Paras vs comelec

Paras was the duly elected punong Barangay of Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. The residents filed a
petition for recall which was granted by the comelec. The recall election obtained 30% of votes. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner's opposition. Comelec set a new recall election on Dec. 16, 1995. Petitioner filed an injunction before the trial court with temporary restraining order. The
petition for injunction was dismissed by the trial court. Comelec for the 3rd time set a new schedule for recall election on Jan.5,1996. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with an urgent prayer of injunction contending that the recall election was barred by the SK election on May 1996, that the SK election was a regular election
and under Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
Issue: WON SK election is a regular election which constitutes to bar the said recall election.
Ruling: Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct
of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. ACCORDINGLY, the
petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall
election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

Santiago vs Castro
In the election for Mayor of Cateel municipality, Davao province, Castro won over Santiago obtaining 15 votes higher than Santiago. Silverio, on the other hand, filed
on November 23, 1963 a protest in the Court of First Instance. A counter protest was filed by Castro.
Subsequently and before hearing of the said election case, Castro died on May 6, 1964. Vice-Mayor Misael Clamor thereupon succeeded to the office of Mayor.
The protest was thereafter heard, starting on July 6, 1964. After hearing, on September 14, 1964, decision was handed down by the trial court, reversing the Board of
Canvassers and declaring Silverio winner by seven (7) votes; that is, Silverio was credited with 1,740 votes; Castro, with 1,733 votes.Appeal was taken therefrom on
behalf of protestee Castro (deceased) directly to Us, to raise questions of law. A dispute later arose as to the personality of protestee's counsel to take an appeal, Castro
having died. This Court resolved the matter by requiring Vice-Mayor Clamor to intervene, as he did, on the side of appellant (Resolution of July 22, 1965).
Santiago contends that the use of the words Jr., Dr., and other nick names in some the ballots should not be counted because it is not the real name of the candidate and
that some of the votes casted in favor of castro was written by one person only.
Issue: Won the use of nicknames accompanied by the names and sure name of theof the candidate can be counted as a valid vote.
Ruling: In the absence of clear and convincing proof that these nicknames were used to identify the voters, the rule is that the use of nicknames of the candidates,
accompanied by their name or surname, does not annul the ballot (Rule 9, Sec. 149, Rev. Election Code).
1. From Precinct 4, ballot C-10. It is for Castro, rejected by the CFI as marked because all the names voted for therein are in very large block letters.
An examination of said ballot reveals nothing irregular to constitute marking; the size of the writing — maintained uniformly throughout — simply conforms to the
space provided for in the ballot itself. This differs from the case in Tajanlangit vs. Cazeñas, L-18894, June 30, 1962, where only two names were written in
extraordinarily big printed letters so that they stood out prominently compared with the rest of the names written in the ballot.
In the present case, the writing could well be the voter's habitual one, there being no evidence to show otherwise. Said ballot was erroneously deemed marked.
2. From Precinct 7, ballot 6-G. In the space for mayor, it has a small "x" written to the left of "Silverio" and another small "x" written after said name, towards the end
of the line. Said ballot was held valid by the CFI.
The placement of said two "x's", viewing the ballot as a whole, which is otherwise neat and filled only with few names, indicates upon its face a clear intent to mark.
Said ballot should have been rejected as invalid.
3. From Precinct 16, ballot 9. It has the letter "x" (apparently in capital) before the name "Penanueva" for councilor. Said ballot was held valid by CFI for Silverio; and
We agree, since the letter "x" as used was meant only to be an initial, as shown by the use of initials throughout the other seven names voted for councilor.
4. From Precinct 18, ballot 10-E. It has votes written in ordinary script and others in block letters. It was held valid for Silverio by the CFI. No error was committed
herein. Rule 18, Sec. 149, Rev. Election Code allows such variation in writing in the absence of evidence aliunde to prove design thereby to identify the voter, and there
is none herein (Sarmiento vs. Quemado 1,18027, June 29, 1962).
Castro emerges as final winner by a plurality of seven (7) votes over Silverio.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and protestee Castro, whose interest is succeeded to and represented herein by intervenor-appellant Clamor,
is declared winner by a plurality of seven (7) votes in the election of mayor of Cateel, Davao on November 12, 1963. No costs. So ordered.

