See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/238334159

Lacan and Bion: Psychoanalysis and the Mystical Language of `Unsaying'

Article  in  Theory & Psychology · May 1995

DOI: 10.1177/0959354395052002

CITATIONS READS

11 1,637

2 authors, including:

Richard E Webb
Haverford College
30 PUBLICATIONS   72 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Resilience as capacity for perpendicular thinking View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Richard E Webb on 15 December 2015.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

194 HEURTSTTCS AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Lopez Piiero, J.M. (1983). Historical origins of the conceptof neurosis' Cam'
bridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.
Masson, J.M. (Ed.). (1985). The completelettersof Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm
F/iess.CambridgeMA: BelknaP.
Morgagni, G.B. (1761).De sedibuset causismorborum. Venice.
Panhuysen,G.E.M. (1990a).Freud'sdoctor'sbag: On his heuristicresources.In
W.J. Baker, R. van Hezewijk, M.E. Hyland, & S. Terwee(Eds.), Recenttends
in theoreticalpsychology(Vol. 2, pp. 405-413).New York: Springer.
Panhuysen,G.E.M. (1990b).Het ei van Freud: Over de biidragevan medische
heuritiekenaan geboorteen groei van de psychoanalyse'Amsterdam: Swets&
Zeitlinger.
Pasteur,L. (1933).The paperson anthrax and chicken cholera.In L' Vallery-
Radot Pasteur (Ed.), Oeuvresde Pasteur.Tome VI: Maladiesvirulentes,virus-
vaccinset prophylaxe de la rage. Paris: Masson.(Original work published 1877')
Popper, K.R. (1959). The logic of scientificdiscovery.London: Hutchinson.
(Original German edition publishedin 1934.)
Popper,K.R. (1963).Conjectures and refutations.London: Routledgeand Kegan
Paul.
Popper, K.R. (1983). Realism and the aim of science:Postscriptto the logic of
scientificdiscovery(Vol. 1). London: Hutchinson.
Skinner,B.F. (1984).Selectionby consequences. Behavioraland Brain Sciences,T,
477481..
Slezak,P. (1989).Scientificdiscoveryby computeras empiricalrefutationof the
strongprogramme.SocialStudiesof Science,19,563400.
Sulloway,F.J. (1979).Freud, biologistof the mind. New York: BasicBooks.
Sydenham,T. (1682). Dissertatioepistolarisad G. Cole. London: Kettilby.
Urbach, P. (1978). The objective promise of a researchprogramme. In G.
Radnitzky & G. Andersson (Eds.), Progressand rationaliry in science(pp. 99-
113). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Virchow, R. (1858).Die Cellularpathologiein ihrer Begrilndungauf physiologische
und pathologischeGewebelehre.Berlin: A. Hirschwald.
Watkins, J.W.N. (1989).The methodologyof scientificresearchprogrammes:A
retrospect.In K. Gavroglu,P. Goudaroulis,& P. Nicalocopoulos(Eds.), /mre
Lakatos and theoriesof scientificchange(pp. 3-13). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Zahar, E.G. (1983).Logic of discoveryor psychologyof invention?BritishJournal
for the Philosophyof Science,34,243-261.
Gnnnr E.M. PlunwsnN is a philosopher and psychologist,working at
the Universityof Utrecht. He teachesin the fieldsof theoreticalpsychology
and philosophyof science.His specialinterestsare in foundationalproblems
of psychoanalysisand in philosophicaland theoreticalaspectsof psychoso-
matic research.The Englishtranslationof his book Het ei vanFreud:Overde
bijdragevan medischeheuristiekenaan geboorteen groei van de psychoana-
/yse(The 'FreudianEgg': On the Contributionof MedicalHeuristicsto the
Birth and Growth of Psychoanalysis;Amsterdam:Swets& Zeitlinger, 7990)
is in preparation. Aoonnss: Sectie TheoretischePsychologie,Vakgroep
Psychonomie,RijksuniversiteitUtrecht, Heidelberglaan2, 3584CSUtrecht,
The Netherlands.
Lacan and Bion
Psychoanalysis and the Mystical Language of
'Unsaying'
Richard E. Webb and Michael A. Sells
Havrnrono Cottrcr, PnNNsvrvaNra
Assrmcr. We examinethe theoryandlanguageof psychoanalysts Jacques
Lacan and Wilfred Bion, regardingcentral issuessuch as the role of
healing, the viability of truth and its location, and the status of the
unconscious, includingwhere it is and who can know it. We placeLacan
and Bion in a criticaldialoguewith the languageof mystical'unsaying',as
exemplifiedin the writingsof Plotinus,Johnthe ScotErigena,Ibn 'Arabi,
MargueritePoreteand MeisterEckhart. On the basisof this comparison,
we arguethat the languages of Lacanand Bion, on the one hand,and that
of the above-citedmystics,on the other, are mutually illuminatingof a
central and often misunderstoodhuman phenomenon,the languageof
unsaying.
'I am farthest from being mystic.' So said Sigmund Freud when Smiley
Blanton (1971, p. 43) broached the idea of Jewish mysticism and psycho-
analysis.Freud was interested in gaining acceptanceof psychoanalysisas a
legitimate scientific endeavor, and he said of mysticism that it 'is the
obscure self-perception of the realm outside the ego, of the id' (Freud,
194111964,p. 300). Marion Milner (1987) is one of the few analysts in
conventional circles to consider seriously its relevance. Donnel Stern
(1992), exemplifying both a caricatured understanding of mysticism and its
dismissal, says in an article on constructivism in psychoanalysis,'We and
our patients are not aiming at the unnameablebliss of mysticism, nor are
we trying to create art. We are trying to say things' (p. 3a3).
Jacques Lacan (1982a), in contrast, writes, '[M]ystical ejaculations are
neither idle gossip nor mere verbiage, in fact they are the best thing you
can read. . . . Add the Ecrits of JacquesLacan, which is of the same order'
(p. 147; original emphasis). In this pup"r *" argue that a particular kind of
mystical writing, apophasis ('unsaying' or ,speaking away,), can illuminate
similar moments of 'unsaying' in the writings of Lacan and wilfred Bion.
our discussioncenters on the writings of Plotinus (d. 270 cr), John the Scot
Tutonv * PsycHorocy@ 1995Srce. Vor. 5(2): 195-215
196 LACAN, BroN AND 'uNslvtNc'
Erigena (d. 877),Ibn 'Arabi (d. 7240), Marguerite Porete (d. 1310) and
M eis t er E c k ha rt (d . c .1 3 2 8 ).1
One may ask what difference it makes whether Lacan or Bion's language
has parallels with mystical apophasis. Some view Bion as 'provocatively
nihilistic' (Lindon, 1967, p. 274) and the writings of Lacan as 'mere
provocation or obscurantism' (see Macey, 1988, p. 8). W.W. Meisner
(1988) goes so far as to say of Lacan that 'too much intimate contact [with
his ideas] can transmit the fatal virus'(p. 446).Lacan, however, claims to
return to the original intention of Freud's revolutionary ideas. Whether he
and Bion are similar to the 'creativemystic . . . who formally claimsto . . .
fulfill the conventions of the Establishment that governs his group' or the
'mystical nihilist, who appearsto destroy his own creations'(Bion, 1988,
p. 74), they have influenced an important segment of the psychoanalytic
community.
Lacan and Bion reshapecentral questionsin psychoanalysis:the role of
healing; the viability of truth and its location; and the status of the
unconscious,including where it is and who can know it. Here, we argue
neither that Lacan and Bion are self-consciouslygrounded in or influenced
by these mystics, nor that 'the real' of Lacan and Bion is substantially
comparableor incomparableto 'the real' of the mystics.Instead, we focus
upon the functional similarity between mystical unsaying and psycho-
analytic unsaying, and ask: What does the languageof mystical unsaying
-the depth and brilliance of which we hope to demonstrate-tell us about
Lacan and Bion's languageof unsaying?2
The Real: The Focus of Knowing/Not Knowing
It might seem that there is little basis for overlap between mysticism and
psychoanalysis, with their apparently different assumptions and world-
views. The presumption of categorical difference, however, is based upon
views of mystical language that ignore or water down the more radical
implications of unsaying. Assumptions about the subject of mystical
language-whether it be named the absolute, the real, gods or God-are
often in conflict with the language of mystical unsaying. Mystical unsaying
stands on the margins of religion conventionally defined, as we believe
Lacan and Bion stand on the margins of psychoanalysis.
