University of Cebu-Banilad Campus

Banilad, Cebu City

School of Law

CIVIL PROCEDURE
ASSIGNMENT

Submitted by:
Janet Dawn Abines
M3 TTH 8:00pm-10:00pm

Submitted to:
Atty. Joel M. Famador
Calo v. Ajax, 22 SCRA 996

Facts:
Sometime on May 7, 1959, plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax
International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot. The transaction was
evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00.

According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, the same was
found short of 300 ft. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant asking for either completion of
delivery or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope.

On November 20, 1961, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. IV-93062 was filed in the
Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the
outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax International, Inc. Charge Order No.
37071 was among those included in the assigned account. Subsequently, a judgment by default
was entered, and a writ of execution issued, against plaintiff Calo.

On January 23, 1962, plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect
complete delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855.00 and
(2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages and expenses of
litigation.

Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the ground,
inter alia, that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to that in Civil Case No.
IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of Manila. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed
the case on the ground that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in
the MTC.

Issue:
WON the plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the MTC.

Ruling:
No. Counterclaims that are beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC are not compulsory and are not
waived by the failure to set up before the MTC. The rules allow such counterclaims to be set-up
only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the
court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said
court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant
has a bigger credit.

However, any counterclaim set-up in excess of the court’s jurisdiction is waived. Failure of the
defendant to set-up such claim does not bar him from filing a separate civil action on the same
claim before the RTC.
Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA (1985)

Facts:
Administrator of estate-lessor files a case for ejectment before the City Courts against the
lessee. Lessee files counterclaim in excess of the City Court’s jurisdiction. City Court decides for
plaintiff.

On appeal, CFI rules for defendant and grants him damages. This became final. Plaintiff files
separate for nullifying the CFI decision on the ground that the damages awarded was beyond
the jurisdiction of the City Court.

Issue:
WON the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's
counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.

Ruling:
A counterclaim not presented in the lower court cannot be entertained on appeal. Defendant is
deemed to have waived his counterclaim in excess of the Cit Court s jurisdiction. It is as
though it has never been brought before City Court. It may not be entertained on appeal. The
amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed
the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the
appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise.
When court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has no
jurisdiction, its adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or
otherwise. The excess award of the CFI is therefore null and void. Action to declare nullity of
award is proper. The award not in excess stands.

The defendant's counterclaim for damages is GRANTED to the extent of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS. The grant of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS in excess of such
amount is hereby declared NULL and VOID, for having been awarded beyond the jurisdiction of
the court.
Ballecer v. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291

Facts:
Petitioners spouses Jose Agawin and Fellicisima Ballacer filed a civil case against respondent
Jose Bernardo to recover damages allegedly caused by him: in consequence of the
destruction and demolition of a portion of a wall of the petitioners, along the common boundary
line of their lot and that of Bernardo, at Felix Huertas Street, Manila, and to recover possession
of a portion of petitioners' aforementioned lot, with an area of 0.80 square meters, which was
allegedly encroached upon by the wall subsequently erected by Bernardo in place of the one he
had destroyed.

Bernardo filed his answer denying petitioners' averments, that the demolition and destruction
made by him had taken place within the boundary of his own property.
Bernardo set up two (2) causes of action: (1) that petitioners were the parties who had
encroached upon and occupied a portion of Bernardo's property, with an area of about 3.70
square meters, without his consent and against his will, (2) that petitioners' complaint is
premature, uncalled for, capricious and without any justifiable cause, for which reason Bernardo
prayed that they be sentenced to vacate his aforementioned portion of land allegedly
encroached upon by them and to turn it over to him, and to pay damages aggregating
P48,000.00.

On the last day of the reglementary period to answer, petitioners filed ex parte urgent motion for
extension of time therefore - denied

Lower court rendered decision in favor of the defendant-counterclaimant and against the
plaintiffs to pay for damages. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the orders which was
denied. Then petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, to restrain the Clerk of Court from issuing a writ of execution which was
also denied. Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration granted on January 18, 1961 but only
to deny it once more, on motion for reconsideration filed by Bernardo.

