1.

G.R. No. 164266               July 23, 2008

NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated February
26, 2004 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Decision3 dated October 26, 2001.
Likewise assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution4 dated July 6, 2004 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and
the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner herein. The Zuñiga family, including
Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together at 550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City. Their
residence had three bedrooms – one for the Zuñiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene;
and the last for Mary Ann and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuñiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend
the wake of Ernesto’s mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene, stayed at
their Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time, asked permission to attend a birthday party.5
At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home to
get some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday party. They thereafter went back to the party
and stayed there until 12 midnight before heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuñiga spouses and Marianne arrived home. They
opened the main door which was then locked. After preparing for sleep, Marianne proceeded to
the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds,
already dead. After seeing Arlene’s body, the Zuñiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann
and the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlene’s room, petitioner stayed at the sala and
cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.6
At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no forcible entry
into the house; no valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house except
Arlene’s room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioner’s underwear
(briefs), gray t-shirt and short pants.7 They further found hair strands on Arlene’s bed. These
pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for examination.
On September 21, 1997, Dr. Noel Minay (Dr. Minay), a medico-legal of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy of the deceased.8 He found that Arlene suffered 21
stab wounds produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was sharp like a balisong or a
kitchen knife. He further declared the possibility that Arlene struggled with the assailant before
she died.9
The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined petitioner’s briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found
that the briefs and shirt were positive of type "O" human blood, Arlene’s blood type. 10 The NBI
Forensic Chemist, subsequently, conducted DNA Analysis on the following specimens:
1. One (1) dirty white Hanford brief[s];
2. One (1) light gray t-shirt with DKNY print infront;
3. Several strands of hair allegedly recovered in the bedroom of [the] victim;
4. Buccal swabs taken from the following:
a. ERNESTO ZUÑIGA (victim’s father)
b. MARGARITA ZUÑIGA (victim’s mother)
c. NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR (suspect)11
The examination of specimen no. 1 yielded a negative result for the presence of human DNA;
while specimen nos. 2, 3, and 4 a-c, yielded positive results.12
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in an Information dated April 8, 1998, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1997, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable
cause and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and stab one ARLENE ZUÑIGA, hitting on the different parts of her body, which led to
the death of said Arlene Zuñiga.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
The aforementioned facts were established during the prosecution’s presentation of evidence. It
was further testified to by the witnesses that – petitioner owned a knife otherwise known as
balisong, which he usually brought every time he went out. Ill motive was shown by petitioner’s
previous act of peeping through the bathroom and Arlene’s room on two occasions – while she
was taking a bath and while she was inside the room with Marianne.
For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was bare denial of the accusations against him.
On October 26, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of homicide. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y
DE LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of homicide as defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, without any attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him
to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused is further sentence (sic) to indemnify
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Arlene Zuñiga
and another amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, both without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. The accused is further sentenced to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish petitioner’s
guilt:
(1) The perpetrator did not use any force or destroy any portion of the house to get inside the
house. This implies that the perpetrator is an occupant of the house. The accused was, during the
time material to this case, residing with his in-laws. The allegation of the accused that the main
door of the house was open when he returned to get the tape is difficult to believe. It is
unthinkable that the remaining occupants of the house, namely, Arlene and Mary Ann, who are
both female, would not take the necessary precaution for their own protection such as locking the
door of the house. It is as difficult to suppose that the perpetrator of the crime would go to the
house where his intended victim was sleeping without being sure that he could gain entry to the
house or have the necessary instruments to open the door.
(2) There were no personal belongings missing in the house. This shows that the person who
entered the room of the victim had no intention to steal. This fact can better be appreciated if we
consider the evidence that the accused was caught many times peeping at Arlene during her
lifetime; and that [bloodstains] were found not in the short pants of the accused but in his
Hanford brief and T-shirt.
(3) The absence of [bloodstains] or spots in any other part of the house except the room of the
victim. This indicates that the assailant must have cleaned the traces of blood inside the house.
The facility and time to clean the area is more available to an assailant who was an occupant of
the house or a member of the household.
(4) Prior to and up to the date of the commission of the crime on September 20 or 21, 1997[,] the
accused was seen by his parents-in-law Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga and her sister-in-law
Marianne and his friend Dondy Hiponia in many occasions to have in [his] possession a
‘balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve." A "balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve" is the tagalong name for a
knife with folding blade. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the testimonies of said
witnesses. Being close relatives and friend of the accused[,] they have no motive to fabricate a
story against the accused or to implicate him to the commission of the crime charged. The claim
of the accused that his father-in-law Ernesto Zuñiga is trying to implicate him [for] the killing of
Arlene because his father-in-law disapproved his marrying Mary Ann, and that he accompanied
his mother-in-law to the house of the mistress of his father-in-law is not supported by the facts of
the case. The accused was allowed to stay in the house of the Zuñigas, an indication that he was
acceptable to the family. The alleged mistress of Ernesto was not shown to exist, nor her
supposed address revealed by the accused. The disappearance of said bladed weapon and the
denial by the accused that he ever owned the same are intriguing because, according to expert
testimony, the stab wounds sustained by the victim were produced by a pointed instrument one
side of which is sharp like a "balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve."
(5) The presence of human blood with type "O" in the t-shirt and brief of the accused, the finding
that the blood type of the victim belongs to groupd (sic) "O," and the circumstance that the
accused had suffered no scratches or wound from which to come blood to stain his T-shirt and
brief are revealing and could only lead to the conclusion that the victim was the source of the
blood found in the T-shirt and brief of the accused.
(6) The conclusion arrived at by Magsipoc that the DNA Profile of the [bloodstain] in the light
gray t-shirt and the DNA Profile on the hair strands could come from the accused and the victim.
(7) The unusual behavior of the accused after the discovery of the dead body of Arlene betrayed
the accused. Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga testified that soon after the discovery of the death of
Arlene[,] they immediately went to the room of the accused and his wife Mary Ann; that it took
Margarita a hard time to awaken the accused; and that upon being awakened, the accused did not
get (sic) inside the room where Arlene was and instead stayed and cried in the sala telling his
wife that he was innocent even if nobody yet at that time was pointing to him as the suspect. The
actuation of the accused then was that of a perpetrator of the crime with troubled conscience.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction.16 Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MOST CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
IS THE RESULT OF THE DNA ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE NBI FORENSIC
CHEMIST.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT BY MEANS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IT
WAS PROVEN AND ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF
ARLENE ZUÑIGA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.17
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community.18
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if the following requisites are complied with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.19
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that
the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.20
In the present case, both the trial and appellate courts considered these pieces of evidence in
finding petitioner’s guilt: 1) the non-employment of force in entering the scene of the crime;
2) no missing personal belongings; 3) the absence of bloodstains in other parts of the house
except Arlene’s room; 4) petitioner’s ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in
stabbing the victim; 5) the presence of type "O" human blood on petitioner’s T-shirt and
briefs; 6) the positive result of the DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioner’s
shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioner’s unusual behavior after the discovery of the victim’s
lifeless body.21
In his appeal before the CA and likewise in this present petition, petitioner questions the
sufficiency of each and every circumstance enumerated above. He specifically points out the
inconsistent findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist and those of the NBI Forensic Biologist.22 As
to the circumstance that there was no forcible entry to the house, he insists that the main door
was not locked; and he, in fact, faults Arlene for not locking the door to her bedroom. 23 Petitioner
adds that the connection between the alleged "peeping incident" and intent to kill was so remote;
and thus insufficient to convict him.24 He also persuades this Court to give credence to his
testimony that he owned a samurai (double-bladed knife) and not a balisong (single-bladed)
which thus negates his authorship of the crime, since it would be contrary to the medico-legal’s
findings that the weapon used was an instrument one side of which was sharp. 25 Petitioner further
asserts that the absence of scratches, wounds and bruises on his body were more consistent with
his innocence rather than his guilt, if we follow the court’s conclusion that Arlene had a chance
to struggle with him prior to his death.26 Lastly, petitioner claims that if we were to believe the
prosecution’s version, it would be hard to imagine that Mary Ann (petitioner’s wife), who was
then in the other room, was not awakened.27
Prior to the fateful night when Arlene’s lifeless body was discovered, several witnesses saw
petitioner in possession of a balisong. The NBI autopsy report, in turn, stated that the wounds
sustained by Arlene were inflicted with the use of a weapon only one side of which was sharp
(such as a balisong). After the discovery of the crime, the balisong was nowhere to be found.
Hence, the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the balisong previously seen in
petitioner’s possession was the very weapon used in stabbing the victim. While petitioner
admitted owning a different kind of weapon, he failed to produce it in court. As such, it remained
a self-serving allegation that cannot be considered to exonerate him from liability.
As to petitioner’s shirt and briefs, as correctly held by the trial court (and as affirmed by the
appellate court), they were found to be stained with type "O" blood (the victim’s blood type).
Instead of questioning the absence of proof that he was not of the same blood type as the victim,
petitioner should have presented evidence that he indeed has type "O" blood. The fact remains
that petitioner offered no explanation why his shirt and briefs contained bloodstains. It is,
therefore, correct to conclude that they were stained with the victim’s blood.
Moreover, the absence of scratches and bruises on petitioner’s body parts does not negate the
trial court’s conclusion that the victim had the chance to struggle with the petitioner. This is so
because, at the time the petitioner attacked the victim between 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, she
was most likely asleep and was only awakened by the petitioner; she was, therefore, not in a
position to offer strong resistance. This explains why such struggle produced no bruises and
scratches.
The presence of petitioner’s wife inside the house at that time does not likewise negate the
commission of the crime. Considering that his wife was a nursing mother who definitely had
sleepless nights, she could not be expected to be conscious of everything that happened outside
her room.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative
to the "peeping incident." Although there was no evidence or allegation of sexual advances, such
incident manifested petitioner’s evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a
state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that
may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred.28 Motive and intent may be considered one and the same, in some instances, as in
the present case.
Lastly, the DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene of the
crime.1avvphi1 Such evidence was considered, together with the other circumstances discussed
earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the accused as the
author of the crime. However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of homicide. We would like
to emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of
the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is
more like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing
towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.29
The prosecution’s evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who happen to be the
victim’s relatives, was not weakened by the fact of such relationship. The Court notes that
petitioner himself is a relative of the witnesses, albeit by affinity, being the husband of the
victim’s sister. It is unnatural for a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse
somebody else other than the real culprit. For her/him to do so is to let the guilty go free.30 Where
there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness
stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.31
We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of
respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the
present case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the
power to review whether the trial court’s conclusions were in accord with the facts and the
relevant laws.32 The credibility given by the trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts’ unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during
the direct and cross-examination by counsels.33
In view of the foregoing, petitioner was correctly convicted of homicide punishable by reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty,
absent any modifying circumstances, shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor and the
maximum of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal. 34 Specifically,
the indeterminate penalty that should be imposed is within the range of 6 years and 1 day to 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Hence, a modification of the penalty imposed by the trial
court is in order. Instead of 8 years, 8 months and 1 day, the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor;35 while the maximum term shall be that
imposed by the trial court.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then becomes the
duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether or not included in the
assignment of errors.36
We affirm the award of ₱50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto to the Zuñiga spouses. When
death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as
indemnity for death without need of any evidence or proof of damages.37 The court likewise
correctly awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral damages because of their mental anguish and moral
suffering caused by Arlene’s death.
The trial and appellate courts did not award actual damages, obviously because the victim’s heirs
failed to present proof of the expenses they incurred. However, it has been repeatedly held by
this Court that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence
of receipts to prove the same, temperate damages may be fixed at ₱25,000.00.38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26048 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. In addition to civil indemnity and moral damages, petitioner is ordered to pay
spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuñiga the sum of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
2.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180281               July 01, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOEMARIE JALBONIAN alias "Budo", Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it is
credible and positive, can prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."1
On appeal is the June 7, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in Criminal Case No. CA-
G.R. CR. HC No. 00565 which affirmed with modification the March 5, 2003 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental in Criminal Case
No. 917 declaring appellant Joemarie Jalbonian alias "Budo" (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
On July 30, 1991, an Information4 for murder was filed against appellant, the accusatory portion
of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January 1991, in the municipality of Ilog, province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is still at-large, armed with a bladed weapon, with evident premeditation, treachery
and with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one FORTUNATO QUINTANILLA, JR., thereby inflicting [a] mortal stab wound [on]
the back of the body of the latter, which caused the death of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Appellant went into hiding for more than five years and was apprehended only on July 10,
1996.6 During his arraignment, he entered a plea of "not guilty".7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Barangay Chairman Oscar Valenciano (Valenciano) testified that at 9:00 a.m. of January 26,
1991, a barangay assembly meeting was held in Balicotoc Elementary School, a public
educational institution located in Brgy. Balicotoc, Ilog, Negros Occidental.8 After the meeting
was adjourned at noon, the participants including Valenciano left the school premises.9
From a distance of about three-arms length, Valenciano saw appellant position himself behind
Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr.10 (Quintanilla), stab the latter on the back with a knife, and
immediately run away.11 Valenciano ordered Julio Gaston, a member of the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), to chase appellant but the latter eluded arrest.12
Quintanilla was brought by Valenciano to the nearest hospital but he died before reaching there.13
The prosecution also intended to present as witness Dr. Ricardo P. Garrido, Rural Health Officer
of Ilog, Negros Occidental, but his testimony was dispensed with14 as the prosecution and the
defense stipulated on the existence of the death certificate 15 issued by him indicating that the
victim died on January 26, 1991 due to shock and hemorrhage resulting from a stab wound.
Recourse of the Defense
After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed a Motion for Leave to File [a] Motion to
Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence).16 However, the trial court denied the motion in its
Order dated May 14, 2002.17 Despite the denial, the defense did not present any evidence
anymore.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On March 5, 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision18 convicting appellant of murder qualified
by treachery. It gave credence to the testimony of Valenciano who identified appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime and gave a detailed account of the stabbing incident. The trial court
found that Valenciano had no reason to falsely testify against the appellant and that his account
as to how appellant stabbed the victim was corroborated by the death certificate. In addition, the
trial court considered appellant’s flight for more than five years as indication of his guilt. The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Joemarie Jalbonian guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of [the] crime of murder as charged[,] qualified by treachery and hereby
sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of the victim
Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. the amount of ₱50,000.00 by reason of his death.
It is hereby ordered that the accused be immediately remitted to the National Penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,20 which the RTC approved in its Order21 of April 10, 2003.
Pursuant thereto, the records of the case were elevated to this Court. However, in view of our
ruling in People v. Mateo22 this case was remanded to the CA for intermediate review.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its June 7, 2007 Decision,23 the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction but modified the RTC’s
judgment by ordering appellant to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages, viz:
WHEREFORE, in x x x view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that accused-appellant Joemarie Jalbonian is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00). The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED as to all other respects.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, the appeal before us.
Assignment of Error
Appellant seeks his acquittal by assigning the lone error that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS [GUILT] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25
The Parties’ Arguments
Appellant assails the credibility of Valenciano and contends that the RTC erred in relying on the
latter’s testimony which was incredible and insufficient to prove his guilt. He posits that if
Valenciano was indeed following the victim, then the latter could not have seen the face of the
attacker who must necessarily position himself between him and the victim. And in order for the
assailant to stab the victim from behind, his back must be turned against Valenciano. Moreover,
Valenciano’s testimony was not even corroborated.26
Appellant likewise asserts that the fatal stab wound on the back of the victim is not by itself
proof of treachery. He maintains that there is nothing on record to prove that he stabbed the
victim’s back to ensure the execution of the crime or to deprive the victim of any chance to
defend himself.27
In its Brief,28 the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
maintains that Valenciano witnessed the commission of the crime since he was just a few meters
away from the victim when the latter was attacked in broad daylight. Also, it was easy for
Valenciano to identify appellant since the former was then the Barangay Chairman and,
therefore, was familiar with the residents of the barangay. The OSG likewise disputes appellant’s
claim that Valenciano’s uncorroborated testimony adversely affects his credibility. It argues
that the testimony of a single witness, if truthful and credible, is sufficient to convict an
accused. Besides, the factual findings of the trial court, in the absence of showing that they
were reached arbitrarily or without sufficient basis, must be upheld. The OSG further argues
that the crime committed was murder qualified by treachery since the suddenness of the assault
deprived the victim of an opportunity to either fight or flee.29
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
The testimony of Valenciano as the lone witness for the prosecution suffices to establish
appellant’s culpability for the crime charged.
We are convinced that it was appellant who killed the victim. Valenciano clearly narrated
the details of the stabbing incident and positively identified appellant as the assailant. In a
simple, spontaneous, and straightforward manner, he testified as follows:
PROS. GATIA
:
At around 12:00 o’clock, x x x on January 26, 1991, can you remember where [y]ou were]?
WITNESS
:
There was an assembly meeting and there was an incident [that] happened. I was about to go
home after the assembly meeting [was] adjourned at 12:00 o’clock noon, sir.
Q
:
After your assembly meeting at Brgy. Balicotoc on January 26, 1991 was adjourned, where did
you proceed?
A
:
We were following each other from the place where the assembly meeting was held, sir.
Q
:
What happened while you were going out from the school where the assembly meeting was
held?
xxxx
WITNESS
:
I saw [the accused who was] following the victim Fortunato Quintanilla [stab] him[. I then]
ordered the CAFGU to [chase] the accused, sir.
xxxx
Q
:
You said you saw somebody [position] himself at the back of Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. and
[stab] him, who was this person who stabbed Fortunato Quintinilla, Jr.?
A
:
Joemarie Jalbonian, sir.
Q
:
Are you referring to this Joemarie Jalbonian alias "Budo" whom you pointed out just awhile
ago?
A
:
Yes, sir.
Q
:
How far were you from Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. when he was stabbed by Joemarie Jalbonian?
A
:
About three (3) extended arms length, sir.30
xxxx
Q
:
What did you do with Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. after he was stabbed?
A
:
I rushed for the transportation to bring the victim, but he did not [survive] because about five
hundred meters we walked, sir.31
It has been held that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner,
there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. 32 Moreover, Valenciano’s
testimony on the stabbing of the victim was corroborated by the Certificate of
Death33 attesting that the cause of death was a stab wound.
As to appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Valenciano to personally identify him as
the assailant since the victim and his attacker had their backs turned to Valenciano, we find the
same unworthy of credence.
Suffice it to say that the relative position of the witness from the victim and the assailant refers to
a minor detail that does not detract from his credibility. What is important is that Valenciano
witnessed the unfolding of the crime and was able to positively identify appellant as the
culprit.34 In addition and as correctly pointed out by the OSG, Valenciano readily identified
appellant because the latter used to reside in the same barangay of which he was barangay
captain. In fact, he testified as follows:
PROS. GATIA
:
Mr. Valenciano, do you know the accused in this case by the name of Joemarie Jalbonian?
WITNESS
:
Yes, sir.
Q
:
Do you know this accused by face and by x x x name before January 26, 1991?
A
:
Yes, sir.
Q
:
Why [do] you know him?
A
:
Because I was then a Barangay Captain [of Brgy. Balicotoc.] I [am familiar with almost all] the
residents there, sir.
Q
:
So, in 1991 of January you were then Barangay Captain of Barangay Balicotoc?
A
:
Yes, sir.
Q
:
If this Joemarie Jalbonian alias "Budo" is here inside the courtroom, can you point to him?
A
:
Yes, sir.
Q
:
Please point to him?
INTERPRETER
:
The witness pointed to the person who stood up[,] and when asked[,] identified himself as
Joemarie Jalbonian y Mellendez.35
Also, the fact that Valenciano was just a few meters away from the victim and that the crime was
committed in broad daylight bolster Valenciano’s identification of appellant as the assailant.
Likewise untenable is appellant’s contention that Valenciano’s testimony cannot be relied upon
since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of guilt based on the
testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon.36 "For although the number of witnesses may be
considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary ‘only when there are
reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had
been inaccurate.’"37 This is not obtaining in this case.
Moreover, appellant also failed to attribute any improper motive to Valenciano to falsely
testify against him. There was no evidence to establish that Valenciano harbored any ill-will
against appellant or that he had reasons to fabricate his testimony. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by
bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence.38 Furthermore, appellant’s immediate departure
from the scene of the crime and successful effort to elude arrest until his apprehension more than
five years later are not consistent with his claim of innocence. Flight from the scene of the
crime and failure to immediately surrender militate against appellant’s contention of
innocence "since an innocent person will not hesitate to take prompt and necessary action
to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him."391âwphi1
Under these circumstances, the rule that "where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with
both the victim and the accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where
no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then [his]
version of the story deserves much weight,"40 thus applies. We are therefore convinced that
appellant’s culpability for the killing of the victim was duly established by the testimony of the
lone prosecution witness, Valenciano.
The crime committed by appellant is murder qualified by treachery.
Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 24841 of the Revised
Penal Code, one of which is treachery.
The killing committed in this case is neither parricide nor infanticide and the same was attended
with treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make."42 "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."43
In this case, treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the
imminent peril to his life. He was unprepared for the sudden, unexpected and unprovoked attack
on his person when appellant stabbed his back with a knife then swiftly run away. Clearly,
appellant’s execution of the killing left the victim with no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate.44
The Proper Penalty
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. As correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the CA,
appellant must suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the said two indivisible
penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime.
The Civil Liability
Appellant must indemnify the heirs of the victim since death resulted from the crime. The heirs
of the victim are entitled to an award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, which is
mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the
crime.45 Hence, we increase the award for civil indemnity made by the trial court and affirmed by
the CA from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. Also, while the CA correctly ordered appellant to pay
the heirs of the victim exemplary damages, the amount awarded must be increased from
₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.46
Aside from these, moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 must likewise be awarded "despite
the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by
human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family." 47 Moreover, while actual damages cannot be
awarded since there was no evidence of actual expenses incurred for the death of the victim, in
lieu thereof, the sum of ₱25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, by way of temperate
damages "as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the [victim] suffered pecuniary loss although
the exact amount was not proved."48 "This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been
violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification." 49 An
interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid should
also be awarded to the heirs of the victim.50
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed June 7, 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00565 is AFFIRMED with modifications in that (1) the
awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages are increased to ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00,
respectively; (2) appellant Joemarie Jalbonian alias "Budo" is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs
the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
4. 
G.R. No. 179748               October 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FEBLONELYBIRTH T. RUBIO AND JOAN T. AMARO, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Appellants Feblonelybirth Rubio (Rubio) and Joan Amaro (Amaro) challenge the August 17,
2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the April 12, 2002 Decision2 of Branch
45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City finding them guilty of rape with homicide.
The Amended Information3 of October 25, 1999 indicting appellants reads:
That on or about 6:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning of July 21, 1999 at [xxx], Bais City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, and, by means of violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take turn in having carnal knowledge
with a girl named [AAA4], a minor, sixteen (16) years of age, against her will and, that on the
occasion of the said rape and for the purpose of silencing her, the herein accused[,] in pursuance
of their conspiracy and using bladed weapons which they were then armed and provided, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior number and strenght [sic] and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
stab the victim thereby inflicting upon her the following injuries[,] to wit:
Head -hematoma left infra-orbital area.
-incised wound #1- 2 cms in length at the left side of the nose.
-Hematoma mid-upper lip.
Neck -stab wound #1 – supra clavicular area ® side.
- 1 cm in length, o.5 cm in width, 0.5 cm in depth.
- Stab wound #2 – above the clavicular notch.
-2 cms in length, 0.7 cm in width, 2 cms. in depth.
-Stab wound #3 – located 6 cms above the (L) nipple lateral side.
-3 cms in length, 3 cms in depth, 1 cm in width.
Upper Extremity- incised wound #2 located ant. Part of ® axilla.
- 3 cms in length 2 cm in depth, 1 cm in width.
-Incised wound #5 located at the dorsal side of ® wrist.
-2 cms in length, 0.2 cms in width, 0.4 cms in depth.
Chest - incised wound #3 located at the mid anterior chest.
-10.2 cms in length, 1 cm in depth, 2 cms in width.
Abdomen -incised wound # 4 located along the medial line of the abdomen.
-22 cms in length, 10.5 cms in width (widest)
-part of the colon & small intestine coming out of the wound.
Genitalia -nulliparous female, (+) hymenal laceration at 6 o’[clock] & 9 o’clock positions.
-aspirated about 2 cc of cloudy white, nucoid fluid from the vaginal canal, said fluid is positive
for sperm cells upon microscopic examination (see attached laboratory result).
Impression -Hypovolimic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds,
-Positive for sexual penetration.
and as a direct result of all of which the said victim [AAA] died, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the said victim.
An act contrary to law. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
From the testimonial evidence for the prosecution consisting of the testimonies of seven
witnesses, namely, Magdalena Olpos, Pepe Olpos, BBB, the father of AAA (the victim), Dr.
Beverly Renacia, SPO4 Ramon Sibala, Perfecto Teves and Lugen Conde, the following version
is culled:
At 6:00 a.m. of July 21, 1999, while Magdalena Olpos (Magdalena) was harvesting peanuts at
the upper portion of the land where her house stands, she heard someone repeatedly shout "Ama,
tabang!" (Father, help!). She thus ran towards her son Pepe Olpos (Pepe), who was at that time
plowing a rice field, and asked him to determine where the shouts emanated.5
Both mother and son at once repaired to where they sensed the shouts came from. On their way,
they saw their neighbor, appellant Rubio, "walking very fast towards the sugarcane plantation,"
and another neighbor, appellant Amaro, "running towards the upper portion of the cliff [going] to
[his] house."6 Pepe likewise saw appellants carrying bloodied hunting knives.7
Perfecto Teves (Teves), who was startled by shouts of AAA’s aunt CCC that her niece was
already dead,8 repaired to the crime scene in the course of which he saw appellants running
toward Amaro’s house.
On reaching what turned out to be the crime scene, Magdalena and Pepe saw the body of AAA
bearing multiple stab wounds, her legs spread apart and her panties pulled down to knee level.9
Magdalena thereafter repaired to her house and related the incident to her daughter whom she
instructed to report to a neighbor.10 Her son Pepe for his part related the incident to a neighbor,
Rustico Culi, who in turn echoed it to the barangay captain.11
BBB, father of the victim, on being informed by his neighbors Rustico Culi and Loreto Culi at
around 8:00 a.m. of the day of the incident that his daughter was raped and killed, 12 went to the
crime scene where he saw Magdalena and Pepe.13
Later in the afternoon, Magdalena went back to the crime scene and, finding SPO4 Ramon
Sibala and other police officers there, she informed them what she had earlier witnessed,
furnishing them the names of appellants.14 Albeit appellant Amaro was also there, Magdalena did
not point him out to the police out of fear of Amaro’s uncles whom she described as "notorious
characters."15
The day after the incident or on July 22, 1999, BBB talked to Magdalena who related to him that
she saw appellant Rubio running away from the place where AAA’s body was found. 16
Dr. Beverly Renacia (Dr. Renacia), who conducted a post-mortem examination of AAA’s body,
came up with the findings incorporated in the earlier-quoted body of the Information. 17 She
concluded that the victim was sexually abused as shown by the hymenal lacerations at 6 o’clock
and 9 o’clock positions as well as the presence of cloudy white fluid from the vaginal
canal18 which was, after analysis by medical technologist Lugen Conde (Conde) of the City
Health Office,19 confirmed to be spermatozoa. Conde averred, however, that he did not know
whether the spermatozoa came from one and the same person.20
SPO4 Ramon Sibala (SPO4 Sibala), who arrived at the crime scene at 2:00 p.m. of the date of
the incident together with two other police officers and Dr. Renacia, talked to Pepe from whom
he could not elicit any response as he observed him to be "hesitant to say something."21
Five days after the incident or on July 26, 1999, Pepe and Magdalena went to the office of SPO4
Sibala to give their respective statements implicating appellants.
Appellants, denying the charge, interposed alibi.
Rubio gave the following tale:
At 6 a.m. of July 21, 1999, he went to the house of the parents of his cousin-co-accused-
appellant Amaro from whom he successfully sought permission to allow Jomar Amaro (Jomar),
Amaro’s younger brother, to help him gather cassava root crops in barangay Alangilan. Before
proceeding to Alangilan with Jomar, he passed by the house of his aunt Marites Papasin from
whom they borrowed a carabao which carried them to Alangilan. They arrived at Alangilan at
11:00 a.m.22 He and Jomar could not return home in the afternoon because it was then raining
and the flood rendered the river they had to pass through impassable. They thus spent the night in
Alangilan and went home the next morning.23
For his part, Amaro claimed as follows:
His brother Jomar and co-appellant Rubio passed by his house at 6:30 a.m. of the day of the
incident to inform him that Jomar had been allowed to go with him to gather cassava. 24 As he
was waiting for the drizzle to subside, he saw two of his neighbors running. When he asked them
what the commotion was about, they told him that AAA had been killed. He thereupon followed
his neighbors to the crime scene and there saw the body of AAA. He waited for the police to
arrive, and when they did arrive at 2:00 p.m.,25 they conducted an investigation. He was not
interrogated, however. More than two weeks later, he learned that he was being implicated in the
crime.26
Jomar corroborated Rubio’s testimony, adding that Rubio had a bolo with him when they went to
gather cassava27
Cristuta Cabugnason likewise corroborated the testimonies of her nephews Amaro and
Jomar.28 As for carabao owner Marites Papasin, she declared that after Rubio and Jomar had left,
she heard people shouting and was soon informed by Teves that AAA had been killed. She thus
went to the crime scene with Amaro.29
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted appellants by Decision of April 12, 2002,
the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds both accused, FEBLONELYBIRTH
RUBIO Y TALARIOM and JOAN AMARO Y TALARIOM, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals for the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE, and pursuant to the provisions of Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No.
8353), are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH with all its accessories (sic)
penalties under Article 40 of the same Code, and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
following: P150,000.00 for actual and moral damages; and P100,000.00 civil indemnity for the
victim’s death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
Pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the whole
records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review and
judgment.
SO ORDERED.30 (Emphasis in the original)
On appellants’ appeal before this Court, it referred the same to the Court of Appeals for
disposition31 pursuant to People v. Mateo.32
By Decision of August 17, 2006, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed with
modification the trial court’s decision by reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of
the passage, in the meantime, of Republic Act No. 9346,33 without eligibility for parole. It
likewise modified the monetary awards by additionally awarding ₱100,000 as civil indemnity.
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING instant appeal
and the assailed Decision of Regional Trial Court (RTC), 7th Judicial Region, Branch 45, Bais
City, in CRIM. CASE NO. F-99-141-B is AFFIRMED. The supreme penalty of death provided
for under 266-A in relation to the 4th paragraph of 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by RA no. 8353 is reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue of RA No. 9346 and that, accused-
appellants are not eligible to parole.
The monetary award is MODIFIED in that, in addition to the ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnification, the appellants are ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as temperate damages.
Consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Pp. vs. Mateo let the entire records
of the case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for final disposition of the case.
SO ORDERED.34
In convicting appellants, both the trial and the appellate courts found that circumstantial evidence
sufficed to hold appellants liable.
Hence, the present appeal, appellants positing that the evidence for the prosecution failed to
prove with moral certainty that they were the perpetrators of the crime charged."35
Under the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.36
To assay its probative value, circumstantial evidence must be tested against four necessary
guidelines:37
x x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the
accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince
beyond reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of
circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from
scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put
together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of
the crime. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)38
Far from being a completed puzzle, the circumstantial evidence adduced in this case only
serves to inculpate doubt in an unprejudiced mind as to the real identities of the
perpetrators of the crime.
Central to the present case’s uncertainty are the glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies
and oddities in the reactions of the prosecution witnesses that cannot be conveniently
overlooked nor easily dismissed as products of faulty memory for they bear on credibility
of testimony, which is all the more material in the determination of the existence of
circumstantial evidence.
Consider the following:
On cross-examination, Pepe, after identifying his sworn statement taken on July 26, 1999 or five
days after the incident wherein he stated that he immediately repaired home to inform his mother
about what he saw, and that it was his mother who informed the barangay captain of the incident,
declared:391avvphi1
Q You stated a while ago that it was a person by the name of Rustico Culi that you first inform
[sic] about what you saw when you came from your house, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q. Let me refresh you of what you have declared [b]efore the police authorities on July 26, 1999
[p]articularly par. 11.
Q-When you saw the dead body of [AAA] already naked with stab wounds in her body, what did
you do?
A-I immediately went home and told the incident of [sic] my mother about what I saw and the
latter also told the barangay captain about the incident.
Can you still remember that what you have declared in this affidavit was correct, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q And did I get you right that you have stated a while ago that the person whom you first
informed about what you saw on July 21, 1999 was Rustico Culi?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, you are lying to the court when you said that it was Rustico Culi and now
your mother whom you informed?
A. It was Rustico Culi who informed the barangay captain.
Atty. Lajot:
I would like to request, your Honor, that the answer was unresponsive to the question. That is all,
your Honor. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Magdalena, also on cross-examination,40 identified the sworn statement41 she executed also five
days after the incident or on July 26, 1999 wherein she pointed to only Rubio alias Gamay as the
one she saw hurriedly leaving the area "where the shout for help came from," viz:
xxxx
Nga samtang nag angat kami nga nag una kanako si Pepe, akong nakita si Feb Lonely
Bird [sic] Rubio alias Gamay nga among silingan nga nag pas-pas ug lakaw palugsong diin nag
sul-ob siya ug usa ka itom nga jacket gikan sa kahagonoyan diin naga gikan ang singgit ug
pakitabang ug kalit lang nga nawala si Gamay; 42
x x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
At the witness stand, SPO4 Sibala, to whom Magdalena claimed to have informed the names of
appellants as the suspects, mentioned only Pepe as the one he queried about the incident. No
mention was made about Magdalena furnishing the names of appellants as suspects during the
interrogation.
Magdalena’s failure to then and there inform the police at the crime scene that Amaro, who was
then present, was one of the two she and her son Pepe saw running cautions this Court against
readily according her credibility.
As for Teves, despite his opportunity to report to the police what he claimed to have seen, he
only later related the same to the relatives of the victim.43 Why he did not immediately name
appellants to the police investigators as the persons he claimed to have seen running from the
direction of the crime scene, no explanation was given. Rubio’s statement that Teves may have
been impelled by improper motive in implicating him and Amaro thus assumes importance, viz:
Q When that period that you were neighbors of these three (3) [Pepe, Magdalena and Teves] do
you remember having any misunderstanding with these three the court mentioned up to July
1999 [sic]?
A There was a misunderstanding between . . . Teves and the mother of [appellant] Joan Amaro.
Q Would you know the misunderstanding about [sic] between . . . Teves and the mother of Joan
Amaro?
A Yes.
Q What is this about?
A It was regarding the sugarcane cutter which we took from [his] house of which he got angry.
Q Has that misunderstanding been settled?
A No. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)44
While the Court takes judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the
solution of crimes due to risks to their lives and limbs, Teves had not alleged the presence of any
such or similar risks.
Still, even if the Court were to credit the identification of appellants as the ones seen running
away from the crime scene at 6:00 in the morning of July 21, 1999, this is the only circumstance
that was established during the trial. Such circumstance certainly does not meet the first requisite
for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict.
Further still, even if appellants were seen carrying bloodied hunting knives, there is no
showing that they matched the instruments, if it was more than one, used in stabbing AAA
vis-à-vis the size of the wounds in her body.
Back to Pepe, he reported for the first time on July 26, 1999 what he witnessed on July 21, 1999
via his statement before the police station, without proffering any reason for such belated
reporting. Thus, he testified:
Q In other words, you saw some policemen who arrived there and you said you came back?
A Yes.
Q You did not volunteer yourself for having been [sic] seen the two persons running away from
the scene you did not inform the policemen?
A No, I did not.
Q And you did not participate [in] the inquiry conducted by the policemen?
A No.
xxxx
Q Now, the following day do you know if there were policemen who went back to the place and
investigated the incident?
A Yes.
Q: You did not volunteer to reveal to said policemen of what you saw?
A No, I did not.
Q Not even to the father of [AAA]? You did not reveal to the father of [AAA]  . . . of what you
saw on July 21, 1999?
A No. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, moral certainty in
an unprejudiced mind that it was the accused who committed the crime, failing which the
accused must be exonerated.45 The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of establishing
the guilt of appellants, however.1avvphi1 This leaves it unnecessary to still pass on
appellant’s defense.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellants, FEBLONELYBIRTH T. RUBIO and JOAN T. AMARO, are, for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, ACQUITTED of
rape with homicide.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless he is being lawfully detained for another cause; and to inform the Court of the
date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from
notice.
SO ORDERED.
5.
A.M. No. P-11-3019               March 20, 2012
SHERYLL C. DELA CRUZ, Complainant,
vs.
PAMELA P. MALUNAO, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter originated from a criminal complaint (I.S. No. 5519-E-2008) filed by
complainant Sheryll C. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) against respondent Pamela P. Malunao
(Malunao), Clerk III of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
(Branch 28) for the crime of robbery with extortion. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court since
Malunao is a trial court employee under the exclusive administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court.1 The case was then docketed as A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2972-P with the Office of the
Court Administrator.
The report of the National Bureau of Investigation dated 8 May 2008 summarizes the facts of the
case as follows:
Investigation disclosed that on 06 May 2008, Subject PAMELA MALUNAO y PASCUA
(Subject Malunao for brevity) through several calls and text messages informed Complainant
SHERYLL DELA CRUZ y CEBALLOS (Complainant Dela Cruz for brevity) that ALAY
KAPWA Cooperative had given bribe money in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP20,000.00) to HONORABLE JUDGE FERNANDO F. FLOR JR. (JUDGE FLOR for
brevity), Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya through an unidentified
individual in exchange of fixing the case in favor of the said cooperative against ERNESTO
ROXAS, a business partner of complainant.
Subject Malunao further informed Complainant DELA CRUZ that JUDGE FLOR was willing to
return the money to ALAY KAPWA Cooperative if the latter will give THIRTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (PHP35,000.00) to Judge Flor through the former (Subject Malunao).
Subject Malunao also intimidated Complainant Dela Cruz that if the latter will not give the said
amount to Judge Flor, the said judge will rule in favor of ALAY KAPWA Cooperative.
Intimidated of the heavy damage that will arise from losing the case against ALAY KAPWA,
Complainant Dela Cruz agreed to pay the amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP35,000.00) but in installment basis. Subject Malunao demanded the amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (PHP15,000.00) to be paid on 2:00PM, 08 May 2008.
At about 10:00AM 08 May 2008, the Complainant, wanting to confirm whether or not the
transaction brokered by Subject Malunao will push through, personally approached Judge Flor at
the Hall of Justice parking lot. However, when asked by Complainant Dela Cruz regarding the
amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP35,000.00) that Subject Malunao asked of
her, Judge Flor denied any knowledge of said transaction.
Judge Flor referred Complainant Dela Cruz to the NBI-Bayombong District Office (NBI-
BAYDO) in order for the latter to file the necessary complaint against the Subject Malunao.
At about 10:30AM, Judge Flor arrived at the NBI-BAYDO to make sure that Complainant Dela
Cruz had already filed a complaint before this office and that an entrapment operation will be
later on set up at 2:00PM 08 May 2008.
At about 1:00PM 08 May 2008, the operatives of the NBI-BAYDO proceeded to No. 45 Espino
St., Brgy. Quirino, Poblacion South, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, complainant’s residence, to
conduct an entrapment operation against Subject Malunao.
Upon Subject Malunao’s receipt of the marked money, the entrapment operation was announced
and Subject Malunao was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights.
Subject Malunao was brought to the NBI-BAYDO where she was booked, photographed and
fingerprinted.
In support of our recommendation, we are submitting the following pieces of evidence, to wit:
1. Complaint Sheet;
2. Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sheryll Dela Cruz y CEBALLOS;
3. Affidavit of Arrest;
4. Booking Sheet and Arrest Report;
5. Photocopy of the marked money
6. others to follow.2
On 23 May 2008, Malunao filed an Affidavit3 denying the accusations against her. Malunao
claimed that Dela Cruz framed her into making it appear that she committed the offense for
which she is now being charged. Malunao claims that she personally knows Dela Cruz as an
employee of the Rural Bank of Solano and a businesswoman connected with ER Agro-
Trading.4 Malunao and her mother-in-law purchased piglets from ER Agro-Trading and learned
that Dela Cruz was engaged in the business of lending money.5 When Malunao inquired from
Dela Cruz about a loan, Dela Cruz asked how much she needed.6 Malunao told Dela Cruz she
needed ₱15,000.00 to pay for the tuition fee of her daughter.7 When Malunao followed up the
loan, Dela Cruz instructed her to come to her house on 8 May 2008 at 2:00 p.m. 8 When Malunao
arrived, Dela Cruz invited Malunao inside the house and offered her a seat in the living room.
Dela Cruz left the living room to get the money, and when she returned, gave Malunao
₱15,000.00.9 After receiving the money, Malunao asked for the promissory note she needed to
sign evidencing the loan.10 However, a tall woman emerged from the kitchen and took her bag,
announced "NBI ito." At the same time, two men entered the house, opened and took pictures of
the contents of her bag, and arrested Malunao.11 Malunao was then brought to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya where she was charged.12
Malunao further claims that Dela Cruz knows her as employed in Branch 28 with Judge Flor as
presiding judge, and not in Branch 29, as stated in Dela Cruz’s Sinumpaang Salaysay. 13 In
addition, Dela Cruz knows that Malunao has been suspended from office since July 2007, long
before Civil Case No. 6875 entitled Alay Kapwa Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Engr.
Nestor A. Gonzaga and Ernesto Roxas (E.R. Agro-Trading) was filed and raffled on 24 January
2008 to Branch 28.14 Malunao further emphasizes that from the time she was suspended, she has
not gone inside the office of Branch 28.15 For these reasons, Malunao denies the accusations
against her and claims she was framed.16
On 14 August 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint-Resolution forwarding
the records of the case to the Supreme Court since Malunao is a trial court employee under the
exclusive administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.17
On 17 August 2009, the Court referred the instant administrative complaint to Executive Judge
Merianthe Pacita M. Zuraek, Branch 29, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for her investigation,
report and recommendation.18
On 12 April 2011, Executive Judge Zuraek submitted her
19 
Report/Recommendation recommending the dismissal of the case for clear lack of evidence,
stating:
In the instant case, complainant Sheryll C. Dela Cruz testified on direct examination on
December 3, 2009. Instead of returning for the continuation of her direct examination, she filed
on August 16, 2010 a manifestation expressing her desire not to pursue her case on account of
her sensitive medical condition, which to her, affects her capability to actively prosecute her
complaint. According to her, she would not object to the eventual dismissal of the case for lack
of evidence arising from her inability to testify and produce witnesses and other evidence.
Having sensed that complainant was merely having second thoughts and was finally ready to
testify, since she testified as a witness in OCA IPI No. 08-2971 entitled Judge Fernando F. Flor,
Jr. versus Pamela Malunao, the undersigned set the instant case for hearing on January 20, 2011
for her to continue her direct examination. This was resorted to since the two (2) cases arose
from the same transaction, which is the extortion of money from complainant. However,
complainant chose not to appear.
To the mind of the undersigned, her failure to appear is a clear affirmation / confirmation of her
lack of interest to prosecute her case.
xxx
In so far as the complainant is concerned, she was heard when she testified. However, the same
is not true with the defendant, who because of the decision of the complainant not to appear any
more, was not able to controvert her testimony by cross-examining her.
Since the testimony of the complainant was not covered by cross-examination, which is a
fundamental and essential right of the respondent, the undersigned orders the evidence of
complainant, both testimonial and documentary, expunged from the records. Moreover,
documentary evidence to be appreciated should be formally offered in evidence. The
complainant of her own volition, chose not to complete her presentation of evidence, which
explains why there was no such formal offer. The rule is, evidence not offered is no evidence at
all. Thus, to give it weight would be in violation of the defendant’s right to due process and fair
trial.
There being no evidence, the undersigned has nothing to evaluate vis a vis the facts of the case.
As a result, it has no power to make conclusions of fact because it has not heard both parties.20
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), on the other hand, in its Memorandum dated 5
October 2011, recommended that: (a) the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter; (b) Malunao be adjudged guilty of grave misconduct; and (c) the accrued leave credits of
Malunao be forfeited, in lieu of dismissal from the service, should OCA’s recommendation in
A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2974-P to dismiss her from the service be adopted by the Court.21
The OCA recommended the dismissal of Malunao with forfeiture of retirement benefits and
accrued leave credits, contrary to the recommendation of the Executive Judge Zuraek, because
technical rules of procedure and evidence, the legal basis of Executive Judge Zuraek’s
recommendation, should not be strictly applied in administrative proceedings. 22 Although Dela
Cruz was not able to complete the presentation of her evidence before Executive Judge
Zuraek, Dela Cruz’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint affidavit of arrest executed by the
NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, the photocopy of the marked money, the
Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruz’s house and the
contents of Malunao’s bag after receipt of the money, can all be considered in the
appreciation of evidence to determine if there is substantial evidence to show that Malunao
committed the acts alleged in the administrative complaint.23 Moreover, Malunao
submitted an Affidavit contradicting the allegations of Dela Cruz.24
In addition, the OCA provided additional information that Malunao has three (3) other pending
administrative matters against her, aside from the present case, namely: (a) A.M. No. P-09-2732
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2971-P) for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 6723; (b) OCA
IPI No. 08-2974-P for Extortion and Grave Misconduct; and (c) A.M. No. P-07-2324 (Formerly
OCA IPI No. 07-2-119-RTC) for Extortion and Illegal Solicitation. In fact, in A.M. No. P-07-
2324, Malunao was placed under preventive suspension pursuant to the Court’s Resolution dated
18 June 2007.25
The OCA recommended the dismissal of Malunao with forfeiture of retirement benefits and
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office including
government-owned and controlled corporations, contrary to the recommendation of Executive
Judge Zuraek.26
We find the recommendation of the OCA in order.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 27 govern the conduct of
disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases. In Section 3, it
provides that, "Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily
adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings."
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Canque,28 the Court held:
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not required.
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. In
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, substantial evidence is defined:
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at
the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of
evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.29
For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the
administrative offense. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing
whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the
Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.
Dela Cruz, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 8 May 2008, claimed that Malunao tried to extort
money from her in exchange for a favorable resolution in the case pending before Judge Flor in
Branch 28. In the entrapment operation conducted by the NBI, Malunao was arrested when she
received ₱15,000.00 from Dela Cruz.
A criminal complaint for robbery with extortion was filed against Malunao with attached
supporting documents such as the Complaint Sheet, Sinumpaang Salaysay of Dela Cruz,
Affidavit of Arrest, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked money, photos
of Malunao entering the house of Dela Cruz and while in the house of Dela Cruz, and photos of
the contents of her bag after Malunao received the marked money. As a consequence of this case,
Judge Flor filed a criminal complaint against Malunao for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713), which complaint was
referred to this Court by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and now docketed as A.M. No.
P-09-2732.
Malunao, on the other hand, claims that she was framed by Dela Cruz, and that she received
₱15,000.00 as a loan. Malunao, however, did not impute any ill-motive to Dela Cruz on why
the latter would frame her.
Malunao has three administrative cases filed against her, aside from the present case, all
alleging the same conduct of extortion and solicitation. In Estabillo v. Malunao, docketed as
A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2974-P, Estabillo, in her Affidavit, claims that Malunao, in July 2006,
asked money from her in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before Judge Flor
of Branch 28 where Estabillo was a defendant. Estabillo gave Malunao ₱10,000.00. On
November 2007, Estabillo learned that an administrative case was filed against Malunao due to
her practice of collecting money from litigants. After Estabillo confronted Malunao, Malunao
promised to return the ₱10,000.00. However, the amount remains unpaid, so Estabillo filed the
complaint against Malunao in A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 08-2974-P.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Malunao, docketed as A.M. No. P-07-2324, Malunao was
once again being investigated for alleged extortions and solicitations from litigants, which
resulted in Malunao’s preventive suspension in the Court’s Resolution dated 18 June 2007.
The third case, Judge Fernando F. Flor v. Malunao (A.M. No. P-09-2732), is an offshoot of this
case. Judge Flor of Branch 28 where Malunao is employed as Clerk III filed an administrative
complaint against Malunao for soliciting money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable
decision from Judge Flor.
To date, none of these three administrative cases against Malunao has finally been resolved by
this Court.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.30 The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules.31 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of
an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.32 Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states: "Court personnel
shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that
such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions."
In Rule IV, Section 52(A)(11) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of an employee’s official duties may
affect the functions of his office merits the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Grave
misconduct under Section 52(A)(3) of Rule IV is also punishable by dismissal for the first
offense.
In the present case, Malunao solicited ₱35,000.00 and received ₱15,000.00 as first installment
from Dela Cruz in exchange for a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 6875 entitled Alay Kapwa
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Engr. Nestor A. Gonzaga and Ernesto Roxas (E.R. Agro-
Trading) pending before Judge Flor in Branch 28. Malunao was arrested in an entrapment
operation upon receipt of the first installment of ₱15,000.00.
At the time of the solicitation, Malunao was already preventively suspended as Clerk III in
Branch 28 by virtue of the Court’s Resolution dated 18 June 2007 in another case, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Malunao (A.M. No. P-07-2324), due to allegations of the same conduct
of extortion and solicitation. As a consequence of such solicitation from Dela Cruz, Judge Flor
also filed a case against Malunao docketed as A.M. No. P-09-2732. In addition, Malunao has a
pending administrative case in Estabillo v. Malunao  docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2974-P,
where Estabillo, a defendant in a criminal case pending before Branch 28, alleges that Malunao
solicited and received ₱10,000.00 in exchange for a favorable decision.
In the present case, Malunao clearly used her position as Clerk III in Branch 28 to solicit money
from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision. This violation of Section 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting
the penalty of dismissal. Dela Cruz’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint affidavit of arrest executed
by the NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked money, the
Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruz’s house, and the contents
of Malunao’s bag after receipt of the money, all prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of
Malunao for the offense of grave misconduct.
What is more alarming and disconcerting is the fact that Malunao has continued to solicit
money from litigants, even after she had been preventively suspended as Clerk III.
Malunao has the propensity to abuse a position of public service and is not fit to remain in
the civil service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya is found GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT. She is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions.
SO ORDERED.
6.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177407               February 9, 2011
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza),
which, in turn, assailed the Orders2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in
Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC)
for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred
to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in
September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the
said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his
evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal
offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her
Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as
follows:
"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the
criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked
as Annex ‘2’ to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III,
on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997,
which is also marked as Annex ‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of
the document marked as Annex ‘3’ which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended
as such Annex ‘3’ to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin,
III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which
is also marked as Annex ‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.
"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is
also marked as Annex ‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten
final report of the same examination which is the document appended as Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’
respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III
in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked
as Annex ‘4’ is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked
as Annex ‘1’ is a certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and typewritten
contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit ‘D.’
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of
exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies,
not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay.
He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by
the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of
[herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation
of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose
they may serve in the resolution of this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the
respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons
stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8,
2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its
probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the
evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, assailing the BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE
FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE
DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE’S
LIVELIHOOD.4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
completely or finally disposes of the case.5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left
to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that
the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of
whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely
hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the
exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. 6 Although trial courts are
enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence
which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have
held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason
that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter
found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers
to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on
Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which
reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The
Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do
not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on,
is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996,
January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical
case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal
complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who
handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in
evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of
her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be
proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting
a matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not
be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. 13 Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, 14 include the structural make-up
and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial
notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human
beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is
inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable
for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left
non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As
previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her
operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of
Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is
allowed.15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building."16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted
Editha’s formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value
thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
8.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 135695-96               October 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28,
in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two
counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City
Prosecutor’s Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as
Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of
complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended
party against the latter’s will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of
complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended
party against the latter’s will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellant’s defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape
charges against him since he and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded
her for going out whenever he was not at home."3
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to
Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and
for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to
Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and
for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainant’s version of what accused did to
her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that
private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and
write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her
father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, she was in the house together
with her father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while
herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However,
when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already undressed was
beside her and was embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used
a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he inserted his penis into
her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital,
which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time
asking by saying (sic) : ‘Does it feel good?’ And at the same time, he was laughing and further,
told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her
when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt
intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: ‘Why
will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)’
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to
heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while she
cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father
was just smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to
sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a
stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her
womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the
right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her father’s place and went to her
neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn,
advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen,
she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her medical
examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by them."5
Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured did not impress the trial
court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double
conviction, simply contending that:6
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS
DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF
THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on
September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue City
Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock that evening. On November 7,
1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have
raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and
naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings."7
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the
trial court’s decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex
delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the
penalty of death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in
its review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no
room to disturb the trial court’s judgment concerning appellant’s guilt, because his defense is
utterly untenable.
Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a
worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life.
Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters,9 such defense
is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even
weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator
of her honor.10 Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant
with ravishing her. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward,
detailed, and consistent.11 Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to
her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court. 12
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single most important
issue.13 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial
court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first
hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an
accurate impression and conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly
been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial court’s
finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and
the judgment rendered affirmed.15
Moreover, we note here that private complainant’s testimony is corroborated by medical
findings that lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr.
Bessie Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: -do-
Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.16
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainant’s
private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part. 17 According to her, the
lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainant’s
genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred
from complainant’s U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet
experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.18 While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-
examination, that the existence of the datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by
masturbation of fingers or other things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations
tends to support private complainant’s claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had
quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution
did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private complainant.
He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent castigation of
her delinquent behavior.20
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case
for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken
seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would
drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is
her natural instinct to protect her honor. 21 More so, where her charges could mean the
death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes
imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This
argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and
private complainant was the only child who lived with him. 22 As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, appellant was thus "free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter."23
Nor does appellant’s assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems
and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of
her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the following
testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be
sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case
your father would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.24
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes
rape of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape 26 and a heinous crime. In proving such
felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with
woman; (3) by force or without her consent27 and in order to warrant the imposition of capital
punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the
rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.28
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim’s father.29 But
the victim’s age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified
that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not
know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said that her
birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - 30
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request
for judicial notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted. …
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may
either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when
court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial
notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.  - A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is
not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The
offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a
house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the
same room which the victim is sharing with the accused’s sister.32
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness and her
antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.33
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields
of professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took
judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin
baby boys as "premature" since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example
would be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when
court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice,
the court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s
admission, thereof acceding to the prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129,
as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of
such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed,
by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that
the rape committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on
October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984.
Although no birth certificate was presented because the victim’s birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mother’s
testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish
that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be
convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove
the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape.1âwphi1 The
prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was
no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We
held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the
trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the
victim, aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we
stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even
though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is
the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18
when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since
the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly
certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s age, appellant could
not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to
have been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when
it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age other than through the testimony of
her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without
any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age by independent proof is a bar to
conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the
actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an ‘iota of doubt’ that the
case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the imposition of the death penalty set by the
law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed
by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its
unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A.
7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on
October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil
indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code" for each count is imprecise.
In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for
pleading or proof as to the basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a
different amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we
find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence,
we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that
generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by
R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the
nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty
mandatory.39 However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was
proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death
sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in
this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on
their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with
perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters.40
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in
Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant
Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count,
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
9.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160684, September 02, 2015
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HI-GRADE FEEDS
CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA,
DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN CITY , AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo
Tuason, the vastness of which measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City,
Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or Original Certificate of Title
(OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on, smaller
lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different persons. Several subsequent
subdivisions, consolidations, and one expropriation of the Estate, spawned numerous legal
disputes, living-up to the name "Land of Caveat Emptor."1 One of these disputed lots was Lot 26,
the property subject of this litigation.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770 dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively,
which annulled petitioner CLT Realty Development Corporation's (CLT) TCT No. T-177013
and affirmed Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation's (Hi-Grade) TCTs No. 237450 and No. T-146941.

