on installments? Give the most
important features of each law? (BAR 1999, 2000)
A: The Maceda Law (R.A. 6552) is applicable to sales of immovable property on installments. The most important
features are:
After having paid installments for at least 2 years, the buyer is entitled to a mandatory grace period of one month for
every year of installment payments made, to pay the unpaid installments without interest. If the contract is cancelled,
the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value equivalent to 50% of the total payments made, and after
five years of installments, an additional 5% every year but not to exceed 90% of the total payments made.
In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than 60
days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the
contract after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act
(Rillo v. CA, G.R. No. 125347, June 19, 1997, Puno, J.).
The Recto Law (Art. 1484 of the NCC) refers to sale of movables payable in installments and limiting the right of seller,
in case of default by the buyer, to one of three remedies:
a) Specific Performance - demand exact fulfillment;
b) Recission - cancel the sale if two or more installments have not been paid; and
c) Foreclosure - foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold. In case of default of two or more installments,
with no further action against the purchaser.
Q: Spouses Roque and the original owners of an unregistered lot executed a 1997 Deed of Conditional Sale over a
portion of a lot for P30,775.00. After the deed’s execution, Spouses Roque took possession and introduced
improvements on the subject portion which they utilized as a balut factory. Sabug, Jr, applied for a free patent
over the entire lot and was eventually issued an OCT in his name. Sabug, Jr., through the 1999 Deed of Absolute
Sale, sold the lot to Aguado for P2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance
of a TCT. Aguado obtained an P8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank secured by a mortgage over the lot. When
she failed to pay her loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and
eventually tendered the highest bid in the auction sale. Upon Aguado’s failure to redeem the subject property,
Land Bank consolidated its ownership and a TCT was issued in its name. Spouses Roque then filed an action for
reconveyance before the RTC. Will the action for reconveyance prosper?
A: No. This case involves a contract to sell. The Court held that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute
sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if
their agreement is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this case. In a contract to sell, there being no previous
sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the
full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot
seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. The action for reconveyance shall fail (Roque v. Aguado, G.R. No. 193787,
April 7, 2014, J. Perlas Bernabe).
BASIS CONTRACT TO SELL CONDITIONAL CONTRACT OF SALE

As to The prospective seller does not as yet agree or The first element of consent is present, although it is
consent consent to transfer ownership of the property conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event,

