The Politics of Pacific Cooperation

Author(s): Han Sung-Joo

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 12, Perspectives on the Pacific Community Concept (Dec.,
1983), pp. 1281-1292
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644475
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THE POLITICS OF PACIFIC
COOPERATION

Han Sung-joo

The term "Pacificcommunity" has come to be associat-

ed with eitherthe naturaland gradualprocess of the emergence of a commu-
nity of nations within the Pacific region or the establishmentof new institu-
tional arrangements supporting and facilitating such an evolving
community. There is not much disagreement over the apparentfact of in-
creasing economic interaction and interdependence among the various
countries in the loosely defined Pacific region. But there is hardly any con-
sensus among or within the nations as to whether a new institution is neces-
sary and, if so, what form it should take. In fact, the major source of
difficultyfor an early realizationof a pan-regionalstructurederives from the
differences in perspectives and interests among the various countries con-
cerning such an institution.
Pacific regional cooperation, as it is conceived today, involves primarily
economic issues. The economic rationale for regional cooperation is quite
persuasive. It is well recognized that, within the overall world setting in
which economic relations are gaining greater importance,the Pacific region
is now emerging as the major center of economic activity. At the same time
the marketeconomies of the region, which depend upon free trade for their
continued economic growth, exhibit a high degree of interdependence
among themselves. The increased economic importance of the Pacific re-
gion, the growing interdependence among the region's various countries,
and the recognition that protectionism in internationaltrade may jeopardize
continued economic vitalityin the region-these are the main argumentsfor
constructing a regional framework that can facilitate multilateralcoopera-
tion and coordination in such areasas trade, finance,investment,technology
transfer,and resource development.
Han Sung-joo is Professor of Political Science and Director of the
Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, Seoul, Korea.
?
1983 by The Regents of the University of California

1281
 1282 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1983

Several proposals for such a regional structure have been advanced by

prominent academics and scholars, mostly economists. Though these pro-
posals have as their common goal the achievement of greater economic
coordination within the region, they differ in their definition of the region,
the size and nature of the membership, and the functional scope of the
proposed structure.
Most frequentlyreferredto among these ideas is that of the Organization
for PacificTradeand Development (OPTAD) proposed by Hugh Patrickof
Yale University and Peter Drysdale of AustralianNational University. The
plan, described at length in their 1979 report to the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, calls for the creation of an OECD-type consultation
mechanism among all market-economy countries around the Pacific basin
except South America.Although it does not representan official proposal of
the United States, the OPTAD idea is probably the most comprehensiveand
concrete plan proposed so far and has served as a useful frame of reference
in all subsequent discussion of the desirability and feasibility of Pacific
regional cooperation.1
Pacific cooperation, however, is not a matter of economics alone. Politi-
cal considerationsare frequentlythe overridingfactor in a country'sposition
concerning the regional cooperation concept.2 Thus, it is the purpose of this
articleto examine the economic and political interestsof the various Pacific
basin countries in the proposed regional cooperation idea.

The UnitedStates and PacificCooperation

Active U.S. participation is essential for successful implementation of the
Pacificeconomic cooperation concept. Other countries in the region expect
the United States to exercise a leadershiprole in Asian-Pacificinternational
relations.For the U.S., a pan-Pacificstructurewould offer a means by which
it can continue to play such a role in the economic as well as political area.
The Asia-Pacificregion has become America'slargest trading partner;since
the late 1970s, U.S. trade with Asia has exceeded that with all of Europe.Yet
the U.S. does not have a regularpolicy-coordinating or information-sharing
mechanismsuch as OECD with the Asian countries.
The U.S. has other important,although less explicitly stated, interests.In
the firstplace, it would have a strong interest in preventinga deteriorationof
its economic position in the area vis-a-visJapan. Japan is now by far the
largesttradingpartnerwith all of the countries in the WesternPacific except
the Philippinesand Taiwan,where the U.S. holds a slight edge. Left alone or
only to bilateralarrangements,Japan's shareof the WesternPacific marketis
 HAN SUNG-JOO 1283