The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which prompted
CLT to file a case for Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and
Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as
Civil Case No. C-15463 against Hi-Grade.

Version of Hi-Grade

Respondent Hi-Grade is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
237450 and T-146941, derived from TCT No. 4211 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal, registered under the names of Alejandro Ruiz (Ruiz) and Mariano Leuterio (Leuterio),
which is a derivative title of OCT No. 994, the mother title.4

Tracing the line of transfer that preceded the title of Hi-Grade, it is averred that TCT No. 4211
was registered under the names of Ruiz and Leuterio on 9 September 1918. Later, Lot 26 was
sold to Francisco Gonzalez (Gonzalez), which resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 4211 and
its replacement by TCT No. 5261, registered under the name of Gonzalez.5

Upon Gonzalez's death, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 35486,
registered under the name of his surviving spouse Rufina Narciso Vda. De Gonzalez. The land
covered by TCT No. 35486 was subdivided into seven (7) lots under subdivision plan Psd-
21154. By virtue of Psd-21154, TCT No. 35486 was cancelled and seven (7) new titles were
issued, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, registered under the children of Gonzalez.

In 1947, the Government expropriated the seven lots.6 By virtue of the expropriation, TCTs No.
1368 to No. 1374 were cancelled and replaced by TCTs No. 12836 to No. 12842. Afterwards, by
virtue of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Psd (LRC) Pcd-1828, the Government consolidated the
titles and then further subdivided the property into 77 lots.

One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito Villanueva under TCTs No. 23027 to No.
23028, which was further subdivided into Lot-A and 17-B, pursuant to subdivision plan Psd-
276839. One of the properties in dispute is Lot 17-B, which was later on registered in the name
of Jose Madulid, Sr. (Madulid, Sr.), under TCT No. C-32979, which was later on sold to Hi-
Grade.

Another lot resulting from the Government's consolidation and subdivision of the Maysilo Estate
into 77 lots, is Lot No. 52, which was registered in the name of Inocencio Alvarez (Alvarez)
under TCT No. 7363. Soon after, Alvarez sold Lot No. 52 to Madulid, Sr. TCT No. 7363 was
cancelled and TCT No. 7364 was issued to Madulid, Sr. Afterwards, Madulid, Sr. sold the lot to
Hi-Grade. This is another one of the properties in dispute.

As a review, first, Hi-Grade traces its title to TCTs No. 7364 and No. C-32979, which were
registered in the name Madulid, Sr., which in turn stemmed from TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460.

TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460 were derived from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374.

TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 stemmed from TCT No. 35486, which was subdivided into smaller
lots.

TCT No. 35486 was derived from TCT No. 5261. TCT No. 5261 stemmed from TCT No. 4211.

Finally, TCT No. 4211 was derived from OCT No. 994, the mother title.

Version of CLT

CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988, executed by the former registered owner,
Estelita I. Hipolito.

CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being fake and spurious based on the
following:

1. As shown in the face of TCT No. 4211, it purports to have been derived from OCT No.
994;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. The original copy of OCT No. 994, which is existing and in due form, on file with the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City, contains dilapidated pages and no longer contains
the pages where Lot No. 26 and some other lots are supposedly inscribed.

3. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT No. 994, it can be seen that the technical
descriptions of the lots and the certificate itself are entirely written in the English
language. On the other hand, the technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs No. 4211,
No. 5261, and No. 35486 are still inscribed in the Spanish language.

4. The dates of the original survey of OCT No. 994, the mother title of TCT No. 4211, i.e.,
8-27 September, 4-21 October and 17-18 November 1911, are not indicated on TCTs No.
4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486. Rather, an entirely different date, 22 December 1917, is
indicated at the end of the Spanish technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs No. 4211,
No. 5261, and No. 35486.

5. The parcel of land covered successively by TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 is
not identified by a lot number and there is no reference or mention of Lot No. 26 of the
Maysilo Estate in the technical description of said titles.

6. There is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and
No. 35486 covering the subdivision of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.

7. The plan Psd-21154 which subdivided the lot covered by TCT No. 35486 (formerly
covered by TCT No. 4211, then TCT No. 5261), could not be traced at the official
depository of plans, which is the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). According to the
EDPS Listings of the Records Management Division of the LMB, there is no record of
Plan Psd-21154. Said EDPS listings indicate those records which were surveyed after the
Second World War. It appears, from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, plan PSD-21154 was
done after the war on 15, 21, 29 September and 5-6 October 1946.

8. The technical descriptions inscribed on TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 show that the tie
points deviated from the mother lot's tie point, which is the Bureau of Lands Location
Monument ("BLLM") No. 1, Caloocan. Instead, different location monuments of the
adjoining Piedad Estate were used. The tie point used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10,
Piedad Estate; while TCTs No. 1369 and No. 1470 used B.M. No. 8, Piedad Estate; and
TCTs No. 1371, No. 1372, No. 1373, and No. 1374 used B.M. No. 7, Piedad Estate. The
changing tie points resulted in the shifting of the position of the seven lots in relation to
the mother lot, using their technical descriptions inscribed on the face of the titles. Thus,
when plotted, the seven lots do not fall exactly inside the boundary of the mother lot. The
same is true when the lots described on the titles of Hi-Grade are plotted on the basis of
their technical descriptions inscribed on the titles.

9. TCT No. 4211 contains patent infirmities, inconsistencies, and irregularities indicating
that it is a falsified document representing a fictitious title and is, therefore, null and void.
The fact was confirmed by an examination by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation, which concluded that TCT No. 4211 was prepared only
sometime in the 1940s and not in 1918, as it is made to appear on the face of the
 document. Thus, the series of titles from where Hi-Grade's titles were derived, starting
from TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486, and up to and including the titles of Hi-
Grade, are also necessarily null and void.

During trial, CLT presented the following witnesses: (1) Ramon Velazquez (Velazquez),
Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Records Section, Records Management Division of the LMB,
who testified that the LMB does not have a copy of Psd 21154; (2) Norberto Vasquez, Jr.
(Vasquez), Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, who identified the various titles relevant
to the case; (3) Juanito Bustalino (Bustalino), a licensed Geodetic Engineer, who testified that
CLT engaged his services to survey the subject property and discovered that there was an
overlap between CLT's and Hi-Grade's titles; (4) Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, one of the
counsel of CLT; and (5) Aida R. Villora-Magsipoc, a Forensic Chemist of the Forensic Division,
National Bureau of Investigation, who examined the titles as an expert witness.

On the other hand, Hi-Grade presented its sole witness, Atty. Jose Madulid, counsel for and
stockholder of Hi-Grade, and son of Hi-Grade's predecessor, Jose Madulid, Sr., who testified that
his family has been occupying the subject properties under the concept of an owner for more
than twenty-seven (27) years, until the properties were transferred to Hi-Grade.
The Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC7 ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older
title, cannot prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities.
Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the subject properties, it is not considered as a
conclusive proof of ownership. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC dated 27
December 1995 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. and against
defendants HI-GRADE FEEDS CORP. et. al., ordering

1. TCT Nos. 237450 and 146941 in the name of the defendant null and void and
accordingly ordering their cancellation;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. defendant to vacate the portion of Lot No. 26 presently occupied by it and turn over
possession of the same to the plaintiff; and

3. defendant to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence and serious and patent errors in the court's appreciation of evidence
and factual findings based on the decision of the court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled "CLT
v. Sto. Niño Kapithahayan Association." The RTC denied the motion for utter lack of merit.
According to the RTC, the ruling in favor of Hi-Grade in Sto. Niño is not a newly-discovered
evidence, as Hi-Grade could not have failed to produce such evidence if it exercised reasonable
diligence. Hi-Grade's reliance in the aforesaid case is already moot and academic as the court
in Sto. Niño already reconsidered its decision and upheld the validity of CLT's title.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Impelled by the adverse ruling of the RTC, Hi-Grade elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take Judicial Notice
of Committee Report on Senate Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on
Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement (Senate Report) on
1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in a Resolution9 dated 31 August 1998.
Included in the Resolution, however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals takes
judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the findings and
conclusions therein. 0
1

In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and in
representation of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, filed a Petition for
Intervention dated 25 August 1998. The OSG averred that its intervention is indispensable as it is
pursuant to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of registration and to protect
the Assurance Fund, in connection with which it can initiate necessary actions for the annulment
of titles irregularly and fraudulently issued. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG motion. The
Court of Appeals resolved the issue on intervention in the appealed Decision dated 18 June 2003.
According to the Court of Appeals, due to the magnitude and significance that will affect the
stability and integrity of the Torrens system, the State has sufficient interest in the case.

Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the trial
court's reliance on the testimonies of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalmo, on the alleged
patent infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211. According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez and
Bustalino never testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to the registration
procedures in 1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are incompetent to
testify on the customary practices in land registration at that time. Reversing the Decision of the
RTC, the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING CLT's complaint a quo and upholding the validity of TCT Nos.
237450 and T-146941 of appellant Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation.

Appellant CLT is further ordered to surrender its owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-177013
to the Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City who is hereby directed to effect its cancellation.

The other incidents are resolved as above indicated. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. In addition to the factual issues raised in
the trial court, the Petition raised the following arguments:
 1. The Court of Appeals went beyond the issues resolved by the trial court and formulated
its own issue regarding the date when OCT No. 994 was originally registered which it
resolved on the basis of extraneous purported evidence not presented before the trial
court in the instant case, in violation of petitioner CLT Realty's rights to due process of
law.

2. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily, arbitrarily and blindly disregarded the findings of
fact and conclusions of the trial court arrived at after a careful evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties and established on record and substituted and supplanted the
same with its own conclusions based on extraneous evidence not presented and admitted
in evidence before the trial court.

3. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court despite the fact that
respondent Hi-Grade has failed to present evidence to refute the established fact that the
alleged titles from where its alleged titles are derived from, i.e., the alleged TCT Nos.
4211, 5261, 35486 and 1368 to 1374, contain patent and inherent technical defects and
infirmities which render them spurious, void and ineffective.

4. The Court of Appeals unjustly made a wholesale rendition in its questioned decision
despite the pendency of important prejudicial motions or incidents which it thereby either
peremptorily resolved or rendered moot and academic, thus, violating petitioner CLT
Realty's right to due process of law.

5. The Court of Appeals totally disregarded the rules on evidence and surrendered the
independence of the judiciary by giving full faith and credence to the findings and
conclusions contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 by taking judicial notice
of the same, which report was rendered pursuant to proceedings initiated and conducted
without notice to petitioner CLT Realty and thus in gross violation of its right to due
process, and was based on documents that were never authenticated.

6. The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the allegation raised in the Republic's
petitioner for intervention although the State has no legal interest in the subject matter of
the litigation of the instant case and may not validly intervene in the instant case since the
matter in litigation are admittedly privately owned lands which will not revert to the
Republic.

7. The Court of Appeals blindly ignored the fact and worse, failed and refused to rule on the
issue that respondent Hi-Grade is guilty of forum-shopping for which reason the latter's
appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed.12

Issues
 
I.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial
notice of the Senate Report
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office of
the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention
III.

Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?
Our Ruling

First, the incidental matters.

I.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial
notice of the Senate Report

CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the Rules of Court and
CLT's right to due process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and should not be given any
probative value because it was obtained in violation of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
considering that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed hearsay evidence.
Contrary to the mandatory procedure under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires
examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report was not put to proof
and CLT was deprived of the opportunity to conduct a cross-examination on the Senate Report.
And it is also contended that the right of CLT to due process was violated because the
proceedings in the Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the admission in
evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers as it is
an encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.

CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the
law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments
of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions,
(1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them;13 it is the duty of the court to
assume something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary
support.14 Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the
traditional form of presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court
proceedings such as cross-examination.15
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial
notice of.

CLT posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers
when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report. This contention is baseless. We adopt the
pronouncements of this Court in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice:16
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No.
994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals
to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the
DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such
questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties, x x x The
reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they
may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence
submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate
should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and
arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and
certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.17 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and
evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why the
taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle. Thus:
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court is altogether a
different matter. Certainly, a determination by any branch of government on a justiciable matter
which is properly before this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding of the
Senate committees may be the appropriate basis for remedial legislation but when the issue of
the validity of a Torrens title is submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter has the
competence to make such a determination and once final, the same binds not only the parties but
all agencies of government.18
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the Court of
Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.
II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the
Office of the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention

The Republic maintains that the proliferation of spurious or fake titles covering the infamous
Maysilo Estate poses a serious threat to the integrity of the Torrens system and the Assurance
Fund. The Republic asserts that because it is bound to safeguard and protect the integrity of the
Torrens system and Assurance Fund, it is duty-bound to intervene in the present case. In granting
the intervention, the Court of Appeals ruled that considering the magnitude and significance of
the issues spawned by the Maysilo Estate, enough to affect the stability and integrity of the
Torrens system, the Republic is allowed to intervene.
CLT, on the other hand, contends that the Republic's intervention is baseless. According to CLT,
the Republic has no legal interest in the properties as the subject properties are not public lands
and as such, will not revert to the Republic. Further, there is no threat or claim against the
Assurance Fund. Anchoring on Presidential Decree No. 478 and Administrative Code of 1987,
CLT claims that the only action which the Office of the Solicitor General may file on behalf of
the Republic in connection with registered lands is an action for the reversion to the Government
of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon, as well as lands held in violation of the
Constitution.19

This time, we agree with CLT.

Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. CA,20 CLT argues that the
Petition for Intervention was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period prescribed in
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, i.e., before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court
clarified that intervention is unallowable when the case has already been submitted for decision,
when judgment has been rendered, or when judgment has already became final and executory.
And, intervention is only allowed when the intervenors are indispensable parties.

Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its power to suspend its
own rules and procedure in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons,21 the attendant
circumstances are not availing in the present case.

The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.22 Here, even without the Republic as participant, a final
determination of the issues can be attained.

Anent the opportuness of intervention, the Court held in Cariño v. Ofilada23 that it may be
allowed only before or during trial. The term trial is used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period
for the introduction of evidence by both parties. The period of trial terminates when the judgment
begins. As this case was already in its appeal stage when intervention was sought, it could no
longer be allowed.

CLT further avers that because there was no claim against the Assurance Fund, intervention is
improper. Section 95 of P.D. 1529 provides for the grounds when a party can claim against the
Assurance Fund:
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on his part,
sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of
the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising after original
registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book,
and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of
any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein,
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be paid
out of the Assurance Fund.
Indeed, whatever party is favored in this case, the losing party may file a claim against the
Assurance Fund as the present case involves the operation of the Torrens system. However, the
action to claim against the Assurance Fund may be dealt with in a separate proceeding.

Now, the merits of this case.

Parenthetically, although the general rule is that the factual findings of the trial court are
accorded respect and are not generally disturbed on appeal, the aforesaid rule does not apply in
the case at bar, as the findings of the trial court and the appellate court are contradictory.24

We shall now discuss the bottom issues.

III.

Which off the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917, is the valid
title?

The mother title, OCT 994

The arguments of the parties come from apparently the same document. Notably, however, the
parties' OCTs No. 994 contain different dates of registration,
namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917

Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917

A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same
property. The date of registration is reckoned from the time of the title's transcription in the
record book of the Registry of Deeds.25 Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title refers
to the date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in Sections 41 and 42 of the
Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529:
Section 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a
certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court to the register of deeds for the province,
or provinces or city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the
decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in
consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register
of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed
by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x

Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to
any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book, "original certificate of title, entered
pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at" (stating the time and place of
entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the
transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like
form, but shall be entitled "Transfer from number" (the number of the next previous certificate
relating to the same land), and also the words "Originally registered" (date, volume, and page of
registration). (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429, the decree registering OCT No.
994, the date of the issuance is 19 April 1917 while on the other hand, OCT No. 994 was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. In this case, the date which
should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title is the date when the mother title was
received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:
For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CLT no less and marked as its
Exhibit "D", shows on its face that the date April 19, 1917 refers to the issuance of the decree of
registration by the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 1917 pertains to the date when
the same decree was Received for transcription in the Office of the Register of Deeds.26
Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds is 3 May 1917,
we rule that the genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.

The derivative title, TCT No. 4211

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, CLT failed to prove by preponderance of evidence,
the alleged defects and infirmities in TCT No. 4211, the title from whence Hi-Grade's titles were
derived.

CLT failed to prove that TCT No. 4211 did not conform to the registration procedures at the time
it was prepared. Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Court cannot give credence to the
testimony of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez27 and Bustalino.28 Vasquez is the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City, while Bustalino is a Geodetic Engineer. For their testimonies to matter,
CLT must first establish their competence as regards the registration rules in land registration in
1918, at the time TCT No. 4211 was prepared. CLT failed to discharge such burden.

On CLT's allegation that the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) has no records of Psd 21154, we
note that CLT did not prove that the LMB indeed has no such records. CLT's witness, Velasquez,
merely testified that he cannot ascertain whether or not Psd 21154 was burned or lost during the
world war.29 Just as important, while Psd 21154 could not be located, it was not only testified to
that it may have been lost or burned during the world war; a blue print copy of the same is being
kept in the vault of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City.

As regards the findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist on the age of TCT No. 4211, the Court of
Appeals correctly found that such findings are inconclusive because the Chemist did not
conclusively state that TCT No. 4211 could not have been prepared in 1918.30 Also, the Chemist,
in her cross-examination, admitted that she did not know who supplied her copies of the TCTs
and that she has not seen any standard document dated 1918.31

On the matter regarding the discrepancy between the dates of survey and issuance, tie points, and
language used in TCT No. 4211 and OCT No. 994, CLT's contention must fail for the obvious
reason that the basis of CLT's allegation is the non-existent mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917. Thus, as OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 has been established as null and void, it
cannot serve as precedent for ascertaining the genuineness of TCT No. 4211.
What matters most in this case is that CLT questioned the title of Hi-Grade for the purpose of
having CLT's own title upheld. Instead of establishing the genuineness of its own title, CLT
attacked Hi-Grade's titles. However, CLT failed to establish the chain of titles linking its TCT
No. T-177013 to the mother title, OCT No. 994. It failed to prove the "circumstances under
which its predecessor-in-interest acquired the whole of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. Ironically,
it is even by CLT's presentation of OCT No. 994 and of the succession of titles previous to those
held by appellant Hi-Grade that the latter's titles [was] established as genuine derivative titles of
OCT No. 994."32

Indeed, CLT's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the alleged weakness of the evidence of Hi-Grade. As already shown, such
allegation was proven wrong by documents on records.

As opposed to CLT's evidence on the alleged infirmities in Hi-Grade's titles, Hi-Grade presented
muniments of title, tax declarations or realty tax payments, on the subject properties.33 While tax
declarations and receipts are inconclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land,
they are prima facie proof of ownership or possession and may become the basis of a claim for
ownership when it is coupled with proof of actual possession of the property.34 In the case at bar,
Hi-Grade is the actual possessor of the subject property.35

To sum up, Hi-Grade was able to establish the chain of titles linking its titles, TCTs No. 237450
and T-14691, to the derivative title, TCT No. 4211, to the mother title, OCT No. 994.36 As borne
by the records, TCT No. 4211 was registered as a derivative title of OCT No. 994 on 9
September 1918.37 On the other hand, CLT's title, TCT No. R-17994,38 was registered also as a
derivative title of OCT No. 994 only on 12 September 1978. Thus, the reference of both parties
is OCT No. 994, but with different dates: CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917, while Hi-
Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917.

This factual issue of which OCT No. 994 is genuine is not a novel matter. This Court, in Angeles
v. The Secretary of Justice,39 citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation,40 exhaustively passed upon and ruled that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was
dated 3 May 1917, not 19 April 1917.

