Miller v.

California court ruled that the publication of

Miller had no literary, artistic,
Facts political or scientific value and
found that hard-core portrayal of
Marvin Miller is an owner of a sexual conduct, for its own sake
business in California which and for the ensuing commercial
distributes explicit or gain, does not fit the articulated
pornographic books and films. He standard.
was was convicted because he
sent these phonographic The court Obscenity is
materials through mail in a determined by applying
restaurant in Newport, California. “contemporary community
The materials consists of standards”
pictures and drawings very
explicitly depicting men and Test for obscenity
women in engaging in a variety of (a) whether the average person,
sexual activities. applying contemporary
community standards, would find
Issue that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest;
Whether or not the
distribution of obscene materials (b) whether the work depicts or
by mail is protected under the describes, in a patently offensive
First Amendment’s freedom of way, sexual conduct specifically
speech guarantee? defined by the applicable state
law and
Ruling
(c) whether the work, taken as a
NO. The Supreme Court said whole, lacks serious literary,
that obscene materials are not artistic, political or scientific
protected by freedom of speech value.
guarantee. Furthermore, the

Pita v. Court of Appeals police was able to confiscate

Facts
The Mayor of Manila, Ramon
Bagatsing, initiated an “Anti-
Smut Campaign” in 1983. The
magazines, publications and
other reading materials believed
to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent from establishments
along Manila sidewalks. The
police then burned the seized
materials along Recto, in the
presence of Mayor and several
officers and members of various
student organizations.
Among the materials seized
and burned was the Pinoy
Playboy magazines which was
published and co-edited by Pita.
Pita (the petitioner) then filed a
case against Mayor Bagatsing in
order to stop the confiscation of
his magazine.
Pita claimed that the
magazine is a decent, artistic
and educational magazine which
is not per se obscene and is
protected by the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech
RTC ruling
Seizure was valid
C.A. ruling
Affirmed the ruling of RTC
Issue
Whether or not the seizure of
Pita’s magazine violated the
guarantee of the freedom of
expression
Ruling
YES. The Supreme Court said
that the government authorities
have not shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of Pinoy
Playboy. First of all, they were
not possessed of a lawful court
order in finding the said materials
to be pornography and second
authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure by way of a
search warrant.
If the pictures in the
magazine was not used for art’s
sake but for commercial
purposes, then it is not entitled
to any Constitutional protection
The court used the Kottinger
ruling to define what is obscene.
In determining the existence of
obscenity through the Kottinger
Ruling, it must be asked that
(1) “To whether the tendency of
the matter charged as obscene,
is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or
other article charged as being
obscene may fall.”
(2) “is that which shocks the
ordinary and common sense of
men as an indecency.”
Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation
Facts
The Inside Story of ABS-CBN
aired “Prosti-tuition” which
depicted female students of
Philippine Women’s University
secretly working as prostitutes
to enable them to pay for tuition
fees. The show caused an uproar
in the PWU community.
PWU and MTRCB alleged that
the “Prosti-tuition” episode
ruined the name of PWU and led
to harassment of its female
students.
MRTCB alleges that (1) the
respondents (ABS-CBN) did not
submit “The Inside Story” for the
MTRCB to review and (2)
exhibited the episode without the
approval of MTRCB which
violates Section 7 of P.D 1986
and the MRTCB Rules and
Regulations.
ABS-CBN contends that “The
Inside Story” is a covered by the
constitutional provision on
Freedom of expression and of the
press and that MTRCB has no
authority to impose any form of
restraint upon them.
Issue
Whether or not MTRCB has
the power to review the
television program “The Inside
Story”
Ruling
Yes. The law gives MTRCB
the power to screen, review and
examine all television program
because P.D 1986 gives MTRCB
“the power to screen, review, and
examine “all television programs”
The word “all” covers all
television programs whether
religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. and since “The
Inside Story” is a television
program it is within the
jurisdiction of the MTRCB.
Furthermore, Supreme Court
cited the ruling in Iglesia ni
Cristo vs. Court of Appeals which
INC sought to be exempted in
MTRCB’s review power. INC
argued that religious programs
are not included in the term
“television programs” It is
significant to note that in Iglesia
ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, the
court declared that freedom of
religion is given preferred status
by the framers of our laws.
However, there has been no
declaration at on that freedom of
expression and of the press has a
preferred status. If this Court, in
Iglesia ni Cristo v CA, did not
exempt religious programs from
the jurisdiction and review power
of petitioner MTRCB, with more
reason, there is no justification
to exempt "The Inside Story”.
which, according to respondents, deemed “offensive” by
is protected by the constitutional contemporary community
provision on freedom of standards
expression and of the press, a
freedom bearing no preferred The American Civil Liberties
status. argued that certain parts of the
Communication Decency Act
Freedom of Expression has were unconstitutional. The
no preferred status Government however contend
the CDA was similar to decency
laws that were prior upheld.