likely to continue to grow, and the formation of a de facto Japanese eco-

nomic sphere would be inevitable.
Furthermore,in the face of the growing Soviet militarychallenge in the
WesternPacific, the United States would have an interest in strengthening
multilateralties with other countries in the region. Although the proposed
institutionalstructureis intended only for economic cooperation, it is bound
to have a positive, if indirect, effect on the U.S. position and role in other
areas. On the other hand, a frankly political or security-orientedregional
arrangementwould be neither feasible nor desirable from the U.S. point of
view. Most Asian countries, as well as American domestic opinion, would
probably be opposed to such a plan. Even if such an arrangementproved to
be feasible, it would only result in creating dissension within the region and
inviting more tension with the Soviet Union, and perhapseven China. Thus,
a multilateralorganizationalframework that concentrates on economic co-
operation would be the most feasible and effective mechanism by which the
U.S. could ascertainand strengthenits presence in the region. In addition, it
would be in the interests of the U.S. if it could, through such a mechanism,
assist the region's developing countries to continue their economic progress,
retaintheirmarketeconomies, and remainideologically pragmaticand mod-
erate.
Another motivating factor on the part of the American advocates of a
Pacificcommunity appearsto be the desire to bring into proper balance the
traditionallyEurope-centeredeconomic policy of the U.S. and to respond to
the risingtide of protectionism in many sectors of the economy. The United
States now finds itself heavily discriminatedagainst by the European com-
munity,the formation of which it had encouraged and assisted. It would not
wish to repeat its experience with Europe by being locked out of a regional
grouping that might emerge in the Western Pacific. America's closer ties
with the Asian-Pacificcountries might serve as a counterweight to the exclu-
siveness of the Europeannations.
Despite the apparentinterests of the U.S. in Pacific regional cooperation,
however, it still remainshesitant and undecided on the issue. In order to take
a more positive and forthcoming attitude, it has to overcome the growing
protectionist trends at home and, perhaps more importantly, the relative
indifference of public officials to the cooperation proposal. What the U.S.
needs for its active participationin the Pacific community movement is the
rise of what might be called the ideal of "Pacificism,"comparableto that of
"Atlanticism"in the post-World WarII period. "Atlanticism,"according to
Calleo and Rowland, is essentially a political vision that aimed at bringing
about an "AtlanticCommunity"based on the ideals of free trade and feder-
 1284 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1983

alism.3 They argue that, in the post-World War II years, the dream of the
Atlanticists was stimulated and aided by America's historic drive for world
power and the anticipated leading role of the U.S. in consolidating the
Westernnations, the liberal economic principle of free trade, and the Cold
War.
Today, although an increasing number of Americans both in and out of
the government are beginning to recognize the inevitability of the United
States' Pacific ties, the "Pacificist"ideals do not seem to be as salient or
strong as those of the "Atlanticists"had been.4 Even when the importanceof
Asia and the Pacific to the United States is recognized, to many Americans
the Pacificregion is frequentlytaken to mean mainlyJapan.As a result, even
the newly recognized importance of the Pacific region shrinks under the
weight of the U.S.-Japanbilateralrelationship.

JapaneseInterests
In many ways,Japan'sinterestsin the Pacific cooperation concept are similar
to those of the United States. Through a cooperative organization,Japan
might be able to assume a leadership role that might not be possible on a
bilateralbasis without arousing resistancefrom countries with smallerecon-
omies. Also, such an organizational framework would have the positive
effect of creating a greater and more realistic awarenesswithinJapan of the
impact of its own domestic economic decisions on other countries.
There are many objectives Japan can seek through the creation of a
regional structure.Japanmay find it useful in (1) maintainingand consolidat-
ing a Pacific economy under its leadershipthat may or may not be shared
with the United States; (2) securing stable and geographically convenient
sources of naturalresources;(3) forming an internationalgrouping capable
of counterbalancingother groupings such as the EuropeanEconomic Com-
munity (EEC)and OPEC;(4) creating a mechanism through which conflict
with other countries such as the U.S. and the newly industrializingcountries
(NICs) can be collectively handled and resolved; (5) neutralizingproblems
and disadvantages arising from subregional or other regional integrative
arrangementssuch as ASEAN, the Andean Common Market, and the Latin
American Free Tariff Area; (6) facilitating coordination and cooperation
with other advanced countries of the area (i.e., the United States, Canada,
Australia,and New Zealand) in dealing with the developing countries and
the NICs in the area;and (7) establishinga mechanism by which rationaland
mutuallyadvantageousdecisions can be made with regardto regional indus-
trial specializationand division of labor.
In additionJapan's own "liberals"and internationalistsappearto be eager
 HAN SUNG-JOO 1285

