Société québécoise de science politique

The Quality of Democratic Accountability: A Comparative View of Latin America

Author(s): Mikel Barreda
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.
47, No. 2 (June 2014 juin), pp. 307-326
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science
politique
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The Quality of Democratic Accountability: A
Comparative View of Latin America

Mikel Barreda Universität Oberta de Catalunya

Completion of the third wave of democratization in Latin America has led

to a significant renewal of the comparative political agenda. Matters related
to democratic transition and consolidation are no longer regarded with such
interest; instead, attention is focused more on the characteristics and per-
formance of the new democracies. One of these matters of interest is that
of accountability institutions and mechanisms, bearing in mind their impor-
tance for a democracy's quality. It is widely recognized that poor perform-
ance of control mechanisms of political power leads to serious problems for
a democracy, such as corruption or arbitrariness in public decisions.
In spite of the importance this issue has attained, there is a lack of com-
parative large n studies on the characteristics and the performance of the
accountability mechanisms established in the Latin American democracies.
This study aims to make a contribution in this respect. In particular, it seeks
to answer three basic questions. (1) How can the quality of democratic
accountability be measured and evaluated? (2) Are there clear differences
among the Latin American democracies in regard to the quality of demo-
cratic accountability? And (3), if there are differences in the quality
levels, what reasons can explain them?
In order to answer these questions, the work has been structured into
four sections. The first presents the concept of accountability, its principal
types and its importance. In the second section, an operationalization of the
notion of quality of accountability is considered and, on this basis, a

Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the support offered by Ministerio de Economía y

Competitividad de España (project CS0201 1-24344), Internet Interdisciplinary Institute
(Universität Oberta de Catalunya) and three colleagues: Joan Balcells, Albert Padró-
Solanet and Leticia M. Ruiz. I also thank the three CJPS reviewers for their useful com-
ments. None is responsible for remaining errors.

Mikel Barreda, Department of Law and Political Science, Universität Oberta de

Catalunya, Av. Tibidabo 39-43, 08035 Barcelona (Spain). E-mail: mbarreda@uoc.edu

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique

47:2 (June /juin 2014) 307-326 doi: 10. 101 7/S00084239 14000432
© 2014 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique)
and/et la Société québécoise de science politique

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308 Mikel Barreda

comparative analysis of
Third, an empirical, rat
that may explain the
section sets out the gen

The Concept of Acco

The control of political

history of political theo
there has been a const
ticians under control,
certain rules and limi
democratic societies wh
sively developed and in
one of the basic elemen
citly in the great major
(Beetham, 1994). Thus
(for example, Przewor
tute the procedure thr
of governments. In re
commonly used by a
the idea of political c
this concept, it is suffi
bility, on one hand, of
justify their decisions a
iour (Peruzzotti and S
In present-day dem
decisions and actions
O'Donnell's distinction
accountability has beco
ability is conducted thr
remedy or punish pres
agents. This type of
within a network of
other and is activated
outside of these notion
among state agents tha
the law (Mainwaring,
exercised through acto
accountability par exc
which citizens make
actions. It is a retrosp
results of decisions tak

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Abstract. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the quality of democratic accountability
mechanisms in Latin America. It begins by reviewing the concept of democratic accountability
quality and its operationalization by means of factor analysis. As a result, three quality indicators
are identified corresponding to the types of accountability that prevail in the literature: horizontal,
electoral and social. The study reveals considerable differences among the Latin American democ-
racies. Set out below is an exploratory analysis of the factors explaining these differences. The
analysis yields three main conclusions. First, it confirms the usefulness of the model. Second,
the quality of each type of accountability is explained by specific factors: no one factor explains
all three cases. Third, a different logic behind social accountability mechanisms is detected as com-
pared with the other two types of accountability mechanisms.