subject of the contract to sell until the happening of which may or may not occur.
an event, which may be the full payment of the
purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges
himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the
subject property when the entire amount of the
purchase price is delivered to him.
Upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, If the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale
As to effect which is the full payment of the purchase price, is thereby perfected, such that if there had already been
of ownership will not automatically transfer to the previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to
fulfillment buyer although the property may have been the buyer, ownership thereto automatically transfers to
of previously delivered to him. The prospective seller the buyer by operation of law without any further act
suspensive still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by having to be performed by the seller.
condition entering into a contract of absolute sale.
There being no previous sale of the property, a Upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale
third person buying such property despite the becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the seller’s title thereto. The second buyer of the property
As to effect
full payment of the purchase price, cannot be who may have had actual or constructive knowledge of
of sale of
deemed a buyer in bad faith. There is no double such defect in the seller’s title, or at least was charged
property
sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a
to third
to the buyer after registration because there is no registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat
persons
defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the the first buyer’s title. In case a title is issued to the
latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of
intending buyer. the property subject of the sale.
LEASE
Q: Jude owned a building which he had leased to several tenants. Without informing his tenants, Jude sold the
building to Ildefonso. Thereafter, the latter notified all the tenants that he is the new owner of the building. Ildefonso
ordered the tenants to vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from notice because he had other plans for the
building. The tenants refused to vacate, insisting that they will only do so when the term of their lease shall have
expired. Is Ildefonso bound to respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenant? Explain your answer. (2009
BAR)
A: YES. Ildefonso must respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants. While it is true that the said lease contracts
were not registered and annotated on the title to the property, Ildefonso is still not an innocent purchaser for value. He ought
to know the existence of the lease because the building was already occupied by the tenants at the time he bought it. Applying
the principle of caveat emptor, he should have checked and known the status of the occupants or their right to occupy the
building before buying it.
PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST
Q: Dielle, Karlo and Una are general partners in a merchandising firm. Having contributed equal amounts to the
capital, they also agree on equal distribution of whatever net profit is realized per fiscal period. After two years
of operation, however, Una conveys her whole interest in the partnership to Justine, without the knowledge and
consent of Dielle and Kaflo.
a) Is the partnership dissolved?
b) What are the rights of Justine, if any, should she desire to participate in the management of the
partnership and in the distribution of a net profit of P360.000.00 which was realized after her purchase
of Una’s interest? (1998 BAR)
A:
a) NO, a conveyance by a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of itself dissolve the partnership in
the absence of an agreement. (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
b) Justine cannot interfere or participate in the management or administration of the partnership business or affairs.
She may, however, receive the net profits to which Una would have otherwise been entitled. In this case,
P120,000 (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
Q: W, X, Y and Z organized a general partnership with W and X as industrial partners and Y and Z as capitalist
partners. Y contributed P50.000.00 and Z contributed P20.000.00 to the common fund. By a unanimous vote of
the partners, W and X were appointed managing partners, without any specification of their respective powers
and duties. A applied for the position of Secretary and B applied for the position of Accountant of the
partnership. The hiring of A was decided upon by W and X, but was opposed by Y and Z. The hiring of B was
decided upon by W and Z, but was opposed by X and Y. Who of the applicants should be hired by the
partnership? Explain and give you reasons. (1992 BAR)
A: A should be hired as Secretary. The decision for the hiring of A prevails because it is an act of administration which
can be performed by the duly appointed managing partners, W and X. B cannot be hired, because in case of a tie in the
decision of the managing partner, the deadlock must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest. In this
case, the opposition of X and Y prevails because Y owns the controlling interest (Art. 1801, Civil Code).

