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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE rls
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VAl TRO CVA VItT NAM TRONG KHU Vl/c CHAU A-THAI BINH DUONG
THE ROLE OF VIETNAM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Ngay 10 thimg 12 nom 2010

December 10''',2010

Thai gian Ni)i dung

Time Content
8:30-9:00 Dang ky dai bi~u/ Registration

Ph3t bi~u khai m~c

9:00-9:15
Welcome addresses
PGS.TS. Nguyin Van Kim, Ph6 hi¢u truong truong Dr;ri h9C KHXH&NV
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Van Kim, Vice Rector of USSH
BiI: Dorit Lehrack, Giam dr5c Rosa Luxemburg tr;ri Vi¢t Nam
Ms. Dorit Lehrack, Director ofRosa Luxembur~ Stiftun~ in Vietnam
Chit tri: PGS.TS. Ph~m Quang Minh (Khoa Qu6c t€ h9C, DH KHXH&NV)
9:15-10: 15
Ba Dorit Lehrack (Giam d6c Rosa Luxemburg t~i Vi~t Nam)

TS. Gerhard Will (Vi~n Nghien clm Khoa h9C va Chfnh trj, Berlin, Duc)

Chairman: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pham Quang Minh (FIS, USSH)

Co-chairman: Ms. Dorit Lehrack
Dr. Gerhard Will (Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany)
Bao cao
Presentations
GS. Carlyle Thayer (Tnrcmg KHXH&NV, HQc vi~n Qu6c phong Australia)

Prof. Carlyle Thayer (School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Australian Defense Force

Academy)

Vi¢t Nam trong quan h¢ v6i Trung Qu6c va MJi

Vietnam's relations with China and the United States
Thi~u tU'6'ng, PGS. TS. Le Van CU'O'ng (B9 Cong An)

General Major Assoc. Prof. Dr. Le Van Cuong (Ministry of Public Security)

vJ vai tro cua Vi¢t Nam trang khu v¥'c cMu A-Thai Binh Duong
On the role of Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific Region
PGS. TS. Le Van Sang (Vi~n Kinh t~ Chinh tri Th~ giai)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Le Van Sang (Institute of World Economics and Politics)

Vi thi dia kinh d, dia chinh tri cua Vi¢t Nam trong khu v¥'c cMu A-Thai Binh Duong: Lich sU:,
hi¢n tr;ti va tuang lai
Ceo-economic and Ceo-politic Positions of Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific Region: Past, Present
and Prospect
Thiiolu~n
10:15-10:45
Discussion
10:45-11:00 Giiii lao/ Coffee Break
Bao cao
11:00-11:45
Presentations
PGS. TS. Hit My HU'O'ng (HQc vi~n Quan h~ Qu6c t~, HQc vi~n Chinh tri va Hanh chfnh Qu6c gia

H6 Chi Minh)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ha My Huong (Institute of International Relations, Ho Chi Minh National

Academy of Politics and Public Administration)

Chinh sach cua Nga dr5i v6i Chau Ii - Thai Binh Duang va v6i Vi¢t Nam thO'i Tr5ng thr5ng D.
Medvedev
Russia's Policy towards tlie Asia-Pacific region and Vietnam under President D. Medvedev
Administration
PGS. TS. Vii Van Hit (T<;lp chi C9ng san)·PGS. TS. Ph~m Thj Thanh B1nh (Vi~n Kinh t~ va

Chfnh tri Th~ giai) .

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vu Van Ha (The Communist Review)-Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pham Thi Thanh Binh

(Institute of World Economics and Politics)

Vai tro cua Vi¢t Nam trong khu v¥'c Chau A-Thai Binh Duong
The Role of Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific Region
PGS. TSKH. Tdn Khanh (Vi~n Nghien clm Dong Nam A, Vi~n KHXH VN)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tran Khanh (Institute for Southeast Asian Studies)
Vi thi cua Vi¢t Nam trong Tr~t t~r m6'i O· Dong A dang hinh thanh
Vietnam's position in an emer~in~ order ofEast Asia
 Thaolu~n
11:45-12:15
Discussion
Nghi trlm/ Lunch
12:15-13:30
Chu tri: GS. Vii DU'(mg Ninh (Khoa Qu6c t~ hQc, DH KHXH&VN)
13:30-14:30
PGS.TS. Hoang Kh~c Nam (Khoa Qu6c t~ hQc, DH KHXH&VN)
GS. Carlyle Thayer
Chairman: Prof. Vu Duong Ninh (FIS, USSH)
Co-chairman: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hoang Khac Nam (FIS, USSH)
Prof. Carlyle Thayer
Bao cao
Presentations
TS. Gerhard Will (Vi~n Nghien dru Khoa hQc va Chfnh trl, Berlin, Duc)
Dr. Gerhard Will (Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany)
Xung ar}t Wl h(fp tac trong khu V!J'C song MekOng
~
Conflict and Cooperation in Mekong Region

/'
D TSKH. Tdn Hi~p (Ban D6i Ngo<;ti Trung Vang)
Dr. Tran Hiep (Central Committee of External Relations of VCP)

)<
,ffi' Nhfmg net chinh vd tiin trinh Vi?t Nam hr}i nh(ip khu V!J'C CMu A - Thai Binh Duong
. Some landmarks in Vietnam's integration process into the Asia-Pacific
TS. »3 Thanh Blnh - TS. Ngnyin Thj Hanh (Khna Lioh Sfr, Dai hno S" Pham m NQ')
i' Prof.Dr.Do Thanh Binh-Dr. Nguyen Thi Hanh (Department of History, Hanoi National
University of Education)
Vai tro etta Vi?t Nam trong vi?c giai quyh tranh chirp 6' bdn Dong giua ASEAN va Trung
Qu6c
The role of Vietnam in resolving ASEAN-China dispute in the South China Sea
;;;
h PGS. TS. Ph~m Quang Minh (Khoa Qu6c t~ hQc, DH KHXH&NV)
Assoc. ~rof: Dr. Pham,Quang Minh (Faculty of International Studies, USSH)
Van ae an ninh bien Dong: Hu6'ng tM h9P tac khu V!J'C '
The South China Sea Securitv Problem: Towards Rexional Cooperation
Thao lu~n/ Discussion
14:30-15:00
Giai lao/ Coffee Break
15:00-15:15
Bao cao
15:15-16:30
Presentations
TS. Nguy~n Thj Thanh Thuy (Khoa Qu6c tS hQc, DH KHXH&NV)
Dr. Nguyen Thi Thanh Thuy (Faculty of International Studies, USSH)
Vi thi cila Vi?t Nam 6' eMu A - Thai Binh Duong trong m6i lien h? v6'i chfnh sach cila My 0'
khu V!J'C
Vietnam's Position in Asia-Pacific in connection with US' foreign policy towards the region
PGS. Nguy~n Huy Quy
Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Huy Quy
Vi?t Nam trong n6 l!J'c aong gop vao hOa binh t(,Ii khu v~rc CMu A-Thai Binh Duong
Vietnam's strives for peace in the Asia-Pacific region
TS. Ngo Tiit T6 (Khoa Quan h~ Qu6c tS, DH DL Dong Do)
Dr. Ngo Tat To (Dean, Internationa! Relations Department, Dopg I?o Unive~sity).
Vai tro cua Vi?t Nam 0' Chau A-Thai Binh Duong nu-a cuoi the kY 20 aau the kY 21
th st
The Role of Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific in the late 20 and early 21 centuries
PGS. TS. Tdn Thj Vinh (Khoa SU', DH SI,!' Ph<;tm Ha NQi)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tran Thi Vinh (Department of History, Hanoi National University of Education)
Dinh vi Vi?t Nam trong chiin IU(fc cua MJ; 6' cMu A-Thai Binh Duong: Lich sir va Hi?n t(,Ii
Defininf! Vietnam's oositioll in the US strateKJ! towards the Asia-Pacific: Past and Present
Thao lu~n/ Discussion
16:30-17:00
Phat bi~u t6ng k~t
17:00-17:15
Closin/? Ceremony I
 Vietnam’s Relations with 
China and the United States 
Carlyle A. Thayer 
 

Paper for the International Conference on the Role of

Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific, co-sponsored by the Faculty
of International Studies, University of Social Sciences and
Humanities and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation,
University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Hanoi,
Vietnam, December 10, 2010
  2

Vietnam’s Relations with China and the United States 
Carlyle A. Thayer* 

Paper for the International Conference on the Role of Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific, co-
sponsored by the Faculty of International Studies, University of Social Sciences and
Humanities and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, University of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Hanoi, Vietnam, December 10, 2010.

Introduction 
This paper presents an analysis of Vietnam’s two most important sets of bilateral
relations, Vietnam-China and Vietnam-United States. In recent history Vietnam
has fought successful wars with both major powers and then proceeded to
normalize relations with its former adversaries. The focus of this paper is on the
post-normalization period in general and defence relations in particular.

The paper is divided into five parts. Part 1 provides a general overview of
Vietnam’s changing worldview and conceptualization of foreign relations. Part 2
reviews Vietnam-China relations. This is followed in part 3 by an analysis of
Vietnam-United States relations. Part 4 presents a comparative analysis of
defence relations. Part 5 offers some preliminary conclusions.