Both Lacan and Bion and the mystical writers of concern here begin with
'not knowing' and end with 'knowing' as the constant movement toward
knowledge. Toward this end, Lacan (1986a)says, 'What the analyst must
know is how to ignore what he knows' (p.20:' cited in Felman, 1987,p. 81).
Bion (1988) says,'[T]he capacityto forget, the ability to eschewdesireand
understanding, must be regarded as essentialdiscipline for the psycho-
analyst' (p. 51). And although Bion (1977) says, 'I think it is "better" to
know the truth about one's self and the universe in which I exist'
RTcHARDE. wEBB & MTcHAEL A. sELLs 197
(unnumbered 'Introduction'), he also stressesthe centrality of not know-
ing. He quotes a Rudyard Kipling poem, 'The Elephant's Child', as the
basis for six of what he calls 'The seven pillars of wisdom' (Bion, 1977,
unnumbered 'Introduction'): 'Their names are What and Why and When/
And How and Where and Who.' He adds in his elusive style, ,[T]he
missing one completes the seven. ' The scope of the search, in other words,
must acknowledge the ineffable within it.
Mystical unsaying also begins with not knowing: ,A poor [blessed]
person wants nothing, and knows nothing, and has nothing' (Eckhart,
DW: 1936-, Yol.2, p. 488). The initial premise of mystical unsayingis the
unknowability and unnameability of the subject of discourse. Though
various traditions have ascribed 'it'-the subject of discourse-names such
as 'the one', 'the infinite', 'the real' or ,God', these names are not
considered sufficient; indeed, insofar as the names are taken as referring to
an object of knowledge, they are dangerous. Mystical unsaying uses
names, but it also 'unsays' them, displacing their referential force.
Erigena's(1981)dialecticculminatesin the proposition that God is nothing
(deus nihil est) or, we might say, no-thing bp. 16G16g); Eckhart (DW:
1936-) prays God 'that we may be free of God' (Vol. 2, pp. 493494).3 No
single proposition in mystical unsaying is meaningful in itself because
-however much it may try to avoid it-it uses a name to refer to the
unnameable,and thus semanticallylimits the ,unlimited'.
Bion and Lacan engagein a similar struggle with naming. Bion (1ggg)
calls that which is chased in analysis 'the ultimate reality, the absolute
truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself'(p. 26).He refers to it
with an empty symbol, the letter 'o', suggesting its lack of referential
closure. Lacan's 'real' represents that which is always just beyond know-
ing. Lacan is particularly elusivein defining his 'real'. For Alan Sheridan,a
major translator of Lacan, the Lacanian real is used 'to describe that which
is lacking in the symbolicorder, the ineliminabreresidueof all articulation,
the foreclosed element, which may be approached, but never grasped,
('Translator's Note' in Lacan, 197g, p. 2g0j.
Knowledge and reference are ephemeral, .An opening like a flash,
quickly closing' (Porete, 1986,pp. 16s-169). For Eckhart und tun'Arabi,
a contact is made in a moment that is within time but infinitely short, an
eternal moment that is lost as soon as one tries to grasp it (see
Sells, 1994,
3,4 and6). Bion-(l?67,1988) saysthat the tiuth or ,O'is something
"l1pr.
wtrich can be approached through a disciplined but always
ephemeral
effort to be without memory or desire. 'o'is 'a ,,dark spot"
thai must be
i l l umi nated by "blindness"'( Bion, 1988,p. 88) . Lacan's t r ut h
or . r eal, is
always masked in a way which can 'dazzle', yet 'the spirit is
always
somewhereelse' (1956/1968b,p. 34).
we return now to the title of this section of the paper, ,The Real: The
Focus of Knowinga.{ot Knowing'. The choice of the term ,the real' is
not
 198 LAcAN, BroN AND .uNsAyrNc'
arbitrary; it is employed by Lacan as well as by Ibn 'Arabi (al-haqqlthe
real or the true), discussed below. However, we do not claim any
substantial identity between the real of the mystics and the real of the
analyst; if the real in both casesis beyond substance,any substantialist
comparison (or contrast) would be problematic.
It might seem that in psychoanalysisthe unconscious,rather than the
real, should be the domain of truth and the 'subject of discourse'.The
unconscious is, of course, the object of study for the more traditional
analyst;it is, so to speak, where the sought-aftertruth is or resides.But we
will argue that Lacan and Bion make clear an important distinction about
the role of the unconsciousin analytic work. For Lacan and Bion, the
unconsciousis, first of all, not somethingwhich can be objectified. Second,
while it may, in a sense,be the object of study, it is not the sole end of
study; rather, it is the shifting lens of discoursethrough which truth or the
real is glimpsed.
A Dynamic Understanding of Language
'Not knowing' need not result in silence.Both psychoanalyticand mystical
versions of'unsaying' challenge the ability of languageto seize the real.
Both move toward a non-referential mode of language.
'We find ourselves in an aporia [perplexity], in pangs at trying to speak.
we speak of the unspeakable;wishing to signify it as best *" we name
it ' ( P lot in u s ,1 9 5 9 , E n n e a d s ,5 .5 .6 .2 3-5,al so ci ted i n S el l s,"un,
1985,p. 49).
Although what is sought is beyond naming, a name must be given to
it---even in the act of denying that it can be named. Sells (19g5) reiers to a
languageof moving, double propositions.For Seils,meaningoccursonly in
the tension between a proposition and that which is coriectins it. But
because the language-conditioned mind tends to reify the last prJposition
a,sa self-standing utterance, a new proposition must be added, ,iiti"irrng
the second, ad infinitum. Plotinus calred this ranguageapophasis;,speak-
ing' Qthasis)'away' (apo).we prefer the transration'unsaying'to,negative
theology'becauseapophasisquestionsboth positive ana negitrve proposi-
tions and challenges the very notion of theorogy (a wordl bgoi, about
deity, theos).
Apophatic language moves between reference and the unsaying of
reference. Language has no direct accessto the real. Any single proposi_
tion will falsify. To say that'it'-the 1sal-'hznssends the world'isio mark
it off from the world and the self, to bind it in a spacebeyond the world.
Such affirmations of transcendence deny the transcendence in the act of
affirming it. To say that it is 'within the world' again binds it as if it were
within a space.It is only through the tension between two often paradoxi-
cally related propositions that a glimpse of the real can be gained: it is
absolutely transcendent but utterly immanent (Ibn 'Arabi, tg+e; s"ttr,
RTcHARDE. WEBB & MTcHAEL A. sELLs 199
1984). The most distinct of all is that which is distinct by its very lack of
distinction (Eckhart, LW: 1936-, Vol. 3, p. 489; 1981,pp. 34-35). Normal
language functions according to the single proposition which can stand on
its own. Apophatic language uses double propositions-no single proposi-
tion on its own can be true or false, can be a meaningful utterance. In the
tension between two propositions, meaning can occur. The meaning is
fleeting. The language-conditioned mind tends to fix (or fixate) upon the
second proposition as if it were meaningful in itself. Ever-new critical
propositions are needed to keep meaning from reifying into a fixed image
(Sells, 1985).
In 'The Presenceof the Analyst', Lacan (197311978)explicitly notes the
inspiration of Plotinus to his thinking. Language for Lacan must be
understood as something which structures and defines perception of the
real, but also language is something which chases an always elusive
ultimate truth or real. For Lacan, there is always a gap between the
signifier and the signified; one is not the other and irrevocably cannot be.