Issue

Whether or not certain

provisions of the 1996
Communication Decency Act
violate first amendment which
guarantees the freedom of
speech?

Ruling

YES. The Supreme Court

Reno v American Civil Liberties distinguished the differences
Union between Internet communication
and previous types of
Facts communication the Court had
ruled on.
The 1996 Communication
Decency Act was intended to Justice Stevens said in order
protect minors from explicit to deny minors access to
material on the internet by potentially harmful speech, the
criminalizing the transmission of Act also effectively suppresses a
“obscene of indecent” messages large amount of speech that
to anyone under 18 years old. It adults have a constitutional right
also criminalizes transmission of to receive and to address to one
information which depicts or another.
describes “sexual or excretory
activities or organs” in a manner
 Although the government has
an interest in protecting children
from harmful materials, it is not
enough to justify an
unnecessarily broad suppression
of speech addressed to adults

SC distinguishes Internet from

radio -> Radio broadcasts were Disini Jr v Sec of Justice
subject to greater regulation than
the print media because it is FACTS
intrusive; listeners have no idea  Petitioners claim that the
what they will hear before tuning means adopted by the
in. On the other hand, Internet cybercrime law for regulating
users must “click on” websites undesirable cyberspace activities
and usually have a general idea violate certain of their
of whether they are likely to view constitutional rights. However,
objectionable material. the government asserts that the
law merely seeks to reasonably
put order into cyberspace
activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on
the system.

Petitioners challenge the

constitutionality of 21 provisions
of the cybercrime law that regard
certain acts as crimes and
impose penalties for their
commission as well as provisions
that would enable the
government to track down and
penalize violators.

ISSUE
(1) Whether or not Section
4(c)(3) violates freedom of
speech
(2) Whether or not Section 12
violates the right to privacy and
protection from the government’s trespass because they tend to
intrusion into online interfere with online services and
communications enter a user’s domain without
(3) Whether or not Section 19 permission.
which authorizes the Department
of Justice to restrict computer The court noted that spams
data to be found in violation of are a category of commercial
the Act violates the right to speech, which does not receive
freedom of expression the same level of protection as
other constitutionally guaranteed
RULING forms of expression, but
YES. The Supreme Court of nonetheless entitled to
Philippines declared (A) Section protection
4(c)(3), (B) section 12, and (C)
section 19 of the Cybercrime   (2) Whether or not Section 12
Prevention Act of 2012 as violates the right to privacy and
unconstitutional.   protection from the government’s
intrusion into online
communications
The Court explained that
section 12 may lead to disclosure
(1) Whether or not Section 4(c)(3) of private communications.
violates freedom of speech The Supreme Court applied a
It held that Section 4(c)(3) two-part test to determine
violated the right to freedom of whether a communication is
expression by prohibiting the entitled to right to privacy.
electronic transmission of A.) Whether the person
unsolicited commercial claiming the right has a
communications. This section legitimate expectation of privacy
prohibits the transmissions of over communication - The
unsolicited commercial Supreme Court stated that
electronic communications, internet users have subjective
commonly known as spams, that reasonable expectation of
seek to advertise, sell, or offer privacy over their communication
for sale of products and services B.) Whether his expectation
unless the recipient affirmatively of privacy can be regarded as
consents. The government objectively reasonable in society
argued that unsolicited - Court did not find the
commercial communications expectation as objectively
amount to btoh nuisance and reasonable because data sent
through internet only discloses Packingham was later
their IP Addresses arrested in 2010 after authorities
came across a post on his
The Court views the law as Facebook profile, thanking God
“virtually limitless, enabling law for having a parking ticket
enforcement to engage in dismissed. He was arrested for
“fishing expedition” violating North Carolina’s laws
Thus, Section 12 is in violation of regarding convicted sex
the right to privacy because it offenders, which barred the
lacked sufficient specificity and offender’s access to social media
definiteness in collecting real- websites.
time computer data.  
In his defense, Packingham
(3) Whether or not Section 19 argued that the law violated his
which authorizes the Department First Amendment rights. He was
of Justice to restrict computer convicted in trial court, which
data to be found in violation of found that the state had a
the Act violates the right to weighty interest in keeping
freedom of expression sexual predators off of social
media websites for the
It struck down Section 19 of “protection of minors.”
the Act for giving the government
the authority to restrict or block
access to computer data without The North Carolina Court of
any judicial warrant. The Appeals reversed and held that
Supreme Court recognizes that the social media website
computer data constitutes a provision of the law was
personal property, entitled to unconstitutional.
protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Issue