to create a greaterand more realisticawarenesswithinJapanof the impact of

its own domestic economic decisions on other countries in the region. They
would also wish to foster a more open, cooperative, and internationalist
atmosphereinJapan in culturaland intellectual as well as economic spheres.
The main issues of choice for Japan, therefore, appearto be: (1) whether
Japan should identify itself primarilyas one of the advanced countries of the
region or as a WesternPacificnation; (2) what role it would envisage for the
U.S. in the formation process and operation of the new organization;(3)
what its position would be concerning the inclusion of South American
countries in the organization; and (4) whether its emphasis would be on
domestic educative endeavors and internationalistreforms or the persuasion
of other countries to support the new organization.
As for the first question, it now appearsthat a 1966 proposal by Kiyoshi
Kojima for a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA)that was "aimed at institu-
tional integration among five advanced Pacific countries, U.S.A., Canada,
Japan, Australiaand New Zealand,"has given way to a plan that emphasizes
functional integration among not only advanced countries but also coun-
tries at other levels of development.5 There is much ambiguity on other
issues, however. While many of the objectives of the integrativescheme can
be adequately (and from Japan's point of view, better) achieved without
American involvement, the apprehension shared by almost all other coun-
tries in the region concerning the possibility of Japanese domination of the
organizationrequiressoliciting an active U.S. participation.It is certainly a
necessarycondition for the participationof Canada,South American coun-
tries, and perhaps even Australiaand ASEAN. Furthermore,it would be in
Japan's security interests to have the U.S. closely involved in Asian affairs
through its participationin the regional structure.
Contraryto the common belief that the Pacific cooperation concept is
Japan's brainchild and that the Japanese must therefore be unequivocally
supportiveof the scheme, it is far from clear that there is a firm consensus in
Japan on the desirability or shape of the proposed organization.Japan's
official interestin the concept during the 1970s coincided with its desire to
improve and strengthenties with the ASEAN countries and to secure steady
sources of naturalresources, including oil. It now appearsthat its relations
with the variousASEAN countries arein a satisfactorystate, and there are no
serious commodities crises on the horizon.6Furthermore,within a multilat-
eral context, Tokyo can expect to be subjected to more demands by both
the advanced and developing countries for greaterconcessions in trade, aid,
technology transfer, and financial and investment issues. Thus, one may
expect thatJapan has lost much of its previous incentive to pursue strongly
 1286 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL.XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER1983

the establishment of a regional cooperative mechanism in Asia and the

Pacific.

OtherAdvanced Countries
Australia,Canada,and New Zealand would play a crucial role in the realiza-
tion of an institutionalizedPacificcommunity. They are industrialcountries,
yet their efforts on behalf of the cooperative structurewould not arouse the
kind of suspicion or apprehensionthat would resultif the U.S. orJapan were
to take the initiative. Since these countries have expanding markets for
manufacturedgoods and are also suppliers of resources, they would help
ameliorateexisting and potential conflict between the advanced and devel-
oping countries.The Pacific community, when and if realized,would have a
unique composition in that it would be a regional organizationwith member
countries at many levels of development. Industrialand trade specialization
will be sought in vertical as well as in horizontal dimensions. The participa-
tion of the three advanced countries will be crucial for the industrial and
resourcediversitywithin the community.
For Australia,which now conducts a great majority of its trade with the
Asian and Pacific countries (almost 70%of exports and 60%of imports),the
proposed cooperative structuremay bring several benefits. LikeJapan, Aus-
traliaseeks avenues of closer cooperation and coordination with those coun-
tries belonging to the existing subregional groupings such as ASEAN and
ANCOM. The Australianadvocates of the regional cooperative organization
feel that Australia,like other countries in the region, has a strong interest in
the preservationand expansion of an open internationaleconomic system.
Furthermore,Australia sees its future more as a Western Pacific or- Asian
than as a Westernnation.7
More importantly, Australiansmay feel that bringing the U.S. into the
structurewould be an effective way to counterbalancethe economic role of
Japan upon which Australiais becoming increasingly dependent for trade
and investment capital. Similarly,Canada would wish to act as a "counter-
weight" to the U.S. by bringing Japan into the picture. As in the United
States and Japan, the "liberal traders"and internationalistsin all three of
these advanced countries-Australia, New Zealand, and Canada-will find
a cooperative organization useful for combating protectionist forces at
home and increasing the public's opportunities for a greater understanding
of and access to the outside world, particularlythe Western Pacific. Addi-
tionally, such a structurewould provide Australiaand New Zealand with an
opportunity to have their South Pacific neighbors (such as Papua New
 HAN SUNG-JOO 1287