Vietnam’s Changing Worldview 
Vietnam has witnessed a remarkable transformation in its worldview and
conceptualisation of foreign relations when the Cold War era is compared with
the post-Cold War period. During the Cold War Vietnam was a member of the
socialist camp led by the Soviet Union and adopted an orthodox Marxist-Leninist
ideological framework. It accepted the view that the world was divided into two
camps, socialist and capitalist, on the basis of antagonistic contradictions. In
other words the world was divided between ‘friends and enemies’ and the key
question was ‘who will triumph over whom? Global integration was viewed
negatively as a process of assimilation (hoa nhap) through which socialist states
would loose their autonomy if not identity.

Vietnam generally refrained from taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute but
adhered to the view that the Soviet Union was the leader of the socialist world.
In the late 1960s, for example, Vietnamese foreign policy theoreticians
propounded the Soviet ‘theory of three revolutionary currents’ (ba dong thac

                                                        
*Professor of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South
Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
  3

cach mang) as a framework for analysing global political developments.1

Vietnam firmly rejected ‘Mao’s theory of three worlds’ in the 1970s

The later years of the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of a in Vietnam’s
worldview. Vietnam was very much influenced by ‘new political thinking’
advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev provided a new rationale and framework for
viewing global change.2 The stress was now on the role of economics and science
and technology as drivers of change. Vietnam’s own domestic socio-economic
crisis in the mid-1980s contributed to the process of re-evaluating Vietnam’s
worldview.

At the end of 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev put paid to the concept of the ‘two worlds’
in a major address to the United Nations General Assembly. Gorbachev stressed
that the development of any one country would be based ‘on the interests of all
mankind’. He spoke of the ‘emergence of a mutually connected and integral
world’ and that future progress would only be possible ‘through the search for a
consensus of all mankind, in movement toward a new world order’. Once again,
influences from the Soviet Union impacted on Vietnam.
The process of adapting and then modifying Vietnam’s traditional worldview
was a gradual one. It involved intense internal debate and in some respects the
elements of the old ideological framework have not been jettisoned completely.
Vietnam’s new outlook now viewed the world as increasingly interdependent
and that economic integration (hoi nhap) was a positive process.

Changes in Vietnam’s worldview can be documented with reference to eight

important conceptual turning points: Politburo Resolution No. 32 (1986),
Politburo Resolution No. 2 (1987), Politburo Resolution No. 13 (1988), Seventh
Party Congress (1991), mid-term party conference (1994), the Ninth Party
Congress (2001) and eighth plenum of the party Central Committee (2003).3

                                                        
1Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnamese Perspectives on International Security: Three Revolutionary
Currents’, in Donald H. McMillen, ed., Asian Perspectives on International Security. London:
Macmillan Press, 1984, 57-76.
2 Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power:
Implications of Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok Initiative. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987 and Carlyle A.
Thayer, ‘Indochina’, in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes, eds., Security and Defence: Pacific and
Global Perspectives. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990. 403.
3 On the eve of the Eighth Congress the VCP was rent by internal divisions between ‘reformers’

and ‘conservatives’ over ideology, the pace and scope of reform efforts, the extent to which
Vietnam should open itself to foreign influences, and leadership change. The foreign policy
section of the Political Report to the Eighth Congress was amended several times before it was
tabled. During this period there was intense internal party debate over developing diplomatic
relations with the United States. The Political Report was a status quo document and did not
develop or elaborate any major new policy themes such as ‘renovation’ adopted by the Sixth
  4

Politburo Resolution No. 32 
In July 1986, after a period of intense internal debate, the Politburo of the
Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) adopted Resolution No. 32 (32/BCT21) on new
opportunities and possibilities to consolidate and develop the economy.
Significantly, this resolution identified ‘peace and development’ as the highest
priority and laid the basis for ‘new thinking’ (tu duy moi) in the
conceptualization of Vietnam’s national security policy. According to Phan Doan
Nam, Resolution 32:

clearly set out guidelines and revised diplomatic policies, and moved toward a
solution in Cambodia. The Resolution clearly stated:
-the external mission of Vietnam is to have good coordination between the strength
of the people and the strength of the era, to take advantage of favourable
international conditions to build socialism and defend the Fatherland, proactively
create a condition for stability and economic construction.
-It is necessary to move proactively to a new stage of development, and peaceful
coexistence with China, ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], and the
United States, and build Southeast Asia into a region of peace, stability and
cooperation.4
Nonetheless, many in the VCP continued to view the world divided into friends
and enemies. According to Interior Minister Pham Hung, in the first stage of the
period of transition to socialism, the struggle to defeat the multi-faceted war of
sabotage waged by hegemonists in collusion with imperialism is closely linked to
the struggle between socialism and capitalism to determine ‘who will triumph
over whom’.

Sixth Party Congress 
In December 1986, Vietnam held its Sixth National Congress, a meeting that has
become synonymous with the expression doi moi or renovation.5 The sixth
congress was mainly concerned with overcoming the crisis in the domestic
economy. Immediate priority was given to increasing food and grain production,
consumer goods and exports. Secretary General Truong Chinh delivered a
summary of the Central Committee’s Political Report. He identified several
means to achieve these priorities including ‘to expand and heighten the
effectiveness of external economic relations’.

                                                                                                                                                                     
Congress, or ‘industrialization and modernization’ endorsed by the Seventh Congress. See
Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Upholding State Sovereignty Through Global Integration: The Remaking of
Vietnamese National Security Policy’, Paper to conference Viet Nam, East Asia and Beyond, City
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, December 11-12, 2008, 25.
4 Phan Doan Nam, ‘Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20 Nam Doi Moi’, Tap Chi Cong San, no. 14(760),

July 2006, 26.

5 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnam’s Sixth Party Congress: An Overview’, Contemporary Southeast Asia,

June 1987, 9:1, 12-22.

  5

Two important points should be noted. First, the policy of doi moi led to the
abandonment of one the central planks of Marxist-Leninist ideology – central
planning. Second, in order to overcome its economic crisis, Vietnam would have
to open itself to foreign investment from non-socialist countries. In order to
achieve this objective Vietnam first had to liquidate the Cambodian problem.6

Politburo Resolution No. 2 
Politburo Resolution No. 2, ‘On Strengthening National Defence in the New
Revolutionary Stage’, was adopted sometime between April and June 1987 and
was kept secret.7 Politburo Resolution No. 2 mandated the return home of all
Vietnamese military forces in Cambodia and Laos to be followed by a major
program of demobilization.8

In September 1989 Vietnam unilaterally withdrew its armed forces from

Cambodia. This set the scene for a negotiated end to a decade-long conflict that
had been costly in blood and treasure and which had left Vietnam diplomatically
isolated and dependent on the Soviet Union. Over the next five years Vietnam
demobilized 700,000 troops, reducing main force strength from 1.2 million in
1987 to 500,000, thus reducing recurrent costs. Vietnam’s strategic readjustment
resulted in the adoption of comprehensive security outlook by depreciating the

                                                        
6‘The period of struggle aimed at a total victory of the Cambodian revolution, under the illusion
that the “situation is irreversible,” had come to an end, and we had to acknowledge the reality of
a step by step struggle to achieve a political solution for the Cambodian question’; see: Tran
Quang Co, Hoi Ky Tran Quang Co, http://www.ykien.net/tqc01.html. See also: Carlyle A. Thayer,
‘Kampuchea: Soviet Initiatives and Regional Responses’, in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A.
Thayer, eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok
Initiative. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, 171-200 and Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Prospects for Peace in
Kampuchea: Soviet Initiatives and Indochinese Responses’, The Indonesian Quarterly, 2nd Quarter,
1989, 17:2, 157-172.
7In September 1987 Nguyen Van Linh addressed a conference of high-level military cadres. In the

course of his presentation, Linh mentioned an important ‘Politburo resolution on national

defence tasks in the present period’ (Nghi quyet cua Bo chinh tri ve nhiem vu quoc phong trong giai
doan hien nay). The speech was published three years later: Nguyen Van Linh, May Van De Quan
Su Va Quoc Phong Trong Su Nghiep Doi Moi (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1990), 7–
21. See also: Editorial, ‘Urgently Consolidate and Improve the Qaulity of the Reserve Force for
Mobilization and Militia and Self-Defense Forces to Meet Demands of New Tasks,’ Quan Doi
Nhan Dan, July 6, 1989 broadcast by Hanoi Domestic Service, July 6, 1989; and Senior Lt. Gen.
Dang Vu Hiep, ‘Some Issues Relating to the Policy Aimed at Achieving the Task of Building the
Army and Consolidating National Defense in the New Situation,’ Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan,
July 1989 broadcast by Hanoi Domestic Service, July 9, 1989.
8 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnam’s Strategic Readjustment’, in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth,

eds., China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1995, 185-201 and Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Demobilization but not Disarmament—
Personnel Reduction and Force Modernization in Vietnam’, in Natalie Pauwels, ed., War Force to
Work Force: Global Perspectives on Demobilization and Reintegration. BICC Schriften zu Abrüstung
und Konversion. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft, 2000, 199-219.
  6

relative salience of military power and raising the importance of economic

power as contributors to national security.

