1. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.

,
G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral
and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections
4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and
2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned
provisions of the Cybercrime Act.

Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications
Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’
constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against
double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure;

• Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for
imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’
right against Double Jeopardy;
• Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause”
to engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of
a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of
communications;
• Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ
to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same
violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon
the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-
protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and
• Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law
increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6
years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts
the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of
DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the said
material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the
 right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased
penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from
access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.

2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this
Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1
par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

ARGUMENTS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
• imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of
online libel will result in two convictions penalized separately under the RP and the
Cybercrime Act; online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of
the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a chilling effect
upon the freedom of speech;
• with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s earlier
threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users who were critical of his
alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive
Health Bill became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to
preclude people such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus
creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of expression;
• gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to
content whether authored by private citizens or the organized press sans any hearing of
any kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article
constitutes online libel;
• respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict
scrutiny

2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
• Persons who commit crimes using information and communication
technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than double the
imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the
Cybercrime Act;
• the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are
absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws which raises the
possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violation of the
Constitution;
• Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through or with
the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause

3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
 • No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the
authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of
Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard except “due
cause” which presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
• While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are
protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals before surveillance operations are
conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in
the Cybercrime Act;
• Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to
privacy;
No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic
data at all times without interruption;
• No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy
of citizens

4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the
Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative Authority
• The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking
of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding without any need for a
judicial determination is in clear violation of petitioners’ Constitutionally protected right
to due process;
• The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be
“judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-related complaints;

Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
• Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications
• Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
• Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data
The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict
computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence – was not in keeping
with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in Section 19 of the
cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC that Section 19
is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final restraint on speech without
prior judicial determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect or record
by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic communication
with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and
services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior affirmative consent from the
recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of the law
to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.
 2. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law
that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the
petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

ISSUES:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is

within the power of Congress to so classify it.

RULING:
1. No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of
law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.

Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
 A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances
left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his
favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.

Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
charged—the element of the offense.

Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission

that “pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is
“two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime,
“ such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder –
 We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of
plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1
par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4
does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only
operated in furtherance of a remedy.

What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

3. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner
cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B.
No.733

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme
or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts
constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be
proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code
to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an
element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed
to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an
animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being.
 There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se.

3. Glora Macapagal Arroyo vs People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and
some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were
granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit
plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then
President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices
and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total
value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail
which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt
against them was strong.
 After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there
was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the
respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by
the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:
Procedural:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial
of the demurrers to evidence.

Substantive:
Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of
plunder: (a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth
in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding
the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?

RULING:
Procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however,
that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory
order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the
conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be
limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that
the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
 convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty
to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

1st Substantive issue:

The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their
collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the
Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express
agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging
conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of
the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude,
etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the
information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of
the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the
crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they
were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of
the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.

Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind
was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10,
2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information
to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to
the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to
be informed of the charges against each of them.
2nd substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least

Php50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten

wealth valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus
delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the
remotest possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been
diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury
(under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to
look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation
of public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim
of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or
phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore,
be modified or restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing
of another’s property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or right
used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs when
“any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all
the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering
that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require
the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires
such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of
raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the
public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
 As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond
reasonable doubt.

4. ROBERTO P. FUENTES v. PEOPLE

GR No. 186421

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Fuentes of violation of Article 3
(e) of RA 3019... refusing for unreasonable length of time, to renew the latter's Business
Permit to engage in Ship Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel without any legal basis
or reason despite the fact that Fe N. Valenzuela has complied with all the requirements
and has been operating the Ship Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel since 1993,
which act caused damage to the perishable ship provisions of Fe N. Valenzuela for M/V
Ace Dragon and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate business thereby causing
damage and prejudice to Fe N. Valenzuela.

Private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is the sole proprietor of

Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple A)... in 2002, Fuentes,
then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A's Business Permit,... nitially, Triple A was
able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said Business Permit by securing
temporary permits with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). However, Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease
and Desist Order... alleging that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug trading.

No Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage of its goods bought
in early 2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited from boarding the said goods to
the vessel due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) the suspension of its operations from
2002 to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally issued in Triple A's favor.

The Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and
ordered to pay Valenzuela the amount of P200,000.00 as nominal damages.