Truth or the real, therefore, is not a static reality but shifting, evolving, and
always changing.a"'[T]ruth" is the name of that ideal movement that
discourse introduces into reality . . . psychoanalysis is a dialectical exper-
ience' (Lacan, !982b, p. 63; original emphasis). As Jacqueline Rose (19g2)
says of Lacan,'[His] statements on language need to be taken into two
directions-towards the fixing of meaning itself (that which is enjoined on
the subject), and away from that very fixing to the point of its constant
slippage, the risk or vanishing point which it always contains (the
unconscious)'(p. a3). Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy (1986) say of
Lacanian language that 'truth speaks in language as it is continuously
produced by speech, through its communiqu| of facts, in between-the-
lines, and at anchoring points. . . . Truth resides,as it were, in the spaces
betweenone signifierand another, in the holes in the chain' (pp. tt7-11g).
Lacan (1982c)says, 'There is nowhere any last word unlessin the sensein
which word is not a word. . . . Meanine indicates the direction in which it
fails' (p. 150; original emphasis).
Bion is less emphatic than Lacan on the role of languagein discovery,
.
but he also locates meaning in the gaps within language. Language hints at
a something else which is struggling to be apprehended. Words, silences
and expressionsof emotions that challenge the psychoanalyst to detect a
content are all aspects of a communication that moves beyond verbal
representation of truth (Bion, 1988, pp. 4243). The real is never gathered
in, but glimpsedvia activity, in movement. '[It] does not fall in thJdomain
of knowledge or learning save incidentally; it can be ,,become", but it
cannot be "known". It is darkness and formlessness. . . its existenceis
conjectured phenomenologically'(Bion, 1988, p. 26). Thus, Bion (19gg)
writes, the 'lie and its thinker are inseparable. The thinker is of no
consequenceto the truth, but the truth is logically necessarvto the thinker'
 LAAii.;loN AND'uNsAYING' RIcHARD E. wEBB & MTcHAEL A. sELLs 2Ol

(p. 103). 'o' or 'ultimate reality' is beyond the subject

who thinks (and For Lacan, identity is a fiction; identity is a coherence existing only in
speaks), a subject who therefore lies or misses the tiuth.
language and because of language. Language does not describe or depict
For Plotinus, 'Discursive reason reflects alienated consciousness.It must
some essential or fundamental state that exists outside of language.
"run after" the object of its contemplation through activity' (sells, 19g5,
'[T]hese effects [of speech] are so radically primary that they are properly
p. 55). Similarly, Lacan (197311978) says,'All I can do is teli the truth. No.
what determine the status of the subject as subject' (Lacan, 197311978,
that isn't so-I have missed it. There is no truth that, in passing through
p. 126). Consistent with this understanding of the central split between the
awareness,does not lie. But one runs after it all the same' (p. vii). Lacan
signified and signifier, Lacan (197311978)defines even the unconscious as
views the process of gaining knowledge as not being so much 'informative'
the 'sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at the level at which the
as 'performative' (Felman, 1987). 'The truth . . . is that which runs after
subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier' (p. 126). The
truth' (Lacan,197311978,p. 188).
unconscious, then, is not the repository or location of a hidden, true self;
For Islamic mystics (Sufis), language veils and unveils the real. pure
the unconscious is the 'discourse of the Other' (e.g. I9561I968b, p. 27;
reality would destroy the gaze of one looking upon it as the sun blinds
197311978,pp. 115, 131); it is structured by and through language, a
those who stare at it. A Sufi tradition has it that the divine has 70,000 veils onot', always elsewhere.
language of desire for Other, that which is always
of light and 70,000 veils of darkness. when forms are viewed as complete
As Michael Thompson (1985) saysof Lacan, '[It is] not the lack of true self,
and mutually exclusive, reality is 'bound' into limited images or idols.
or good self, or a strong ego which characterizes the various forms of
when the forms are viewed as perpetually changing manifestations/veilings
psychopathology, but rather the state of alienation that ensues when we
of a real beyond any single, static image, they become signs. But their
imagine ourselves to be selves at all' (p. 192). Elsewhere Lacan calls the
meaning occursonly in the moment, it cannot be held (Sells, 19g4,p.294).
ego-self a 'symptom', echoing the apophatic mystics but with a Buddhist
I acan (19561r968b)suggestsa similar elusivenessof meaning: 'It is Truth
flavor.5
in fact which throws off the mask in his words, but only in order for the
Bion points similarly to the idea that identity is something grafted on via
spirit to take on another and more deceiving one' (p. 34).
the use of language (symbolism). He says of the psychotic that he or she is
a person who has lost a sense that the pairing of behavior and symbols is
Where Are the Self and the Real, and Where Are They Not? arbitrary. The psychotic 'has severed all links with anything that shows the
conjunctions [of behavior and symbols] to be fortuitous and devoid of
Implicit in the view of language as dialectical process which provides a meaning unsaturated' (Bion, 1988, p. 68). Because of this severed
glimpse, and only a glimpse, in an 'aesthetic-in-between' are two radical
link, contact with reality is 'unwelcome' and'painful' to the psychotic, who
propositions: that the ego-self and the self-identity it claims are an illusion,
is struggling to hold on to a senseof identity, which includes the struggle to
and that the real is unlocatable in space and always, ultimately, undefin-
limit the definition of that identity. 'Contact with reality is unwelcome
able.
becauseit tends not only to show that an element is unsaturated but also to
The encounter with the real occurs only insofar as the ego-self is
saturate the element in ways that are painful to the personality' (Bion,
annihilated (Ibn 'Arabi, Porete) or becomes empty (Eckhart) from and of
1988,p. 68).
its own will and images. For Porete and Eckhart, any lwill'-to be virtuous,
For traditionalists in psychoanalysis, the unconscious reveals a hidden
to gain paradise,to avoid hell, to do God's will, not to have sinned, to do
self discernable via language associations.o Language may not capture
anything for God or refrain from doing anything for God-is merely an identity, but language describessomething that exists outside of language.
enslavement to the illusory self-identity of the egb-self. Knowledge in the
The unconscious of interest is located in the analysand, and it is this
lorm of conceptions and images is a similar projection of the ego--self.For
unconscious which must be studied scientifically. Toward this end an
Eckhart, all such images must be emptied from the soul. For Ibn .Arabi,
accurate picture of the 'shadow of the object' (Bollas, 1987), a 'factual'
imagesor conceptionsof the real are'gods of belief,(cited in Sells, 19g4, sense of the character of the parents or caretakers of the analysand, is
pp. 299107), delimited forms mistakenly worshiped as if they were
helpful. The subject, the analysand, is an object which can be signified.
unlimited. The self, though seemingly separate from its image of the deity, There is a distinction of importance between historical truth and narrative
is in fact constituted by that image, even as the deity is creaied through ils reality (Spence, 1982) or fact and fiction (May, 1990).
refraction in the lens of the self. Divine and human are mutually
To Lacan, there is no historical reality that would illuminate the true self
intertwined and creative of one another. The real lies beyond this divine- of the analysand, because there is no self to be studied, only the fiction of
human polarity. selfhood. Thus, Lacan (L97311978)warns analysts that 'mapping the
202 LAcAN, BroN AND'uNSlyrNG'
subjectin relationto reality, suchasit is supposedto constituteus, and not
in relation to the signifier,amountsto falling alreadyinto the degradation
of the psychologicalconstitution of the subject' (p. MZ). Bion (1967)
suggestsa similar view in his emphasisupon immediacy:'Psychoanalytic
"observation"is concernedneitherwith what hashappenednor with what
is going to happenbut with what is happening'(p. 272).While the analyst
can know thingsthe client saysor doesor appearsto be, Bion viewssuch
knowledgeto be irrelevant to psychoanalysis. To Bion (1988),'interpre-
tation', a cornerstonein psychoanalysis, dependsnot upon suchfixed or
fixing knowledgebut ratheron 'an evolutionof O that is commonto analyst
and analysand'.It dependsupon the analyst"'becoming" O' (p. 89).
For Lacan,thereis no core-selfbut only the fiction of coherenceand the
binding of identity which occursin the handsof language.Therefore,the
'status of being, which is so elusive, so unsubstantial,is given to the
unconsciousby the procedureof its discoverer'(Lacan,197311978, p. 33).