Résumé. Cet article présents une analyse comparée de la qualité des mécanismes d'accountabil-
ity démocratique en Amérique Latine. D'abord, le concept de qualité ď accountability démocratique
est examiné et opérationnalisé au moyen d'une analyse factorielle. En conséquence, trois indica-
teurs de qualité, qui prévalent dans la littérature spécialisée, sont identifiés selon la typologie d'ac-
countability: horizontal, électoral et social. L'étude révèle des différences considérables parmi les
démocraties latino-américaines. Ensuite, une analyse exploratoire des facteurs qui expliquent ces
différences, a été menée. Trois conclusions se dégagent de cette analyse: première, la confirmation
de l'utilité du model développé. Deuxième, la qualité de chaque type d'accountability est expliquée
par des facteurs spécifiques, par conséquent, aucun facteur n'explique pas à lui seul les trois cas.
Troisième, une logique différente à été détecté dans le cas des mécanismes d'accountability
social, comparés avec les autres deux mécanismes d'accountability.

Some authors have pointed out that there are other, non-electoral forms
of vertical accountability that play a leading role in modern-day democra-
cies. Peruzzoti and Smulovitz (2006) have coined the expression "social
accountability" to refer to the action of control and demand of accountabil-
ity, exercised through the actions of different groups of civil society, or even
individual persons, with the purpose of publicizing governmental errors,
introducing new issues into the public agenda or activating the agencies
of horizontal accountability. The chief peculiarity of these social control
and monitoring actions is that they operate outside of the formal structure
of accountability institutions (Mainwaring, 2003). However, this does not
mean that social accountability relies on informal institutions alone or
that this type of accountability goes against horizontal and electoral
accountability. As Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2000) both note, social
accountability employs both formal (for example, legal actions) and infor-
mal mechanisms (social campaigns, complaints to the media, and so forth)
and help complement and bolster other kinds of accountability.1
In summary, we can speak of three types of democratic accountability:
horizontal accountability and two variants of vertical accountability (elec-
toral and social). Electoral accountability is inherent to the notion of democ-
racy: without the holding of free and clean elections, we cannot speak of
democracy. However, this does not mean that electoral accountability is
more important than the other types of accountability. In fact, in most
democracies, elections are a very limited instrument for guaranteeing that

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 310 Mikel Barreda

governments maxim
reasons, because the c
to be able to deman
specify which of the
rewarded or punish
emphasized, all three t
running of a democrac
between them.
As has been stated, accountability mechanisms are a key factor in the
optimal functioning of a democracy, but what benefits do they bring? In
particular, they perform two crucial functions in a democracy (Peruzzotti,
2007). In the first place, they contribute to generalizing social confidence
in democracy itself. The presence of different agencies of state control
assures the citizens that, in the event of their political representatives com-
mitting irresponsible or even criminal actions, investigation and sanction
procedures will be activated, thus preventing harm being done to the credi-
bility of the democratic system. In the second place, the various account-
ability mechanisms operate as "signalling mechanisms" that help a
government to correct and improve public practices and policies. For
example, they can inform a government of what are the issues that most
concern the citizenry.
In view of the above, it comes as no surprise that accountability is one
of the basic parameters for analyzing the quality of a democracy.2 The type
of accountability referred to varies from study to study, in line with the
concept of democratic quality used; studies based on a minimalist
concept of democratic quality focus their attention on electoral accountabil-
ity (for example, Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Mainwaring and Pérez-
Liñán, 2008), while those with a broader-based concept of democratic
quality also take into account other types of accountability, horizontal
(for example, Diamond and Modino, 2004) or both horizontal and social
(for example, Levine and Molina, 201 la).
The subject of accountability is of particular interest in Latin America,
given the generalized perception that accountability has serious weaknesses
in most countries there (Mainwaring, 2003), weaknesses that affect both
horizontal and vertical accountability. With regard to the former, particu-
larly well-known is O'Donnell's diagnosis (2004b) of the horizontal
accountability deficit of a large proportion of Latin American democracies.
The most problematic cases are those of "delegative democracies," whose
presidents govern with practically no constitutional or legal checks. This
diagnosis is, in general, one shared by many academics. For example,
Shugart and colleagues' study (2003) shows that there is a significant hori-
zontal accountability deficit in the region, whose origin lies with insuffi-
cient representation of voters' interests and opinions. Many other studies
point to constraints in the exercising of electoral accountability as a result