The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution had established all the elements of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, considering that: (a) Fuentes was admittedly the
Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time relevant to the case; (b) he singled out Valenzuela's
Triple A despite the fact that the rumors relative to the illegal smuggling and drug-
 related activities covered all ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel; (c) he still
refused to approve Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A even though she had
already secured clearances not only from the other offices of the LGU, but from the PNP
itself, exculpating her from any illegal activities; and (d) as a result of Fuentes's acts,
Valenzuela was unable to operate her ship chandling business through Triple A, thus,
causing her undue injury

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime of violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

RULING:
The Court is convinced that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime
charged, as will be explained hereunder.

As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to
suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 16[23] and
444 (b) (3) (iv)[24] of the Local Government Code as an incident of his power to issue
the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke
is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to
refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance.
In the exercise of these powers, the mayor must observe due process in that it must
afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.

Finally, the Court deems it proper to modify the award of damages in Valenzuela's favor.
To recapitulate, the Sandiganbayan awarded her P200,000.00 as nominal damages
occasioned by Fuentes's non-issuance of a Business Permit to Triple A. As defined under
Article 2221[28] of the Civil Code, nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right
is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown."[29] In
this case, however, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to
the suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was
not proven with certainty. Thus, the award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is
proper. The Court's pronouncement in Evangelista v. Spouses Andolong[30] is relevant
on this matter:

Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc.

temperate damages were rightly awarded because plaintiff suffered a loss, although
definitive proof of its amount cannot be presented as the photographs produced as
evidence were deemed insufficient.
 Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation... temperate damages were also
awarded wherein respondent's goods did not reach the Pepsi Cola Plant at Muntinlupa
City as a result of the negligence of petitioner in conducting its trucking and hauling
services, even if the amount of the pecuniary loss had not been proven.

Given these findings, we are of the belief that temperate and not nominal damages
should have been awarded, considering that it has been established that respondent
herein suffered a loss, even if the amount thereof cannot be proven with certainty.

Consequently, in computing the amount of temperate or moderate damages, it is

usually left to the discretion of the courts, but the amount must be reasonable, bearing
in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than
compensatory.

Principles:

As defined under Article 2221[28] of the Civil Code, nominal damages are "recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced
no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown."

In this case, however, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to the
suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was not proven
with certainty. Thus, the award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is proper.

under Article 2224 [of the Civil Code], temperate or moderate damages may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.

The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages under Article 2224,
makes the following comment:In some States of the American Union, temperate damages are
allowed. There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance,
injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show
with certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should
be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff
should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.
 5. RAQUIL-ALI M. LUCMAN, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SANDIGANBAYAN 2ND DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Lucman of violation of Section
3 (c) of RA 3019, the accusatory portion of which states:

On 8 September 2009 to 16 October 2009, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in

General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, RACQUIL-ALI M. LUCMAN, a public officer being then the OIC-
Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region XII, committing the offense in relation to and in abuse of his office, did then and
there [willfully], unlawfully, and criminally request for himself the amount of Two
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) from Sergio Balolong, Aladin
Saydala, and Hadji Abdulwahid D. Bualan, and actually receive the amount of One
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the said parties, in
consideration for the assistance of accused Lucman in the investigation, processing, and
approval of the aforementioned parties' application over two (2) parcels of alienable
and disposable public lands located at Brgys. Olympog and Tambler, General Santos
City.

The prosecution alleged that sometime in August 2009, private complainants Hadji
Abdulwahid D. Bualan (Bualan), Sergio Balolong (Balolong), and Aladin Saydala (Saydala;
collectively, private complainants) went to the office of Lucman, then the Officer-in-
Charge (OIC)-Regional Executive Director (RED) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII, to discuss with the latter their intended
applications for the issuance of Free Patent title. During the said meeting, Lucman
allegedly demanded Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) from
them as consideration for the grant of their applications. Private complainants acceded
but asked to pay in installments. Subsequently, on September 4, 2009, Bualan applied
for Free Patents on behalf of Balolong and Saydala before the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of General Santos City. On September 8, 2009,
Lucman called up Bualan and demanded Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
part of their agreement, as the former needed the money for his trip to Manila.
Complying with Lucman's demand, Bualan proceeded to Tambler International Airport
where he gave Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Lucman's driver for
which the latter signed a cash voucher. Thereafter, Bualan regularly followed up their
applications with Lucman, but the latter told him to wait for two (2) to three (3) months
for approval. On October 16, 2009, Lucman again called up Bualan and told him to go to
the house of Balolong for the payment of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). Thereat,
Balolong allegedly issued a check worth One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for which
Lucman signed a check voucher. However, despite the payment of a total of One Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00), their applications remained pending.
 Thus, private complainants filed a joint complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of General Santos City.