Politburo Resolution No. 13  
On May 20, 1988, Vietnamese party leaders adopted probably the most
important modification of foreign policy in the contemporary period: Politburo
Resolution No. 13 ‘On the External Mission and Policy in the New Situation’.9
Politburo Resolution No. 13 used the term national interest (loi ich dan toc) for the
first time, unequivocally identified economic development as Vietnam’s main
priority, and called for a ‘multi-directional foreign policy’ orientation. The new
emphasis was ‘to maintain peace, take advantage of favorable world conditions’
in order to stabilize the domestic situation and set the base for economic
development over the next ten to fifteen years.10
In other words, this resolution marked the beginning of a shift away from the
‘two worlds’ view towards the concept of an interdependent world. Vietnam was
now poised to shift from confrontation to accommodation in its foreign policy.
According to one party official, Politburo Resolution No. 13 directed that a
‘comprehensive and long-term regional policy towards Asia and Southeast Asia;
be drawn up ‘as soon as possible’.11

Seventh Party Congress (1991) 
The next important evolution in Vietnam’s worldview was the formal adoption
of a ‘multi-directional foreign policy’ by the Seventh National Congress in June
1991.12 As key foreign policy documents made clear, Vietnam would ‘diversify
(da dang) and multilateralise (da phuong) economic relations with all countries
and economic organizations...’ In short, ‘Vietnam wants to become the friend of
all countries in the world community, and struggle for peace, independence and
development’. According to the Political Report, ‘We stand for equal and
mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries regardless of different socio-

                                                        
9 Gareth Porter, ‘The Transformation of Vietnam’s Worldview: From Two Camps to
Interdependence’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12:1, June 1990, 1-19; Chu Van Chuc, ‘Qua trinh
doi moi tu duy doi ngoai va hinh thanh duong loi doi ngoai doi moi’, Nghien Cuu Quoc Te, 3:58,
2004, 9; Nguyen Dy Nien, ‘Chinh Sach Van Hoat Dong Doi Ngoai Trong Thoi Ky Doi Moi’, Tap
Chi Cong San, 17(740), September 2005, 30; and Phan Doan Nam, ‘Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20
Nam Doi Moi’, Tap Chi Cong San, no. 14(760), July 2006, 26-30.
10 Luu Doan Huynh, ‘Vietnam-ASEAN Relations in Retrospect: A Few Thoughts’, Dialogue +

Cooperation, 2004, 1, 23-31.

11 Nguyen Huu Cat, ‘Viet Nam Hoi Nhap vao Khu Vuc vi Hoa Binh va Phat Trien’, Nghien Cuu

Dong Nam A, February 1996, 28-29.

12Vu Khoan, ‘Mot so van de quoc te cua dai hoi VII quan’, in Bo Ngoai Giao, Hoi nhap quoc te va

giu vung ban sac. Hanoi: Nha xuat ban chinh tri quoc te, 1995. 75 and Carlyle A. Thayer,
‘Indochina’, in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-
Pacific and the Former Soviet Union. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, 221.
  7

political systems and on the basis of the principle of peaceful co-existence’.13

The Political Report, reflecting the anxieties of party conservatives and
ideologues caused by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, gave priority to
relations with the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia, China, Cuba, other ‘communist
and workers’ parties’, the ‘forces struggling for peace, national independence,
democracy and social progress’, India, and the Non-Aligned Movement. It was
only at the end of this list that Vietnam’s ‘new friends’ were mentioned:
To develop relations of friendship with other countries in South-East Asia and the
Asia-Pacific region, and to strive for a South-East Asia of peace, friendship and co-
operation. To expand equal and mutually beneficial co-operation with northern and
Western European countries, Japan and other developed countries. To promote the
process of normalization of relations with the United States.14

Other residues of old political thinking remained. The final version of the
Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism, chapter
two, for example, asserted that ‘the contradictions between socialism and
capitalism are unfolding fiercely’ but that ‘mankind will certainly advance to
socialism, for this is the law of evolution of history’.15 For its part, Vietnam
would by-pass the capitalist stage and embark on a prolonged transition to
socialism ‘involving many stages’ of which the present was just the ‘initial stage’.

Since the seventh party congress, Vietnam succeeded in diversifying its foreign
relations by moving from dependency on the Soviet Union to a more diverse and
balanced set of external relations. Five developments were particularly notable:
normalization of diplomatic relations with all members of ASEAN,
normalization of relations with China (November 1991), Vietnam’s accession to
the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the restoration of official
development assistance by Japan (November 1992), and establishment of
diplomatic relations with South Korea (December 1992).16 By 1995 Vietnam
established diplomatic relations with 163 countries, up from only twenty-three
non-communist states in 1989.

                                                        
13 Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National Congress Documents. Hanoi: Vietnam Foreign

Languages Publishing House, 1991. 134.

14 Ibid., 135.
15 Ibid., 49-50.
16 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Internal Southeast Asian Dynamics: Vietnam’s Membership in ASEAN’, in

Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin, eds., The Role of Security and Economic Cooperation Structures
in the Asia Pacific Region: Indonesian and Australian Views. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 1996, 78-88; Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnam and ASEAN: A First Anniversary
Assessment’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1997. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997,
364-374 and Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnam. Asia-Australia Briefing Papers, Sydney: The Asia-
Australia Institute, The University of New South Wales, 1992. 55-62. In July 1992, Vietnam
attended a meeting of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as an observer for the first time. By signing
the ASEAN TAC Vietnam renounced the use of force or the threat to use force in foreign relations
and committed itself to the non-violent resolution of any conflict that might arise.
  8

Mid‐Term Party Conference (1994) 
The VCP convened its first mid-term party conference in Hanoi in January 1994
where, among other issues, Vietnam’s response to the ‘threat of peaceful
evolution’ was of major concern.17 Secretary General Do Muoi’s Political Report
reaffirmed Vietnam’s commitment to the broad outlines of economic and
political renovation that had emerged following the seventh congress.18 His
report warned about the threat of peaceful evolution aimed at ‘abolishing the
party and socialist regime’. In the face of this assessment, the Political Report
reaffirmed Vietnam’s commitment to ‘building a socialist orientated market
mechanism under state management’ and opposition to political pluralism or
any other challenges to socialism.

The major policy theme to emerge from the mid-term conference, however, was
the priority to be given industrialization and modernization. In order to
industrialize and modernize the Political Report underscored the crucial
importance of mobilizing domestic and foreign capital. The shift of the economic
structure to support industrialization had been mentioned first in the Strategy of
Socio-Economic Stabilisation and Development Up Until the Year 2000 adopted by the
Seventh Congress. The stress on industrialization and modernization had been
endorsed by the Central Committee’s third plenum in June 1993. Now it was
given higher status by its endorsement by the mid-term conference.

After the conference the official Vietnamese media highlighted what it termed
the challenges of ‘four dangers’ facing Vietnam: the danger of being left behind
(tut hau) economically by regional countries; danger of peaceful evolution against
socialism; danger of corruption; and danger of the breakdown of social order and
security.19
In the period after the 1994 mid-term conference and the convening of the Eighth
Congress in mid-1996 Vietnam continued to pursue an open door foreign policy
designed ‘to make friends with all countries’ in an effort to diversify and
multilateralise its external relations. These efforts paid handsome dividends.
Vietnam continued to attract increased direct foreign investment mainly in the
form of joint ventures. In 1993-94 the United States ended its long-standing
objections to the provision of developmental assistance to Vietnam by the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund, and gradually lifted restrictions on trade
and investment with Vietnam. Vietnam thus became eligible for a variety of aid,
credits and commercial loans to finance its development plans.

                                                        
17Prior to the conference delegates were given a required reading list that contained four works
dealing with the threat of peaceful evolution. One of the books was a translation of a Chinese
account justifying the suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing in 1989.
18 Nhan Dan, January 21, 1994.
19 Voice of Vietnam, January 22, 1994.
  9

In July 1995, Vietnam made a major break though on the foreign policy front; it
normalized relations with the United States, became ASEAN’s seventh member,
and signed a framework cooperation agreement with the European Union. For
the first time, Vietnam had diplomatic relations with all five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council and, equally importantly, with the
world’s three major economic centres: Europe, North America and East Asia.

Ninth Party Congress (2001) 
The Ninth Party Congress met in April 2001 and reaffirmed that ‘Vietnam wants
to be a friend and a reliable partner to all countries in the world’ by diversifying
and multilateralilzing its international relations.20 Priority was placed on
developing relations with ‘socialist, neighboring and traditional friendly states’.21

The Ninth Congress set the goals of overcoming underdevelopment by the year
2010 and accelerating industrialization and modernization in order to become a
modern industrialized state by 2020. In order to accomplish these goals Vietnam
vigorously stepped up efforts to integrate itself with the global economy by
pursuing membership in World Trade Organisation (WTO). This process of
integrating Vietnam’s economy with the global economy was popularized by the
expression ‘vuon ra bien lon’ or ‘to plunge into the big ocean’.