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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 3 1 1

of patronage, vote-buying and fraud (for example, Corral and Rosón, 2013;
Stokes, 2006). In contrast to these sombre diagnosis, some authors have
given positive assessments to the potential of social accountability initiat-
ives to change the situation and improve the quality of Latin America's
democracies (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006).

An Analysis of the Quality of Democratic Accountability in Latin

America

This section presents a comparative analysis of the quality of accountability

mechanisms established in the Latin American democracies on the basis of
some aggregate indicators resulting from a factor analysis. Before setting
out the results of this analysis, an explanation will be given of how the
notion of quality of democratic accountability has been operationalized.

How the quality of democratic accountability is operationalized

As noted, the quality of democratic accountability is an issue of significant

academic interest, but it is difficult to measure empirically. This study offers
a comparative examination of democratic accountability quality in Latin
America, based on a combination of quantitative indicators. None of the
indicators available captures in its entirety the concept of accountability
as formulated earlier nor any of the dimensions mentioned above.
Consequently, it was decided to create new indicators on the basis of apply-
ing a factor analysis (of principal components) in a group of indicators. This
technique has been applied in several studies on quality of democracy
because of the relationships between many of the available indicators and
because of the difficulty in specifying the indicator corresponding to each
dimension of democratic quality (for example, Altman and Pérez-Liñán,
2002; Barreda, 201 1). For example, it is common for a vertical accountabil-
ity indicator to closely relate to a social accountability indicator or for one
indicator to contain information on both types of accountability.
Research on institutional quality has revealed a considerable number of
indicators that can measure various aspects of democratic accountability.
However, the availability of these indicators for the 18 Latin American
democracies is rather limited. The geographical and temporal coverage of
many existing indicators is too small to perform an analysis like the one
conducted in this study. For example, there is insufficient information avail-
able on other aspects of citizens' electoral behaviour that have a bearing on
vertical accountability and are contained in the literature, such as the level
of political knowledge (Fraile, 2007). Something similar can be said about
social accountability for which there are few objective indicators of social
action and mobilization; instead, survey data must be used.3

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 312 Mikel Barreda

The indicators selected for each of the three variants of democratic

accountability are presented below. In selecting them, three basic criteria
have been taken into account: (1) they must be indicators with sufficient
academic recognition; (2) they must cover all Latin American democracies
during a relatively extensive period of time; and (3) they must be "perform-
ance" indicators of the various accountability mechanisms and not indi-
cators of "form." In regard to this latter, it must be borne in mind that the
purpose of this study is not to examine the design of the various account-
ability mechanisms but to examine their quality of performance.
In total, nine indicators have been selected, of which three correspond
to the performance of horizontal accountability institutions. The first two
indicators relate to check-and-balance mechanisms. The first is the
Political Constraints Index V drawn up by Witold Henisz (2014), centred
on strategic actors with the power of veto over government policy.
Specifically, it takes into account three questions: the number of state
actors with capacity of veto, the party alignment of those actors and the het-
erogeneity of preferences in the legislative chambers. The second indicator
is executive constraints, one of the components of the Polity IV democracy
index, and measures the extension of institutionalized constraints on the
executive power. These constraints can be imposed by "accountability
groups" (parliament and the judiciary in the case of democracies), which
is precisely what this indicator aims to measure. The third indicator, the
rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2013), refers to one of the typical horizontal
accountability mechanisms, the judiciary, but also incorporates other
aspects associated with the quality of the legal system.4
Two indicators have been chosen to measure electoral accountability.
One of them is the question asked in the Latinobarómetro (2014) on
whether elections held in the country are clean or fraudulent. The existence
of electoral fraud is a symptomatic indicator of the weakness and ineffec-
tiveness of electoral accountability mechanisms (Peruzzotti and
Smulovitz, 2006). The other indicator of electoral accountability is the
level of institutionalization of a party system.5 Specifically, use is made
of one of the components of this concept, namely trust in political parties
(with data from Latinobarómetro).
Three social accountability indicators have been selected. Two of them
(from Latinobarómetro) measure the level of activism and citizen partici-
pation outside the electoral sphere. Specifically, one indicator is the fre-
quency with which citizens have worked on issues that affect their
community and the other one is the frequency with which citizens have par-
ticipated in authorized demonstrations. It is to be expected that the greater
the level of citizen participation, the greater their capacity to exert influence
on politicians and control their decisions (Levine and Molina, 201 lb). We
have also selected the Freedom House indicator of guarantee of press
freedom. The communications media perform a major function of political