Q: “X” used his savings from his salaries amounting to a little more than P2,000 as capital in establishing a
restaurant. “Y” gave the amount of P4,000 to “X” as “financial assistance” with the understanding that “Y” would
be entitled to 22% of the annual profits derived from the operation of the restaurant. After the lapse of 22 years,
“Y” filed a case demanding his share in the said profits. “X” denied that there was a partnership and raised the
issue of prescription as “Y” did not assert his rights anytime within ten (10) years from the start of the operation
of the restaurant. Is “Y” a partner of “X” in the business? Why? What is the nature of the right to
demand one’s share in the profits of a partnership? Does this right prescribe? (1989 BAR)
A: YES, because there is an agreement to contribute to a common fund and an intent to divide profits. It is founded upon
an express trust. It is imprescriptible unless repudiated.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO, “Y” is not a partner because the amount is extended in the form of a financial assistance
arid therefore it is a loan, and the mere sharing of profits does not establish a partnership. The right is founded upon a
contract of loan whereby the borrower is bound to pay principal and interest like all ordinary obligations. Yes, his right
prescribes in six or ten years depending upon whether the contract is oral or written.
Q: Eliza Zu iga-Santos filed a Complaint or annulment of sale and revocation of title against respondents Maria Divina
Gracia Santos-Gran and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before the RTC, alleging that: (a) she was the registered
owner of three (3) parcels of land prior to their transfer in the name of private respondent Gran; x x x and (f) she
discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran. Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss that the action filed by
petitioner had prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the
time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the questioned documents before the
Registry of Deeds. Has the action for the reconveyance of title already prescribed?
A. YES. It is evident that petitioner ultimately seeks for the reconveyance to her of the subject properties through the
nullification of their supposed sale to Gran. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Having alleged the commission of fraud by Gran in the transfer and
registration of the subject properties in her name, there was, in effect, an implied trust created by operation of law pursuant to
Article 1456 of the Civil Code which provides that, “If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.” The
plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property is material. If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession, the action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference
point being the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. If the real owner of the property remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him
and in such case, the action would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. (ZUNIGA-SANTOS v.
SANTOS-GRAN, G.R. No. 197380 | October 8, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe)
Q: Felisa Buenaventura, the mother of the Bella and Resurreccion, Rhea and Regina, owned a parcel of land with a
three-storey building. In 1960, Felisa transferred the same to her daughter Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and
Felimon, Sr., the common-law husband of Felisa, to assist them in procuring a loan from the GSIS. In view
thereof, her title over the property was cancelled and a new one was issued in the names of Bella, married to
Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. Upon Felisa's death in 1994, the Bihis Family, Felisa's other heirs who have long been
occupyi ng the subject property, caused the annotation of their adverse claim over the property. However, the
annotation was cancelled, and thereafter a new TCT over the property was issued in the names of Bella, et al. Finally,
by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997, the subject property was sold to Wilson and Peter, in whose names
TCT No. 170475 currently exists. A complaint for reconveyance was then filed. Was there a trust established between
Felisa and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.?
A: Yes. An express trust was created. From the letter executed by Felisa, it unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention
of transferring the title over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to merely accommodate them in
securing a loan from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was retaining her ownership over the subject property and
articulated her wish to have her heirs share equally therein. Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely
created between Felisa, as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and beneficiaries, the execution of
the September 21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all, the nature of the trust established between them as an express one,
their true intention irrefutably extant thereon. (GO vs. THE ESTATE DE BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No. 211972, July 22, 2015,
PERLAS-BERNABE)
CREDiT TRANSACTIONS
Guaranty vs Surety
GUARANTY SURETYSHIP
Liability depends upon an independent agreement to pay the Surety assumes liability as a regular party to the contract.
obligation of the principal if he fails to do so.
Guarantor is secondarily liable. Surety is primarily liable.
Guarantor binds himself to pay if the principal cannot pay. Surety undertakes to pay if principal
does not pay.
Insurer of solvency of debtor. Insurer of the debt.
Guarantor can avail of the benefit of excussion and division in Surety cannot avail of the benefit of excussion and division.
case creditor proceeds against him.
Q: Felipe borrowed $100 from Gustavo in 1998. On March 1, 2008, Felipe tendered to Gustavo a Cashier’s check