Packingham v North Carolina Whether or not the law

prohibiting registered sex
Facts offenders from accessing the
Lester Packingham was internet, where minors are known
convicted of taking “indecent to be active and have accounts,
liberties” with a minor in 2002, as regardless of whether or not the
a 21-year-old college student. sex offender directly interacted
with a minor, violate the First
Amendment?

Ruling
YES. The Court held that, in order
to be valid under the First
Amendment, a content-neutral
regulation of speech must be
narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest.
In other words, the law
cannot burden substantially more
speech than necessary to
advance the government’s
legitimate interest.
In this case, although the
government has a legitimate
interest in protecting children
from abuse, this law too broadly
restricted access to all sorts of
websites. Even if it were limited
only to social media websites,
the law would still
unconstitutionally restrict
speech because of the vast
number of functions that social
media websites perform in the
modern world.
First Amendment
jurisprudence has never allowed
for such a broad regulation of
speech, and similarly broad
restrictions have been struck
down. However, a state could
accomplish the same goal by
enacting a more narrowly written
statute.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v Commission on
Elections
Facts
The COMELEC released a resolution
which approved the issuance of a
restraining order against ABS-CBN
to conduct an exit survey or exit
polls. It acted upon reports that the
network plans to conduct a TV- radio
coverage of the elections and make
an exit survey of the votes cast for
President and Vice President and
then broadcast the results
immediately.
Supreme Court issued a TRO
(Temporary Restraining Order)
against the resolution of COMELEC
and the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media.
ABS-CBN contends that holding exit
polls and nationwide reporting of
results are valid exercises of the
freedoms of speech and of the
press.
2. Exit surveys indirectly violate the
sanctity of ballots as enshrined in
the Constitution (Sec. 2 Art. 5)
because the voters will be lured to
reveal their votes.
3. Exit surveys pose a clear and
present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the
electoral process because the media
is not supervised by any gov’t
agency which can easily be
manipulated.
Issues
Whether or not COMELEC in
the exercise of its power can ban
the exit polls
Ruling
NO. COMELEC ‘s restriction
on exit polls is overly broad. Its
application is without
qualification whether the exit
polls is disruptive or not. And
assuming that there is such
qualification, there is no showing
that exit polls will cause chaos in
voting centers. The absolute
prohibition restricts the future
use of valuable information for
long-term research on the impact
of current events on the voting
behavior of people.
The Court then stated that
the freedom of speech and of the
press should all the more be
upheld when what is sought to be
curtailed is the dissemination of
information meant to add
meaning to the equally vital right
of suffrage. The interest being
protected is the fundamental
right to vote and securing its
sanctity through the ballots.
The Constitution mandates
that no law shall be passed
abridging freedom of speech and
press. These freedoms basically
consist of the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter
of public interest without prior
restraint. (Gonzales v. COMELEC)
It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that
debates on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide
open.
There are limitations however
to this freedom in which the state, in
the exercise of its police power, can
curtail whenever these tests are
satisfied:
1.
– the evil consequence of
comment or utterance must be
extremely serious and the
degree of imminence must be
extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The
danger to be guarded against is
the substantive evil sought to
be prevented.
2.
the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent,
then such words are
punishable. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.
Social Weather Stations, Inc v
COMELEC
Facts
The Social Weather Stations
(SWS) is an institution
conducting surveys in various
fields. On the other hand,
Kamahalan Publishing Corp.,
publishes the Manila Standard
which is a newspaper of general
circulation and features items of
information including election
surveys.
Both SWS and Kamahalan are
contesting the validity and
enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair
Election Act), especially section
5.4 which provides that surveys
affecting national candidates
shall not be published 15 days
before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall
not be published 7 days before
the election.
SWS wanted to conduct an
election survey throughout the
period of the elections both at
the national and local levels and
release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Kamahalan, for its
part, intends to publish election
survey results up to the last day
of the elections on May 14, 2001.
Issue
Whether or not the
restriction on the publication of
election survey constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any
clear and present danger to
justify such restraint
Ruling
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A.
9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgement of