Issue:
WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in declaring the petitioners in default and in
rendering judgment against them on Bernardo's counterclaim after an ex parte hearing

Ruling:
Yes. To begin with, A motion for extension of time to file an answer to the counterclaim had
been filed within the reglementary period and plausible reasons were given in support thereof:
counsel for petitioners had been unable to contact them owing to a typhoon that had just hit
Manila, and the flood and inclement weather that had followed

There are motions that may be heard and granted ex-parte, and a motion for extension of time
to file an answer to a counterclaim belongs to such class.

Where the issues raised in the counterclaim are inseparable from those posed in the complaint,
it is not absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to file an answer thereto.
Gojo v. Goyala, 35 SCRA 557

Facts:
Segundo Goyala together with his wife Antonina sold to Faustino Gojo by a “Deed of Pacto de
Retro Sale” a parcel of agriland, repurchase to be made within one year. About 10yrs after
execution of said document, Gojo filed with the Sorsogon CFI a petition for consolidation of
ownership of the land.

Goyala filed an opposition to the petition alleging that it was a mere mortgage and not a Pacto
de Retro sale as evidenced by a deed of mortgage executed by the Goyalas. Goyala also
alleged that he and Antonina went to Gojo’s house and tendered to him the payment of the
debt, but Gojo refused to receive the same and to cancel
the document of mortgage. Goyala also prayed that Gojo be ordered to pay Php1800 per annun
(less the legal annual interest of the loan) as the reasonable monetary value of the products of
the said land. (counterclaim)

Goyala’s counsel filed a manifestation informing the trial court the Antonina was already dead.
Hearing was had on that manifestation and the trial court ordered Gojo’s counsel to submit an
amemded complaint substituting Antonina with her successors-in-interest.

Goyala filed MtD the complaint on the ground of failure to submit amended complaint. TC
dismissed complaint without prejudice. Thereafter, Goyala filed a motion to declare Gojo in
default for failure to answer the counterclaim. TC declared Gojo in default. Gojo appeals to CA.
CA certified the appeal to SC upon finding that the appeal involves purely questions of law.

Issue:
WON the said counterclaim “falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim” which does
not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations

Ruling:
A plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in
default, principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically
joined by the allegations of the complaint.
Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100

Fact:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in
Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact
in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological
incapacity.

The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7
January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became
manifest only thereafter." Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill
of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin
specified that –

. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession – that of a newly qualified
Doctor of Medicine – upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his
lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

Salita was not content, but TC upholds its sufficiency and directed Joselita to file her responsive
pleading.

Issue:
WON the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein petitioner is of sufficient definiteness or
particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for
trial.

Rulng:
A complaint only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of
action. Ultimate facts has been defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support.
The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which
these material elements are to be established. It refers to the facts which the evidence on the
trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.
A motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite,
nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not
call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information
may be obtained by other means. The Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient
to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask
for information on evidentiary matters. On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident
that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Benguet Elec., v. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55

Facts:
Peter Cosalan was the GenMgr of Benguet Electric Coop (BENECO). Cosalan received Audit
Memo#1 issued by the COA. The memo noted that cash advances received by officers and
employees of BENECO had been virtually written off in the books of BENECO. COA directed
BENECO to secure the approval of the Nat l Electric Admin (NEA) before writing off said cash
advances.

COA issued another memo addressed to Cosalan.inviting attention to the fact that the audit of
per diems and allowances received by officials and members of the Board of Directors of
BENECO showed substantial inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA. The memo once
again directed the taking of immediate action in conformity with existing NEA regulations.

BENECO received COA Audit Report on the financial status and operations of BENECO. The
report noted the irregularities in the use of funds released by NEA to BENECO and
recommended that appropriate remedial action be taken.

BENECO board adopted resolutions. Cosalan was removed. He filed a case. The respondent
Beneco Board members received the decision of the labor Arbiter on 21 April 1988. Accordingly,
and because 1 May 1988 was a legal holiday, they had only up to 2 May 1988 within
which to perfect their appeal by filing their memorandum on appeal. The respondent Board
members' memorandum on appeal was posted by registered mail on 3 May 1988 and received
by the NLRC the following day. Clearly, the memorandum on appeal was filed out of time.

Respondent Board members, however, insist that their Memorandum on Appeal was filed on
time because it was delivered for mailing on 1 May 1988 to the Garcia Communications
Company, a licensed private letter carrier. The Board members in effect contend that the date of
delivery to Garcia Communications was the date of filing of their appeal memorandum.

