MANILA LAW COLLEGE

CASE OUTLINE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Judge Ma. Socorro A. Vista

First Semester 2019 – 2020

VI. Structure and Powers of Government

A. The Legislative Branch

 Article VI, Philippine Constitution

 Macias vs Comelec, 3 SCRA 1
 Banat vs Comelec, GR 179271, April 21, 2009
 Ang Ladlad vs Comelec, GR 190582, April 8, 2010
 Walden Bello vs Comelec GR 191998, December 7, 2010
 Atong Paglaum vs Comelec, GR 203766, April 2, 2013
 Aquino vs Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)
 Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona, G.R. 134577, November 18, 1998
 Avelino vs Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
 De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002
 Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 732 (1991)
 Codilla vs De Venecia, G.R. 150605, December 10, 2002
 Cunanan vs Tan, 5 SCRA 1 (1962)
 Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014
 Belgica vs Ochoa, G.R. 208566, November 19, 2013
 ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
 Tan vs Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000)
 Lung Center vs QC, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004
 Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455, October 30, 1995
 Bengzon vs Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
 Senate vs Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006
 Neri vs Senate Committee GR 180643, September 4, 2008
 Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

C. Executive Department

 Article VII, Philippine Constitution

 Republic vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, July 15, 2003
 Estrada vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
 Dela Cruz vs COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001
 Marcos vs Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760
 Soriano vs Lista GR 153881, March 24, 2003
 Pimentel vs Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005
  Constantino vs Cuisia, GR No. 106064, October 13, 2005
 Gudani vs Senga, GR No 170165, August 15, 2006
 Gloria vs CA, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000
 Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014
 Saguisag vs Ochoa, GR No. 212426, January 12, 2016
 Lagman vs Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017
 Lagman vs Senate President GR No. 235935, February 6, 2018

D. The Judicial Department

 Republic vs Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

 Miranda vs Aguirre, G.R. No 133064, September 16, 1999
 MMDA vs Jancom, GR 147465, April 10, 2002
 Tirol vs COA, GR No. 133954, August 3, 2000
 Cruz vs DENR, GR 135385, December 6, 2000
 Martinez vs CA, GR 123547, May 21, 2001
 Aguirre vs Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036 (2003)
 In RE: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (1989)
 De La Llana vs Alba 122 SCRA 291

E. Constitutional Commissions
 Cayetano vs Monsod, GR 100113, September 3, 1991
 Gaminde vs COA, GR No. 140335, December 13, 2000
 Brillantes vs Yorac, GR No. 93867, December 18, 1990
 CSC vs DBM, GR 158791, July 22, 2005
 Sarmiento vs COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307
 Ambil vs Comelec GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000

1. The CSC
 Camporedondo vs NLRC, GR No. 129049, August 6, 1999
 General vs Roco, GR No. 143366, January 29, 2001
 CSC vs Salas, GR 123708, June 19, 1997
 Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No. 159940, February 16,
2005
 Vistan vs Nicolas 201 SCRA 524
 Domingo vs Zamora, GR 142283, February 6, 2003
 Office of the President vs. Buenaobra, GR 170021, September 8,
2006
 Central Bank vs CSC, G.R. No. 80455-456, April 10, 1989 (171
SCRA 744)

2. The COMELEC
 Brillantes vs Comelec, GR 163193, June 15, 2004
 Sandoval vs Comelec, GR 133842, January 26, 2000
 Al Haj vs Comelec, GR No. 151046, February 5, 2002
  Guevarra vs Comelec, 104 Phil 269
 Jaramilla vs Comelec, GR No, 155717, October 23, 2003
 Baytan vs Comelec, GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003
 Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR 222731,
March 8, 2016

3. The COA
 DBP vs COA, 231 SCRA 202
 Bustamante vs COA, 216 SCRA 164
 DBP vs COA, GR No. 88435, January 16, 2002

4. Sandiganbayan
 PD 1606
 Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433

5. Ombudsman
 Roxas vs Vasquez, GR No. 114944, June 19, 2001
 People vs Velez, GR No. 138093, February 19, 2003
 Ledesma vs CA GR No. 161629, July 29, 2005
 Ombudsman vs Madriaga, GR No. 164316, September 27, 2006

6. Office of the Special Prosecutor

 Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988
 Vicente Orap vs Sandiganbayan, L-50508-11, October 11, 1985,
139 SCRA 252

7. National Commissions
 Carino vs CHR, GR 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483
 Canonizado vs Aguirre, GR No. 133132, February 15, 2001

_______________________________
A. The Legislative Branch

 Article VI, Philippine Constitution

 Macias vs Comelec, 3 SCRA 1
 Banat vs Comelec, GR 179271, April 21, 2009
 Ang Ladlad vs Comelec, GR 190582, April 8, 2010
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the rules of Court, files by Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party against the resolutions of the COMELEC dated November
11, 2009. The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit ang ladlad
as a party-list organization under Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-list System Act.

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as Lesbian’s as Lesbian, Hays, Bisexuals of Transgendered
individuals.
Ang ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 which was
denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
In August 2009, the aboved-mentioned party again filed a petition for
registration with the COMELEC. On November 2009 afteradmittingthe
oetitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC, 2nd Division dismissed the petition on
moral grounds, stating that the LGBT sector makes it ckear that the petitioner
tolerate immorality which offends religious beliefs, even siting bible verses from
the book of Genesis about the fall of soddom and Gamorah. Apparently they
tolerate acts against legal provisions such as Art. 695 of the Civil Code and the
immoral doctrines of the Revised Penal Code.

On January 2010, ang ladlad filed another petition, praying that the Court annul
the assailed resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant ang ladlad’s
application for accreditation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad party should be accredited as party—list

organization.

RULING:

The petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 are hereby SET-
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections was directed to GRANT petitioners
application for party-list accreditation.