In the recent case of Syjuco v. Republic of the Philippines,41 this Court, reiterated the rulings
in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice42and Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation, that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was registered on 3 May 1917, not on 19 April
1917, and that any title that traces its source from OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, is deemed
void and inexistent.43

As we have priorly pronounced, any title that traces its source to a void title, is also void. The
spring cannot rise higher than its source. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse
habet. All titles that trace its source to OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, are therefore void, for
such mother title is inexistent.44 CLT so traces its title to OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, the
title of CLT is void.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation
v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III," dated 18
June 2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
10
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 163684 : April 16, 2008]
FAUSTINA CAMITAN and DAMASO LOPEZ, Petitioners, v. FIDELITY INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 and of the Resolution2 dated May 12, 2004, both of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 entitled Fidelity Investment Corporation v.
Alipio Camitan, Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez, the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna (Branch 37) and the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
The case arose from the Petition3 for the issuance of another duplicate copy of Certificate of Title
No. T - (12110) T-4342 (TCT) filed in 1993 by herein petitioners, together with Alipio Camitan,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna. The case was raffled to Branch 37
of the said court and was docketed as SLRC Case No. 1198-93-C.
The petition contained, among others, the allegations that: (1) the petitioners are the true and
lawful registered co-owners of a parcel of land located at Maunong, Calamba, Laguna, consisting
of 30,000 square meters covered by the TCT; (2) the lot is declared for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 14187; (3) petitioners paid the realty taxes on the said property until 1993; (4)
the owner's duplicate copy was lost and could not be found despite diligent efforts to locate it;
(5) per Certification4 dated June 21, 1993 of the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, there
were no legal claims annotated at the back of the TCT filed with that office; (6) petitioners filed
with the Register of Deeds an affidavit of loss of the said owner's duplicate copy; (7) they
secured a certified true copy of the original TCT from the Register of Deeds with the affidavit of
loss annotated at the back thereof; (8) at the last page of the original certificate of title, a
mortgage was annotated, which upon verification was found to have already been paid; (9) the
Register of Deeds of Calamba could not cancel the mortgage from the original copy of the title
until presentation of the owner's duplicate copy to the bank; and (10) petitioners were in
possession of the subject property.
After due proceedings, the RTC, in its Order5 dated April 8, 1994, granted the petition, directed
the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a second owner's duplicate copy of the TCT,
and declared void the first owner's duplicate copy thereof.
Later, on May 25, 1995, herein respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation (Fidelity) filed a
Petition6 for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the CA. According to
Fidelity, on December 16, 1967, it purchased the property covered by the subject certificate of
title from the registered owners thereof pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale7 of the same date. It
said that upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment in full of the purchase
price, the vendors delivered to Fidelity their owner's duplicate copy of the TCT, which has been
in its possession since. It also alleged that it had been in actual physical possession and
continuous occupation of the subject property and that it had been paying the real estate taxes
due thereon.
It further said that, sometime in March 1995, upon verification with the Register of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna, it learned for the first time of the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy
as recorded under Entry No. 357701 dated May 26, 1994 and annotated on the TCT. Thus, it
caused the sale of the property in its favor to be annotated on the TCT. The notice of the sale was
annotated on March 28, 1995 as Entry No. 384954. Fidelity then filed, on April 26, 1995, a
Notice of Adverse Claim with the concerned Register of Deeds, which was annotated on the
TCT as Entry No. 387483.
In fine, Fidelity argued that the Order dated April 18, 1994 is null and void, the RTC having no
jurisdiction to issue the same as the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT was in its possession all
along and the respondents therein had no standing to file the petition on account of the Deed of
Absolute Sale they executed in its favor. It claimed that the petitioners perjured themselves
before the RTC when they stated that the duplicate copy of the TCT was lost and that they gave
notice to all who had interest in the property, because they failed to notify Fidelity despite
knowledge of the latter's possession of the property.
In their Comment,8 private respondents [herein petitioners] Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez,
and the surviving heirs of deceased Alipio Camitan, denied having committed falsehoods in their
petition before the trial court, which they claimed had jurisdiction over the case. They submitted
that the long, unexplained, and questionable silence of Fidelity on its alleged possession of the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the non-
registration and titling thereof in its name for about 27 years since the purported sale, was tainted
with malice and bad faith, thus, subjecting it to estoppel and laches.
By its Resolution dated May 27, 1997, the CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of
judgment, and a preliminary conference was set, directing Fidelity to bring the owner's duplicate
copy of the TCT. At the preliminary conference, Fidelity's counsel presented what was claimed
to be the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT. Counsel for private respondents examined the
certificate of title and admitted that it is the genuine owner's copy thereof. Thereafter, counsel for
Fidelity manifested that they were no longer presenting other evidence. On the other hand,
counsel for private respondents prayed that an additional issue, the question of the validity of the
deed of sale in favor of Fidelity, be likewise resolved. Fidelity's counsel objected on the ground
of irrelevancy. However, in order to expedite the proceedings, he agreed to have private
respondents amplify their position in their memorandum.
In their Memorandum, private respondents retracted their counsel's admission on the
genuineness of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest
mistake and negligence owing to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA.
They pointed to some allegedly irreconcilable discrepancies between the copy annexed to the
petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity during the preliminary conference. They also
reiterated the issue on the validity of the purported deed of sale of the property in favor of
Fidelity.
In its Comment to the Memorandum, Fidelity countered that there were no discrepancies
between the owner's duplicate copy it presented and the original copy on file with the Registry of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. It argued that private respondents are bound by the judicial
admission made by their counsel during the preliminary conference. It, likewise, objected to the
inclusion of the issue on the validity of the deed of sale over the property.
In the Decision dated November 28, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of Fidelity. It declared that the
RTC was without jurisdiction to issue a second owner's duplicate copy of the title in light of the
existence of the genuine owner's duplicate copy in the possession of petitioner, as admitted by
private respondents through counsel. According to the CA, a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It said that honest mistake and
negligence, as raised by private respondents in retracting their counsel's admission, are not
sufficient grounds to invalidate the admission.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of '
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THAT THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF THE COUNSEL OF THE
PETITIONERS DURING THE HEARING IN C.A.-G.R. SP. NO. 37291 WAS A
PALPABLE MISTAKE.
Herein petitioners argue that despite the existence of a judicial admission, there is still some
leeway for the court to consider other evidence presented. They point out that, even as early as in
their Memorandum before the CA, they had already retracted their counsel's admission on the
genuineness of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, and claim that their
counsel was honestly mistaken and negligent in his admission owing to his excitement and
nervousness in appearing before the CA. Petitioners likewise cite, in support of their position, the
circumstances they alleged in their petition before the RTC which convinced the latter to issue
them a new owner's duplicate copy of the TCT. Further, petitioners raise in issue the
discrepancies between the certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna and that submitted by Fidelity during the preliminary conference before the CA.
In its Comment,9 Fidelity reiterate the arguments it presented before the CA.
We find for the respondent.
At the outset, we emphasize that the core issue in this case is the validity of the issuance by the
RTC of a new owner's duplicate copy of the TCT in favor of petitioners. The applicable law is
Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which states:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In case of loss or theft of an
owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon
as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of
any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice
and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioners were able to convince the RTC that their owner's duplicate copy had indeed been lost.
They appeared to have complied with the requirements of the law. This led the RTC to grant
their petition.
Upon discovery of the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the TCT, Fidelity went to the
CA seeking to annul the judgment of the RTC. Unfortunately for petitioners, their counsel
admitted the genuineness of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity during
the preliminary conference at the CA. The following exchange is revealing:
J. MARTIN:
Counsel for the private respondent, will you go over the owner's copy and manifest to the
court whether that is a genuine owner's copy?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Make it of record that after examining the owner's copy of TCT NO. (T-12110) T-
4342, counsel for the private respondent admitted that the same appears to be a genuine
owner's copy of the transfer certificate of title. Do you have a certified true copy of this or any
machine copy that you can compare?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. REYES:
Including all the entries at the back page.
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Does it include all the list of the encumbrances?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
We do not admit, Your Honor this being only a xerox copy and not certified . . .
J. MARTIN:
It is only for purposes of substitution. Will you compare that with the other copy which you
already admitted to be a genuine owner's copy.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Counsel, are you marking that?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Your Honor, we request that this copy of the transfer certificate of title No. T-12110, T-4342 be
marked as Exhibit A to A-3 for the petitioner?
J. MARTIN:
Preliminary conference.
Alright, after examining the machine copy consisting of three pages and comparing the
same with the admittedly genuine owner's copy of the transfer certificate of title, counsel
prayed for the substitution of the machine copy - after marking them as Exhibits A-A-3
inclusive. We will return the owner's copy to you so that you can submit this already in lieu
thereof.
This is a preliminary conference. Unless you have other incidents to thresh out, I think that we
can terminate the conference this morning. Counsel for the private respondents?10
The foregoing transcript of the preliminary conference indubitably shows that counsel for
petitioners made a judicial admission and failed to refute that admission during the said
proceedings despite the opportunity to do so. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal
or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which
dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.11
Petitioners, in their Memorandum before the CA, attempted to retract their counsel's judicial
admission on the authenticity of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT in the possession of Fidelity.
Petitioners explicate that the wrong admission was an honest mistake and negligence attributable
to the counsel's nervousness and excitement in appearing for the first time before the CA.
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, such an admission may only be refuted upon a
proper showing of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Thus, the claim
of "honest mistake and negligence" on the part of the counsel due to his excitement and
nervousness in appearing before the CA did not suffice.
Petitioners now claim that the "honest mistake and negligence" of their counsel amount to
palpable mistake. They also enumerate observed discrepancies between the original TCT on file
with the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and the owner's duplicate copy presented by
Fidelity, to wit:
1. On the above left margin of the xerox copy of the ORIGINAL COPY of TCT No. (T-12110)
T-4342 on file with the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna in question, (Annex A,
Respondent's Petition in question before the Court of Appeals) Annex C, supra, the PRINTED
WORDS were:
"(JUDICIAL FORM NO. 109)
(Revised September, 1954.)
However, in the belated submission of the alleged xerox copy of the alleged duplicate copy of
the title in question by the respondent to the Court of Appeals (Exh. A; Annex "H", supra,) the
following PRINTED WORDS appeared:
"(JUDICIAL FORM NO. 109-D)
(Revised September, 1954.)" (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
xxx
[2.] The Serial Number of the Xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question on file with
the Register of Deeds of Calamba City was written in handwriting as "158640".
However, the Serial Number of the purported duplicate copy of the original title in question of
the respondent was PRINTED in letters and in figures: "No. 158640".
3. The typewritten words "PROVINCE OF LAGUNA" on the heading of the xerox copy of the
original copy of the said title on file with the said Register of Deeds were written in big type of
letters.
However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, of the respondent, it was typewritten with small type of
letters.
4. In the FIGURES of the xerox copy of the original copy of the said title: NO. (T-12110) T-
4342 in question, they were written in a big type of letters. The same is true in the letters "T" and
DASH after the letter "T". The figures "4342" were printed in big letters.
However, the printed and handwritten figures and words in Exh. A, Annex C, supra, were small.
The figures 4342 were in handwriting.
5. In the xerox copy of the original copy of title of the property in question covered by TCT No.
(T-12110) T-4342, which cancelled TCT No. T-10700, the type of letter "T", figures, 10700 and
dash thereof were in big letters.
However, the purported duplicate copy of the original copy of the title in question submitted to
the Court of Appeals by the respondent, the type of the letter, dash and figures thereof were in
small letters.
6. The type of the printed words, dashes, and figures in the body of the Xerox copy of the
original title in question, it was typewritten with big letters and figures.
The purported duplicate copy of the original title of the property in question submitted to the
Court of Appeals by the respondent, the letters, dashes and figures there of were typewritten in
small letters.
7. The letters, dashes, and figures of the xerox copy of the original title in question
were typewritten in a manual typewriter with big letters.
In Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of the original title in question
submitted to the Court of Appeals by the respondent, they were typewritten in a manual
typewriter with small letters and figures.
8. The signatures of the Registrar of Deeds in the xerox of the original copy of the title in
question; had loop in small letter "d" and the rest had no loops.
In Exh. A, Annex H, supra, of the purported duplicate copy of the title in question submitted by
the respondent to the Court of Appeals, there was no loop, except there were two (2) open
vertical lines below thereof after four letters.
9. The xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question after TCT No. T-10700 was
cancelled, it was entered in the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna since September 24, 1957
at 9:10 a.m.
10. In view thereof, it is but NATURAL that the judicial forms and descriptions of letters and
figures of the original copy of title in question and file with the Register of Deeds its duplicate
copy since September 24, 1954, were the SAME and already OLD.
11. However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of the title in question
submitted by the respondent to the Court of Appeals, the judicial form thereof was already small
and it clearly appeared that it might have been NEWLY ISSUED NEW COPY OF TITLE. It
might be the revised new form in 1988 that is presently used in the Register of Deeds.12
Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the alleged discrepancies are
more imagined than real. Had these purported discrepancies been that evident during the
preliminary conference, it would have been easy for petitioners' counsel to object to the
authenticity of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity. As shown in the
transcript of the proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners' counsel to examine the
document, retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he chose not to
contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the petitioners' counsel was
made through palpable mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel
within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the
act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the client's counsel, which
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule
otherwise would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to claim neglect or
mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation, as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel
who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another
counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsel's mistake is so great and serious that the
client is deprived of his day in court or of his property without due process of law. In these cases,
the client is not bound by his counsel's mistakes and the case may even be reopened in order to
give the client another chance to present his case.13 In the case at bar, however, these exceptional
circumstances do not obtain.
With proof that the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT was in the possession of Fidelity, the RTC
Decision dated April 8, 1994 was properly annulled. In a catena of cases, we have consistently
ruled that if an owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void, as the court rendering the decision
never acquires jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked at any time.14
The circumstances cited by petitioners in support of their petition, i.e., the TCT is still in their
names; the property in question is declared for tax purposes in their names; they were the persons
informed by the Municipal Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna for the non-payment of real estate
taxes for the years 1990-1993; they paid the real estate taxes due on the property; no one was
claiming the property per the certification of the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; the questionable delay of Fidelity in registering its claim
over the property under the purported sale of December 13, 1967; and the validity of the
Absolute Deed of Sale, all pertain to the issue of ownership over the property covered by the
TCT.
In a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one
allegedly lost, on which this case is rooted, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with
limited jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land
covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title.15 Consequently, any question
involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit where the trial court will
conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties presenting their respective evidence to prove
ownership over the subject realty.16
At this point, we reiterate the principle that possession of a lost owner's duplicate copy of a
certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it.
Registration of real property under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because it is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it
is merely an evidence of title over the particular property described therein.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2003 and the
Resolution dated May 12, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37291
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
11.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 170300             February 9, 2007
BARTOLOME BALINGIT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO YAMAT, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,  J.:
Pablo Yamat (Yamat) was declared the elected Punong Barangay of Nigui, Masantol,
Pampanga, in the last July 28, 2002 barangay elections, with Yamat obtaining 257 votes, and his
opponent, Bartolome Balingit (Balingit), 250 votes.
Balingit filed an election protest with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-
Masantol, Macabebe, Pampanga, alleging fraud in the counting and preparation of the election
returns. After revision of the ballots, the tally turned out with Balingit still having 250 votes,
while Yamat had 255 votes.
Thereafter, in a Decision dated September 24, 2003, the MCTC declared Balingit as the duly
elected punong barangay, with the following tabulation:1

Precinct Nos. Balingit Yamat

53-A 64 16
54-A 52 4
55-A 87 13
56-A 11 57 (97+1-41)
57-A 16 (17-1) 48 (63+1-16)
58-A 19 34 (62+1-29)
Total Votes 249 172
The MCTC invalidated a total of 86 ballots cast in Precinct Nos. 56-A, 57-A, and 58-A, and
credited three separate votes cast in these three precincts, resulting in 172 votes cast in Yamat's
favor. On the other hand, the MCTC discredited in Balingit's favor one vote cast in Precinct No.
57-A for having been a marked ballot, reducing the latter's number of votes to 249.
Yamat appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On the other hand, Balingit filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of the MCTC Decision
which was granted by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated January 26, 2005.2
On April 11, 2005, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution on Yamat's appeal,
reversing the MCTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Macabebe-Masantol, Macabebe,
Pampanga, in Election Case No. 02(01) declaring appellee Bartlome [sic] Balingit the duly
elected Punong Barangay  of Barangay Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga, during the
2002 Barangay Elections is hereby REVERSED.
Let the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implement this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.3
The COMELEC Second Division validated 80 out of the 86 ballots previously invalidated by the
MCTC and counted them in favor of Yamat, while the other six ballots remained invalid. The six
ballots were as follows:

Precinct No. Exhibit Nos.

B44
B45
56-A B5
B7

135
58-A 136

Thus, a total of 252 votes were considered in favor of Yamat, with Balingit still having the same
number of votes – 249.
COMELEC Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, however, registered his dissent on the
Commission's findings with regard to six other ballots, namely: Exhibits B-3, B-6, B-41, B-
72, B-137, and B-138. These six ballots were among the 86 ballots previously invalidated by the
MCTC but were held to be valid by the Commission. It was Commissioner Sadain's view that
these ballots appear to have been written by one person and should have been invalidated and not
credited in favor of Yamat. Thus, only a total of 246 votes should be credited in favor of Yamat,
making Balingit, with 249 votes, the winner by a margin of three votes.4
Balingit filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution with the
COMELEC En Banc but it was denied per Resolution dated November 12, 2005. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merits. The Resolution of the Second Division promulgated [on]
April 11, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. The proclamation of PABLO YAMAT as Punong
Barangay of Barangay Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga is UPHELD.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission EN BANC hereby ORDERS:
1. Appellee BARTOLOME BALINGIT to VACATE the contested post which he assumed by
virtue of the Order of the Second Division dated January 26, 2005 granting execution pending
appeal, in favor of PABLO YAMAT and to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions
attached to said office.
2. The Deputy Executive Director for operations of the Commission to furnish a copy thereof to
the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government, and the Office of the Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, Masantol,
Pampanga.
Considering the proximity of the end of the term of the contested office in this case, this
resolution is hereby declared immediately executory.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Balingit filed before the Court a Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
A. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT LIMITED AND FOCUSED ONLY ITSELF
FROM CONDUCTING AN ALLEGED "EXAMINATION OF BALLOTS" WHICH ARE
THE SUBJECT OF COMMISSIONER MEHOL K. SADAIN'S DISSENTING OPINION,
BUT DID NOT EXAMINE THE ENTIRE BALLOTS AND EVIDENCE SUBJECT OF
BALINGIT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
B. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT MISLED THE PARTIES TO JUSTIFY THE
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS IN HOLDING THAT
"PROXIMITY OF THE END OF TERM OF THE CONTESTED OFFICE IN THIS CASE"
WHEN IN TRUTH, THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS ELECTED
ON JULY 15, 2002 HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO LAST MONDAY OF OCTOBER 2007 BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9340, APPROVED ON 22 SEPTEMBER 2005
C. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PROMULGATED ITS ASSAILED 11 APRIL
2005 RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE STRONG AND VALID OBJECTIONS
OF BALINGIT ON THE CONTESTED BALLOTS, AS CORRECTLY RULED BY THE
TRIAL COURT, THAT THOSE CONTESTED BALLOTS OF PABLO YAMAT WILL
CLEARLY REVEAL THAT MOST, IF NOT ALL ARE GROUPS OF BALLOTS WRITTEN
BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON (WBO) AND SINGLE BALLOTS WRITTEN BY TWO
PERSONS (WBT).
D. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PROMULGATED ITS ASSAILED 11
APRIL 2005 RESOLUTION IN SWEEPINGLY VALIDATING THE EIGHTY (80)
CONTESTED BALLOTS OF YAMAT, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED
AS GROUPS OF BALLOTS WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON (WBO),
WHOSE FINDINGS/RULINGS THEREON DO NOT CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY
EXPRESSED [sic] THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH THEY WERE BASED.6
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is
exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility. Such abuse must
be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.7
In this case, Balingit laments the manner in which the COMELEC, both the Second Division
and En Banc, resolved the issue on the contested ballots, arguing that it committed grave abuse
discretion when it merely limited itself to the six ballots that Commissioner Sadain found to be
invalid, that it did not consider his arguments on the invalidity of all the contested ballots and
"sweepingly" validated these ballots without setting forth the basis, and that it erroneously
justified the immediate execution of the decision.
A review by the Court of the assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005 rendered by the
COMELEC's Second Division and Resolution dated November 12, 2005 of the COMELEC En
Banc failed to establish any grave abuse of discretion such that these Resolutions should be set
aside.
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact
best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country, as it is the constitutional commission vested
with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial
and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings, and
decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall
not be interfered with by this Court.8
The MCTC originally found a total of 86 ballots cast in favor of Yamat in Precinct Nos. 56-A,
57-A, and 58-A as invalid for having been written by only one person. Both the COMELEC
Second Division and En Banc, however, nullified the MCTC's findings on 80 of these ballots and
found them to be valid.
It is fallacious for Balingit to argue that the COMELEC "sweepingly" validated the
contested ballots and did not take into consideration his objections thereto, and that the
COMELEC did not clearly set out the basis for its findings, as the assailed Resolution
dated April 11, 2005 shows otherwise. The COMELEC's Second Division, in fact,
physically examined each set or pair of contested ballots and accordingly made its
corresponding factual findings, viz.:9

Precinct
Exhibit No. Commission’s Finding/Ruling
No.
56A B2, B8, B16 Contrary to the finding of the trial
B39, B40, court, these ballots are valid. The
B41, differences in strokes, writing
B44, B45, styles, dents, alignment of letters,
B50, color of ink used and the point of
B51, B54, the pen are glaring.
B55
B56, B57, We found however Exhibit Nos.
B58, B44 and B45 as pair of ballots
B61, B65, written by one person. The
B66, Minutes of Voting and Counting
does not show that there was a
 B67, B68,
B69, physically disabled or illiterate
B70, B72, voter assisted during the voting.
B74, We cannot therefore uphold the
B75, B80 and validity of these ballots.
B83

B53, B73,
Valid ballots
  B78,
Strokes are different.
B79 and B81

Exhibit Nos. B3, B4 and B6 are

valid ballots.
However, Exhibit Nos. B5 and
B7 are two (2) ballots that could
B3, B4, B5,
hardly be considered valid. The
  B6
similarities in strokes,
and B7
handwriting, dents, color of the
ink and pen point, and the spacing
of letter are so obvious to the
naked eye.