Issue: WON the date of delivery to private carrier Garcia Communications is the date of filing of
appeal.

Ruling:
No. Transmission through a private carrier or letter-forwarder, instead of the Philippine Post
Office, is not a recognized mode of filing pleadings. The date of delivery of pleadings to a
private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing
thereof in court. In such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of
delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
Adamson v. Adamson, 179 SCRA 279

Facts:
The Adamson University (AU) was granted to increase their tuition fees by 10% and 5% for the
school year 1983-84. The Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association (AUFEA)
believing that under P.D. No. 451 60% thereof should be allocated for the increase in salaries
and wages of the members of the faculty and other members of the school filed a complaint in
the Ministry of Labor & Employment (MOLE) against the AU for the recovery of the said 60%.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The AUFEA appealed therefrom to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on September 30, 1988 setting aside the appealed decision and ordering the AU to
remit to the members of AUFEA the amount of P1,298,160.00 representing the 60%.

The herein petition for certiorari filed by the AU. On February 22, 1989, the court dismissed the
petition for failure to sufficiently show that respondent commission had committed a grave
abuse of discretion in rendering its questioned judgment.

A Motion to Dismiss hereof was filed by petitioner contending that SERVICE OF THE
DECISION UPON THE SECURITY GUARD OF THE TOEFEMI BUILDING,WHERE
RESPONDENT'S FORMER COUNSEL USED TO HOLD OFFICE, IS INEFFECTIVE AND
DOES NOT CAUSE THE RUNNING OF THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR AN APPEAL.

Issue:
WON the service of the copy of the decision upon the security guard of the building where the
former office of petitioner's counsel was located was sufficient compliance with the requirements
of the law.

Ruling:
Where the copy of the decision is served on a person (e.g. security guard) who is neither a clerk
nor one in charge of the attorney's office, such service is invalid and is not considered as
service on the party.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the service of the decision dated October 11, 1988 on the
security guard of the building where the then counsel for petitioner was holding office was an
invalid service and the running of the period within which to appeal therefrom or file a motion
reconsideration cannot be deemed to commence thereby.
Solar v. Ricaforte, 293 SCRA 661

Facts:
Solar Team filed before the RTC a complaint against Felix Co. Summons and copies of the
complaint were forthwith served on Co. Co then filed his answer. A copy thereof was furnished
counsel for Solar Team by registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written
explanation as to why service was not made personally upon Solar Team, as required by
Section 11 of Rule 13. Offices of counsels of both parties are only 200 meters apart.

Solar Team filed a motion to expunge the answer and to declare Co in default, alleging therein
that Co did not observe the mandate of Section 11. RTC issued an order stating that under
Section 11 of Rule 13, it is within the discretion of the RTC whether to consider the pleading
as filed or not, and denying, for lack of merit, Solar Team’s motion to expunge.

Issue:
WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s motion to expunge privates’ answer with counterclaims on the
ground that said pleading was not served personally

Ruling:
The antecedents are not disputed.

In case personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and
filing, the exception. Whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then
be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable
to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie
merit of the pleading sought to be expunged. This applies to both service of pleadings and other
papers on the adverse party or his counsel and to the filing of pleadings and other papers in
court. Here, in view of the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel and
the absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not
effected, the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious.

However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of
the trial court's discretion. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997,
while the questioned answer was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39th day following the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Defendant’s counsel may not have been fully aware of the
pertinent requirements. His shortcomings may be condoned. However strictest compliance with
Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one month from promulgation of this Decision.
Valmonte v. CA 252 SCRA 92

Facts:
Private respondent Dimalanta files a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of
rentals against spouses Valmonte. Lourdes Valmonte was residing in Wasington. Alfredo
Valmonte was practicing law in Manila. In a previous letter to Dimalanta, Lourdes
stated that in regard to the partition of the property in question, all communications intended for
Lourdes should be sent to her husband. The complaint now alleges that summons on Lourdes
may be served on her husband Alfredo in his office in Manila. Summons was served on Alfredo.
Alfredo accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the
summons for his wife, Lourdes on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process
on her behalf.

Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for
Lourdes. Alfredo filed his answer with counterclaim. Lourdes did not file her answer. RTC
refused to declare Lourdes in default. CA reverses and declared her in default.