The unconscious,then, does not contain rejectedimpulses,instinctsand
aspectsof buried and authentic self but, rather, rejected signifiersor
symbols(Felman, 1987).Thus, 'what truly belongsto the order of the
conscious,is that it is neither being, nor non-being,but the unrealized'
(Lacan, 197311978, p. 30), and the unconscious is not an entity within one
personbut is 'radicallydialogic'(Felman, 1987,p. 125).The unconscious
existsbetweer? persons;it is always a relational event. As with Bion's
analyst and analysandevolving a common 'O', Lacan's psychoanalytic
action 'is developedin and through verbal communication,that is, in a
dialecticalgraspof meaning.It presupposes. a subjectwho manifests
himself as such to the intention of another'(Lacan, 196611977, p.9).
'[P]sychoanalysisis a dialecticalexperience'(Lacan, 1982b,p. 63; original
emphasis).
The refusal by Lacan and Bion to find a true self located within the
unconsciousof the analysandand in a relationship to an analyst is
paralleledby the refusalof apophaticmysticsto find a true Selfwithin a
dualisticrelationshipwith deity. For the apophatics,the real lies beyond
and betweenthe self and the deity. The impossibilityof placingthe real
led the philosopherErigenato his statementthat 'God is nothing' (1981,
pp. 166-168).It alsoled him to a critiqueof the languageof an essentialist
deity as a placingof the real within temporaland spatiallimits, evenwhile
denying such a placement.Such conventionalreligious languageleads
to nothing other than 'monstersand'abominableidols' (Erigena,L981,
pp. 82-83). The sameconcernpropelsthe dialecticof transcendence and
immanencewhere the divine is consideredtruly transcendentonly insofar
asit is utterly immanent.The real is both everywhereand nowhere.Sucha
dialectic is at odds with conventionallogic's affirmation that the more
transcendenta deity is, the lessimmanent'it' would be. When the ego-self
passesaway or emptiesitself of its self and its God, the real is glimpsed
RTcHARDE. WEBB & MIcHAEL A. sELLs 203
beyond the domain where the human and the divine create one another
and put one another in their respective places.
In this spirit Eckhart (1981) states, 'When a person clings to place, he
clings to distinction. Therefore we pray to God that we may be free of God'
(p.202). His statement reveals the radical nature of the apophatic
relationship to deity: even in the act of praying for liberation from the
reified images of deity, one is caught up in the reification of such an image.
Similarly, Ibn'Arabi (1946; Sells, 1984) criticizes Noah for calling on the
lord as if he could call on fixed reality, as if there were a place where this
lord existed and a place where it did not. Instead, the mystic knower
chants, 'My lord, increase me in bewilderment in you' in a language that
rejects the'to' and 'from', but finds the divine everywhere. Porete (1986) is
particularly forceful in her critique of the searchfor deity' as if it were to be
found 'some-where'.
The elusiveness of the real-psychoanalytic and apophatic-has pro-
found implications for any positing of an essential reality or ultimate
importance of selfhood. Lacan (196611977)says of the truth of the 'I':
'There where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an
extinction that is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, "I" can come into
being and disappear from what I say' (p. 300). Ibn 'Arabi (1946) writes:
'You are not he/But you are he/You see him in the essence of things/
boundlessand limited' (p. 70; cited in Sells, 1984, p.302).
Rethinking Healing or Salvation
The denial of a core self recaststhe role of the psychoanalystand the aim of
psychoanalysis,just as it reshapesnotions about the role of religion and the
aim of mysticism. From the traditional perspective, psychoanalysisis the
'talking cure'. How Freud meant this can be a matter for discussion,but it
seemsclear that many mainstream analysts have come to view themselves
not only as discoverersbut also as healers(e.g. Kohut, 1984;Kurtz, 1989;
Strachey, 1934). The analysand gains understanding from interpretations,
and this promotes intrapsychic balance, better adaptation and amelioration
of symptoms. Emphasis on healing leads to talk about strengthening the
ego through better acceptance and understanding of the unconscious self.
In the language of Lacan and Bion we might say that from this perspective
the real-in the senseof being that which is ultimately true and the aim of
'knowing'-is contained in the unconscious.
Lacan and Bion do not envision psychoanalysis as an enterprise for
healers, and they view the real as something beyond the unconsciouseven
if the unconscious is an avenue to it. The goal of healing is antithetical to
the basic task of psychoanalysis.This is a minority viewpoint in the field,
although Masud Khan (1983), Harold Searles (1979) and Robert Murphy
(1960) make isolated comments akin to it'
204 LAcAN, BIoN AND 'uNSlvrNG'
Healing, then, is not the reason that the unconscious is explored. To
Lacan and Bion, the unconscious is the pathway to the real. To Bion
(1988), the analysisof the unconsciousis a pursuit of 'O', the pursuit of the
'ultimate truth . . . the infinite' (p. 26). To Lacan (197311978), the
unconscious shows the 'the gap through which neurosis recreates a
harmony with a real-a real that may well not be determined' (p.22). And
'[w]hat is ontic in the function of unconsciousis the split through which that
something, whose adventure in our field seems too short, is for a moment
brought into the light of day-a moment becausethe second stage, which is
one of closing up, gives this apprehension a vanishing aspect' (Lacan,19731
1978,p.31). It follows that the ego, which keepsthe unconsciousin stasis,
far from being a source of strength 'is nothing other than a privileged
symptom. It is the human symptom par excellence. The ego is human
being's mental illness'(Lacan, 197811988a, p. 16). With Lacan, the ego, or
a postulation of a true and authentic unconscious self, is an illusion. This
illusion is adopted in relationship to the 'other' in order to cope with the
fundamental chaos of existence, the fundamental confrontation with the
r eal. 7
For Lacan (195611968b),then, 'Psychoanalysis is properly that which
reveals both the one and the other to be simply mirages' (p. 56), and the
analyst, then, is not properly speaking a healer nor the holder of truth, but
the mediator between the analysand's various expectations of healing and
bestowal of truth (see Webb, Bushnell, & Widseth, 1993).
Similarly, for Bion, trying to 'make better', either by giving knowledge
accumulated or by any preoccupation with healing, subverts all oppor-
tunity to learn. Not wishing to heal is of central importance, because, like
not-knowing, it is a precondition for accessto knowing. 'Desires for result,
cure or even understanding must not be allowed to proliferate' (Bion,
1967, pp.272-273), becausein such a posture the analyst .cannot allow the
experienceto obtrude' (Bion, 1988,p. 41). 'At-one-ment'with ,O' (Bion,
1988, p. 89) means being free of all concerns about causing any effect; the
task is, so to speak, 'to be' not 'to do'.
Neither Bion nor Lacan rule out a healing aspect to psychoanalysis,but
they make clear that any intention to heal is destined to interfere with the
pursuit of knowing. And it is through knowledge which can be gained by
not looking to heal that healing, paradoxically, can occur.
The apophatic mystics make a similar critique of intentionalism. The
word 'salvation' is, in fact, derived from the Latin word for ,healthy',
salvw. For apophatic mystics, the mystical path entails seeking neither
holiness in this life nor salvation in an afterlife. Porete and Eckhart are
particularly insistent in their denunciations of promises of heaven or
threats of hell, and of the use of religious practices to obtain an end. Before
the soul can attain authentic life, it needs to give up all means, usagesand
dimensions of the will--even the will 'to do God's will', to avoid sin. to
RTcHARDE. wEBB & MIcHAEL A. sELLs 205
attain blessedness,to achieve paradise, to avoid hell' One who gives up
such will no longer lives 'for anything', but rather lives 'without a why' or
'without a for-what'. For Eckhart and Porete, life 'without a why' is the
only authentic life.
Beyond the Mirror: Who Can Know the Real?
Eckhart's (1931) above-cited words are useful here as a starting-point:
'When a person clings to place, he clings to distinctions' (p' 202). For Ibn
'Arabi, to think one knows the real and that one can specify or define it is
to fall into the error of taqyid or'binding'. He uses the Qur'anic story of
the angels' boasting of their superiority over Adam as a basis for a homily
on such errancy. The angelsboasted that they praised Allah with particular
divine names. However, since each angel, no matter how specially
powered, has only a limited perspective of the real, none can perform a
complete praise of the real or affirm adequately its transcendence' To
believe one can do so is to fall into dogmatism and reification (see Sells,
r988).
