G.R. No.

L-14639            March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which
this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be
met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents
no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of
popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the
courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might
prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918,
the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably,
during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of
Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government
office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the
Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor
of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers
sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed
and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear
as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and
the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not
essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went
to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a
goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were
putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of
the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme
Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to
include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same
questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the
women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for
the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration
and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners
were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First
Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did
not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached
to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries,
on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in
answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of
Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that
directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own
expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk
of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December
2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in
court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to
come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret
service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition
copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of
Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of
Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits
showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to
return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill
the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control,
because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or
signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have
any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey
the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a
second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order
to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed
that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents
Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in
written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the
clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided
and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of
certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court
of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the
respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the
city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the
facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas
corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and
agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that
eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could
return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to
find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal
were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court.
The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women
were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on
board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the
mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and
that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy
acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of
what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress
these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We
turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a
hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of
the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment
by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes
the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy,
to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment
to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law!
Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But
one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of
the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change
his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so

important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence
and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction.
Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United
States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no
such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the
executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor
and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of
motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of
police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If
these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same.
And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right
to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the
head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen.,
111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to
punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882],
106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in
another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in
issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning
that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a
government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the
citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup
money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but
it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now
before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
provides:
 Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more
than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of
the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred
and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a

general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to
change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of
not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers
find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will
institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the
same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons
guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the
words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a
monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be
restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime,
and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and
punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at
liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3)
that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila
only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from
Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was
consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous
regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is
unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First
Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general
rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions
for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ
shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this
instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that
the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other
hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved
parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still
be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to
grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the
writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor
and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a
tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be
perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who
handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called
upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to
undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails
to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very
persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person
within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State.
The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was
composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On
the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred
Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J.,
held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a
large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter
appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries
and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed
for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his
speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will
have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the
 petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered
that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the
life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the
proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their
notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception
as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court
of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the
statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of
rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this
writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his
jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person
who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the
court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole
force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means
to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is
the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they
are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore,
not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by
the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of
affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of
the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where
the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter
of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac.
Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been
taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the
defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date
to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the
issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in
contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
 A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That
writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in
chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to
bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason
can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by
reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the
issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that
might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to
produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not
obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument
to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of
showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt.
But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The
question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued
by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish
case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three
colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated
on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the
writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody.
The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected
they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and
insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in
court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the
marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of
law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of
the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland.
Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis
[1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883],
111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of
the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did
not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus
given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before
sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of
the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the
writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity
those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right
to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of
the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women
were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by
the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable
number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to
jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were
far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all
tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example,
in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court,
said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act,
he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get
the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything
that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof
of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show
that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the
court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see
presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate
their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards
were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women,
and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and
counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we
come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect
may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally
closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made
the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with
it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose
Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does
not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority,
adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or
fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ
of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the
court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of
the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely,
it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to
have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than
to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent
of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable
position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the
official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the
police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as
the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His
intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly
acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof
to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each,
which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a
contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be
possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second
order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the
court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the
correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court
tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his
later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at
once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary.
The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to
be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay
into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred
pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record
the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs
shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the
hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government
of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

G.R. No. 170924             July 4, 2007

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and
JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner,
vs.
Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all
persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE
LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and
all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which dismissed the Petition
for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Roberto Rafael Pulido (Pulido) in behalf of Cezari
Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure, and its
Resolution2 dated 6 January 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are not disputed.

At around one o’clock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twenty-one (321)
junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments
(Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed
the security guards of said establishment and planted explosives in its immediate
surroundings.

The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances
against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo).
They declared their withdrawal of support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP –
President Arroyo – and demanded her resignation and that of the members of her cabinet
and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

At about one o’clock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427
declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she issued General
Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving
due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion."

After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government negotiators, the
former agreed to return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of Oakwood.

Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius
Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf that the Petition
for Habeas Corpus was filed before the Court of Appeals.

On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a directive3 to all
Major Service Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) regarding the Custody of Military Personnel Involved
in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof, Gonzales and Mesa were taken into
custody by their Service Commander.

Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles
of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case entitled, "People v. Capt. Milo
D. Maestrecampo, et al." was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On 18 November
2003, a Commitment Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of
Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite
City.4

On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged5 from military service.

On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678 entitled, "People v. Ramon B. Cardenas"
pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, on the ground that the cases are
founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a series of offenses of similar character.6

In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 2004, Commodore Normando Naval,

Commander of Naval Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to relieve him of
his duty as custodian of Gonzales and Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the
Makati City Jail.7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC relieved him of his duty but
ordered the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in Sangley Point,
Cavite City, to the Philippine Marine Brigade Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the custody of the Commander of the Marine
Brigade of the Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.8

In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the
accused-soldiers. It admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to
bail pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each.9

On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail.10 On 20 July 2004, the RTC issued
orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps, Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City, to release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody.11 Despite said orders and
their service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not released.

On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration12 of the
order granting bail. Prior to the resolution of said motion, Jovencito R. Zuño, Chief State
Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer action
on the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa "until the Motion for Reconsideration
shall have been resolved and attained finality."13 On 26 October 2004, the RTC denied
the motion for partial reconsideration.
With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court
of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, asking for the nullification and setting aside of the orders dated 8
July 2004 and 26 October 2004 of Judge Oscar B. Pimentel for having been issued
without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari was raffled to the Seventh Division and was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Oscar B.
Pimentel, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148." The
Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) did not issue a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.

Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas

Corpus14 was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and raffled to the Third Division. In support thereof,
it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer subject to Military Law as they
had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003, and since they are not
charged before a court martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain
them, and there is no legal ground to detain them further because a court order for their
release had already been issued.

On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas

Corpus directing respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and Gen. Ernesto
de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his
stead and under his authority, to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the
Court and to appear and show the cause and validity of their detention.15

On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made.16 Respondents

prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1)
the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the
Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail
to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure
to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of
Appeals and pending before its 7th Division.

On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (7th Division) rendered its decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88440 dismissing the petition that questioned the propriety of the granting of
bail to Gonzales, Mesa, and twenty-five of their co-accused.17

On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition

for Habeas Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It
ratiocinated:
A reading of the parties’ submissions reveals a threshold issue – the charge of
forum shopping and the related falsity in the certification supporting the petition.
We must initially resolve these issues because a finding that the petitioner violated
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can lead to the outright dismissal of the
present petition. x x x

xxxx

The records show that the present petition contained the following certificate of
non-forum shopping:

"I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with office address at Unit 1601,

16th Floor 139 Corporate Center Valero Street, Makati City, after having
been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby state that:

1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned case;

2. I have read the Petition and caused it to be prepared. All the contents
thereof are true to my own personal knowledge and the record;

3. I have not heretofore commenced any action or proceeding involving the

same issues, in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency and to the best of my knowledge, no action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; except for the related cases of "Eugene Gonzales
et al. vs. Gen. Narciso Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007 and "Humabono
Adaza et al., vs. Gen. Pedro Cabuay et al., G.R. No. 160792, both awaiting
the resolution of the Supreme Court.

5. (sic, should be 4) If I should learn of any similar action or proceeding

filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report such fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Court.

The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show that the
petitioner never mentioned the pendency before the Seventh Division of this Court
of the certiorari case, SP 88440, for the annulment of the lower court’s order
granting the soldiers-accused’s petition for bail, when this same lower court order
is cited as basis for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa in the present
petition. All that the certification mentioned were the related cases pending before
the Honorable Supreme Court. Neither did the petitioner comply with his
undertaking under his certification to inform this Court within five (5) days of the
pendency of any similar action or proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, as in fact the
certiorari case was already pending with this Court when the present petition was
filed. The certiorari case was only brought to our attention after the respondents
filed their Return of the Writ.

To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the counsel for the accused Gonzales and
Mesa in the criminal case before Branch 148 RTC Makati City and who represents
Gonzales and Mesa as private respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign
ignorance of the pendency of the certiorari case. Why he deliberately kept the
pendency of the certiorari case hidden from us, has not been sufficiently
explained. We have no doubt, however, that his deliberate act of withholding
information on a material fact directly required to be disclosed by the Rules of
Court cannot but have legal consequences.

The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and posted by
Gonzales and Mesa. This is very clear from the petitioner’s argument that "The
continued detention of the enlisted personnel constitutes violation of the lawful
orders of the civilian court." He cited in support of this argument the grant and the
posting of the bail, and the issuance of the release orders by the lower court. He
did not disclose, however, what subsequently happened to the order granting bail.
He deliberately omitted in his narration the fact that the People moved to
reconsider this order. Thus, he gave the impression that the order granting bail
immediately became enforceable and that Gonzales’ and Mesa’s continued
detention is illegal because their constitutional rights to bail, which have received
judicial imprimatur, were continuously being violated by the respondents.

The petitioner next omitted the fact that after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail, the People filed the certiorari case
before this Court, seeking to annul the lower court’s order. While we are aware of
the rule that – the mere pendency of a petition for certiorari will not prevent the
implementation of the assailed order unless the court where the petition was filed
issues either a temporary restraining order or a writ or preliminary injunction –
the filing of a petition for habeas corpus while the order granting bail is being
questioned on a petition for certiorari raises issues beyond the immediate
execution of the lower court’s bail and release orders. They raise questions on the
propriety of filing the habeas corpus petition to seek the release of persons under
detention, at the same time that a petition regarding their continued detention and
release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner wanted to avoid these questions,
prompting him to actively conceal the subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the bail order and the petition for certiorari directly questioning this same
order. In short, the petitioner conveniently omitted in his narration of facts the
material factual antecedents detrimental to his cause; he chose to narrate only
the factual antecedents favorable to his cause.
That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is
beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed
by the People seeks to prevent the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the
lower court’s grant of bail. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed in
behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the order
granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement
through a petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the
lower court has ordered. The question this immediately raises is: can this be done
through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the
release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?

We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely
the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The
remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and
Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of
jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be
sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the
effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of
the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if
this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper.
For this very same reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the
matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be
finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and Mesa’s release. The Decision
of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore footnoted, ordering the release on
bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.

To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention and immediate release that are now
before the two Divisions of this Court are likewise properly within the jurisdiction
of the lower court who has original jurisdiction over the criminal case and who has
issued the order granting bail in the exercise of this jurisdiction. If indeed there is a
question relating to the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa pursuant to the
lower court’s order pending the determination of the certiorari issues, such
question should be brought before the lower court as the tribunal that has ordered
the release, or before the Seventh Division of this Court in the exercise of its
supervisory powers over the lower court. The Decision recently promulgated by
the Seventh Division of this Court ordering the release on bail of the soldiers-
accused effectively demonstrates this point.

The inter-relationships among the criminal case below, the certiorari case and the
present petition, as well as among the courts where these cases are pending, show
beyond doubt that the petitioner committed forum shopping in the strict sense of
that term i.e., the attempt by a party, after an adverse opinion in one forum, to seek
a favorable opinion in another forum other that through an appeal or certiorari.
 The "adverse" aspect for the petitioner, while not an opinion, is no less adverse as
he has failed to secure the release of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court
and before this Court in the certiorari case (as of the time of the filing of the
present petition); thus, he came to us in the present petition. That the Seventh
Division of this Court has ordered the release on bail of the soldiers-accused, thus
rendering the present petition moot and academic after the finality of the
7th Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this legal reality.18

The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure for the aforesaid violation.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for

violation of and pursuant to Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner,
Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, is hereby CENSURED for these violations. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Supreme Court, to be attached to
the petitioner’s record as a member of the Bar, as a RECORD OF
CENSURE that may be referred to and considered in any future similar act.19

On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the Court of

Appeals (Special Former Third Division) denied in its resolution21 dated 6 January 2006.

Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF
FORUM SHOPPING.

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE ACTION
AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONER THE PENALTY OF
CENSURE.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF
VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI
GONZALES.

Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals be
reversed and set aside, and an order be issued ordering respondents to immediately
release Gonzales and Mesa. He further prays that the censure against him be also
reversed and set aside.

Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with leave of court, a
Motion to Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of Julius Mesa and Cezari
Gonzales.22 Petitioner informed the Court that the Commanding General of the Philippine
Marines had ordered the release of Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered their persons to
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and Gonzales are now enjoying
temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC.
Petitioner asks that the prayer for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be
dismissed but asks that the other prayers in the petition be granted.

In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that the habeas corpus petition has been
rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of Mesa and Gonzales from
detention and, in the absence of an actual case or controversy, it is impractical to consider
and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their detention, including the
alleged refusal of the Court of Appeals to resolve said issues.

When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic.23 With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas
Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus,
the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues
have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value.24 This Court will therefore
abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called
for.25

The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum shopping?
(2) Should petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the 3rd Division of the Court
of Appeals of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before the
7th Division of the same court which asked for the annulment of the RTC’s order granting
Gonzales and Mesa’s petition for bail?

To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner asserts that the
issues in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not similar/identical. As to his
non-disclosure of respondents’ filing of the motion for reconsideration and the Petition
for Certiorari, petitioner claims that the same has no legal relevance to the Petition
for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said petition, the order granting bail
subsisted and has not been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction has been
issued that would affect the efficacy or validity of the order granting the bail and the
order directing the release of Mesa and Gonzales.
For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is
precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping.

It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable)
opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or
the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Thus, it has
been held that there is forum shopping — (1) when, as a result of an adverse decision in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another; OR (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files a
motion before the Court of Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals in
the hope that even in one case in which a particular allowable remedy sought for is
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open; OR (3) where a
party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain
the same from the original court.26

The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently,
there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.27

As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in
both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa.
Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is
seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the
main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on
bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue
are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case
will be binding on the habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case,
petitioner clearly violated his obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the
same or a similar action or claim as mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 728 of the Rules of
Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90546 dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169482             January 29, 2008

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E.

RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and September 2,
2005 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying the petition for habeas
corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion
for reconsideration, respectively.

Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of
mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She was living with petitioner, her
nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian.

In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R.
Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made repeated demands for the
return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining
Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on
January 13, 2005.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that
respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their
mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia
as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005,6 the Court
of Appeals denied his petition.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should

issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully
being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights.
The writ of habeas corpus is available not only if the rightful custody of a person is being
withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if the person who disappears or is
illegally being detained is of legal age and is not under guardianship. Thus, a writ
of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another.
According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought
before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation
of liberty.

In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of
Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent
Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister8 while respondent Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and
petitioner’s sister.9

Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with
Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the
house, the utilities and other household needs.

Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the "encargado" or administrator of

the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased Maximo. As such, he took
charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for
and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the
late Maximo.

In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return
of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia
and the respondents were compelled to file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s
deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11,
2005. The latter willingly went with them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to prove
either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.

We rule for the respondents.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is
being withheld from the one entitled thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of
liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person.11 Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of
any person from someone entitled to such custody.

In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld
from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly,
although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless
insists that respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue
of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal freedom.

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.12

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or

not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty.14 If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint
exists.15 If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged.16 Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will
be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.17 Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ.18 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person
is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be
granted.19 If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person
in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 20

In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being
restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not:

There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty
by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by
respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are
taking care of her.21 (emphasis supplied)

The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

UDK-14071               July 17, 2009

MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER, Petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS or his
representative, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17
years was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had
already served 14 years, three months and 12 days, including his good conduct
allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.1

In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited that the petition
should be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In
particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by petitioner or a person on his
behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the
cause of petitioner’s detention or commitment order.

The OSG further opposed the issuance of the writ on the following grounds: petitioner’s
prison sentence was never commuted by then President Ramos; he had not been granted
the status of a colonist; there were other pending cases against him warranting his
continued detention2 and he was put under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a
valid judgment.

We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed for
failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with
the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court
may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out
a case for habeas corpus. In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison,3 we held that the
formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The
petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal.4 Indeed,
in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,5 this Court declared that it is the duty of
a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his
liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. So long as this Court
sits, technicality cannot trump liberty. Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form,
such as petitioner’s petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its
allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.6

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint.7 The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.8

Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to
ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts
must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly
restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates
the writ but also waters down the precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to
liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is to negate the right
itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison
walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.9

Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the
writ.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty.10 However, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued
when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.11

It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995.12 On
June 24, 1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment
of actual damages of ₱102,235.56.13

Based on petitioner’s prison records,14 he began serving his sentence on July 24, 1997. He
claims that after having served good conduct time allowance for 14 years, three months
and 12 days,15 he should now be released from prison.

We disagree.

A convict may be released on parole after serving the minimum period of his sentence.
However, the pendency of another criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of
such convict from being released on parole.16 Unfortunately, petitioner is again on trial in
Criminal Case No. 94-6988 for estafa.17 The case was filed as early as 1996 but he was
arraigned only on October 6, 2008. He pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. Pre-
trial was set on January 26, 2009.18 Clearly, he is disqualified from being released on
parole and consequently must serve out the entirety of his sentence.

We note the issuance of a warrant for petitioner’s arrest on March 8, 1996, the date he
was first set for arraignment in Criminal Case No. 94-6988. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, the writ cannot be issued and petitioner cannot be discharged
since he has been charged with another criminal offense.19 His continued detention is
without doubt warranted under the circumstances.

Petitioner asserts that his sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995 was commuted by then
President Ramos. However, he presented no proof of such commutation. Other than
indorsements by the Chief Justice,20 Public Attorney’s Office21 and Undersecretary of the
Department of Justice,22 no document purporting to be the commutation of his sentence
by then President Ramos was attached in his petition and in his subsequent missives to
this Court. His barren claim of commutation therefore deserves scant consideration, lest
we be accused of usurping the President’s sole prerogative to commute petitioner’s
sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995.23

Having established that petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid

judgment and court process, we see no need to discuss petitioner’s other arguments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182497               June 29, 2010

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR
GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 651 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for Habeas
Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of her husband
Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan2 (PO1 Ampatuan).

Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan
Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police
to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali
(Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was
directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed
of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to
the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound
for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned
over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police
Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted
where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail
in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest
Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the
alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the
COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional
Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3

Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva
ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4 The Order was approved
by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.

This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 37.5
Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at
around 7:08 o’clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man,
later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department,
was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded
the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his
Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge
PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan,
the accusatory portion of which reads:

CHARGE SHEET

THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named

respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to
Section 52 of R.A. 85516 in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024,
committed as follows:

That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro
Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active member of the
PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.

Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.7

Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I.
Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office
(NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:

1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1
Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee
Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.

2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA

8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a
 grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal
complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.

3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan,
suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both
COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody.

4. For strict compliance.8

On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent

Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board
to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.9

On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E.
Acuña, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director,
NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:

Restrictive Custody

PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional
Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated
18 April 2008).

BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:10

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case
against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from
custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.11

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office,
petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.

On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent
Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding
therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents
to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.12

On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:

Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally
detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor
Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no
administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.

Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1
Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an
administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge
Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position, respondents
cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that
habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that
this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to
place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of administrative
case for grave misconduct.

Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-
dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.

The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention, meaning, if
there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge
him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not
nominal or moral.

Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply
ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be
denied that the PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly
pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan
under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.

The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP
and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer.

Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan
has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be accepted
by this Court.1avvph!1 It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by
the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed
while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby

DISMISSED.13

Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The
issues are:
 I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION
OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT
AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT AVELINO
RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN
UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS;

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE
RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS
MAMANG PULIS.14

Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.15

Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the
issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:

RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS

SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided

by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the
court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for
hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or
a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district.

xxxx

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a
person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.16

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued
when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.17

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under
some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.18 Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.19

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.20

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists.
If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and
the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.21
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If
the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose
behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.22

Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of
respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against him.
When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon
respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff
Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial
authority against him.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents
maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that
PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as
the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and
is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In
the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,24 where this Court held that a
petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is
being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.25

The Solicitor General is correct.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No.
6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police
force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b)
of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may
be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter
of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:

Sec. 52 – x x x.

xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of
dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof
for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the
Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after
the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.
[Emphasis ours].

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a
valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.26

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of
the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.27

Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative case filed
against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.

We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April
2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and
the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in
accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:

SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of a complaint
or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding
ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by
evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may
order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That
the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent:
Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in
the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,
we have to dismiss the petition.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the
issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition
fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and
enshrined in the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182855               June 5, 2013

MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive Director,
MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF
JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its Chairperson, MR.
JOSE TORRES, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS
AND PENAL FARM, PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus1 under Rule 102 of the
1997 Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alexander Adonis (Adonis), praying that the
Court directs respondent Superintendent Venancio Tesoro (respondent), Director of the
Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, to have the body of the former brought before this Court
and in the alternative, praying for the application of the Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 08-2008,2 which imposes the penalty of a fine instead of imprisonment in
Criminal Case No. 48679-2001.3

Antecedent Facts

In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him by then Representative
Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five (5) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum penalty, to four (4) years, six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as maximum penalty.4 He began
serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.5

A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed
against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch
14.6

On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the
Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included
Adonis. The said document was received by the City Parole and Probation Office of
Davao on May 2, 2008.7

Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
the subject of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."

In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17
a Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate release from
detention and for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said
Circular.

On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis
moved for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding
Judge George Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of
₱5,000.9 Subsequently on even date and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an
undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of Davao Penal Colony
"to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or
offenses."11 On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent,12 but the
release of Adonis was not effected.

On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.13

The respondent consequently filed his Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October 27, 2008
an Urgent Motion to Resolve15 and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and
Motion,16 reiterating all his previous prayers.

On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the
Court that Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions set forth in his parole and with the advise to report to the City
Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.17

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for
the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.18

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be
allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal
Case No. 48679-2001.1âwphi1 Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he
is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP
granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007.19 While it is true
that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum
period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for
the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.20 Notably, at the time
he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch
14.21 In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was
still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore,
proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.

Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
citing Fermin v. People,22 where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather than
imprisonment under the circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
was issued on January 25, 2008 and provides the "guidelines in the observance of a rule
of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel cases." The pertinent portions read as
follows:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of
preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the
crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:

1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative

penalty for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fame alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperative of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there
is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on
subsidiary imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)

A clear reading of the Administration Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular can not be given
retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to
raise such argument considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already become
final and executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced serving his sentence.
Eventually, he was released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the
conditions of the parole granted to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160739               July 17, 2013

ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA
JUDY SOLINAP, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR
REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through
habeas corpus.
Antecedents

On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four
others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising
of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees,
membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful
authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of
the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining
Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for
the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail.2 On the next day, the entire records of
the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with
the prevailing rules.3

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).4

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed
when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was
without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed
in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from
detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her
because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of
arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the
case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.5

In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA denied the petition for habeas
corpus for its lack of merit, explaining:

As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or
could have been procured by resort to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs.
Plaza, if petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid,
the remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the
warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the Municipal Judge or
by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation shall transmit his
resolution, together with the record of the case, including the warrant of arrest, to the
Provincial Prosecutor, who shall review the same and order the release of an accused who
is detained if no probable cause is found against him. Thus, the proper remedy available
to petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from
detention on the grounds alleged in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas
corpus,8 but the CA denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the
release of Mangila from detention?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review lacks merit.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,10 the
Court discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding of habeas corpus in the
following manner:

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is
made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to
be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a
criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ
cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating
to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to
the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null
and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in
the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued
as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving
the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat
that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors
and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when

instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge
in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The
writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only
parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner
in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show
facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative

writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or
judge. It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to
the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the
right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief
from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is
held.11 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and,
if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-
settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ
is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.12

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and
her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the
proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly
provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable
by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)

Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation
even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest
against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s
petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the
warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing
the legal authority to do so.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges
to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005
pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued
by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve
her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and
pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote
the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13

The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is
held under lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has
appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the
jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its
face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:

Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge Pangilinan
in her attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest
because of its having been issued without an exhaustive examination of the complainants
and the witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of probable cause;
and without consideration of the necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice were enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.14

Mangila fails to persuade.

To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one
of the complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge,
considered Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her
cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case
and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the
preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not be the
proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even
granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the
equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights.15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of
arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of
determining the existence of probable cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to
the review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the
detainee if no probable cause should beultimately found against her. In the context of the
rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her
release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities
attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for
her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most
direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following
Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17 We
agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a
substitute for another available remedy.18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003
and November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

UDK No. 14817               January 13, 2014

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR

SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON
DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko),1 her
14-year-old daughter, ran away from home on September 23, 2011. On November 2,
2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of information that
Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer in
that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of
the National Bureau of Investigation NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura
Pura), informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with
a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child was fine
and had been attending school.

This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent
Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA)
rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as reason several threats
against her life in that city.

In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012,2 the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP 07261 to

deny the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. According
to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the
whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or
caused the disappearance of such person.3 The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for
reconsideration on January 8, 2013, hence, this petition for review.

In her Comment,4 respondent Cabcaban claimed that on September 28, 2011 police

officers found Shang Ko crying outside a church. When queried, the latter refused to give
any information about herself. Thus, they indorsed her case to the Bacolod City Police
Women and Children Protection Desk that Cabcaban headed. After the initial interview,
Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay Pasilungan , a temporary shelter for abused women
and children.

Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with the
minor who said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. She narrated that
on September 27, 2011 Shirly instructed another daughter to give Shang Ko ₱280.00 and
take her to the pier to board a boat going to Iloilo City.5 Shang Ko was told to look for a
job there and to never come back to Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she
arrived in Iloilo City, Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City with the money given
her. She went to her best friend’s house but was turned away for fear of Shirly. She called
her sister so that she and her boyfriend could get her but they, too, turned her down.6

Respondent Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social
worker not to return her to her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City Police filed a
complaint7 against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. The police
sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a conference but she refused to receive such notice.
Two days later, however, she came and spoke to Cabcaban, pointing out that Shang Ko
had been a difficult child with a tendency to steal. From their conversation, Cabcaban
surmised that Shirly did not want to take her daughter back, having offered to pay for her
daily expenses at the shelter.

Respondent Cabcaban said that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn over Shang Ko
to the Calvary Kids, a private organization that gave sanctuary and schooling to
abandoned and abused children.8 On November 2, 2011 petitioner Shirly showed up at
the police station asking for her daughter. Cabcaban told her that Shang Ko was in a
sanctuary for abandoned children and that the police officer had to first coordinate with it
before she can disclose where Shang Ko was. But Shirly was adamant and threatened her
with a lawsuit. Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a Taiwanese and that Shirly
wanted the child back to use her as leverage for getting financial support from him.

Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that one year later, NBI agents led by Pura went to
the police station to verify Shirly’s complaint that Cabcaban had kidnapped Shang Ko.
Cabcaban accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to talk to the institution’s social
worker, school principal, and director. They provided the NBI agents with the child’s
original case study report9 and told them that it was not in Shang Ko’s best interest to
return her to her mother who abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko herself told the NBI
that she would rather stay at Calvary Kids because she was afraid of what would happen
to her if she returned home.10 As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that, contrary to
her mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban actually helped her when she had nowhere
to go after her family refused to take her back.11

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available,
not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor.12 The general
rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the
right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly
and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars
that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
properly counseled.

Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod
City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city.
Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in
placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should
remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself
has expressed preference to stay in that place.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP
07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and ORDERS this custody case
forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the
evidence warrants. Meantime until such court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko
Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.

Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson Demaisip to pay
the balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10 days from receipt of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018 ]

PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., ENCARNACION A. GAOR, JOSEPHINE P.
CALAJATE, GENEDINE D. JAMBARO, EDEN C. BATTULAYAN, EVANGELINE
C. TABULOG, PETITIONERS, MARIA IMELDA JOSEFA "IMEE" R. MARCOS,
CO-PETITIONER, V. THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C.
FARIÑAS, THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY T. PIMENTEL,
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LT. GEN. ROLAND DETABALI (RET.), IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SERGEANT-AT-ARMS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
RESPONDENTS, THE COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY, CO-RESPONDENT.

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Styled as an Omnibus Petition,[1] petitioners Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr. (Agcaoili, Jr.),
Encarnacion A. Gaor (Gaor), Josephine P. Calajate (Calajate), Genedine D. Jambaro
(Jambaro), Eden C. Battulayan (Battulayan), Evangeline C. Tabulog (Tabulog) – all
employees[2] of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte and storied as "Ilocos 6" –
seek that the Court assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition[3] earlier filed by
petitioners before the Court of Appeals (CA),[4] and upon assumption, to direct the CA to
forward the records of the case to the Court for proper disposition and resolution.
Co-petitioner Maria Imelda Josefa "Imee" Marcos – the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Ilocos Norte – joins the present petition by seeking the issuance of a writ of
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for purposes of declaring the legislative
investigation into House Resolution No. 882[5] illegal and in excess of jurisdiction, and to
enjoin respondents Representatives Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Fariñas) and Johnny T. Pimentel
and co-respondent Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability (House
Committee) from further proceeding with the same. Co-petitioner prays for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to
restrain and enjoin respondents and co-respondent from conducting any further hearings
or proceedings relative to the investigation pending resolution of the instant petition.
In common, petitioners and co-petitioner seek the issuance of a writ of Amparo to protect
them from alleged actual and threatened violations of their rights to liberty and security
of person.
The Antecedents
On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondent Fariñas,
along with Representatives Pablo P. Bondoc and Aurelio D. Gonzales, Jr., directing
House Committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally
manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7171.[6] The "whereas clause" of House Resolution No. 882
states that the following purchases by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of
vehicles in three separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 in the aggregate
amount of P66,450,000.00 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as well as of R.A. No.
9184 [7] and Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 1445:[8]
a. Check dated December 1, 2011, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase
of 40 units Mini cab for distribution to the different barangays of Ilocos Norte as per
supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ...." EIGHTEEN MILLION SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP18,000,000.00);
b. Check dated May 25,2012, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase of 5
units Buses as per supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ..." FIFTEEN
MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP15,300,000.00), which were
all second hand units; and

c. Check dated September 12, 2012, "to cash advance payment of 70 units Foton Mini
Truck for distribution to different municipalities of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers
hereto attached in the amount of ...." THIRTY TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP32,550,000.00).[9]
Invitation Letters[10] dated April 6, 2017 were individually sent to petitioners for them to
attend as resource persons the initial hearing on House Resolution No. 882 scheduled on
May 2, 2017. In response, petitioners sent similarly-worded Letters[11] dated April 21,
2017 asking to be excused from the inquiry pending official instructions from co-
petitioner Marcos as head of the agency.
Because of petitioners' absence at the May 2, 2017 hearing, a subpoena ad
testificandum was issued by co-respondent House Committee on May 3, 2017 directing
petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a hearing set on May 16, 2017.[12] Likewise,
an invitation was sent to co-petitioner Marcos to appear on said hearing.[13]
Since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one day prior to the scheduled
hearing, petitioners requested that their appearance be deferred to a later date to give
them time to prepare. In their letters also, petitioners requested clarification as to what
information co-respondent House Committee seeks to elicit and its relevance to R.A. No.
7171.[14] Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other hand, submitted a Letter [15] dated May 15,
2017 seeking clarification on the legislative objective of House Resolution No. 882 and
its discriminatory application to the Province of Ilocos Norte to the exclusion of other
virginia-type tobacco producing provinces.
Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled on May 16, 2017. As such, the House
Committee issued a Show Cause Order[16] why they should not be cited in contempt for
their refusal without legal excuse to obey summons. Additionally, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos were notified of the next scheduled hearing on May 29, 2017.[17]
In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they received the notice
only one day prior to the scheduled hearing date in alleged violation of the three-day
notice rule under Section 8[18] of the House Rules Governing Inquiries.[19] Co-petitioner
Marcos, on the other hand, reiterated the queries she raised in her earlier letter.
Nevertheless, at the scheduled committee hearing on May 29, 2017, all the petitioners
appeared.[20] It is at this point of the factual narrative where the parties' respective
interpretations of what transpired during the May 29, 2017 begin to differ.
Legislative hearing on May 29,
2017 and the contempt citation
On one hand, petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they were subjected
to threats and intimidation.[21] According to petitioners, they were asked "leading and
misleading questions" and that regardless of their answers, the same were similarly
treated as evasive.[22]
Specifically, Jambaro claims that because she could not recall the transactions Fariñas
alluded to and requested to see the original copy of a document presented to her for
identification, she was cited in contempt and ordered detained.[23] Allegedly, the same
inquisitorial line of questioning was used in the interrogation of Gaor. When Gaor
answered that she could no longer remember if she received a cash advance of
P18,600,000.00 for the purchase of 40 units of minicab, Gaor was likewise cited in
contempt and ordered detained.[24]
The same threats, intimidation and coercion were likewise supposedly employed on
Calajate when she was asked by Fariñas if she signed a cash advance voucher in the
amount of P18,600,000.00 for the purchase of the 40 units of minicabs. When Calajate
refused to answer, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.[25]
Similarly, when Battulayan could no longer recall having signed a cash advance voucher
for the purchase of minicabs, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.[26]
Agcaoili, Jr. was likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained when he failed to
answer Fariñas's query regarding the records of the purchase of the vehicles.[27] Allegedly,
the same threats and intimidation were employed by Fariñas in the questioning of
Tabulog who was similarly asked if she remembered the purchase of 70 mini trucks.
When Tabulog replied that she could no longer remember such transaction, she was also
cited in contempt and ordered detained.[28]
On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioners were evasive in answering questions
and simply claimed not to remember the specifics of the subject transactions. According
to respondents, petitioners requested to be confronted with the original documents to
refresh their memories when they knew beforehand that the Commission on Audit (COA)
to which the original vouchers were submitted could no longer find the same.[29]
Proceedings before the CA
The next day, or on May 30, 2017, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali) before the
CA. The CA scheduled the petition for hearing on June 5, 2017 where the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its special appearance for Detabali, arguing that the
latter was not personally served with a copy of the petition.[30] On June 2, 2017, the CA in
its Resolution[31] issued a writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies
of the petitioners before the court on June 5, 2017.
On June 5, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. Instead, the Deputy Secretary General of
the House of Representatives appeared to explain that Detabali accompanied several
members of the House of Representatives on a Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to
attend the scheduled hearing.[32] A motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also
filed on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the petition.[33]
On June 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on petitioners'
constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the motion.[34]
At the hearing set on June 8, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. On June 9, 2017, the
CA issued a Resolution[35] denying Detabali's motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas
Corpus and granting petitioners' Motion for Provisional Release upon posting of a bond.
Accordingly, the CA issued an Order of Release Upon Bond.[36] Attempts to serve said
Resolution and Order of Release Upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail.[37]
On June 20, 2017, the House of Representatives called a special session for the
continuation of the legislative inquiry.[38] Thereat, a subpoena ad testificandum was
issued to compel co-petitioner Marcos to appear at the scheduled July 25, 2017 hearing.
[39]

The tension between the House of

Representatives and the CA
During the June 20, 2017 hearing, House Committee unanimously voted to issue a Show
Cause Order against the three Justices of the CA's Special Fourth Division,[40] directing
them to explain why they should not be cited in contempt by the House of
Representatives.[41] The House of Representatives was apparently dismayed over the CA's
actions in the Habeas Corpus Petition, with House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez quoted as
calling the involved CA Justices "mga gago" and threatening to dissolve the CA.
[42]
 Disturbed by this turn of events, the involved CA Justices wrote a letter dated July 3,
2017 addressed to the Court En Banc deferring action on certain pending motions[43] and
administratively referring the same to the Court for advice and/or appropriate action.
Meanwhile, in the Habeas Corpus Petition, Detabali moved for the inhibition of CA
Justices Stephen Cruz and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela while CA Justice Edwin Sorongon
voluntarily inhibited himself.[44]
Subsequent Release of Petitioners
and Dismissal of the Habeas
Corpus Petition by the CA
On July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA,
petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.
During the congressional hearing on July 25, 2017 which petitioners and co-petitioner
Marcos attended, and while the present Omnibus Petition is pending final resolution by
the Court, respondent House Committee lifted the contempt order and ordered the release
of petitioners. Consequently, petitioners were released on the same date.[45] Respondent
House Committee held the continuance of the legislative hearings on August 9, 2017 and
August 23, 2017.[46]
On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus Petition
considering the case as closed and terminated on the ground of mootness.[47]
The Arguments
For the assumption of jurisdiction
over the Habeas Corpus Petition
Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending before the CA can be
transferred to the Court on the strength of the latter's power to promulgate rules
concerning the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts and its authority to exercise
jurisdiction over all courts as provided under Sections 1[48] and 5(5),[49] Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Additionally, petitioners stress that the Court exercises administrative supervision over
all courts as provided under Section 6,[50] Article VIII of the Constitution, and pursuant to
its authority as such, the Court has the power to transfer cases from one court to another
which power it implements through Rule 4, Section 3(c)[51] of AM No. 10-4-20-SC.[52]
Citing People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, et al.,[53] petitioners likewise argue that the
administrative power of the Court to transfer cases from one court to another is based on
its inherent power to protect the judiciary and prevent a miscarriage of justice.[54]
Respondents counter that the Omnibus Petition should be dismissed on the ground of
mootness as petitioners were released from detention.

In any case, respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition pending before the CA as assumption of
jurisdiction is conferred by law. Respondents also argue that the Omnibus Petition is
dismissible on the grounds of misjoinder of action and for failure to implead
indispensable parties, i.e., the CA in the petition to assume jurisdiction over the Habeas
Corpus Petition and the Congress in the prohibition and Amparo petitions. Respondents
also argue that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the present
Omnibus Petition at a time when a motion for reconsideration before the CA was still
pending resolution.
For the issuance of a Writ of
Prohibition
Co-petitioner Marcos assails the nature of the legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition
in violation of petitioners' right to due process and is allegedly discriminatory to the
Province of Ilocos Norte.

Respondents counter that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to enjoin
legislative actions. House Committee is not a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial or ministerial function but a separate and independent branch of
government. Citing Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,[55] and The
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon. Majaducon,[56] respondents argue that prohibition
does not lie against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
For the issuance of a Writ of Amparo
Petitioners contend that their rights to liberty and personal security were violated as they
have been detained, while co-petitioner Marcos is continuously being threatened of
arrest.[57]
In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas
Corpus are two separate remedies which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-exist
in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that the issuance of a writ of Amparo is
limited only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances which are not
extant in the instant case.
The Issues
Encapsulated, the issues for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of petitioners
from detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release from detention?
2. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition
then pending before the CA?
3. Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882 may be
enjoined by a writ of prohibition?

4. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo?[58]
Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the Omnibus Petition.
I.
The Petition to Assume Jurisdiction
over Habeas Corpus Petition
The release of persons in whose
behalf the application for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus was filed
renders the petition for the
issuance thereof moot and
academic
The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty"[59] was devised as a "speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom."[60] The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."[61] Under the Constitution, the privilege of
the writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.[62]
As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case law[63] deems any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action as sufficient. Thus, as provided in the
Rules of Court under Section 1, Rule 102 thereof, a writ of Habeas Corpus "shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 102 spells the instances when the writ of Habeas
Corpus is not allowed or when the discharge thereof is authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court[64] because
since then, the restraint has become legal.[65] In the illustrative case of Ilagan v. Hon.
Ponce Enrile,[66] the Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of
mootness considering the filing of an information before the court. The court pronounced
that since the incarceration was now by virtue of a judicial order, the remedy of habeas
corpus no longer lies.
Like so, in Duque v. Capt. Vinarao,[67] the Court held that a petition for habeas
corpus can be dismissed upon voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner. Further, in Pestaño
v. Corvista,[68] it was pronounced that where the subject person had already been released
from the custody complained of, the petition for habeas corpus then still pending was
considered already moot and academic and should be dismissed. This pronouncement
was carried on in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,[69] where the Court reiterated
that the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas
corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic.[70] Thus, with the subsequent release of all the petitioners from detention, their
petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot. The rule is that courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual
interests are involved and thus, will not determine a moot question as the resolution
thereof will be of no practical value.[71]
Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal deprivation of
freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus.
Consequently, in the absence of confinement and custody, the courts lack the power to
act on the petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused.
Any lingering doubt as to the justiciability of the petition to assume jurisdiction over
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA is ultimately precluded by the CA Resolution
considering the petition closed and terminated. With the termination of the Habeas
Corpus Petition before the CA, petitioners' plea that the same be transferred to this Court,
or that the Court assume jurisdiction thereof must necessarily be denied.
Nevertheless, the Court, in
exceptional cases, decides moot
questions
Although as above-enunciated, the general rule is that mootness of the issue warrants a
dismissal, the same admits of certain exceptions.

In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,[72] the Court summed up the four exceptions

to the rule when Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, thus: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[73] At the least, the
presence of the second and fourth exceptions to the general rule in the instant case
persuades us to proceed.
The Court's administrative
supervision over lower courts does
not equate to the power to usurp
jurisdiction already acquired by
lower courts
Jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to issue the writ
are shared by this Court and the lower courts.
The Constitution vests upon this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus.[74] On the other hand, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Big. 129,[75] as amended, gives the
CA original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.[76] The CA's original jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus petitions was
re-stated in R.A. No. 7902.[77] Similarly, B.P. Blg. 129 gives the RTCs original
jurisdiction in the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus.[78] Family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court and the CA in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
of minors is at issue,[79] with the Family courts having exclusive jurisdiction to issue the
ancillary writ of Habeas Corpus in a petition for custody of minors filed before it.[80] In
the absence of all RTC judges in a province or city, special jurisdiction is likewise
conferred to any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge or Municipal Circuit
Trial Judge to hear and decide petitions for a writ of Habeas Corpus.[81]
These conferment of jurisdiction finds procedural translation in Rule 102, Section 2
which provides that an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus may be made before this
Court, or any member thereof, or the Court of Appeals or any member thereof, and if so
granted, the same shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[82] An application for
a writ of Habeas Corpus may also be made before the RTCs, or any of its judges, but if
so granted, is enforceable only within the RTC's judicial district.[83] The writ of Habeas
Corpus granted by the Court or by the CA may be made returnable before the court or
any member thereof, or before the RTC or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on
the merits.[84]
It is clear from the foregoing that this Court, the CA and the RTC enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by
petitioners with the CA, the latter has acquired jurisdiction over said petition to the
exclusion of all others, including this Court. This must be so considering the basic
postulate that jurisdiction once acquired by a court is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated.[85] A departure from this established rule
is to run the risk of having conflicting decisions from courts of concurrent jurisdiction
and would unwittingly promote judicial interference and instability.
Rule 102 in fact supports this interpretation. Observe that under Section 6, Rule 102, the
return of the writ of Habeas Corpus may be heard by a court apart from that which issued
the writ.[86] In such case, the lower court to which the writ is made returnable by the
issuing court shall proceed to decide the petition for habeas corpus. In Medina v. Gen.
Yan[87] and Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc.,[88] the Court held that by virtue of such
designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits
of the [petition for habeas corpus.]" Indeed, when a court acquires jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus, even if merely designated to hear the return of the writ, such
court has the power and the authority to carry the petition to its conclusion.
Petitioners are without unbridled freedom to choose which between this Court and the
CA should decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not
afford the parties absolute freedom to choose the court to which the petition shall be filed.
After all, the hierarchy of courts "also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs."[89]
Further, there appears to be no basis either in fact or in law for the Court to assume or
wrest jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition filed with the CA.
Petitioners' fear that the CA will be unable to decide the Habeas Corpus petition because
of the assault[90] it suffered from the House of Representatives is unsubstantiated and
therefore insufficient to justify their plea for the Court to over-step into the jurisdiction
acquired by the CA. There is no showing that the CA will be or has been rendered
impotent by the threats it received from the House of Representatives.[91] Neither was
there any compelling reason advanced by petitioners that the non-assumption by this
Court of the habeas corpus petition will result to an iniquitous situation for any of the
parties.
Neither can the Court assume jurisdiction over the then pending Habeas Corpus Petition
by invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of A.M.
No. 10-4-20-SC which both refer to the Court's exercise of administrative supervision
over all courts.
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

This Constitutional provision refers to the administrative supervision that the Department
of Justice previously exercised over the courts and their personnel. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission enlighten:

MR. GUINGONA: x x x.

The second question has reference to Section 9, about the administrative supervision over
all courts to be retained in the Supreme Court. I was wondering if the Committee had
taken into consideration the proposed resolution for the transfer of the administrative
supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know, none
of the proponents had been invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution.

Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the fact that the UP Law
Constitution Project in its Volume I, entitled: Annotated Provision had, in fact, made this
an alternative proposal, the transfer of administrative supervision from the Supreme
Court to the Ministry of Justice.
Thank you.

MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

We did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent for the transfer of
supervision of the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. I even personally called up and
sent a letter or a short note inviting him, but the good Minister unfortunately was
enmeshed in a lot of official commitments. We wanted to hear him because the Solicitor
General of his office, Sedfrey Ordofiez, appeared before us, and asked for the
maintenance of the present arrangement wherein the supervision over lower courts is with
the Supreme Court. But aside from that, although there were no resource persons, we did
further studies on the feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower courts to
the Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into consideration motu proprio.[92]
Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2, Chapter 7, Book IV of the
Administrative Code is defined as follows:

(2) Administrative Supervision.—(a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the

administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory
agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of
the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and
to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the
conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action
as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including
rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review
and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them[.]

Thus, administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the operations of agencies

to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically, but without
interference with day-to-day activities.[93]
Thus, to effectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts as
prescribed by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 842, created the Office of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in the functions
of the several offices in the Office of the Court Administrator is it provided that the Court
can assume jurisdiction over a case already pending with another court.[94]
Rule 4, Section 3(c) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, on the other hand provides:
Sec. 3. Administrative Functions of the Court. - The administrative functions of the
Court en banc consist of, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx

(c) the transfer of cases, from one court, administrative area or judicial region, to
another, or the transfer of venue of the trial of cases to avoid miscarriage of justice[.]
(Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the administrative function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter of venue,
rather than jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the import of the Court's
pronouncement in Gutierrez[95] is the recognition of the incidental and inherent power of
the Court to transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a
neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.[96] Such incidental and inherent power
cannot be interpreted to mean an authority on the part of the Court to determine which
court should hear specific cases without running afoul with the doctrine of separation of
powers between the Judiciary and the Legislative.
II.
The Petition for Prohibition
Under the Court's expanded
jurisdiction, the remedy of
prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of
the Government
Respondents principally oppose co-petitioner Marcos' petition for prohibition on the
ground that a writ of prohibition does not lie to enjoin legislative or quasi-legislative
actions. In support thereof, respondents cite the cases of Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association[97] and The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.[98]
Contrary to respondents' contention, nowhere in The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee did
the Court finally settle that prohibition does not lie against legislative functions.[99] The
import of the Court's decision in said case is the recognition of the Constitutional
authority of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure and provided that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thus, if these Constitutionally-prescribed
requirements are met, courts have no authority to prohibit Congressional committees
from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a subpoena.
On the other hand, the Court's pronouncement in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association should be taken in its proper context. The principal relief sought by
petitioners therein was the invalidation of the implementing rules issued by the National
Government Center Administration Committee pursuant to its quasi-legislative power.
Hence, the Court therein stated that prohibition is not the proper remedy but an ordinary
action for nullification, over which the Court generally exercises not primary, but
appellate jurisdiction.[100]
In any case, the availability of the remedy of prohibition for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Legislative and Executive branches has been categorically affirmed by the Court
in Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,[101] thus:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.[102] (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
The above pronouncement is but an application of the Court's judicial power which
Section 1,[103] Article VIII of the Constitution defines as the duty of the courts of justice
(1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and (2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Such innovation under the 1987 Constitution later on
became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and "expanded jurisdiction,"
respectively.[104]
While the requisites for the court's exercise of either concept of jurisdiction remain
constant, note that the exercise by the Court of its "expanded jurisdiction" is not limited
to the determination of grave abuse of discretion to quasi-judicial or judicial acts, but
extends to any act involving the exercise of discretion on the part of the government.
Indeed, the power of the Court to enjoin a legislative act is beyond cavil as what the
Court did in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, et al.[105] when it enjoined therein respondent committees from conducting
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the notorious "Hello Garci" tapes for failure to comply
with the requisite publication of the rules of procedure.
Co-petitioner Marcos failed to
show that the subject legislative
inquiry violates the Constitution
or that the conduct thereof was
attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction
While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions, the
Court finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the instant case.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
expressly provided by the Constitution under Section 21, Article VI thereof, which
provides:

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such
inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis ours)
Even before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the Court in Arnault v.
Nazareno[106] recognized that the power of inquiry is an "essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function."[107] In Senate of the Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,
[108]
 the Court categorically pronounced that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch, as in the instant case.[109]
Although expansive, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not without limitations. Foremost, the inquiry must be in furtherance of a
legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation, and as such, "investigations conducted
solely to gather incriminatory evidence and punish those investigated" should necessarily
be struck down.[110] Further, the exercise of the power of inquiry is circumscribed by the
above-quoted Constitutional provision, such that the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."[111] It is
jurisprudentially settled that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify
against one's self.
In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the nature of the legislative inquiry
as a fishing expedition in alleged violation of her right to due process and to be
discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte. However, a perusal of the minutes of
legislative hearings so far conducted reveals that the same revolved around the use of the
Province of Ilocos Norte's shares from the excise tax on locally manufactured virginia-
type cigarettes through cash advances which co-petitioner Marcos herself admits[112] to be
the "usual practice" and was actually allowed by the Commission on Audit (COA).[113] In
fact, the cause of petitioners' detention was not the perceived or gathered illegal use of
such shares but the rather unusual inability of petitioners to recall the transactions despite
the same having involved considerable sums of money.
Like so, co-petitioner Marcos' plea for the prevention of the legislative inquiry was
anchored on her apprehension that she, too, will be arrested and detained by House
Committee. However, such remains to be an apprehension which does not give cause for
the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition. Consequently, co-petitioner
Marcos' prayer for the ancillary remedy of a preliminary injunction cannot be granted,
because her right thereto has not been proven to be clear and unmistakable. In any event,
such injunction would be of no useful purpose given that the instant Omnibus Petition has
been decided on the merits.[114]
 III.
The Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo
The filing of the petition for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo
before this Court while the
Habeas Corpus Petition before the
CA was still pending is improper
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of Amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz, et
al. v. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et al.,[115] thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of Amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security — the personal concern
that the writ is intended to protect — is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or
on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.[116] (Italics in the original)
Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition
for habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo,[117] the peculiarity of the then pendency of
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.
The privilege of the writ of
Amparo is confined to instances of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof
Even if the Court sets aside this procedural faux pas, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos
failed to show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to the issuance of the writ. Much less
have they exhibited, by substantial evidence, meritorious grounds to the grant of the
petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,[118] the

Court categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, and
jurisprudentially defined these two instances, as follows:
[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the
other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[119] (Citations omitted)
The above definition of "enforced disappearance" appears in the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances[120] and is as statutorily defined
in Section 3(g)[121] of R. A. No. 9851.[122] Thus, in Navia, et al. v. Pardico,[123] the elements
constituting "enforced disappearance," are enumerated as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or

give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition;
and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.[124]
In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,[125] the Court reiterates that
the privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether
the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a
private individual.[126]
Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus Petition
does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on
this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is dismissible.
Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and security were violated
because of their unlawful detention. On the other hand, co-petitioner Marcos seeks the
protective writ of Amparo on the ground that her right to liberty and security are being
threatened by the conduct of the legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882. But
even these claims of actual and threatened violations of the right to liberty and security
fail to impress.
To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the (1) right to life;
(2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life. In Rev. Fr. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[127] the Court had
occasion to expound on the rights falling within the protective mantle of the writ
of Amparo, thus:
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to
security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained the concept
of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property ... pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of
person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr., in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare." x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., thoroughly expounded on the

import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." x x x Some
scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of person"
as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides,
viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and
any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a
state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The
degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of
their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the
"freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in
the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.
xxxx

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by

the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x.[128] (Citations
omitted and emphasis and italics in the original)
Nevertheless, and by way of caution, the rule is that a writ of Amparo shall not issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, every petition for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo should be supported by justifying allegations of fact, which the Court
in Tapuz[129] laid down as follows:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by
an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.[130] (Citations
omitted and italics in the original)
Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where the
alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.[131]
In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has effectively ceased
upon their subsequent release from detention. On the other hand, the apprehension of co-
petitioner Marcos that she will be detained is, at best, merely speculative. In other words,
co-petitioner Marcos has failed to show any clear threat to her right to liberty actionable
through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
In Mayor William N. Mamba, et al. v. Leomar Bueno,[132] the Court held that:
Neither did petitioners and co-petitioner successfully establish the existence of a threat to
or violation of their right to security. In an Amparo action, the parties must establish their
respective claims by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is
more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of
liability against the person charged.[133]
Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended and participated
in the subsequent hearings on House Resolution No. 882 without any untoward incident.
Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus failed to establish that their attendance at and
participation in the legislative inquiry as resource persons have seriously violated their
right to liberty and security, for which no other legal recourse or remedy is available.
Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo must be dismissed.
 IV.
Congress' Power to Cite in Contempt
and to Compel Attendance of Court Justices
It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the events surrounding the filing of the
present Omnibus Petition bear the unsavory impression that a display of force between
the CA and the Congress is impending. Truth be told, the letter of the CA Justices to the
Court En Banc betrays the struggle these CA Justices encountered in view of the
Congressional power to cite in contempt and consequently, to arrest and detain. These
Congressional powers are indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the
Court of its Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of
their official duties. The fact remains that the CA Justices are non-impeachable officers.
As such, authority over them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other.
To echo the Court's ruling in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez:[134]
[T]he Supreme Court [has] administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.[135]
It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined under the
Constitution that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling under the sole
discretion of the legislative branch of the government. In point is the power of legislative
investigation which the Congress exercises as a Constitutional prerogative.

Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic
postulates for exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for
excluding the Judiciary's privileged and confidential documents and information
from any compulsory processes which very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry
in aid of legislation.[136] Such exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial
privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one Supreme
Court and lower courts created by law.[137]
However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The
invocation of the Court's judicial privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are
part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of the Members'
adjudicatory functions and duties. For the guidance of the bench, the Court herein
reiterates its Per Curiam Resolution[138] dated February 14, 2012 on the production of
court records and attendance of court officials and employees as witnesses in the then
impeachment complaint against former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, insofar as it
summarized the documents or communications considered as privileged as follows:
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the
Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to
pending cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the
raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court (IRSC);
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative
process, i.e, notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers;
(4) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in
the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even
after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot
be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made
available by the court to the general public.
xxxx

By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the

Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. Justice Antonio T. Carpio
discussed in his Separate Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, by way of example, the
non-confidential matters as including those "information relating to the commission of
crimes or misconduct, or violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or any violation of a
law or regulation," and those outside the Justices' adjudicatory functions such as
"financial, budgetary, personnel and administrative matters relating to the operations of
the Judiciary."
As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is
principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which
Members of the Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations,
are called to appear and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative
adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial privilege may not be successfully invoked.

The Court had occasion to illustrate the application of the rule on judicial privilege and
its qualifications to impeachment proceedings as follows:

[W]here the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be called
as a witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to or is
not connected with the adjudicatory functions and duties of a magistrate. A Justice,
however, may not be called to testify on the arguments the accused Justice presented in
the internal debates as these constitute details of the deliberative process.[139]
Nevertheless, the traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat
a positive Constitutional duty. Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis,[140] is a
Constitutional process designed to ensure accountability of impeachable officers, the
seriousness and exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial
privilege.
To be certain, the Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment proceedings even
as against its own Members, recognizes not the superiority of the power of the House of
Representatives to initiate impeachment cases and the power of the Senate to try and
decide the same, but the superiority of the impeachment proceedings as a Constitutional
process intended to safeguard public office from culpable abuses. In the words of Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereneo in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to
the Per Curiam Resolution, the matter of impeachment is of such paramount societal
importance that overrides the generalized claim of judicial privilege and as such, the
Court should extend respect to the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court and give it
wide latitude in favor of its function of exacting accountability as required by the
Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues
raised in the Omnibus Petition.

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 232006

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR MICHAEL LABRADOR

ABELLANA (PETITIONER, DETAINED AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISONS,
MUNTINLUPA CITY),  
vs.
HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY BRANCH 13, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, S/SUPT BENJAMIN DELOS SANTOS (RET.), IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus under Rule
102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Michael Labrador Abellana (petitioner) prays for his
release from prison on the ground that he has been deprived of his rights to due process
and to competent counsel.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged before Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City (RTC) with
violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The factual findings by the RTC in its
Decision are as follows:
A search warrant was issued against herein accused by the presiding judge of this court.
The accused who is Michael Badajos also known as Michael Badayos is a resident of
Bgy. Suba, Cebu City. The search warrant was for violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165.

When the team led by P/Supt. Labra arrived, the accused was present. They identified
themselves as police officers and informed the accused of the existence of the search
warrant. PO2 Maglinte was designated as searcher while PO2 dela Victoria was
designated recorder. The search was done in the presence of the accused and barangay
tanods of Bgy. Suba.

The sala of the 2-storey house was searched first. Then they found the hanged pants of
the accused in the window. There was no other male person in the house. They found in
the said front pocket of the accused the following items:

1. Big transparent plastic pack of white crystalline substance believed to be shahu. They
marked it SW-MAB-01. They also found shabu paraphernalia consisting of the
following:

One scissor;

Two disposable lighters;

One improvised clip;

One rolled aluminum tinfoil;

One improvised burner;

Six assorted sizes of empty plastic packs;

One improvised funnel inside a plastic pack (Exh. D).1

Subsequently, petitioner was charged on the basis of the following Informations:

CBU-77150

That on or about the 26th day of May 2008 at about 4:30 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and under his control one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing 6.89
[grams] locally known as "shabu" containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, without authority of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

CBU-77151

That on the 26th day of May 2008 at about 4:30 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent and without any lawful purpose, did then and there have in his possession and
control the following:

a) One (1) scissor

b) Two (2) disposable lighters

c) One (1) improvised clip

d) One (1) rolled aluminum tin foil

e) One (1) improvised burner

f) Assorted sizes of empty packs to be used in repacking shabu

g) One (1) improvised funnel

which are instruments or equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, ingesting or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged in both Informations.3

He thereafter filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant, which was denied by the RTC in
an Order dated September 15, 2006.4 After the pre-trial, the trial for the case ensued.
Petitioner was represented then by Atty. Dario Rama, Jr. (Atty. Rama).5

On November 9, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Physical Re-examination and Re-
weighing of the alleged shabu confiscated from him, which was granted by the RTC. The
Qualitative Report revealed that the actual weight of the drugs seized was 4.4562 grams
and not 6.89 grams. As a result, petitioner was able to file a Petition for Bail, which was
granted.6 Thus, on April 4, 2008, petitioner was released from detention after furnishing
the bail bond.7

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
denied.8
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Raul Albura (Atty. Albura) filed his Entry of Appearance9 as
counsel for petitioner.

On April 30, 2009, the RTC issued an Order10 submitting the case for decision for failure
of petitioner and his counsel to appear during the scheduled hearing on even date for
initial presentation of evidence for the defense.11

On July 25, 2009, petitioner, through Atty. Albura, filed an Urgent Motion to Defer
Promulgation of Judgment.12 Petitioner claimed that he received a copy of the July 17,
2009 Notice setting the promulgation of judgment on July 29, 2009 at 9:30 a.m. only on
July 22, 2009. Petitioner also made the following claims:

x x x the Honorable Court, ordered the accused to present his witness starting September
10, 2008. Unfortunately, he failed to testify or present witnesses because x x x there
was no proper guidance of his previous counsel [which] he observed [as] not [being
able to defend] his case diligently as exemplified by: a) failure to quash the search
warrant before arraignment[; and] b) failure to file the Demurrer to Evidence on time.

Finally, last September 24, 2008 hearing, accused manifested [to] the Honorable Court
[his desire to replace or change] his counsel. Due to financial constraints, it took him
until December 9, 2008 to engage the services of Atty. Raul A. Albura, who entered
his appearance on the same date.

x x x Unfortunately, the present counsel was never furnished copies of any [order,

process and notice] from this Honorable Court since the time he represented the
accused despite filing a formal Entry of Appearance received by the court last December
9, 2008 x x x.

In fact, the undersigned counsel accidentally received the Notice of Promulgation of

Judgment when he visited the court's office to follow-up his Notarial Petition.

x x x In view of the foregoing, the promulgation of judgment in this case without

giving the accused an opportunity to adduce his defense either testimonial or
documentary is a denial of his constitutional right to due process.13 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Rulings of the RTC

On July 29, 2009, the RTC promulgated its Decision14 dated May 11, 2009,15 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused MICHAEL L.

ABELLANA[,] also known as MICHAEL BADAYOS[,] GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165, and sentences him to
TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of
imprisonment, subject to [a] fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00)[;] and for violation of Section 12, Art. 2, RA 9165[,] he is hereby
sentenced to suffer SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO FOUR (4) YEARS of
imprisonment and a fine in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).16

Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration

On August 13, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration.17 He
alleged that his rights as an accused had been prejudiced by some irregularities
committed during trial. Specifically, he claimed that he had been deprived of his right to
due process because he had not been properly notified ever since Atty. Albura became his
new counsel and that in total, Atty. Albura received only two notices involving the case,
which included the Notice of Promulgation of Judgment.18 Petitioner also discussed the
merits of his case, claiming that there were errors of fact in the RTC Decision.19

On August 28, 2009, the RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest20 against petitioner.

On November 25, 2009, the RTC issued a Show Cause Order21 against Atty. Albura to
explain why he should not be held in contempt for the following statements in petitioner's
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration:

x x x Although, counsel acknowledged his part of the blame for his failure to attend
the said promulgation but with a reason as a sign of a protest premised on the
foregoing circumstances especially that counsel tried to defer the promulgation of the
judgment by filing an "Urgent Motion to Defer the Promulgation of Judgment with a
Manifestation to Submit a Memorandum" filed last July 27, 2009.22 (Emphasis supplied)

On December 28, 2009, the RTC issued an Order23 denying petitioner's Motion for New
Trial or Reconsideration on the basis of the last paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — x x x

xxxx

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The RTC stated that when the case was called for promulgation of judgment, petitioner
failed to appear despite notice through the bond company. His counsel's knowledge of the
scheduled promulgation was also admitted when he stated in the Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration that "the first notice was received accidentally when counsel visited the
courts' office to follow up his notarial petition whereby a court's personnel casually
served [it] like an ordinary notice."24 Thus, petitioner's failure to appear for promulgation
of judgment was without justifiable cause. Moreover, petitioner did not surrender within
15 days from date of promulgation and there was no manifestation that his absence was
for a justifiable cause. Thus, he lost all the remedies available, including a motion for
new trial or reconsideration.25

In any case, the RTC ruled that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
The RTC stated that there was no proper substitution of counsel.26 The RTC also rejected
petitioner's claim that his previous counsel was negligent for failing to quash the warrant
and for failure to file the demurrer to evidence on time. The RTC ruled that there was no
ground to quash the warrant and the demurrer was actually filed on time. Moreover, the
RTC stated that the previous counsel, Atty. Rama, was not remiss in his duties as he filed
several pleadings for petitioner, including the motion for re-examination and re-weighing
of the shabu and the petition for bail, both of which were granted for petitioner's benefit.
In contrast, the RTC stated that it was Atty. Albura who discouraged his client from
attending the scheduled promulgation as a sign of protest.27

Lastly, the RTC ruled that contrary to petitioner's claims, he was not deprived of his day
in court. He was represented when all prosecution witnesses testified and the latter were
cross-examined by his previous counsel. The RTC held:

The accused invoked his right to be present. But after he posted bail, he became scarce
and failed to appear during the scheduled promulgation. The right to present
evidence may be waived.

Contrary to the contention of counsel for movant, there was no conviction without due
process of law. Due process does not mean lack of hearing but lack of opportunity to be
heard. In this case, the accused was given opportunity to be heard.28 (Emphasis
supplied)

At the time of the issuance of the RTC Order dated December 28, 2009, petitioner was
still at large.29 On February 10, 2010, petitioner was finally arrested at his residence.30

On February 12, 2010, Atty. Albura filed a Manifestation of his withdrawal as counsel
for petitioner, which was granted on February 16, 2010.31
 Petition for Relief from Judgment

On August 16, 2010, petitioner's third counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Acosta (Atty. Acosta),
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment32 on the ground that petitioner was "deprived of
his [constitutional right to be heard and to present evidence in his behalf in view of the
excusable negligence of Atty. Albura in not appearing during the above-mentioned
hearing and for failure of his bondsman or Atty. Albura to inform him of the scheduled
hearing."33 In his Affidavit of Merit,34 petitioner claimed that he was neither notified of
the schedule of the hearing on the initial presentation of defense evidence nor was he
notified of the promulgation of judgment.

In an Order35 dated September 7, 2010, the RTC denied the petition for relief from
judgment for lack of factual and legal basis. The RTC ruled that relief from judgment was
not a proper remedy. In any event, even if the petition were to be given due course, it
would still be denied based on the following:

He blamed his bondsman and original counsel in not informing him of the scheduled
hearing. He should not rely on his bondsman and counsel. He is the most interested
party in these criminal cases. His lawyer was not negligent because he filed a Motion
for New Trial or Reconsideration although the court denied the same. After his
conviction on May 11, 2009, he was arrested and detained on February 2010, he had
plenty of time to avail of any remaining remedy. It was only on August 16, 2010 [when]
he filed the so-called petition for relief from judgment. Thus, he filed the said petition
more than six (6) months from the time he learned about his conviction.

He was abandoned by his former lawyer because he did not cooperate with him.

The accused is bound by the negligence of his counsel. He cannot blame his
bondsman because, as earlier stated, he should have inquired from his lawyer, the
bondsman or the court the scheduled hearing. In fact, he knew the scheduled
hearing.36 (Emphasis supplied)

On October 6, 2010 and December 28, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. These
motions were denied by the RTC in an Order37 dated January 24, 2011. The RTC
reiterated its ruling in the previous order, with the addition that the petition was filed out
of time.

The RTC emphasized that according to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for relief should be filed "within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken."
Here, petitioner was detained on February 10, 2010 and according to the RTC, it is
presumed that he learned about the judgment against him on said date. However,
petitioner filed the petition only on August 16, 2010, which is beyond the 60-day period;
hence, the same was filed out of time.38

The RTC also ruled, citing jurisprudence, that a party who has filed a timely motion for
new trial cannot file a petition for relief after his motion has been denied as these two
remedies are exclusive of each other. Here, since petitioner filed a timely motion for new
trial but was denied, he should have appealed the same. A petition for relief from
judgment will not be granted when appeal was available and was an adequate remedy.39

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via petition for certiorari.40

Ruling of the CA

On February 17, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution41 dismissing the petition. The CA

adopted the RTC's findings that petitioner had due notices of the hearings set for defense
evidence and promulgation of judgment but failed to appear. The CA also agreed with the
RTC that the petition for relief was filed out of time and that the proper remedy should
have been an appeal from the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration.42

On March 16, 2012, the above-mentioned Resolution became final and executory for
petitioner's failure to move for reconsideration or appeal the same. Consequently, an
Entry of Judgment was made and the resolution was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.43

Petition before the Court

On June 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus44 before the Court. He claims that a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy in such cases when a person is
deprived of his Constitutional rights during the court proceedings.45 Specifically, he
claims that he has been deprived of his rights to due process and to competent counsel.

Petitioner avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of
notice of the proceedings in the RTC. He claims that the RTC hastily submitted the
criminal cases for decision even if there was no proof on record that petitioner or his
previous counsels, Attys. Rama and Albura, received any notice or order from the court
of the proceedings, thereby effectively depriving him of his right to be heard and to
present evidence on his behalf.46 Moreover, petitioner argues that he has been deprived of
his right to competent counsel due to the negligence of Atty. Albura.47
In compliance with the Court's directive,48 respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment.49 The OSG contends that petitioner was not deprived of
his constitutional rights; hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued to him as a
post-conviction remedy.

According to the OSG, petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to be heard and to
adduce his own evidence. However, it was his and his counsel's negligence and fault that
caused his current predicament. The OSG notes that petitioner was represented by
counsel when the prosecution witnesses testified and he was able to cross-examine them.
His failure to present evidence in support of his defense was due to his negligence and
that of his counsel for failing to appear at the trial despite due notice. Likewise,
petitioner's counsel received the notice of the promulgation of judgment set on July 29,
2009. The OSG emphasized that petitioner's counsel even filed an Urgent Motion to
Defer Promulgation of Judgment dated July 25, 2009, yet he still failed to appear during
the date of promulgation. Petitioner similarly did not appear despite notice to his
bondsman. As a result of his inexcusable absence during the promulgation of judgment,
petitioner already lost all legal remedies in the rules against the judgment.50

Additionally, the OSG argues that while Atty. Albura was indeed negligent, petitioner
was nevertheless bound by the negligence of his counsel. Citing the case of Bejarasco,
Jr. v. People,51 the OSG avers that petitioner is bound by the gross negligence of his
counsel because he himself was negligent for failing to monitor the status of his case.52

The OSG also maintains that the doctrine of immutability of judgment applies against
petitioner. The OSG points out that the judgment rendered by the CA dismissing his
petition for certiorari which sought to annul and set aside the RTC Orders had already
become final and executory. Thus, the petition should be denied.53

Lastly, the OSG contends that the same issues and arguments raised by petitioner have
already been thoroughly discussed by the RTC in its December 28, 2009 Order and the
CA in its February 17, 2012 Resolution. Likewise, petitioner was able to file different
pleadings raising the arguments in the instant petition. Thus, the Court should deny the
same.54

In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated June 20, 2018, petitioner filed a
Reply55 reiterating the grounds he had raised in his petition.

Issue

Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

The Court's Ruling

The petition should be denied.

The Writ of Habeas

Corpus

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice and to have it ascertained
whether he is held under lawful authority.56

Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.57 Thus, the most basic criterion
for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived
of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint.

Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ

of habeas corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not ousted of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in the course of the
proceedings.58

However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be
availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence sentence as to
circumstance of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is
attendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint
of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed
penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as such excess.59 Here, petitioner is
invoking the first circumstance.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that when the detention complained of finds its origin in
what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
considerably narrowed.60 Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from the exceptional
circumstances listed above, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation of a violation of
one's constitutional right is not enough. The violation of constitutional right must be
sufficient to void the entire proceedings.61 This, petitioner failed to show.

On petitioner's right to
due process

In essence, procedural due process entails that a party is afforded a reasonable

opportunity to be heard in support of his case and what is prohibited is the absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party invoking his right to due process
was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his
own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must
fail.62

Petitioner avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of
notice of the proceedings in the trial court. To recall, the RTC submitted the case for
decision on April 30, 2009 for failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear during the
scheduled hearing on the same date for initial presentation of the evidence for the
defense.63 However, petitioner claims that he was not notified of said hearing. He
likewise claims that he was not given the notice setting the promulgation of judgment on
July 29, 2009.

As regards the scheduled hearing on April 30, 2009, even if it were true that petitioner or
his counsel were not notified of such, it is still not enough to warrant a finding of denial
of due process. For in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process.64 In this case, the Court finds
that petitioner was still afforded opportunity to be heard, as will be discussed below.
Moreover, the hearing on April 30, 2009 was not the first scheduled hearing for the
presentation of evidence of the defense. The records show that as early as September 10,
2008, the RTC had already ordered petitioner to present his witnesses; however, he failed
to do so.65

On the notice setting the promulgation of judgment on July 29, 2009, it is already
established that Atty. Albura received the same since he was able to file on July 25, 2009
an Urgent Motion to Defer Promulgation of Judgment.66 However, petitioner claims that
he was not notified by Atty. Albura. The Court is not convinced.

The Urgent Motion to Defer Promulgation of Judgment was filed by Atty. Albura on
petitioner's behalf.1âшphi1 Further, in the Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration,
Atty. Albura explained that when he received the notice setting the promulgation of
judgment, he inquired from petitioner whether he received other notices of scheduled
hearings.67 Thus, it is clear that Atty. Albura informed petitioner of the promulgation of
judgment. Furthermore, the RTC also informed petitioner through his bonding
company.68 Petitioner cannot now claim that he was not informed of the scheduled
promulgation.

On this note, Section 6 of Rule 120 provides:

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — x x x

xxxx
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion
for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence
at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, petitioner lost the remedies available to him when he failed to appear at the
promulgation of judgment despite being notified of the same. He cannot shift the blame
to his counsel, for while Atty. Albura was out of line when he deliberately did not appear
at the promulgation "as a sign of protest," it was still incumbent on petitioner to attend the
same. Moreover, the rule provides that within 15 days from promulgation, the accused
may still surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, after
proving that his absence was for a justifiable cause. However, the Court notes that
petitioner, who was out on bail, failed to surrender himself as he was then at large.69 He
was only arrested on February 10, 2010.70

Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that petitioner was
not deprived of due process. After all, the Court has consistently held that the crux of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.71 Verily,
petitioner was able to file several pleadings, including the following: motion to quash the
search warrant,72 motion for physical re-examination and re-weighing of the
alleged shabu confiscated from him,73 petition for bail,74 and demurrer to
evidence.75 Also, he was represented by counsel when all prosecution witnesses testified
and his counsel was also able to cross-examine them.76 Lastly, he was able to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration77 of the RTC Decision convicting him. A party
who was given the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of cannot claim denial of due process of law.78

In view thereof, petitioner's claim of denial of due process is without merit.

On petitioner's right to
competent counsel

Likewise, petitioner's claim of denial of right to competent counsel must fail. While Atty.
Albura was indeed negligent when he deliberately failed to appear at the scheduled
promulgation of judgment as a sign of protest, the same does not warrant the granting of
the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. On the contrary, petitioner is
bound by Atty. Albura's negligence. As held by the Court in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People:79
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even
mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a
counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that
any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes
of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself. A recognized exception to the
rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due
process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not
be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, considering that the client
has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the
status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment
is rendered against him.

Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no
prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the
client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of
the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances
of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.80 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In sum, the negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client, unless the
counsel has committed gross negligence. For a claim of a counsel's gross negligence to
prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. As well,
the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or
malice.81

Here, Atty. Albura's act of not attending the promulgation of judgment as a sign of
protest was clearly an act of negligence. However, the same cannot be characterized as
gross negligence as to amount to a clear abandonment of petitioner's cause. As mentioned
earlier, Atty. Albura informed petitioner of the schedule of promulgation of judgment. He
was also able to file a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration of the RTC Decision
convicting petitioner.

At any rate, even if such act constituted gross negligence, the Court finds that petitioner
was also negligent. Despite being notified of the scheduled promulgation of judgment, he
still failed to attend the same. Worse, he became a fugitive from justice for several
months until he was arrested. Even in the subsequent proceedings, petitioner still appears
to lack sufficient diligence over his case. He filed a petition for relief from judgment
more than six months after his arrest, which was clearly beyond the period allowed by the
rules. Moreover, the instant petition had been filed more than five years after the Entry of
Judgment of the CA Resolution, making the same final and immutable.
Considering that what is at stake is his liberty, petitioner should have exercised the
standard of care which an ordinary prudent man devotes to his business.82 He cannot
simply leave the fate of his case entirely to his counsel and later on pass the blame to the
latter. Indeed, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their clients.83

Time and again, the Court has ruled that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct,
negligence, and mistake in handling a case. To allow a client to disown his counsel's
conduct would render the proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by
the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.84 While this rule has recognized exceptions, the
Court finds none in this case.

