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Gretyl R.

Tomampos
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

As embodied in 1987 Philippine Constitution Article III, Section 1. No person shall


be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The clause grants all people "equal protection of the laws," which means that the
states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or
class of persons over another. Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
the others.
The equal protection clause is available to all persons, natural as well as juridical.
Artificial persons, however, are entitled to the protection only insofar as their
property is concerned. It does not require the universal application of the laws,
that is, it operates on all the people without distinction. With that it needs to
classify, and speaking of classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all
others in these same particulars.

It is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that
distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not arbitrary. This classification, to be reasonable, must conform to
number of requisites. In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal
protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;(2) It
must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. Nevertheless, the classification would still
be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane
to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification
must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to
be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

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In People vs. Vera, the old Probation Law provided that the probation system
shall be applicable “only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer.” Our Supreme Court
held:

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow
from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the
counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while
another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act
would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that
a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy
the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated
in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious
reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the
affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that
hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would
be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting
inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any
amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now —
and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act,
the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal
board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation
officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality
may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits
therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever
may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There
are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal
protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law
vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of
the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal
protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a
law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and

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impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is
within the constitutional prohibitions. Also in ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC.
vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY A perusal of the requisites instantly
shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions
as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because
EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. That
the law be enforced and applied equally. "no state must ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws".

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