Lacan views as the basis for alienation from truth any notion that a
person has a speakable or definable true. self or good self, i.e. some
essentialunconscious identity which can be known. The analyst must not
fall into the posture of the boastful angel, into the presumption of knowing
becauseof special position or power. '[T]he ego of the analyst must not be
taken as the clinical criterion for reality, normality, or health, and should
thus serve neither as a model for the development of a strong autonomous
ego in the patient nor as a reference point for a cure effected through
narcissisticidentification' (Felman, 1987, p. 12).In a sentiment similar to
that expressed by Erich Fromm (1954), Lacan (1966) criticizes any view
that there is 'the one who suffers and the one #ho cures' or'the one who
knows and the one who does not know. . . . [O]ne's worst corruption is the
belief that one is better' (p. 403; cited in Felman, 1987, p.90). The analyst
should not accept the illusion that there is a 'reality of the subject beyond
the languagebarrier' or be seducedby the analysand'sbelief that'his Truth
is alreadygiven in us [the analyst]'(Lacan, 1956/1968b,p.72). To fall prey
to such illusion leads to 'objectifying intervention' (Lacan, 195611968b,
p. 72),'degradation' of the analysand (Lacan, 197311978,p. 142), and to
'setting the analysis off on an aberrant path' (Lacan , 19561t968b,p. 75).
Traditional psychoanalysishas long assumed the 'distinction of place'.
For instance, in the drive-discharge model the analyst is, as Stern (1992)
says, 'the arbiter of reality' (p. 33a). Bollas (1986) writes that self-
psychology 'aims to cure the classicalanalyst of his unwittingly obstructive
moralism' fu. a31). As viewed, however, from the apophatic margin, the
traditional schools of psychoanalysis, whether classical (drive-discharge
206 LAcAN, BroN AND'uNSavrNG'
model) or self-psychological (deficit or developmental-arrest model), are
but different refractions from the same prism. All locate the unconsciousin
the analysand. The analyst is the holder of the accumulating knowledge,
and the holder plays a role in assessinghow things fit together so that an
apt intervention or interpretation can be offered at the right time. The
analyst behind the couch taking notes, concretely personified or not, is the
defining image. The core assumption is that there is a knowable truth.
From this, judgments of good and bad are inevitable. 'Whereas it has been
joked that in the classical drive-conflict model, the customer is always
wr ong. . . , model , the
i t m a y b e s a i d th a t i n th e d e vel opmental -arrest
customer is always right' (Tansey,1992, p. 309).
Within traditional psychoanalysis, then, debate centers on whether
interpretations are theory-determined rather than properly induced from
attention to free association(e.g. Levine, 1985;Slap & Levine, 1978).The
antagonists in these debates, however, agree that the object of the search
for knowledge is the unconscious of the client.
In the extreme of this position, the analyst is the blank slate or the
mirror; what is discovered in one properly conducted analysis is what
would be discovered in another. The source of the knowledge, in other
words, doesn't change, only the person applying the technique. Thus, the
analyst doing a proper job is, in a sense,interchangeablewith any other
who would continue doing a proper job. The guiding ideal (caricature) in
all of this is science in the positivist tradition: there is a clear object of
study, and proper technique is purified of non-controlled variables (the
analyst has been through a 'control' analysis) and contaminating sources
(countertransference). Meetings to discuss matters relating to psycho-
analysis are frequently titled 'scientific'.
In mystical unsaying, the real is nowhere and everywhere. Plotinus, like
Lacan, was reluctant even to write down his ideas. Neither wanted to imply
that truth could be fixed. Bion (1991), in similar spirit, writes, 'All my life I
have been imprisoned, frustrated, dogged by common-sense, reason,
memories, desires and-greatest bugbear of all-understanding and being
understood . . . . "Why then write?" you may ask, To prevent someonewho
KNows from filling the empty space-but I fear I am being "reasonable",
that great Ape' (unnumbered). Eckhart frequently refers to his previous
statements as those of 'a certain master who said', only to go beyond them
with the phrase 'But now I say' (Sells, 1994, chaps. 6-7). Lacan (197311978)
refers to Acteon and Artemis when speaking of his attempt to speak truth:
'When I find the goddess'shiding place, I will no doubt be changed into a
stag, and you can devour me' (p. 188). Knowledge is in constant
movement. No one, regardlessof position or training, can hold it.
Ibn 'Arabi destabilizes the position of the knower through his myth of
creation and metaphor of the polished mirror. (1) Before creation, the real
existed only in its unmanifest itage, and thus did not know itself through its
RTcHARDE. WEBB & MTcHAELA. sELLs 207
'divine' names. (2) The names, non-existent in themselves, can exist only
in a cosmos in which they inhere. In order to actualize the names the real
created a cosmos. (3) The cosmos is an unpolished mirror. For the mirror
to shine and for the names to achieve actuality, the 'complete human
being'is needed (see Sells, 1988; and Sells, 1989, pp.175-124).
Ibn 'Arabi suggests that the 'complete human being' is the mythic
counterpart of the Sufi mystic who polishes the mirror of his heart and thus
achieves the 'passing away' (fana') of the ego-self (see Sells, 1989; and
Sells, 1994, chap. 4). At this moment, the ownership of the image in the
mirror becomes ambiguous. Is this the deity appearing in the mirror of the
human heart or the human self appearing in the mirror of the deity? At this
moment of mystical union, the ambiguity is expressed linguistically
through a fusion of antecedents.When Ibn'Arabi (1946) writes: 'It reveals
in it(self) through it(self) its mystery' (pp. 48-50), the antecedent of the
pronoun 'it' in each caseis neither the deity nor the human, or is both deity
and human (Sells, 1994, chaps. ,t-5). In the above translation, Sells uses
parentheses to indicate how Ibn 'Arabi's language overcomes the basic
distinction between reflexive action and non-reflexive action (enforced in
English by the grammatical rule that reflexive object pronouns must take
the suffix 'self').
To apophatics like Ibn'Arabi, the real is beyond all duality and thus
beyond being an object 'to whom' revelation occurs or a subject of
prediction, an entity said'to know'(Sells, 1988, pp. 134-138;Sells, 1994,
chap. 3). When one looks at a smudged mirror, one sees an external
object. When the mirror is polished, one seesone's own image; the mirror
as such is no longer noticed. The mirror truly exists as a mirror only in its
process of passing away.
The greatest danger in religion, for Ibn'Arabi, is to attempt to grasp the
image, to possessit. Such grasping leads to a reification of the real and the
image becomes an idol or what Ibn 'Arabi calls a 'God of beliefs' (cited in
Sells, 1984, pp. 288-301; and Sells, 1994, chap.4). The goal of the Sufi is to
achieve a state of perpetual transformation in which a new image is
engendered and then set free in each moment. That fleeing and ever-new
image is both the deity and the human at the moment of their constituting
one another.
The apophatic mystics have a complex relationship to hierarchy. They
are part of traditions that stress the authority of a sacred text and the
authority of a master or shaykh. In consonance with the medieval world-
view that saw the earth as part of a cosmos made up of layered levels or
spheres of heavens, they often set up sophisticated hierarchies of stations
and ranks. Yet what distinguishes the apophatic mystics is the affirmation
that the highest station is the station of no-station, the station in which the
entire elaborate chain collapsesback into itself. According to Eckhart, this
moment-in which the 'procession' is equal, paradoxically, to the return
 LACAN' BION AND.UNSAYTNG,
208
-always has occurred and always is occurring (Sells' 1994' chap' 6)'
Insofai as one participatesin this, one is 'equal' to this reality, a reality in
which God, th; highe;t angeland tl" fly are equal (Eckhart' 1981'p' 200;
DW: 1936-,Vol. i, pp. +6t+O+1.8
Bion and Lacan do not refer to mystical states of fana', but their
languagerecallsmysticalunsayingin the way it exposesand overcomes
suUject--oUlect dichotomies.eion (t988) writes, 'What is required [is] a
sciencethat is not restrictedby its genesisin knowledgeand sensuous
background.It must be a scienceof at-one-ment'(pp. 88-89). 'The more
his iiterpretations can be judged as showing how necessaryhis lthe
analyst,sjknowledge,ftls experience,his characterare to the thought as
formulatLd,the more reasonthere is to supposethat the interpretationis
. . . alien to the domain of o' (p. 105;original emphasis).Analytic effort
requires 'rendering oneself "artificially blind" through the exclusionof
memory and desire' (p. 57).