Issue:

Ruling:
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible, substituted
service, is essential. If the defendant is temporarily abroad, but a Philippine resident, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. A resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by
means of substituted service or by publication. It should be noted that the defendant must be a
resident of the Philippines. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in
the country, summons may be served exterritorialy.

Plaintiff’s action in this case, which is for partition and accounting, is in the nature of an action
quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in
a specific property and not to render a judgment against him.

As defendant Lourdes is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons
on her must be either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication and registered mail; or (3) in
any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. Since the service of summons upon
Lourdes was not done by means of any of the first two modes. Neither does it qualify under the
3rd mode. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such
as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.
Furthermore, service of summons on Alfredo was not made upon the order of the court and
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the
service to be valid and on that basis declare Lourdes in default.

In the second place, service in the attempted manner was not made upon prior leave of the trial
court as required. Such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of
the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given
ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than 60 days after
notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident
defendant (15 days from service) differs from the period given in an action filed against a
nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines (at least 60 days from notice).

Lourdes did not appoint her husband as her attorneyin-fact. Although she wrote plaintiff that "all
communications" intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer
at the latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be
inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of this
case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations between her
and plaintiff, concerning the partition of the property in question. As is usual in negotiations of
this kind, the exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the
authority given to defendant's husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as
also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.
Citizen Surety v. Herrera, 38 SCRA 369

Facts:
Petitioner Citizens' Surety filed its complaint in the Manila CFI, alleging that at request of
defendant Santiago Dacanay, the plaintiff Surety Company had issued its Surety Bonds Nos.
4942 and 4944, the first, in favor of Gregorio Fajardo to guarantee payment of a P5,000-
promissory note executed by said Dacanay, and the second, in favor of Manufacturers Bank &
Trust Co., to guarantee payment of another promissory note in like amount; that in consideration
of said bonds, Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements, binding
themselves jointly and severally to indemnify plaintiff for any losses, costs and expenses which
it might sustain in connection with the issuance of the bonds aforesaid, with interest at 12% per
annum; that as additional security, the Dacanays mortgaged to plaintiff a parcel of land in
Baguio City, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-8116, the mortgage having been duly
recorded; that the promissory notes were not paid and as a result, plaintiff Surety was
compelled to pay P5,000.00 to Gregorio Fajardo and P4,081.69 to the Manufacturers' Bank;
that the Dacanays failed to reimburse the Surety for such payments, whereupon the Surety
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim of P12,941.69 representing
its payments, interest and stipulated liquidated damages: that at the foreclosure sale, the land
mortgaged was sold to plaintiff, as highest bidder, for the sum of P2,000.00 leaving an
unsatisfied balance of P10,491.69, that plaintiff sought to recover from defendants Dacanay,
plus 10% thereof as attorneys' fees, and the costs. At petitioner's request, respondent Judge
caused summons to be made by publication in the newspaper Philippines Herald. But despite
the publication and deposit of a prepaid copy of the complaint at the Manila post office,
defendants did not appear within the period of 60 days from last publication, as required by the
summons.

Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in default; but instead, the Judge, by order of
May 16, 1970, asked it to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the suit being in
personam and defendants not having appeared. Then, on May 29, 1970, respondent Judge
dismissed the case, despite plaintiff Surety's argument that the summons by publication was
sufficient and valid under section 16 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ruling:
We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the
Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a nonappearing defendant, absent a personal
service of summons within the forum. We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon vs. Asunci.n, 105
Phil. 765, pointing out without such personal service, any judgment on a nonappearing
defendant would be violative of due process.

The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real
or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be
attached under Rule 57, section 1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be
deemed valid and effective.