Guinea) involved in a broader international environment. Finally, even

though Australia and New Zealand are linked with the United States in
security matters through the ANZUS pact, they would consider it highly
desirablefor their own securityintereststo have the United States economi-
cally involved in the WesternPacificby means of a multilateralorganization.
ForCanada,Australia,and New Zealand, the choice appearsto be wheth-
er to maintaintheir traditionallyspecial relationshipwith Europe and/or the
United States and leave the WesternPacific area essentially under the exclu-
sive economic leadership of Japan, or actively participatein and promote
multilateraland institutional economic cooperation in the broader Pacific
region. It is reasonableto expect that they will choose the latter course.

The Interests of the ASEAN States

The ASEAN countries, whose support is perhaps most crucial for the
planned organization, have a strong interest in preserving and expanding
marketopportunitiesin the advanced industrialcountries.Just as the OECD
has not weakened the EEC, so a pan-Pacificconsultative structureneed not
affect the solidarityand cooperative ties among ASEAN countries. Instead,
it would give them greater opportunities for policy coordination, informa-
tion sharing, and interest representation. By bringing both the U.S. and
Japaninto the structure,ASEAN would be able to overcome the problem of
dealing with one giant at time.
But it is obvious that the ASEAN countries, as a group and individually,
are reluctant to jump on the Pacific community bandwagon. It cannot
escape their attention that proposals for a pan-Pacificorganizationare being
considered most actively by non-ASEAN countries. Until the full implica-
tions of the proposed schemes are known and understood, a guarded and
apprehensive initial reaction is inevitable.8 They also recognize that
ASEAN's solidarity is not particularlyfirm as yet. Though ASEAN was
establishedin 1967, it has actively promoted multilateraleconomic coopera-
tion only since 1976. Despite the exclusive emphasis on economic coopera-
tion, ASEAN's cooperative success has been more conspicuous in the politi-
cal than in the economic area.
Intra-ASEANexports constituted only 14%of their total exports and 16%
of their total imports in 1977. These figures are considerably lower than
those of the EuropeanEconomic Community in the 1950s, which stood at
approximately22% for both imports and exports. Complete elimination of
tariffs,free movement of funds and people, and close coordination of indus-
trialdevelopment areyet to be achieved. There is no militaryalliance accom-
 1288 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL.XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER1983

panying economic cooperative arrangements.Thus, it is quite understand-

able that the ASEAN countries fear that their participation in a wider
economic organization might seriously weaken their own organization,
which they have put together so painstakingly.Even those countries such as
Singapore, which can expect much benefit from the larger integrative
scheme, are reluctantto show their enthusiasmfor fear it might be interpret-
ed as a lack of concern for ASEAN solidarity.
Another reason for the ASEAN states' reservationsstems from their de-
sire to safeguard"nonalignment"credentials,which they feel might be com-
promised by joining a regional organizationclosely identified with the Unit-
ed States and Japan. This reasoning, however, may be losing its force as
increased tension and instability in Indochina tend to underscore the need
for active U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia in some form. The ASEAN
countries may also feel that the present arrangement,under which ASEAN
can collectively deal with the advanced countries such asJapan and the U.S.
separately,has in many cases served their interestsreasonablywell, at least so
far. Furthermore,they do not see the immediate prospect of benefits (such as
radicalconcessions by the advanced countries) resulting from a pan-Pacific
arrangement.
The Southeast Asian countries, after much debate and deliberation, may
recognize the benefits the Pacific cooperation concept can bring them indi-
vidually and as a group. But persuading the ASEAN countries about the
advantages of the proposed Pacific community will be much more difficult
if the new organization is meant to duplicate or supplant the cooperative
functions now being performedor attempted by ASEAN. A Pacificcounter-
part of the EEC, if proposed, is likely to encounter an insurmountable
resistance from the ASEAN countries. Neither will it be possible to bring
them into the organization by the wishes and efforts of the countries and
individualsoutside of ASEAN alone. The balance sheet of the new organiza-
tion should be examined by those within ASEAN who have to come to their
own conclusions. Others can make themselves useful to their ASEAN col-
leagues through research consultations and information sharing. Perhaps
ASEAN will present proposals of its own. All this will take time, but at the
moment there seems to be no way around it.