According to Vu Khoan, the Ninth Congress resolution identified two main

measures to attain this goal: ‘first, perfect the regime of a market economy with
socialist characteristics, and second, integrate deeper and more fully into the
various global economic regimes.22 Integration into the global economy will tie
our economy into the regional and global economies on the basis of common
rules of the game’.23 In the following years Vietnam succeeded in getting the
United States Congress to grant it permanent normal trade relations status

                                                        
20 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnam in 2001: The Ninth Party Congress and After’, Asian Survey, 42:1,
January/February 2002, 81-89.
21A Politburo resolution adopted in November 2001 sketched Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy as

follows: continue to strengthen relations with Vietnam’s neighbours and countries that have been
traditional friends; give importance to relations with big countries, developing countries, and the
political and economic centers of the world; raise the level of solidarity with developing countries
and the non-aligned movement; increase activities in international organizations; and develop
relations with Communist and Workers’ parties, with progressive forces, while at the same time
expanding relations with ruling parties and other parties. Pay attention to people’s diplomacy’;
see: Vu Duong Ninh, editor in chief, Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Hien Dai 1975-2002. Hanoi: Hoc Vien
Quan He Quoc Te, 2002, 110.
22 Vu Khoan, ‘Tich Cuc va Chu Dong Hoi Nhap Kinh Te Quoc Te’, Tap Chi Cong San, 119, 2006,

internet edition.
23This was the first time the concept of ‘market economy with socialist characteristics’ was

endorsed; Le Xuan Tung, ‘Nhung Dot Pha Tu Duy Ly Luan ve Kinh Te Thi Truong o Nuoc Ta’,
Tap Chi Cong San, 16(715), August 2004, 17.
  10

(PNTR) as a prerequisite for United States approval of Vietnam’s membership in

the WTO.

8th Plenum (2003) 
The party Central Committee’s eighth plenum (ninth congress) met from July 2-
12, 2003. It approved an important reinterpretation of two key ideological
concepts – the ‘objects of struggle’ (doi tuong) and ‘partners’ (doi tac) in foreign
relations. According to the eighth plenum’s resolution, ‘any force that plans and
acts against the objectives we hold in the course of national construction and
defense is the object of struggle’. And, ‘anyone who respects our independence
and sovereignty, establishes and expands friendly, equal, and mutually
beneficial relations with Vietnam is our partner’.24

The eighth plenum resolution argued for a more sophisticated dialectical

application of these concepts: ‘with the objects of struggle, we can find areas for
cooperation; with the partners, there exist interests that are contradictory and
different from those of ours. We should be aware of these, thus overcoming the
two tendencies, namely lacking vigilance and showing rigidity in our perception,
design, and implementation of specific policies’.

The eighth plenum resolution provided the policy rationale for Vietnam to step
up defence relations with the United States.25 After the plenum Vietnam advised
the United States that it would accept a long-standing invitation for its Defence
Minister to visit Washington. Vietnam also approved the first port call by a U.S.
Navy warship since the Vietnam War.

This section has traced the gradual evolution of ‘new thinking’ in the
conceptualization and implementation of Vietnam’s foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era. The sections that follow will analyse Vietnam’s two most
important sets of bilateral relations, those with China and the United States.

Vietnam‐China Relations 

Background 
In January 1950, the People’s Republic of China extended diplomatic recognition
to Vietnam’s fledgling communist regime, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

                                                        
24 Vietnam Communist Party, Commission on Ideology and Cultural Affairs, Documents of the
Eighth Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party (Hanoi: The National Politics Publishing
House, 2003), quoted in Nguyen Vu Tung, ‘Vietnamese Foreign Policy: At a New Crossroad?,’
Paper to Strategic and Foreign Relations, Vietnam Update 2004, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore, November 25-26, 2004.
25 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The Prospects for Strategic Dialogue’, in Catharin E. Dalpino editor,

Dialogue on U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Ten Years After Normalization. San Francisco: The Asia
Foundation, 2005, 26-30.
  11

(later renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam). China supported the

Vietnamese communists in their successful resistance to French colonialism.
Relations were described ‘as close as lips and teeth’. China then provided
substantial material and personnel support to communist Vietnam during the
Vietnam War (1965-73).
Relations began to fray in 1992-73 when China began to urge a diplomatic
settlement of the Vietnam War short of reunification. Hanoi’s relations with
Beijing began a downward spiral in 1977-78 over growing conflict between the
Khmer Rouge regime and Vietnam. Hostilities erupted in February-March 1979
when China invaded northern Vietnam to teach Vietnam a lesson for its invasion
of Cambodia. Relations remained strained throughout the Cambodian conflict as
China continued to support the Khmer Regime and shell Vietnam’s northern
provinces.

It was only in September 1990, a year after Vietnam’s unilateral withdrawal of

military forces from Cambodia that China and Vietnam agreed to normalize
relations at a secret summit in Chengdu. Vietnam and China formally
normalized relations in November 1991 pointedly after an international
conference in Paris reached a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia
the previous October.26

The Structure of Bilateral Relations 
This section provides an overview of the structure of bilateral relations involving
both party-to-party relations as well as state-to-state and military-to-military
relations.27

In March 1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and the Vietnam Communist Party adopted a sixteen-character guideline
calling for ’long-term, stable, future-orientated, good-neighborly and all-round
cooperative relations’. In June 2008, following another summit of party leaders in
Beijing, bilateral relations were raised to that of ‘strategic partners’, and a year
later this was upgraded to a ‘strategic cooperative partnership’.

                                                        
26China also turned down a Vietnamese proposal to form an alliance, replying ‘comrades but not
allies’; see: Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Comrade Plus Brother: The New Sino-Vietnamese Relations’, The
Pacific Review, 5(4), September 1992, 402-406 and Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Sino-Vietnamese Relations:
The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest’, Asian Survey, 34(6), June 1994, 513-528.
27 See: Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The Structure of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991-2008’, Journal of

International Culture [Chosun University, Gwangju], December 2008, 1(2), 45-98 and Carlyle A.
Thayer, ‘Vietnam and Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry’, in Daljit
Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2010. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, 392-
409.
  12

Vietnam and China hold regular summit meetings of their party leaders. These
meetings provide the opportunity for wide-ranging discussions and an impetus
for the resolution of various outstanding issues. Party-to-party relations are
cemented by the frequent exchange of party delegations from Central Committee
Departments, administrative units, and specialists on socialist ideology. The VCP
and CCP have also conducted a series of five seminars on ideology. In sum,
party-to-party ties have been used to identify common ground between former
antagonists.

In 2000, a summit meeting of state presidents from China and Vietnam codified
their bilateral relations in a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in
the New Century. This document has served as the framework for long-term
state-to-state relations up to the present. In 2006, in a major development,
Vietnam and China set up a Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation at
deputy prime ministerial level to coordinate all aspects of their relationship. The
Steering Committee meets on an annual basis alternating between capital cities.
The first meeting was held in November 2006, the second in January 2008 and
the third in March 2009. At the third meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
Vietnam and China set up a hot line to deal with urgent issues, such as clashes in
the South China Sea.

Vietnam and China initiated their first defence contacts since the 1979 border war
in 1992. In April 2005, they initiated their first annual defence security
consultations; and in November 2010 they held their first Strategic Defence
Security Dialogue in Hanoi.28 Military-to-military relations are discussed in
detail in the following section (see also Appendix A).

Vietnam pursues three strategies in its relations with China. First, it utilizes high-
level party and state visits as a diplomatic tool to codify its relations with China.
Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements, and treaties in an
effort to quarantine contentious issues from intruding on and negatively
affecting other areas of cooperation and to make Chinese behavior more
predictable and less likely to harm Vietnam’s national interests.

High-level meetings have resulted in the adoption of guidelines to regulate

bilateral relations and set deadlines for lower officials to settle particular disputes
– such as the land border. A prime example may be found in Vietnam’s approach
to managing border disputes with China.29 Vietnam stresses the legacy of past

                                                        
28 ‘China-Vietnam boost defence cooperation.’ Voice of Vietnam News, November 28, 2010;
‘Vietnamese party, army senior officials meet with Chinese military delegation,’ Xinhua,
November 28, 2010; and ‘Defence officials meet in dialogue with China,’ Viet Nam News,
November 29 2010.
29 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2006, 5 and 89-90.

  13

close relations and mutual benefit over contemporary differences. Vietnam

obtained Chinese agreement to detach these issues from high-level consideration
and to relegate them to technical working groups, and to solve the easier
problems before the more difficult. Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy emphasized
common interests, such as making the land border safe and secure so that both
sides could benefit from cross-border trade. As a result a treaty on the land
border and agreement demarcating the Gulf of Tonkin were reached.

Vietnam’s second strategy is to promote multilateral efforts to enmesh China is a

web of cooperative relations. Vietnam utilizes regional multilateral institutions
such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight and the East Asia Summit. During 2010,
Vietnam used its position as Chair of ASEAN effectively to internationalize the
South China Sea issue. China is now discussing the implementation of the 2002
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN
counterparts in a joint working group.

Vietnam’s third strategy may be characterized as ‘self-help’ or developing its

own sufficient military capacity to deter China from using force. For example,
Vietnam will take delivery of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia over a six-
year period. This is a defensive strategy aimed at area denial. Vietnam has also
offered Cam Ranh Bay as a repair facility to all navies in the world in an effort to
encourage the presence of foreign navies in the South China Sea.