Garcia vs Comelec Date: October 5, 1993 Petitioners: Enrique Garcia, et al Respondents: Comelec and Lucila Payumo, et al

Facts: Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable
Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively.
Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the
ground of "loss of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded."
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the requirements under the LGC. The comelec
dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160
allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate
proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the
proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of the
meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly.
Issue: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional
Held: No Ratio: A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall
from office of local elective officials, originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal
reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action
of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate
was utilized only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained
that this initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators added
in the second mode of initiating the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause
instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease.
Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of
recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative
mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the
Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of
any law.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC

Facts: In the May 1995 elections for governor, Marquez questioned Rodriguez’s candidacy via a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based on the
allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" for leaving the US where a charge against him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand
theft of personal property was pending. Marquez claims that Rodriguez should be disqualified or held ineligible under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
COMELEC then promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case filed by Marquez in 1992 elections) and SPA No. 95-089
(present disqualification case), where it found Rodriguez a fugitive from justice in line with the MARQUEZ Decision’s (1995) definition of "fugitive from justice.”
With Rodriguez’s walk-out during the hearing of the case, COMELEC considered him as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez' documentary
evidence.
Nevertheless, Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. However, COMELEC also made a
report entitled "EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that
Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the
Consolidated Resolution. COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in
Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los
Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held: No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of
a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.
This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los
Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about
such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at
such time.
The Court also agrees with the COMELEC that:

-The voluminous copy of an investigation report presented by Marquez in order to establish the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said
investigation due to its magnitude is misleading because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford
law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged.

- The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor.
The evidence presented by Rodriguez even proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political
campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. And being a figure in the events leading to the EDSA Revolution, Rodriguez began serving his home
province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986, Governor in 1988, re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in
1995.

- When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative
peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from
justice. Besides, there is no law requiring petitioner to travel to the United States and subject himself to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending himself
before the country's courts. During that time, Rodriguez was also in public service. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could
he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves.

Claudio vs Comelec Date: May 4, 2000 Petitioner: Jovito Claudio Respondents: Comelec, DBM and Richard Advincula

Facts: Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998. On May 19, 1999, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the
purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula was designated chair. The members of the PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, initiating Claudio’s recall. The
petition for recall was filed on the Office of the City Mayor. The comelec also posted the petition on the bulletin boards of certain public places.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by Jovito Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the
petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only
representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited
period; (4) the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should
first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA,
considering that 10 were actually double entries, were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support,
and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.
The comelec granted the petition and dismissed the opposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than
necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a
majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified

Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He
contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to
petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown
by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC.
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines
drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed
the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall
resolution of which the pages in question are part.
 The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not
commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot,
therefore, be raised now.

MALONZO vs.COMELEC

The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-026, 1 dated November 18, 1996, of the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) calling for an
Election for the Recall of the Petitioner Reynaldo O. Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City.
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995. Barely one year into his term, petitioner's office as Mayor was put to serious question when
on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No.
01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.
Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with
the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was deficient in form and substance because some of the notice they served to the members of
PRA thru mail was not acknowledged, and the recall was initiated by Liga ng Barangay which he contends that it was only an organization of Barangay and not of the
Chairmans and Kagawad therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order.
Issue:
The validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in the issuance of the questioned Resolution.
Held:
Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the addressee himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a person of
sufficient discretion in the member 's residence or office. Service by registered mail was evinced by the return card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for
him. There were instances when notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesses. The circumstances
being thus, we hold that there was complete service of the notices as contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC,
based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity
of the same.
Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes
that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the
barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the
barangay chairman." 7 The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities
representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the
resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground.
Tan vs Comelec

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and
contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:

(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by
the governing statute

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after
the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:

W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that --

"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

HELD:

In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,
"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.

The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.

"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries
would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte."

The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2,
1984 (128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting
view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:

"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar
or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that
"the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." However, when the bill was
enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme Court held that
it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.

"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much
an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the
points raised by the petitioners."

Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment
of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.

Padilla vs Comelec

Creation of Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte from the Municipality of Labo. Upon the said plebiscite majority of the residents vote
against the creation of the Municipality. Petitioner seeks to annul the said the said plebiscite contending that it was illegal because it must be conducted only on the
political unit affected and should only include the 12 Barangay of to be formed Municipality of tulay-na lupa

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)

Facts: President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976,
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo
Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election."
Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect
when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy
and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. In
political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of
policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Ceniza v. Comelec [GR L-52304, 28 January 1980]

En Banc, Concepcion Jr. (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 22 December 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Pambansa 51 providing for local elections on 30 January 1980. To implement this Act,
Comelec adopted Resolution 1421, excluding 18 cities (including Cebu and Mandaue) from participating in the election of provincial officials. Because of its income,
the City of Cebu is classified as a highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the election of the elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu,
although the Charter of Cebu City allows the qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu. The City of Mandaue
is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter expressly provides that the
registered voters of the city cannot participate in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor. Ramon B. Ceniza,
Federico C. Cabilao Jr., Nelso J. Rosal and Alejandro R. Alinsug filed the petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, as
taxpayers and registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They vigorously assail Section 3 of BP 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as the basis
for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the province
where the city is geographically located; and RA 5519 (Charter of Mandaue City), which went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue
in a plebiscite or referendum. They prayed that a restraining order to temporarily prohibit the election for Provincial Governor and elective provincial officials in Cebu,
prohibiting the National Treasurer to release public funds and the Commission on Audit (COA) to pass in audit said funds in connection with and for the purpose of
holding the local elections; and after hearing render Section 3 of BP 885 void, as well as Section 96, Article XVIII of RA 5519 (Charter of Mandaue).
Issue: Whether the exclusion of inhabitants of highly urbanized cities and component cities from electing provincial government officials violate the equal protection of
law.
Held: The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a
denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to
another individual or group of voters in the same city. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the
voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. These cities being independent of the province in the administration of their affairs leaves the provincial
government without governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. Such being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the
provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities. Further, express
provisions in Charter of a City may exclude registered voters of the city from voting for the provincial officials of the province. The practice of allowing voters in one
component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.
Jose Hontiveros vs Simeon Mobo