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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 3 1 3

control and can in turn activate other accountability mechanisms, but

order for this function to be effective, freedom of the press is essential.
Finally, we have included an indicator of participation that is close
related to electoral and social accountability, the frequency of political dis
cussion (Latinobarómetro). Considering the virtues emphasized by scholars
of deliberative democracy (for example, Elster, 1998; Manin, 1987), discus-
sion is expected to improve electoral and social accountability by providin
better political information.
The time coverage of these nine indicators is incongruent. For th
reason, the series of each indicator has been classified into five perio
(1994-1996, 1997-1999, 2000-2002, 2003-2005 and 200^2008) and
the average value of each period has been calculated. This generates 90
observations (18 countries per 5 periods), which will enable a statistical
analysis to be performed, with certain limitations, of the quality of demo-
cratic accountability in Latin America.
As has been said, the use of a factor analysis makes it possible to ident-
ify whether or not there is some factor or dimension underlying the nine
indicators. The results of our analysis (see Table 1) confirm the presence
of the three democratic accountability dimensions mentioned and, in
general, of the classification of the different indicators within each dimen-
sion. The first factor, which is the most explanatory (it helps to account for
33.5% of the total variance), is defined fundamentally by the three indi-
cators of horizontal accountability (rule of law, executive constraints and
Political Constraints Index V) and freedom of the press. It may seem
strange that the principle of press freedom - presented earlier as an indicator
of social accountability - should form part of this factor and, moreover,
should have the highest correlation coefficient. However, press freedom

Table 1

Factor matrix of the analysis of principal components

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

Press freedom 0.85 0.18 -0.06

Rule of law 0.74 0.53 -0.19
Executive constraints 0.71 -0.04 -0.14
Political Constraints Index V 0.63 -0.01 0.10
Trust in political parties -0.19 0.83 0.30
Clean elections 0.36 0.82 -0.14
Work in issues that affect the community -0.17 -0.16 0.77
Political discussions -0.09 0.20 0.77
Participation in authorized demonstrations 0.44 0.07 0.57
% of variance 33.5 20.1 13.8

Source: Author, from databa

Latinobarómetro.

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 314 Mikel Barreda

forms part of the set

must be protected by t
The second factor in o
iance) is basically defin
political parties and fai
variance) expresses th
Specifically, it is defin
are not confined to the
munity, political discu
With the factorial sc
cators of democratic
Latin American democracies.

A comparative vision of the Latin American democracies

The quality of democratic accountability varies considerably among Latin

American countries. If we use the horizontal accountability indicator as a
reference, three major groups of countries stand out, although within
them there are differences with regard to the other two indicators (see
Graph 1). The first group, composed of Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay,
Bolivia, Brazil and Panama, has a higher level of horizontal accountability.
In some cases, electoral accountability is also at a satisfactory level, particu-
larly in Chile and Uruguay. The opposite is true of social accountability,
which only reaches satisfactory levels in Bolivia and Panama.

