MCL Maghirang

ASSIGNMENT NUMBER 4

I. Possessor of Animals

ART. 2183. THE POSSESSOR OF AN ANIMAL OR WHOEVER MAY MAKE USE OF THE SAME IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE WHICH IT MAY CAUSE, ALTHOUGH IT MAY ESCAPE OR BE
LOST. THIS RESPONSIBILITY SHALL CEASE ONLY IN CASE THE DAMAGE SHOULD COME FROM
FORCE MAJEURE OR FROM THE FAULT OF THE PERSON WHO HAS SUFFERED DAMAGE.


Vestil vs IAC

Doctrine: Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on
the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause

Facts: On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu
City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated
wounds on the forehead"  and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following
day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.

Counter argument of Purita Vestil: She insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by
her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. She also
argues that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness, there was no clear
showing that she died as a result thereof

Issue: Whether or not Purita Vestil should be held liable?

Held: YES. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the
incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care
of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness,  and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the
house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is
also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although
Purita said she knew them only casually.

On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death has beep satisfactorily established.The death certificate is not conclusive proof of the
cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient
to convince he court that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated
a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor

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liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not
matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the
child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long
as they cause injury.

II. Things thrown or falling from a building

ART. 2193. THE HEAD OF A FAMILY THAT LIVES IN A BUILDING OR A PART THEREOF, IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THINGS THROWN OR FALLING FROM THE SAME.

Dingcong vs Kanaan

Facts: Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria rented a
room in the upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above the store occupied by
Kanaan brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night, Echevarria carelessly left his faucet open
thereby flooding his room and it caused water to drip from his room to the store below. Because of this,
the articles sold by Kanaan were damaged. Also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from
Echevarria’s room was defective hence the flooding and dripping.

Issue: Whether or not Dongcong should be held liable for the damages caused by Echevarria?

Held: YES. Dongcong as the owner of the hotel is liable for the negligent acts of the guests staying at his
hotel, in this case Echevarria. The court found that it was not shown the Dingcong, as owner, exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the damage caused. The pipes should have been
repaired and that Echaverria should have been provided with a container to catch the drip. Therefore,
Dongcong is liable to pay for the damages by reason of his negligence.

III. Death / Injuries in the course of employment

ART. 1711. OWNERS OF ENTERPRISES AND OTHER EMPLOYERS ARE OBLIGED TO PAY
COMPENSATION FOR THE DEATH OF OR INJURIES TO THEIR LABORERS, WORKMEN,
MECHANICS OR OTHER EMPLOYEES, EVEN THOUGH THE EVENT MAY HAVE BEEN PURELY
ACCIDENTAL OR ENTIRELY DUE TO A FORTUITOUS CAUSE, IF THE DEATH OR PERSONAL
INJURY AROSE OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT. THE EMPLOYER IS ALSO
LIABLE FOR COMPENSATION IF THE EMPLOYEE CONTRACTS ANY ILLNESS OR DISEASE
CAUSED BY SUCH EMPLOYMENT OR AS THE RESULT OF THE NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT.
IF THE MISHAP WAS DUE TO THE EMPLOYEE'S OWN NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE, OR
VOLUNTARY ACT, OR DRUNKENNESS, THE EMPLOYER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR
COMPENSATION. WHEN THE EMPLOYEE'S LACK OF DUE CARE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH
OR INJURY, THE COMPENSATION SHALL BE EQUITABLY REDUCED.

ART. 1712. IF THE DEATH OR INJURY IS DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF A FELLOW WORKER, THE
LATTER AND THE EMPLOYER SHALL BE SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR COMPENSATION. IF A
FELLOW WORKER'S INTENTIONAL MALICIOUS ACT IS THE ONLY CAUSE OF THE DEATH OR
INJURY, THE EMPLOYER SHALL NOT BE ANSWERABLE, UNLESS IT SHOULD BE SHOWN THAT
THE LATTER DID NOT EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION OR SUPERVISION OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S FELLOW WORKER.

Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine

Doctrine: The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an
employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to
recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from
his place of employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his

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employment. This does not imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his
way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment.

Facts: It appears from the evidence that Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing
Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila,
and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. His
compensation was a commission of eight per cent on all collections made by him. On the afternoon of
Sunday, November 16, 1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally
injured at the corner of O'Donnell and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano
Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without notifying
the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in
San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on
Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.

On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck which caused the death of Leopoldo
Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and was
sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, and to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo
Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000.

On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the present action to
recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, P100 for
burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and
they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 ︎fty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks or
P1,745.12, plus P100 for burial expenses.

Contention of company: That the plaintiffs had already obtained a judgment against Vitaliano Sumoay for
the damages caused by him; that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries
resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday;
that the deceased had never notifi︎ed the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del
Monte to Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the
accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or
require its agents to use bicycles

Issue: Whether or not the company should be liable to pay the family of the deceased employee?

Held. NO. Madlangbayan died on Nov 16, 1930. Act 3812 was approved on Dec 8, 1930. o Therefore, it
is Act 3428 that applies.