Conclusion

The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.85

Indeed, the rule is that when there is a deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the
court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his detention.86 The inquiry on a writ
of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction,
but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person has
been restrained is a complete nullity. The concern is not merely whether an error has been
committed in ordering or holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such error is
sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process in question.87

Petitioner, however, failed to convince the Court that the proceedings before the trial
court were attended by violations of his rights to due process or competent counsel as to
oust the RTC of its jurisdiction. Thus, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is
unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117078 February 22, 1995

In the matter of the petition of ALFREDO O. LAMEN and REYNALDO A.

CORTES for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for WILLY BAGAWE y
PAGALLA; ALFREDO O. LAMEN and REYNALDO A. CORTES,
vs.
THE HON. DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINGLUPA,
METRO MANILA.
 RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Availing of our decision in People vs. Simon,1 the petitioners filed the instant petition to
secure the release of Willy Bagawe y Pagalla, who was earlier convicted of the violation
of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425,2 as amended, for selling and delivering
marijuana and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00. The prohibited drugs involved consist of three matchboxes containing
marijuana flowering tops with a total weight of 3.5 grams, one matchbox with a
marijuana cigarette butt, and one brown paper bag containing 10 grams of marijuana
flowering tops.3

In our decision of 7 April 1992,4 we affirmed in toto the aforesaid judgment of the trial
court.5 Our decision became final on 11 May 1992.6

Willy Bagawe y Pagalla is presently serving his sentence in the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. He has been under incarceration since his arrest on 14 April
1987.

The petitioners contend that since the gross quantity of the marijuana involved in this
case is only 13.6 grams, then in the light of People vs. Simon, the maximum term
imposed on Bagawe should be reduced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional; and since he has already served more than six years, he should
be released from imprisonment.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioners
that Simon should apply but disagrees with their computation of the maximum penalty. It
recommends that, following the penalties imposed by us in Simon and in People
vs. Saycon,7 the proper penalty should be six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, without fine.

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code operates to benefit Willy Bagawe since R.A. No.
7659, is favorable to him and since he is not a habitual criminal.

Following Simon, the penalty which could have been imposed on Willy Bagawe under
R.A. No. 6425, as further amended by R.A. No. 7659, would have been prision
correccional and, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he would have been
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.
Since the decision in G.R. Nos. 88515-16 had long become final and Willy Bagawe is in
fact serving his sentence, we cannot alter or modify the penalty therein imposed.
Nevertheless, the writ of habeas corpus comes to his rescue since he has undergone
imprisonment for a period more than the maximum imprisonment which could have been
properly imposed on him taking into account the favorable statute, R.A. No. 7659. In the
1932 case of Directo vs. Director of Prisons,8 we ruled:

In view of the foregoing considerations we are of the opinion and hold: (1)
that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which makes penal provisions
retroactive so far as they favor the accused, provided he is not a habitual
criminal, does not authorize a court whose sentence has become final and
executory to make a substantial amendment, and any amendment made in
such sentence, though it be to give effect to a penal provision favorable to
the accused, would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) that the
only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused when the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ
of habeas corpus.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED and WILLY

BAGAWE y PAGALLA, accused-appellant in G.R. Nos. 88515-16, is hereby ordered
RELEASED from detention, unless for any other lawful cause his further confinement is
warranted.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO

LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971

ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL.

CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971

LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary,

COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary
and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as Secretary, Department of
National defense, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO

E. PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners,

vs.

GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF

OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR
RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in
his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar
Association, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE

CONSTABULARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971

REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine

Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF

OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C.
DE CASTRO. CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the
Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN

ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971

GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et

al., respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.

E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.

Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Fortunato de

Leon, R. G. Suntay and Juan T. David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.

Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.

Nuñez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc.

E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al.

Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.

Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo P. Pardo for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation
of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand
grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and
other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more
injured, including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom
sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not
been for the timely medical assistance given to them.

On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the
issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely

established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by
common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the
active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and
directed by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends,
have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their
forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and
waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize
political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government,
and supplant our existing political social, economic and legal order with an
entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose
conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and
family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are
based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front

organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously
and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through
sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from
among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and
mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment
and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our
society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political,
 social, economic and moral foundations of our existing government and to
influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass
media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against
our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law
enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our
society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and

disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest
manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party
rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and
serious injury of scores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be

taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people
and preserve the authority of the State;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section
10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as
others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by
them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith.

Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by
the following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then
detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of
their detention, namely:

1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the

petitioners in Case No. L-33964 — filed on August 24, 1971 — who, on August 22,
1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary
— which is under the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia — to go
and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon
City, for interrogation, and thereafter, detained;

2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 — filed, also, on August
24, 1971 — who was picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village,
Quezon City, by members of the Metrocom and then detained;
3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 — or on August 28, 1971 —
the same was amended to include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as
petitioners therein, although, apart from stating that these additional petitioners are
temporarily residing with the original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended
petition alleged nothing whatsoever as regards the circumstances under which said
Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are said to be illegally deprived of their liberty;

4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 — filed on August 25, 1971
— who was similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City,
and detained by the Constabulary;

5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 — on August 27,
1971 — upon the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August
22, 1971, at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by Constabulary agents in his house, at St.
Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the Camp Crame stockade, Quezon
City;

6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed — on August 30, 1971 — to intervene
as one of the petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been
arrested by members of the Constabulary on August 22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30
p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and
brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;

7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in
said three (3) cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was,
likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of the Philippine Constabulary
and brought, first to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to
Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;

8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the
same three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St.,
Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at
Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;

9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college students of
St. Louis University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara — in his
capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association —
filed on September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that said
Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary
agents, while on his way to school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the
Constabulary premises therein at Camp Holmes, and, thereafter, taken, on August 24,
1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25, 1971, to the Constabulary
headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;

10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 — filed on September 7,

1971 — a 19-year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio city — who, while allegedly
on his way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was
joined by three (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas at
San Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is
detained;

11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE

CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago — as President of the Conference
Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) — filed the petition in Case No. L-
34039 — on September 14, 1971 — against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on
August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested, while at Liamzon
Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by agents of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC
headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon, her husband was
brought, also, by PC agents and both are detained;

12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 — on October
26, 1971 — against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero
Olivas, Chief of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging
that, upon invitation from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, who referred petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn,
referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin Castillo and another CIS against, whose
name is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogated by the two (2),
petitioner was detained illegally; and

13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 — filed on November 10, 1971 —
who was apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8,
1941, in Quezon City, and then detained at Camp Crame, in the same City.

Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to
answer the petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 — which
was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by reference in the other cases, except
L-34265 — alleges, inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and detained
"on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or
rebellion;" that "their continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President
of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and
that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in
Proclamation No. 889; that in making said declaration, the "President of the Philippines
acted on relevant facts gathered thru the coordinated efforts of the various intelligence
agents of our government but (of) which the Chief Executive could not at the moment
give a full account and disclosure without risking revelation of highly classified state
secrets vital to its safely and security"; that the determination thus made by the President
is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the
nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to
Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882; that
petitioners "are under detention pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on
the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are still committing, individually or
in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency and other subversive
activities for the overthrow of the Government; that petitioners cannot raise, in these
proceedings for habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt or innocence"; that the "Chief
of Constabulary had petitioners taken into custody on the basis of the existence of
evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come within
the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
suspended"; that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide
precautionary and preventive measure demanded by the necessities of public safety,
public welfare and public interest"; that the President of the Philippines has "undertaken
concrete and abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the
petitioners as well as of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to
Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and unhampered"; and that "opportunities or
occasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of the proclamation have
been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in
directives issued by proper authority."

These safeguards are set forth in:

1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971,
directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught in flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be
made without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that
such authority shall not be granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences,"
it appears satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court,
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation;
that, if such person will be charged with a crime subject to an afflictive penalty under the
Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued unless supported
by signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt act;
that no unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that
arrested persons shall not be subject to greater restraint than is necessary for their
detention;
2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971,
to all units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other
persons than those specified in the proclamation; that the same does not involve material
law; that precautionary measures should be taken to forestall violence that may be
precipitated by improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest
under the proclamation will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers
occupying position in the provinces down to provincial commanders"; that there shall be
no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not be harmed and shall be
accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's immediate
family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;

3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971,

directing the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action
Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of
the privilege of the writ; and

4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential
Administrative Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses committed in
connection with the implementation of Proclamation No. 889.

Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan
Carandang had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found
that the evidence against them was insufficient."

In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some
allegations of fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that
Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been and is detained "on the basis of a
reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt acts in furtherance of rebellion
or insurrection against the government" and, accordingly, "comes within the class of
persons as to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by
Proclamation No. 889, as amended," the validity of which is not contested by him.

On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending
Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely

established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by
common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the
active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and
directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends,
have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their
forces together for the avowed purpose of [actually] staging, undertaking,
[and] wagging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and
rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country,
overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing
political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose
form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and
religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose
political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist teaching and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front

organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously
and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through
sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from
among our peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and
mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment
and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our
society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political,
social, economic and moral foundations of our existing government and
influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass
media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against
our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law
enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our
society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and

insurrection, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting
public safety and security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has
been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21,
1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of
persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be

taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people
and preserve the authority of the State;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section
10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all
others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] overt acts
committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof[,]. [or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith.]1
On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly
heard and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted
from September 3 to September 9, 1971.

Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended
by Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippine, namely:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.

2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or.
3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
4. Abra 18. Bohol
5. Abra 19. Capiz
6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan
7. Batangas 21. Antique
8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo
9. Masbate 23. Leyte
10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur
11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar
12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar
13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
14. Palawan.

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Guimaras 3. Siquior
2. Biliran

C. CITIES:

1. Laog 10. Bacolod

2. Dagupan 11. Bago
3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon
4. Batangas 13. La Carlota
5. Lipa 14. Bais
6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete
7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo
Occ.) 17. Roxas
8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran
9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu
 20. Cebu 24. Tacloban
21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc
22. Danao 26. Calbayog
23. Toledo

On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the
privilege of the writ in the following provinces and cities:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur

2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or.
3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ.
4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte
5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan
6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian
7. Agusan del Norte

B. CITIES:

1. Surigao 8. Tangub
2. Davao 9. Dapitan
3. Butuan 10. Dipolog
4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
5. Gingoong 12. Basilan
6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian.
7. Oroquieta

On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation
No. 889-D, in the following places:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
2. Cavite 6. Albay
3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon
4. Kalinga-Apayao

B. CITIES:

1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires

2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi
As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the
following eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:

A. PROVINCE:

1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato

2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
9. Lanao del Norte

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Aurora 2. Quirino

C. CITIES:

1. Angeles 10. Manila

2. Baguio 11. Marawi
3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
6. General Santos 15. Pasay
7. Iligan 16. Quezon
8 Iriga 17. San Jose
9 Lucena 18. San Pablo

The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the
view taken in Barcelon v. Baker,2 and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castañeda,3 pursuant
to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension
(of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is
final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said
question been decided in the affirmative the main issue in all of these cases, except
L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor
importance, said cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a
majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached, although tentatively, a
consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to and should inquire
into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of
the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to
hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of them
having previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the
Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that
—

... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it

may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for
the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be
detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the
Philippines, which area has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces,
two subprovinces and eighteen cities with the partial lifting of the
suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential Proclamations Nos.
889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency
of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14,
and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and
considering that the members of the Court are not agreed on the precise
scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises, even as all of
them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect,
the Court RESOLVED that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8,
1971 at 9:30 A.M.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time
jointly with cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then
granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their respective oral arguments,
which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971.

Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October
8, 1971, their willingness to impart to the Court classified information relevant to these
cases, subject to appropriate security measures, the Court met at closed doors, on October
28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by
the latter, namely, Senator Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty.
Leopoldo Africa, as well as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff,
was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay
Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said
Armed Forces, on said classified information, most of which was contained in reports and
other documents already attached to the records. During the proceedings, the members of
the Court, and, occassionally, counsel for the petitioners, propounded pertinent questions
to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both parties were then granted a period of time
within which to submit their respective observations, which were filed on November 3,
1971, and complemented by some documents attached to the records on November 6,
1971, and a summary, submitted on November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified
information.

In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the
parties therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.

On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations — motions stating that
on November 13, 1971, the following petitioners were:

(a) released from custody:

(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964

(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.

(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor,
with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's
Office of Quezon City:

(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *

(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *

(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of
a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal:

(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **

(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *

and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying
that the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-
34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution of the remaining cases. Copy of
the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of said court — which was appended to
said manifestations-motions of the respondent as Annex 2 thereof — shows that Gary
Olivar, the petitioner in L-34339, is one of the defendants in said case.

Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in

L-33973, in his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits
of the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the ground that he is still detained and that the
main issue is one of public interest involving as it does the civil liberties of the people.
Angelo de los Reyes, one of the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio
E. Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit the petitions in L-33982
and L-34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is not moot, not
even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ
remains suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained again without just
cause or valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor
General insisted that the release of the above-named petitioners rendered their respective
petitions moot and academic.

Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of
the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this
connection, it should be noted that, as originally formulated, Proclamation No. 889 was
contested upon the ground that it did not comply with the pertinent constitutional
provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of our Constitution, reading:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in

cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during
such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.

and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that:

The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend
the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law.

Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in case of "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or rebellion —
which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the
Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of its Bill of Rights —
petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence
of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that,
consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This contention was predicated upon the
fact that, although the first "whereas" in Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless
elements" had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces
together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed
insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not of an
uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of
the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms.

Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic
by Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original
proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A
amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation by postulating the
said lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded
their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are
actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize
political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant
our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...."
Moreover, the third "whereas" in the original proclamation was, likewise, amended by
alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of rebellion and insurrection,"
have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of
the State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and
of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A
asserts that the lawless elements "are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and
rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.

It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original
proclamation and particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly
suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the
Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it
having in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise in arms, rather than of the
factual existence of the rebellion itself. The pleadings, the oral arguments and the
memoranda of respondents herein have consistently and abundantly emphasized — to
justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — the acts of violence
and subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above
referred to, and the conditions obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original
proclamation. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the original
proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.

II
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to
the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the
valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must
be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of
Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under
consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and
that4 "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to
maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the
State."

Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon
the authority of Barcelon v. Baker5 and Montenegro v. Castañeda.6 Upon the other hand,
petitioners press the negative view and urge a reexamination of the position taken in said
two (2) cases, as well as a reversal thereof.

The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a)
it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott7 involving the U.S. President's power to call out the
militia, which — he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces — may be
exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter
does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the American
Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of
its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing
with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all
government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based
mainly upon the Barcelon case, and hence, cannot have more weight than the same.
Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it could go into the question: "Did the
Governor-General" — acting under the authority vested in him by the Congress of the
United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain
conditions — "act in conformance with such authority?" In other words, it did determine
whether or not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the
Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the
presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In
short, the Court considered the question whether or not there really was are rebellion, as
stated in the proclamation therein contested.

Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point
under consideration. Although some cases8 purport to deny the judicial power to "review"
the findings made in the proclamations assailed in said cases, the tenor of the opinions
therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the court's conviction that the
conditions essential for the validity of said proclamations or orders were, in fact, present
therein, just as the opposite view taken in other cases9 had a backdrop permeated or
characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum of Chief
Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own
circumstances." 10 One of the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith,
was intimated in Sterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:

.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject
is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed
against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the
Federal judicial power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority
appropriate to its
exercise. .... 12

In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the
Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are
now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of
said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified.
The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights
establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the
former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way
of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger
thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall
exist." 13 For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or
the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place
where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions
mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond
which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the
Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance
therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the
explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of
our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political
system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of
the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual
freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of
every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as
criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and
the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth,
regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled
enjoyment and exercise of such right — which, under certain conditions, may be a civic
duty of the highest order — is vital to the democratic system and essential to its
successful operation and wholesome growth and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one
enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence,
within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context
of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social
order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law — such as by rising
publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby
committing the crime of rebellion — there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a
limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must
be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent — no matter how emphatic or intemperate
it may be — for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot
hesitate, much less refuse — when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has
been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied — to uphold the finding of the
Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the
Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore,
without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is
called upon to epitomize.

As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there
must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10
of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must
require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889,
as amended, that both conditions are present.

As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the Communist

activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early
thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate
objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the
movement seemed to have waned notably; but, the outbreak of World War II in the
Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed
firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent
liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with
such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army — called
HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan
(HMP) after liberation — which clashed several times with the armed forces of the
Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated
October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the validity of
which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castañeda. 15 Days before the promulgation of said
Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the
Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the
crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order
were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the
Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground — stated in the very preamble of
said statute — that.

... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political

party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in
the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of
the Philippines; 17 and

... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion,

national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special
legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security
of the country....

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the
Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which Report was filed in these cases by
the petitioners herein —

The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of
several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the
Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang
Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the
 Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement
for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the
intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate,
influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of
nationalism. 18

Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups,
one of which — composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction —
reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New
People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the "Protracted People's
War" or "War of National Liberation." Its "Programme for a People's Democratic
Revolution" states, inter alia:

The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its

general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino
communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of
achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is
genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and
prosperous ...

xxx xxx xxx

The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political

power. The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time
that both the international and national situations are favorable of asking the
road of armed
revolution ... 19

In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of National
Defense — conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent
incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered
243 losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA
casualties more than doubled.

At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the
traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are
indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in
accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a
given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of
course, that the arm forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's
Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its
establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in
the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a
declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even
before the actual commencement of hostilities.

We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who
have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are
engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too
small, compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that the
Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate,
however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory
viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent
from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of
rebellion, 20 which may be limited in its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also,
from paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the
suspension of the privilege of the writ "wherever" — in case of rebellion — "the
necessity for such suspension shall exist." In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred
to a proclamation suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only.
The case of In re Boyle 21 involved a valid proclamation suspending the privilege in a
smaller area — a country of the state of Idaho.

The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the
validity of the suspension of the privilege — namely, that the suspension be required by
public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings
thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon the
validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.

Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of
separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme
within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not
absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances,
under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not
to supplant 22 — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the
validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable
with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal
from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court
of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the
judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more
limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the
reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested
administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is
undertaken. The administrative findings can be interfered with only if there
is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary,
capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some American
courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases,
in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been
construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," 23 even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations

involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of
evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of
an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence — in the sense in
which the term is used in judicial proceedings — before enacting a legislation or
suspending the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of
Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that:

... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy
adopted, with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it,
the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ...

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General —

... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go
no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision
is correct and that public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified
the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did
not act arbitrarily.
No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-
equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system,
seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the
Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner
Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative
answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of
the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the
courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has
actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension,
because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in
the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that

counsel for several petitioners herein have admitted it.

With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the
time of the suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such
that courts of justice no longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have been
unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners'
reference to the normal operation of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the
contested act of the Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was
adverted to in some American cases to justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act
of the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction by military courts of
members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was manifestly,
illegal for military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so charged, when civil
courts were functioning normally.

Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not
necessarily bear out petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to
the suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of its logical effects is to compel those
connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of them could
not be located by the authorities, after August 21, 1971.

The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the
theory that, according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of
terror ... is sociological and psychologically selective," and that the indiscriminate resort
to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people's symphaty and to
deprive the dissidents of much needed mass support. The fact, however, is that the
violence used is some demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize
the bulk of its inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudent, therefore, for the
Executive to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale, under
the July-August Plan.

We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New
People's Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to
public safety of such magnitude as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes apparent when we consider that
it assumes that the Armed Forces of the Philippines have no other task than to fight the
New People's Army, and that the latter is the only threat — and a minor one — to our
security. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous.

The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had
information and reports — subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the
abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven 25 — to the effect that
the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift
armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to
the assassination of uncooperative local official; that, in line with this policy, the
insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were
fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970; that the
Constitutional Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza
Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, was
bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the
COMELEC building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO substation at Cubao,
Quezon City; and that the respective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman
Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office
premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in
Caloocan City.

Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that — as per said information and reports
— the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's
concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the
government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people
themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis
upon a most extensive and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front
organizations in urban centers, the organization of armed city partisans and the
infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the
CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations;
that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of
eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty
(30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the
Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the
Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng
Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng
Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five
(245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were
in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central
Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in
1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of
which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over
five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led
by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally
instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the number of
demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that
twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen
(15) persons and the injury of many more.

Subsequent events — as reported — have also proven that petitioners' counsel have
underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it
appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and
staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two
(2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on
August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus,
attacked the very command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters
and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a
total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the
Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at
Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander
Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an
encounter in the barrio of San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the
NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances
in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered more complex by the
involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio
Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as
conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said
reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.

It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are,
according to intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives
out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention
Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army,
believed to have been one of many pilfered from the Subic Naval Base a few days before;
that the President had received intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-
August Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism and mass
destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the beginning of
said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly
in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with
the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces discharge other functions; and that
the expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country,
particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna,
Quezon and Bicol Region, required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a
wide area.

Considering that the President was in possession of the above data — except those related
to events that happened after August 21, 1971 — when the Plaza Miranda bombing took
place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely
abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security
required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike
simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245)
KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens
of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as
electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote, he
was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.

He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the
situation was critical — as, indeed, it was — and demanded immediate action. This he
took believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the light of the
circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief.

Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the
privilege in the entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing so in some
provinces or cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, he could
not be reasonably certain, however, about the placed to be excluded from the operation of
the proclamation. He needed some time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he
caused the suspension to be gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-
seven (27) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on
September 25, 1971, in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13) cities; and, still
later, on October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total
of forty-eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities, within a
period of forty-five (45) days from August 21, 1971.

Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have
declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the
suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by
Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons
detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or
rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-
33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith.

In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President

has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call
out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the
armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of
the two (2)other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in
issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

III

The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said
Proclamation, as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of
persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended?

In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964,
Gerardo Tomas, petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013,
were, on November 13, 1971, released "permanently" — meaning, perhaps, without any
intention to prosecute them — upon the ground that, although there was reasonable
ground to believe that they had committed an offense related to subversion, the evidence
against them is insufficient to warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of
the petitioners in L-33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L-33965, Nemesio Prudente,
petitioner in L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose benefit
the petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were, on
said date, "temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as
Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are
still under detention and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they — together with over forty
(40) other persons, who are at large — having been accused, in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and
that Angelo delos Reyes and Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and
L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged — together with over fifteen
(15) other persons, who are, also, at large — with another violation of said Act, in a
criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City.

With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang — petitioners in L-33965 — who were
released as early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente,
Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr., Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C.
de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were released on
November 13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions
have, thereby, become moot and academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned,
and should, accordingly, be dismissed, despite the opposition thereto of counsel for
Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the privilege of the
writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again, without
just cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective petitions is not moot.
In any event, the common constitutional and legal issues raised in these cases have, in
fact, been decided in this joint decision.

Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-33964,
L-33965 and L-33973, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar,
petitioner in L-34339, who are still detained? The suspension of the privilege of the writ
was decreed by Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for persons detained "for the crimes
of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts committed by them in furtherance
thereof."

The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor
Felipe, Angelo de los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal
Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with a violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act and that the similar charge against petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and
Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint, originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, has, also, been filed with said court. Do the offenses so charged constitute one of
the crimes or overt acts mentioned in Proclamation No. 889, as amended?

In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:

That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter
up to and including August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines,
and elsewhere in the Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts
became officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, a subversive association as defined by Republic Act No. 1700,
which is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the
Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and other
illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
communist totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders
of the Communist Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and
mutual helping one another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, and
feloniously and by overt acts committed subversive acts all intended to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:
 1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the
government, engaging in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, exacting contributions or diverting public lands or
property from the law purposes for which they have been
appropriated;

2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement

activities not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also of the united front organizations of the Communist
Party of the Philippines as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM),
Movement for the Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang
Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students' Alliance for
National Democracy (STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction,
Student Cultural Association of the University of the
Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (PMP) and many others; thru
agitation promoted by rallies, demonstration and strikes some
of them violent in nature, intended to create social discontent,
discredit those in power and weaken the people's confidence
in the government; thru consistent propaganda by
publications, writing, posters, leaflets of similar means;
speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other similar
means; or thru the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all
intended to promote the Communist pattern of subversion;

3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by

assassinations, bombings, sabotage, kidnapping and arson,
intended to advertise the movement, build up its morale and
prestige, discredit and demoralize the authorities to use harsh
and repressive measures, demoralize the people and weaken
their confidence in the government and to weaken the will of
the government to resist.

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of

the offense:

a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the
public authorities;

b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief
Executive;
 c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;

d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;

e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen(15)
years old.

Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
except that the second paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the
complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially the same. 26

In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and
subversion, of — in the language of the proclamation — "other overt acts committed ... in
furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are covered by the proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ. It is clear, therefore, that the crime for which the detained
petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended.

Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles
enunciated.

After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners
Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del
Rosario and Teresito Sison are detained for and actually accused of an offense for which
the privilege of the writ has been suspended by said proclamation, our next step would
have been the following: The Court, or a commissioner designated by it, would have
received evidence on whether — as stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" — said
petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had
"participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion."