in payment of his debt, based on the PH Peso – US$ exchange rate at that time. Gustavo accepted the check, but
forgot to deposit it until Sept 2008 which caused the check to become stale. Gustavo now wants Felipe to pay him
in cash claiming that the previous payment was not in legal tender and therefore, Felipe should pay him the
value of the debt at the time it was incurred. Felipe refused claiming that Gustavo is estopped from raising the
issue of legal tender and that it was Gustavo’s negligence in not depositing the check immediately that caused
the check to become stale.
a) Can Gustavo now raise the issue that the cashier’s check is not legal tender?
A: NO, because Gustavo is guilty of estoppel by laches. He led Felipe to believe that he could pay by cashier’s check, and
Felipe relied that such cashier’s check would be encashed thus extinguishing his obligation. Because of Gustavo’s
inaction of more than six months the check became stale and Felipe will be prejudiced if he will be required to pay the
$100 at the exchange rate of P56 to $1.00. The exchange should be the rate at the time of payment.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes. The cashier’s check is not legal tender until it is encashed. (Art. 1249, CC). The cashier’s
check by itself is not legal tender. (Cuaycong v. Ruiz, 86 Phil. 170 [1950], Moran, C.J.; Belisario v. Natividad, 60 Phil.
156 [1934], Butte, J.).
b) Can Felipe validly refuse to pay Gustavo again?
A: YES, if the payment is valid. Since the bank considered the cashier’s check as being stale for not having been encashed
on time, then the cashier’s check may be issued again. At any rate, non- payment of the amount to Gustavo would
constitute unjust enrichment.
c) Can Felipe compel Gustavo to receive US$100 instead?
A: YES. Felipe can compel Gustavo to pay US$100 instead. Under the prior law, RA 529, as amended by RA 4100,
payment can only be in PH currency as it would be against public policy, null and void and of no effect. However, under
RA 8183, payment may be made in the currency agreed upon by the parties, and the rate of exchange to be followed is at
the time of payment (C.F. Sharp & Co. Inc v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 381 SCRA 314 [2002], Ynares-Santiago, J.).
Q: iBank, a commercial bank, granted Yulim, a domestic partnership, a credit facility in the form of an Omnibus
Loan Line for P5,000,000. The partners, namely, H, I, J, and K executed a Continuing Surety Agreement in favor
of iBank whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally with Yulim and unconditionally and irrevocably
guaranteed full and complete payment of any and all credit accommodations granted by the bank to Yulim.
Yulim defaulted on the said note. iBank sent demand letters to Yulim but the demand went unheeded. iBank
then filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Replevin against Yulim and its sureties, H, I, J, and K. Are the
individual defendants liable for the obligation of Yulim?
A: YES, the individual defendants are jointly and severally liable with Yulim. A surety is considered in law as being
the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their
liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. It is well settled that when the obligor/s undertake to be jointly and
severally liable, the obligation is solidary, as in this case. There can thus, be no doubt that the H, I, J, K have bound
themselves to be solidarily liable with Yulim for the payment of its loan with iBank (Yulim International Company v.
International Exchange Bank (now Union Bank), G.R. No. 203133, February 18, 2015, Reyes, J.).
Q: On December 15, 1980, respondent Spouses Tarrosa obtained a loan from PNB-Republic Bank, now Maybank
Philippines, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. After payment of said loan, the respondents again
obtained another loan from Maybank however, respondents failed to pay upon maturity. Sometime on April 1998 a
Final Demand Letter was sent by Maybank to Spouses Tarrosa requiring the latter to settle their loan including
interest, and penalty charges. The spouses offered to settle it in a lesser amount to which the bank refused.
Thereafter, Maybank instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding and the subject property was eventually sold
in a public auction to Philmay Property Inc. (PPI). The spouses then filed a complaint for declaration of nullity and
invalidity of the foreclosure sale averring that, Maybank’s right to foreclose had already prescribed. Does the right of
Maybank to foreclose the real estate mortgage over the subject property already barred by prescription?
A: No. An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of
action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred
by prescription and the mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage. However, mere delinquency in payment does not
necessarily mean delay in the legal concept. In the absence of showing that demand is unnecessary for the loan obligation to
become due and demandable, Maybank's right to foreclose the real estate mortgage accrued only after the lapse of the period
indicated in its final demand letter for Sps. Tarrosa to pay. (Maybank Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Oscar and Nenita Tarrosa,
G.R. No. 213014, October 14, 2015, J. Perlas Bernabe)
Q: Odiamar owed from Valencia certain amount and the former issued a check to guarantee the payment of the debt.
But upon presentment, the same was dishonored. Valencia alleged that Odiamar refused to pay despite repeated
demands. Odiamar argued that it was her deceased parents who owed respondent money and such should be filed in
the proceedings for the settlement of their estates. Odiamar averred that Valencia had participated in the settlement
proceedings and had issued a certification stating that it was petitioner's deceased parents who were indebted to
Valencia. The court ordered petitioner Nympha S. Odiamar to pay respondent the amount of P1,010,049.00
representing the remaining balance of petitioner's debt to the latter in the original amount of P1,400,000.00. In said
motion, respondent prays for the imposition of legal interest on the monetary award due her. She likewise insists that