 Walden Bello vs Comelec GR 191998, December 7, 2010

 Atong Paglaum vs Comelec, GR 203766, April 2, 2013
 Aquino vs Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)
 Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona, G.R. 134577, November 18, 1998
 Avelino vs Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
 De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002
 Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 732 (1991)
 Codilla vs De Venecia, G.R. 150605, December
10, 2002
FACTS :
 Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. (Petitioner) was the mayor of Ormoc City,
while Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (Respondent) was the incumbent
Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte;
 Codilla and Locsin were both candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte on the 2001, May
14 elections.
 On May 8, 2001, a certain JOSEPHINE DELA CRUZ, a registered
voter of Kananga, Leyte FILED directly with the COMELEC Main
Office a Petition for Disqualification against Codilla.
 At the day of elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director
(RED) HAD YET TO HEAR the disqualification case. Codilla was
included in the list of candidates for District Representative and even
WON the candidacy.
 On May 16, 2001, a “Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation”
was filed by Locsin, wherein, a copy of Motion was allegedly served to
 Codilla by registered mail but NO REGISTRY RECEIPT was
attached. Followed by a “Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation” on May 18. 2001.
 On May 18, 2001, COMELEC 2ND Division issued an Ex Parte Order
directing Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to SUSPEND THE
PROCLAMATION of Codilla.
 On May 24, 2001, Codilla was able to file an ANSWER to the Petition
for his Disqualification with the RED, alleging that:
a. He has not received the summons together with the copy of petition;
a. He became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by
COMELEC 2nd Div. informing him that a petition was filed against him;
b. He obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional
Office No. 8 at his own instance; and
c. That the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads of
the municipality of MATAG-OB and KANANGA alleged by
JOSEPHINE DELA CRUZ were UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT HIS
CONSENT

 On May 25, 2001, Codilla filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.

 On June 15, 2001, Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th Leg. District of Leyte. On June 18, she took
Oath, and on June 30, She assumed office.
 On June 20, 2001, Codilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Div. which ordered his disqualification.
 On August 29, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a
“Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes” reversing the resolution of
the 2nd Division and declaring the proclamation of Locsin as NULL
and VOID.
 Locsin relied on the opinion of the HOR Executive Director and Chief
Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III, that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of Locsin for she had taken her
oath, leaving it to under the authority of the HRET.
 On September 4, 2001, Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to
the HOR during its regular session, DECLARING “That she will not
only DISREGARD but will openly DEFY the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution ordering her to vacate her position.”
 On September 12, 2001, Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers as duly elected Representative and took his Oath of
Office.
 On September 20, 2001, A copy of COMELEC En Banc resolution was
received by the HOR, yet, “NO ACTION WAS TAKEN”
 On October 30, 2001, Speaker JDV, then recognized the finality of the
COMELEC en banc decision, however, considering the stand of Locsin
deters the house’s liberty to take action. And it would be best if it
would be adjudicated by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC 2nd
Division is valid;
ii. Whether said proclamation of Locsin divested the COMELEC En Banc
of jurisdiction to review its validity; and
iii. Whether or not it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize Codillo as the legal elected representative of the 4th
Legislative District of Leyte.
RULING:
i. The proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void:
1. Codillo was denied due process during the entire proceedings;
2. The votes cast in favor of the Codillo cannot be considered “Stray”
and Locsin cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.

ii. There is no merit in this contentions.

1. The validity of Locsin’s proclamation was a core issue in the
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
a. Citing that the COMELEC 2nd Division erred in its decision
b. COMELEC En Banc was NOT DIVESTED of jurisdiction.
The said order of the 2nd Division was yet
UNENFORCEABLE as it has not attained finality.
2. It is HRET which has NO jurisdiction in the instant case.
a. The issue on the validity of the resolution of the COMELEC
2nd Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC En
Banc.
b. The instant case does not involve the election and
qualification of Locsin.

iii. The administration of Oath and Registration of the Petitioner in the

Roll of Members of the HOR is NO LONGER a matter of discretion on
the part of the Respondents, facts were already settled:
1. Codillo garnered 71,350 while Locsin got 53,447 votes;
2. COMELEC En Banc set aside the order of the 2nd Division and
ordered the proclamation of Codillo;
3. COMELEC En Banc, being a Constitutional body has jurisdiction
on the matter.

 Cunanan vs Tan, 5 SCRA 1 (1962)

PER CURIAM:

Gentlemen:

For your information and guidance, the resolution of this Court on even date is
quoted below:

In Civil Case G.R. No. L-19721 "Carlos Cunanan vs. Jorge Tan, Jr." the 
facts are:

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan — who claims to be a career employee, with

more than thirty (30) years in the government service — was, on June 6 or
8, 1961, appointed by the President of the Philippines as acting Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thereupon, he qualified and assumed
the duties and functions of said office. On November 6, 1961, the
President extended to him an ad interim  appointment as Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On April 3, 1962, six (6) Senators and
seven (7) members of the House of Representatives, purporting to act as
the Commission on Appointments, rejected said ad interim appointment.
On April 11, 1962, respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was designated by the
President as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
performed the function of said office, without the consent of petitioner
 herein. Hence, soon thereafter, or on April 27, 1962, petitioner commenced
the present quo warranto proceeding against respondent, contending that
the latter's designation is invalid, the office of Deputy Administrator of
the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, not being vacant when he was designated thereto, because the
aforesaid rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment is invalid for
several reasons.

When the first session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines opened on
January 22, 1962, the members of the Senate were evenly divided into two
(2) groups: there were twelve (12) Senators affiliated with the Liberal
Party, on the one hand, and on the other were twelve (12) Senators
affiliated with the Nacionalista Party and Nationalist-Citizens' Party.
Hence, the Senate has been unable to elect a new Senate President, and
Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., who was President of the Senate during
the immediately preceding Congress, continued to hold said office in an
acting capacity. The House of Representatives, consisting of seventy-two
(72) members affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, twenty-nine (29)
affiliated with the Liberal Party and one (1) not affiliated with any
political party, elected Congressman Daniel F. Romualdez as Speaker of
said chamber.