On the other hand, China asserts considerable direct and indirect influence on
Vietnam. Probably no major decision of any nature is made in Hanoi without
taking Chinese interests and likely responses into account. For example,
Vietnam’s 2009 Defense White paper makes no mention of the 1979 border war
with China so as not to offend Beijing. The Chinese Embassy regularly intervenes
to protest any publication or action that is seen as infringing Chinese
sovereignty, especially in the South China Sea. The slow pace of Vietnam-United
States military-to-military relations up until recently may be attributed in part to
concerns about China’s reaction.

China exerts direct pressure through high-level meetings by national leaders.

Party-to-party relations represent a special conduit for Chinese influence.
Vietnam’s model of economic development borrows heavily but not exclusively
from Chinese experience. Vietnamese foreign policy also mimics Chinese
formulations such as appropriating the expression ‘peace, cooperation and
development’ to describe general strategic trends in Asia Pacific. Hanoi also
adapts Chinese ideology to its own needs, such as ‘the threat of peaceful
evolution’. In sum, no other foreign state is as assertive or influential in Hanoi
than China.
  14

Economic Relations 
When Vietnam normalized relations with China two-way trade grew
astronomically. China is now Vietnam’s largest trading partner. China supplies
Vietnam with machinery, refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies China
with unrefined oil, coal and rubber. The single most important issue in the trade
relationship is the imbalance in China’s favor. In 2008, China exported $15.7
billion worth of goods to Vietnam, while Vietnam managed to export only $4.6
billion to China, leaving a deficit of $11.1 billion.

China’s trade surplus has figured at every high-level summit in recent years.
Party and state leaders agree that efforts should be made to make it more
balanced. But how? The structure of Vietnamese exports had changed little over
the years and no major change is expected in the coming years. Vietnamese
domestic manufacturers cannot produce quality goods that are competitive in
the Chinese market place. Restricting Chinese imports is not on the cards.

Vietnam’s massive trade deficit with China must be placed in the context of
Vietnam’s current trade deficit of $19 billion with the rest of the world (2009).
Vietnam needs continued access to markets in the United States where it has a $9
billion surplus (2009).

Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese investment to mitigate the
trade imbalance. Although China has responded, the total amount of investment
($3 billion) is modest when compared to other foreign investors. Also, China’s
investment in bauxite mining in the Central Highlands has proven to be highly
contentious in Vietnam.

In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there are also geo-strategic

considerations at play. The growth of trade has been accompanied by a massive
upgrading and construction of infrastructure – roads, bridges, railways – much
of it funded by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank as part of the
Greater Mekong Sub-region. Increasingly mainland Southeast Asia is being
linked to southwestern China. In addition, Vietnam and China are promoting the
development of the ‘two corridors and one economic beltway’ linking southern
China, Hainan island and northern Vietnam. From Hanoi’s point of view, this
not only serves Vietnam’s development needs, but also enmeshes China and
provides Beijing incentives for cooperative behavior.

The relationship between Vietnam and China is a highly asymmetric one in all
dimensions of power. Vietnam, with a population of 89 million, ranks as the
world’s thirteenth most populous country, yet it is only a middle sized Chinese
province by comparison. The major strategic preoccupation of the Vietnamese
leadership is how to use the levers of diplomacy, economic relations and military
  15

ties to maintain their autonomy and independence and prevent from being
pulled into China’s orbit.

Outstanding Issues 
Conflicting  claims  to  sovereignty  in  the  South  China  Sea  have  led  to  a  number  of 
issues that have soured bilateral relations.30 Six clusters of issues may be identified: 

1. China’s establishment of the Sansha administrative unit on Hainan Island with

responsibility over the Paracel Islands, Spratly archipelago and Macclesfield
Bank.

2. The publication of anti-Vietnamese material on the Internet such as the

purported Chinese invasion plan of Vietnam and Chinese criticism of
Vietnamese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea published on a joint
Vietnam-China Trade Ministry website. And the publication of anti-China
commentary on the Internet by Vietnamese bloggers.

3. Chinese pressures on ExxonMobile, BP and others to cease assisting Vietnam

in exploring and developing hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea.

4. China’s imposition of unilateral fishing bans in the South China Sea north of 12
degrees north latitude annually during the months of May-August, and Chinese
aggressiveness against Vietnamese fishing craft in imposing these bans.

5. China’s protest at submissions by Vietnam (including a joint submission with

Malaysia) to the United Nations Commission on Limits to Continental Shelves in
May 2009 and China’s lodging of a China U-shaped map containing nine dash
lines to indicate the extent of Chinese sovereignty claims.

6. Continued Chinese diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to cease any action,

including blogging and publication that China finds objectionable, especially in
relation to the South China Sea.

                                                        
30 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Peace,
Stability and Cooperation in the Region’, in Tran Truong Thuy, ed., The South China Sea:
Cooperation for Regional Security and Development. Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban The Gioi, 2010, 125-138;
Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The South China Sea Dispute: A Review of Developments and
Their Implications since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties,” in K. V. Kesavan and
Daljit Singh, eds., South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo-Political and Security
Challenges. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, 57-72; and Carlyle A. Thayer,
‘Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Peace and Prosperity’,
Paper presented to the 2nd International Workshop on the South China Sea: Cooperation for
Regional Security and Development, co-sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and
the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, New World Saigon Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam,
November 12-13, 2010.
  16

The souring of relations over the South China Sea has also magnified other issues
such as China’s massive trade surplus in relation to Vietnam and the paucity of
Chinese investments in Vietnam; illegal Chinese workers/migrants in Vietnam;
and environmental and possibly national security concerns over China’s bauxite
mining venture in Vietnam’s Central Highlands.

Vietnam‐United States Relations 

Background 
The United States withheld diplomatic recognition from Vietnam for over two
decades following the end of the Vietnam War. The main impediment was the
issue of a full accounting of all U.S. servicemen who went missing in action or
were held as prisoners of war (MIA/POW). In 1994, the U.S. lifted its trade
embargo as a result of progress in addressing this issue by Vietnam. In July 1995
the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam.

War Legacy Issues 
For the next fifteen year bilateral relations continued to be weighed down by
unsettled legacy issues arising from the Vietnam War: full accounting for U.S.
Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, Vietnamese refugees and Vietnam’s
demand that the U.S. address ‘the wounds of war’ and stop its support for anti-
communist exiles seeking to overthrow the Hanoi government. It took Vietnam
and the United States six years before could they could negotiate their first
substantive agreement - the Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001.

Legacy issues left by the war still persist today but are no longer the centerpiece
of the bilateral relationship. The U.S. accepts that Vietnam is doing its best in
providing a full accounting for MIAs. Nevertheless, the POW/MIA issue still
remains one of the U.S. government’s highest priorities with Vietnam. In
reciprocation for Vietnamese humanitarian assistance in addressing the MIA
issue, the U.S. has made cooperation in health the cornerstone of its assistance
program and directs three-quarters of its funding to addressing HIV/AIDS and
pandemic influenza.

Vietnam has pressed for reciprocity in addressing legacy issues and in recent
years has asked the United States for assistance in dealing with Agent Orange
hot spots. Congress has appropriated funds to assist with dioxin removal and to
provide health care facilities in Da Nang where Agent Orange was once stored.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised in Hanoi ‘to increase our cooperation
  17

and make even greater progress together’ to deal with the legacy of Agent
Orange.31

Economic Relations 
Economics took center stage in 2000, a pivotal year, with the signing of a Bilateral
Trade Agreement. In 2007, Vietnam and the United States signed a Trade and
Investment Agreement. Two-way trade jumped from $450 million in 1995 to
$12.9 billion in 2009. As noted above, Vietnam enjoys a hefty $9 billion surplus.
Obama Administration officials support Vietnam’s full participation in the Trans
Pacific Partnership to expand free trade. American companies have invested $9.8
billion in Vietnam, placing the U.S. sixth on the investment ladder. Economic
relations also include a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement (2003, amended in
2008) and a Bilateral Maritime Agreement (2007). Over 200 memoranda of
understanding have been signed between universities in both countries.

Political Relations 
Political relations have steadily improved since 2000 when Bill Clinton became
the first American president to visit Hanoi. In 2006 and 2007, the U.S. and
Vietnamese presidents exchanged reciprocal visits. A major turning point
occurred in June 2008 when Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited
Washington. In a joint statement, the United States declared its respect for the
territorial integrity of Vietnam and its opposition to the use of force to overthrow
the Hanoi government, thus addressing Vietnamese concerns about the activities
of overseas Vietnamese. Prime Minister Dung revisited Washington in April 2010
to attend President Barrack Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit. At that time the
two countries signed a MOU on cooperation in nuclear power including access to
reliable sources of nuclear fuel.32 The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review 2010
identified Vietnam as a potential strategic partner along with Indonesia and
Malaysia.33

Military Relations 
Military-to-military relations developed slowly after 1995 because Vietnam was
concerned that defense relations might outstrip economic ties. In 2000, the
United States and Vietnam initiated defense ministers’ visits, on a reciprocal
basis, every three years. It is significant that Vietnam agreed to an annual
defense dialogue first with the United States in 2004 prior to commencing
bilateral defense security consultations with China the following year. In October
                                                        
31 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, Government Guest House, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010,
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, July 22, 2010. 
32 This agreement reportedly will open the door for Bechtel and General Electric to sell nuclear

reactors to Vietnam.
33 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.
  18

2008, U.S.-Vietnam bilateral defense ties took a significant step forward with the
holding of the first Political, Security and Defense Dialogue in Washington. The
dialogue was convened by the U.S. State Department and Vietnam’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and focused on regional security and strategic issues.