Graph 1
Quality of democratic accountability (horizontal, electoral and social) in
Latin America (average 1994-2008 of each country)

Notes: The values of each accountability indicator correspond to the average for the
period examined (1994-2008). These values come from a factorial analysis.
Source: Author.

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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 3 1 5

The second group, composed of Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuel

Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, has the weakest horizon
accountability performance. In contrast, these countries generally achieve
better result for social accountability. Guatemala and Honduras are unique
cases; the quality level for the three types of accountability is below
Latin American average.
The remaining five countries are at an intermediate position with
respect to the previous two groups. It is worth underlining the wea
quality of electoral accountability in Peru and particularly in Ecuador (the
weakest in the region).
Beyond the similarities and differences among countries, the compara
tive analysis reveals a different logic behind social accountability mechan-
isms with respect to the other two accountability mechanisms. Positi
relations tend to predominate in horizontal and electoral accountabili
mechanisms, whereas the relations between social accountability mecha
isms and the other two tend to be negative. However, this does not m
that there are mutually exclusive relationships between social a
"formal" (horizontal and electoral) accountability mechanisms. Quite t
contrary, there is often evidence of the mutually beneficial effects of bo
types of accountability.7
This classification of the Latin American countries according to their
quality of accountability presents certain notable coincidences with recent
classifications of democratic quality (Alcántara, 2008; Altman and Pére
Liñán, 2002; Barreda, 2011; Levine and Molina, 2011b). The princi
similarities affect the extreme cases; Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay a
unanimously placed in the group with the highest level of democra
quality, while Guatemala, Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela appear
the least favourable positions. These similarities with other classificati
do not respond to the use of common indicators, which further strength
the relevance of accountability in analyzing the quality of a democracy.8
Following this comparative analysis, the question that arises is whethe
there have been significant changes in the quality of democratic accou
ability over time. As shown in Graph 2, the regional average of horizonta
and electoral accountability quality has barely changed since the mi
1990s. Social accountability, on the other hand, has experienced great
variation; it rose significantly in the 1997-1999 period and then dropp
sharply to reach its lowest level in the 2003-2005 period. One reason th
may explain such an increase is the economic crisis that began in th
region in 1997 as a result of the financial behaviour of internationa
markets after the Asian crisis and lasted until the beginning of the
century. This issue will be more rigorously explored in the next section.
Obviously the variations in democratic accountability levels were more
pronounced in some countries than in others. One approach for conductin
this analysis (see Table 2) is to compare the scores from the first period o

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 316 Mikel Barreda

Graph 2
Evolution of quality of democratic accountability (horizontal, electoral and
social) in Latin America (regional average)

Notes: The values of each accountability indicator correspond to the average of

Latin American democracies. These values come from a factorial analysis.
Source: Author.

the series (1994-1996) with those of the last (2006-2008). The most strik-
ing changes occurred in Venezuela; while horizontal accountability wea-
kened considerably, social and electoral accountability improved
significantly. The Chávez government may be largely responsible for
these variations. As many international observers and NGOs have
warned, the Chávez government has substantially weakened horizontal
accountability mechanisms by adopting measures such as closing news
media outlets and interfering with the judiciary (Human Rights Watch,
2008). It is also worth noting the cases of Ecuador, Nicaragua and
Paraguay. Ecuador has experienced a marked deterioration in the quality
of its horizontal and social accountability, while the two types of vertical
accountability have deteriorated in Nicaragua and Paraguay.