The Newly Industrializing

Countries
To the newly industrializingcountries (NICs) outside of ASEAN such as
South Korea, the question of economic cooperation and coordination in the
 HAN SUNG-JOO 1289

Asia-Pacificregion is of crucial importance for their continued economic

growth and viability.It would probably be in the interestsof the NICs if a
common market,a free tariffarea,or a nonexclusive regionalGATT is estab-
lished in the region includingas many countriesas possible. Obviously, this is
not feasible at this time, partly because of the protectionist sentiments in
virtuallyall of the countriesconcerned, and partlybecause some of the coun-
tries being considered for membershipare alreadymembers of other subre-
gional groupings. In any case, an EEC-typeeconomic integrativestructureis
neitherfeasible nor advisableat this time. The experienceof EEC shows the
need for a long period of gestation, preparation,and step-by-stepprogression.
Furthermore,the EECstartedfrom much more homogeneous and, therefore,
favorableculturaland political bases for economic integration.Effectiveeco-
nomic integration assumes various political, bureaucratic,ideological, and
culturalconditions that the Pacificregion is far from meeting.
The NICs would have an interest in some or all of the regional countries
agreeing to liberalizetheir trading relationshipson either a permanentor a
temporarybasis. They can do so in an inclusive ratherthan exclusive way-
that is, not for the purpose of excluding some countries within or outside of
the region but for the positive purpose of lowering trade and other econom-
ic barriersamong those countries that wish to join the arrangement.The
NICs, in the overall scheme, can play a critical role as the "bridge" or
intermediarybetween the advanced and the developing countries.
Along with the other newly industrializingcountries, Korea expects that a
new regional arrangementwill contribute to bringing about a more stable
and open environmentfor trade and finance, expanded trade with the other
countriesin the region, a more favorable position in multilateraltrade nego-
tiations with the advanced countries, and a more stable source of natural
resources.South Korea is also one of those countries with a keen interest in
keeping the United States economically involved in the WesternPacific for
economic, political, and security reasons.9
South Korea's interest in the regional cooperation concept derives from
its judgment that such an arrangementcan help further some of its own
diplomatic objectives. Seoul may hope that, through Pacific cooperation, it
can expand its regional role and enhance its international profile. Since
Korea is not a member of such regional organizationsas ASEAN or OECD,
a broad mechanism such as the one being proposed for the Pacific region
would give it better access to and more regularcontact with other regional
countries. Because of the division of the Korean peninsula into two states
 1290 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1983

and the resulting diplomatic handicap, South Korea would hope to expand
its international involvement as much as possible by becoming an active
member of a regional organizations
South Korea recognizes the need to guard against the temptation to seek
more than just economic cooperation from the proposed organization. At
present, it probablyneitherwishes, nor is able, to establish new security ties
with any of the Pacific regional countries. However, it may expect indirect
political benefits from a Pacific community plan that could contribute to-
ward assuringa continued U.S. presence in Asia and broaden Seoul's overall
ties with other countries in the region.