Pleading "not guilty" to the charge, Lucman denied demanding and receiving money from
private complainants for and in consideration of the approval of their Free Patent applications.
He claimed that Bualan merely wanted to destroy his honor and integrity. He further claimed
that Bualan's testimony cannot be given any weight since it was not corroborated either by
other witnesses or by supporting documents.

The SB Ruling

In a Decision dated March 9, 2018, the SB found Lucman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of six (6) years and one (1) month with perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

The SB found that the prosecution had established all the elements for violation of Section 3 (c)
of RA 3019, considering that: (a) Lucman was the OIC-RED of the DENR, Region XII at the time of
the commission of the offense; (b) as the OIC-RED, he had authority to grant applications for
Free Patent, such as the ones applied for by private complainants; (c) he demanded Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) and actually received One Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) from private complainants; and (d) the amount was for and in
consideration of the grant of such applications.

Aggrieved, Lucman moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution[19]
dated April 23, 2018; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SB correctly convicted Lucman for the crime of violation of Section 3
(c) of RA 3019.

RULING:
The petition is without merit. Section 3 (c) of RA 3019 states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or
material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public
officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given,
without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
 As may be gleaned from above, the elements of the crime charged are as follows: (1)
the offender is a public officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or
obtain, for a person any government permit or license; (3) he directly or indirectly
requested or received from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit for himself or for another; and (4) he requested or received the gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help given or to be given.

After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the SB correctly
convicted Lucman for violating Section 3 (c) of RA 3019. It is undisputed that Lucman
was a public officer at the time the offense was committed, then being the OIC-RED of
the DENR, Region XII. As the OIC-RED, he had the authority to grant applications for Free
Patents, such as the ones filed by private complainants. It was likewise established
through the testimony of Bualan and the evidence on record that Lucman demanded
Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) and actually received One
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) from private complainants, and
that these amounts were for and in consideration of the grant of their applications.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn the SB's findings, as there
is no showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts
and circumstances of this case, and considering further the fact that it was in the best
position to assess and determine the credibility of the parties' witnesses. As such,
Lucman's conviction for violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 3019 must stand.

As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Lucman, Section 9 (a) of RA 3019, as

amended, states that the prescribed penalties for a violation of the said crime includes,
inter alia, imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month to fifteen (15)
years and perpetual disqualification from public office. Taking into consideration the
provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which states that "in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by
the Revised Penal Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a
minimum term, which shall not be less than the minimum term of imprisonment
provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum term which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed law," the Court deems it proper to modify Lucman's sentence to
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as
minimum, to nine (9) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6. Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals, et al
G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016
FACTS:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with
the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain
bank deposits and investments, including related accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the
supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of
his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the
Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.

From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank
accounts, including accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente
Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article
published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank
Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow
the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law
office where a family member was once a partner.

xx xx
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza
Mendoza & Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former
partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe
of Binay 's assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting
the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB.
Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional
examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and
prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering Act is
unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any
notice to the affected party: (1) It violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It
violates the person's right to privacy.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.
2. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.
3. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy
enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

RULINGS:
1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA
providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits
and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical
seizure of property involved at that stage.

In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order
under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits
and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form
of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order
authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking
institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property
deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but
are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and
transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected
under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder.
Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the
instance of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary
cooperation and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank
deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical
seizure of the targeted corporeal property.

2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in
Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint with either the
DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage by the
Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be
furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's
constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of probable
cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed and does
not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents during the pre-trial or even during trial.
 Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of
possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts
allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-
judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order,
cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the

constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's
ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents
and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general
warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client
privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering
offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing
arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into
certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before
a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of
preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:
The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for
bank inquiry order; The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable
cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 of the AMLA; A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is
preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account which court
order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such
related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and The
authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related
accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the
bank account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative
discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC,
and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such
governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we
specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for information concerning
the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte
application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank
deposits and investments.
 7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BOLANTE
G.R. No. 186717

FACTS:
In April 2005, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) submitted to the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) a series of suspicious transaction reports involving the
accounts of Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), Molugan Foundation (Molugan), and
Assembly of Gracious Samaritans, Inc. (AGS).

