RFID Technical Tutorial and

Threat Modeling

Presented by: Neeraj Chaudhry

University of Arkansas

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 RFID Tutorial Outline
• Introduction
• RFID System
• Tags
• Readers
• Data link layer
– Modulation
– Encoding
– Anti-Collision Protocol
– Frequencies
• Standardization
• EPCglobal Network
• EPC vs UPC
• EPC Tag Classes
– Class-0 Tag
– Class-1 Gen-1 Tag
– Class-1 Gen-2 Tag
• RFID Threats Categorized with STRIDE
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 What is RFID?
• Stands for Radio Frequency Identification
• Uses radio waves for identification
• New frontier in the field of information
technology
• One form of Automatic Identification
• Provides unique identification or serial
number of an object

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 Applications
• Mobil Speedpass systems
• Automobile Immobilizer systems
• Fast-lane and E-Zpass road toll system
• Animal Identification
• Secure Entry cards
• Humans
• Supply chain management

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 RFID System
• Tags consists of antenna and a microchip
• Readers consists of a transmitter,
receiver, and one or more antennas
• Management system
• Communication protocol
• Computer Networks

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RFID System

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 RFID Tag
• Tag is a device used to transmit
information such as a serial number to the
reader in a contact less manner
• Classified as :
– Passive
– Active
– Semi-passive

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Classification of Passive and Active tag
Characteristics Passive RFID tag Active RFID tag

Power Source Provided by a reader Inbuilt

Availability of power Within the field of reader Continuous

Signal Strength (Reader High Low

to Tag)

Signal Strength (Tag to Low High

Reader)

Communication range < 3meters >100 meters

Tag reads < 20 moving tags @ >1000 moving tags @

3mph in few seconds 100mph in 1 sec

Memory 128 bytes 128 Kbytes

Applicability in supply Applicable where Applicable where

chain tagged items movement tagged items movement
is constrained is variable and
unconstrained
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 RFID Reader
• Also known an interrogator
• Reader powers the tag by sending it RF energy
• Can be handheld or stationary
• Consists of:
– Transmitter
– Receiver
– Antenna
– Microprocessor
– Memory
– Controller or Firmware
– Communication channels
– Power

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 Communication Link
• Inductive Coupling
• Backscatter Coupling

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 Modulation
• Process of changing the characteristics of
radio waves to encode data and to
transmit it to the other end
• Techniques used depends on the power
consumption, reliability and available
bandwidth.
– Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK)
– Frequency Shift keying (FSK)
– Phase Shift Keying (PSK)

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 Encoding
BINARY
DIGITS 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
NRZ

RZ

MANCHESTER

PWM

PPM

MILLER

FM0

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 Anti-Collision Protocol
• Tag Anti-Collision protocol
– Aloha/Slotted Aloha
– Deterministic binary tree walking
– Query tree walking
• Reader Anti-Collision protocol
– TDM/FDM

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RFID Frequency range
Frequency Band Description
< 135 KHz Low frequency

6.765 – 6.795 MHz HF

7.4 – 8.8 MHz HF

13.553 – 13.567 MHz HF

26.957 – 27. 283 MHz HF

433 MHz UHF

868 – 870 MHz UHF
902 – 928 MHz UHF
2.4 – 2.483 GHz SHF

5.725 – 5.875 GHz SHF

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 Standarization
• ISO
– 18000–1: Generic air interfaces for globally accepted
frequencies
– 18000–2: Air interface for 135 KHz
– 18000–3: Air interface for 13.56 MHz
– 18000–4: Air interface for 2.45 GHz
– 18000–5: Air interface for 5.8 GHz
– 18000–6: Air interface for 860 MHz to 930 MHz
– 18000–7: Air interface at 433.92 MHz

• EPCglobal
– UHF Class-0
– UHF Class-1 Generation-1 (Class-1 Gen-1)
– UHF Class-1 Generation-2 (Class-1 Gen-2)

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 Electronic Product Code Global
(EPCglobal) Network
• EPCglobal Network consists of five
component
– Electronic Product Code (EPC) number
– ID system (tags and readers)
– EPC middleware
– Discovery Service (ONS)
– Information service

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Electronic Product Code (EPC)

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 EPC vs.
UPC (Barcodes)

• Both are forms of Automatic identification

technologies
• Universal Product Code (UPC) require line of
sight and manual scanning whereas EPC do not
• UPC require optical reader to read whereas EPC
reader reads via radio waves
• EPC tags possess a memory and can be written
while UPC do not
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 EPC Tag Classes
Class 0 Passive Read only

Class 1 Passive Read only write once

Class 2 Passive 65 KB read-write

65 KB read-write with
Class 3 Semi-passive
built-in battery

Class 4 Active Built-in battery

Communicates with other

Class 5 Active
class 5 tags and devices

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 EPCglobal UHF Class-0 Tag
• Describes physical layer reader-to-tag link,
tag-to-reader link and data link anti-
collision protocol
• Reader to tag link use 100% or 20% modulation
amplitude modulated (AM) carrier signal
• Use binary tree anti-collision protocol

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Class-0 Reader-to-Tag Symbols

BINARY 0

BINARY 1

NULL

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Binary tree anti-collision protocol for
Class-0