Lacan, too, evokesthe metaphorof the mirror. Insteadof the analyst
being a mirror which informs, the analystin his or her 'attitude offersthe
subjectthe pure mirror of an unruffledsurface'(Lacan, 196611977, p'.15),
not 'a living mirror, but an empty mirror' (Lacan, 1978/1988br p. 246). It is
not, then, a mirror which animates, informs or judges but a mirror which
'makes death present' (Lacan, 196611977, p. 140). For Lacan, what is
ultimately of importance is not what self-imagethe subject perceives
frozen in the mirror but what is seen beyond the mirror. And while
,psychoanalysis may accompanythe patient to the ecstaticlimit of the
'iThou art that", in which is revealedto him the cipher of his mortal
destiny,. . . it is not in our merepower aspractitionersto bring him to the
point where the real journey begins' (Lacan, 196611977, p. 7). Psycho-
is the meansto the truth or real. 'Thou art that'
analysisof the unconscious
is the famous statementfrom the ChandogyaUpanishad(tat tvam asi)
affirmingthe identity of a personwith the atman,that absolutereality or
self that is at one with brahman,the real. This Upanishadicreal is within
and without, transcendentand immanent,eternallyunmoving,swifter in
its motion than the wind, glimpsedonly when the mind is calmedand loses
its ego-selfattachments(Up anishads,1948,pp. 14-25,6+7 8).
For Lacan, it is not ultimately a questionof recognizingoneselfin the
mirror. '[O]n the contrary,the issuewould be not to recognizeoneselfin
the mirror, to shatter it and move on, bloodied into the void of its
absence.. . . The 'ecstasy'in questionhere is thus no longer the ek-stasis
into nothingand
of the egointo its specularimage.It is alreadyan ek-stasis
p. 81)'
a journeytowarddeath' (Borch-Jacobsen, 1991,
Lacan usesthe metaphorof the mirror as a way of sayingthat while a
personis initially constitutedas a 'self in the gazeor reflectiorrof the an-
;other', a personis continuallyin pursuitof the Other, the truth or the real
that canbe glimpsedbut not captured.The role of the analystis of mirroring,
RTcHARDE. wEBB & MTcHAEL A. sELLS 209
but only in order to bring death to the illusion that the self is an objective
reality so that the 'beyond' can be considered. The only way that this death
of self can occur is in the discourse between the analyst and the subject, a
discourse, as Felman (1987) says, 'that no consciousnesscan own' (p. 123)'
For apophatic mystics, this stage is an encounter with nothingness. For
Plotinus, the moment of mystical union demands the 'withdrawal of being'
from the real, the one (to'en), a withdrawal that engenders the fear of
nothingness. Erigena proclaims the nothingness of the deity as the
culmination of a radical destabilization of the temporal, spatial and causal
deliminations in which both deity and human have been bound by
traditional religious language. With Ibn'Arabi, as with all Sufis, the self is
annihilated in fana'and only then can a genuine image appear, fleetingly,
in the mirror of reality. With Porete, the soul is 'annihilated' in love. In the
theurgic Kabbalah of the Zohar, Keter, the highest of the divine emana-
tions and the gateway to the unlimited (ayn sof) is called nothing, ayin.
With Eckhart, the soul must lose its own will and own images before it can
give birth to the only-begotten son or word of God, which always has been
born and always is being born. This emptiness is described as knowing
nothing, willing nothing and having nothing-not even a place in which the
son is to be born. For the apophatic mystic, it is only from this encounter
with nothingness that the real can be glimpsed or contacted. It is only
through an acceptance of nothingness (without standard consolations
about afterlife) that one can be said to truly live.
Summary
In this paper, we have looked at the language of unsaying in the writings of
the apophatic mystics and the analytic writings of Lacan and Bion. We note
in the comparison that: (1) Healing or salvatiori (a term related to healing
in its etymology) are not prime motivations. Only when the desire for
healing or salvation is put aside can there be an authentic glimpse of the
real. At a more radical level, the mystics suggestthat such a glimpse occurs
only when all intention, including the intention to understand, is momen-
tarily put aside. Authentic life is life, as Eckhart and Porete would say,
'without a why'. (2) Truth, whether of the real of the apophatic mystics, or
of the fiction of the Lacanian unconscious, true self, is found within the
interstices, in the semantic'in-between'. It is fleeting, and passeswith the
flow of words and the oppositions within language. (3) The real is not
locatable in space and cannot be confined or delimited within a subject-
object relationship. And: (4) Distinctions of position or place lead to
moralism. They are incompatible with a 'radically dialogic' notion of the
unconscious which places the real beyond any function of station or
position.
 RICHARD E. WEBB & MICHAEL A. SELLS 217
LAcAN' BIoN AND 'ullslYtNc'
ZIO
theoria'In this 4. We do not wish to imply that Lacan and Bion are alone in the field of
called the perpetual mo.veTelt:f 'unknowing' psychoanalysis in strugglingwith this issue.CharlesHanly (1990)addresses it
Plotinus is at one
pru""5't'rl""llt'"o'y' o{ -of(which
unsaying explicitlyin his distinctionbetween'correspondence' and 'coherence'theoriesof
paper, we have "At"i"e"! *1ttt 1v.s,-ticat
language psychoanalytic truth. A recentedition of anotherjournal was devotedto the issueof 'What
with its practice) *tl " ltte is the
do ttrat such r"iittance to closure Does the Analyst Know?' Addressingthis issueare articlesby Louis Fourcher
unsaying. We of the
""t"*i'nl"'iiply of Lacan and Bion or (1992),IrwinHoffman (1992),Donnel Stern(1992)and MichaelTansey(1992).
only strain of thoughi wi;;*11i"'*"rks
ni*13,t"sed upon the commonalities Lacan and Bion, however,are among the earliestanalystsso persistentlyto
apophaticmystics.e;itnJil;" unsaying'we by no means questionpsychoanalytic truth. Of the authorsnamedabove,only one mentions
psychoanalvtic
betweenmysticalunsayingand context Lacanin passing(Stern),and none citespapersor lecturesby Lacanor Bion.
the metaphvsicaland historical
wish to deny the aiiiJr"ri"", in is those 5. According to the anatmcn (no-self) doctrine of TheravadaBuddhism, self-
be'heard; indeed' it
across which those ;;;;;i*i"' do we identity is the primary illusion, the ground of ignorance.When ignoranceis
io'';-ffi"g"" rather than a tautology' Nor
"un
differencesttut uttow dispelled,suffering ends. The similaritiesbetween apophaticmysticismand
;i**J oftnut dialogue'Our comparison
proposeto defineo' "il"- tt'" iurther conversation easternthought have been noted. among others, by Daisetz Suzuki (1957),
is a beginning ttop"-""uning
it *if
"n"o"'age human Reiner Sch0rmann(1978)and Rudolf Otto (1960).