But because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at concealing
their properties, the dismissal of the case below by respondent Judge should be set aside and
the case held pending in the court's archives, until petitioner as plaintiff succeeds in determining
the whereabouts of the defendants' person or properties and causes valid summons to be
served personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period
of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter of court
records and he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
profit from his own misdeed and claim prescription of his just debt.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the case issued by the Court below is hereby set aside,
and in the interest of justice, the proceedings are ordered suspended, to be held pending until
the plaintiff petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the whereabouts of the defendants and/or
locating properties of the same, to enable proper summons to be issued conformably to this
Opinion. No costs.
Kawasaki v. Amores, 199 SCRA 230

Facts:
C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha is corporation organized under the law of Japan. It appears to
have incurred obligations to several creditors amongst which are defendants, also foreign
corporations organized and existing under the laws of Japan. It defaulted on its creditors.
Thereafter defendants have resorted to demanding payment from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. filed
a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief. Since the defendants are non-residents,
without business addresses in the Philippines but in Japan, extraterritorial service of summons
was resorted to. Thereafter, defendants filed their special appearances to question the court’s
jurisdiction over their persons.

Ruling:
This Court had ruled that extraterritorial service of summons is proper only in four (4) instances,
namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of theplaintiffs; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines." (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23 [1975]; The Dial Corporation v. Soriano,
161 SCRA 737 [1988]).

As ruled by this Court, where the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor
any property in the Philippines in which defendants have or claim an interest, or which the
plaintiff has attached, but purely an action for injunction, it is a personal action as well as an
action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendants, nor extraterritorial service, is necessary to
confer jurisdiction on the court. In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons
and complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the
regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they
exercise their authority. Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court
jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders (Dial Corporation v. Soriano, 161 SCRA
738 [1988] citing Section 3-a Interim Rules of Court, Section 21, subpar. 1, BP Blg. 129).

It is easy to see in the instant case, that what is sought is a declaration not only that private
respondent is a corporation for there is no dispute on that matter but also that it is separate and
distinct from C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha and therefore, not liable for the latter's indebtedness.
It is evident that monetary obligations does not, in any way, refer to status, rights and
obligations. Obligations are more or less temporary, but status is relatively permanent. But more
importantly, as cited in the case of Dy Poco v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., 16 SCRA
618 [1966], the prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would
be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status and other
relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the case is not one for declaratory
judgment." Thus, considering the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief
may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid
reason to adhere to the principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where
judgment would have to be made, only after a judicial investigation of disputed issues. In fact,
private respondent itself perceives that petitioners may even seek to pierce the veil of corporate
identity.
Private respondent alleges that most if not all, of the petitioners have merely demanded or have
attempted to demand from the former the payment of the obligations of C.F. Sharp K.K.
Otherwise stated, there is no action relating to or the subject of which are the properties of the
defendant in the Philippines for it is beyond dispute that they have none in this jurisdiction nor
can it be said that they have claimed any lien or interest, actual or contingent over any property
herein, for as above stated, they merely demanded or attempted to demand from private
respondent payment of monetary obligations of C.F. Sharp K. K. No action in court has yet
ensued. Verily, the fact that C.F. Sharp Philippines is an entity separate and distinct from C.F.
Sharp K.K. is a matter of defense that can be raised by the former at the proper time.
Cariaga v. Malaya, 143 SCRA 441

Facts:
Private respondents herein Ana Almonte Cariaga Soon filed in her behalf and in behalf of her
minor daughter Carolina, an action for (1) Annulment of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Property, (2) Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3) Recovery of Real
Property with damages, in the Laguna CFI. All defendants in said action filed their answer with
counterclaim with the exception of petitioners herein Jose C. Cariaga Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-
Celis who were both residing abroad and were not served with summons.

The lower court upon motion of plaintiffs granted them leave to effect extra-territorial service of
summons upon said defendants pursuant to Secs. 7, 17 and 18 of Rule 14 of the New Rules of
Court. Accordingly, summons with copies of the complaint were served to the defendants by
registered mail abroad (Guam and U.S.A.) by the Clerk of Court at the instance of plaintiffs.
Defendants, who are residents of the Philippines, filed a motion to set aside the said summons
and to declare the service of summons abroad by registered mail as null and void, it being
allegedly irregular and unauthorized under the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to
which motion plaintiffs filed their opposition. CFI denied the motion and ruled that "Defendants
Jose C.Cariaga, Jr., and Marietta C. Cariaga, having already received copies of plaintiffs'
Complaint with the service of summons on them, said defendants are given NINETY (90) days
from receipt of this Order within which to file responsive pleadings.

Petitioner herein, residing abroad, by special appearance and thru counsel filed their motion to
consider the service of summons upon them by registered mail as null and void. CFI issued
another order denying the said motion.