Valid ballots
The dents and scratches, the
  B21 and B22 alignment and the spacing of the
letters are different.

Valid ballots
The strokes, terminals and loops
  B29 and B30 of the letters are strikingly
different, specifically the way the
letters Y, L, D and Z is written.

B86, B87,
B88
B91, B113,
Valid ballots
B114
Writing styles, strokes and dents
57A B115, B116,
of the letters are strikingly
B117, B118,
different.
B119, B121,
B122, B128
and B129

58A B135, B136, Exhibit Nos. 135 and 136 are

B142, B143, invalid ballots for their obvious
B144, B153, similarities in handwriting,
B161, B162, strokes or dents and scratches of
 letters. They are undoubtedly
written by one person. No
B163, B164, illiterate or physically disables
B165, B166, voter had been assisted during the
B167, B168, voting as manifested by the
B182, B186, Minutes of Voting and Counting
B192 and duly issued by the members of the
B196 Board of Election Tellers.
The rest of the contested ballots
are valid.

Valid ballots.
These ballots were all written in
script but the dissimilarities in the
strokes, loops, connecting and
spurs are evident.
The handwriting of different
B137 and
  people may appear to bear a
B138
marked resemblance to each
other, although, on analysis of the
structure of the master patterns
can be shown to be quite
distinctive and unlikely to be
confused.

Valid ballots
B139, B140
  See ruling in Exhibit Nos. 137
and B150
and 138 above.

Valid ballots
B157 and
  The strokes, dents and spacing of
B158
letters are not similar.

Valid ballots
We do not see any fluency and
B159 and
  rhythm in the handwriting
B160
evidently showing that they were
accomplished by only one person.

The total votes obtained by appellant and appellee based on the rulings discussed above are now
as follows:

  Appellant Appellee
Number of Votes Per
Decision of the Trial Court 172 249

Plus: Number of Votes Validated by 80 0

the Commission
Minus: Number of Votes Invalidated
69 0
by the Commission
Equals: Total Number of Votes
252 249
Obtained from All Precincts
And, contrary to Balingit’s allegations in the petition, the COMELEC En Banc conducted its
own examination of the ballots and did not limit itself only to the six ballots that were validated,
subject matter of the dissent of Commissioner Sadain, thus:
The Commission En Banc could have conveniently upheld the dispositions of the Division and
declared the same as appropriate finding of facts. However, considering that Presiding
Commisioner Mehol K. Sadain dissented therefrom and manifested his different appreciation of
the ballots, the Commission En Banc conducted its own examination of the ballots to arrive at a
judicious determination.
Hereunder are our findings:
Precinct No. 56A
The Commission En Banc AFFIRMS the rulings of the Second Division declaring
as INVALID only the ballots marked as Exhs. B44 and B45, B5 and B7. The similarities in the
handwritings in these ballots were glaringly similar that there is sufficient reason to believe that
these two ballots were prepared by only one person.
The other ballots alleged as prepared in sets or groups by only one person must be considered
VALID. The Division correctly cited in the Resolution Silverio v. Castro as the basis of its
rulings. It is therein taught:
In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand there must be not only
be present class characteristics but also individual characteristics or "dents and scratches" in
sufficient quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence; to reach the conclusion that
writings are by different hands, we may find numerous likenesses in class characteristics but
divergences in individual characteristics, or we may find divergences in both, but the divergence
must be something more than mere superficial differences.
"x x x the rule is simple – whatever features two specimen handwriting may have in common,
they cannot be considered to be of common authorship if they display but a single dissimilarity
in any feature which is fundamental to the structure of the handwriting and whose presence is
not capable of reasonable explanation." (Silverio v. Castro, 19 SCRA 520)
Putting it simply, where the writings in said ballots were strikingly alike, these ballots must
be ruled to be of single authorship and must be rejected.
The Second Division is right in its observation that the handwritings on the questioned ballots
were glaringly different and no identical characteristics are impressive. Indeed, it could
justifiably be concluded that the cited ballots were each prepared by the individual voters and not
in sets or pairs by only one person.
Whatever perceived similarities in the handwritings were but pictorial effects and general
resemblances which were insufficient to warrant a finding of single authorship.
Precinct No. 57A
We AFFIRM the Division’s rulings that the ballots questioned as having been written in sets or
pairs by one person are VALID because the strokes, dents, and slants were distinctly different
and it could not be justifiably concluded that only one hand prepared the ballots.
Precinct No. 58A
We agree with the Division that only the ballots marked as Exh. Nos. B135 and
B136 are INVALID because of the obvious similarities in the strokes, slants and dents of the
handwriting on the ballots.
All the other ballots contested on the allegation that they were written in sets or pairs by only one
person did not show remarkable similarities which could sufficiently warrant a finding that they
were written by only one hand.
By the En Banc’s own computation, the total number of votes to be credited to Appellant are as
follows:
PABLO YAMAT