Act 3428 says: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance
of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified. The phrase “due to and in the pursuance of” used in Act No. 3428 was changed in
Act No. 3812 to “arising out of and in the course of.” Accdg to Mueller v. Industrial Board: The words
“arising out of” refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the
words “in the course of” refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an
insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the
employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of
the work in the scope of the workman’s employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in
which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a
special degree by reason of such employment. o Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally
exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. This does
not mean that an employee cannot recover for injuries suffered while on the way to and from work. o

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That depends on the nature of his employment. o In this case, if Madlangbayan had been killed while
going from house to house in San Francisco while collecting, the family would have the primacie right to
recover.

Also, Madlangbayan did not notify the company of his change in address, so it did not know that he was
living in Manila. o Also, the company did not require him to work on a Sunday o It did not give/require its
employees to use bicycles Those are addtl reasons to say that the accident was not due to and
pursuance of the employment. If he saw fit to change his residence and to make use of a bicycle, he did
so at his own risk. If he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment,
and his employer is not liable for any injury.

The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his
employment. At the time that he was run over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the
pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had
︎nished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to make collections for the
defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an
employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to
recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from
his place of employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his
employment.

The court do not mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way
to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if the deceased had
been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his
employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.

IV. Strict Liability / Product Liability

ART. 2187. MANUFACTURERS AND PROCESSORS OF FOODSTUFFS, DRINKS, TOILET ARTICLES

AND SIMILAR GOODS SHALL BE LIABLE FOR DEATH OR INJURIES CAUSED BY ANY NOXIOUS
OR HARMFUL SUBSTANCES USED, ALTHOUGH NO CONTRACTUAL RELATION EXISTS
BETWEEN THEM AND THE CONSUMERS.

Coca - Cola vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Respondent Lydia Geronimo was the proprietess of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, engaged
in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public.
On August 12, 1989, some parents of the students complained that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She discovered the presence of some fiber-like
substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an
unopened Sprite bottle. The Department of Health informed her that the samples she submitted are
adulterated. Her sales of soft drinks plummeted, and not long after that, she had to close shop. She
became jobless and destitute. She demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was
rebuffed by it. 

Issue: Whether or not Coca Cola should be liable?

Held: YES. The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract
between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability
may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a
quasi-delict. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by

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the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been,
in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case.

Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based
on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.Quasi-delict, as de︎ned in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or quasi-delitos) is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal
acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.

V. Interference with contractual relations

ART. 1314. ANY THIRD PERSON WHO INDUCES ANOTHER TO VIOLATE HIS CONTRACT SHALL
BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTY

GR LEGAL BASIS XPN

Only the parties to a contract are Art. 1311. Contracts take effect 1. If the contract contains
bound by the terms of the only between the parties, their stipulations in favor of 3rd
contract and only a party to the assigns and heirs persons

contract can file an action for 2. If the contract is intended to

b re a c h o f c o n t r a c t o r f o r defraud creditors
rescission or annulment thereof
GR LEGAL BASIS ELEMENTS

The contracting parties cannot Art. 1314. Any third person who 1. Existence of a valid contract

sue a 3rd person for breach of induces another to violate his 2. Knowledge on the part of the
contract but if the 3rd person contract shall be liable for third person of the existence
induces another to violate his damages to the other of the contract

contract then he can be sued.

contracting party
3. Interference of the third
person without legal
-this is known as “interference justification or excuse
with contractual relations”

AS TO CONTRATCS

When will there be no tort even if there is interference?

1. If the party to the contract had already broken the contract

2. If the injured party voluntarily released the other

3. If the contract is void

NOTE: Even if the contract is UNENFORCEABLE (meaning there was failure to comply with the statues
of fraud), an action for the interference of contract can still be maintained.



AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE

Malice - the intentional doing of a harmful act without legal or social justification or excuse.

How do you know if there is malice?

1. The wrong doer knows the existence of the contract

2. He sets about to break it up

note: it is irrelevant if he would benefit from it or he just likes to gratify himself for this mischief

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AS TO ITS PROCUREMENT (how is it done)

Induce - a situation where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or
intimidation

AS TO ITS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION

When will intentionally invading the legally protected interest of others justifiable?

1. If he acts to promote the interests of others or himself

2. If the interest which he seeks to advance is SUPERIOR to the interest invaded

When will competition in business afford the privilege to interfere?

1. If the defendant’s purpose is a justifiable one

2. If the actor employs no means of fraud or deception that are regarded as unfair

AS TO THE EXTENT OF LIABILITY]

What is the extent of liability for the tortfeasor?

Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of whether foreseen or unforeseen.

What if there is good faith, what will be the extent of liability for the tortfeasor?

When there is good faith, the party who breached the contract is only libale for consequences that can
be forseen

Gilchrist vs Cuddy

Doctrine: The interference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto gives rise to an action for damages
in favor of the injured person. The law does not require that the responsible person have known the
identity of the injured person.