Issue:
WON the service of summons by registered mail upon defendants in the case at bar is one
which is contemplated within the principles laid down in the provisions of Secs. 17, 7 and 22,
Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court

Ruling:
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when
defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14,
Rules of Court).

In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; and (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient. The third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with
in this case. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23, 33, 34).

There is no question that the requirement of due process has been met as shown by the fact
that defendants actually received the summonses and copies of the complaint and as evidenced
by the Registry Return Cards marked as Annex A-1 (page 56-Record) and Annex B-1.
Whatever defect there may have been in the service of summons was aptly corrected by the
court a quo in its assailed order dated January 16, 1978, which gave said defendants ninety
(90) days from receipt of order within which to file their responsive pleadings. Defendants have
no reason to complain that they were unaware of the action filed against them or claim that they
were denied due process.

The case of Habana v. Vamenta et al., L-27091, June 30, 1970, or 33 SCRA 569, cited by the
petitioners in support of their claim has no bearing in the case at bar since in said case service
of summons was never made, even if defendant knew of the case against him, while in the case
under consideration, service of summons was made upon them (although claimed erroneously
by them as defective).

When extraterritorial service of summons is proper, service by registered mail is sufficient (“in
any other manner which the court may deem sufficient”).

More so if the defendants actually received the summons and copies of the complaint and as
evidenced by the Registry Return Cards. Whatever defect there may have been in the service of
summons may be corrected by the court by giving the defendants 90 days from receipt of order
within which to file their responsive pleadings.
Dial Corp. v. Soriano, SCRA 737

Facts:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organize and existing under the laws of US, UK, Malaysia,
and are NOT domiciled in the Philippines, NOR do they have officers or agents, place of
business, or property in the Phil., they are not licensed to engaged, and ARE not engaged in
business here; Respondent (IVO) is a Philippine corporation. The petitioners and respondent
entered into a contract for delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those contracts stipulate
that any dispute shall be resolved through arbitration, either in FOSFA or NIOP. Because IVO
failed to deliver, petitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration proceedings and some have
already obtained arbitration awards against respondent;

IVO filed a complaint for injunction against 19 foreign coconut oil buyers including petitioner,
with whom its president Dominador Monteverde, entered into contract with. IVO repudiated
Monteverde’s contracts oon the ground that they were mere “paper trading in futures” as no
actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties. IVO replaced
Dominador Monteverde and named Rodrigo Monteverde in his stead and disowned the former’s
allegedly unauthorized acts;

Petitioners allegedly “harassed” IVO to recognize the contract entered into by Dominador and to
come into settlement with them, which is why IVO applied for TRO and WPI; IVO also prayed
for Moral Damages, Actual Damages, Exemplary Damages, and Counsel Appearances. On
motion of IVO, respondent judge authorized to effect EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF
SUMMONS to all the defendants through DHL Philippines; Pursuant to such order, petitioners
were served with summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service.

Without submitting to court’s jurisdiction, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over them. The respondent court denied the motion on the ground that “the
present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which
defendant claim liens or interests, actual or inchoate, legal or equitable. And one of the reliefs
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendants from interest in such property
for the reason that their transactions with plaintiffs former president are ultra vires. Furthermore,
as “foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, they opened
themselves to suit before Philippine courts”, pursuant to Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code of
the Philippines. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition for
certiorari with TRO, which the court granted.

Ruling:
No, the extraterritorial service of summons was is not proper and therefore, null and void.

The complaint in this case does not involve personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in
the Philippines in which defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached.

The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against
IVO (“abusing and harassing”) its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and
to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such “harassment”.

It is clearly a PERSONAL ACTION as well as an ACTION IN PERSONAM, not an action in rem

or quasi in rem. This case is a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on
the defendants, NOT extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.
BPI v. Far East Molasses 198 SCRA 689

Facts:
On 15 April 1976, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Rizal a complaint 3 for recovery of a sum of money against herein respondent and L & A
Company, Inc., Estate of Trinidad Lazatin and the Intestate Estate of Eduardo Ayson, praying
therein for judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay herein petitioner the
aggregate amount of P575,043.75 plus interest at the rate of 14% per annum and a service fee
of 2% per annum from and after March 16, 1976 until the amount is fully paid. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 23282.