Votes per physical count - - - - - - -

255
------
Less: Votes Invalidated
By the Division and En Banc - - - - 6
------

149
Add: Validated Claims +3

252
There being no issue as regards the disposition on the ballots of Balingit, The Commission En
Banc left the findings of the Trial Court and the Second Division that Bartolome Balingit
obtained a total of 249 votes, undisturbed.10
Based on its own physical assessment of the contested ballots, the COMELEC En Banc agreed
with the Division's conclusions that the invalidity of Exhibits Nos. B-44, B-45, B-5, B-7, B-
135,  and  B-136 should be sustained, while the other ballots shall remain valid.11
Balingit also appears to be in awe of the MCTC's disquisition on the invalidity of these
ballots, quoting the MCTC's use of the term "autoptic proference" in maintaining that its
rulings on the objections and claims of the parties is the valid ruling.12 Autoptic proference,
in legal parlance, simply means a tribunal's self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing
itself.13 The COMELEC may not have used such a high-sounding term, nevertheless, it does
not follow that it did not examine the ballots or that its findings were flawed.
The Court cannot imagine how Balingit can argue as he did when the foregoing findings clearly
show that all the 86 contested ballots were physically examined by the COMELEC, and the basis
for upholding the validity of 80 of these ballots was sufficiently established. The Court also
cannot find any salient distinction between the MCTC's and the COMELEC's treatment of these
ballots such that the MCTC's findings should outweigh the COMELEC's. Both tribunals
physically examined the contested ballots and made their respective findings thereon. The
divergence lies in the physical and actual appreciation and interpretation of the perceived defects
in the ballots, and it need not be stressed that given that the COMELEC is the specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country,14 which the framers of the
Constitution intended to place on a level higher than statutory administrative organs, its factual
finding is binding on the Court.15
Balingit wants the Court to consider in his favor the six ballots that Commissioner Sadain opined
to be invalid and should not be credited to Yamat, thus giving him an edge of three votes, i.e.
249 as against Yamat's 246, and making him the victor. Suffice it to say that the COMELEC
adequately explained the reason for holding these six ballots as valid,16 and absent any evidence
to the contrary, the appreciation of these ballots by the COMELEC, acting as a collegial body,
should be upheld.17
Finally, with regard to Balingit's view that it was misplaced and misleading for the
COMELEC En Banc to justify the immediate execution of its assailed Resolution dated
November 12, 2005, with the proximity of the elections when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9340
amended R.A. No. 9164 by extending the term of barangay and sangguniang kabataan until
October of 2007; indeed, the Court finds it odd that the COMELEC should justify the immediate
execution of its decision with the "proximity of the elections."
The COMELEC, being the specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections, is
presumed to be aware of the passage of R.A. No. 9340. As Balingit correctly pointed out, R.A.
No. 9340 extended the term of barangay and sangguniang kabataan to October 2007, thereby
amending R.A. No. 9164, which initially set the synchronized elections on the last Monday of
October three years after the July 15, 2002 elections, i.e., October 2005.
Obviously, the COMELEC cannot refer to the proximity of the October 2005 elections since at
the time it issued its November 12, 2005 Resolution, the elections would have already passed.
Neither can the COMELEC refer to the October 2007 elections because it would not then be
proximate (or immediate) because such elections will take place a little less than two years after
the issuance of the November 12, 2005 Resolution.
Nevertheless, such mistake will not render the issuance of the assailed Resolutions tainted with
any grave abuse of discretion.1awphi1.net
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The proclamation of Pablo Yamat as Punong
Barangay of Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga is UPHELD; and the order for petitioner
Bartolome Balingit to vacate, cease and desist from performing the functions attached to
said office per COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2005
is REITERATED.
Costs against petitioner.
12.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151932               August 19, 2009
HENRY CHING TIU, CHRISTOPHER HALIN GO, and GEORGE CO, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision1 dated September 28, 2001, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 57732, dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21 in Civil Case No. 99-352, dated
December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In June 1993, Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by herein petitioners, applied
for a real estate loan with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) to fund its purified
water distribution business. In support of the loan application, petitioners submitted a Board
Resolution2 dated June 7, 1993. The loan was guaranteed by collateral over the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13020.3 The loan was eventually approved.4
In August 1996, AWRI applied for a bigger loan from PBCOM for additional capitalization
using the same Board Resolution, but without any additional real estate collateral. Considering
that the proposed additional loan was unsecured, PBCOM required all the members of the Board
of Directors of AWRI to become sureties. Thus, on August 16, 1996, a Surety Agreement5 was
executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary public on the same date. All copies of
the Surety Agreement, except two, were kept by PBCOM. Of the two copies kept by the notary
public, one copy was retained for his notarial file and the other was sent to the Records
Management and Archives Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk of Court.6
Thereafter, on December 16, 1998, AWRI informed the bank of its desire to surrender and/or
assign in its favor, all the present properties of the former to apply as dacion en pago for AWRI’s
existing loan obligation to the bank.7 On January 11, 1999, PBCOM sent a reply denying the
request. On May 12, 1999, PBCOM sent a letter to petitioners demanding full payment of its
obligation to the bank.8
Its demands having remained unheeded, PBCOM instructed its counsel to file a complaint for
collection against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-352.
On July 3, 1999, petitioners filed their Answer. It alleged, among other things, that they were not
personally liable on the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement in their
capacities as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to the
complaint as Annexes "A" to "A-2"9 were falsified, considering that when they signed the same,
the words "In his personal capacity" did not yet appear in the document and were merely
intercalated thereon without their knowledge and consent.10
In support of their allegations, petitioners attached to their Answer a certified photocopy of the
Surety Agreement issued on March 25, 1999 by the Records Management and Archives Office
in Davao City,11 showing that the words "In his personal capacity" were not found at the foot of
page two of the document where their signatures appeared.12
Because of this development, PBCOM’s counsel searched for and retrieved the file copy of the
Surety Agreement. The notarial copy showed that the words "In his personal capacity" did not
appear on page two of the Surety Agreement.13
Petitioners’ counsel then asked PBCOM to explain the alteration appearing on the agreement.
PBCOM subsequently discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor. It alleged
that when the Surety Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he called the attention of the
loans clerk, Kenneth Cabahug, as to why the words "In his personal capacity" were not indicated
under the signature of each surety, in accordance with bank standard operating procedures. The
auditor then ordered Mr. Cabahug to type the words "In his personal capacity" below the second
signatures of petitioners. However, the notary public was never informed of the insertion.14 Mr.
Cabahug subsequently executed an affidavit15 attesting to the circumstances why the insertion
was made.
PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to
Substitute Annex "A" of the Complaint,16 wherein it attached the duplicate original copy
retrieved from the file of the notary public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the
insertion and explained that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the notary public.
PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to speak the
truth of the parties’ intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners were already primarily
liable on the Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion was made, having admitted in their
pleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement in the original form.
PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules, emphasized that the motion incorporated in
the pleading can be treated as a motion for leave of court to amend and admit the amended
complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
On December 14, 1999, the RTC issued an Order17 allowing the substitution of the altered
document with the original Surety Agreement, the pertinent portion of which reads:
August 16, 1996 attached as Annexes "A" to "A-2" of the reply and answer Resolving the
Motion to Substitute Annexes "A" to "A-2" of the complaint and the opposition thereto by the
defendant, this Court, in the interest of justice, hereby allows the substitution of said Annexes
"A" to "A-2" of the complaint with the duplicate original of notarial copy of the Agreement
dated to counter-claim.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,18 but it was denied in the Order19 dated January 11,
2000, to wit:
Resolving the motion for reconsideration and the opposition thereto, the Court finds the motion
substantially a reiteration of the opposition to plaintiff’s motion.
Additionally, the instant motion for reconsideration treats on evidentiary matter which can be
properly ventilated in the trial proper, hence, there is no cogent reason to disturb the Court’s
order of December 14, 1999.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57732.
Petitioners claimed that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their motion for
reconsideration and in allowing PBCOM to substitute the altered copy of the Surety Agreement
with the duplicate original notarial copy thereof considering that the latter’s cause of action was
solely and principally founded on the falsified document marked as Annexes "A" to "A-2."20
On September 28, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Orders dated December 14, 1999
and January 11, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
The COURT committed a reversible error in affirming in toto the order of the lower court
allowing the substitution of the falsified document by relying on the provision of section 3,
rule 10 of the rules of Court.
II
Acting as the court on the petition for certiorari, the court committed a reversible error having no
jurisdiction to rule on the obligation of the petitioners based on the falsified document
III
The court erred in giving credence to the allegation of respondent bank that from August 15 to
December 9, 1997 asian water resources inc. obtained several availments of new bigger and
additional loans totalLing p2,030,000.00 evidenced by 4 promissory notes marked as annexes
"B," "B-1," "B-2" and "B-3."
IV
The court failed to consider the misapplication of the principle of equity committed by the lower
court in ordering the substitution of the falsified document.22
Petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Order of the RTC
allowing the substitution of the document by relying on Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners assert that the Rules do not allow the withdrawal and substitution of a "falsified
document" once discovered by the opposing party.
Petitioners maintain that PBCOM’s cause of action was solely and principally founded on the
alleged "falsified document" originally marked as
Annexes "A" to "A-2." Thus, the "withdrawal" of the document results in the automatic
withdrawal of the whole complaint on the ground that there is no more cause of action to be
maintained or enforced by plaintiff against petitioners. Also, petitioners argue that if the
substitution will be allowed, their defenses that were anchored on Annexes "A" to "A-2" would
be gravely affected. Moreover, considering that the said document was already removed,
withdrawn, and disregarded by the RTC, the withdrawal and substitution of the document would
prevent petitioners from introducing the falsified documents during the trial as part of their
evidence.23
Petitioners submit that the RTC misapplied the principle of equity when it allowed PBCOM to
substitute the document with the original agreement. Petitioners also claim that the remedy of
appeal after the termination of the case in the RTC would become ineffective and inadequate if
the Order of the RTC allowing the "withdrawal" and "substitution" of the document would not be
nullified, because the falsified document would no longer be found in the records of the case
during the appeal.24
Petitioners contend that the CA went beyond the issue raised before it when it interpreted the
provisions of the Surety Agreement, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, and then ruled on the
obligations of the parties based on
the document. Petitioners posit that the CA prematurely ruled on petitioners’ obligations,
considering that their obligations should be determined during trial on the merits, after the parties
have been given the opportunity to present their evidence in support of their respective claims.
Petitioners stress that the CA went into the merit of the case when it gave credence to the
statement of fact of PBCOM that "From August 15 to December 9, 1997, Asian Water
Resources, Inc. obtained several availments on its additional loans totalling ₱2,030,000.00 as
evidenced by 4 promissory notes marked as Annexes B, B-1, B-2, and B-3. Thus, the conclusion
of the CA in declaring the petitioners liable as sureties violated their right to due process.25
For its part, PBCOM argues that since the complaint is based on an actionable document, i.e., the
surety agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be attached to the pleading as an exhibit,
which shall be deemed part of the pleading. Considering that the surety agreement is annexed to
the complaint, it is an integral part thereof and its substitution with another copy is in the nature
of a substantial amendment, which is allowed by the Rules, but with prior leave of court.
Moreover, PBCOM alleges that since the Rules provides that substantial amendments may be
made upon leave of court, the authority of the RTC to allow the amendment is discretionary.
Thus, the CA correctly held that the act of granting the said substitution was within the clear and
proper discretion of the RTC.
The petition is without merit.
As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the
original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, its
substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof "shall" be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof, to wit:
Section 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an action or defense is based upon
a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set
forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be
set forth in the pleading.
With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed
thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if
it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,26 thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule
in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was
stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3,
Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of
action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding."27
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or
that it was not made to delay the action.28 Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if
the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could
still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent
delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made
before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer
and to prepare for trial.29
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real
facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the
taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.30
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the
altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have
submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through
inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words "IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" were inserted to conform to the bank’s standard practice. This
alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOM’s counsel had no idea
that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the
surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved.
Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the
written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both
principle and policy that when the written contract is established as the repository of the
parties’ stipulations, any other evidence is excluded, and the same cannot be used to
substitute for such contract, or even to alter or contradict the latter.31 The original surety
agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties’ respective rights and
obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the complaint, which
consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the
original.
It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided.32 Applied to the instant case, this not only assures that it would be resolved based
on real facts, but would also aid in the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing the best
evidence possible to determine the rights and obligations of the party- litigants.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ contention, they could not be prejudiced by the substitution
since they can still present the substituted documents, Annexes "A" to A-2," as part of the
evidence of their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay the
action. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides, the
petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM for
attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the
documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The case before the
RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is separate and distinct
from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible error when it allowed the substitution of
the altered surety agreement with that of the original.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.33
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1) the
writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.341avvphi1
The phrase without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority or want
of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in
general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority. Excess of jurisdiction occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board
or officer (to do) is not authorized, and is invalid with respect to the particular proceeding,
because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it
are wanting. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.35
The present case failed to comply with the above-stated requisites. In the instant case, the
soundness of the RTC’s Order allowing the substitution of the document involves a matter of
judgment and discretion, which cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. This rule is only intended to correct defects of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions.
However, this Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the CA should not have made
determinations as regards the parties’ respective rights based on the surety agreement. The CA
went beyond the issues brought before it and effectively preempted the RTC in making its own
determinations. It is to be noted that the present case is still pending determination by the RTC.
The CA should have been more cautious and not have gone beyond the issues submitted before it
in the petition for certiorari; instead, it should have squarely addressed whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the Orders dated December 14, 1999
and January 11, 2000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Subject to the above disquisitions,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57732, dated September 28, 2001,
and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21, in Civil
Case No. 99-352, dated December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13.
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 171701               February 8, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R.
MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA,
YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines assailing the
Resolutions1 issued by the Sandiganbayan in connection with an alleged portion of the Marcoses’
supposed ill-gotten wealth.
This case involves ₱200 billion of the Marcoses’ alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also
includes the alleged use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos
family’s personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged
illegal acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco).
The Facts
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President
Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was given the following mandate:
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.
(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be repeated in any
manner under the new government, and the institution of adequate measures to prevent the
occurrence of corruption.
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or
office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining
thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would
frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing
its task.
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation,
business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration
or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such
acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of facts by any person or entity that
may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the
Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and/or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts and other
documents as may be material to the investigation conducted by the Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties,
following the same procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of the government.
(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order.
Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the civil cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No.
0002, now subject of this Petition.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate
upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-
Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
On 1 October 1987, the PCGG filed an amended Complaint to add Constante Rubio as
defendant.
Again on 9 February 1988, it amended the Complaint, this time to include as defendants
Nemesio G. Co and herein respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho, and Yeung Chun
Fan.
For the third time, on 23 April 1990, the PCGG amended its Complaint, adding to its growing
list of defendants Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc.2
The PCGG filed a fourth amended Complaint, which was later denied by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution dated 2 September 1998.
The allegations contained in the Complaint specific to herein respondents are the following:3
29. Defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic)
Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among others, in confiscating and/or
unlawfully appropriating funds and other property, and in concealing the same as described
above. In addition, each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue advantage of their
relationship with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the
above-described active collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of stocks
in corporations, illegal payments such as commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of
improper privileges, income, revenues and benefits. Defendant Araneta in particular made use of
Asialand Development Corporation which is included in Annex "A" hereof as corporate vehicle
to benefit in the manner stated above.
31. Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan are
the controlling stockholders of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.).
Through Glorious Sun (Phils.), they acted as fronts or dummies, cronies or otherwise willing
tools of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the family, particularly of Defendant
Imelda (Imee) Marcos-Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign exchange4 by importing denim
fabrics from only one supplier – a Hong Kong based corporation which was also owned and
controlled by defendant Hong Kong investors, at prices much higher than those being paid by
other users of similar materials to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff.
Thus, petitioner set forth the following causes of action in its Complaint:5
32. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST – A public office is a public
trust.1avvphi1 By committing all the acts described above, Defendants repeatedly breached
public trust and the law, making them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The funds and other property
acquired by Defendants following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, some of which
are mentioned or described above, estimated to amount to ₱ 200 billion are deemed to have been
acquired for the benefit of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor
of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Consequently, Defendants are solidarily liable to restore or
reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus impressed with constructive trust for the
benefit of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
33. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER –
(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of right and
power which caused untold misery, sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants violated,
among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial interest in
funds and other property and concealed such title, funds and interest through the use of relatives,
business associates, nominees, agents, or dummies. Defendants are, therefore, solidarily liable to
Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other property unlawfully acquired by them
estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, solidarily, by
way of indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the amount of such funds or the
value of other property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon from the date of
unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.
34. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT –
Defendants illegally accumulated funds and other property whose estimated value is ₱ 200
billion in violation of the laws of the Philippines and in breach of their official functions and
fiduciary obligations. Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and
irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation at law,
independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative, to solidarily
return to Plaintiff such funds and other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad
faith, have unjustly enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of
such funds and the value of the other property including those which may have been wasted,
and/or lost estimated at ₱ 200 billion with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition
until full payment thereof.
35. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING –
The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the applicable law, believe that
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, in unlawful concert with one another, and with the
active collaboration of third persons, subject of separate suits, acquired funds, assets and
property during the incumbency of Defendant public officers, manifestly out of proportion to
their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.
Consequently, they are required to show to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they
have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and property which are in excess of their legal net
income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that the Defendants are under obligation to
account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets
of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the lawful earnings or lawful income from
legitimately acquired property.
36. Fifth Cause of Action – LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES –
(a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered
actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by the latter as a result of
the Defendants’ unlawful acts, the approximate value and interest of which, from the time of
their wrongful acquisition, are estimated at ₱ 200 billion plus expenses which Plaintiff has been
compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to recover Defendants’ ill-gotten
wealth all over the world, which expenses are reasonably estimated at ₱ 250 million. Defendants
are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages in an amount reasonably
estimated at ₱ 200 Billion Pesos and to reimburse expenses for recovery of Defendants’ ill-
gotten wealth estimated to cost ₱ 250 million or in such amount as are proven during the trial.
(b) As a result of Defendants’ acts described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had
painfully endured and suffered moral damages for more than twenty long years, anguish, fright,
sleepless nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock as well as besmirched
reputation and social humiliation before the international community.
(c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino people are entitled to temperate damages for their
sufferings which, by their very nature are incapable of pecuniary estimation, but which this
Honorable Court may determine in the exercise of its sound discretion.
(d) Defendants, by reason of the above described unlawful acts, have violated and invaded the
inalienable right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people to a fair and decent way of life befitting a
Nation with rich natural and human resources. This basic and fundamental right of Plaintiff and
the Filipino people should be recognized and vindicated by awarding nominal damages in an
amount to be determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound discretion.
(e) By way of example and correction for the public good and in order to ensure that Defendants’
unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts are not repeated, said Defendants are solidarily
liable to Plaintiff for exemplary damages.
In the meantime, the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO (PEA-PTGWO), a union of
Pantranco employees, moved to intervene before the Sandiganbayan. The former alleged that the
trust funds in the account of Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco) amounting to ₱ 55
million rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the money judgment the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarded in favor of the employees and against
Pantranco. Thus, PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation of petitioner that the assets of Pantranco
were ill-gotten because, otherwise, these assets would be returned to the government and not to
the employees.
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents.
However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated the
best evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover,
petitioner had not provided any reason for its failure to present the originals.
On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution6 admitting the pieces of evidence
while expressing some reservation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, taking note of the objections of accused Marcoses and the reply thereto by the
plaintiff, all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution are hereby admitted in
evidence; however, their evidentiary value shall be left to the determination of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Imelda R. Marcos; Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III; Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the
PEA-PTGWO subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.
On 6 December 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution,7 which granted all the
Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendant Imelda R.
Marcos is hereby DENIED. The Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendants Maria Imelda
Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos Araneta, Gregorio Maria Araneta III,
Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Fan, Yeung Chun Ho, and intervenor PEA-PTGWO, are
hereby GRANTED. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of defendant
Gregorio Maria Araneta III, are accordingly ordered lifted.
SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan denied Imelda R. Marcos’ Demurrer primarily because she had categorically
admitted that she and her husband owned properties enumerated in the Complaint, while stating
that these properties had been lawfully acquired. The court held that the evidence presented by
petitioner constituted a prima facie case against her, considering that the value of the properties
involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’ lawful income. Thus, this
admission and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was the compulsory heir and administratrix of the
Marcos estate were the primary reasons why the court held that she was responsible for
accounting for the funds and properties alleged to be ill-gotten.
Secondly, the court pointed out that Rolando Gapud, whose deposition was taken in Hong Kong,
referred to her as one directly involved in amassing ill-gotten wealth. The court also considered
the compromise agreement between petitioner and Antonio O. Floirendo, who disclosed that he
had performed several business transactions upon the instructions of the Marcos spouses.
With regard to the siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., the court noted
that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established. In fact, they were
never mentioned by any of the witnesses presented. Neither did the documentary evidence
pinpoint any specific involvement of the Marcos children.
Moreover, the court held that the evidence, in particular, exhibits "P,"8 "Q,"9 "R,"10 "S,"11 and
"T,"12 were considered hearsay, because their originals were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that
petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These
exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in the media networks
IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These
exhibits also sought to prove her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil
Apparel.
Finally, the court held that the relationship of respondents to the Marcos spouses was not enough
reason to hold the former liable.
In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court similarly held that
there was no testimonial or documentary evidence that supported petitioner’s allegations against
the couple. Again, petitioner failed to present the original documents that supposedly supported
the allegations against them. Instead, it merely presented photocopies of documents that sought
to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos13 as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus
company Pantranco.
Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court found the allegations against them
baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate how their business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments
Manufacturing, Co. Phils. (Glorious Sun), was used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show
that they themselves were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary
evidence relevant to this allegation was inadmissible for being mere photocopies, and that the
affiants had not been presented as witnesses.
Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-PTGWO. While the court held that
there was no evidence to show that Pantranco was illegally acquired, the former nevertheless
held that there was a need to first determine the ownership of the disputed funds before they
could be ordered released to the rightful owner.
On 20 December 2005, petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that there
was a preponderance of evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio
Araneta III had connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that
respondents were compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged to render an
accounting and to return the ill-gotten wealth.
Moreover, petitioner asserted that the evidence established that the Yeungs were dummies of the
Marcoses, and that the Pantranco assets were part of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Finally, petitioner questioned the court’s ruling that the evidence previously admitted was later
held to be inadmissible in evidence against respondents, thus, depriving the former of due
process.
Inadvertently, petitioner was not able to serve a copy of the motion on respondents Imee Marcos-
Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. But upon realizing the oversight, it immediately did so and
filed the corresponding Manifestation and Motion before the court. Nonetheless, this
inadvertence prompted Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. to file their Motion for
Entry of Judgment.
On 2 March 2006, the court issued the second assailed Resolution,14 denying petitioner’s Motion.
The court pointed out its reservation in its Resolution dated 12 March 2002, wherein it said that
it would still assess and weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. Furthermore, it
said that even if it included the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses, these were not substantial to
hold respondents liable. Thus, the court said:
WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient reason to set aside the resolution dated December 6,
2005, the plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff’s
Motion and Manifestation dated January 18, 2006 is GRANTED in the interest of justice. The
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by defendants Imee Marcos and Bongbong Marcos
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:15
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND
(BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR., CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR
CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND
OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN
UNLAWFULLY AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL TREASURY.
II. PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT
RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA
CONNIVED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRING
BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND
ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.
III. RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY
HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO
RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF
THE MARCOSES.
IV. THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG
CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES FOR
THE MARCOSES, AND USED THE CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A CONDUIT
IN AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN
ERRED IN GRANTING THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
V. THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH
RESPECT TO THE PANTRANCO ASSETS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE
AMPLE EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE SAID ASSETS INDUBITABLY FORM PART OF
THE MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO WHOM THESE ASSETS
RIGHTFULLY BELONG.
VI. THE SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING WHICH REJECTED PEITITONER’S
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING "INADMISSIBLE"
DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS ITS EARLIER RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WAS RENDERED IN A MANNER THAT
DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
There is some merit in petitioner’s contention.
The Marcos Siblings and
Gregorio Araneta III
Closely analyzing petitioner’s Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear
that the Marcos siblings are being sued in two capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the compulsory heirs of their
father, Ferdinand E. Marcos.16
With regard to the first allegation, as contained in paragraph 29 of its Third Amended Complaint
quoted above, petitioner accused the Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated in,
and/or benefitted from their parents’ alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In particular, as
far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused of dollar salting by using Glorious
Sun to import denim fabrics from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other
users of similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted from the
sequestered media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a
substantial interest.
Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having conspired with her husband,
respondent Gregorio Araneta III, in his being President Marcos’ conduit to Pantranco, thereby
paving the way for the President’s ownership of the company in violation of Article VII, Section
4, paragraph 2 of the 1973 Constitution.17
To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner primarily relied on the
Sworn Statement18 and the Deposition19 of one of the financial advisors of President Marcos,
Rolando C. Gapud, taken in Hong Kong on various dates.
Meanwhile, to prove the participation and interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in De Soleil
Apparel and the media networks, petitioner relied on the Affidavits of Ramon S.
Monzon,20 Yeung Kwok Ying,21 and Rodolfo V. Puno;22 and the transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) taken during the PCGG hearing held on 8 June 1987.23
As to spouses Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Araneta III, petitioner submitted the Articles
of Incorporation of Northern Express Transport, Inc.;24 the Memorandum of Agreement25 and the
Purchase Agreement26 between Pantranco and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc.
(BLTBCo.); the Confidential Memorandum regarding the sale of the Pantranco assets;27 the
Affidavit28 and the letter to the PCGG29 of Dolores A. Potenciano, owner of BLTBCo.; the
Affidavit30 and the Memorandum31 of Eduardo Fajardo, who was then the Senior Vice-President
of the Account Management Group of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was in turn
the creditor for the Pantranco sale; and the Affidavit of Florencio P. Lucio, who was the Senior
Account Specialist of the National Investment and Development Corporation.32
Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rule’s third exception, that is, these
documents are public records in the custody of a public officer or are recorded in a public office.
It is its theory that since these documents were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the
conditions for the exception to apply had been met. Alternatively, it asserts that the "documents
were offered to prove not only the truth of the recitals of the documents, but also of other
external or collateral facts."33
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner failed to observe the
best evidence rule.
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted,
the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or
benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a
preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is
constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by
respondents.
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the
documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that
could prove petitioner’s allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the
original document itself. The origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as
early as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker,34 wherein the Court of Chancery said:
The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of
evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.
The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by
those witnesses.
The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict
necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all
are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is
lost, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have heard the deed, and
yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not
presented, or any compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary
evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule
130, which states:
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ─ When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ─ For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
SECTION 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations
does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in
the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a
credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify
only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own
perception.35 Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents,
but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant,
but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.36
As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a
public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGG’s exercise of its mandate, it was
not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls
short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.37
In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Further, again contrary to the theory of the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the
aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules
of Court. Under paragraph (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ presentation of the original thereof is excepted.
However, as earlier observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were not
necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings
purportedly before the PCGG, the plaintiff’s exhibit "Q", may be a public document, but what
was presented by the plaintiff was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide
that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and it was not even signed by the stenographer who
supposedly took down the proceedings.
The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 3. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that ‘when the original documents has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.’ Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be admissible,
there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss,
destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good
faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of these requirements were
complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit ‘Q’, exhibits ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all
photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court.
Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter which is clearly a private document. Not only does it not fall within the
exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere photocopy. As We previously emphasized, even if
originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if
the affiants do not testify and identify them.38
Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to
prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former
President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couple’s alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.
The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.
To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos respondents be
made to (1) pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of
acquisition; (2) render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of
property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and
beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at ₱200 billion and additional actual
damages to reimburse expenses for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at
₱250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages amounting
to ₱50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in the amount of
₱1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial costs.39
It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and the
extent of the properties involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis
that the Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the accounting
of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the allegations of the
Complaint, the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos
estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3)
issuing the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these
properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is proper.
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is
imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the
protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.40 On that
note, we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E.
Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,41 we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state
their right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their
possession, control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case
pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-interest
without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who
possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with
that of the other parties.42
In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos – that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth – the present case must be
maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr.,
as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. According
to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal
property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.
We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and
Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third
Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.43 It is only during the trial of Civil Case No.
0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties
are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus,
while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may
be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as
heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove
the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.
Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the
Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the
decedent’s death.44 In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to
transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration
or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,45 we said:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed
to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the
decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the
death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left
with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains
undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And according to article 399 of
the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property,
and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of
Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the
others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then
Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was
limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
(Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, petitioner’s prayer in its Third Amended Complaint directly refers to herein respondents,
to wit:
1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION – To return and
reconvey to Plaintiff all funds and other property acquired by Defendants during their
incumbency as public officers, which funds and other property are manifestly out of proportion
to their salaries, other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property which
Defendants have failed to establish as having been, in fact, lawfully acquired by them,
alternatively, to solidarily pay Plaintiff the value thereof with interest thereon from the date of
acquisition until full payment.
2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – to individually render to this Honorable
Court a complete accounting and inventory, subject to evaluation of Court-appointed
assessors, of all funds and other property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them,
as well as their legal and beneficial interest in such funds and other property. (Emphasis
supplied)
In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action pending before
the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly
protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct
involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.
Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Ho And Yeung Chun Fan
It is worthy to note that respondents draw our attention to American Inter-Fashion Corporation v.
Office of the President46 in which they contend that this Court considered the allegation of dollar
salting as baseless. The cited case, however, finds no application herein as the former merely
ruled that Glorious Sun was denied due process when it was not furnished by the Garments and
Textile Export Board (GTEB) any basis for the cancellation of the export quota because of
allegations of dollar salting. That Decision did not prevent petitioner from adducing evidence to
support its allegation in Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan under a different cause of
action.
Nevertheless, the allegations against Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan in
the case at bar were also proved to be baseless. Again, petitioner failed to illustrate how
respondents herein acted as dummies of the Marcoses in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. This Court
notes that the Complaint against the Yeungs alleges that the Marcoses used Glorious Sun – the
garment company in which the Yeungs are controlling stockholders – for illegal dollar salting
through the company’s importation of denim fabrics from only one supplier at prices much
higher than those being paid by other users of similar materials. Notably, no mention of De
Soleil Apparel was made.
To prove its allegations, petitioner submitted the controverted Exhibits "P," "Q," "R," "S," and
"T." As earlier discussed in detail, these pieces of evidence were mere photocopies of the
originals and were unauthenticated by the persons who executed them; thus, they have no
probative value. Even the allegations of petitioner itself in its Petition for Review are bereft of
any factual basis for holding that these documents undoubtedly show respondents’ participation
in the alleged dollar salting. The pertinent portion of the Petition reads:
To illustrate, the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987 executed by Mr. Ramon Monzon which was
submitted as Exhibit P, showed that respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc owns and controls IBC-
13, BBC-2 and (R)PN-9, and has interest in the De Soleil Apparel. The testimony of Mr. Ramon
Monzon during the hearing on June 8, 1987 before the Presidential Commission on Good
Government as shown in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes also affirmed his declarations in
the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987. The Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated June 8, 1987 was
presented as Exhibit Q. Moreover, the Affidavit dated March 21, 1986 of Yeung Kwok Ying
which was presented as Exhibit R disclosed that Imee Marcos-Manotoc is the owner of 67%
equity of De Soleil Apparel. The letter dated July 17, 1984 signed by seven (7) incorporators of
De Soleil Apparel, addressed to Hongkong investors which was presented as Exhibit
S confirmed that the signatories hold or own 67% equity of the corporation in behalf of the
beneficial owners previously disclosed to the addressees. In addition to the foregoing documents,
petitioner presented the Affidavit of Rodolfo V. Puno, Chairman of the Garments and Textile
Export Group (GTEB) as Exhibit T wherein he categorically declared that the majority of De
Soleil Apparel was actually owned by respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc.47
The foregoing quotation from the Petition is bereft of any factual matter that warrants a
consideration by the Court. Straight from the horse’s mouth, these documents are only meant to
show the ownership and interest of Imee Marcos Manotoc in De Soleil – and not how respondent
supposedly participated in dollar salting or in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
PEA-PTGWO
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as a consequence of the
prosecution’s failure to establish that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten, as discussed earlier.
Thus, we find no error in the assailed Order of the Sandiganbayan.
A Final Note
As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been recognized as an evidentiary standard
since the 18th century. For three centuries, it has been practiced as one of the most basic rules in
law. It is difficult to conceive that one could have finished law school and passed the bar
examinations without knowing such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply disturbing that the PCGG
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) – the very agencies sworn to protect the interest of
the state and its people – could conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To
emphasize, the PCGG is a highly specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
while the OSG is the principal legal defender of the government. The lawyers of these
government agencies are expected to be the best in the legal profession.
However, despite having the expansive resources of government, the members of the prosecution
did not even bother to provide any reason whatsoever for their failure to present the original
documents or the witnesses to support the government’s claims. Even worse was presenting in
evidence a photocopy of the TSN of the PCGG proceedings instead of the original, or a certified
true copy of the original, which the prosecutors themselves should have had in their custody.
Such manner of legal practice deserves the reproof of this Court. We are constrained to call
attention to this apparently serious failure to follow a most basic rule in law, given the special
circumstances surrounding this case.
The public prosecutors should employ and use all government resources and powers efficiently,
effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage of public funds and
revenues. They should perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill.48
The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and secure justice for those seeking its
aid.49 In order to do this, lawyers are required to observe and adhere to the highest ethical and
professional standards. The legal profession is so imbued with public interest that its
practitioners are accountable not only to their clients, but to the public as well.
The public prosecutors, aside from being representatives of the government and the state, are,
first and foremost, officers of the court. They took the oath to exert every effort and to consider it
their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.50 Lawyers owe fidelity to
the cause of the client and should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.51 Hence, should serve with competence and diligence.52
We note that there are instances when this Court may overturn the dismissal of the lower courts
in instances when it is shown that the prosecution has deprived the parties their due process of
law. In Merciales v. Court of Appeals,53 we reversed the Decision of the RTC in dismissing the
criminal case for rape with homicide. In that case, it was very apparent that the public prosecutor
violated the due process rights of the private complainant owing to its blatant disregard of
procedural rules and the failure to present available crucial evidence, which would tend to prove
the guilt or innocence of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that the trial court
was gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the truth and, instead, just "passively watched as the
public prosecutor bungled the case."
However, it must be emphasized that Merciales was filed exactly to determine whether the
prosecution and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in the proceedings of the case, thus
resulting in the denial of the offended party’s due process. Meanwhile, the present case merely
alleges that there was an error in the Sandiganbayan’s consideration of the probative value of
evidence. We also note that in Merciales, both the prosecution and the trial court were found to
be equally guilty of serious nonfeasance, which prompted us to remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings and reception of evidence. Merciales is thus inapplicable to the case at
bar.
Nevertheless, given the particular context of this case, the failure of the prosecution to adhere to
something as basic as the best evidence rule raises serious doubts on the level and quality of
effort given to the government’s cause. Thus, we highly encourage the Office of the President,
the OSG, and the PCGG to conduct the appropriate investigation and consequent action on this
matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6 December 2005 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. For the reasons stated herein, respondents Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Irene
Marcos-Araneta, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as defendants in Civil Case
No. 0002 pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the President so that it may look into the
circumstances of this case and determine the liability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the manner by which
this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.