It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 — or two (2) days before the
proceedings relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed
by the filing 27 of the summary of the matters then taken up — the aforementioned
criminal complaints were filed against said petitioners. What is more, the preliminary
examination and/or investigation of the charges contained in said complaints has already
begun. The next question, therefore, is: Shall We now order, in the cases at hand, the
release of said petitioners herein, despite the formal and substantial validity of the
proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged with
offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal
complaints against them and the preliminary examination and/or investigations being
conducted therein?
The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the
opinion, and, so hold, that, instead of this Court or its Commissioner taking the evidence
adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary examination and/or investigation to be
completed, so that petitioners' released could be ordered by the court of first instance,
should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest
could be issued, should a probable cause be established against them. Such course of
action is more favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as the preliminary examination or
investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish that the
Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and
detained upon the ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime of
insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for the reason that the Court has opted to allow
the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the determination of the existence of
probable cause, although ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the
existence of the substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of
rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would require the reception of evidence by this
Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of first instance.
What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings would be
substantially the same and the presentation of such evidence cannot be made
simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the other.

Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion — in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason,
in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 to the effect that "... if and when formal complaint is presented,
the court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and
becomes a judicial concern ..." — that the filing of the above-mentioned complaint
against the six (6) detained petitioners herein, has the effect of the Executive giving up
his authority to continue holding them pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
even if he did not so intend, and to place them fully under the authority of courts of
justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his liberty without
lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of them, and that,
accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite the humanitarian and
libertarian spirit with which this view had been espoused, the other Members of the Court
are unable to accept it because:

(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid —
and We so hold it to be — and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a
complaint or information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege,
and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us;

(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the
validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to
construe the filing of said formal charges with the court of first instance as an expression
of the President's belief that there are sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners so
charged and that hey should not be released, therefore, unless and until said court — after
conducting the corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation — shall find
that the prosecution has not established the existence of a probable cause. Otherwise, the
Executive would have released said accused, as were the other petitioners herein;

(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation — of the act of the President in
having said formal charges filed — is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than
that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view — particularly the theory that the
detainees should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of
said preliminary examination and/or investigation — would tend to induce the Executive
to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should
encourage the early filing of said charges, so that courts of justice could assume
jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection.

Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the
constitutional right to bail is affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon such question, the same not
having been sufficiently discussed by the parties herein. Besides, there is no point in
settling said question with respect to petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is
necessary to express our view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their
release without bail might still be decreed by the court of first instance, should it hold that
there is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on the right to
bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;

2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039

and L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda,
Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando,
Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;

3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in
conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation
of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor
Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to
issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against
them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and

4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the
aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the
proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in
these proceedings the proper relief.

5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 132852. May 31, 2000.]

TEOFILO MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously filed as a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. But this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have
decided to give it due course to resolve the question whether the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to appeal as a pauper litigant.
1chanrobles.com.ph : red

The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case No. 5753 before the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City. 2 During the hearing on 23 June 1994 petitioner
represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney’s Office of Butuan City
objected to petitioner’s motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to
strike out the entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution on the ground that it
was inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial privilege afforded to children in
cases involving their parents. The Presiding Judge 3 deferred his ruling on the objection
and allowed the testimony to be continued. 4 On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an
order overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court denied the motion for
reconsideration. 5 This prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders. 6

On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Litigate as
Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by two
(2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to petitioner’s eligibility to avail himself of
this privilege. 7 The appellate court subsequently issued its resolution dated 21 March
1997 denying the motion and directing petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the total
amount of P 420.00 within five (5) days from notice. 8 On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying his motion to litigate as a pauper, but
this was similarly denied in the resolution of 8 October 1997. 9 Petitioner then filed a
Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he stated through counsel that he was
transmitting the docket fees required of his client "under protest" and that the money
remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez himself. 10 The transmittal
of the amount was evidenced by two(2) postal money orders attached to the Motion to
Litigate as Pauper. 11

In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, citing petitioner’s failure to pay the required docket fee. 12 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration citing his compliance with the docket fee requirement as alleged in his
Manifestation adverted to above. 13 However, the Court of Appeals in the second
assailed Resolution of 21 January 1998 denied this latest motion on the ground that, per
verification by the Judicial Records Division, the amount remitted by petitioner as docket
fee was short of P150.00. 14

The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to litigate as pauper can
be entertained by an appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original
motion to appeal as pauper before the appellate court the applicable rule was the second
paragraph of Sec.16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which provides —

SECTION 16. Appeal by pauper. — Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to
the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of
prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount
involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate
court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk
shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence
taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court
upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.chanrobles.com :
chanrobles.com.ph

A petition to be allowed to appeal as a pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate

court.

Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had uniformly
frowned upon appellate courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the
question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a
question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The trial court is the court
which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact which may require
presentation of evidence whether the appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and
whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount involved
but of the nature of the question raised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the
appellate court. 15

When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1 July 1997 the provision
abovequoted was not reenacted. Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the
procedure for, as well as the effects of, the grant of a motion to litigate as pauper —

SECTION 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied
that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees,
and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him.
The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the
payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may
impose.chanrobles.com.ph:red

On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for the
exemption of pauper litigants from payments of legal fees —

SECTION 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. — Pauper-litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property
with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt
from the payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the
pauper-litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that
he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they
own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit
of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit.chanrobles.com :
law library

Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may
have been incurred.

It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned provisions that the restrictive policy
enunciated by Sec. 16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was carried over to
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nowhere can we find a provision to the effect that" (a)
petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate
court."cralaw virtua1aw library

We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent procedural laws
are retroactive. 16 We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an indigent can be made
even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for
review or in special civil actions.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with our Bill of
Rights, which decrees that," (f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." 17 Our
espousal of the democratization of appellate remedies is shared by the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black —

There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to
defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate
appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance . . .
Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. 18

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied with all the evidentiary
requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an
affidavit attesting to the fact that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a hut, cannot be worth
more than P10,000.00. 19 He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by Florencia L.
Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who generally attested to the
same allegations contained in petitioner’s own affidavit. 20 Based on this evidence, the
Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an indigent.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November

1997 dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its
Resolution dated 2 January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for
appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow petitioner to
litigate as pauper and to return to him the amount of P420.00 representing the docket fees
he paid.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 182484             June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.

ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff
of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.
LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to

Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is
the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed
by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his
capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his
capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay
Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in
Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson,
respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the
"private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-
Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M.
Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz
and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering about 120. The
private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners
under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon,
Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's
prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the
objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure.

In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of
the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3)
the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked
for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the private
respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the
private respondents' favor, thus:

"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and
the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown
in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs
14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question
on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio
Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime
in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs
were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it
was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic)
the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of
inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio
Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and
Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their confrontation, the parties
signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate
the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures
thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January
4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about
6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a
sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120
persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and
built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in
question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown
by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police
blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the
Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File
Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.

Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were
already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under
claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of
other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed

by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by
the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to
conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in
question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the
defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the
land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants'
claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as
a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the
land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown
in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to
the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built
structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4,
Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto
on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of

defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic]
categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered
 the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men
threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to
leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry
happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants
overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to
the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their
pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in
the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be
safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises
of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and
cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question
prior to April 19, 20066."

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch
6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the
issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ7 -
authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued
by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007
after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners
moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand,
filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17
May 20078.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen
(15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their
house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a
Petition for Review11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of
the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo,
Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition on 19 March 2008.12

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29
April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas
data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of
amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual
positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most
importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land
and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations
of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:

"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot
guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They
were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the
following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by
defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained
their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was
identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a
resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to
ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were

reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists
trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and
MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant
violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children,
which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.

[…]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered
petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their
employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to
their financial and political clout.
 35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by
defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in
dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to
the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena
Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada.
Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the
plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict
the defendants.13"

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that
the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or
an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved
exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC.
Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was
appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have
validly issued the assailed orders.

OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the
petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is
not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the
"CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition,
although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status
of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of
Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very
least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the
latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than
eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is
separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least
eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of
the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for
reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of
Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance")
that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the
same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any
insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to
Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period
under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel.
The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from
the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is
merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an
administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the
assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an
independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18,
2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-
mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's
Prayer patently shows.17

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty
of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of
forum shopping.

By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in
this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act
on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be
a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to
resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of
demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18

Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition
- at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:

"x x x

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held

that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES
OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR
RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring
supplied)
 (g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this
date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

x x x"

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate
court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern --
from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did
not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in
the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the
petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without
frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present
petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification
of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time,
although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes
willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary
dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate
paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all
of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court
of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping
violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory
orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a
favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the
rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct
contempt."20

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is

defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with
Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their
postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible
entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title
to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction
over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have
had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved;
the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into
or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the
recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the
recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer
to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction
may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the
assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was
patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by
certiorari under the present petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out
of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the
Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

 (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent
may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."22

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual
allegations heretofore quoted,23 that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the
petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:

"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong,
Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual
positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents'
intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their
security guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts
(firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors - descendants
of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially

corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
 (d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod
regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis,
narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the
private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one
of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a

house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente,
was accidentally burned by a fire."

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of
physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating
to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of
"armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to
life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia
Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The
Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what
had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning
of two residential houses was "accidental."

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the
forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are
significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial
process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions,
evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a

dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was
brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal
that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive
results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the
issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the
pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and
focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of
ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action
may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of
the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal
process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly
administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not
intend to weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the
indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of
the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners
sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper
remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out
above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the
extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far
from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary
course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary
though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari
process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation
obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for
rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a
subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an
orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when
the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal concern
that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so

that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners
and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents,
furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the

Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the
burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the
investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right
to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the
writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not
also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In
these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present

petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.

SO ORDERED.

AR

[ G.R. No. 182795, June 05, 2008 ]

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS'N., I - XIII, INC., ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon
the following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and
embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private
and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court
is the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in
the Rules - the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."[1]
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City.  Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the
time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.

While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and
spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth
these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with
the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines.  If only to give its proper meanings,
the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous
political protégées.  If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the
Torrens System of land registration in this Country.  It is therefore the ardent initiatives
of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their
participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the
hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable
Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession
of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.[2]
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Court's dismissal of petitions in
G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for
reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme
Court.  As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present
petition should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration.  Solely,
this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might
affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038.  Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision,
that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits
and evidence.  This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.[3]
We dismiss the petition.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which
in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768,
177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-
quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim
to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment
adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security.  There is, therefore,
no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners' claim to the land in question is not
alleged in the petition at all.  The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had
already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ
of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected.

Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the
petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or
judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue.  The
clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may
deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall
not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be
issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for
the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life,
liberty and security.  The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to
give priority to petitions of this nature.  However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 180906             October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind
secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights.
The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar
involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ
of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation
to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both
questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo,
petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines, respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein
petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or
their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic
rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and
equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered
the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to
the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and
(2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting,
curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights
as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took
effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the
petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of
the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a
verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter
required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and
all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the
Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5)
all other just and equitable reliefs.8

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a
petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring

them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five
(5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA
and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the
summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the
petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein
petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF

AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF

OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from
notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation
undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file
herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt

Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice
of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and

charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic)
personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of
respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority
to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this
directive.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein
respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February
14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned
to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents
were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw
some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue
pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was
Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The
armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was
kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the
road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to
stay.12

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la
Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as
lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members
of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and
armed men.13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded.
Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18
months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario
alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of
the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-
haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin,
white-skinned and about 30 years old.14

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to
sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice
of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until
they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different
room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the
butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his
(Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The
soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he
was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades
were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped.
Each time he answered none, they hit him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers
who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was
in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they
arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high
officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and
thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in
Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in
connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him,
Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up.
When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time,
Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was
sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach
with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the
mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer
endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo
to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that
they would come back the next day and kill him.18

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get
drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When
none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and
jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped
near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a
forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some
women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was
told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted
him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They
brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He
was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured
gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she
wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was
returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were
treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when
respondents' guards got drunk.21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room
enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters,
and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and
sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including
his brother Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay.
They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into
the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn,
soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only
knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and
eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they
replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt
other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined
respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid.
They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink
plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times.
Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While
there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor
and take care of them.25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and
several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey
house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by
Hilario's men.26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on
board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of
"Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to
them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the
compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two
arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already,
to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him.
Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were
made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not
believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot

sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay,

basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo -
huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil
niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon.
Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do
otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same
group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to
his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the
presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened
Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never
see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was
talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and
Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white
vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his
strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said
the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said
that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they
would not be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen.
Palparan by his picture.32

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen.
Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo
were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman
checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep
each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang.
Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar,"
a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again
Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other
military men and civilians.34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the
24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle.
Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his
blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the
barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were
many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the
barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told
him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped.
She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival,
two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were
put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas,
called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and
Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would
all be killed.37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that
they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed
life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their
parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left
for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp
from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using
the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were
transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many
huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the
battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as
"Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and
Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook,
and help in raising livestock.39

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other
soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA.
They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of
an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was
a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in
another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where
NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was
there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to
Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A
retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were
made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until
June 2007.42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo,
and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond
narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si

Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na
kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan,
nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong
binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong
sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas
ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang
bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila
sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong
nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan.
Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban
ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang
mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod.
Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila.
Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na
sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil

kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot
pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa
isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na

araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
 Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano
ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang
dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald
na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang
trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan,
ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his
land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were
also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They
were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for
Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal,
Laguna.44

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they
stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or
Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each,
Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange
text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it
first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00
between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of
them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong,
the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp.
There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong
and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the
volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and
Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and
barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar
as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were
taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he
was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the
18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay,
Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA
because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and
punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang,
Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was
kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was
instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time,
he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the
vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario
delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and
red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the
blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay
and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with
the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations,
particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct
medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about
their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the
scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries
inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after
respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting
the examination.47

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In

compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the
Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested,
forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the
custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as
head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of
the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity
as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza.
The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court
of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr.,
then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006,
Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a
finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in
the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it
exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
 establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo
brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining
the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein
petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on
August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also
claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional
operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the
field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal
responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing
strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court

in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in
compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such
compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007,
I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP
should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance

of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of
the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or

disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the
Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent
Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose
of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof
to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on
the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05,
2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info:
COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message
is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be

conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought
for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives
of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to
establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners
and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have
participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar
of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be
gathered in the process.50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF
(GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving
Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry
Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB
detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any
detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino
being held captive;
 11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in
Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the
Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or
deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the
alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the
inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have
been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of
Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other
persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission
of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U.
Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers
Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of
Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the
7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to
investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his
unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo
de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning;
and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of
the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU
auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez
testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the
Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening
within his territorial jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute
sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation
started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating
officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six
persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to
Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.62

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were
not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time
that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall,
Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as
the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that
the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they
were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to
Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon
of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office
of the Chief of Personnel.68

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their
evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO

MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed
men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of
the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his
residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February
2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the
abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation
that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because
he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo
brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any
participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA
and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA
Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the
two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on
February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being
constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know
about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by
Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation
about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in

(Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being
a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he
also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy.
Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only
about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the
only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a
criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an
NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in
support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit
"E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he
was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused,
he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko,
Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident
lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he
knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry
with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their
brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further
that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living
witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on
the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
"F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of
CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in
his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two
(2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his
barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his
relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in

(Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at
Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well
the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the
Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active
supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of
the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of
their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is
the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad
in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further
that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors
and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains
loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the

proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged
involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to
indict them as charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote:
the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN:
 Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones
who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony
of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of
the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were
in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any
intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware
of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection
with the CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of
abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in
this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative
punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are
innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz,
Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L.
Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the
foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following
grounds, viz:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN

BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY
SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY
OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN

REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH
TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
 OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE
PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,
RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN
OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE
MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL
(MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the

recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-
17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on
the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives
from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the
justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence
of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time
of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional
rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the
Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."76

The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in

Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico
and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S.
appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a
constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to
protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws
enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers
of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in
the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute
or regulation that motivated the violation.80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If,
after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being
violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to
take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S.
with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual
rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the
entire nation.82

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving
into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the
words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-
attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a
shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a
protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional
rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the
judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial
review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo
agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect
the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other
countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental
rights.87

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ
of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse
Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion,
and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas
corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring
of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through
remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition
for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the
pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the
swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary
proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out
of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better
remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The
remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and
curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from
depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23,
2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary
remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their
petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their
motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first
argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full
faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent
Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of
petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong
to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of
action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to

any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats

thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by

substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained
until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of
the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched
in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog
na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan
ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-
bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang
babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent
Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by
the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU
auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house
through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and
army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de
la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and
residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction.
Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of
their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the
participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and
their CAFGU auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the
petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the
abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother
of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at
best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the
7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries
involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall
could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very
least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform
assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in
person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their
parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of
the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under
his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process
of law and without probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division
(Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok,
Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention.
Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline
Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of
the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in
which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006.
Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the
captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort
Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of
strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren)
brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished
house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three
months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to
face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early
morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was
presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join
anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not
again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights
violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master
Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen.
Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to
take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other
occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
 It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other
military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in
the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is
overwhelming.101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's
affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino,
and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also
corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.
Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as
the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the
"Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some
time in said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that
complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan
government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November
1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and
credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she
was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also
examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree
burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette
burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of
the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to
surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo.
There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But
while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they
assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue
to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and
testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty
and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of
being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct
violation of their right to security of person.111

Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is
"often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the
prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no
right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit
that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and
solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of
person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II
of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa
v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no
undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to
"report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty"115 or
being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right
to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been
violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of
person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of
his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not
only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly,
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this provision
was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and

seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when
attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
[1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of
home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of
the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy
and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only
be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security
of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right.124 It is the "right to
security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3
of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis

supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security
of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be

subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established
by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of
mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The
degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of
their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause
in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological

integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the
bodily integrity or security of a person.129

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When
employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate
incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological
integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will -
although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of
the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who
are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these
degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture

was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov
v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state
authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR
relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities
at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in
order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the
procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his
allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made
a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the
right to security and liberty, viz:
 ...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of
human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under
specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1
of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of
person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by

the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect
for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.133 As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does
not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in
the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a

mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his
family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the
government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection
has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few
cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in
conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that
the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other
words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of
person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to
a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed
from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location
as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises
only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that
 the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the
other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security
of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the
Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of
security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was
intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of
formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have
undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be
the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of
persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable
and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9
which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of
non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective
the guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political

activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and
restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the
ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the
ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the
complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v.
Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he
(complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to
security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing
a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR
interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had
not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's
right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with
the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping
with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the
authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must
 be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody
and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we
now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents'
life, liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their
families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and
poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort
Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed,
spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has
come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they
were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought
to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when
respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told
them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent
Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na

araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in
detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now
that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their
own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared
such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The
threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of
their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as
face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless,
the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security,
and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart
from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves
perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in
conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the
testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez,
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-
sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the
CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present
at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he
did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their
credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated
persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum

Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief
of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially
include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them;
determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance;
identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent
court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he
received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting
on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP
for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the
recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy
directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007,
respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek
through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that
there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is

violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners

question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with
the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of

M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports,
records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and
medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical
personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order
sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they
claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior
to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or
affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4)
the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at
bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague
allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally
by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the
documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the
involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule
should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the
people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or

things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in
relevant part, viz:
 Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which
an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in his possession, custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under

authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of
among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company
questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and
seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained
to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide
results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative
to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the
present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as
well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial,
and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it
will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and
duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat
of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.

Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring
the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such
disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices
and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information
to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions,
when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights
are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ
of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182161               December 3, 2009

Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF
APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 4, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which
dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,
as amended. It also assails the CA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.

The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others,
were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same
day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y.
Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to
ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for
trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national
security and public safety.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for
the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable

Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ
panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime
charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be
made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated
that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show
that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the
accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other
accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the
deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and
expressing one’s sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them
conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the
intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law
penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.

On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ
Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could
not act on petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is settled
in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of
petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal
of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19,
2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the
Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s
counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong;
that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong
Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad,
he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued
inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not
acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that
immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the
continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.

On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the
Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars
No. 17, Series of 19982 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2)
that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course
of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon the request of
the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondent’s
pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the
Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for
Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the
constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo
proceeding.

During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of
Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez
manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would
leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and
interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the
DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion
to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to
recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.

For respondents’ part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the
Secretary of the DOJ’s power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the
Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of
the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No.
17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
Dismissal of the trial court.

On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the

Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJ’s Motion for
Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion
should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. 4
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no
power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal
basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and
denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration5 thereon was also denied in the assailed

Resolution6 dated March 25, 2008.

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

I.

THE DOJ SECRETARY’S ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF

AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN "REGULARLY
EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE
PAST).

II.

THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF

THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT
MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.

III.

THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE

CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL
THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES
NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER
WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.

IV.

DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR

THE DOJ SECRETARY’S CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT
A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY
STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT
BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.7
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut
of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty] includes the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and
includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways." Part of
the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.

In their Comment,8 both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan

argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance
with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,9 and Circular No. 18, Series
of 2007,10 which were issued pursuant to said Secretary’s mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration
regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretary’s
authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within
the ambit of a writ of amparo.

The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would
entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

The petition must fail.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical

pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two
instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof,
thus:

x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the
other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."12

In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on
the writ of amparo as follows:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must
be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent
may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well
as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."14
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis
supplied)

Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the
protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his
right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to
security.

In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the concept
of right to life in this wise:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property… pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of
person "emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."16

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.,17 in this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on the
import of the right to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to
security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

xxx

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of
mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus
can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of
fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause
in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological

integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.
Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the
bodily integrity or security of a person.

xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human
rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis
supplied) 19

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.20 As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such
cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian
reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion." 22

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of

the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there
exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,23 this Court ruled
that:

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for
the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life,
liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious
time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of
Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:

Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ
shall be available by motion in the criminal case.1avvphi1
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under
the writ of amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-
Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however,
did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in
the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that
issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the
HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue an HDO.24 We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:

The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its
pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul25 that once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the
sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal of
the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-
3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo
retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this
Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by
motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).26

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v.
Del Rosario,27 thus:

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal concern that
the writ is intended to protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger
or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying
by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal
case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his

apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.28 Petitioner’s
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to
his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an
actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18,
Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and
Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated

February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190108               October 19, 2010

DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO

GUISANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A. VICENTE, National Center for Mental
Health, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 190473

HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO
GUISANDE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions:

(1) A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against Judge Esteban A.
Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208,
Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente (Dr. Vicente) of the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH), docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and

(2) G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of
Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH, assailing the Resolution1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) rendered in open court on December 3, 2009, in the case
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039.
The antecedents are:

Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande),
accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So
alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while
confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City
to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a
non-bailable offense.

Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was
committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center
(MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla,
stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was
"not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan.

Acting on the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to Refer Accused’s Illness to a Government

Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent
forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to
stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande
be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary
legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding
order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s
determination that she was ready for trial.

Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead of
Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section, where female court case patients are usually
confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith, Dr. Vicente issued a special
Memorandum on November 9, 2009, reiterating existing hospital policies on the handling
of court case patients undergoing evaluation procedures to foreclose any possibility of
malingering2 on the patient’s part, specifically patients accused of a non-bailable crime.

Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the

NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional
rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her
father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary
Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No.
190108 for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo.

On the Motion for Relief filed with RTC Mandaluyong City, Judge Tacla issued the
following Order:
The Court rules to Grant accused’s [Guisande’s] motion subject to the condition that only
the accused’s counsel and the accused’ physician on her hypothyroid condition are
allowed to visit the accused in coordination with the respective psychiatrist/doctor of the
NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric examination upon accused.3

On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, this Court issued a Resolution on
November 24, 2009, to wit:

G.R. No. 190108 (David E. So, in Behalf of his Daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs.
Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 208, Dr.
Bernardo A. Vicente, National Center for Mental Health). – Acting on the Petition for
Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, the Court Resolved to

(a) ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO;

(b) REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i) IMMEDIATE
RAFFLE among the Members of the said Court; (ii) HEARING on December 3,
2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii) DECISION within ten (10) days after its
submission for decision; and

(c) ORDER the respondents to make a verified RETURN of the Joint Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Amparo before the Court of Appeals, Manila, on December 1,
2009, and to COMMENT on the petition before said date.4

As directed by this Court, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente appeared before the CA on
December 1, 2009 and, in the afternoon, filed their Consolidated Return of the Writ.

On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the RTC
Mandaluyong City:

ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS:

Review of the history and clinical reports from Makati Medical Center revealed that Ma.
Elena So-Guisande was diagnosed and managed as Bipolar I Disorder. On the other hand,
based on a series of mental status examinations and observations at our center, she is
found not manifesting signs and symptoms of psychosis at the present time. Neither a
manic episode nor a severe depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at
our center, despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although she is complaining
of mood symptoms, these are not severe enough to impair her fitness to stand trial.

Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and objective of the court
proceedings and the possible consequences of her cases. She is likewise capable of
communicating with her counsels.
She is therefore deemed COMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial. (Emphasis
supplied.)