Conclusion
From the above discussion of the various countries' interests and percep-
tions, it is possible to make certain observations concerning the shape and
feasibilityof a Pacific community organization.First,it seems that American
participationin the organizationis desired by most countries in the Western
Pacific. An active U.S. role is essential to allay the apprehensionshared by
many countries in the region that the organization might be dominated by
Japan. In some ways, this is analogous to the situation that pertained in
Europe when the admission of Great Britain to the European Economic
Community was being debated. While Francehad many reservationsabout
allowing Britain'sentry into the common market,the other countries, partic-
ularly the smaller ones, welcomed the opportunity to counterbalance the
predominantinfluence of Franceand to some extent that of West Germany
within the EEC.Americanparticipationin the proposed organizationis also
deemed useful for the security of the WesternPacific in an indirect way. It
could contribute to reversingwhat appearedto be a post-Vietnam WarU.S.
drift toward neo-isolationism and a Eurocentricsecurity policy.
A second observation is that, despite the security considerations that
might be present in the background of each country's attitude toward the
Pacificcommunity proposal, there is much resistanceto going beyond eco-
nomic cooperation and to making it a multipurposeorganization.Attempt-
ing to mix security needs with economic interests in connection with the
proposed organizationis considered to be self-defeating. Culturaland edu-
cational cooperation, which will both serve as a basis of economic coopera-
tion and be a product of it, can be pursued both within and outside of the
context of the proposed organization.Regardlessof the pace of progresson
the current effort to establish an economic cooperation structure,cultural
and personnelexchanges among the countries in the region will be pursued
 HAN SUNG-JOO 1291

on unilateraland bilateral,as well as multilateral,bases. The evolution of the

Pacific region into a "community"is likely to happen in a number of areas
including economic relations, and those may take place simultaneously as
well as in sequence.
Third, Pacific regional cooperation involves what might be called the
politics of nonexclusion." While few countries take the official position of
actively supportingthe move to institutionalizeregional economic coopera-
tion, each country is anxious to prevent its exclusion from a pan-regional
structurein case it should materialize.It is perhaps for this reason that the
variouscountriescontinue to join in and carryout discussions on the matter
although they do so without showing a great deal of official enthusiasm.
As many observers have pointed out, Pacific regional cooperation may
have to be promoted as a long-term policy and objective. But it is also true
that much has already been accomplished in promoting regional coopera-
tion through the various existing organizationalactivities such as the PECC
(Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference),1"PAFTAD(Pacific Tradeand
Development) Conferences, and PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council). It
should be pointed out that the very process of frequent meetings and joint
attempts to work out solutions to regional problems has been instrumental
in enhancing mutual understanding and fostering a sense of community
within the region. For that reason, the belief that the Pacific cooperation
concept is worth serious thought seems to be shared by a growing number
of people in the various countries of the region.

Notes
1. U.S. Senate (Committee on Foreign Relations), An Asian-Pacific Regional Economic
Organization.An ExploratoryConceptPaper, 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington,
D.C., 1979).
2. Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of InternationalEconomicRelations,2nd ed. (New York:
St. Martin'sPress, 1981), pp. 4-5.
3. David P Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, America and the WorldPolitical Economy.
Atlantic Dreamsand National Realities(Bloomington and London: Indiana University
Press, 1973), pp. 17-19.
4. Richard Nations, "Pax Pacifica:The Reagasone Prosperity Plan," Far EasternEconomic
Review,July 14, 1983, pp. 55-58.
5. Kiyoshi Kojima, 'An Organisation for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: A Propos-
al," Paper published under the direction of the Australian Committee of the Australia-
Japan Economics Relations Research Project, mimeo., September 1976.
6. See reports on Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to ASEAN in Far Eastern
EconomicReview,May 26, 1983.
7. Peter Drysdale, 'Australia's Relations with Asia and the Pacific: Past Perspectives and
FutureProspects," mimeo. (Canberra,1978).
 1292 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1983

8. Noordin Sopiee, "ASEAN and the Pacific Basin Concept: Four Questions and Five
Imperatives,"in Day After Tomorrow in the PacificRegion,1981 (New York, 1981).
9. Han Sung-joo, "Thoughts on the Pacific Community Proposal: A Korean View, in The
PacificCommunityConcept.Viewsfrom Eight Nations (Tokyo:J.C.I.E., 1980), pp. 42-56.
10. Han Sung-joo, "South Korea's Policy Objectives in Southeast Asia," in Melvin Gurtov,
ed., SoutheastAsia in Transition(Seoul, 1977), pp. 214-219.
11. The first PECC (also known as PCC, Pacific Cooperation Conference) was held in
Canberrain 1980 under the auspices of the AustralianNational University. The second
meeting was held in Bangkok in 1982. The third and fourth meetings will be held in Bali,
Indonesia, in November 1983, and in Seoul, Korea, some time in late 1984, respectively.