Facts: Cuddy was the owner of the ︎lm Zigomar and that on the 24th of April he rent

ed it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week
beginning that day. A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he had
forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other arrangements with his ︎lm. The other
arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the
injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the week beginning the 26th
of May. It appears from the testimony in this case, conclusively, that Cuddy wilfully violated his contract,
he being the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because the defendants had offered him more for the
same period.

Issue: Was the interference of Espejo, a stranger to the contract, gives rise to an action for damages
against the injured party?

Held: YES. In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist-Cuddy contract on
the part of the appellants was a desire to make a pro︎t by exhibiting the ︎lm in their theater. There was no
malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that
contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable
to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of
the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film. The
liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were
under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist

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So Ping Bun vs Court of Appeals

Facts: In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan and Sons,
Inc. (DCCSI) involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used to store textiles. The
agreements were for one (1) year, with provisions for month-to-month rental should the lessee continue
to occupy the properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved, and the former
members formed Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing partner of the
defunct company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson, occupied the warehouse for his
own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong (Tek Hua
Enterprises, the new company after Tek Hua Trading was dissolved) sent a letter to So Ping Bun (the
grandson) demanding that the latter vacate the premises. So Ping Bun refused, and on March 4, 1992,
he requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. The contracts were executed. Private respondents
moved for the nullification of the contract and claimed damages. The petition was granted by the trial
court, and eventually by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract?

Held: YES. Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other
has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The
elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or
excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a
result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as correctly
viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the
instant case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule,
justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to
benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.
Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that
of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is
substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts
in self-protection. Moreover justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to
depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient
if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Where
there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where
the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said
that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse
to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the
property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice on him. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and
since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual,

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moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's
fees.

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing
contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing,
without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused
by petitioner's interference.

VI. Liability of local government units

ART. 2189. PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES SHALL BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR
THE DEATH OF, OR INJURIES SUFFERED BY, ANY PERSON BY REASON OF THE DEFECTIVE
CONDITION OF ROADS, STREETS, BRIDGES, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND OTHER PUBLIC WORKS
UNDER THEIR CONTROL OR SUPERVISION.

Guilatco vs City fo Dagupan

Doctrine: It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised
over the defective road or street.

FACTS: Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national
road) when she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her
hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable to
go to work, thereby losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial
self since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She filed an action for
damages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the
manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan.

ISSUE: Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.

HELD: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defective
road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either control
or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, this control or supervision is
provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include
the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of Dagupan provides
that the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the
regulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage
hole is located.

VII. Presumption of Negligence

ART. 2185. UNLESS THERE IS PROOF TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS PRESUMED THAT A PERSON
DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN NEGLIGENT IF AT THE TIME OF THE MISHAP, HE WAS
VIOLATING ANY TRAFFIC REGULATION.

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ART. 2188. THERE IS PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANT IF THE DEATH OR INJURY RESULTS FROM HIS POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS
WEAPONS OR SUBSTANCES, SUCH AS FIREARMS AND POISON, EXCEPT WHEN THE
POSSESSION OR USE THEREOF IS INDISPENSABLE IN HIS OCCUPATION OR BUSINESS.

ART. 2190. THE PROPRIETOR OF A BUILDING OR STRUCTURE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

DAMAGES RESULTING FROM ITS TOTAL OR PARTIAL COLLAPSE, IF IT SHOULD BE DUE TO THE
LACK OF NECESSARY REPAIRS. (1907)

ART. 2191. PROPRIETORS SHALL ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED:

(1) BY THE EXPLOSION OF MACHINERY WHICH HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN CARE OF WITH DUE
DILIGENCE, AND THE INFLAMMATION OF EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN
KEPT IN A SAFE AND ADEQUATE PLACE;
(2) BY EXCESSIVE SMOKE, WHICH MAY BE HARMFUL TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY;
(3) BY THE FALLING OF TREES SITUATED AT OR NEAR HIGHWAYS OR LANES, IF NOT CAUSED
BY FORCE MAJEURE;
(4) BY EMANATIONS FROM TUBES, CANALS, SEWERS OR DEPOSITS OF INFECTIOUS MATTER,
CONSTRUCTED WITHOUT PRECAUTIONS SUITABLE TO THE PLACE. (1908)

ART. 2192. IF DAMAGE REFERRED TO IN THE TWO PRECEDING ARTICLES SHOULD BE THE
RESULT OF ANY DEFECT IN THE CONSTRUCTION MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 1723, THE THIRD
PERSON SUFFERING DAMAGES MAY PROCEED ONLY AGAINST THE ENGINEER OR ARCHITECT
OR CONTRACTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAID ARTICLE, WITHIN THE PERIOD THEREIN FIXED.

ART. 2193. THE HEAD OF A FAMILY THAT LIVES IN A BUILDING OR A PART THEREOF, IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THINGS THROWN OR FALLING FROM THE SAME.

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