On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CA’s Special Seventeenth
Division held a hearing. Thereafter, Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro), to
whom the petition was raffled, disposed, in this wise:

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

The essence of the deliberation this morning is on the proceedings that obtained pursuant
to the September 22, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong
City. The parties heard the arguments of the Petitioner on the right of the subject patient,
Ma. Elena, to avail of extended medical treatment citing the Constitution and the Geneva
Convention on Human Rights.

In the course of the proceedings this morning, Judge Tacla, Jr., informed this Court that
the NCMH submitted to him a report consisting of eight (8) pages at about 8:46 this
morning. The parties, specifically the petitioner, were shown the said report. Afterwards,
Judge Tacla’s opinion on the matter was heard and he did not interpose any objection
thereto. The Accused, subject of this case, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, may now be
discharged from the custody of the NCMH and is considered fit for the rigors of trial. The
parties were heard on the matter and all of them were in accord with the dispositive
portion of the aforesaid report.

After a prolonged discussion on the matter, and without objection on the part of the
parties, as the Accused should now proceed to trial in accordance with law, and at the
same time recognizing the right of the Accused to avail of further medication, this Court
decrees the following set up that should cover this proceedings: The trial of this case shall
resume and the arraignment at the Court a quo shall push through as originally scheduled
on February 2, 2010. To balance the situation, the right to seek medical treatment of the
subject is hereby recognized by all and the patient shall be confined at the St. Clare’s
Medical Center, 1838 Dian St., Palanan, Makati City, her hospital of choice, under the
headship of Dr. Yat, subject to the twenty-four (24) hour custodial control of the NBI.

xxxx

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

Dr. Yat is directed to submit, again by agreement of the parties, a periodic report every
fifteen days to the RTC, Branch 208, for its evaluation. The first report shall be submitted
on or before December 18, 2009.
In this regard, the Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to cause
the transfer from NCMH to the St. Clare’s Medical Center of the subject Accused, Ma.
Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or three (3) security personnel to the Accused
after making the proper coordination with the RTC, Branch 208. Director Mantaring is to
submit a one (1) page compliance on the matter within three (3) days from receipt of this
Resolution – furnishing Judge Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof.

xxxx

It is understood that the case pending before RTC, Branch 208, involves a non-bailable
offense where normally the Accused should have been confined in jail. But considering
the peculiarities of this case, the parties have all agreed to the set up as provided in this
Order. It is also understood by the parties that henceforth the control of the trial
proceedings as well as the control over the custody of the accused/patient shall be in the
hands of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City.

STATE SOL. DE VERA:

Your honor, the Hospital fees to be settled before the transfer, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

As committed in open-Court, Atty. Carpio shall insure the settlement of the fees for the
confinement of Accused/patient at the NCMH, as a pre-condition for her release
therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for Habeas Corpus
and Amparo is considered CLOSE and TERMINATED. All parties are notified in open
court of this Order.

xxxx

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

Let copies of this Order be furnished the RTC, Br. 208, Mandaluyong City, the Director
of the National Bureau of Investigation as well as the Supreme Court, and all the parties.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190473, filed by the
OSG, which was consolidated with G.R. No. 190108.

During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which
ultimately led to the incident before this Court, i.e., a Manifestation and Motion6 dated
March 11, 2010, filed by the OSG on behalf of public respondents, Judge Tacla and Dr.
Vicente, to wit:

1. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor’s January 25, 2010 Motion to
Withdraw Information, public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. MC019-12281. Hence, their Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) before this Honorable Court has been rendered moot and academic. A copy
of the February 4, 2010 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 is attached
herewith as Annex "A."

2. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from which
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the
Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and
the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) stemmed from, these cases and
pending incidents thereon should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and
academic.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of
Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No.
190473) and all other pending incidents thereon be DISMISSED for having been
rendered moot and academic.

Petitioner So filed a Comment7 refuting the OSG’s motion to dismiss G.R. Nos. 190108
and 190473. Through counsel, and using strong words, he vehemently opposed the
dismissal of the petitions because they had filed criminal complaints and an
administrative case against respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the
NCMH and an attending doctor thereat, for purported violations of accused Guisande’s
rights during her confinement at the NCMH. Adding to the flurry of cases, petitioner So
filed a Verified Petition to cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA
for their supposed submission of an altered and falsified document, which was attached
to, and formed an integral part of, their Consolidated Return of the Writ.

Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a Motion to Admit
Reply8 with its Reply9 to the Comment of petitioner So attached thereto. The OSG
clarified and denied outright petitioner So’s allegation in the Comment that the criminal
case for Qualified Theft against accused Guisande was a prevarication and concoction of
private complainant10 and that Judge Tacla had conspired to falsely accuse petitioner So’s
daughter, Guisande. In all, the OSG reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had
been rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the criminal case for Qualified
Theft against Guisande.
Significantly, on August 25, 2010, the OSG filed another Manifestation and
Motion11 informing this Court of the following:

(1) Resolution dated June 7, 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa D. Escobar-
Pilares (Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares), dismissing the charge of petitioner So
against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente and their counsels for Falsification under Article 171
and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as I.S. No. XV-07-INV-10B-01371, for
insufficiency of evidence;12 and

(2) Resolution dated July 27, 2010 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, where petitioner
So’s verified petition for contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and where the CA
ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo closed and terminated.13

Likewise, the OSG reiterated its motion to dismiss the instant consolidated petitions.

We completely agree with the OSG. Accordingly, we deny the petitions in G.R. Nos.
190108 and 190473 for having been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. MC09-12281 for Qualified Theft pending before the RTC
Mandaluyong City.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and
amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s
daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and
circumstances of his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was
"life threatening"; although Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH
could not adequately treat Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting
right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to
court processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the
transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s Medical Center, while noting that
because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular course of
procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was
charged with a non-bailable offense.

Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the
Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner So’s
claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were
the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining
the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the
contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high
regard by petitioner So’s and accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit for
trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or
the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas
corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for
amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.

Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:

Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules.
In Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin
Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain
Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the
Ombudsman,14 we qualified:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and
in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.15

In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila,
Branch 37, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee
M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson,16 we intoned:

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the
writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists.
If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and
the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If
the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose
behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.17

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be
referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition.18 In addition, we note that it was
procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s
mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the
transfer of accused to St. Clare’s Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who
was required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC
Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of
the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In
other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable
criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the
hospital and from a doctor of her choice.1avvphi1
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no
longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively,
accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or
may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC
Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic
which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,19 is defined as "one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value."

Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares,

unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:

We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this
Court when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable
offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel
for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which
[petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not
even material in the instant case for habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be
determined here was whether or not Elena’s confinement at NCMH was lawful.

Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of
court, is rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its
open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was
only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.

Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr.
Vicente and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against
Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is
declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.20

In XV-07-INV-10B-01371 for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Assistant City Prosecutor made the following findings:

x x x [T]he undersigned finds no probable cause that respondents committed the charges
filed against them.

Examination of the Contract of Confinement which was claimed to have been falsified
reveals that it was merely a photocopy. The supposed full photocopy of the original copy
of the subject contract did not contain any alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion)
that could have changed its meaning or that could have made it speak of something false.
The contents of the contract depicting that [Guisande’s] yaya (Ms. Galleto) was indeed
confined at the NCMH as claimed by respondents to accompany [Guisande], [So’s]
daughter who was confined thereat remained the same. Respondents explained that they
were unaware of the inadvertent partial reproduction of the document and supported the
same with an affidavit of good faith executed by an NCMH clerk explaining why it was
only partially reproduced.

Likewise, respondents’ statement that [Guisande] is "facing non-bailable offenses" is not

absolutely false. Respondents satisfactorily explained that at the time of the filing of their
pleading, they believed in good faith that she was facing more than one non-bailable
offenses (sic) as she was charged with Qualified Theft before the Mandaluyong City
RTC, Branch 208 and Syndicated Estafa before the San Juan Prosecutor’s office. While it
may be true that [Guisande] has only one (1) non-bailable offense pending in court,
respondents proved with their evidence that she had others pending at the time in other
forum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charges for

Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code filed against all
respondents namely: (1) Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., (2) Dr. Bernardino A. Vicente, (3)
ASG General Magtanggol M. Castro, SSS Diana H. Castañeda-de Vera, SS Charina A.
Soria and AS Jefferson C. Secillano, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.21

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108
and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot and academic. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 184379-80               April 24, 2012

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO

LOZADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA,
AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER
VALEROSO,* Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
What the Court decides today has nothing to do with the substance or merits surrounding
the aborted deal of the Philippine government with the National Broadband Network and
ZTE Corporation, or any allegation of petitioner Rodolfo Noel "June" Lozada, Jr.,
(Lozada) regarding the same. There is only one issue that we decide today – whether
circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to
the protection of the writ of amparo. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of
the Decision dated 12 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.1

Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Forest Corporation (PFC), a government-owned- and -controlled corporation under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).2 Petitioner Violeta Lozada
(Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo Lozada (Arturo) is his brother.

At the time the Petition for the Writ of Amparo was filed, respondent former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) was the incumbent President of the
Philippines. Meanwhile, Eduardo Ermita (ES Ermita) was then the Executive Secretary;
Avelino Razon (Razon), the Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP);
Angel Atutubo (Atutubo), the Assistant General Manager for Security and Emergency
Services of the Manila International Airport Authority; and Rodolfo Valeroso (Valeroso),
an agent of the Aviation Security Group (ASG) of the PNP.

Antecedent Facts

The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a
transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband
Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese manufacturer of
telecommunications equipment.3 Former National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri (Sec. Neri) sought the services of Lozada as an
unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal.4 The latter avers that during the course of his
engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain
public officials.5 These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon
Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an investigation thereon,6 for which it
issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.7

On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada left the
country for a purported official trip to London, as announced by then DENR Secretary
Lito Atienza (Sec. Atienza).8 In the Petition, Lozada alleged that his failure to appear at
the scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive Assistant
Undersecretary Manuel Gaite (Usec. Gaite).9 Consequently, the Senate issued an Order
dated 30 January 2008: (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and
detention; and (c) directing the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to implement the Order and
make a return thereon.10
While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be allowed to go
back to the Philippines.11 Upon the approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family
that he was returning from Hong Kong on 5 February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific
Flight No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on the same day.12

In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the aircraft, several men held
his arms and took his bag. Although he allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he
later realized that it was wiser to just follow them, especially when he overheard from
their handheld radio: "[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado."13

Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to call up his
brother, petitioner Arturo, and inform him of his situation.14 The men thereafter led him
through the departure area of the airport and into a car waiting for them.15 They made him
sit alone at the back of the vehicle, while a man, whom he later discovered to be
respondent Valeroso, took the passenger seat and was always in contact with other
individuals.16 Lozada observed that other cars tailed their vehicle.17

Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people from the
government, and that the former was going to confer with "ES and Ma’[a]m." Lozada
surmised that these individuals referred to ES Ermita and former President Arroyo,
respectively.18 Sec. Atienza also purportedly instructed Lozada to pacify his wife,
petitioner Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return.19

The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove towards the direction of
Laguna.20 Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting
police protection.21

Lozada requested that he be brought home to Pasig, but the men were allegedly
compelled to deny his request on account of unidentified security risks.22 Eventually,
however, the vehicle turned around and drove to Libis, Quezon City. The group stopped
at The Outback restaurant to meet with certain individuals, who turned out to be Atty.
Antonio Bautista (Atty. Bautista) and Colonel Paul Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the
Police Special Protection Office (PSPO). At the restaurant, Lozada claimed that he was
made to fill in the blanks of a prepared affidavit.23

After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going to billet him in a hotel
for a night, but he suggested that they take him to La Salle Green Hills instead. The men
acquiesced.24

Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his sister, Carmen
Lozada (Carmen).25 He observed that the perimeter was guarded by policemen,
purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening not only his security, but also that of
his family and the De La Salle brothers.26

On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada
to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an affidavit.27

At about 1:00 p.m., Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus, docketed
as G.R. No. 181342 (the Habeas Corpus case).28 Arturo likewise filed before this Court a
Petition for a Writ of Amparo, docketed as G.R. No. 181356 (the Amparo case), and
prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the
authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show
responsibility for his alleged abduction.29

At around the same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo, Col.
Mascarinas drove Lozada back to La Salle Green Hills.30 Lozada was then made to sign a
typewritten, antedated letter requesting police protection.31 Thereafter, former Presidential
Spokesperson Michael Defensor (Sec. Defensor) supposedly came and requested Lozada
to refute reports that the latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged
anomalies in the NBN-ZTE deal. Sec. Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada ₱50,000
for the latter’s expenses.32

On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him.33 Lozada claimed that after
his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then
harassed, stalked and threatened.34

On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution (a) consolidating the Habeas Corpus case
and the Amparo case; (b) requiring respondents in the Habeas Corpus case to comment
on the Petition; (c) issuing a Writ of Amparo; (d) ordering respondents in the Amparo
case to file their verified Return; (e) referring the consolidated Petitions to the CA; and
(f) directing the CA to set the cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.35 Accordingly, the
court a quo set both cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.36

On 12 February 2008, respondents filed before the CA a Manifestation and Motion,

praying for the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case.37 They asserted that Lozada was
never illegally deprived of his liberty and was, at that time, no longer in their custody.
They likewise averred that, beginning 8 February 2008, Lozada had already been under
the supervision of the Senate and, from then on, had been testifying before it.38

In their verified Return, respondents claimed that Sec. Atienza had arranged for the
provision of a security team to be assigned to Lozada, who was then fearful for his
safety.39 In effect, respondents asserted that Lozada had knowledge and control of the
events that took place on 5 February 2008, voluntarily entrusted himself to their
company, and was never deprived of his liberty. Hence, respondents prayed for the denial
of the interim reliefs and the dismissal of the Petition.40

During the initial hearing on 14 February 2008, Lozada and Violeta ratified the Petition
in the Amparo case41 to comply with Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo,42 which imposes an order to be followed by those who can sue for the writ.43 The
CA also dismissed the Habeas Corpus case in open court for being moot and academic, as
Lozada was physically present and was not confined or detained by any of the
respondents.44 Considering that petitioners failed to question the dismissal of the Habeas
Corpus case, the said dismissal had lapsed into finality, leaving only the Amparo case
open for disposition.

Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for Temporary Protection Order and Production of
Documents,45 while Arturo filed a Motion for Production of Documents.46 Additionally,
Arturo also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties Romulo Neri, Benjamin Abalos,
[Sr.], Rodolfo Valeroso, "Jaime" the Driver and Other Respondents. Respondents
opposed these motions.47 The CA denied the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on the
ground that the alleged acts and statements attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos
(Abalos) were irrelevant to the Amparo case, and that to require them to testify would
only result in a fishing expedition.48 The CA likewise denied Arturo’s subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration.49

In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA dropped former President Arroyo as a
respondent on the ground that at the time the Petition in the Amparo case was filed, she
was still the incumbent President enjoying immunity from suit.50 Arturo filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,51 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated 25 March 2008.52

On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioners the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo and dismissing the Petition.53 The CA found that petitioners were
unable to prove through substantial evidence that respondents violated, or threatened with
violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.

Petitioners thus filed the instant Petition, praying for: (a) the reversal of the assailed CA
Decision; (b) the issuance of the TPO; and (c) the accreditation of the Association of
Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines and the De La Salle Brothers as the
sanctuaries of Lozada and his family.54 In the alternative, petitioners pray that this Court
remand the case to the CA for further hearings and reverse the latter’s Orders: (a)
denying the Motion to Issue a Subpoena Ad Testificandum and (b) dropping former
President Arroyo as a respondent. Petitioners raise the following issues:
 (1) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in ruling to dismiss the petition for a writ of
amparo and deny Petitioners’ prayer for a Temporary Protection Order, inter alia,
because there is no substantial evidence to prove that the right to life, liberty or
security of Jun Lozada was violated or threatened with violation. This rule is not
in accord with the rule on the writ of amparo and Supreme Court jurisprudence on
substantial evidence[.]

(2) Whether the Ponencia erred and gravely abused its discretion by prematurely
ruling that the testimony of witnesses which Petitioners sought to present and who
are subject of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena ad testificandum were
irrelevant to the Petition for a Writ of Amparo in a way not in accord with the
Rules of Court and Supreme Court decisions.

(3) Whether the Court a quo erred in using and considering the affidavits of
respondents in coming up with the questioned decision when these were not
offered as evidence and were not subjected to cross-examination. This ruling is not
in accord with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.

(4) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria Arroyo
despite her failure to submit a verified return and personally claim presidential
immunity in a way not in accord with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.55

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners failed to adduce
substantial evidence, as the allegations they propounded in support of their Petition were
largely hearsay.56 The OSG also maintains that it was proper for the CA to have dropped
former President Arroyo as respondent on account of her presidential immunity from
suit.57

Respondent Atutubo also alleges, among others, that: (a) Lozada voluntarily asked for
security and protection; (b) Lozada willingly submitted himself to the company of the
police escorts; (c) Atutubo merely accompanied him to pass through the contingency
route customarily provided to VIP passengers, public figures, foreign dignitaries, and the
like; and (d) Atutubo only performed his job to ensure security and maintain order at the
airport upon the arrival of Lozada.58

In the face of these assertions by respondents, petitioners nevertheless insist that while
they have sufficiently established that Lozada was taken against his will and was put
under restraint, respondents have failed to discharge their own burden to prove that they
exercised extraordinary diligence as public officials.59 Petitioners also maintain that it was
erroneous for the CA to have denied their motion for subpoena ad testificandum for being
irrelevant, given that the relevancy of evidence must be examined after it is offered, and
not before.60 Finally, petitioners contend that the presidential immunity from suit cannot
be invoked in amparo actions.61
 Issues

In ruling on whether the CA committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision,
three issues must be discussed:

I. Whether the CA committed an error in dropping former President Arroyo as a

respondent in the Amparo case.

II. Whether the CA committed an error in denying petitioners’ Motion for the
Issuance of a Subpoena Ad Testificandum.

III. Whether petitioners should be granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Discussion

The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial
relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security.62 Having been originally
intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the
said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity
in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.63

As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.64 Considering that this remedy is aimed at
addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it
cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds,65 or in cases where the alleged
threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.66 Instead, it must be granted
judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and
in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.67 (Emphasis supplied.)

Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed CA decision
and the evidence adduced by the parties, this Court denies the Petition.

First issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or
her tenure of office or actual incumbency.68 Conversely, this presidential privilege of
immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during
his or her tenure.69

In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of
the original Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the
incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a quo
to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.

It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former
President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a
defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the
alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada.

Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on
the issue of former President Arroyo’s alleged responsibility or accountability. A
thorough examination of the allegations postulated and the evidence adduced by
petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on
her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain
"Ma’[a]m,"70 whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told
Lozada that "the President was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,"71 there is nothing in
the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the
events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that
Lozada and his family purportedly received.

Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum

This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,72 ruled that for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear
that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy, to wit:

A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.

In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify,
while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents
therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil
Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad
testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall
bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described
in the subpoena.

Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first
be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other
things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
(test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be
readily identified (test of definiteness).73 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to
be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court a
quo aptly ruled in this manner:

The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not
relevant to the instant Amparo Petition where the issue involved is whether or not
Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security was threatened or continues to be threatened
with violation by the unlawful act/s of the respondents. Evidence, to be relevant, must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver "Jaime" are not respondents in
this Amparo Petition and the vague allegations averred in the Motion with respect to
them do not pass the test of relevancy. To Our mind, petitioner appears to be embarking
on a "fishing expedition". Petitioner should present the aggrieved party [Lozada], who
has been regularly attending the hearings, to prove the allegations in the Amparo Petition,
instead of dragging the names of other people into the picture. We have repeatedly
reminded the parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition
does not involve the investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. Petitioner should focus on
the fact in issue and not embroil this Court into said ZTE-NBN contract, which is now
being investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Office of the
Ombudsman.74 (Emphasis supplied.)

All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to
the ZTE-NBN deal, and not to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the
ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly received. Although the present action is
rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction, the
testimonies of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the main
issue of whether there was an unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents that
violated the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Thus, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum.

Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo

A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada

Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish
their claims by substantial evidence,75 or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.76 The use of this evidentiary threshold
reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing
amparo situations.77

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is
necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing
threat.78 Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v. Tagitis:79

Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced

disappearance was no longer a problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they escaped from
captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing
more than two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in
Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers’ right to security; the
brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were
still at large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of
being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct
violation of their right to security of person.80 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the
threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations
presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the
parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this
regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that
Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked
from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport,81 as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents:

[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because he was
instructed by Secretary Atienza, th[r]ough a phone call on the night of 04 February 2008,
while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to the Bureau of Immigration so that
few people would notice him and he could be facilitated in going out of the airport
without any hassle from the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada]
stated that he wanted to get away from the Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the
men’s room of the airport, after he was allegedly "grabbed", where he made a call to his
brother Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not prevented from making said call,
and was simply advised by the person who met him at the tube to (sic) "sir, bilisan mo
na". When they proceeded out of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard from the
radio track down, "wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado", so they took a
detour and went up to the departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area, and
proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty Free Shop and then down towards the
tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-
at-Arms, said detour appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where
[Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly
stamped.

This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada] struggled or made an
outcry for help when he was allegedly "grabbed" or "abducted" at the airport. [Lozada]
even testified that nobody held him, and they were not hostile to him nor shouted at him.
With noon day clarity, this Court finds that the reason why [Lozada] was fetched at the
airport was to help him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain him at
the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony, pursuant to the Order of the Senate on the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada]
clearly knew this because at that time, it was still his decision not to testify before the
Senate. He agreed with that plan.82 (Emphases supplied.)

The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to
avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him at the airport were
there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and
voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have been forcibly abducted.

However, these men’s subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the vehicle and
driving him around, without disclosing the exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond
what he had consented to and requested from Sec. Atienza. These men neither informed
him of where he was being transported nor provided him complete liberty to contact his
family members to assure them of his safety. These acts demonstrated that he lacked
absolute control over the situation, as well as an effective capacity to challenge their
instructions.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained,
so much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that
manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of
the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada was deprived of his
liberty from the point when he was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up
to the time he was taken to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and
his family continue to suffer various threats from respondents remain unproven. The CA
correctly found as follows:

The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the
custody of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and
security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would make that kind of media
announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security.

x x x           x x x          x x x

He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of armed men riding in

motorcycle passing outside the De La Salle premises where he and his family are staying
and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to. Again, these
alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of
the respondents.

[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and
at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that
these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed
to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose
of threatening his right to life, liberty and security.

[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend, i.e., wherever he goes, there is a
bomb threat. There were bomb threats in the places where he went to like in [the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines], Dagupan, Cebu and Bohol. However,
[Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to ascertain where the bomb threats
emanated. Plainly, there is no evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the
respondents or done upon their instigation.

Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice that he was put
on the watch list of the Bureau of Immigration as a threat to his life, liberty and security.
This alleged threat is again unsupported by evidence, as in fact, [Lozada] testified that he
did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the
official watch list of the Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of the
respondents in the amparo petition, and there is no showing in the record that it was the
respondents who ordered the same for the purpose of threatening him.

[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases against him and his family as
threat to his life, liberty and security. xxx However, [Lozada] himself testified that he
does not know whether the respondents or any of the respondents ordered the filing of
these cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined based on
their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed
against the respondents.83 (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by
the required evidentiary standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove
their defenses by substantial evidence and to show that respondents exercised
extraordinary diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.84 This Court has
squarely passed upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,85 to wit:

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of
the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by
substantial evidence.

Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence,
and they cannot merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their
defenses or their exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the
evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the
privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and academic by the
cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty.

B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ of amparo and its interim reliefs

As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ of
amparo, considering that the illegal restraint alleged in this case had already ceased and
there is no imminent or continuing restriction on his liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,86 this
Court held as follows:

Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication
for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there
is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified. (Emphasis supplied.)1âwphi1

Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
Complaint charging respondents with kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed as I.S.
No. 2008-467.87 In this regard, this Court’s ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo88 is worth
considering:

First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention
rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition
has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial
steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded
individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in
motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before
the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.

Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a
criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the
other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for
amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo
Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the
terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But
as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer
technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court
has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the
CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22;
and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed
to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition,
those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at
the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo
petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the
mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.

Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo
as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be
violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of
the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards
this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-
finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint
before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the
allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB
should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own
investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall
be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the
CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed,
if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be
fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case,
then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners.
After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to
facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators.89 On the other hand, if there is no
actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if
applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his
liberty.

Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v.
Sanchez,90 declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection
and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public officials were not
accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be
incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production
Orders and at the same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing
threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a
prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Court
of Appeals’ denial of the privilege of the writ of amparo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184467               June 19, 2012

EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V.
PARDICO Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown
by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate or
whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3

This petition for review on certiorari4 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC5 challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent
against the petitioners.

Factual Antecedents

On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation8 (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A
Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival
of the vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben),
who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw
two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked
Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw
Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian
Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision.9

Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10 The supervisor of the security
guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.

As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective versions diverge.

Version of the Petitioners

Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a
report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she
saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision.11 The reported
unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio)
and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land
security department. Following their department’s standard operating procedure, Dio and
Buising entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis.
It was there where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They
thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two
suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.