freedom of speech, expression,
and the press.
The power of the COMELEC over
media franchises is limited to
ensuring equal opportunity, time,
space, and the right to reply, as
well as to fix reasonable rates of
charge for the use of media
facilities for public information
and forms among candidates.
Here, the prohibition of
speech is direct, absolute, and
substantial. Nor does this section
pass the O’brient test for content
related regulation because (1) it
suppresses one type of
expression while allowing other
types such as editorials, etc.; and
(2) the restriction is greater than
what is needed to protect
government interest because the
interest can e protected by
narrower restrictions such as
subsequent punishment.
GMA Network, Inc v COMELEC
Facts
The five (5) petitions before
the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9
(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 limiting the broadcast and
radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties
for national election positions to
an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes
and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They
contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable
broadcast time violates freedom
of the press, impairs the people’s
right to suffrage as well as their
right to information relative to
the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the
forth coming electionsSection 9
(a) provides for an “aggregate
total” airtime instead of the
previous “per station” airtime for
political campaigns or
advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval
for candidates’ television and
radio guestings and appearances
Issues
Whether or not Section 9 (a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression,
of speech and of the press.
Ruling
YES. The Court held that
the assailed rule on “aggregate-
based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains
the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out
and communicate with the
people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits
– leveling the playing field – does
not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such
a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and
political parties
to communicate their
ideas, philosophies, platforms
and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in
the absence of a clear-cut basis
for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly
unreasonable and whimsical to
adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when
we consider that the Philippines
is not only composed of so many
islands.
There are also a lot of
languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach
out to as many of the electorates
as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his
message through his
advertisements in languages
and dialects that the people
may more readily understand and
relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in
different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself –
a form of suppression of his
political speech.
Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC
Facts
The diocese of Bacolod
posted 2 tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten
feet (10') in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains
the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark,
or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an
“X” mark.
The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote
on the adoption of Republic Act
No. 10354, otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for
the passing of the law were
classified by the diocese as
comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay”.
The Election Officer of Bacolod
ordered the removal of the 2nd
tarpaulin. Claiming it to be an
election propaganda, the
COMELEC issued an order
prompting for the removal of the
tarpaulin for being oversized.
The Diocese assailed the
said order of the COMELEC for
being violative of their
constitutional right to freedom of
expression and that it is a
violation of the separation of the
state and the church.
 The Diocese likewise COMELEC considered the
assails that the tarpaulins are tarpaulin as a campaign material
beyond the regulatory powers of in their issuances. The provisions
the COMELEC regarding election under the Constitution, the Fair
materials since they are neither Election Act, and COMELEC
candidates nor belonging to any Resolution No. 9615 regulating
political party the posting of campaign
materials only apply to
Issues candidates and political parties,
and petitioners are neither of the
1.
two. The tarpaulin was not paid
the expression made by the
for by any candidate or political
Diocese of Bacolod, the
party. There was no allegation
latter being private
that the Diocese coordinated
citizens?
with any of the persons named in
the tarpaulin regarding its
posting. On the other hand,
petitioners posted the tarpaulin
as part of their advocacy against
1. the RH Law. While the tarpaulin
violate the constitutional may influence the success or
right of the Diocese of failure of the named candidates
Bacolod to freedom of and political parties, this does
speech and expression? not necessarily mean it is an
election propaganda.
Ruling

Can the COMELEC regulate

the expression made by the Did the COMELEC order violate
Diocese of Bacolod, the the constitutional right of the
latter being private Diocese of Bacolod to freedom of
citizens? speech and expression?