't"p' of an often misunderstood
between two developed versions 6. We hastento note that any comparisonamongstschoolsof psychoanalytic
phenomenon,unsaYing' thought is likely to offend, as generalizationleads to caricature.Such broad
comparisonslose the appreciationthat ultimately every analystis different,
everyanalysta'school'and an'exception'.SeeStephenMitchell(1991)for a
Notes and reviewof how differentschoolsstrugglewith the questionof 'self'.
uTolg the metaphysical'ontological
1. There are, of course' differences the functional 7. Rose (1982)writes that for Lacan 'the place of the Other is also the placeof
ivriters. we'focusupon
theologicalcontexts;f ;;;il;ystical God' (p. 50 ) .
tt'e'n' For a full argumentshowing
and linguistic t"ut"t"t oi'i'*uylng' 'f'ut"Ot'y 8. As with the expression'We pray God that we may be free of God' (seenote 3),
ir,".o,i.onuritv.ttt'ir#;;;;iil:11vf
to tne lli,li":i::ii;
*ffi ffi:::llX1i:ffi moderneditorsand translatorshaverewritten.Eckhart's originalstatementhere
seeSells(1994)'The featurescommon from falling into the aswell, attributingthe radicalequalityto 'God' ratherthan God. For a critique
tfre
disontology-the attempt to keep 1.............iU!lrotii'Joutt"
of emanation in whichthe of this rewritingof apophatictexts and interpolationback into them of modern
metaphor
categoryof being;(2) a self-deconstructive conceptions of what the medievalsmusthavebelieved,seeSells(1994,chap.7).
gradedhie-rarchies'iltu;;t-;;;i;:::-T'.H':1.:'';3;"J;::-t:i:;;i: 9. SeeJonathanLee (1990)for a detailedaccountof the developmentof Lacan's
-:::,ffi positionon healing,the subversionof the Cartesianhuman subject,and the
;,l?,fi"JT;il:i':#'"""Tffi,?lL;;;;;"euue";(a)u"'itiqu"ot
in-favorof a dialecticof transcendence
unknowabilityof the real. Of specialinterestare Lee's discussions of paradox
(pp. 133-138,190-196) and jouissance(pp. 177-186).For a different, but
theologicalum'*utlonllii'*""nA"n"e no single
aotturJ ptpositions in which
and immanent", (5;";;;g"le" "f
complementaryperspective,see Malcom Bowie (1991). For a critique of
t,"i"*"* about the transcendentis meaningful' Lacan'snotion of the 'lack', seeGilles Deleuzeand Felix Guattari ('1977),and
2.Edithwyschogrod ; %i";;; ;.ottt:t"'::*i:"-T ;?i"":' T:ffi
Lacan :l'":?t::il;
specincailv EugeneHolland (198S).Sells(1994)placesthe radicallyapophaticaspects ofthe
is\oted berow'
' :j;:l'H1"J'-ili.'",i':';tL'#'Plotinus'
of
influence
.-{t,Ii' t:i::'ift
five mysticsdiscussed abovewithin the contextof their completewritings.
thelnltusr
acknowledges
tne
acknowledges :13"il":tiTt'#
first
*:1 ti need to proceed
":**t
*"^
influence were our primary interest' the Lacanian'lack'( References
whosewritin'fi": ;']'l:i;ii:1":'",1.,''
Augustine, 1e8e' p' ix)'
fi,;il;;h' iio*nn"ra,& Raschke'
Benvenuto,B., & Kennedy,R. (1986).Theworksof Jacques
Lacan.London:Free
3. rhe modern editorof Fckhart's Books.
##il;;;;;';;i**,9':"li:":::'-,:'^'i:::i%l
*".ul3lill"nffi ""111..:',i:i":?:"li:"J[ili::#:::l *.rrssociation
otll: W.R. (1967).
Noteson memoryand desire.Psycho-analytic
Forum,2,272-
transrator,
translator' iq'I.*1,-t
E'or.urtu c"ii"ds"
Edmund ?11
J'.i::'^l*'i;l ffi:":11 2n.
tt?n, *.*
1;;;" Iiit o*n' thus translatinc-
tit.phtu:::; (1977).Sevenservants:Four works by Wilfred R. Bion. New york:
interPolations,and adde
pray Godt toridus.t'c.'o;i nottherein Eckh
"l*1"':t:'*::;Li],1ill"ll'H"Jt:'J'X art's ^.Jason
Aronson.'
?|XI:r: !i :'uor$ lJ,.""t::";"'t' "o", 9":1Tl'^' "tS,-I.n. (1938). Attention and interpretation.London: MaresfieldLibrary,
uPvvr -*"-'
butthroughserective-'"q'lP;3?;;:;*lll3:f.t::i
but through selectrveuse ur
j"-e"Tip:tffi:i tt o.H' KatnacBooks.
he reader is led to believe
Quint,Colledge
;;;iiil;-" cases' "."dItilII':
n t:;ll" Rt""' w:i.iil;\'.'ur*oi, of thefuture.NewYork: Brunner/Mazel.
thedistinctton
the existed
onexrsreu
distincti til'-"'i ""tlli1 l interest
t"'r':';; "-1:
llt-":lil l:HffJ#l". S. (1971). Diary of my analysis with Sigmund Freud. New York:
" t'J';;^ rp""i"r that this particular
g'
oi ltsetras rre nkin
e-ihi Books.
:1"".:$:::,,n ffi iliiXi; ;; i ;;iJ *rinks
2t2 LACAN, BroN AND 'uNsavtNc'
iiollas, C. (1986).Who doesself psychologycure?Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 6, 429-
435.
Bollas, C. (1987). The shadow of the obiect: Psychoanalysisof the unthought
known. London: Free AssociationBooks.
Borch-Jacobsen, M. (1991).Lacan: The absolutemaster.Stanford,CA: Stanford
UniversityPress.
Bowie,M."(1991).Lacan.Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress.
Deleuze,G., & Guattari, F. (1983).Anti-Oedipus:Capitalismand schizophrenia
(R. Hurley, M. Seem, & H. Lane, Trans.). Minneapolis:University of
MinnesotaPress.
Eckhart, M. (DW: 193G). Die deutschenwerkefThe Germanworks] (J. Quint,
Ed.). Stuttgart:W. Kohlhammer.
Eckhart,M. (LW: 193G). Die lateinischen werke[The Latin works](J. Koch, Ed.).
Stuttgartand Berlin: W. Kohlhammer.
Eckhart, M. (1941).MeisterEckhart:A moderntranslation(R.B. Blakney, Ed.).
New York: Harper.
Eckhart, M. (1981). Meister Eckhart: The essentialsermons, commentaries,
treatises,and defense(E. Colledge& M. McGinn, Eds. & Trans.). New York:
PaulistPress.
Erigena,John the Scot.(1981).Periphyseon: De divisionenaturae[Concerningthe
divisionof nature] (Vol. 3) (LP. Sheldon-Williams, Ed. & Trans.).Dublin:
Dublin Institutefor AdvancedStudies.
Felman, S. (1987).JacquesLacan and the adventureof insight.Cambridge,MA:
Harvard UniversityPress.
Fourcher,L. (1992).Interpretingthe relative and absoluteunconscious. Psycho-
analytic Dialogues,2, 317-329.
Freud, S. (1964).Findings,problems,ideas.In J. Strachey(Ed. & Trans.), The
standardedition of the completepsychologicalworks of SigmundFreud (Yol.23,
pp. 299-300).London: Hogarth Press.(Original work published1941.)
Fromm, E. (1954, 11 March). Remarks on the problem of free association.
PsychiatricResearchReports, 1,4.
Hanly, C. (1990).The conceptof truth in psychoanalysis. InternationalJournalof
Psycho-analysis,7I, 375-383.
Hoffman, LZ. (1992).Somepracticalimplicationsof a social-constructivist view of
the psychoanalytic situation. PsychoanalyticDialogues,2, 287-304.
Holland, E. (1988).The ideologyof lack in Lackanianism. In R. Merrill (Ed.),
Ethicslaesthetics:
Postmodernpositions(pp. 59-69). Washington,DC: Maison-
neuvePress.
Ibn 'Arabi. (1,946).Fusus al-Hikam lBezels of wisdoml (A.A. Afifl, Ed. &
Comm.). Cairo: Dar Ihya' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya.
Khan, M.M.R. (1983).Hiddenselves:Betweentheoryandpracticein psychoanaly-
sis. London: Hogarth Press.
Kohut, H. (1984).How doesanalysiscure? Chicago,IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Kurtz, S. (1989). Theart of unknowing: Dimensionsof opennessin analytictherapy.
New York: JasonAronson.