At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted
that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to
the house of Lolita.12 Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant
was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia
ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the
guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.13 His mother Lolita also
signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or
entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.

Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved
in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief
discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the
logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed
and without any injury.14

Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her
sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita
asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was being asked to sign,
to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the
entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein. After which, the guards
left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15 from the Malolos City Police Station
requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia
Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all
three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police Station. However, since Virginia
was not present despite having received the same invitation, the meeting was reset to
April 22, 2008.16

On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they
released Ben and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.17 They
assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the investigation of her
missing husband.18

Version of the Respondent

According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully
arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for
investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na
naman?"19 and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas
were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts of his
body.20 Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at
wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben."21

Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area
where their house is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the
administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But
since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in
the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong got
was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no
longer pursued his plan. 22

Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she
undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.23 Thereafter, Navia again asked
Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolita’s inquiry as to why she had to sign again, Navia
explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong unharmed but that Ben
had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since she has poor
eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with
Bong.24 At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However,
since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security office at once leaving
Ben behind.25

Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to
sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already
twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was
about to sign only pertains to Bong’s release. Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight,
Lolita took Buising’s word and signed the logbook without, again, reading what was
written in it. 26

The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her
husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with
Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay.
Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.

In the course of the investigation on Ben’s disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that
petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the
logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never
witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him in
petitioners’ custody at the security office.27

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparo28 before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order29 dated June 26, 2008 directing,
among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben
before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:

WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M.
No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of
amparo be issued, as follows:

(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of
the Asian Land Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of
aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;

(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the

aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally
appear thereat;

(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew

Buising to file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from
service of the writ, a verified written return with supporting affidavits which shall,
among other things, contain the following:

a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party, through any act or omission;
 b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and

c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining

to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.

(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the

[petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of contempt,
from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate
family and any [member] of his household.

The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at

their address indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together
with copies of the petition and its annexes.30

A Writ of Amparo31 was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27,
2008.32 On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33 praying for the denial of the
petition for lack of merit.

A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of

Buising, while Virginia submitted the sworn statements34 of Lolita and Enrique which the
two affirmed on the witness stand.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision35 granting the petition. It
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it
proper and appropriate, as follows:

(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately

conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia,
Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding
the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as part of the
investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;

(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the
witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure
their safety and security; and

(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to

investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur]
 Pardico by the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said
investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions forming part of the record
of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.

Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director
Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.36

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration37 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order38 dated August 29, 2008.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:

4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.

4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT

PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN
VIOLATION OF HER HUSBAND’S RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR
SECURITY.

4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED

THE FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.

4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT

THE ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE
INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.39

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the
writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation
or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear.
Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these.
First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity
the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a
threat to Ben’s right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from
the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his
alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the
signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March
31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the
writ and in holding them responsible for Ben’s disappearance.

Our Ruling

Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be
dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the
rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to
provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." 40

Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute
his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners’ security office
on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Ben’s
inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 641 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42 recognizes every human being’s
inherent right to life, while Article 943 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to
liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty
and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with
law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without
due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.44

The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben’s disappearance as alleged in
Virginia’s petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the
court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.

It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis ours.)

While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.45 Then, the budding jurisprudence
on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis46 when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of
international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition of enforced disappearances, as "the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law."47

Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148 on December 11, 2009.
Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or

abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or
a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom
or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his

Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the
rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an
‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is."50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s
reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851.
Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC in relation to RA No. 9851.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of

liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to

acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and,
 (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be
shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element
of government participation.

In the present case, we do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude
towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the
circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben," cannot be
taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there
is nothing on record which would support petitioners’ assertion that they released Ben on
the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained
how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the
entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best,
like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or presented in
court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.1âwphi1

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not

enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with
the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This
indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does
not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to
show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s
amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of
an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his
case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible
or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie
against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable
or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are
mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and
their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government
and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by
Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183533               September 25, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.
GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT.
CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL.
ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL
FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST
SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL.
JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY
GOMEZ, Respondents.

For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated September 26, 2010
filed by petitioner Francis Saez of our Resolution2 dated August 31, 2010 denying the
Petition for Review3 he filed on July 21, 2008.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does
not find cogent grounds to warrant setting aside our decision.

Antecedent Facts

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege
of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order,
inspection of place and production of documents.5 In the petition, he expressed his fear of
being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by
the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the
order of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP).

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo
commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court
of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision.The case before the CA was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.

In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains
Lawrence Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents
also alleged that the names and descriptions of "Capt. Alcaydo," "a certain First
Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny," and "Joel" were insufficient to properly identify
some of the persons sought to be included as among the respondents in the petition.

On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt.
Jacob Thaddeus Obligado, Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana,
Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil submitted their affidavits.

The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to
determine specific acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he
was always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel"
pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the
petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him of his marital status and
current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was
still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if
the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in
the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.

CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA

On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial

grounds the reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA ratiocinated:

There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio’s
presence at their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and
what Zaldy Osio was doing there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner’s
right to life, liberty or security. This Court cannot just grant the privilege of the writs
without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s entitlement thereto. This Court
cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation or conjecture. This
Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the rules on the
writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the
privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies
available to address the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.

xxxx

Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the
supposed threat or violation of petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is
committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances attendant to said supposed
violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life, liberty or security to warrant
entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.

xxxx

A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the
aforestated requirements of Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the pertinent
rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how
petitioner’s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include
any allegation as to what recourses he availed of to obtain the alleged documents from
respondents. Neither did petitioner allege what specific documents he prays for and from
whom or [sic] from what particular office of the government he prays to obtain them. The
petition prays "to order respondents to produce any documents submitted to any of them
in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military
intelligence reports."

xxxx

Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC and Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement
to the privilege of the writs applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own
admission that nothing happened between him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of
the petition appears to have been precipitated by his fear that something might happen to
him, not because of any apparent violation or visible threat to violate his right to life,
liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish likewise who among the
respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both writs to constitute
violation or threat to violate petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to
privacy thereof.

xxxx

x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:
"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. x x x."

xxxx

IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.8

On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision with
the following issues submitted for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
AS PARTY RESPONDENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING

FROM THE PETITIONER IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE
LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT FAILED TO CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE
LIST, THREATS AND VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND
SECURITY WERE ACTUALLY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.9

Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010

On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10 denying the petition for review for
the following reasons, viz:

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the
petition was bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents
violated or threatened petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His claim that he was
incommunicado lacks credibility as he was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back
to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that petitioner failed to present
substantial evidence that his right to life, liberty and security were violated, or how his
right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did not specify the particular
documents to be secured, their location or what particular government office had custody
thereof, and who has possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that the
respondents be ordered "to produce any documents submitted to any of them in the matter
of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports."

Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he
had specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the Order
of Battle and promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate and become a
military asset. However, despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices
during the hearing, he still failed to enlighten the appellate court as to what actually
transpired to enable said court to determine whether his right to life, liberty or security
had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the unsubstantiated claims of
petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.

As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-

respondent, we find the same also to be without merit. The Court has already made it
clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that the President, during his or her tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the President be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable the President to fully attend to the
performance of official duties and functions.11 (Citation omitted)

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by the
respondents’ own admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were
threatened. Military personnel, whom the petitioner had named and described, knew
where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a military asset, but under
duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to the CPP and including
him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances were not
denied by the respondents.

The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered
incommunicado as he was even provided with a cellular phone. The petitioner argues that
the phone was only given to him for the purpose of communicating with the respondents
matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal organizations.

The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13 which pronounced that "in
the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the
‘freedom from threat’".14 According to the petitioner, his freedom from fear was
undoubtedly violated, hence, to him pertains a cause of action. Anent the quantum of
proof required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere substantial
evidence is sufficient. The petition "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings".15

Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of proof
than what the rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the respondents’
evidence.

The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno who expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by any citizen
against any governmental agency or register to find out what information is held about
his or her person." The person can likewise "request the rectification or even the
destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her." In the petitioner’s
case, he specifically sought the production of the order of battle, which allegedly
included his name, and other records which supposedly contain erroneous data relative to
his involvement with the CPP.

OSG’s Comment

In the respondents’ comment16 filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the petitioner
advances no cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s Resolution dated August
31, 2010.

The Court’s Disquisition

While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court
nevertheless finds ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The petition conforms to the

requirements of the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data

Section 517 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 618 of
A.M. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the said petitions
should contain.

In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made
specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and those of the respondents.
The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his
rights and the participation of some of the respondents in their commission. As to the pre-
requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was
explained that the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived as
his oppressors, hence, his request for assistance from a human rights organization, then a
direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of
habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been
satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking
the petitioner to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence
reports making references to him. Although the exact locations and the custodians of the
documents were not identified, this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d)
of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises
only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo
Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights.19 Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under
exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules. However,
they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept "hook, line and sinker", so to
speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a
different matter altogether.

No substantial evidence exists to

prove the petitioner’s claims

The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the evidentiary difficulties
attendant to the filing of a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions
may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced.20

With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did not commit a reversible
error in declaring that no substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the reliefs
prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence on record and
finds no reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.

In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the petitioner
if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish
with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored. The encounter happened once and
the petitioner, in his pleadings, nowhere stated that subsequent to the time he was asked
about his involvement with ANAKPAWIS, he still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance
operations on him. He alleged that he was brought to the camp of the 204th Infantry
Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but was sent home at 5:00 p.m. The petitioner and
the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired thereafter. The petitioner
insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in
places under the latter’s control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was
the petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected
as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.

Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings
made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of
the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court
agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed
upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1
of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their
coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security.
Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion
of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense
of "freedom from threat".21

It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the
surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on
the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the
military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the
intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated
earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack
corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand
on nebulous grounds.

The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to a petition for the
issuance of the writs. Unlike, however, the unique nature of cases involving enforced
disappearances or extra-judicial killings that calls for flexibility in considering the gamut
of evidence presented by the parties, this case sets a different scenario and a significant
portion of the petitioner’s testimony could have been easily corroborated. In his
Sinumpaang Salaysay22 dated March 5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet dated December 9,
200723 executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights-Southern
Tagalog (KARAPATAN-ST), the petitioner stated that when he was invited and
interrogated at the military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, he brought with him his
uncle Norberto Roxas, Barangay Captain Mario Ilagan and two of his bodyguards, and
Edwardo Estabillo – five witnesses who can attest and easily corroborate his statement –
but curiously, the petitioner did not present any piece of evidence, whether documentary
or testimonial, to buttress such claim nor did he give any reason for their non-
presentation.This could have made a difference in light of the denials made by the
respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.

The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another
allegation by the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court
notes that such allegation was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008, stated that he "does not have knowledge
about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists
the petitioner as a member of the CPP."24 This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the
petitioner identified as the one who told him that he was included in the order of
battle.25 The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division of the Philippine Army also
conducted an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Esperon,26 and it was shown that the persons identified by the petitioners who allegedly
committed the acts complained of were not connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry
Division.27

Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From
the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought
the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST, there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go
home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances. And while he may have
been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence at the pier, there was no claim by the petitioner that he
was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may transport
him back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile phone; hence, he had
unhampered access to communication and can readily seek assistance from non-
governmental organizations and even government agencies.

The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a
military informant and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be
one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay28 executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted
that he actually knew the petitioner way back in 1998 when they were still students. He
also stated that when he saw the petitioner again in 2007, the latter manifested his
intention to become a military informant in exchange for financial and other forms of
assistance.

The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a
certain "Joel", e.g., the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle
pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances. Such allegation by the
petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere impression that the
petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The petitioner
even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a conversation with "Joel"
sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether he was still connected with
ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything" and no other incident occurred
between them since then.29 There is clearly nothing on record which shows that "Joel"
committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the conclusion arrived at by the
petitioner, especially since the alleged acts committed by "Joel" are susceptible of
different interpretations.

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his
claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to
amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of
proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some
adequate evidence."30

The President cannot be

automatically dropped as a
respondent pursuant to the doctrine
of command responsibility

In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,31 the Court stated:

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of
the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as

superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is
adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government
Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the

Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O.
226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed,
is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his
area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge
of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been
repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as

the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military. (Citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-

Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life,
liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had
exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had
failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules.1âwphi1

The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president’s incumbency.32

Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting

president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.33 Courts look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34

The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial
evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or
omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the
petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party respondent without any
attempt at all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged
violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for
any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus, while the President
cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-
in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.

Compliance with technical rules of

procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy

Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs
of amparo and habeas data was the defective verification which was attached to the
petition. In Tagitis,35 supporting affidavits required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition and it was ruled that the
defect was fully cured when the petitioner and the witness personally testified to prove
the truth of their allegations in the hearings held before the CA. In the instant case, the
defective verification was not the sole reason for the CA’s denial of the petition for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that
although rules of procedure play an important rule in effectively administering justice,
primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where there was at
least substantial compliance with the requirements and where petitioner himself testified
in the hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be

accorded primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to
prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the defect in
the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to
the petition was deemed cured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is

DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189689

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Cases

In each of these three (3) consolidated petitions for review, the Court is tasked to evaluate
the substantially similar but separately issued Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Davao City, Branch 10, dated August 14, 2009[1] in the three (3) writ of amparo cases,
as well as, the Order dated September 22, 2009[2] denying the joint motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is
alleged to be a JCICC "AGILA" 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the
Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID),[3] which is a list containing the names
of organizations and personalities in Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao City,
supposedly connected to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military
arm, the New People's Army (NPA).  They perceive that by the inclusion of their names
in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings a real threat to their life, liberty and security.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 189689, ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first
came to know of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21,
2009.  This was after the PowerPoint presentation made public by Bayan Muna Party-List
Representative Satur Ocampo (Representative Ocampo) on May 18, 2009 during the
conclusion of the International Solidarity Mission (ISM) conducted by various
organizations.  The following entries bearing specific reference to her person were
reflected therein:

7. ON 12 NOV 07, MEETING AT SHIMRIC BEACH RESORT, TALOMO, DC

PRESIDED BY ATTY LILIBETH LADAGA SEC GEN, UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYER MOVEMENT (UPLM) AND KELLY DELGADO SEC GEN,
KARAPATAN:

-   PRESENTED THE NATL GOAL/THEME WHICH STATES THAT "THE

STAGE IS SET, TIME TO UNITE AGAINST ARROYO, STEP UP PROTESTS
AND ARMED OFFENSIVE."

-   DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WHICH WILL BE CAPITALIZED

ON THEIR PLANNED ACTIVITIES ON 30 NOV 07:

ISSUES:

1. OUTREACH PROGRAMS/ MEDICAL MISSION IN RURAL AREAS;

 2. OUT OF SCHOOL YOUTH RECRUITMENT;
3. P125 DAILY WAGE HIKE OR P3,000 ACROSS THE BOARD HIKE;
4. SCRAP ANTI-TERRORISM BILL;
5. OIL DE-REGULATION LAW;
6. ANTI-LARGE SCALE MINING;
7. CORRUPTION AND ANTI-POVERTY/ZTE ISSUES AND BRIBERY;
8. ANTI-POLITICAL AND EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS;
9. CARP ISSUES AND LAND DISPUTES; AND
10. LATEST GLORIETA BOMBING

COMPOSITION: CIVIC, RELIGIOUS, TRANSPORT, LABOR AND

PEASANT, YOUTH SECTOR, PROGRESSIVE GROUPS, BUSINESS
SECTOR, ANTI-PGMA, BLACK AND WHITE MOVEMENT AND ANTI-
POVERTY MOVEMENT.

ULTIMATE GOAL: TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 07[4]

In her Affidavit,[5] Atty. Ladaga substantiated the threats against her life, liberty and
security by narrating that since 2007, suspicious-looking persons have been visiting her
Davao City law office during her absence, posing either as members of the military or
falsely claiming to be clients inquiring on the status of their cases.  These incidents were
attested to by her law office partner, Atty. Michael P. Pito, through an Affidavit[6] dated
June 16, 2009.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 189690, Davao City Councilor ATTY.
ANGELA LIBRADO-TRINIDAD (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a Privilege
Speech[7] before the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City on May
19, 2009 to demand the removal of her name from said OB List.  Subsequently, the
Davao City Council ordered a formal investigation into the existence of the alleged OB
List.  The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), for its part, announced the conduct of
its own investigation into the matter, having been presented a copy of the PowerPoint
presentation during its public hearing in Davao City on May 22, 2009.

According to her, in the course of the performance of her duties and functions as a
lawyer, as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao, as well as, of Bayan
Muna, she has not committed any act against national security that would justify the
inclusion of her name in the said OB List.  In her Affidavit,[8] she recounted that
sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men on a motorcycle tailed her vehicle as
she went about her day going to different places.  She also recalled that on June 23, 2008,
while she was away from home, three unidentified men tried to barge into their house and
later left on board a plate-less, stainless "owner type-vehicle."   Both incidents were duly
reported to the police.[9]

Meanwhile, the petitioner in G.R. No. 189691, current Secretary General of the Union of
Peoples' Lawyers in Mindanao (UPLM) and Davao City Coordinator of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG), ATTY. CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE (Atty. Zarate), was
informed sometime in May 2009 that his name was also among those included in the OB
List made public by Representative Ocampo at a forum concerning human rights
violations in Southern Mindanao.  In Atty. Zarate's petition,[10] he alleged that:

5.  On May 19, 2009, during a press conference marking the conclusion of an
International Solidarity Mission (ISM) attended by both local and international delegates
and organized to investigate alleged human rights violations in Southern Mindanao by
state's forces Bayan Muna Party-list Representative Satur Ocampo revealed the existence
of a "watch list," officially known in military parlance as "Order of Battle" prepared by
the intelligence arm of Philippine Army's 10th ID, headed by respondent Maj. Gen.
Reynaldo Mapagu. x x x;

6.  The said "Order of Battle" was contained in a [PowerPoint] presentation marked
"SECRET" and captioned "3rd Quarter 2007 OB Validation Result"; it was supposedly
prepared by the "JCICC 'Agila'" under the [O]ffice of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence of the 10th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.  It also mentioned a
certain "JTICC 'LAWIN'" with the following as members: Task Force Davao
Chairman; Team Leader, SPOT11-3, MIG11, ISAFP, NISU-Davao, NISG-EM, PN,
305th AISS, PAF, TL, ISU 11, PA, S2, RCDG, PA; M2, DCPO; NICA XI; S2, 104th
DRC, PA, and, WACOM-Researcher/Analyst MIG11, ISAFP[;]

7.  The said [PowerPoint] presentation (which Representative Ocampo said was "leaked"
by a "conscientious soldier"), revealed the names of organizations and personalities in
Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao City, supposedly "connected" to the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA);

8.  The name of the herein petitioner was listed in the categories of "human rights" and
"Broad Alliance"  x x x;[11] (Emphasis in the original)

Asserting that the inclusion of his name in the OB List was due to his advocacies as a
public interest or human rights lawyer, Atty. Zarate vehemently and categorically denied
that he was fronting for, or connected with, the CPP-NPA.[12]

In fine, petitioners were one in asserting that the OB List is really a military hit-list as
allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of  extrajudicial
killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List, to wit: Celso B. Pojas,
who was assassinated in May 2008[13] purportedly because he was Secretary General of
the Farmers Association of Davao City[14] and Spokesperson of the Kilusang Magbubukid
sa Pilipinas (KMP),[15] which organizations were identified as communist fronts in the
subject OB List; Lodenio S. Monzon, who was a victim of a shooting incident in April
2009[16] due to his supposed connection to the known activist party-list group Bayan
Muna[17] as Coordinator in the Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental; and Dr. Rogelio
Peñera, who was shot to death in June 2009 allegedly because he was a member of RX
Against Erap (RAGE),[18] a sectoral group also identified in the OB List.

Petitioners further alleged that respondents' inconsistent statements and obvious

prevarication sufficiently prove their authorship of the subject OB List.  Supposedly
sourced from their own Press Releases,[19] respondents have been quoted in several
newspapers as saying: 1) that the "10th ID has its Order of Battle, and, it is not for public
consumption";  2) that the Order of Battle "requires thorough confirmation and validation
from different law enforcement agencies, and from various sectors and stakeholders who
are the ones providing the information about the people and organizations that may in one
way or the other, wittingly or unwittingly, become involved in the CPP's grand design";
3) that an "order of battle does not target individuals; it is mainly an assessment of the
general threat to national security"; 4) that Representative Ocampo "utilized the material
to disrupt the ongoing government efforts in the area by raising issues and propaganda
against the military";  5) that "[t]he public viewing of the "falsified" document of the OB
was a deliberate act of Representative Ocampo x x x to mar the image of the military
forces, gain media mileage and regain the support of the masses and local executives"; 6)
that Reperesentative Ocampo "'twisted' the data and insinuated names as targets of the
AFP/10ID when in fact these are targets (for infiltration) by the CPP/NPA"; and 7) that
this "attempt of the CPP to attribute human rights violations to the Philippine government
is a cover to mask their record of killing people."  According to petitioners, there is no
question that these Press Releases came from the 10th ID.  Its source email address,
dpao10id@yahoo.com, has been identified by regular correspondent of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer Jeffrey Tupas as the same one used by respondent Lt. Col. Decapia in
sending to him previous official press statements of the 10th ID, including the Press
Release entitled, "CPP/NPA demoralized, ISM on the rescue."[20]

On June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo with Application for a Production Order,[21] docketed as Special
Proceeding Nos. 004-09,[22] 005-09[23] and 006-09.[24]  On June 22, 2009, the RTC issued
separate Writs of Amparo[25] in each of the three (3) cases, directing respondents to file a
verified written return within seventy-two (72) hours and setting the case for summary
hearing on June 29, 2009.

In their Returns,[26] respondents denied authorship of the document being adverted to and

distributed by Representative Ocampo to the media.  They claimed that petitioners
miserably failed to show, by substantial evidence, that they were responsible for the
alleged threats perceived by petitioners.  Instead, they asserted that petitioners' allegations
are based solely on hearsay, speculation, beliefs, impression and feelings, which are
insufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ and, ultimately, the grant of the privilege
of the writ of amparo.

In her Reply,[27] Atty. Librado-Trinidad averred that the present petition substantially

conformed with the requirements of the Amparo Rule, as it alleged ultimate facts on the
participation of respondents in the preparation of the OB List, which naturally requires
utmost secrecy.  The petition likewise alleged how the inclusion of their names in the said
OB List substantiates the threat of becoming easy targets of unexplained disappearances
and extrajudicial killings.  On the other hand, Attys. Zarate and Ladaga commonly
asserted[28] that the totality of the events, which consists of respondents' virtual admission
to the media of the existence of the OB List, as well as, the fact that known victims of
past extrajudicial killings have been likewise labeled as communist fronts in similar
orders of battle, more than satisfies the standard required to prove that petitioners' life,
liberty and security are at risk.

During the scheduled summary hearing on June 22, 2009, Representative Ocampo's oral
testimony on the circumstances surrounding his obtention of the alleged military
document was dispensed with and, instead, the Affidavit[29] he executed on June 30, 2009
was presented in the hearing held on July 1, 2009 to form part of the documentary
exhibits of petitioners.[30]

After submission of the parties' respective Position Papers,[31] the RTC issued on August
14, 2009 the three separate but similarly-worded Orders finding no substantial evidence
to show that the perceived threat to petitioners' life, liberty and security was attributable
to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents, thus disposing of each of the three
cases in this wise:

Prescinding therefrom, and in x x x light of all the pieces of evidence presented, this
Court is of the considered views [sic] that petitioner failed to prove, by substantial
evidence, that indeed, (her/his) perceived threat to (her/his) life, liberty and security is
attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents.  Accordingly, this Court
has no other recourse but to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.[32]

The RTC rejected the sworn statement of Representative Ocampo for being hearsay,
holding that with no direct or personal knowledge of the authenticity of the subject OB
List, even an oral testimony from him on the circumstances surrounding its obtention
through a "conscientious soldier" would still be of no probative weight.  It likewise found
that the violent deaths of Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera, and
other incidents of threat have no direct relation at all to the existence of the present OB
List.

In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration,[33] petitioners argued that the existence and
veracity of the OB List had already been confirmed by respondents themselves through
their statements to the media, hence, respondents' personal authorship thereof need not be
proven by substantial evidence, as it is, after all, "not the crux of the issue."  Petitioners
explicated that since respondents were being impleaded as the responsible officers of the
10th ID the military unit that supposedly prepared the OB List PowerPoint presentation,
their general denials on the existence of the OB List without taking serious steps to find
the persons actually responsible for the threat could not discharge respondents from the
standard of diligence required of them under the Amparo Rule.

The RTC, however, rejected petitioners' arguments in the September 22, 2009 Order,
hence, these petitions for review on certiorari raising the following issues:

I. The trial court erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence
to warrant the grant of the privilege of the writ, i.e., protection;

II. The trial court erred in failing to consider that the Respondents likewise failed to
discharge the diligence required by the Amparo Rules by their sweeping and
general denials; AND

III. The trial court erred in appreciating the nature and concept of the privilege of the
writ.[34]

Commenting on the petitions, respondents argue[35] that the purported OB List could not
have come from the military because it does not have the "distinctive marks and security
classifications" of military documents.  They quickly defend the correctness of the RTC's
denial of the privilege of the writ and the interim relief of a protection order as petitioners
have not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence,
to establish that public respondents are threatening to violate their rights to life, liberty
and security or that, at the very least, were involved in the preparation of the OB List.