In due course, the Commission on Appointments was constituted

pursuant to the Constitution, on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties in each House of Congress, as follows:

On the Part of the Senate

Nacionalista Party Liberal Party

Hon. Alejandro Almendras
Hon. Fernando Lopez
Hon. Genaro Magsaysay
Hon. Cipriano Primicias
Hon. Jose Roy
Hon. Gil J. Puyat
Hon. Eulogio Balao
Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco
Hon. Ferdinand Marcos
Hon. Camilo Osias
Hon. Francisco (Soc)
Rodrigo
Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa

On the Part of the House of Representatives

Nacionalista Party Liberal Party

Hon. Jose M. Aldeguer Hon. Eladio T. Balite
Hon. Wenceslao R. Lagumbay Hon. Manuel T. Cases
Hon. Felix A. Fuentebella Hon. Floro Crisologo
Hon. Rodolfo Ganzon Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas
Hon. Agustin Gatuslao
Hon. Rasid Lucman
Hon. Apolonio V. Marasigan
Hon. Maximo Noel

On March 21, 1962, by the vote of twenty-nine (29) Congressmen affiliated with
the Liberal Party and twenty-five (25) Congressmen affiliated with the
Nacionalista Party, forming what is commonly known as the "Allied Majority,"
declared vacant the seats of the twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives in the Commission of Appointments and re-elected, as members
thereof for said Chamber, its former representatives in said Commission, except
Congressmen Ganzon, Lucman and Lagumbay, in lieu of whom said "Allied
Majority" elected Congressmen Jose Alberto, Reynaldo Honrado and Jose
Cojuangco, Jr. although still affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, these three (3)
Congressmen form part of the "Allied Majority". The members of Congress who
took part in the alleged session of the Commission on Appointments on April 3,
1962, and rejected the ad interim appointment of petitioner herein were:

(a) Six (6) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, namely: Hon. Eulogio
Balao, Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco, Hon. Ferdinand Marcos, Hon. Camilo
Osias, Hon. Francisco (Soc) Rodrigo, Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa;

(b) Four (4) Congressmen affiliated with the same party, to wit: Hon.
Eladio T. Balite, Hon. Manuel T. Cases, Hon. Floro Crisologo, and Hon.
Gerardo M. Roxas; and

(c) Three (3) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, but
identified with the 'Allied Majority': Hon. Jose Alberto, Hon. Reynaldo
Honrado and Hon. Jose Cojuangco Jr.

Was the rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment by the aforementioned

thirteen (13) members of Congress, purporting to act as the Commission on
Appointments, valid or not? The determination of this issue depends upon: (1)
the legality of the resolution of the House of Representatives of March 21, 1962,
declaring the seats of its twelve (12) members in the Commission on
Appointments vacant; and (2) the legality of the action of the House of
Representatives in reconstituting the membership of the Commission on
Appointments for said House. In view of the conclusion we have reached with
respect to the first question, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the second
question.

With respect to the first question, we hold that the same should be resolved in
the negative. The Commission on Appointments is it creature of the Constitution.
Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission
is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from
Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of
Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in
nature. In order that the members of the Commission could properly discharge
their duties as such, it is essential that their tenure therein be provided with a
certain measure of stability to insure the necessary freedom of action.1äwphï1.ñët

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be
a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve
(12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House,
respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL
PARTIES THEREIN", necessarily connotes the authority of each House of
Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial
organization of the Commission, but, also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of
successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion
from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with
another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in
the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare
vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held
by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by
the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
One thing, however, is to take these measures owing to changes of permanent
character in the representation of the political parties in the House, and another
thing for some members thereof affiliated with a political party to make common
cause in certain matters with members of the House belonging to another
political party. In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the
formation of the so-called "Allied Majority", does not suffice to authorize a
reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise,
the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes
shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution
could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the
Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.

We are aware of the statements made on the floor of our Constitutional

Convention indicating the opinion of some officers thereof or delegates thereto
that members of the Commission on Appointments were to serve at the pleasure
of the legislature. It should be noted, however, that said statements were made
with reference to the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly,
the unicameral legislature under our original Constitution. The statements did
not refer and do not necessarily apply to the Commission on Appointments
under the present Constitution, as amended, for we now have a bicameral
Congress, both Houses of which are represented in the Commission on
Appointments. If a House of Congress were free, at any time, to declare vacant
the position of its members in the Commission on Appointments, such House
could, in effect, paralyze the entire Commission, without the consent of the other
House. Such possibility could not have been countenanced by the Constitutional
Convention.

In his amended petition petitioner alleges that on April 27, 1962, his ad
interim appointment was confirmed by the "legitimate" Commission on
Appointments, in a meeting said to have been presided over by its chairman ex
oficio, Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., and attended by six (6) Senators — namely.
Senators Almendras, Lopez, Magsaysay, Primicias, Roy and Puyat — and eight
(8) Congressmen — namely, Congressmen Aldeguer, Lagumbay, Fuentebella,
Ganzon, Gatuslao, Lucman, Marasigan and Noel. Respondent has denied such
allegation, but this cannot affect our foregoing view.

Without prejudice to an extended decision later on, the Court holds, therefore,
that the resolution of the House of Representatives of March 21, 1962, declining
vacant the seats of the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in
the Commission on Appointments and appointing others in lieu of some of them,
as well as the rejection of the ad interim  appointment of petitioner by thirteen (13)
alleged members of the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized, and
the designation of respondent Jorge Tan, Jr., as Acting Deputy Administrator of
the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, on April 16, 1962, when said office was not vacant, are null and void;
that petitioner is entitled to hold said office; and that respondent should vacate
the same and turn it over to petitioner, with costs against said respondent.

Mr. Justice Padilla voted to dismiss the petition, upon the ground that the
effectivity of petitioner's ad interim appointment expired on December 30, 1961,
for the reasons given in his concurring opinion in Aytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-
18313 (January 19, 1962).

Yours truly,
(SGD.) PAULINO S. MARQUEZ
Clerk of Court

 Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014

FACTS:

Senator Jinggoy Estrada in his privilege speech revealed that some senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 million as “incentive” for
voting in favour of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Secretary
Florencio Abad then made a public statement in response, explaining that the
funds released to the Senators were part of the Disbursement Acceleration
program (DAP). The Department od Budget Management released the sources of
the DAP and its legal bases that includes: (1) Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; (2) Section 49 and 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Executive Order
No. 292; and (3) General Appropriation Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP were filed to the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP.

ISSUES:

1. Whether DAP violates Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

2. Whether DAP, NBC No. 541 and all other executive issuances
implementing the DAP violate Sec, 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution

RULING:

The DAP does not violate Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court agreed with the OSG’s position, that no law was necessaryfor the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor
an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of
prioritizingspending and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of authority
of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully served.

However, the DAP, NBC No. 541 and related executive issuances violate
the Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the

implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment the appropriations of other offices outside the
Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations
Acts.
 Belgica vs Ochoa, G.R. 208566, November 19, 2013
  ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
 Tan vs Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000)
FACTS:

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the simplified income

taxation scheme under Articles 26 and 28 and III (1). The SNIT contained changes
in the tax schedules and different treatment in the professionals which
petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being isolative of the equal protection
clause in the constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious

RULING:

No. Uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely
require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated
alike both privileges and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as
long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law.
It is not limited to existing only and must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain the present
global treatment on taxable corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary
nor inappropriate.