According to the reports, LIVECOR transferred to Molugan a total amount of' ₱172.6
million in a span of 15 months from 2004 to 2005. On 30 April 2004, LIVECOR
transferred ₱40 million to AGS, which received another P38 million from Molugan on
the same day. Curiously, AGS returned the P38 million to Molugan also on the same day.

The transactions were reported '"suspicious" because they had no underlying legal or
trade obligation, purpose or economic justification; nor were they commensurate to the
business or financial capacity of Molugan and AGS, which were both lowly capitalized at
P50, 000 each. In the case of Molugan, Samuel S. Bombeo, who holds the position of
president, secretary and treasurer, is the lone signatory to the account. In the case of
AGS, Samuel S. Bombeo shares this responsibility with Ariel Panganiban.

On 7 March 2006, the Senate furnished the AMLC a copy of its Committee Report No. 54
prepared by the Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations.

Committee Report No. 54 narrated that former Undersecretary of Agriculture Jocelyn I.

Bolante (Bolante) requested the Department of Budget and Management to release to
the Department of Agriculture the amount of ₱728 million for the purchase of farm
inputs under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program. This amount was used to
purchase liquid fertilizers from Freshan Philippines, Inc., which were then distributed to
local government units and congressional districts beginning January 2004. Based on the
Audit Report prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), the use of the funds was
characterized by massive irregularities, overpricing, and violations of the procurement
law and wanton wastage of scarce government resources.

The AMLC issued Resolution No.75 finding probable cause to believe that the accounts
of LIVECOR, Molugan and AGS - the subjects of the suspicious transaction reports
submitted by PNB - were related to what became known as the "fertilizer fund scam.
The acts involved in the "fertilizer scam" may constitute violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, x x x as well as violation or Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder).

Thus, the AMLC authorized the filing of a petition for the issuance of an order allowing
an inquiry into the six accounts 18 of LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS, Samuel S. Bombeo and
Ariel Panganiban. The AMLC also required all covered institutions to submit reports of
covered transactions and/or suspicious transactions of these entities and individuals,
including all the related web of accounts.

Petition was filed ex parte before the R TC and docketed as AMLC SP Case No. 06-003.
On 17 November 2006, the trial court found probable cause and issued the Order
prayed for. It allowed the AMLC to inquire into and examine the six bank deposits or
investments and the related web of accounts.

In view of this development, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 40.27 It authorized the
filing of a petition for the issuance of a freeze order against the 70 accounts found to be
related to the fertilizer fund scam. Hence, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Petition
docketed as CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 before the CA, seeking the issuance of a freeze
order against the 70 accounts.

The CA issued a freeze order effective for 20 days. The freeze order required the
covered institutions of the 70 accounts to desist from and not allow any transaction
involving the identified monetary instruments. It also asked the covered institutions to
submit a detailed written return to the CA within 24 hours from receipt of the freeze
order.

The CA conducted a summary hearing of the application, after which the parties were
ordered to submit their memoranda, manifestations and comments/oppositions. The
freeze order was later extended for a period of 30 days until 19 August 2008.

Finding that there existed probable cause that the funds transferred to and juggled by
LIVECOR, Molugan, and AGS formed pati of the ₱728 million fertilizer fund, the CA
extended the effectivity of the freeze order for another four months, or until 20
December 2008. The extension covered only 31 accounts, which showed an existing
balance based on the returns of the covered institutions.

In the meantime, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Application docketed as AMLC Case No.
07-001 before the RTC. Drawing on the authority provided by the AMLC through
Resolution No. 90, the ex parte application sought the issuance of an order allowing an
inquiry into the 70 accounts.

The RTC found probable cause and issued the Order prayed for. It allowed the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the 70 bank deposits or investments and the related web of
accounts.

Hence, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex Parte Petition docketed as CA-G.R. AMLC No.
00024 before the CA seeking the issuance of a freeze order against the 24 accounts.