petitioner's loan obligation to her is not just P1,400,000.00 but P2,100,000.00 and, as such, she should be made to pay
the latter amount. Whether a prayer for the imposition of legal interest on the monetary award due is proper?
A: YES, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest
for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent
(12%) per annum but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the
new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum
legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall
be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable. (Nympha S. Odiamar, v. Linda Odiamar Valencia, G.R. No.
213582,September 12, 2018, J. Perlas Bernabe)
Q: The parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest rate is 12% and it can be increased if
there is a law that would authorize the increase of interest rates. Suppose OB, the lender, would increase by 5% the
rate of interest to be paid by TY, the borrower, without a law authorizing such increase, would OB’s action be just and
valid? Why? Has TY have a remedy against the imposition of the rate increase? Explain. (2001, 2004 Bar)
A: OB's action is not just and valid. The debtor cannot be required to pay the increase in interest there being no law
authorizing it, as stipulated in the contract of loan. Increasing the rate in the absence of such law violates the principle of
mutuality of contracts under Art. 1308.
Negative Pledge Covenant Clause
-a type of negative covenant that prevents a borrower from pledging any assets, if doing so would jeopardize the
lender’s security. This part of clause may be part of bond indentures and traditional loan structures.
Escalation Clause
-refers to stipulations allowing an increase in the interest rate agreed upon by the contracting parties. An escalation
clause is not void per se. Nevertheless, an escalation clause that grants the creditor an unbridled right to adjust the interest
independently and upwardly, completely depriving the debtor of the right to assent to an important modification to the
agreement is void. A stipulation of such nature violates the principle of mutuality of contracts.
LTD
Q: On March 27, 1980, Cornelio filed an application for land registration involving a parcel of agricultural land that
he had bought from Isaac identified as Lot No. 2716 with an area of one (1) hectare. During the trial, Cornelio
claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than thirty (30) years. He likewise introduced in evidence a
certification dated February 12, 1981 citing a presidential declaration to the effect that on June 14, 1980,
agricultural lands of the public domain, including the subject matter of the application, were declared alienable and
disposable agricultural land.
a) If you are the judge, will you grant the application for land registration of Cornelio?
b) Can Cornelio acquire said agricultural land through acquisitive prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary? (2014 BAR)
A:
a. NO, I will not grant the application for registration. Under the law, it is required that the applicant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. It merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration is filed and not during the entire period of possession, or since June 12, 1945 (Malabanan
v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013, Tinga, J.). Here, the land applied for by Cornelio was
declared alienable and disposable agricultural land only on June 14, 1980, or almost three months from
the date of filing of his application on March 27, 1980. Hence, the application for registration cannot be
granted.
b. NO. Cornelio cannot acquire the land through acquisitive prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. The exception is
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which allows a qualified individual to apply for the registration of
property which has been acquired by prescription under existing laws. Under Section 14 (2), only
when land of the public domain is patrimonial, and hence private in character, can said land be
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. But in order that land of public domain may become
patrimonial property, there must be an express declaration by the State that such land is no longer
needed for public service or for the development of the national wealth. Here, there is no such
declaration, hence the land cannot be the subject of acquisition through prescription.
Q: Respondents filed a verified application for registration of title to land under P. D. No. 1529. They claimed that
they inherited the subject property from their late parents and have been in physical and continuous
possession thereof in the concept of an owner even before June 17, 1945. During presentation of evidence, the
respondents submitted the following: (i) Conversion Plan and Geodetic Engineer's Certificate of the subject
property; (ii) Tax Declarations; and (iii) the Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR)-National Capital Region (NCR) verifying the subject property as alienable and disposable.
Are the respondents entitled to their application for registration of title over the subject property?
A: NO. It is imperative for an applicant for registration of title over a parcel of land to establish the following:
i. possession of the parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership, by himself and/or through his predecessors-in-
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
ii. that the property sought to be registered is already declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application.
The conversion plan, technical descriptions of the property, and the Certification issued by the DENR- NCR are insufficient
proof of the alienable and disposable character of the subject property. Clearly, respondents failed to prove their
entitlement thereto. Certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by
the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that the property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather,
this Court stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records (People v.
Mendiola, G.R. No. 211144, December 13, 2017, Tijam, J.).
Q: Manuel was born on 12 March 1940 in a 1,000-square meter property where he grew up helping his father,
Michael, cultivate the land. Michael has lived on the property since the land was opened for settlement at about the
time of the Commonwealth government in 1935, but for some reason never secured any title to the property other
than a tax declaration in his name. He has held the property through the years in the concept of an owner and his stay
was uncontested by others. He has also conscientiously and continuously paid the realty taxes on the land. Michael
died in 2000 and Manuel - as Michael’s only son and heir -now wants to secure and register title to the land in his own
name. He consults you for legal advice as he wants to perfect his title to the land and secure its registration in his
name.
1. What are the laws that you need to consider in advising Manuel on how he can perfect his title and register the land
in his name? Explain the relevance of these laws to your projected course of action.
2. What do you have to prove to secure Manuel's objectives and what documentation are necessary?
A:
1. For purposes of confirmation of imperfect title, I will have to consider the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as well
as the Property Registration Decree or P.D. 1529 in giving my advice to Manuel. C.A. No. 141 which amended the second Public
Land Act (Act 2874) provides that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title namely:1) open and
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by himself or through his predecessor in interest
under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945; and 2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. (Secretary of DENR v. Yap -G.R. NO. 167707, October 8, 2008) The Property Registration Decree or P.D.
1529 provides who may file an application for registration of title to the land under Section 141 thereof which provides that
those who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands for the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Since Manuel’s father Michael had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
since 1935, and that the land was declared alienable in the same year, his possession has ripened into ownership which
entitles him or his successor Manuel to file an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. (Bar Question 2011,
2013, & 2017)
2. I have to prove that the land was already declared alienable at the time that Manuel or his father Michael took possession of
the land and that their possession was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious which started prior to or on June 12, 1945 as
required by C.A. No. 141. To prove the first requisite, the original classification of the land as approved by the DENR Secretary
(Republic v. T.A. N. Properties 555 SCRA 4777 (2008) or in lieu thereof, a Certification by the DENR Regional office attesting to
the alienable and disposable character of the land (Republic v. Serrano, G.R. No. 183063, February 24, 2010) must have to be
submitted. I also have to file together with the application for registration all original muniments of title or copies thereof and
a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. 1529.2 Manuel may also
submit the tax declarations and tax payment receipts which have been ruled to be good indications of possession in the
concept of owner (Republic vs. Candy Maker, Inc. G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006).
Q: Ellen entrusted her title over the lot where she is residing to Patrick, her nephew, for safekeeping because of her
poor eyesight. Patrick, a gambler, prepared a Special Power of Attorney empowering him to mortgage the lot. Ellen's
signature was forged. With the help of Julia who represented herself as Ellen, Mega Bank granted a loan to Patrick
secured by a mortgage on Ellen's lot. Due to non-payment, Mega Bank foreclosed the mortgage and was declared the
highest bidder. Title was later registered in the name e bank. When Ellen was notified that she should vacate the
premises, she filed a complaint to nullify the loan with mortgage, the auction sale and the title of Mega Bank on the
ground that the bank is not a mortgagee in good faith. Decide the case with reasons. (5%)
A:I will decide in favor of Ellen, the victim of a forged document, Section 52, of RD. No. 1529 provides that after the entry of a
decree of registration, any subsequent registration procured by a forged deed shall be null and void, even if accompanied by
the owner's duplicate certificate of title. In this case, the registered owner, Ellen, did not lose her title, and neither did the
mortgagee, Mega Bank, acquire any right to the property (Joaquin v Madrid, G.R. No. L-13551, January 30,1960,106 Phil.
1060). The bank was defrauded because it believed the imposter who had, without authority gained possession of Ellen's
certificate of title, and who then forged her signature to the deed of mortgage (De Lam v. Ayroso, G.R. No. L-6122, Ma
31,1954,95 Phil. 185). It is not a mortgagee in good faith. (2016 Bar)
TORTS
Q: What is the doctrine of last clear chance or humanitarian negligence doctrine?