Lacan, J. (1966).Ecrits. Paris:Editionsdu Seuil.
Lacan, J. (1968a).Introductiond Scilicet.Paris:Editions du Seuil.
RTcHARD E. wEBB & MTcHAEL A. sELLS 213
Lacan, J. (1968b).Speechand languagein psychoanalysrs (A. Wilden, Trans').
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published
19s6.)
Lacan,J. (1977).Ecri* (A. Sheridan,Trans.).New York: Norton. (Originalwork
published1966.)
Lacan,J.(1978).Thefourfundamentalconceptsof psychoanalysis(J.Miller,Ed. &
A. Sheridan,Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published1973.)
Lacan,J. (1982a).God and thejouissanceof thswoman. In J. Mitchell & J. Rose
(Eds.), Femininesexuality:JacquesLacan and the 4colefreudienne(pp. 138-
148).New York: Norton. (Original work published1975)
Lacan,J. (1982b).Interventionon transference.In J. Mitchell & J. Rose (Eds.),
Femininesexuality:JacquesLacan and the 1colefreudienne(pp. 61-73). New
York: Norton. (Original work published1975.)
Lacan, J. (1982c).A love letter. In J. Mitchell & J. Rose (Eds.), Feminine
sexuality:JacquesLacan and the Acolefreudienne(pp. 1a9-161).New York:
Norton. (Original work published1966.)
Lacan, J. (1988a). The seminarof JacquesLacan. Book I: Freud'spapers on
technique,1953-1954(J. Miller, Ed. & J. Forrester,Trans.).New York: Norton.
(Original work published1978.)
Lacan, J. (1988b).The Seminarof JacquesLacan. Book II: The ego in Freud's
theory and in the techniqueof psychoanalysis 1954-1955(J. Miller, Ed. & S.
Tomaselli,Trans.). New York: Norton. (Originalwork published1978.)
Lee, J.S. (1990).JacquesLacan.Boston,MA: TwaynePublishers.
Levine, F. (1985). Self-psychologyand the new narcissismin psychoanalysis,
ClinicalPsychologyReview,5 , 215229.
Lindon, J. (1967). Discussantof Bion's paper, 'Notes on memory and desire'.
Psycho-analyticForum, 2, 274-275.
Macey,D. (1988).Lacan in contexts.London: Verso.
May, R. (1990).The idea of historyin psychoanalysis: Freud and the 'Wolf-Man'.
PsychoanalyticPsychology,7, 163-183.
Meissner,W.W. (1988).Book review. Thought,63, 442446.
Milner, M. (1987).1973:Somenoteson psychoanalytic ideasabout mysticism.In
D. Tuckett (Gen. Ed.), Thesuppressed madnessof sanemen (The New Library
of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 3, pp.258-274).London: Tavistock.
Mitchell, S.A. (1991).Contemporaryperspectiveson the self: Toward an inte-
gration. Psychoanalytic Dialogues,1, 121-147.
Murphy, R.C. (1960). Psychotherapybased on human longing. Pendle Hill
Pamphlet111.
Otto, R. (1960).MysticismEastandWest (B. Bracey& R. Payne,Trans.).New
York: Collier Books.
Plotinus.(1959).Plotini opera,editio maior (Vol. 2; P. Henry & H.R. Schwyzer,
Eds. and G. Lewis, Trans. Arabic version).Paris:Descl6ede Brouwer.
Porete,M. (1986).Le mirouerdessimplesames(Speculumsimpliciumanimarum).
[The mirror of the simple souls](R. Guarnier, Ed. Old French;P. Verdeyen,
Ed. Latin). CorpusChristianorum69. Turnbolt: Brepols.
Rose, J. (1982). Introduction-Il. In J. Mitchell & J. Rose (Eds.), Feminine
sexuality, Jacques Lacan and the lcole freudienne (pp. 27-57). New York:
Norton.
 2I4 LAC A N , B ION A N D .U N SA Y IN G' RIcHARD E. wEBB & MTcHAEL A. sELLS 215

Schiirmann,R. (197g). MeisterEckhart, mystic and philosopYer.Bloomington: Mtcraer A. Snns is AssociateProfessorand Chairpersonin the Depart-
ment of Religionat Haverford College.He is interestedin the natureof
Indiana UniversityPress.
symbolsand in literarylanguages that resistclosure.His work on mystical
Searles,H.F. (1979). The .dedicated'physicianin the field of psychotherapyand languageis representedinhis Mystical Languagesof Unsaying(University
psychoanalysis.In Counteryansference and related subiects: Selectedpapers of ChicagoPress,1994).His writing on the ancientArabic Ode (Qasida)
(pp. 71-S8).New York: InternationalUniversitiesPress.(Original work published is representedin his DesertTracings:Six ClassicArabian Odes(Wesleyan
re67.) UniversityPress,1989),and 'Guisesof the Ghul: DissemblingSimileand
Sells,M.A. (1984).Ibn'Arabi's gardenamongthe flames:A reevaluation.History SemanticOverflow in the ClassicalArabic Qasida', in S. Stetkevych
of Religions, 23, 287115. (8d,.), Reorientations:Arabic and PersianPoetics(University of Indiana
Sells,M.A. (1985).Apophasisin Plotinus:A criticalapproach.Hqrvard Theologi- Press,1993).His most recentessayon Qur'aniclanguageis 'Soundand
cal Review,78, 34, 47-65. Meaningin Suratal-Qari'a' (Arabica,40(3),1993).Annnnss:Department
Sells,M.A. (1988).Ibn 'Arabi's polishedmirror: Perspectiveshift and meaning of Religion, Haverford College, Haverford, PA 19041-1392(e-mail:
event. Studia Islamica, 67, 121-149. msells@haverford. edu).
Sells,M.A. (1989).Bewilderedtongue:The semanticsof mysticalunion in Islam.
In M. Idel & B. McGinn (Eds.), Mysticalunion and monotheistic faith (pp.87-
124, 163-173).New York: Macmillan.
Sells, M.A. (1994).Mystical languagesof the unsayable.ChicagoIL: University of
ChicagoPress.
Slap,J., & Levine,F. (1978).On hybridconceptsin psychoanalysis.Psychoanalytic
Quarterly, X LV I I, 499-523.
Spence,D.P. (1982).Naruativetruth and historicaltruth: Meaningand interpre-
tation in psychoanalysis.New York: Norton.
Stern, D.B. (1992). Commentaryon constructivismin clinical psychoanalysis.
PsychoanalyticDialogues,2, 331163.
Strachey,J. (1934). The nature of the therapeuticaction of psycho-analysis.
Internationallournal of Psycho-analysis,15, 127-159.
Suzuki,D.T. (1957).Mysticism:Christianand Buddhist New York: Harper.
Tansey,M.J. (1992).Psychoanalytic Dialogues,2,305-
experience.Psychoanalytic
316.
Thompson,M. (1985).Thedeathof desire:A studyin psychopathology. New York:
New York UniversityPress.
Upanishad.s. (1948).(S. Prabhavananda & F. Manchester,Eds. & Trans.). New
York: Mentor.
Webb, R.E., Bushnell,D.F., & Widseth,J.C. (1993).Tiresiasand the breast:
Thinking of Lacan, interpretation,and caring.InternationalJournalof Psycho-
analysis,73, 597412.
Wyschogrod,E., Crownfield,D., & Raschke,C. (1989).Lacan and theological
discourse.Albany: State University of New York Press.

AcxNowrtocEMtNr. A shortenedversionof this paperwas presentedat

the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association,Wash-
ington,DC, 15 August1992.
Rtcrano E. Wrss is Director of PsychologicalServicesat Haverford
College and is also in private practiceas a psychotherapist. He has a
specialinterest in assumptionsabout 'truth', authority and agencyof
changein the practiceof psychotherapy. He has written about this as it
relates to Lacanian psychoanalysis, time-limited therapy and psycho-
therapywith collegestudents.Annness:Psychological Services,Founders
Hall,320 W. LancasterAve., HaverfordCollege,Haverford,PA 19041-
1392(e-mail: rwebb@acc.haverford.edu).

View publication stats