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EPCglobal UHF Class-1 Gen-1

• Employs same modulation and

encoding techniques as UHF Class-0
• Use query tree walking anti-collision
protocol
– Reader queries by using group of bits,
matching tags responds with an 8-bit
response during one of eight time slots.
SLOT SLOT SLOT SLOT SLOT SLOT SLOT SLOT
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111

Eight time slot for tags response

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Query Tree Protocol for Class-1
Gen-1 and first step of Gen-2

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EPCglobal UHF Class-1 Gen-2
• Use one of ASK, FSK or PSK modulation
with PWM encoding referred as pulse-
interval encoding (PIE) format.
• Reader chooses the encoding format for
tag-to-reader link.
– FM0
– Miller
• Use Aloha-based random anti-collision
protocol called Q protocol
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 Q Protocol (Anti-Collision Protocol)
• Select phase
– Single out particular tag population with one or more bits like query tree protocol
• Inventory phase – identify individual tag using Q protocol (slotted-aloha
based)
– Reader sends Query with parameter Q and Session number (Q=4 is suggested
default)
– Reader creates slotted time
– Tags pick random 16-bit number for handle
– Tags in requested session pick a random number in the range [0,2^Q-1] for
slot_number
– If slot_number = 0, backscatter handle
– If slot_number != 0, wait that number of slots to backscatter handle
– Reader ACKs individual tag with handle and goes to access phase. All other tags
wait.
– If more that one tag answers, reader can send same Q again or send modified Q
• Access phase
– Reader interacts with tags requesting EPC number and any other information

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 RFID Threats Categorized with
STRIDE
• Spoofing identity
• Tampering with data
• Repudiation
• Information disclosure
• Denial of service
• Elevation of privilege

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 Spoofing Threat
• A competitor or thief performs an unauthorized inventory
of a store by scanning RFID EPC tags with an
unauthorized reader to determine the types and
quantities of items. An unauthorized reader can query
the tag for the EPC number because most tags used in
the supply chain respond to any reader. The EPC
number is only a number. However, because of the
standard way of creating an EPC number, an attacker
can determine the manufacturer and possibly the
product number. It is likely that the number assigned to
all manufacturers will become public knowledge as well
as the product number after some short period of time.

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 Tampering with Data Threats
• An attacker modifies a tag.
– An attacker modifies the tag in a passport to contain the serial number associated with a
terrorist or criminal.
– An attacker modifies a high-priced item’s EPC number to be the EPC number of a lower cost
item.
– An attacker modifies the EPC number on tags in the supply chain, warehouse, or store
disrupting business operations and causing a loss of revenue.
• An attacker adds a tag to an object.
– An attacker adds a tag in a passport that contains the serial number associated with a
terrorist or criminal.
– An attacker adds additional tags in a shipment that makes the shipment appear to contain
more items than it actually does.
• An attacker deletes data on a tag.
– An attacker kills tags in the supply chain, warehouse, or store disrupting business operations
and causing a loss of revenue
– An attacker erases the tags setting all values including the EPC number to zero in the supply
chain, warehouse, or store disrupting business operations and causing a loss of revenue.
– An attacker removes or physically destroys tags attached to objects. This is used by an
attacker to avoid tracking. A thief destroys the tag to remove merchandise without detection.
• An attacker reorders data on a tag or reorders tags.
– An attacker exchanges a high-priced item’s tag with a lower-priced item’s tag.

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 Repudiation Threats
• A retailer denies receiving a certain pallet,
case, or item.
• The owner of the EPC number denies
having information about the item to which
the tag is attached.

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 Information Disclosure Threats
• A bomb in a restaurant explodes when there are five or
more Americans with RFID-enabled passports detected.
• An attacker blackmails an individual for having certain
merchandise in their possession.
• A fixed reader at any retail counter could identify the tags
of a person and show the similar products on the nearby
screen to a person to provide individualized marketing.
• A competitor or thief performs an unauthorized inventory
of a store by scanning tags with a reader to determine
the types and quantities of items.
• A thief could create a duplicate tag with the same EPC
number and return a forged item for an unauthorized
refund.

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 Denial of Service Threats
• An attacker kills tags in the supply chain,
warehouse, or store disrupting business
operations and causing a loss of revenue.
• A shoplifter carries a blocker tag that disrupts
reader communication to conceal the stolen
item. The blocker tag is used against the Class-0
using the tree walking anti-collision protocols. An
attacker can simulate many RFID tags
simultaneously causing the anti-collision to
perform singulation on a large number of tags
making the system unavailable to authorized
use.
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 Elevation of Privilege Threats
• A user logging on to the database to know
the product’s information can become an
attacker by raising his/her status in the
information system from a user to a root
server administrator and write or add
malicious data into the system.

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 Contact Information
NEERAJ CHAUDHRY
705 West Putman Street,
Apt # R-2, Fayetteville, AR-72701
Email: nchaudh@gmail.com
Phone: (479) 599-9107

Dale R. Thompson, P.E., Ph.D.

Department of Computer Science and Computer Engineering
University of Arkansas
311 Engineering Hall
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701
Phone: +1 (479) 575-5090
FAX: +1 (479) 575-5339
E-mail: d.r.thompson@ieee.org
WWW: http://csce.uark.edu/~drt/

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