Military relations stepped up noticeably in 2009, in apparent response to Chinese

assertiveness in the South China Sea. In April, Vietnamese military officials
visited the USS John D. Stennis, an aircraft carrier operating in the South China
Sea. In December, Vietnam’s Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh,
stopped off in Hawaii to meet with U.S. Pacific Command officials as part of his
visit to Washington. In Hawaii he was photographed peering through the
periscope of the USS Florida, a nuclear-powered guided missile submarine
(SSGN). In 2009 and 2010, Vietnam completed repairs on two U.S. Military Sealift
Command vessels.
On the 15th anniversary of normalization, Vietnam’s deputy ambassador visited
the USS George W. H. Bush in Norfolk, Virginia, while half a world away
Vietnamese local government and military officials flew out to the USS George
Washington in waters off the central coast of Vietnam. Just prior to the fly out, the
U.S. and Vietnam conducted their first naval engagement activities. In August
2010, in a significant upgrade of their defence relationship, Vietnam and the US
held their first Defense Dialogue between senior defence officials.34 This meeting
focused on bilateral issues such as MIA accounting, unexploded wartime
ordnance, Agent Orange, and areas for future cooperation.
Also on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic
relations (July 1995-July 2010), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in
Hanoi that America considers Vietnam ‘not only important on its own merits,
but as part of a strategy aimed at enhancing American engagement in the Asia
Pacific, and in particular Southeast Asia’. According to Secretary Clinton, all the
fundamentals were in place for the U.S. to take its relations with Vietnam ‘to the
next level of engagement, cooperation, friendship, and partnership’.35

Constraints and Difficulties 
While there is definitely new momentum in the bilateral relationship, there are
constraints and potential difficulties in the path ahead.36 The first concern is what
Secretary Clinton described as ‘profound differences’ over human rights and

                                                        
34 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnam’s Defensive Diplomacy’, Op Ed, The Wall Street Journal, August 20-
22, 2010, 11.
35 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister

and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, Government Guest House, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010,
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, July 22, 2010.
36 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘US-Vietnam Relations: A Scorecard’, Asia Pacific Bulletin (East-West Center,

Washington, D.C.), No. 67, September 14, 2010, 1-2

  19

political freedom.37 Human rights remain the main point of contention in

bilateral relations. U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Michael Michalak, made clear
that arms sales to Vietnam are not possible until the human rights situation
improves. In an interview with VietNamNet Publisher Nguyen Anh Tuan,
Ambassador Michalak stated, ‘We would very much like to expand our military
to military relationship to include the sale of arms, but until we are more
comfortable with the human rights situation in Vietnam, that’s just not going to
be possible.’38

The second constraint arises from conservative elements in Vietnam who still
view the United States with suspicion. They not only characterize religious
freedom, human rights and democracy as tools to undermine Vietnam’s socialist
regime but argue that educational exchanges are part of the ‘plot of peaceful
evolution’. The conservative influence within the VCP is evident in draft policy
documents to be considered by the Eleventh Congress in 2011. The draft Political
Report is replete with references to ‘hostile forces’ and ‘peaceful evolution.’39
VCP conservatives oppose the current trajectory in defense relations with the
U.S. because of the potential friction they may cause with China.

A third constraint lies in different expectations regarding economic reforms.

Vietnam is frustrated by what it considers politically motivated trade barriers
such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy taxes on Vietnamese goods as well as
U.S. pressures to equitize state-owned enterprises. The U.S. has offered technical
assistance in trade and investment matters and would like to encourage good
governance. But many obstacles stand in the way. Corruption is rampant and
affects all sectors. Vietnam’s restrictions on access to the Internet has become a
contentious issue.40 Vietnamese government decision-making lacks transparency,
such as the recent imposition of price controls and foot dragging on permission
for American universities to operate in Vietnam and the U.S. Embassy to increase
its staff. Also, a bilateral investment treaty has yet to be agreed.

                                                        
37 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at Event Celebrating the 15th
Anniversary of United States-Vietnam Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010, U.S. Department
of State, Office of the Spokesman, July 22, 2010.
38 Tuan Viet Nam, July 6, 2010 reprinted in ‘Vietnam’s relations with America are in fact a strategic

connection,’ VietNamNet, July 11, 2010.

39 ‘Du thao [Mat] Bao Cao Chinh Tri tai Dai Hoi XI cua Dang (April 2, 2010),’ in Dang Cong San

Viet Nam, Du thao Cac Van Kien Trinh Dai Hoi XI cua Dang (Tai Lieu Su Dung Tai Dai Hoi Dang
Cap Co So), Luu Hanh Noi Bo, April 2010.
40 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, Government Guest House, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010,
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, July 22, 2010. 
  20

Vietnam’s Defence Relations with China and the US 

Background 
The first defense contacts between Vietnam and China since their 1979 border
war were initiated thirteen years later in 1992 and one year after the
normalization of relations. Vietnam and China exchanged delegations from the
External Relations Departments of their respective defense ministries. Another
nine years elapsed before Vietnam and China formally agreed to ‘multi-level
military exchanges’.41 In contrast, it was only in 2003, thirty years after the end of
the Vietnam War and eight years after the establishment of diplomatic relations,
that Vietnam decided to upgrade its defense relations with the United States.42
Vietnam’s Minister of National Defense made an historic official visit to
Washington late that year.
This section provides a comparative assessment of Vietnam’s military relations
with China and the United States under six headings: high-level exchanges,
naval port visits, professional military education and training, other defense
cooperation, arms and equipment sales and strategic cooperation.

1. High­Level Visits 
The United States and Vietnam have exchanged two reciprocal visits by defense
ministers/secretary of defense. These have been spaced at three-year intervals
(see Table 1 below). In contrast, the patterns of ministerial level visits between
Vietnam and China has been more erratic and heavily weighted China’s favor.
Vietnam’s defense minister has journeyed to China on seven occasions since
1991. A six-year gap occurred between the second and third visits and a five-year
gap took place between the fourth and fifth visits. The exchanges are not
reciprocal. China’s defense minister has visited Vietnam only twice with a
thirteen year gap between visits.
Vietnam hosted its most recent ministerial-level visits from China in April 2006
and the United States in July of the same year. In October 2010, both the Chinese
and U.S. defence ministers attended the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
Eight (ADMM + 8) inaugural meeting in Hanoi. Vietnam’s Defense Minister last
visited the United States in November 2009 and China in April 2010.
A review of high-level defense exchanges below secretary/minister level for the
period 2002-mid-2009 reveals that Vietnam has received roughly equal
delegations from China (ten) and the United States (eleven).43 But there is a
                                                        
41 Joint Statement on Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century, December 2000.
42 Decision of the eighth plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, July 2-12,
2003.
43 Data on exchanges was taken from Vietnam’s 2004 and 2009 Defense White Papers. Data for

the year 2004 was omitted from these publications.

  21

marked imbalance in delegations from Vietnam. Eleven high-level Vietnamese

delegations visited China, while only four visited the United States.
High-level exchanges between Vietnam and China may be classified into three
broad categories: general staff, general political department and regional military
commands. There is a rough balance in exchanges at general staff and general
political department level.44 China has dispatched three delegations of regional
military commanders to Vietnam and received only one return visit. Most
recently, in a new development, the Political Commissar of the Vietnam People’s
Army Navy, Tran Thanh Huyen, visited Beijing.45
Table 1
Exchanges of Defense Ministers:
Vietnam, China and the United States, 1991-2009

Visits to China by Visits to Vietnam Visits to the Visits to Vietnam

Vietnam’s Defense by China’s United States by by the U.S.
Minister Defense Minister Vietnam’s Defense Secretary of
Minister Defense

1991 July

1992 December 1993 May

1998 January

2000 July 2000 March

2005 October 2006 April 2003 November 2006 July

2007 August

2008-09 no visits 2008-09 no visits 2009 November 2008-09 no visits

April 2010

Because Vietnam and China are both communist states and maintain a system of
political control over their armed forces, they have an avenue of defense
cooperation not available to the United States. Also, Vietnam and China share a
common border and both have put in a major effort to demine and demarcate
their common frontier.
                                                        
44 Senior Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff,
visited Vietnam on November 27, 2010. His visit is not included in these figures.
45 ‘China, Vietnam Need to Enhance Cooperation: Senior Chinese Military Officer,’ Xinhua,

November 23, 2010.