An Exploration of the Determining Factors of the Quality of

Democratic Accountability

As we have just seen, there are important differences among the Latin
American democracies in relation to the quality of their accountability
mechanisms. This leads to the last of the questions posed at the beginning:
what are the reasons that can explain these differences? To date, the litera-
ture has not given a satisfactory answer. We do not have enough studies that
have considered in an integral manner the determining factors of the per-
formance of democratic accountability and have formulated solid theories

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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 3 1 7

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318 Mikel Barreda

on the matter. There ar

First, in the empirical
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Porta et al., 1999; Mau
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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 319

performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms (particularly to ju

cial weakness and the deterioration of the rule of law) and electoral acco
ability mechanisms (with higher levels of abstention). The final structu
variable also refers to the level of division of a society, but in relation
ethnic identities. Ethnolinguistic fragmentation has been shown to und
mine the quality of democratic accountability, especially in terms of el
toral accountability. Specifically, high ethnic fragmentation has b
associated with issues such as political favouritism, restriction
freedom of opposition (La Porta et al., 1999) and the presence of signifi
electoral barriers to political competition (Van Cott, 2003). Social mo
ation and "unconventional" political control tend to increase in situation
underrepresentation of ethnic minorities (Álamo, 2006).
The following indicators have been chosen to measure these th
structural variables: GDP per capita (World Bank) as an indicator of
omic development, Gini (World Bank) as an indicator of income inequali
and the ethnic fragmentation index of Alesina and colleagues (2003). 10
Some studies have also used other economic variables that are short-
term explanations of variations in institutional quality (Mainwaring and
Pérez-Liñán, 2008). The idea is that poor economic performance may lead
to the activation of mobilization and social control mechanisms (outside
the formal accountability channels). It is particularly enlightening to
examine this explanation for the case of Latin America, given the economic
crisis that began in the region in the late 1990s and is known as the "lost half
decade" (Ocampo, 2002).The model includes two economic performance
indicators: inflation and unemployment (World Bank, compiled in
DataGob).11 Also included is a dummy variable that corresponds to the
"lost half decade" period (the value 1 corresponds to the 1997-2002 period).
The third explanation is the democratic experience of each country.
Some recent studies have shown that the higher the level of democratic
experience, the greater the probability of the democracies enjoying a
higher level of quality (Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Barreda, 2011;
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2008). This is largely explained because a
pronounced democratic history favours the development of institutional
and cultural elements that are key elements for the quality of a democracy.
These elements include those relating to accountability (an independent
judiciary, plurality of communications media, a culture of legality, and so
forth). The indicator used to measure the democratic experience is the
number of years of democracy, resulting from combining the information
gathered by Smith (2004), up to the year 2000, and that of Freedom
House referring to electoral democracies, for the years 2001 to 2008.
There are many institutional variables capable of explaining the per-
formance of the different accountability mechanisms. However, the avail-
ability of appropriate indicators for all countries is quite limited. Here,
attention will be focused on two variables of the electoral system: the

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320 Mikel Barreda

type of lists and the d

open lists politicians
towards the voters. In
toral accountability; f
expel corrupt politicia
To test whether the ty
study, a dummy variabl
gathered by Negretto,
systems and 0 to syste
vote. The indicator prep
The last group of exp
ables. Particularly, it h
based on trust and co-o
democratic institutio
(Putnam, 1993). Social
and engage in debat
actions of control and
among the results o
capital has a positive
2013), others indicate
To measure social capi
personal trust has been

The results of the anal

On the basis of the m

been carried out (see
are statistically signif
accountability. Only c
accountability variants
example, ethnic fragm
accountability but fav
quality of each of the
specific explanatory fa
Moving on to examine
accountability, democr
zontal accountability. A
favours the level of pe
The influence of the ot
The explanation of t
accountability involve
economic inequality, et
and interpersonal con
ethnic fragmentation.