A: Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of
time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party (Greenstar
Express, Inc. and Fruto L. Sayson v. Universal Robina Corporation and Nission Universal Robina Corporation, G.R.
No. 205090, October 17, 2016) (DEL CASTILLO, J.).
Q: The Church of Jesus Christ (CJC) entered into a construction contract with JAO Builders for the former’s
meetinghouses in Makati. On May 18, 2001, JAO Builders informed CJC that it suffered financial losses from another
project which it handles and thereby requested that it be allowed to execute deeds of assignment in favor of its
suppliers so that they may collect any payments directly from CJC to which the latter agreed. CJC, however,
terminated its contract with JAO Builders and engaged LAO Builders to complete the Makati houses. JAO Builders filed
a complaint against CJC for breach of contract and payment for the additional works performed by them. Is CJC liable
for the additional works?
A: No. Article 1724 of the Civil Code governs the recovery of additional costs in contracts for a stipulated price (such as fixed
lump-sum contracts), as well as the increase in price for any additional work due to a subsequent change in the original plans
and specifications. Based on the same provision, such added costs can only be allowed upon the: (a) written authority from the
developer or project owner ordering or allowing the written changes in work; and (b) written agreement of parties with
regard to the increase in price or cost due to the change in work or design modification. Case law instructs that compliance
with these two (2) requisites is a condition precedent for recovery. The absence of one or the other condition thus bars the
claim of additional costs. Notably, neither the authority for the changes made nor the additional price to be paid therefor may
be proved by any evidence other than the written authority and agreement as abovementioned.
There is neither a written authorization nor agreement covering the additional price to be paid for the additional work. CJC
should not pay JAO Builders of the additional works. (The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Btl
Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 176439; G.R. No. 176718, Jan. 15, 2014, J. Perlas Bernabe)
Q: Nanito Evangelista filed a complaint for damages against Andolong over the latter's failure to give the former's
share in the net profits derived from their business. However, this was evidenced solely by the documentary exhibits
which disclosed the gross monthly revenue and not the actual profit earned. During the course of the proceedings,
Andolong was declared in default. Consequently, it was no longer possible for Evangelista to prove the actual profit
earned since such documents were in possession of Andolong. Can Evangelista recover damages if the net profits can
no longer be ascertained?
A: Yes. Evangelista can recover damages although the exact amount of the net profits remained unproven. This comes in the
form of temperate or moderate damages. Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty. Consequently, in
computing the amount of temperate or moderate damages, it is usually left to the discretion of the courts, but the amount must
be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory. (Nanito
Evangelista v. Spouses Nero Andolong Iii and Erlinda Andolong Et.Al. G.R. No. 221770, November 16, 2016, J. Perlas Bernabe)
Q: LWV is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. GAMCA is authorized
to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment. LWV referred Raguindin to
GAMCA for a pre-deployment medical examination. After undergoing the required examinations, GAMCA cleared
Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report. Unfortunately, when Raguindin
underwent another medical examination he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry
of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia required a re-examination of Raguindin. However, the results of the re-
examination remained the same. This led to Raguindin’s repatriation to the Philippines. Was the accredited member
of GAMCA negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence, should be held
liable for damages?
A: Yes. An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or non-
performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing
contractual relation.
In this case, the respondent did not proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages may be
recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint, respondent mainly avers that had petitioner not
issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his documents, deployed him
to Saudi Arabia, and later on — in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to
work — suffered actual damages in the amount of P84,373.41. Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not
premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-existing contractual relation was
averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 of the Civil Code should govern. (St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. Lwv
Construction Corp., G.R. No. 217426, December 4, 2017, J. Perlas Bernabe)
Q: OJ was employed as a professional driver of MM Transit bus owned by Mr. BT. In the course of his work, OJ hit a
pedestrian who was seriously injured and later died in the hospital as a result of the accident. The victim’s heirs sued
the driver and the owner of the bus for damages. Is there a presumption in this case, that Mr. BT, the owner, had been
negligent? If so, is the presumption absolute or not? (2004 BAR)
A: YES, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. However, such presumption is rebuttable. The
liability of the employer shall cease when they prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage (Art. 2180). When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there

arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee. The employer’s liability is solidary. (Delsan Transport
Lines v. C & A Construction, G.R. No. 156034, October 1, 2003).
---
Q: Peter, a resident of Cebu City, sent through Reliable 'Pera Padala (RPP) the amount of P20, 000.00 to his daughter,
Paula, for the payment of her tuition fee. Paula went to an RPP branch but was informed that there was no money
remitted to her name. Peter inquired from RPP and was informed that there was a computer glitch and the money
was credited to another person. Peter and Paula sued RPP for actual damages, moral damages and exemplary
damages. The trial court ruled that there Was no proof of pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs but awarded moral damages
of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00. On appeal, RPP questioned the award of moral and exemplary
damages. Is the trial court correct in awarding moral and exemplary damages?
A: No, the trial court is not correct in awarding moral and exemplary damages. The damages in this case are prayed for based
on the breach of contract committed by RPP in failing to deliver the sum of money to Paula. Under the provisions of the Civil
Code, in breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was of gross negligence
(amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation. In the same fashion, to warrant the award of
exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accomplished by bad faith and an award of damages would be allowed only if
the guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent Manner (Article 2232 of the Civil Code). Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case,
however, RPP's breach. (2016 Bar)
Q: Wenifredo Salvaña was driving the bus owned by Bachelor Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc. along the national
highway when he overtook a PUJ jeepney while negotiating a blind curve in a descending road causing him to intrude
into the opposite lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of petitioner Cresencio Baño running uphill from
the opposite direction. The collision resulted in damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death of the truck driver,
Amancio Asumbrado, and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvaña. A complaint for quasi-delict was filed
against Salvaña for negligently driving the bus causing it to collide with the dump truck. Respondents denied liability,
claiming that prior to the collision; the bus was running out of control because of a problem in the steering wheel
system which could not have been avoided despite their maintenance efforts. Instead, they claimed that Asumbrado
had the last clear chance to avoid the collision had he not driven the dump truck at a very fast speed. Was Salvaña
grossly negligent?
A: Yes. When bus driver Salvaña overtook the jeepney in front of him, he was rounding a blind curve along a descending road.
Considering the road condition and that there was only one lane on each side of the center line for the movement of traffic in
opposite directions, it would have been more prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper place. Having thus encroached on
the opposite lane in the process of overtaking the jeepney, without ascertaining that it was clear of oncoming traffic that
resulted in the collision with the approaching dump truck driven by deceased Asumbrado, Salvaña was grossly negligent in
driving his bus. He was remiss in his duty to determine that the road was clear and not to proceed if he could not do so in
safety (Cresencio Baño v. Bachelor Express, GR No. 191703, March 12, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.).