In the Resolution dated 4 February 2009, the CA issued a freeze order effective for 20
days. The freeze order required the covered institutions of the 24 accounts to desist
 from and not allow any transaction involving the identified monetary instruments. It
also asked the covered institutions to submit a detailed written return to the CA within
24 hours from receipt of the freeze order.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Republic committed forum shopping in filing CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024
before the CA.
2. Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there exists no
probable cause to allow an inquiry into the total of 76 deposits and investments of
respondents.

RULING:
Yes. The Republic committed forum shopping. As we ruled in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co, forum shopping is committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, where the previous case has not
yet been resolved (the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, where the previous case
has finally been resolved (the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes
of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

While it is true that a previous freeze order was issued in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014
covering some of the accounts subject of CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024, CA-G.R. AAILC No.
00014 had already attained finality when the second petition was filed, neither
petitioner nor any of the respondents interposed an appeal therefrom, pursuant to
Section 57 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil F01feiture, etc.

We are not even sure where the Republic got the notion that the CA found "that the
filing of the second petition for freeze order constitutes forum shopping on the ground
of litis pendentia. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court aptly cited Quinsay v.
CA, stating that "forum shopping concurs not only when a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis pendentia are
present."

Rule 10.2 of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9160, as
Amended by Republic Act No. 9194, defined probable cause as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to
believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is
being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or
property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful
activity and/or money laundering offense.
 Section 11, itself requires that it be established that "there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities," and it obviously is the court
which stands as arbiter whether there is indeed such probable cause. The process of
inquiring into the existence of probable cause would involve the function of
determination reposed on the trial court.

For the trial court to issue a bank inquiry order, it is necessary for the AMLC to be able
to show specific facts and circumstances that provide a link between an unlawful activity
or a money laundering offense, on the one hand, and the account or monetary
instrument or property sought to be examined on the other hand. In this case, the R TC
found the evidence presented by the AMLC wanting. For its part, the latter insists that
the RTC's determination was tainted with grave abuse of discretion for ignoring the
glaring existence of probable cause that the subject bank deposits and investments
were related to an unlawful activity.

It was this excerpt that led the AMLC to connect the fertilizer fund scam to the
suspicious transaction reports earlier submitted to it by PNB. However, the R TC found
during trial that respondent Bolante had ceased to be a member of the board of
trustees of LIVECOR for 14 months before the latter even made the initial transaction,
which was the subject of the suspicious transaction reports. Furthermore, the RTC took
note that according to the Audit Report submitted by the Commission on Audit, no part
of the P728 million fertilizer fund was ever released to LIVECOR.

We note that in the RTC Order dated 17 November 2006 in AMLC SP Case No. 06-003,
the AMLC was already allowed ex parte to inquire into and examine the six bank
deposits or investments and the related web of accounts of LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS,
Samuel S. Bombeo and Ariel Panganiban.

With the resources available to the AMLC, coupled with a bank inquiry order granted 15
months before Eugenio was even promulgated, the AMLC should have been able to
obtain more evidence establishing a more substantive link tying Bolante and the
fertilizer fund scam to LIVECOR. It did not help that the AMLC failed to include in its
application for a bank inquiry order in AMLC SP Case No. 06-003 LIVECOR's PNB account
as indicated in the suspicious transaction reports. This PNB account was included only in
the application for a bank inquiry order in AMLC Case No. 07-001.

As it stands, the evidence relied upon by the AMLC in 2006 was still the same evidence it
used to apply for a bank inquiry order in 2008. Regrettably, this evidence proved to be
insufficient when weighed against that presented by the respondents, who were given
notice and the opportunity to contest the issuance of the bank inquiry order pursuant to
Eugenio. In fine, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
application.
 8. ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 151258

FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). Hazing was pre-requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had
undergone the process. After the initiation, Lenny’s condition worsened due to the
blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead
on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the
accused (Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was
reduced to crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor
by the Court of Appeals. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of
the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they should be liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide instead.

In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the
decision of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their
criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable
sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Hence, they
have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications for Probation for which
the terms therein are already been complied with.

ISSUE:
Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of
conviction?

HELD:
Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no
jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law requires
that an application for probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and
sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin (Branch 121). Hence, its grant of
probation with Tecson et. al. is void.

However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have
appealed their conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs.
People that the Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
 through no fault of his. Had the RTC done what was right and imposed the correct
penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover, the Court was
quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.

9. DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 209464

FACTS:
On January 14, 2006, at around 3:20am, Marlon Villanueva was brought to the
emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital by two men. Dr Masilungan, the
attending physician, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no
hearbeat. He tried to revive the patient for about 15 to 30 minutes but the latter did not
respond to the resuscitation and was later pronounced dead. He also noticed big
contusion hematoma on the face and several injuries on the patient’s arms and leg.
After pulling down, Villanueva’s pants, he saw large contusions on both legs and thighs..
Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the Medico-Legal officer, opined, based on the
nature, extent and location of the injuries, that Villanueva was a victim of hazing.

The two men who brought Villanueva were later identified as Dandy Dungo and
Gregorio Sibal Jr. They were later found out to be members of Alpha Phi Omega- Theta
Chapter and that Villanueva and two (2) others were neophytes of Alpha Phi Omega –
Theta Chapter and were in the process of their final initiation rites. On February 7, 2006,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed information for the violation
of RA 8049 or the anti-hazing law against Dungo and Sibal Jr before the Regional Trial
Court. The prosecutor presented several witnesses to prove the presence of the accused
in the initiation rites.

The prosecution argued that under RA 8049, mere presence in the hazing creates a
prima facie evidence of participation therein and when added with circumstantial
evidences is enough to convict the accused as principals in the crime of hazing.

On the other hand, the defense argued that the accused were not present during the
initiation rites and thus did not directly and actively participate in the initiation rites. The
trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of R.A.
8049 and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate
court affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the disputable presumption of participation under Section 4 of RA 8049 is
unconstitutional for violation of the right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence is enough to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:
1. No. The Court ruled that a finding of prima facie evidence does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys, because before prima facie evidence arises,
certain facts have still to be proven. The trial court cannot depend alone on such
evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the
weak defense the latter may adduce. In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the
petitioners' participation in the hazing because of their presence in the venue. As
correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at Villa
Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio, a prosecution witness.
She testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store. The
prosecution indubitably established the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing.
Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their actual participation in the hazing of
Villanueva.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was
shown that they performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of
hazing. Not only did they induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners
also actually participated in it based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are
sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.

Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the
criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence
during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

2. Yes. The Court ruled that while proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence
when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable just like in the
present case. The crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Bearing in mind the
concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper to resort to the presentation of
circumstantial evidence to prove it. However, in order to sustain a conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence, it requires the following requisites: 1) There
are more than one circumstance; 2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and 3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused. The circumstances must be established to form an unbroken
 chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the
authors of the crime.

In support of the convictions, below are the facts detailed by the CA and cited by the SC
-

1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate

Joey Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, [UPLB student Gay
Czarina] Sunga was staying at their tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three
men were seated two meters way from her. She identified two of the men as appellants
Sibal and Dungo, while she did not know the third man. The three men were wearing
black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology
wing arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the
victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the
two fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He
later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant
Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him
why he did not report to him when he was just at the, tambayan. Dungo then
continuously punched the victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just
kept quiet with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards
the Entomology wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the
evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the
initiation right. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, [nearby sari-sari
store owner] Susan Ignacio saw more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa
Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney. She estimated the ages of these persons to be
between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons riding a single motorcycle likewise
arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort
who looked like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these
persons went to her store to buy some items. She did not know their names but could
identity [sic] their faces. After she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the
man later identified as Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the man later
identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified
that around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for
passengers at the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and
told him that someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort
and asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the
body of the man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like
a vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal
Hospital and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad
and hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the
emergency room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an arm's
length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the passengers thereof as
appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the passengers unload a
body inside the tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two men for identification cards. The latter replied
that they did not bring with them any I.D. or wallet. Instead of giving their true names,
the appellants listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y
Lanzon and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling
them that they secretly called the police to report the incident which was their standard
operating procedure when a dead body was brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency
room, observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the
latter did not respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan
noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several
injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already
cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on
both legs which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial
portion or the back of the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined
that he was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having
undergone hazing when he was a student and also because of his experience treating
victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV,
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on
the cadaver of the victim on January 14 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt
head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of
the two (2) persons whose deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons
sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of their body, particularly
on the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons died of brain
hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr.
Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those
two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and contusions on his body,
he opined that these injuries were hazing-related.