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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 321

Table 3
Determining factors of the quality of democratic accountability (horizontal,
electoral and social) in Latin America (linear regression analysis)
Horizontal Electoral Social
accountability accountability accountability

B t B t B t

GDP per capita Õ^OU 0,094 0,207a 2^565 0,109 'jm

Economic inequality (Gini) 0,046 0,329 -0,221a -2,211 0,026 0,198
Ethnic fragmentation 0,050 0,451 -0,433b -5,532 0,273b 2,666
Inflation -0,029 -0,289 -0,105 -1,486 0,342b 3,687
Unemployment -0,049 -0,440 0,036 0,460 0,206a 1,988
1997-2002 crisis 0,158 1,566 0,022 0,316 0,344b 3,688
Democratic experience 0,483 b 3,640 -0,099 -1,058 -0,295a -2,397
Closed lists 0,007 0,057 -0,233b -2,806 0,153 1,406
District magnitude 0,087 0,664 0,264b 2,861 0,109 0,905
Interpersonal confidence -0,244 -1,887 0,198a 2,159 -0,014 -0,116
Constant -0,405 2,264 -0,930
N 90 90 90
Adjusted R2 0,195 0,597 0,308

Notes: a: p < .05; b: p < .01 .

Source: Author.

with the arguments presented above. Thus, the increase in GDP per capita,
the magnitude of electoral districts and the level of interpersonal trust
increase the quality of electoral accountability. By contrast, the increase
in economic inequality and ethnic fragmentation, together with the presence
of closed lists, weakens the quality of electoral accountability.
The variables of inflation, unemployment, 1997-2002 crisis, ethnic
fragmentation and democratic experience have a significant impact on
social accountability. The first three indicate that economic recession
improves the performance of social accountability mechanisms. This is par-
ticularly apparent in the crisis that began in the region in the late 1990s.
Ethnic fragmentation reduces the quality of electoral accountability;
however, it promotes social accountability, which is consistent with the
arguments presented in the previous section. Finally, democratic experience
has a negative effect on social accountability but a positive effect on hori-
zontal accountability. What this suggests is that in Latin American societies
with a longer democratic tradition, citizens have greater incentives to resort
to formal accountability mechanisms (both horizontal and electoral) than to
informal or social mechanisms, and vice versa.
In short, the above analysis yields two main conclusions. First, it
demonstrates the explanatory power of the variables included in the
model and in the manner expected. Second, the quality of each democratic
accountability type is subject to specific determinants.

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 322 Mikel Barreda

Conclusions

One of the fundamental issues in studies on institutional quality is to deter-

mine the criteria under which this quality is to be examined and evaluated.
In this work, the review of the literature and the operationalization of the
concept of democratic accountability has made it possible to establish
three quality indicators, one referring to horizontal accountability and
other two to the vertical type (electoral and social). On the basis of these
indicators, a comparative analysis of the Latin American democracies has
been carried out. There are four important contributions from this study.
First, the diagnosis of the quality of accountability in Latin America is
more satisfactory than is often portrayed in the literature. Although
serious accountability weaknesses can be seen in many countries, there is
significant variance. For example, the quality of horizontal accountability
is polarised between countries at two extremes: Costa Rica, Chile,
Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Panama, with more favourable levels, and
Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala, with lower ones. This classification is generally in line with
those of democratic quality studies, which shows the importance of
accountability to the analysis of democratic quality.
Second, the diachronic analysis shows slight variations in the quality
of horizontal and electoral accountability at the regional level. Social
accountability, on the other hand, is subject to greater oscillation, particu-
larly as a result of the impact of the economic crisis in the 1997-2002
period, which increased mobilization and social protest. At the country
level, the most significant variations have occurred in Venezuela; while
horizontal accountability has weakened considerably, social and electoral
accountability have improved significantly.
The third contribution refers to the explanation of the different quality
levels of democratic accountability. Tackling this question is a complex
task, given the diversity of potentially explanatory factors and the
absence of empirical studies that have dealt with these factors jointly.
Consequently, an exploratory study has been carried out. The results
endorse the utility of the model constructed and show that the quality of
each type of accountability depends on specific factors. Thus, only demo-
cratic experience exerts a significant effect on horizontal accountability;
development, inequality and ethnic fragmentation, institutional factors
(type of lists and district magnitude) and interpersonal trust have an
effect on electoral accountability; and economic performance, democratic
experience and ethnic fragmentation variables have an influence on social
accountability.
Lastly, a different logic behind social accountability mechanisms is
detected compared with the other two types of accountability mechanisms.
Social checks tend to be greater in countries with lower levels of horizontal