Civil Law Tips on Persons, Family Relations and Succession

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CIVIL LAW UST LAST MINUTE TIPS 2019

Q: When may rights be waived?

Article 15, Civil Code

Q. What is the Nationality Principle?

Article 16, Civil Code

Q. What is Lex Rei Sitae

Q: What are the exceptions to Lex Rei Sitae?

Article 17, Civil Code

Q: What is lex loci celebrationis?

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

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(A) Will Dorothy's suit prosper? Decide with reasons. (2.5%)

Q: Differentiate Article 147 from Article 148 of the Family Code

ARTICLE 147 ARTICLE 148

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(A) Decide the case and explain.

Movable or Personal Property

Donation Mortis Causa

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Joint accounts are co-owned properties

POSSESSION OF MOVABLES (Art. 559)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Was Erica Preterited?

Was the disinheritance valid?

House and Lot

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

2. Mora Accipiendi (default on the part of the creditor)

3. Compensation Morae (default of both parties in reciprocal obligations)

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3. As to terms of influence on the obligation

A: NO. The requisites of consignation are as follows:

Q: What are the requisites of compensation?

A: The requisites are as follows:

a) If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay;

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BASIS CONTRACT TO SELL CONDITIONAL CONTRACT OF SALE

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Guarantor is secondarily liable. Surety is primarily liable.

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b) Can Felipe validly refuse to pay Gustavo again?

c) Can Felipe compel Gustavo to receive US$100 instead?

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Negative Pledge Covenant Clause

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Q: What is the doctrine of last clear chance or humanitarian negligence doctrine?

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