  22

High-level exchanges between Vietnam and the United States are markedly
different because the U.S. Defense Department and armed forces are not
structured the same way as the Vietnamese and Chinese militaries. For example,
Vietnam has no counterpart for the U.S. system of Combatant Commanders,
such as the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (formerly Commander-in-
Chief Pacific Command or CINCPAC). The United States has no counterpart for
the head of the General Political Department. U.S. delegations to Vietnam may
be grouped into three categories: (1) visits by the Commander U.S. Pacific
Command; (2) visits at Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense level; and (3) visits
by component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command.
Between 2002 and mid-2009. the United States sent an equivalent number of
high-level delegations to Vietnam as China (eleven as compared to China’s ten).
U.S. delegations reflect a greater diversity of interest and potential for
cooperation. By far the most frequent U.S. visitor to Vietnam is the Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Command who logged four visits between 2002 and mid-2009
(and a total of seven visits from 1994). In addition, Vietnam has received the
commanders of the U.S. Army Pacific (May 2004), 13th Air Force (May 2008),
Pacific Fleet (March 2009) and Pacific Air Force (June 2009). It is notable that
visits by component commanders are a relatively new feature of U.S.-Vietnam
defense relations.
U.S.-Vietnam defense relations are poised to enter a new phase following the
visit of Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh to Washington in late 2009 and the
holding of the first direct military-to military talks in 2010. This may prove to be
the venue for advancing concrete proposals for defense cooperation.46

2. Naval Port Visits 
In November 1991, as Vietnam and China were normalizing their political
relations, a People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) Jiangwei II guided missile
frigate made the first visit by a Chinese warship to a Vietnamese port since
unification in 1975. The frigate visited Ho Chi Minh City. No further port calls
were made until November 2008 and August 2009.
In 2000, Vietnam and China reached agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin and
on fisheries. In April 2006, the navies of both countries commenced joint patrols
in the Gulf of Tonkin and nine patrols have been conducted between then and
the June 2010. The last joint patrol also included the first Search and Rescue
Exercise (SAREX) between China and Vietnam. In June 2009, in an historic first,

                                                        
46General George W. Casey, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, paid a working visit to Vietnam on
November 22, 2010 and held discussions with Lt. Gen. Nguyen Quoc Khanh, Deputy Chief of the
General Staff, Vietnam People’s Army on military personnel exchanges. ‘US Army General Visits
Vietnam,’ Vietnam News Agency, November 22, 2010.
  23

two Vietnamese naval ships made a visit to Zhanjiang port in Guangdong

province in Southwestern China.
Vietnamese-Chinese naval exchanges pale in comparison to the regular annual
visits by U.S. Navy warships, supplemented by a slowly growing number of
non-combatant and humanitarian ships (see Table 2).
In addition to the ‘show the flag’ and protocol nature of these visits, the U.S. ads
value to port calls by providing humanitarian and medical assistance to the
surrounding community. The visits by the USNS Safeguard in 2009 and USNS
Byrd in 2010 for ship repairs may be harbingers of more permanent
arrangements. Now that the Vietnamese navy has made port visits to Thailand,
Malaysia and China it is possible Vietnam may agree to visit a U.S. port such as
Guam.
Table 2
U.S. Naval Ship Visits to Vietnamese Ports, 2003-2010

Date of Visit Ships Involved Port Visited

2003 November USS Vandergrift Ho Chi Minh

City

2004 July USS Curtis Wilbur Da Nang

2005 March-April USS Gary Ho Chi Minh

City

2006 July USS Patriot and USS Salvor Ho Chi Minh

City

2007 July USS Peleliu Da Nang

2007 October USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang

2007 November USS Patriot and USS Guardian Hai Phong

2008 June USNS Mercy Nha Trang

2009 June USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang

2009 August- USNS Safeguard Ho Chi Minh

Sept. City
  24

2009 November USS Blue Ridge* and USS Lassen Da Nang

2010 Feb.-March USNS Richard E. Byrd Hon Khoi Port

2010 May USNS Mercy Qui Nhon

2010 August USS John S. McCain Da Nang

*U.S. 7th Fleet Flag Ship and escort.

Finally, the United States has added a new dimension to naval relations by flying
Vietnamese military officers out to the USS John D. Stennis and USS George
Washington to observe flight operations in the South China Sea in April 2009 and
August 2010, respectively, and by the holding of their first naval engagement
activities.

3. Professional Military Education and Training 
Vietnamese-Chinese cooperation in the area of professional military education
and training is at the nascent stage. The visits by senior officials from their
respective General Political Departments invariably include discussions on
exchanging experiences in army building on their agenda. In 2008, Vietnam’s
Deputy Defense Minister held discussions in Beijing on cooperation in personnel
training. Both sides also have discussed Vietnamese participation in courses
offered by China’s National Defense University.47
Vietnamese participation in professional military education and training with the
United States is of longer standing but involves only limited number of
Vietnamese personnel. Perhaps the first opportunity for military education was
offered by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii in the late 1990s.
Incomplete data suggests that numbers have slowly risen from two in 1998 to a
high of thirteen in 2004. Since 2005, Vietnam has been eligible for Extended
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and later IMET (English
language and medical training). Eight Vietnamese military personnel
participated in FY2005. In 2007 the United States asked Vietnam to accept U.S.
officers and cadets for training in Vietnamese universities. The status of this
proposal is uncertain.48

4. Other Defense Cooperation 

                                                        
47A major delegation from China’s National Defense University first visited Hanoi in late 2004.
48For comparison, Australia has hosted more than 80 senior Vietnamese Defense visitors and
over 150 Vietnamese Defense students since February 1999. During the same period over 900
Australian Defence officials have visited Vietnam.
  25

As noted above, defense cooperation between Vietnam and China has been
mainly of a confidence building nature involving demining and demarcating
their common land border and joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tokin.
By contrast, Vietnam’s other defense cooperation relations with the United States
have been and continue to be more extensive. Obviously MIA-POW full
accounting has been the main focal point for decades. But Vietnam and the
United States also cooperate on other programs designed to address the legacies
of the Vietnam War such as demining and unexploded ordnance removal and
joint research into Agent Orange. Other areas of defense/security cooperation
include: military medical research (HIV/AIDS), humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief (flood control), counter-terrorism (including information sharing),
and counter drug trafficking.
Since 2007-08, the United States has funded Vietnamese participation at a
number of defense-related seminars and exercises in the region such as COBRA
GOLD, Western Pacific Naval Symposium and U.S.-Southeast Asia bilateral joint
exercises. In the past, Vietnam has turned down a number of requests for small
joint exercises. In 1997, for example, the U.S. unsuccessfully proposed tactical
discussions and joint training exchanges in jungle warfare. More recently (2009),
the United States has invited Vietnam to participate in search and rescue
exercises.

5. Arms Sales and National Defense Industry 
In 2005, Vietnam and China initiated discussions at ministerial level on
cooperation between their respective national defense industries. That year a
delegation from China’s Commission for Science, Technology and Industry
visited Vietnam. It was later reported that NORINCO (China North Industries
Corporation), a Chinese state-owned arms manufacturer, agreed to sell
ammunition for small arms, artillery and military vehicles to Vietnam.
NORINCO was also reported to be discussing co-production arrangements for
heavy machine guns and ammunition with a Vietnamese counterpart. In 2008,
Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister held discussions with China’s Commission
for Science, Technology and Industry in Beijing. No doubt the prospects for
Chinese defense industry cooperation with Vietnam have been limited by recent
arms and servicing agreements between Vietnam and the Russian Federation.
Military equipment sales between the United States and Vietnam have been
raised over a number of years. In 1994, for example, the Commander in Chief
Pacific Command proposed equipment exchanges and sales while on a visit to
Vietnam. In 2005, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam raised the possibility of joint
cooperation in repair and maintenance and the purchase of supplies by the U.S.
Navy. The following year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while on a
visit to Hanoi, suggested that Vietnam might buy military spare parts.
  26

All of these proposals were subject to legal restrictions. In 2006, the Secretary of
State approved the sale, lease, export and/or transfer of non-lethal defense
articles and defense services to Vietnam. This was followed by a Presidential
Memorandum establishing Vietnam’s eligibility under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 to make certain purchases. Vietnam was excluded, however, from
lethal end items or their components including non-lethal crowd control and
night vision devices. In 2007, the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations
were amended to allow sales to Vietnam on case-by-case basis.
The U.S. would like to see Vietnam take part in the Foreign Military Sales
process. U.S. officials have already explained the process involved and how to
submit a Letter of Request for Price and Availability. Vietnam could seek
approval to acquire spare parts for its stock of captured U.S. Armored Personnel
Carriers (APCs) and UH-1 (Huey) helicopters which are presently inoperable. In
2009, the head of the Pentagon’s Defense Cooperation Agency singled out
maritime patrol craft and coastal radar as possible items for sale. But U.S.
officials have made clear that non-lethal arms sales are contingent upon Vietnam
engaging more fully with the United Sates.
As early 2003, U.S. private sector defense industry sources began to identify
Vietnam as a potentially attractive arms market. In 2007, the U.S.-ASEAN
Business Council opened an office in Hanoi and hosted a visit by a U.S. Defense
and Security Corporate Executive Delegation representing ITT Corporation,
Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Oracle.