NO. COMELEC had no legal YES. The regulation is a

basis to regulate expressions violation of the constitutional
made by private citizens. guarantee of free speech. The
message of the Diocese, taken as
a whole, is an advocacy of a
social issue that it deeply regards the application of Resolution
believes. No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately
Through rhetorical devices,
owned public utility vehicles (PUVs)
it communicates the desire of the and transport terminals. The
Diocese that the positions of petitioner then requested the
those who run for a political COMELEC to reconsider the
position on this social issue be implementation of the assailed
provisions and allow private owners
determinative of how the public
of PUVs and transport terminals to
will vote. It primarily advocates a post election campaign materials on
stand on a social issue; only their vehicles and transport
secondarily — even almost terminals.
incidentally — will cause the
The COMELEC en banc issued
election or non-election of a Minute Resolution No. 13-0214,
candidate. which denied the petitioner’s
request to reconsider the
1-United Transport Koalisyon v implementation of Section 7(g)
COMELEC items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
Facts   

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC

promulgated Resolution No. 9615,
which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in
connection with the May 13, 2013
national and local elections and
subsequent elections.  constitutional.
Section 7 thereof, which enumerates
the prohibited forms of election
propaganda. The violation of items
[5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall
be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make
the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election
offense under Section 9
of Republic Act No. 9006 as
implemented by Section 18 (n) of
these Rules.Petitioner sought for
clarification from COMELEC as
Issues
  Whether or not Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
Ruling
NO. The Supreme Court
held that the said provisions of
Resolution No. 9615 are null and
void for violating Sections 1 and
4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly
infringe on the fundamental right of PUVs and transport
of the people to freedom of terminals.  As a result of
speech.  Central to the prohibition, owners of PUVs
the prohibition is the freedom of and transport terminals are
individuals, i.e., the owners of forcefully and effectively
PUVs and private transport inhibited from expressing their
terminals, to express their preferences under the pain
preference, through the posting of indictment for an election
of election campaign material in offense and the revocation of
their property, and convince their franchise or permit to
others to agree with them. operate. 

The prohibition constitutes a
clear prior restraint on the right
to free expression of the owners
Resolution No. 9615

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the

campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
 (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material
outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private
properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the
following:
xxxx
5.  Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries,
pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals,
airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
Social Weather Stations v Petitioners were successful
COMELEC applicants for recognition of
Philippine citizenship under RA
Facts 9225, which accords to such
applicants the right to suffrage,
Issues among others. Long before the May
2004 national and local elections,
Ruling petitioners sought registration and
certification as
Nicolas-Lewis v COMELEC “overseas absentee voter” only to
be advised by the Philippine
Facts Embassy in the United States that,
per a COMELEC letter to the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated
September 23, 2003, they have yet
no right to vote in such elections
owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed
by the Constitution. The same letter,
however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for
voter’s registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would
contextually affect merely certain
individuals who would likely be
eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied
petition of the petitioners on the
ground that to
exercise absentee voting; the one-
year residency requirement should
be fulfilled.
Issues
Whether or not petitioners who
might have retained or acquired
citizenship pursuant to R.A 9125
may vote as absentee voter under
R.A 9189?
Ruling
Yes. The Constitution (Art 5,
sec1 & 2) provides the following:
a. Sec 1 - Suffrage may be
exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least
18 years of age, who shall have
resided in the PH for at least one
year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least 6
months.
b. Sec 2 - The congress shall
provide a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
c. Sec 1 prescribes residency
requirement as a general eligibility
factor the right to vote.
On the other hand, Sec. 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system
wherein a non-resident may as an
exception to the residency
prescription shall be allowed to vote.
Social Weather Stations v
Asuncion
Facts
Published under the by-line of
one Marichu Villanueva and titled
“Judiciary worse than PNP,” an item
in the June 17, 1993 issue of the
Manila Standard, a metropolitan
daily, reported that the results of
the latest opinion polls conducted
by the Ateneo Social Weather
Station, as Social Weather Stations,
Inc. (or SWS) is also known, showed
the Judiciary to have an even lower
satisfaction rating that the
Philippine National Police. The item
went on to state that the President
and his Cabinet had been briefed on
the results of the survey by
Professors Mahar Mangahas and
Felipe Miranda of the SWS, and that
Malacanang had expressed concern
over the Judiciary’s law standing.
Press Secretary Jesus Sison was also
quoted as saying that this was
“most puzzling,” although he could
not, recall the exact rating, noting on July 26, 1993, Professor
only that the PNP had “a better Mangahas addressed a letter to the
image that the judiciary.” Chief Justice intended “as a formal
complaint against Honorable
Said report appears to have Maximiano C. Asuncion for grave
prompted Judge Maximiano C. abuse of authority and gross
Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch ignorance of the law, in connection
104 of the Regional Trial Court at with his issuance of an Order dated
Quezon City, motu proprio to initiate 17 June 1993.
on the same date of June 17, 1993
proceedings ordering the President Issues
of the SWS to: “explain why you Whether the Order dated 17
should not be held in contempt for June 1993 is violative of the
distributing to the general public constitutional guarantees of
without prior permission from any
freedom of speech and freedom
court your findings that the people
have more confidence with the from prior restraint.
police than with judges thereby
Ruling
tending directly or indirectly to
degrade the administration of
No. What was clearly implicit in
justice”.
the newspaper report about the
results of the SWS poll