 Lung Center vs QC, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004

 Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455,
October 30, 1995
FACTS:

The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to
10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of R.A. 7716 because it does not exclusively
came from the House of Representatives.

In addition, the petitioner contends that Senate Bill 1630 (when R.A. 7716 was
still a bill) passed its second and third readings on the same day, which in fact, it
should be passed in separate days.

ISSUE:

Whether R.A. 7716 is unconstitutional because of the above mentioned grounds.

RULING:

No, “exclusively” came from the House of Representative only falls under
revenue bill, not on revenue law like the R.A. 7716. In addition, the president
certified the passing of Senate Bill 1630 as urgent, that is why it can be passed
even on the same day.

 Bengzon vs Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

 Senate vs Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:

On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on
the issues of “Gloriagate,” Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was
shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators.

On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those “resource persons”
were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while
on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive
Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail).

On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to
the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons
from the executive dept would not be able to attend w/o the consent of the
president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col.
Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court
martial proceedings for testifying w/o the president’s approval.

ISSUE:

IS E.O. 464 VALID?

- The congress has the power of inquiry that is expressly recognized by ART 6.21
of the Constitution, where congress may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
- Since congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the
executive operations, although there are exemptions to the power of inquiry
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege” (the power of the
government to withhold info from the public, the courts, the congress) it is only
recognized in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character, and
it is inclined heavily against secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
- The power of congress to compel the appearance of exec officials under sec 21
and the lack of it under sec 22 find their basis in the principle of Separation of
Powers. While the exec branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of congress to legislate by refusing to comply w/ its
demands for info.
- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch,
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefore and why it must be respected.

RULING:

PETITIONS ARE PARTLY GRANTED, Sec(s) 2(b) &3 of E.O. 464 ARE
DECLARED VOID. Sec(s) 1&2(a) ARE HOWEVER, VALID.
  Neri vs Senate Committee GR 180643, September
4, 2008
FACTS:

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and

testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National
Broadband Project (NBN Project), a project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President
Arroyo) of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or
not she directed him to prioritize it,  and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve it. Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to
these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify on November 20,
2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege.

Petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. Respondent Committees thereafter
issued show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations
unsatisfactory and issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in
contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms.

On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two
grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were
covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. On April 8, 2008,
respondent Committees filed motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the

communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the
exercise of their functions; and
(2) Whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the contempt order.

RULING:

Respondent Committees failed to show that the communications elicited by the

three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions. The presumption
of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need  for disclosure
of the information covered by executive privilege. Respondent Committees
argued that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in
the discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three
(3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption. They intrude into
the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which,
according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation. The need
for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the
judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. There is simply a generalized
assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate
and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. During the Oral
Argument, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the
Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering
the three (3) questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so
critical after all.

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged
bribery to the Office of the President.  While it may be a worthy endeavor to
investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the
President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the
Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine
anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed
upon the Legislature the latter role. Respondent Committees claim that they are
conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for truth," which in
respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for persons
responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.

Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

contempt order. The deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the
issuance of the contempt order is flawed. The contempt order which was issued
on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took
place on said date because not all of those who signed the contempt order were
present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’
settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled
expectation is shattered. Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in
contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has
been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the
witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in
such proceeding.

 Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

FACTS:

On October 18, 2017 Arvin R. Balag was cited in contempt by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee for his contumacious attitude and evasiveness to answer
questions raised by Senators Poe, Lacson, Villanueva and other members of the
Committee. Balag was called as resource person on the hearing due to his alleged
ascendancy of Aegis Juris fraternity to which a UST Civil Law student Horacio
Thomas “Acio” Castillo III allegedly died due to hazing initiated by AJ fraternity.
Hence, Balag was held at the office of the Senate Sgt-at-Arms.

Balag filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of
TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin the
implementation of the October 18, 2017 Order of Contempt.

ISSUE:

WoN respondent Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in

conducting legislative inquiry and citing the petitioner in contempt.

HELD:

The petition is denied. The Senate did not acted with grave abuse of discretion. It
is a constitutional mandate upon the Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

As regards with the inherent power of contempt of the Senate, the period of
imprisonment should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry in
aid of legislation.

C. Executive Department

 Article VII, Philippine Constitution

 Republic vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, July 15, 2003
 Estrada vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
 Dela Cruz vs COA, G.R. No. 138489, November
29, 2001
FACTS:

On September 19, 1997, COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038, disallowing

payments of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet
secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of
the rule on multiple positions.
It also was also stated that Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it
allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistant to hold other offices, in
addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation
Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J, Vasquez
issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061.

Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of
Directors, appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on
Audit

On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No.98-3818 denying petitioners'
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners is allowed to receive such compensations.

RULING:
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio  members of the NHA
Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation, whether
it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot
likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give
petitioners a better right than their principals.

We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely
abuse its discretion.

 Marcos vs Manglapus,178 SCRA 760

FACTS:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled
to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the
respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the
President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend
under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to
impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits
prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

ISSUE:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines? 

RULING:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace.
The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and
instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present
time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is
DISMISSED.

 Soriano vs Lista GR 153881, March 24, 2003

 Pimentel vs Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005
  Constantino vs Cuisia, GR No. 106064, October 13, 2005
 Gudani vs Senga, GR No 170165, August 15, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo1 enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before
Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive
relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation
for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice
system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.

On September 26, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of
the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing
before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. The hearing was
scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in
the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of
copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano also known as the “Hello Garci” Controversy.

Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per
instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not to testify before said Committee. 

On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting
Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the
Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for
investigation. 

The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military
service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged
with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer.
Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking
that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the
charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-
interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently
enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having
testified before the Senate. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not can a President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:

Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power
as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice. 

The ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost
on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the
armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the
title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining
to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents’ ability to control the individual members
of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is
torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will
without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all,
the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality
by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative
inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not
offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy
lies with the courts.

Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct
order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a
paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly
ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the
Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution
simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly
committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same
result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles.

The petition is DENIED.