14.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 168387               August 25, 2010

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL
ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.

When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these
documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is
authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent
actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.

Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that
prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to
mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,2 as well as the
May 11, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated
17 January 2001, rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.4

The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following dispositive portion:

Accordingly, judgment is rendered:

1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong property
covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);

2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of Salun-at
Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are disqualified to become tenants of the
Lantap property;

3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary, herein
tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and conditions;
4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering the latter
to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents] plus such accrued
and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly accounted for with the assistance of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed to
assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts and;

5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until otherwise
modified or dissolved by the appellate body.

SO ORDERED.5

Factual Antecedents

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with
an area of two hectares each. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the
Lantap property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the
Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap property is tenanted by
respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)6 (who is the husband7 of respondent Elenita Espejo
(Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and
Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).8

The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to
secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were
foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January
14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following description:

Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or less from
B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,

thence N. 28 deg. 20 ‘E., 200.00 m. to point 2;

thence S. 61 deg. 40 ‘E., 100.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 28 deg. 20 ‘W., 200.00 m. to point 4;

thence N. 61 deg. 40 ‘W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;

Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the southeast, and
southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario
Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination 0131 ‘E. Points referred to are marked
on plan H-176292. Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance
with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in]
December 1912-March 1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No.
79-A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.9
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and
contained the following description:

Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 ‘W., 1150.21 m. from BLLM
No. 122, Irrigation project,

thence N. 61 deg. 40’E., 200.00 m. to point 2;

thence N. 28 deg. 20’E, 100.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 61 deg. 40’E, 200.00 m. to point 4;

thence S. 28 deg. 20’W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of 2.0000
hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land; and on the
northwest by Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31’E., points referred to are
marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in
accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land
Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No.
119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.10

Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag Townsite, K-27," without
any reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.

On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed
of Sale11 described the property sold as follows:

x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x that

certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and
more particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:

Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded
on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public Land; and on the NW., by Public Land,
properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 ‘B.
Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292.

of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple in
accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto being evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.

As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the
property was located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title
corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents took
possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who
continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership
over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita
and brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the other property -- the
Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner.
The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994.12

Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 2013 and 2114 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 6657,15 executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners
Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject
thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836
(which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).16

After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of ₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the
DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners
Marquez17 and Dela Cruz18 on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were
parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.19 The CLOAs were registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.

On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and
almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a
Complaint20 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners’ CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by
petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by
RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents’ theory that the
Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the
1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their
Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.

Petitioners filed their Answer21 and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-
beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good faith, paid lease
rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI
upon the honest belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised
acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what respondents
Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their
continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.

RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back
transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the transaction
and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural
banking rules and regulations.

OIC-RARAD Decision23

The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the
VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents’ Deed of Sale and the said title refers to
the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the
Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836,
which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners’ CLOAs
necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in the VLTs
that the subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere
typographical error.

Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers
thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap
property and ordered the cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a
leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.

The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners’ only right as the actual tillers of the Murong
property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts with and
payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.

DARAB Decision24

Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that
in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the
burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel
were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued the corresponding
CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This
conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents’ admission that petitioners are the actual
tillers of the Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.

As for respondents’ allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the
DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more
credence to RBBI’s claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong
property. Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an
agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of the
Lantap property.

The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:

We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs issued to
appellants as they are by operation of law qualified beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is
nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with the CARP program
implementation; and finally, the Board declares that all controverted claims to or against the
subject landholding must be completely and finally laid to rest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed decision is
ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:

1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-tillers over the
Murong property and therefore they are the qualified beneficiaries thereof;
2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the name of [farmer-
beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz respectively, covered formerly by TCT
No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;

3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold contract with bona fide
tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the latter] being the subject matter of the
‘buy back’ arrangement entered into between [respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong,
Incorporated, and other incidental matters are deemed resolved.

SO ORDERED.25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they
repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong property. They
were adamant that the title numbers indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should
control in determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents’ Deed of Sale expressed that its
subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to them was the Murong
property. On the other hand, petitioners’ VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property with
TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property.
Respondents added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their
CLOAs should be cancelled due to their lack of qualification.

The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130,
Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly
the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed
that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the
property that the respondents repurchased.

The CA further ruled that as for petitioners’ VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No.
T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional description in
the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere
typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more
accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly describes the properties’
metes and bounds.

Both the RBBI26 and petitioners27 filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which
were separately denied.28

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
163320, with this Court.29 RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that
respondents did not come to court with clean hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the
time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free
from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyone’s expense. RBBI’s petition
was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review on
certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient showing that the Court
of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.30

Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.31 Entry of judgment was
made in that case on December 15, 2004.32

On July 27, 2005,33 petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issues

Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Court’s
determination:

What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBI’s Petition for Review on Certiorari,
which assailed the same CA Decision

II

Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the
contracts

III

What are the subject properties of the parties’ respective contracts with RBBI

Our Ruling

Propriety of the Petition

Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond
the province of Rule 45.34

The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate court’s
rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence
Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the
Court’s authority to review.35

Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The
rule that a petition for review should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among
which are "(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record."36

In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the
appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best
Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three
reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.

First Issue
Dismissal of RBBI’s appeal

Respondents maintain that the Court’s earlier dismissal of RBBI’s petition

for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the
appellate court’s decision in favor of the respondents.37

We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBI’s earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because
it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The bank did not
point out the inadequacies and errors in the appellate court’s decision but simply placed the
responsibility for the confusion on the respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the
identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI
argued that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.

These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate court’s
Decision. It is the appellant’s responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the appealed
decision. When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the "clean hands" doctrine
without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be no
surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is
dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the
appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellant’s inadequate
discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.

RBBI’s failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners
who were not parties to RBBI’s appeal, especially because petitioners duly filed a separate
appeal and were able to articulately and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be
deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just because another party had already
appealed ahead of him,38 or just because the other party’s separate appeal had already been
dismissed.39

There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI
executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the commencement of the action.
Thus, when the action for cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of
its title to the two properties involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam)
is conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action.40 Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already
transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any
judgment which may be rendered against the vendor.41

Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?

Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between
respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the
respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-
62096 – the title for the Murong property – then the property repurchased by the respondents was
the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and RBBI
refer to TCT No. T-62836 – the title for the Lantap property – then the property transferred to
petitioners was the Lantap property.

Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the
subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the
issue in the case is not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not
adequately expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule
that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.

Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence
Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is
the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral
evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance
of undetected tampering with the document.42

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because
there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties
that the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the
petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject,
which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and
RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of
the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).

As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to
the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to
"Barangay Murong" was a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the
reference to "Barangay Murong" reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-
62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from
an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To
resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.

The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any
other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though
the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol
Evidence Rule instead, which provides:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as

containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.43

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to
contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument.
Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused
to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best
Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts
and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the
first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they
are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol
evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The
parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party
or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.44

Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the petitioners’ VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject
property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject
property as being located in "Barangay Murong." Even the respondents’ Deed of Sale falls under
the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), but
RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put
in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the
parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-
settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that
prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,45 not its wording which is prone to
mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the
interpretation of contracts:

Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail
over the former.

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise
enlightening:

Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. – For the proper construction of an

instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those whose language he is to interpret.1âwphi1

Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the
Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong
property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
the parties.

Third issue

Determining the intention of the parties

regarding the subjects of their contracts

We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents
was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the
Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that could show that they
indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take
possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the
possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the
respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to
RBBI, not to the respondents.

Aside from respondents’ neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property,
there is one other circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really repurchased was
the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer
actually tilling the Lantap property, without turning over the supposed landowner’s share
to RBBI. This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not
RBBI) as the owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita
and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come they
never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants of RBBI’s land? The factual
circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory propounded by the respondents.

We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLTs) in favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the Lantap property.
When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already the tenant-farmers of the
Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural
that the Murong property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI
with the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained
in possession of the Murong property, enjoying and tilling it without any opposition from
anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their payment of the total purchase price
of ₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials conducted their
investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, did not reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual
possession of the Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR
officials issued CLOAs in petitioners’ favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the land in
Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong property,
undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997.

All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their
position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap
property. Conversely, there has been no contrary evidence of the parties’ actuations to indicate
that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their
VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the
said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No.
T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate
the particular barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by
a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the
two properties are very similar.

The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners’ argument that their VLTs were intrinsically
ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an
action for the reformation of their contract.46 A cause of action for the reformation of a contract
only arises when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide
by the true agreement of the parties.47 It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no cause to
reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to
the interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong
property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts
argued for a different interpretation, that the issue became relevant for the first time.

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI
covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property
under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence, the CA’s ruling against RBBI should not be executed
as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the CA’s decision had
already become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBI’s petition in
G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders
the execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7,
2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the
DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between
respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-
62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396
of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in
accordance with this Decision. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate JusticeTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

15.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202122               January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEOANRDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the
conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556-CFM and 04-1557-CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The
Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-15 5 6-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor victim’s mother, through
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there
mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of said minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-1558-CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BERNABE PAREJA
Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission
of the crime of Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a13 years old minor by then and there
crawling towards her direction where she was sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform
all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason other than
his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victim’s mother who
confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against
him.7 After the completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits
ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse
took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and
March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old9]. At the time of the commission of
the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused-appellant
Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their
children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother
was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation,
[Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already
naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied,
[Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she
felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident
for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would
expose the incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once.
According to AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested
by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not
around while she and her half-siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started
to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his
finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s
mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was
asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report
the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused
by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan
issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her medico-legal report stated
the following conclusion:
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
xxxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s
mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against
him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter
of his live-in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the
alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and
argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10)
meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the
vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side.
Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly
still go about with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by
AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because
AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her parents’ separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted
him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004
incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of
attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and
he is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as
minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of ₱50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more
weight to the prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill
motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to testify about
what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted
Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the
basis of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what
happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on
January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556 and
04-1557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors as
he did before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED
SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was
raped.18
Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of
AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the
credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing
happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled
with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain
guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we
enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
(Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and
when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court."21 While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has
found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts
on the matter of AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally
expected.22 As this Court stated in People v. Saludo23:
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an
offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and
casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that
merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the
year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s ordeal.25 The date and
time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates serious
doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of
conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when
the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the
commission of the crime."26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our
rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are
prominently missing in Pareja’s case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillo’s acquittal in that
case was because his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated when the Information against him only stated that the crime was
committed "on or about the year 1992." We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the
Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as
near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs
afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time
to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been
committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992
but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-
appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to
allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove
during the trial the date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived
accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the
charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of residence in the
year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the
rape.
xxxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused-
appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the
offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored
mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt,
that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place
indicated in the Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not
specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike "on or about the
year 1992." Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the
rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he raped the victim in
that house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo
contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse
Ladrillo’s conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness’ testimony that militates
heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered
independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court’s judgment of conviction,
but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as
logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed
judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged
against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other
evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja
merely denied the accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this
Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their
house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged
incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if
anything unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out
on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases
appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or
place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on
such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with
big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the
presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for
privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual
congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it
would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not
impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened
while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep
more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in
the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where
other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have
repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time and place," and rape can be committed in
even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said
that "the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to
thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her purity." Pareja pointed out that they
lived in a thickly populated area such that any commotion inside their house would have been
easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their
help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the
authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. AAA’s belated
confession, he claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her
credibility."37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the
blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has
recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has
been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape.
Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially
when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is
committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAA’s lack of resistance was
brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke
of the incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also
not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act
within reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a
standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot
be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of
a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.39
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja
threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why
a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation,
to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her
or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated.
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and
pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats
to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as it
failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted." Furthermore,
Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence
against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in December, was not by penetration of the
vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the
sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is
merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time
she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually
bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal
penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the
incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct
a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for
the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is
highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world,
would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. (Citations
omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and
convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual
violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape;
and the crime’s expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the
reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’
as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual
intercourse.’"44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the
Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ
rape" or "penile rape."45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal
knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object
rape," or "gender-free rape."47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a
man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended
party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault
is "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her
anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she
was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the
occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the
Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape
through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even
though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included
in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault
when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the
variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prisión correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were
sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for
rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of
rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the
Philippines, as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the
Information, which contains the charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in
public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 – to the State, that its penal laws are not broken
and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that
he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and defective Information, such as that in Criminal
Case No. 04-1556-CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party, and even the
offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate and
appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution
against Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on
the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this
Court had to modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof,
i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted
rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the
February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she was
actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from
sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to
give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being
repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA
failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later
on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of
the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February
2004 incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her
breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is
included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her
breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo
of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution
of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him because she was
angry that he caused her parents’ separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by
AAA’s father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. "AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such
imputation of ill motives.1âwphi1 It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her
father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge."58 Furthermore, motives such as resentment,
hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is
settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since
when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was indeed committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión
correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree,62 i.e.,
arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisión correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows:
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 ₱30,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱10,000.00 as exemplary
damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused-
appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined
and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two
(2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2
months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA,
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

16.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143340       August 15, 2001
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled "Lamberto T. Chua
vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga" and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000 denying
the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter
collectively referred to as petitioners).
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth
Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia),
daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for
"Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a
sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of
P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart
contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a
sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's
fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net
profits, in addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation
went quite and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to success of their
business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied
by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the
merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent
however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated and
undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's
repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibeth
allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its
properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and
reasons to evade respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of
P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter's share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up
of the properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly
failed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income
of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del
Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance
denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims,
contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests,
damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the
claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership
affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties should be dismissed
and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial
Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner,
"as petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court."2
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was
remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of
the case of January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were
considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled
date for reception of evidence despite notice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive of
the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
as follows:
(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under accounting procedures
and standards of the properties, assets, income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center
Since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued the business operations
including all businesses derived from Shellite Gas Appliance Center, submit an inventory, and
appraisal of all these properties, assets, income, profits etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for
approval or disapproval;
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties, assets,
income and profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and advantage the legally
pertain to the plaintiff and account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of
this petition as basis;
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff ½ shares and interest of the plaintiff in
the partnership of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on
pages 4-5 of the petition;
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and profits from the
partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the
sum of P35,000.00 per month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its business
activities pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the ½ interest, shares, participation
and equity in the partnership, or the value thereof in money or money's worth, if the properties
are not physically divisible;
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and
hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and,
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's (sic) and
P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.
SO ORDERED."3
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case
to the Court of Appeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
respects."4
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon following grounds:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a partnership
between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter'' invitation
and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets and business were taken over by
petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or prescription did
not apply in the instant case.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was competent and
credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that indeed
there was a partnership, the finding of highly exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership
assets and profits."5
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the
absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent
and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule"
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or
assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
We are not persuaded.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real
rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary.6 Hence,
based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their
language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise.7 The essential profits that
must be proven to that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common
stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the
written contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the
introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial
issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to
render inadmissible respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction
of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in
prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."10
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim11 against respondents in their answer
before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves
effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute".12 Well entrenched
is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before
the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring
before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the
estate or representatives of the deceased.14
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the
simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine
to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners'
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor
because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has
arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has
arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the
party plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value
because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his
favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that
if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can
conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not
in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.
Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of
her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of
witnesses.16
Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim
cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the
testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of
partnership, albeit an informal one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight
of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between
respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review.17 This Court can no
longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior
credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out that
petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now
turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of
respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that
such evidence was offered.19
With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished
respondent's claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for
accounting filed by respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the
prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes
in six (6) years20 while the right to demand an accounting for a partner's interest as against the
person continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the partnership22 ,
in this case, it was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an
account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's death dissolved
the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil
Code23 expressly provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal
personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business, culminating in its
termination.24
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should
have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is
mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships with
a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register with the SEC, however, this registration requirement
is not mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code25 explicitly provides that the partnership retains
its juridical personality even if it fails to register. The failure to register the contract of
partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as the contract has the
essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and
it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract.26 In the
case at bar, non-compliance with this directory provision of the law will not invalidate the
partnership considering that the totality of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto
indeed forged the partnership in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

17.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
 
SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document committed, according to the Information, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named a
BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his spouse
Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot
belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc.
No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa.
Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital
consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved
to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which
provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or
against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the
exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977.
A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order
dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the
People of the Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and
praying that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court
enjoining said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to
require the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of the
Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5,
1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision. 7
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative of
the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document
filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the
signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the
latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a
crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification
rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-
wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear
therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the
said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale,
been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave
rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make
the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the
aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that
such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance
a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,
in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up
the criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad. The
better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE
EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the
rape committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed
by the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in
that can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for
the reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the
crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third
person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly
and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent
efforts 10 in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified
her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point
out in previous decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason
to apply the martial disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the
Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a
husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking
shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all
with unabashed and complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto,
in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case,
allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
18.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179786               July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.
The Facts and the Case
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage
relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no
longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena
duces tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action
of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.
Question Presented
The central question presented in this case is:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
The Ruling of the Court
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of
Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her
action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for
subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be
examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s
reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate
to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to
make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a
physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had
transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting
his own health at great risk.4
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be
made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in
those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is
about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c)
of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that
he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth
claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged
character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that
provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given
in evidence.1âwphi1
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify
Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not
yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of
his hospital records would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request
for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.