6. Strategic Cooperation 
The United States has engaged with Vietnam more fully to promote strategic
cooperation than China.49 Vietnam conducts strategic cooperation with its
northern neighbor mainly through multilateral channels such as ASEAN and
ASEAN Regional Forum. Vietnam is keen to promote what is known as the
ADMM + 8 process involving ASEAN Defense Ministers and their dialogue
partners (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and
the United States). Vietnam held the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi in
October and will host the first meeting of the ADMM + 8 Senior Officials in
December 2010.
Vietnam’s strategic cooperation with the United States includes more channels
for cooperation than the ASEAN process. In 2004, Vietnam attended the Asia-
Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) meeting held in Tokyo for the first time. A
Vietnamese observer reportedly attended a meeting of the Proliferation Security

                                                        
49Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation. ASPI Strategy Report.
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010, 41-55.
  27

Initiative held in New Zealand. Vietnam has also discussed - but remained
noncommittal on - its participation in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
In June 2008, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, announced plans for Vietnam’s
participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Vietnam continues to
send defense officials to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. In 2008, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Vietnamese representatives for the
first time.
China is relatively new to the defense cooperation game. The scope of what
China can offer is limited in comparison to long-established programs in the U.S.
China and Vietnam share a special political-ideological conduit for relations
between their armed forces that is closed to the United States. This conduit
provides China a means to influence Vietnam but the extent of China’s ability to
do so in practice appears quite limited. Vietnam and China have made concrete
progress in addressing land and maritime (Gulf of Tonkin) border issues. In
October 2010, at the inaugural meeting of the ADMM + 8, China agreed to join
Vietnam as co-chair of the Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief.
The United States engages in defense cooperation on a global scale. It can offer
an extraordinarily wide scope of programs that are of long-standing. The unique
role of Combatant Commanders in the U.S. system gives the U.S. Pacific
Command a special edge in offering opportunities for cooperation with Vietnam.
Although Vietnam has sent nearly three times as many high-level defense
delegations to China (eleven) as the United States (four) from 2002 to mid-2009
that has not resulted in greater Chinese influence or defense cooperation.
In summary, bilateral defense cooperation between Vietnam and China and
Vietnam and the United States are heavily tinged by political considerations. No
doubt defense officials in both Beijing and Washington would like to see an
increase in bilateral military-to-military cooperation with Vietnam. Vietnam
moves slowly and deliberately and generally sets the pace. When Vietnam
decides to move forward, its policies towards China and the United States
appear to move in tandem. The initiation of defense dialogues with the U.S. and
China is 2004-05 is an example. Vietnam also maintains a rough equivalency in
the number of high-level exchanges it receives from both countries.

Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed four major topics: Vietnam’s changing worldview in the
post-Cold War era, Vietnam-China relations, Vietnam-United States relations
and Vietnam’s defence relations with China and the United States in comparative
perspective.

Vietnam has completely altered its worldview from the orthodox Marxist-
Leninist ideological view of the world riven by antagonistic contradictions
  28

between the socialist and capitalist states to world that is economically and
technologically interdependent. Vietnam’s new world view embraces the concept
of national interest in which sustainable economic development leading to
industrialization and modernization has top priority. Therefore, Vietnam has
sought both international and regional integration through an open door policy
that welcomes foreign direct investment and promotes trade.

Vietnam has adopted a comprehensive view of security that depreciates (but

does not jettison) the role of military power and emphasizes the importance of
economics. In the post-Cold War era Vietnam has sought peaceful coexistence
with its former adversaries – China and the United States. Vietnam has also
adopted policies to turn Southeast Asia into a ‘region of peace, stability and
cooperation’.

And Vietnam has adopted a multi-directional foreign policy that stresses

diversification and multilateralization of its external relations. This new
approach is encapsulated in the expression that Vietnam seeks ‘to be a friend and
reliable partner with all countries’. In short, Vietnam eschews classical balance of
power politics in its relations with China and the United States.

By way of conclusion, this section will attempt to answer three major questions:

1. How is Vietnam responding to the rise of China?

Vietnam suffers from the ‘tyranny of geography’ in that it is located next to

China and has one of the most asymmetric bilateral relationships in the world.
Brantly Womack characterizes the current relationship as one of mature
asymmetry through which China seeks acknowledgement of its primacy and
Vietnam seek recognition of its autonomy.50

Vietnam has sought to enmesh China in a web of bilateral ties in order to make
China’s behaviour more predictable. Vietnam has structured its bilateral
relations with China through a series of agreements that stress comprehensive
cooperation through party-to-party, state-to-state and military-to-military ties.
Vietnam has also sought to enmesh China in a web of multilateral ties through
ASEAN-centric regional institutions.

Vietnam faces two major obstacles in maintaining a mature asymmetric

relationship with China: a huge and mounting trade deficit and conflicting
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam’s policy of enmeshment has
not been entirely successful. In light of Chinese assertiveness in the South China
                                                        
Brantly Womack, 2006. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. New York: Cambridge
50

University Press, 235-237.

 
  29

Sea, dating from 2007 to the present, Vietnam has sought to enhance its position
vis-à-vis China through defence self-help measures and by cultivating defence
ties with the United States.

2. Why is Vietnam recalibrating its relations with the United States?

Vietnam’s pursuit of global economic integration has meant that it has had to
develop good political and economic relations with the United States despite the
legacy of issues left over from the Vietnam War. Vietnam is dependent on trade
with the U.S. (and the European Union, Japan and South Korea) to
counterbalance its huge trade deficit with China. Even further, it is in Vietnam’s
interest to encourage U.S. investment in Vietnam to give Washington a stake in
Vietnam’s stability and development.

Vietnam’s bilateral relations with the United States are bedevilled by

Washington’s promotion of human rights and religious freedom. This gives rise
to concerns by party conservatives that the United States seeks to overturn
Vietnam’s socialist regime through peaceful evolution.

Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has led Hanoi to recalibrate its
relations with the United States by urging Washington to oppose China’s ambit
claims to the South China Sea.51 Therefore, Vietnam has responded to U.S.
overtures by taking gradual – mainly symbolic - steps to develop more robust
defence relations to insulate itself from Chinese pressures.

                                                        
51Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea’,
Security Challenges [Kokoda Foundation], 6(2), Winter 2010, 69-84.
  30

3. What is Vietnam’s future strategic significance in the Asia-Pacific?

Vietnam today is widely viewed as an important strategic player in Southeast

Asia and the Asia-Pacific. This is based on the size of its population and
economic performance. Vietnam is an emerging middle-income country.

Vietnam is also a key player in ASEAN and in ASEAN-centric regional

architecture. Vietnam has a proven diplomatic track record of contributing
positively to regional security through ASEAN-centred institutions and as a
recent non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council where it
had to address global issues.

Finally, and of strategic significance, Vietnam is a littoral state on the South

China Sea through which pass vital sea lines of communication. For a number of
years Vietnam has been gradually modernizing its armed forces.52 When
Vietnam fully absorbs new guided missile frigates and Kilo-class submarines
into its armed forces, Vietnam will be a position to contribute more positively to
regional maritime security in partnership with Asia-Pacific’s major power.

                                                        
52Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnam People’s Army: Development and Modernization. Armed Forces Lecture
Paper Series Paper No. 4. Bandar Seri Begawan: Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, 2009.
  31

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  38

Appendix A
Vietnam and China: Naval Ship Visits and Joint Patrols, 1991-2010

Date of Visit PLAN to Vietnam VPA Navy to China

19-22 November 1991 Yulin, Jiangwei II guided

missile frigate, Nha Rong
port, Ho Chi Minh City

26 October 2005 Defence Ministers in Beijing Defence Ministers sign

sign agreement on joint agreement on joint
patrolling in the Gulf of patrolling in the Gulf of
Tonkin (May and Tonkin
December)

27 April 2006 1st Joint Patrol in Gulf of 1st Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin Tonkin

28 December 2006 2nd Joint Patrol in Gulf of 2nd Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin Tonkin

May 2007 3rd Joint Patrol in Gulf of 3rd Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin Tonkin

26-31 August 2007 Defence Ministers meet in Defence Ministers meet in

Beijing and agree to Beijing and agree to
enhance naval patrols in the enhance naval patrols in the
Gulf of Tonkin Gulf of Tonkin

1 October 2007 4th Joint Patrol in Gulf of 4th Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin? Tonkin?

28 May 2008 5th Joint Patrol in Gulf of 5th Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin, Yuqing and Jinsha Tonkin, HQ861 and HQ862
guided missile boats guided missile boats

November 2008 PLAN training ship, Zheng

He, visits Da Nang

December 2008 6th Joint Patrol in Gulf of 6th Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin Tonkin

May 2009 7th Joint Patrol in Gulf of 7th Joint Patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin* Tonkin*
  39

June 2009 Two VPA Navy Sonya-class

coastal mine sweepers, HQ
863 and HQ 864, visit
Zhanjiang port, Guangdong
province.

18-20 August 2009 8h Joint patrol in Gulf of 8th Joint patrol in Gulf of
Tonkin by Yuzheng 311 and Tonkin by two ships from
Yuzheng 45001, fishery Vietnam’s Marine Police
vessels.

4 December 2009 Two PLAN ships, Cheng

Hai and Chao Yan,g pay
visit to Haiphong.

9 May 2010 9th Combined patrol in Gulf
of Tonkin included
SAREX**. VPA Navy ship
HQ261 and HQ 263
participated.
9th Combined patrol in Gulf
of Tonkin included
SAREX**

*Between April 2006 and June 2009 a total of seven joint patrols conducted in
Gulf of Tonkin according to Chinese media.
**SAREX = Search and Rescue Exercise