After due trial, the lower court in the furtherance of justice and equity, hereby renders judgment
in favor of plaintiff, BPI.

Private respondent (then defendant) received a copy of the Decision on 7 July 1987. It had,
therefore, until 22 July 1987 within which to appeal therefrom. Instead of filing a notice of appeal
within the period, it filed, in the morning of 22 July 1987, a motion to reconsider the decision.
The motion, however, did not contain any notice of hearing.

It appears nevertheless, that on 22 July 1987, probably to cure the defect of lack of notice of
hearing, counsel for respondent allegedly mailed by ordinary mail a so-called Manifestation and
Motion incorporating therein the omitted notice of hearing, 6 and claiming that said notice "was
inadvertently omitted from the said Motion for Reconsideration."

This so-called Manifestation and Motion, as admitted by respondent, 8 appears to have been
received by the trial court only on 7 August 1987. Petitioner claims that it never received a copy
of said pleading 9 and that there is even doubt as to when it was actually mailed since the
messenger of private respondent's lawyer, in his affidavit, Annex "AA" of Petition, could not
even state the name of the Post Office where he supposedly mailed it.

The trial court denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order
granting the motion for reconsideration and ordering the execution of the decision.

Unable to accept the above order, respondent herein filed with the Court of Appeals a Special
Civil Action for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order seeking
the nullification of the order. The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Petitioner filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the above decision, which was denied

Issue:
WON the former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded
that the Notice of Appeal of respondent was seasonably filed.

Ruling:
We find the instant appeal by certiorari to be impressed with merit. The challenged
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is not in accord with the rules and settled
jurisprudence and must perforce be reversed and set aside. Its findings and conclusions
are not supported by facts and are based on erroneous assumptions.

The unrippled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a motion that does not contain a notice of
hearing is but a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention and
consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and
hence, the clerk has no right to receive it.

There is no showing that petitioner was furnished with a copy thereof; on the contrary, petitioner
denied having received one. That none at all was furnished to petitioner is undisputably
confirmed by the failure of the affidavit of the messenger of private respondent's counsel to
state the contrary. Personal service of a copy could have been easily done
since the office of counsel for petitioner is located at Juan Luna St., Manila, while that of counsel
for private respondent is located at Makati, Metro Manila. The so-called notice incorporated
in the Manifestation and Motion is not the notice required by law. It is a
notice of the Clerk of Court and not to counsel for the petitioner. Section 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court expressly and unequivocally requires that the notice "shall be directed
to the parties concerned." It did not then cure the fatal defect of the motion for reconsideration.

Even if We disregard for the moment the absence of proof of service thereof to petitioner, still no
relief is forth-coming to private respondent. The copy of the manifestation and motion
for the trial court was sent by ordinary mail. No credible justification has been offered by private
respondent as to why it was not sent by registered mail. Section 5 of Rule
13 of the Rules of Court on service by registered or ordinary mail requires service by registered
mail where registry service exists. Otherwise stated, service by ordinary mail is allowed only in
instances where no registry service exists. Private respondent fails to indicate that no registry
service was available at the Post Office where it was mailed. Considering nevertheless,
that the office of counsel for private respondent is in Makati, Metro Manila, We cannot be
persuaded to admit that there is no Post Office thereat which does not offer registry service.
Nonetheless, even conceding some lapses in the degree of diligence required by counsel, and
admitting that it did send by ordinary mail the manifestation and motion
in the afternoon of the day it filed the defective motion for reconsideration, still the former did not
cure the defect. For, to all legal intents and purposes, the manifestation and motion must be
deemed to have been filed on the day that it was received by the court, i.e., on 7 August 1987.
Having been filed clearly beyond the period to appeal, it did not operate to
cure the defect of the motion for reconsideration. It cannot be given a retroactive effect.

Section 23 of the Interim Rules of Court and the decisions referred to, contrary again
to the perception of the respondent Court Of Appeals, do not interpret the phrase "last day to
appeal by any party," but rather refer to the perfection of the appeal. There is a whale of a
difference between last day to appeal and perfection of the appeal. The last day to appeal
is the fifteenth day from receipt by a party of a copy of the decision. However, that appeal is not
considered perfected until the expiration of the period to appeal by the other party
in the case. The distinction assumes importance only in cases involving execution of judgment
pending appeal.