Thus, Judge Asuncion can

On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar
hardly be faulted for what, at a
Mangahas through Atty. Antonio M.
minimum, he must have felt duty-
Abad, Jr. submitted his comment
bound to do in the circumstances.
and explanation that it was not true
No question of prior restraint or
that the Social Weather Stations,
violation of the guarantee of free
Inc. distributed to the general public
speech arises here, what he did
the alleged survey. Said survey was
being, in essence, merely to initiate
privately given to Pres. Ramos and
an inquiry into the source and basis
the cabinet and was not intended
of the derogatory news report. And
for publication nor for public
he forthwith abated the proceedings
consumption and that if ever it
upon receiving an explanation he
reaches the media, he had not
deemed satisfactory.
authorized anyone to do so.

The hearing was had a Fortun v Quinsayas

scheduled on June 23, 1993, after
which Judge Asuncion promulgated Facts
an Order dated July 2, 1993, finding
Professor Mangahas’ explanation The petitioner is the counsel for
satisfactory and dismissing the Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the
contempt charge against him. After principal accused in the murder
three weeks or so, or more precisely
cases filed and raffled to the RTC
of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the case,
respondent Quinsayas, counsel of
Mangudadatu, filed a disbarment
complaint against Fortun, the
details of which were published
and circulated among several
news outlets, particularly, the
GMA News TV internet website,
the Inquirer.net, PhilStar, and
ANC (their heads were also made
respondents in this case).
Fortun alleges that the
dissemination of the details of
the disbarment complaint against
him violated Rule 139-B of the
ROC on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings, exposed
this Court and its investigators to
outside influence and public
interference, as well as opened
his professional and personal
reputation to attack. Petitioner
prayed for the penalty of
imprisonment.
Issues
Whether respondents
violated the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings,
warranting a finding of guilt for
indirect contempt of court.
Ruling
Yes. Atty. Prima Jesusa
Quinsayas is guilty of indirect
contempt for distributing copies
of the disbarment complaint
against Atty. Fortun to members
of the media.
Since the disbarment
complaint is a matter of public
interest, legitimate media had a
right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. The Court
also recognizes that respondent
media groups and personalities
merely acted on a news lead they
received when they reported the
filing of the disbarment
complaint.
The distribution by Atty.
Quinsayas to the media of the
disbarment complaint, by itself,
is not sufficient to absolve the
media from responsibility for
violating the confidentiality rule.
However, since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a
public figure because he is
representing a matter of public
concern, and because the event
itself that led to the filing of the
disbarment case against
petitioner is a matter of
public concern, the media has
the right to report the filing of the
disbarment case as legitimate
news.

Difference between criminal and

civil contempt

A criminal contempt is conduct

that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court
or a judge acting judicially; it is
an act obstructing the
administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.

A civil contempt consists in

failing to do something ordered
to be done by a court in a civil
action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is,
therefore, an offense against the
party in whose behalf the
violated order is made