 Gloria vs CA, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000

 Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014
FACTS:

Senator Jinggoy Estrada in his privilege speech revealed that some senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 million as “incentive” for
voting in favour of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Secretary
Florencio Abad then made a public statement in response, explaining that the
funds released to the Senators were part of the Disbursement Acceleration
program (DAP). The Department od Budget Management released the sources of
the DAP and its legal bases that includes: (1) Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; (2) Section 49 and 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Executive Order
No. 292; and (3) General Appropriation Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP were filed to the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP.

ISSUES:

3. Whether DAP violates Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

4. Whether DAP, NBC No. 541 and all other executive issuances
implementing the DAP violate Sec, 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution

RULING:
The DAP does not violate Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court agreed with the OSG’s position, that no law was necessaryfor the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor
an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of
prioritizingspending and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of authority
of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully served.

However, the DAP, NBC No. 541 and related executive issuances violate
the Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, namely:

(d) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the

implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(e) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment the appropriations of other offices outside the
Executive; and
(f) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations
Acts.

 Saguisag vs Ochoa, GR No. 212426, January 12, 2016

FACTS:

EDCA or Enchanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the

Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the military forces to access to or conduct
activities within certain agreed location the country.

After eight rounds of negotiation for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the
U.S ambassador to the Philippines signed an agreement on April 28, 2016. President
Benigno Aquino III ratified EDCA on June 6, 2016, it was not transmitted to the Senate
for executive’s understanding that to do was no longer necessary.

Senator’s file Senate Resolution No. (SR 105). The resolution strongly sense that for
EDCA to be valid and effective, it must be submitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign

military bases, troops or facilities.

2. Whether the provision under EDCA are consistent with the constitution, as well
as with existing laws and treaty.

RULING:

1. EDCA is constitutional in its arrangement as an executive agreement.

2. It remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement.
The manner of the President’s execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by
law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President may take
necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. It is the Presidents’
prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine Defense interests.
(Commander-in-chief Powers)
EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the
Presidents without the need of Senatorial votes for its execution.
Petitioners contend that for EDCA must be in the form of treaty duly concurred by
Senate. They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
Section 21, Art. VII. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all members of the Senate.
Section 25, Art. XVIII. x x x Military bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in the Senate
x x x.

The President however may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops or facilities, if (a) it is not an instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.

The VFA is a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1991- already allowed the return of US
troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose and framework of Mutual Defense
Treaty and VFA. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the
details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces
is not at all unusual to jurisdiction.

EDCA is not constitutionally infirm, as an executive agreement, it remains consistent

with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
WHEREFORE, petition dismissed.

 Lagman vs Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding sixty days, President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law
and suspending of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216. The President then explain that on May 23, 2017, a
government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayaf
Group and Maute Group was conducted.

Through these groups’ armed siege and acts of violence towards civilians and
government authorities, institutions, and establishments were able to take
control of Marawi Ciy. The unfolding of these events as well as classified reports
received by the President, it led him to conclude that these activities constitute
not only simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the group’s
seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH
wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.

There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a
precedent to spreading their control over entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said
area, defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed and
remove his supervisory powers over local governments.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and
finding Proclamation No. 216 “ to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it
found no compelling reason to revoke the same.

The Senate’s counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments.
Likewise the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050
“EXPRESSING FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE
PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED ‘DECLARING STATE OF MARTIAL
LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 is valid

RULING:

The Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension
of privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao. The Court ruled
that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied
with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause
to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires that the martial law
declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

There is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the
rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target
but the whole Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, “lawless armed groups
have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply
lines, and backdoor passages;” there is also the plan to establish wilayat in
Mindanao by staging the siege in Marawi. Considering the widespread atrocities
in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed
uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only
to Marawi.

The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during
the Davao City bombings, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga siege, and
the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan among
others. The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime
without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that
the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called
for by the circumstances.

 Lagman vs Senate President GR No. 235935,

February 6, 2018
FACTS:
 These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60)
days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled
him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S.
Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution
No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no cause
to revoke the same.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of

Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current
security assessment.”

On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar

recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of
DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-
minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups
(ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and
financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction
efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic
development and prosperity in Mindanao.”

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8,

2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend
the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

ISSUE:

PROCEDURAL:

1. Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses

No. 4 fatal to their petitions.
2. Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent.
3. Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the
consolidated petitions.
4. Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao.
5. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari)
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216.
6. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the
President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
7. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the
period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
8. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis
to extend Proclamation No. 216.
9. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner
of the President’s exercise of military powers.
10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites
for the issuance of an injunctive writ.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both

Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. NO.

The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of
Congress, the they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of
the legislative department without the introduction of evidence.

 Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to
their Consolidated Comment.

SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party

respondent. YES.

The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent
considering that he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:

It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that
he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him
by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the

consolidated petitions. YES.

The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of
sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable
party thereto.

The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are
questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the approval
of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore,
it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the
subject matter of these cases.

FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of

conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in
Mindanao. NO.

The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues
between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at bar.

Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-
litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in a
succeeding litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities
of parties and issues is required.

The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court
already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger
the President’s initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the
case at bar refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which
would justify the extension of martial law.

The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence
of the rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory
nature of the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for a
declaration of martial law.

Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the
existing factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity
and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be re-
examined, in order to make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion
persists in Mindanao as to justify an extension of a state of martial law.

FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded

(certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO.

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized
that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a
petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his
or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of
emergency powers.
 Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari
will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII,
which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible
martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ.

PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW

Congressional check on martial law

Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus
consists of:

1. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such
proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is
made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot
be set aside by the President.
2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension,
upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the
invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or

suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution,
becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment”        
between the President and the Congress.

SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the

President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO.

The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in
the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the
above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the
Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating

its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power
deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be
added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or
publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly
cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The
Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it
may take its time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in
undue speculation that members of Congress did not review and study the
President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for
deliberation was too short.

SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and
determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how
many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional
authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension
should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the
persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and
(3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis
upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the
proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the
authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the
extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not
adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers evidently
gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of
the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of
the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as
regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor
is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires”
such extension.

EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient
factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the
extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public
safety requires the extension.

Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial
law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate
that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to
exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS
territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new
members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued
attacks.

AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance
of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also
showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the
new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.

Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the
DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the
Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation
in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply
moved to other places in Mindanao.

Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public

The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the
extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general
public.

The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law
or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based
principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department.
Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive
Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to
the scrutiny of the Court.”

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP
gave its “briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data,
which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on
the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and residents in
affected areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the
PNP. According to the AFP, the same presentation, save for updates, was given
to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented has not been
challenged or questioned as regards its reliability.

The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply

establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly
endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis
for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress
in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice

and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO.

The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the
determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers
should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the
President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article
VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the
President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised.

 
TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the
requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. NO.

By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden

to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an
urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on

respondents’ gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the
martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that
petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the
extension or martial law in Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil
liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of the
Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military
forces”.

The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the grant
of injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged violations
are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They likewise failed
to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of his martial law powers
and their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will target civilians who
have no participation at all in any armed uprising or struggle”. Incidentally,
petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer to, and how
the extension of martial law in Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties” in
derogation of the rule of law. Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or
disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant
of an injunctive writ.

This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must

depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable
under the circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive
writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even
presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be
determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and proof.

Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports
petitioners’ theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be utilized
as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to declare
martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction petitioners’
plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going against the principle of
separation of powers.

As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such
transgressions can be addressed in a separate and independent court action.
Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office
or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against erring parties.

D. The Judicial Department

 Republic vs Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

 Miranda vs Aguirre, G.R. No 133064, September 16, 1999
  MMDA vs Jancom, GR 147465, April 10, 2002
FACTS:

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision dated January
30, 2002 affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, declaring that there is a
valid and perfected waste management contract between the RP and JANCOM
Env’l Corp and dismissing the petition filed by MMDA for lack of merit. The
petitioner reiterates its arguments that (1) resort to a petition for certiorari was
proper; (2) that the waste management contract never got through the
negotiation stage; (3) that the signature of the President is necessary for the
perfection of the contract in question; and (4) that the contract could be
unilaterally cancelled by the Government since incineration is prohibited by the
Clean Air Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision dated January 30, 2002 on the issues mentioned may
be reversed.

RULING:

The motion for reconsideration is denied and its denial is final. First, the
petitioner claims that a garbage crisis was imminent due to the trial Courts
decision to prohibit and enjoin MMDA from conducting a bidding for the
establishment and operation of a new sanitary landfill that impelled them to file
a petition for certiorari rather than a regular appeal. Petitioner claims, however,
that while appeal was available, the same was an inadequate remedy under
circumstances, stating that availability of appeal is not sufficient to preclude a
petition for certiorari. The court argued that the decision is not immediately
executor as it is not a judgment in action for injunction, receivership, accounting
& support and such other judgments, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court.
Since the decision is not immediately executor, appeal would have stayed in
execution. Consequently, the adverse effects of said decision will not visit upon
petitioners during the appeal. In other words, appeal is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Second, the petitioner claims that the waste management contract never got
through the negotiation stage since the notice sent by their MMDA Chairperson
Prospero Oreta, informing JANCOM that it was the winning bidder specifically
provided that the same was “subject to negotiation and mutual approval of the
terms & conditions of the contract of award.” The argument is misleading since it
deceivingly overlooks the fact that after said letter was sent, a contract was
prepared and signed by JANCOM and the Philippine Government. The signing
and execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the
parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the
material details of the contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the
contract.
Third, the claim that the signature of the President is necessary for the
validity of the contract which points out that the Memorandum Order no. 202
(Memo Order Creating an Executive Committee to Oversee the BOT
Implementation of Solid Waste Management projects for waste disposal in
Carmona & San Mateo) only gives the Executive Committee and that the same is
not valid that it glosses over the fact that the Secretary signed the contract not as
a member of executive committee but as a chairman of the Presidential Task
Force on Solid Waste.
Lastly, petitioner argued that the incineration technology provided in the
contract is prohibited by law, citing the Clean Air Act in support thereof. The
appellant court pointed out that the Section 20 of the Clean Air Act does not
absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal; rather only those
burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are banned. As defined
under Section 5, Article II of the said Act, poisonous and toxic fumes means any
emissions & fumes which are beyond internationally accepted standard,
including but not limited to World Health Organization (WHO) guideline
values.

 Tirol vs COA, GR No. 133954, August 3, 2000

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under R.A. 6770 Sec. 27,
(Ombudsman Act 1989).

The petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region VIII. During his capacity, he
approved the purchase of overpriced school equipment for the
Lalawigan National Highschool. COA investigated the transaction
and the petitioner was found guilty for malversation of public
funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue is a question of law and therefore may be reviewed by
the Supreme court.

RULING:
The court does not interefere with the discretion of the Ombudsman. The rule is
based upon respect for investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and practicality.

Another reason for the dismissal of the petition, it is under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. The court has declared Section 27, unconstitional in
Fabian v. Desierto for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent.

In Addition, the petitioner’s and his counsel’s acts manifest a scheme to frustrate
the ends of justice by using court procedures to delay the resolution of a pending
case. 

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED and the
Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED.

 Cruz vs DENR, GR 135385, December 6, 2000

 Martinez vs CA, GR 123547, May 21, 2001
 Aguirre vs Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036 (2003)
 In RE: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (1989)
 De La Llana vs Alba 122 SCRA 291

E. Constitutional Commissions
 Cayetano vs Monsod, GR 100113, September 3, 1991
  Gaminde vs COA, GR No. 140335, December 13,
2000
FACTS:

On Jun e11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, Ad Interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commisioner. She assumed
office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. The Commission on
Appointment confirmed the appointment.

However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the office. In
reply to her request, the chief Presidential Legal counsel, in a letter dated April 7,
1998 opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 2, 2000, not
on February 2, 1999.

Relying on the said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after

February 2, 1999. On February 4, 1999, Chairmen Corazon Alma G. De Leon,
wrote the commission (COA) requesting opinion on whether or not Commission
Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries not
withstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999.

On February 18, 1999, the General counsel, COA, issued an opinion that the term
of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.

Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC resident auditor Floritas U. Felipe issued
notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101(99) disallowing in audith the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective
February 2, 1999.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner,

Civil Service Commssion, to which she appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.