In the election for the provincial governor of Capiz both Hontiveros and Mobo are candidates for the said position. Mobo obtained the majority vote and thus he was
proclaimed as the governor of the province. Hontiveros file an election contest before the CFI contending the presence of fraud in the said election. Upon investigation
of the CFI a number of votes were deducted on both candidates but this time the Hontiveros obtained the majority vote and the CFI ordered the revision of the counting
and proclaim Hontiveros as the winner. Mobo appealed the case without securing the bonds for Hontiveros. Hontiveros contends that the court has no jurisdiction over
case and Mobo did not comply with the requirement for an appeal.
In our opinion such frauds and irregularities as are disclosed by the record cannot be winked at nor tolerated by those in authority. If such frauds are permitted, honest
men will not allow their names to be used as candidates for office. Local governments will fall into the hands of the rabble and unscrupulous persons, and disorder and
confusion will prevail instead of order, quietude and peace. It is just such acts on the part of officials as are disclosed in the record in the present case, which lead good
men, finally, to arise in their might and to demand a change in the form of government imposed upon them. The Filipino people are a very patient, law-abiding and
peace-loving people, but their history shows that they will not endure such wrongs forever. The elective franchise was extended to the masses in order that they might
have a direct participation in the democratic government which has been established here. That right must not be thwarted nor defeated without imposing upon those
who attempt so to do the severe penalties of the law.
It is therefore hereby ordered and decreed that the Attorney-General investigate the frauds and irregularities described in the record and file criminal complaints against
all persons believed to be guilty, to the end that they may be punished in accordance with the provisions of section 2632 of Act No. 2657 (section 2639 of Act No.
2711). So ordered.lawphi1.net

AMPATUAN V. COMELEC 375 SCRA 503

FACTS: ^ Petitioner Ampatuan and Respondent Candao were candidates for the position of Governor of Maguindanao during the 2001 elections ^ May 2001:
respondents filed a petition with the comelec for the annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections in several municipalities. They claimed that
the elections were “completely sham and farcical”. The ballots were filled-up en masse by a few persons the night before the election day, and in some precincts, the
ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all. ^ Comelec suspended proclamation of winning candidates ^ Petitioners filed a
motion to lift suspension of proclamation. Comelec granted and proclaimed the petitioners s winners. ^ June 2001: Respondents filed with SC a petition to set aside
Comelec order and prelim injunction to suspend effects of the proclamation of petitioners. ^ July 2001: Comelec ordered the consolidation of the respondents’ petition
for declaration of failure of elections. ^ Sept 2001: Petitioners filed the present petition and claimed that by virtue of the proclamation, the proper remedy available to
the respondents was not petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest. The former is heard summarily while the latter involves a full-blown trial.
^ Oct 2001: Comelec ordered the suspension of the 2 assailed orders (with regard to respondents’ petition fro failure of elections and directing the continuation of
hearing and disposition of the consolidated SPAs on the failure of elections and other incidents related thereto)
^ Nov 2001: Comelec lifts the suspension order ^ SC issues TRO enjoining Comelec from lifting suspension

ISSUE: W/N The Comelec was divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide respondents’ petition for declaration for failure of elections after petitioners had been
proclaimed

HELD: No. Petition dismissed ^ The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive comelec of its authority to annul any canvas and illegal
proclamation. ^ Validity of the proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office. ^ In the case at bar, the Comelec is
duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct of the May 2001 election.
^ It is well to stress that the Comelec has started conducting the technical examination on Nov 2001. However, by an urgent motion for a TRO filed by the petitioners,
in virtue of which we issued a TRO, the technical examination was held in abeyance until the present. ^ In order not to frustrate the ends of justice, we lift the TRO and
allow technical examination to proceed with deliberate dispatch.
September 1, 2008
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents. MENDOZA, J.
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became
mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U.
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as
mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.
Issue: Whether Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Ruling: No. Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides: SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in §43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160): (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected….
A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election.
The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive terms.
The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that “voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.