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The Quality of Democratic Accountability 323

and electoral accountability and vice versa. Although analysis of th

relationships would call for more detailed studies, the literature prov
numerous examples of how social accountability can complement a
reinforce the other types of accountability.
The above shows that the contributions made by this study are far fr
definitive. Rather, they aim to provide the basis for future studies that re
the measurement and explanation of democratic accountability in L
America, and which broaden our knowledge of the relations between
different types of accountability.

Notes

1 For instance, the presence of a civil society and communications media attentive to the
activities of the public powers can provide very useful information to set in motion or
complement mechanisms of horizontal and electoral accountability.
2 The concept of democratic quality is complex and the subject of widely varying
interpretations (Munck, 2013). However, two large groupings of definitions can be
identified: on the one hand, those inspired by Dahl' s notion of democratic regime (poly-
archy) and that consider that the level of democratic quality depends upon the degree to
which a polyarchy's requirements are met and, on the other, those that posit that democ-
racy is more than a matter of access to political power (political regime) and that it also
requires the exercise of political power to be taken into account. According to the second
group of definitions, any analysis of democratic quality must include matters such as
horizontal accountability and the rule of law (Barreda, 201 1). Some authors are critical
of this theory, stressing that taking into account the exercise of political power means
altering the original meaning of democracy (Mazzuca, 2007).
3 Lately, scholars are emphasizing the role of political control played by direct democracy
mechanisms, particularly the mechanisms initiated by citizens. In Latin America, only
four countries have used these mechanisms on a national scale (Altman, 2010).
Uruguay is the country where this kind of initiative occurs most commonly, under the
form of the referendo facultativo (optional referendum), by means of which legislation
can be rejected (something that occurred on four occasions between 1989 and 2009). In
2006, Bolivia held a national referendum on a new form of territorial organization, stem-
ming from a people's legislative initiative. Venezuela's President Chávez was subject to
a recall referendum in 2004, which did not succeed. Colombia is the only country which
has held non-binding popular consultation initiatives (a consultation on a constituent
assembly, in 1990).
4 "Rule of law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. In the literature on institutional quality,
the rule of law sometimes appears as an aspect of the concept of horizontal accountabil-
ity (for example, Mainwaring, 2003), while on other occasions it is dealt with as a
related, but separate matter (for example, Diamond and Morlino, 2004). Whatever the
case, only under the rule of law can accountability agencies function effectively
(O'Donnell, 2004a). The three indicators mentioned are compiled in the Quality of
Government Standard Dataset (The Quality of Government Institute, 2013).
5 Two reasons for this can be pointed out. First, weakly institutionalized party systems
make access to power easier for "outsider" politicians, who tend to elude any type of
control over their conduct. Second, in weakly institutionalized party systems the citizens
have to face greater difficulties in obtaining information on the actions of governments
and the politicians (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006).

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 324 Mikel Barreda

6 The direction of the orig

range from 0 (minimum gu
7 See O'Donnell (2004b) and
the literature on the relation
ing contributions (Helmke
shows how informal institu
institutions.
8 Only the classifications of
and Molina (201 lb) contain s
of law and freedom of press
9 In selecting indicators in
(1) their number must be r
must seek to prevent problem
have the greatest possible
10 The latter contains inform
be taken durin as a constant
DataGob (Inter- American D
Quality of Government Stan
1 1 These two indicators com
average citizen's wellbein
American context; one of t
1980s and 90s was the high

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