RULING:

Accordingly, the court Reversed the decisions of the Commission on Audit

insofar they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from
February 2, 1999, with February 2, 2000. Ther decision is effective immediately.

 Brillantes vs Yorac, GR No. 93867, December 18,

1990
FACTS:

Sixto Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines

of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been
named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December
1989 coup d'etat attempt.
It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior member of the
Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo
E. Abueg, Jr.

The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. He cites the practice in this court , where the senior
Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the designation mode by the President violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC?

RULING:

Yes, Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme

court ruled although essentially executivein nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. The
designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely
grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the function of
the COMELEC. In the choice of the acting chairman, the members of the
commission on elections would most likely have appreciated it. In any event,
that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the president to make. To
emphasize the importance of the COMELEC’s constitutionality guaranteed
independence, the court said that the choice of a temporary Chairman is an
internal matter which comes under the discretion of the Commission a body and
that such discretion cannot be exercised for the Commission by anybody else.

But even though the president’s appointment of yorac as acting president is void,
the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting
chairman. What is that the members should elect their acting chairman pursuant
to principles that Constitutional. Commissions are guaranteed by the
constitution as an independent body.

 CSC vs DBM, GR 158791, July 22, 2005

 Sarmiento vs COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307
 Ambil vs Comelec GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000

8. The CSC
 Camporedondo vs NLRC, GR No. 129049, August 6, 1999
 General vs Roco, GR No. 143366, January 29, 2001
 CSC vs Salas, GR 123708, June 19, 1997
 Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No.
159940, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
 Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner.
  Civil Service Commission, respondent.
 On July 31, 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M.
Clemente and Jose Tereso U. De Jesus Jr were appointed Graft
Investigation Officers III of the petitioner. The CSC approved the
appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire
security of tenure, they must obtain CES or CSE eligibility which is
governed by the CESB.
 On January 2, 2003 letter to the CSC, the Ombudsman requested for
the change of status, from temporary to permanent, of the
appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus effective
December 18, 2002.
 Carandang and Clemente were conferred with CSE Eligibility dated
June 6, 2003.
 On August 28, 2003, CSC changed the status of Carandang’s and
Clemente’s appointments to permanent status effective June 6, 2003,
but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he “has not met the
eligibility requirements”.

ISSUE:
i. Whether or not the respondent curtailed on the discretionary power of
appointment of the petitioner.

RULING:
i. Yes, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the
Ombudsman that the appointment be made permanent effective
December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear
encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as
appointing authority.

 Vistan vs Nicolas 201 SCRA 524

FACTS:

Complainant Leonila A. Vistan filed on March 16, 1987 an AM No. MTJ 87-79,
charging the Respondent as then the MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan with
gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and immorality.
However, it was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

Upon Respondent’s manifestation and after verification with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) that the Respondent had resigned from the service
when he became a congressional candidate in the 1987 election. However, such
reconsideration sought by the complainant and again confirmed by the OCA.
Respondent Judge was then re-appointed to the service on February 9, 1989 as
the MTC Judge of Pandi, Bulacan. Accordingly, the AM No. MTC-89-79 was
reinstated and the other case AC No. 3040 for disbarment of Respondent was
filed on May 15, 1987. The charges set forth ate basically the same with AM No.
MTC-87-79.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not Respondent Judge Nicolas engaged in electioneering while still

an MTC Judge

RULING:

The Court ruled that the Respondent acted improperly and for having held
himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench,
Respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy demeaned the
stature of his office, and must pronounce guilty of gross misconduct.

The Court also denied the prayer for disbarment and order the dismissal of the
Respondent from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch,
agency, or any instrumentality of the government including GOCCs and with
forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits and leave credits.

 Domingo vs Zamora, GR 142283, February 6, 2003

 Office of the President vs. Buenaobra, GR 170021, September 8,
2006
 Central Bank vs CSC, G.R. No. 80455-456, April 10, 1989 (171
SCRA 744)

9. The COMELEC
 Brillantes vs Comelec, GR 163193, June 15, 2004
 Sandoval vs Comelec, GR 133842, January 26, 2000
 Al Haj vs Comelec, GR No. 151046, February 5,
2002
FACTS:

Tawantawan M. Caturongan Al Haj and Naseer Manalao are candidates for

Municipal Mayor and Vice mayor. They filed a petition to COMELEC to declare a
failure of elections in Municipality of Munai, Lanao Del Norte on the following
grounds:

1. Massive vote buying.

2. Illegal assignment of Rakim Paute as Election Inspectors.
3. Appointment of disqualified Board of Election Inspectors.
4. Shoot out on the eve of election between unidentified armed men and
members of the Philippine Army escorting election forms and
paraphernalia in Barangay Cadulawan.
5. Transfer of polling places without notice.
6. Absence of voting booths in Barangay Tambo and Cadulawan.
7. Non-signing of voter’s registration form.

ISSUE:

Whether the grounds enumerated by Al Haj and Manalao to declare failure of

elections are valid.

RULING:

Petition must fail. There are only three instances where a failure of election may
be declared, those are:

1. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed
because of force, majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes.
2. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of voting on account of force, majeure,
terrorism, and other analogous causes.
3. After voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, the election results in a
 failure to elect on account of force, majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
and other analogous causes.

The irregularities pointed by the petitioner such as vote buying, fraud, and
terrorism are grounds for an election contest and may not be invoked to declare
failure of election.

 Guevarra vs Comelec, 104 Phil 269

 Jaramilla vs Comelec, GR No, 155717, October
23, 2003
FACTS:

Respondent Suyat and petitioner Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member
of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May
14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta.
Cruz, proclaimed the eight (8) winning members of the Sangguniang Bayan, with
petitioner Jaramilla as No. 7 and respondent Suyat as No. 9.

Respondent Suyat reviewed the votes and discovered that petitioner Jaramilla
was credited with only twenty three (23) votes per Election Return from Precinct
No. 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes
by Precinct, petitioner Jaramilla was credited with seventy three (73) votes or
fifty (50) votes more than what he actually obtained.

Respondent Suyat filed before COMELEC en banc, which granted the Petition
and annulled Jaramilla’s proclamation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not COMELEC en banc may took cognizance of the petition for
correction despite its having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary, its lack of
certification against forum-shopping and respondent’s failure to pay filing fee on
time

RULING:

Yes. Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules expressly provides that COMELEC
has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the
requirement of certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest
of justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it.

COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-

payment of filing fees. Section 18, Rule 40 the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
states:

Sec 18. Nonpayment of Prescribed Fees If the fees above prescribed are

not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they
are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.

The use of the word "may" in the aforecited provision readily shows that the
COMELEC is conferred the discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in
case of non-payment of legal fees.
  Baytan vs Comelec, GR No. 153945, February
4, 2003
FACTS:

Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their
way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected
Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who
led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A Barangay 18.
Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay
28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and
registered anew.

Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELC Assistant Executive

Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous
registration.

Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial

Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who subsequently,
recommended filing information for double registration against petitioners. The
COMELEC affirmed Ravanzo’s resolution. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by comelec en banc.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it

recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack
of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of
previous registration.

RULING:

No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in
different precincts without cancelling their previous registration. Since “double
registration” is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ claim of lack of intent to violate
the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel
their previous registration. This letter was sent after their second registration was
accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported
their act of double registration to a higher official.

Moreover, petitioners’ claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial

compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous
registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than
at the preliminary investigation. The established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof.

 Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR 222731,

March 8, 2016

10. The COA

  DBP vs COA, 231 SCRA 202
FACTS:

In 1986, the Philippine government obtained from the World Bank an Economic
Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of US$310 million, which was intended to
support the recovery of the Philippine economy during that time of financial
crisis.

As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine
government to rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-
performing loans. Accordingly, the government made a policy entitled Policy
Statement for the Development Bank of the Philippines which stated in part:
Furthermore, like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP
will now be required to have a private external audit, and its Board of Directors
will now be opened to adequate private sector representation. It is hoped that
with these commitments, DBP can avoid the difficulties of the past and can
function as a competitive and viable financial institution within the Philippine
financial system."

Pursuant to said Policy, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079
amending the Central Bank's Manual of Regulations for Banks and other
Financial Intermediaries, in line with the government's commitment to the World
Bank to require a private external auditor for DBP. Thus, on December 5, 1986,
the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124, providing
that: "SECTION 1. Subsection 1165.5 (Book I) is amended to read as follows:

1165.5 Financial Audit. - Each Bank, whether Government-owned or controlled

or private, shall cause an annual financial audit to be conducted by an external
independent auditor not later than thirty (30) days after the close of the calendar
year or the fiscal year adopted by the bank. x x x.
The Audit of a Government-owned or controlled bank by an external
independent auditor shall be in addition to and without prejudice to that
conducted by the Commission on Audit in the discharge of its mandate under
existing law. x x x.

Former COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona Jr. did not object said provisions and
new regulations imposed. So, DBP hired Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as its external
auditor for calendar year 1986.

However, during a change of its leadership, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio
Domingo, wrote the Central Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's
issuance of said Circular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the COA's
constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies. Hence, he
issued a Memorandum disallowing payments to said auditing firm saying that
the services rendered were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.

DBP sought consideration of COA Chairman’s Memorandum but was denied.

Likewise, in a COA en banc decision, the same was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Constitution vests in the COA the sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by
private external auditors under any circumstance
RULING:

The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA
enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government
agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole and
exclusive authority, under the second paragraph of the same Section, to define
the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules
on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The
bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's power under the first
paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second
paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive."

The qualifying word "exclusive" in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be

applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A
qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately
associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in another paragraph or sub-
section.26 Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it appears,
without the word "exclusive", signifying that non-COA auditors can also
examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution
intentionally omitted the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2
precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors.

The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is
that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand,
the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules
and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.

The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not
divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings
and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.

Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its
framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the
exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a
private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar
when the government borrows money from abroad.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of the

Chairman of the Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letter-
decision promulgated by the Commission on Audit en banc dated May 20, 1989,
are hereby SET ASIDE, and the temporary restraining order issued by the court
enjoining respondent Commission on Audit from enforcing the said decisions is
hereby made PERMANENT.

 Bustamante vs COA, 216 SCRA 164

 DBP vs COA, GR No. 88435, January 16, 2002
FACTS:
In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President
Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan
("ERL" for brevity) in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL was intended to
support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely
from the financial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos
regime.

Former COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. did not object said provisions and
new regulations imposed by the Central Bank Circular No.1124. So, DBP hired
Joaquin Cunanan & Co., as its external auditor for calendar year 1986. However,
a change in the leadership of the COA suddenly reversed the course of events.

On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private
auditing firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP
Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow
any payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal
and unnecessary.

On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the
DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan & Co., signed four months earlier on
March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA's
concurrence to the contract.

During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the
DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487, 321.14
despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued
a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons
personally liable for such payment.

On June 14, 1989 the DBP filed this petition for review with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, assailing the two COA letter-decisions for being
contrary to the Constitution and existing laws.

ISSUE:

Does the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine
and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private
external auditors under any circumstance?

RULING:

The DBP's petition is meritorious and hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of

the Chairman of the Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letter-
decision promulgated by the Commission on Audit en banc dated May 20, 1989,
are hereby SET ASIDE, and the temporary restraining order issued by the court
enjoining respondent Commission on Audit from enforcing the said decisions is
hereby made PERMANENT.

The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2,Article
IX-D, the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all
government agencies, including the DBP.

The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is
that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand,
the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules
and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-
exclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution mandates that:

"Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."

11. Sandiganbayan
 PD 1606
 Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433

12. Ombudsman
 Roxas vs Vasquez, GR No. 114944, June 19, 2001

 People vs Velez, GR No. 138093, February 19,

2003
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the office of the
Ombudsman against respondents of violation 3(g) of R.A.3019. After finding
probable cause, Ombudsman recommended the filing of information against the
malefactors. Respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan a joint motion for
reconsideration which was granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated Sec.27 of R.A.6770

HELD:
No. When the office of the Ombudsman approved the resolution prepared by the
Graft Investigator, the information was filed prematurely against the
respondents.

 Ledesma vs CA GR No. 161629, July 29, 2005

 Ombudsman vs Madriaga, GR No. 164316, September 27, 2006

13. Office of the Special Prosecutor

 Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988
 Vicente Orap vs Sandiganbayan, L-50508-11, October 11, 1985,
139 SCRA 252

14. National Commissions

 Carino vs CHR, GR 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483
 Canonizado vs Aguirre, GR No. 133132, February 15, 2001