We deny the petitions.

The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in
response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and
extrajudicial killings.[36]  It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of
impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as
the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.[37] 
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[38] the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an
extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life,
liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to
issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.  Hence,
every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying
allegations of fact on the following matters:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by
an assumed appellation;

(c)    The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.[39]  (Underscoring supplied)

The sole and common issue presented in these petitions is whether the totality of
evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule.  Sections 17 and
18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows:

SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.

xxxx

SEC. 18.  Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision.  If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis
supplied)

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged.[40]  The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well as, the use of substantial
evidence as standard of proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address
situations of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with
what is akin to administrative proceedings.[41]

Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and informal treatment
of amparo cases, the Court eventually recognized the evidentiary difficulties that
beset amparo petitioners, arising as they normally would from the fact that the State
itself, through its own agents, is involved in the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing that it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate.  Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,
the Court laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to
enable amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct
or indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair and proper rule
in amparo cases "to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality"
and "to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced."[42]  Put simply,
evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as
long as it satisfies "the most basic test of reason i.e., relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence."[43]

This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence, however, does not do away
with the requirement of substantial evidence in showing the State's involvement in the
enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing or threats thereof.  It merely permits, in the
absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the relevance and
significance of every available evidence,[44] including those that are, strictly speaking,
hearsay where the circumstances of the case so require, and allows the consideration of
the  evidence adduced in terms of their consistency with the totality of the evidence.[45]

As emphasized by Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) during the deliberations on this
case, in cases of enforced disappearance, the evidence that would directly establish a
violation of the right to life, liberty and security is indubitably in the State's possession. 
The same is not equally true in cases where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this case)
a threatened violation of his/her rights since the facts, circumstances and the link between
these that create an actual threat to his/her life are measurably within the ability of
the amparo petitioner to prove.  These include, among others, the alleged documented
human rights violations by the military in Mindanao; documentary and/or testimonial
evidence on the military's counter-insurgency operations; corroborative evidence to
support the allegations on the presence of suspicious men; and presumptive evidence
linking the deaths of Celso Pojas, Ludenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera to their
political affiliation and the similarity of their situation to those of petitioners.  A mere
inclusion of one's name in the OB List, without more, does not suffice to discharge the
burden to establish actual threat to one's right to life, liberty and security by substantial
evidence.

The statement of Representative Ocampo that the respondents are the real source of the
OB List is unquestionably hearsay evidence because, except for the fact that he himself
received the OB List from an unnamed source merely described as "a conscientious
soldier," he had no personal knowledge concerning its preparation.  But even if the Court
were to apply the appropriate measure of flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the
hearsay testimony of Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to
the totality of those adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by the 10th ID admitting
the existence of a military-prepared Order of Battle, the affidavits of petitioners attesting
to the threatening visits and tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the
violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to the conclusion that the threat to
petitioners' security has not be adequately proven.

Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a
real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of known activists Celso
Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera to the inclusion of the latter's names or
the names of their militant organizations in the subject OB List.  Petitioner Atty. Librado-
Trinidad even attributed the alleged tailing of her vehicle by motorcycle-riding men and
the attempted entry by suspicious men into her home to the inclusion of her name in the
OB List.  The RTC, however, correctly dismissed both arguments, holding that the
existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of
suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities, thus:

"Anent petitioner's revelation that sometime in 2008, a number of unidentified men

attempted to forcibly enter the premises of her dwelling and that at one occasion, the
vehicle she was riding was tailed by motorcycle-riding men, the same could not led [sic]
to the conclusion that indeed, those incidents were related to the existence of the "OB
List."  There appears not even an iota of evidence upon which the same assumption can
be anchored on.[46]

This Court likewise sees no direct relation between the violent deaths of Celso Pojas,
Ludenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera and the subject "OB List."  There is no
evidence pointing to the claim that they were killed because their names or the
organizations they were involved in were mentioned in the same "OB List."  More
importantly, there is no official finding by the proper authorities that their deaths were
precipitated by their involvement in organizations sympathetic to, or connected with, the
Communist Party of the Philippines, or its military arm, the New People's Army.  Lastly,
and more telling, the existence of the subject "OB List" has not been adequately proven,
as discussed heretofore, hence, reference to the same finds no basis."[47]

The Court holds that the imputed pattern of targeting militants for execution by way of
systematically identifying and listing them in an Order of Battle cannot be inferred
simply from the Press Releases admitting the existence of a military document known as
an Order of Battle and the fact that activists Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr.
Rogelio Peñera have become supposed victims of extralegal killings.  The adduced
evidence tends to bear strongly against the proposition because, except for Celso Pojas,
the names of the supposed victims of extrajudicial killings are manifestly absent in the
subject OB List and the supposed connection of the victims to the militant groups
explicitly identified in the OB List is nothing short of nebulous.

Moreover, while respondents may have admitted through various statements to the media
that the military has its own Order of Battle, such an admission is not equivalent to proof
that the subject OB List, which was publicly disclosed by Representative Ocampo by way
of a PowerPoint presentation, is one and the same with the Order of Battle that the
military has in its keeping.  And, assuming that the Press Releases do amount to an
admission not only of the existence but also the authenticity of the subject OB List, the
inclusion of petitioners' names therein does not, by itself, constitute an actual threat to
their rights to life, liberty and security as to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo.

In the case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[48] the Court ruled that a person's
right to security is, in one sense, "freedom from fear" and that any threat to the rights to
life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong.  The term "any threat," however, cannot be
taken to mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one to fear for his life,
liberty or security.  The Court explicated therein that "[f]ear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action.  Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently.  The degree of fear can vary
from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination,
strength of character or past experience with the stimulus."  Certainly, given the
uniqueness of individual psychological mindsets, perceptions of what is fearful will
necessarily vary from one person to another.

The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security must be actual,
and not merely one of supposition or with the likelihood of happening.  And, when the
evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then,
it goes without saying that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence
in amparo proceedings has also been met.  Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the
context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts
and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat
as that which brought ultimate harm to victims Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr.
Rogelio Peñera without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the
suspicious deaths of these three people were, in fact, on account of their militant
affiliations or that their violent fates had been actually planned out by the military
through its Order of Battle.

The Court may be more yielding to the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence and
logical inferences, but substantial evidence is still the rule to warrant a finding that the
State has violated, is violating, or is threatening to violate, amparo petitioners' right to
life, liberty or security. No substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' life,
liberty and security has been shown to exist in this case.  For, even if the existence of the
OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners' names therein, can be properly inferred
from the totality of the evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established
to relate the subject OB List either to the threatening visits received by petitioners from
unknown men or to the violent deaths of the three (3) mentioned personalities and other
known activists, which could strongly suggest that, by some identifiable pattern of
military involvement, the inclusion of one's name in an Order of Battle would eventually
result to enforced disappearance and murder of those persons tagged therein as militants.

Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the

cases of Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner's failure to establish by
substantial evidence the involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of
rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct of further investigation
where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced
disappearance.  The Court directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the
modest efforts of police investigators were effectively putting petitioner's right to security
in danger with the delay in identifying and apprehending her abductors.  In Razon, Jr.,
the Court found it necessary to explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue
with extraordinary diligence the investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a
known activist because not only did the police investigators conduct an incomplete and
one-sided investigation but they blamed their ineffectiveness to the reluctance and
unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the authorities.   In both of these cases,
the incidents of abduction and torture were undisputed and they provided the evidentiary
support for the finding that the right to security was violated and the necessity for further
investigation into such violation.  Unlike Roxas and Razon, Jr., however, the present
petitions do not involve actual cases of abduction or disappearance that can be the basis
of an investigation.  Petitioners would insist that respondents be investigated and directed
to produce the Order of Battle that they have admitted to be in their safekeeping and
justify the inclusion of petitioners' names therein.  However, without substantial evidence
of an actual threat to petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security that consists more than
just the inclusion of their names in an OB List, an order for further investigation into, or
production of, the military's Order of Battle, would have no concrete basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DENIED. The assailed

Orders dated August 14, 2009 and September 22, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 10, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204528               February 19, 2013

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and

DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in
Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting
respondent's application for the issuance of inspection and production orders x x x."1 This
is raised through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from
the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated 20 March 2012.

From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B.

Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.2 This case was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.

The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima,

Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National
Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al.
"to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by
filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the
alleged ambush incident."3
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1 March
2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection
order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.5

In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules of
Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.9

Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10 Even
without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda
within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not
yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would
be filed in lieu of their Answer.11

On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary
protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were
in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the
attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records
how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or
security of the respondent Gatdula.

In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated

23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very
Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz:

SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x
x (Emphasis supplied).

It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ
of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its
procedures in the proper context.

The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard
the right of the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights.15 It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.16

Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to
afford swift but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a
Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The
judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the
petition and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed".21 After
evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately
dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not
show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts
complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the
respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the
clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an
Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case.
Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the
actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and
preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or
disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.25 Clearly
these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods
that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.

There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the merits
of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the
hearing will be done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render
the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.28
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege
of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The judgment should
contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge
may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this
judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the
measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this
is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated
by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated
through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil.31 Until
the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant
judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.

The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the

judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision", to
wit:

The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ
of Amparo.

Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the
Writ of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may
call upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the government.

This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the

Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an
interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and
inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection,
production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court
upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.32

The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves
as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy
remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to
be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted
on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2

March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall
apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.

Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure shall apply.

Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall
file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer
ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33

The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has
devised for the following circumstances:

SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of
the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not
exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

xxxx

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding.
It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is
not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the
issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not
have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a

responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a
hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the
other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually
required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.35

The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of
its decision, the RTC stated:

"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and

the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is
similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis
supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual

order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure
outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the
petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will
mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life,
liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed.1âwphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial
succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot
be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."

The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used
in elevating the matter to this Court.

It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper
procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts
efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge
himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result.

The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other
hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave
injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to
promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.37 The
rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the
case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities

committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section
5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:

(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge

Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo;

(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his

receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on
the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on

Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his
proper guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from
the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 183460               March 12, 2013

Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY PADOR, Petitioners,

vs.
Barangay Captain BERNABE ARCAYAN, Barangay Tanod CHIEF ROMEO
PADOR, Barangay Tanods ALBERTO ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES,
ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO ARCAYAN, CHRISTOPHER ALIVIO &
BIENVENIDO ARCAYAN, all of Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Resolution2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB. The RTC Resolution
denied the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by petitioner-spouses Nerio and Soledad
Pador and Rey Pador against respondents - Barangay Captain Bernabe Arcayan,
Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo Pador, and Barangay Tanods Alberto Alivio, Carmela
Revales, Roberto Alimorin, Winelo Arcayan, Christopher Alivio and Bienvenido
Arcayan.

On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Amparo.3

Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador
was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City.4 On 17 March 2008,
respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their
ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none.5 After the raid, petitioners
Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent
Barangay Captain Arcayan.6 They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who
advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan.
When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and
refused to sign a receipt of the document.7 Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of
the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to
receive their letter-reply – as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false
accusations, and possible violence from respondents – gravely threatened their right to
life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.8
After examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits attached to it, the RTC
issued the Writ and directed respondents to make a verified return.9

In compliance with the RTC’s directive, respondents filed their Verified Return and/or
Comment.10 In their counter-statement of facts, they alleged that on 16 March 2008,
respondent Winelo Arcayan received a report regarding the alleged existence of a
marijuana plantation in a place called Sitio Gining in Barangay Tabunan.11 He then
referred the matter to Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo Pador and Barangay Captain
Arcayan, who commenced to organize a patrol.12

On the morning of 17 March 2008, while the barangay tanods were having a final
briefing, Carmelo Revales left the place to take his breakfast.13 While he was taking his
breakfast, Nerio Pador, who was riding a motorcycle, stopped and accused the former of
uprooting the marijuana plants.14 Carmelo denied any knowledge about the incident, and
Nerio thereafter threatened to have him killed. Carmelo promptly reported this threat to
the other barangay tanods.15

Respondents recounted that, notwithstanding Nerio’s actions, they proceeded to patrol the
area.16 When they passed by the house of Nerio, he angrily uttered in Cebuano, "If I will
be informed who reported the matter to the police, I will attack the informant." Carmelo
then asked him, "Who reported to you?" Nerio replied, "I will tell you later once I will be
captured by police authorities. All of us will be dead this afternoon. I want a shoot out!"17

Respondents thereafter commenced their patrol of a place owned by a certain David

Quintana, but their rounds yielded a negative result.18

Later that evening, while respondent Alberto Alivio was passing by the house of Nerio,
the latter threatened to kill him, saying, "I want to kill now!"19 Alberto then asked him,
"Who reported to you so that the truth will come out?" Nerio then punched the door of his
house and said, "I will tell you later when I will be captured by the police authorities!"
Alberto then left the place and reported the matter to respondent Barangay Captain
Arcayan.20

In response to the reports, Barangay Captain Arcayan stated that he ordered his secretary
to prepare invitation letters for petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador, as the allegations of
threats and intimidation made by Nerio against some of the barangay tanods were serious.
Barangay Captain Arcayan explained that he no longer signed a copy of petitioners’
letter-reply, as he had already been given a copy of it.21

The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed
Resolution22 finding that petitioners’ claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations,
surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficiently explained the reason
behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners
the privilege of the writ of amparo.23

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioners filed the instant Petition for
Review24 before this Court, ascribing grave and serious error on the part of the trial
court.25

The Court’s Ruling

We uphold the RTC’s Resolution and deny the instant Petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo26 provides for the grounds that may be relied
upon in a petition therefor, as follows:

SEC. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial
evidence27 that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission.

A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations:
first, that respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information
that the latter were cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent barangay captain
sent them invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that
respondent barangay captain refused to receive petitioners’ letter-reply; and fourth, that
petitioners anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and
potential violence from respondents.

All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.

On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners’

ampalaya farm was sufficiently controverted by respondents.

Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was conducted, not on
the ampalaya farm of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining, which was
beside the lot possessed by David Quintana.28
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner
Rey Pador himself admitted that they had done so with his permission, as stated in his
affidavit:

5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him
good morning. He told me that there are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our
ampalaya farm and that there is already a raid.

6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya
farm for marijuana plants.29

Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners’ permission, we
cannot grant the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya
farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners’
property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,30 we ruled that the writ of amparo does not
envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature, as
follows:

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available
and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.31 x x x. (Emphasis in the original)

We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners’ ampalaya farm is an
insufficient ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.

On petitioners’ second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captain’s act of
sending invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their
letter-reply did not violate or threaten their constitutional right to life, liberty or security.
The records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis
for his actions. Moreover, the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners were
coerced to attend the conference through the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary,
they had full freedom to refuse to attend the conference, as they have in fact done in this
case.1âwphi1

The fourth allegation of petitioner – that, following these events, they can anticipate more
harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence from respondents – is baseless,
unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this
allegation does not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary
remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations."32

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The 3
July 2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc.
No. 16061-CEB is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191805               November 15, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA,
P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL.
REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA,
CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents.

x------------------------x

G.R. No. 193160              

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN.
JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE
VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA,
ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A.
CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on
Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April
2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.

Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa,
PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt.
Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their official
posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within
five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to
petitioner – covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost
marshal reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th
Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports
in any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents
are ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents having any
reference to petitioner.

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General

Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are
DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and
security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on

account of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED
with respect to respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is
DENIED.

Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R.
No. 193160. He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director
General (PDG.) Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W.
Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.)
Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz
(Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the
events relevant to the present Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo was the
President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) in Region II.

Antecedent Facts

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.2

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel,
Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men
forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in
civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more
persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car,
while the others rode on the tricycle.3

The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back
and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission
and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced
Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he
remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There
were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on
it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.4

Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to
confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell
asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation,
two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.5

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded
him and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit
him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes,
the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to
being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on
the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied
his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be
poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the
waist.6
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to
Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his
contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his
head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained silent, the soldiers
beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m.,
where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp
and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to
answer.7

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him
their guide on their way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man
named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member who had surrendered
to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a member of the NPA. He also
heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a
man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to
Tabbak, Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the
name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed
him as "sir."8

Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain
Elvis and told him that Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers
forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the location of the NPA camp. They
brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death. When the
soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA
camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day.
The soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9

On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the
location of the NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they
would beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to
the same room where he had first been detained, and two soldiers mauled him again.
They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and gave
him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body
pain. The soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper,
they ordered him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the
soldiers maltreated him once more.10

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he
had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and

that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he
refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to
sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was merely coerced.11
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he
knew the men appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the
individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write down the name of his
school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper,
making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the
document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the
soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive
another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.12

At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military

operation in the mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13

In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent.
When they stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location
of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked
him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the
Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.14 When the
doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he
sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s
medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area,
chest and sternum.15

Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took
pictures of him while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in
front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see
his mother. 16

Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of
paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to
end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.17

Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath.
They gave him a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two
soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to the media his
experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the military.18

At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived
surrounded by several men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col.
Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the
military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him
that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and
Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the
CHR employees took photographs of his bruises.19
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two
weeks to supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog
also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become military assets. Rodel
refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers
reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter
will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.20

Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied
them to the CHR office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he
was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to
sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they
had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR
Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board
followed them.21

The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon
reaching a mall in Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two
other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon
reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and
called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a
cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey
back home.22

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010.
Callagan and two soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video
footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as
evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely.
Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued
and only left thirty minutes later.23

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International

Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical
Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.24

Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel
Robles, noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail
Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.25

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December
2009.26 The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac
(Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:

a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.

b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or

approaching Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.

c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co.,
5th Infantry Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where
Rodriguez was brought.

d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any

report on Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of
the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.1âwphi1

e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in

the custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from
being used.27

On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by
members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered
respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009
and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we directed the
Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10
days after its submission for decision.30

During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to
submit affidavits and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27
January 2010.31

On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed their Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on
the petition.32 In their Return, respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered
to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as
"Ka Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel

B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA
operating in Cagayan Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and
Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in exchange for his protection.35
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of
Loyalty and an Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society
and become a military asset.36 Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the
NPA to gather information.37 However, he feared that his NPA comrades were beginning
to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the
soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a
double agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40

Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated
15 January 2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating
Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and securing their journey back
home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma
sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls
to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.42 Cruz was able to
speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This
information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in
turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry
Division.44

When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry
Battalion at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion
Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as
evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latter’s
Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the
soldiers.46 In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to
any maltreatment. Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter,
Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were made to sign a certification to this
effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not witness any
threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47

During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he
was very much at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt.
Matutina.48 Neither was there any force or intimidation when the soldiers took pictures of
his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.49

During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and
position papers and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of
these pleadings.50

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently,

on 28 April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52 Before the
Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the
instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following
assignment of errors:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary
protection order.

b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ
of amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of
violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is
ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing
respondent from approaching petitioner."

c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo had command responsibility.53

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:

a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure
of office or actual incumbency.

b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less
substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated,
were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as
well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection
order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on
the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.54

On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina,
Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They
alleged that Rodriguez –

Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence,
to establish his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with
violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is
not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data.56
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its
assailed Decision and Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:

I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the

basis of the presidential immunity from suit.

III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases.

IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were
promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and
security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.58 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February
2008.60

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.63 It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an
independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to
informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does
not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in
the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access
to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the
database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion,
destruction or rectification.67

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary
protection order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before
final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:

Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the
court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate
family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private
institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the
protection may be extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions
that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of
the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall
expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to
the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature
of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.

(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or
to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
(Emphasis supplied)

We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the
court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim
reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any
case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted,
necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner
the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near
Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal

liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As
we held in Razon v. Tagitis:69

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather,
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed
to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision71 found respondents in G.R.
No. 191805 – with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the
violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. 72 The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her
presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a
respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or
accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’
rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her
presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.

In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We
emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right, to wit:

We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must
first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution
No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing
to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President
who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:

"x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then
his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision
says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard
Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's
associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that
he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable
to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded
that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in
a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further
held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts."
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of
Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial
conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential

immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity

from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of
the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is
a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity
for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed
arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention
that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers
his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has
relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity
from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing
litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas:

The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez:

So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas:

There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez:

On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from
suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.76 (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President
Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial
scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez

contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in
Rubrico v. Arroyo,77 command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."78 Although
originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine
has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States,
for example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v.
Garcia – civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Protection Act.80 This development in the use of command responsibility in civil
proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even
to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As
we held in Rubrico:

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold

military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

x x x           x x x          x x x

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,

at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable
the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory
to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the
Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:

That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil
or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in
proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command
responsibility to Amparo cases.

Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its
contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. It further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice.

Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in
principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who
were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organizations
accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the
personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the
Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command
responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act
on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as
a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html -
fnt20cm Such limited treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose
and not intended to rule out the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to
other appropriate cases.

Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and
police officers from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. The explicit adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility in the present
case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.

In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to
be if it truly wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a
genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the
ponencia’s hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent
to the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82 (Emphasis supplied.)

This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v.
Cadapan,83 likewise penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases

to determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement
as far as amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command

responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable
individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,
at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable
the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory
to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order
to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a

preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in
the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of
the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as

superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
 b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses

control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine. 86

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is
adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government
Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other
Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be
held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite
such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities,
crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government
official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed
within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.90

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as

the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military.91

b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through
substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his
abduction. We rule in the negative.

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced
disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA.92 Without even attaching,
or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points
to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count
of forcible disappearance.93 Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece
of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction.
Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the
violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate,
punish or prevent it.

Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s
ruling in Razon,94 to wit:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words,
we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus,
even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.95 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the
records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez
indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in G.R. No.
191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.

a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or

accountability of respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life,
liberty and security.

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court
of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6
September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.

Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and

straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in
which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the
NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical
surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his
abduction, detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the
CHR representatives who appeared during his release.98

More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.

As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr.
Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the
soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. According to the
Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,100 she examined Rodriguez
in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and
arrived at the following findings:

FACE

- 10cm healed scar face right side

- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)

- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)

- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side

- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)

- both leg arm

- hip area/lumbar area101

Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September

2009, the results of which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted
through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus issued a Medical Report dated 23 September
2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured during his detention by the
military, to wit:
X. Interpretation of Findings

The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the
torture and ill-treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots
found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was
forced to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the
conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found
on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of
tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming
punching and kicking on his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom
experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological trauma he encountered
during his detention.

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to
the torture and ill-treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The
physical injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is compatible with the alleged
date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)

In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the
medical finding that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the
maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he sustained showed that he
could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’ claim
highly implausible.

Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the
allegations of Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805
still stubbornly clung to their argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather,
they claimed that he was a double agent, whose relationship with the military was at all
times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary
human experience.

If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he
should have unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among
friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In
fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made
the following averments:

18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil
sa mukha syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.
 19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag
ko syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;

x x x           x x x          x x x

23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng
dalawang linggo sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob
ng kampo;

24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;

x x x           x x x          x x x

33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa

kaligtasan ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105

Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 3 December 2009:106

24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya,
malaki ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;

25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil
nakilala ko syang masigla at masayahin;

26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito,
papatayin nila ako."

27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang
linggo ang aking kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.

28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107

Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly
contradictory, contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had
complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he
nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become a double-
agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:

In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his
military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he
experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again
because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return,
respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and
wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the
movement directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and
desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become
an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he
dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction,
detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had
violated and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording
of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:

In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the
house of petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos
of the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of
the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said
videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his
family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner
and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be
free from the watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of
a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not –
condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioner’s right to security
guaranteed by the fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)

Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the
contradictory defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his
claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.

It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan,
there was no substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation,
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the
CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its
criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The
CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations
thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and
address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed
their insufficient competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez
after his ordeal.

b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or

threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right
to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official.111 Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to
the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.113

In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo114 that

the right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to
ensure the observance of the duty to investigate, viz:

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human
rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to
security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing
a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR
interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not
been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's
right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the
very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his
or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities
to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has
been taken into custody and has not been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible
or accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on
account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his
ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory
investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into
consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the
military. The ruling of the appellate court must be emphasized:

In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina
are accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject
incident, the investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided.
The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained of,
depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt.
Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the
military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident
and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction of petitioner.

Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of

Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest
of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." In this
case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to
unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG
Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action
against him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to
effectively and aggressively investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty
and security by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of
Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must
be held responsible or accountable.

Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any

responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already
been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months
before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were
maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through
substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible
and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the
basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009,
and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus,
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a
result, there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege
of these writs already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from
violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President
Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of
the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez
failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible
or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise
failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of
respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No.
191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or
liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been incurred by
respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the
results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives
mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the
incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing
shall constitute contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178497, February 04, 2014

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.

GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 183711]

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.

GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 183712]

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.

GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, AND LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 183713]

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES

OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.; COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; AND
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case, specifically:
(a) The determination of the relevance and advisability of the public disclosure of the
documents submitted by respondents President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo, Lt. Gen.
Romeo P. Tolentino, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col.
Noel Clement, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Director General Oscar Calderon,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon,
Jr.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano; and
Chief of the Philippine National Police, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr. to this
Court per paragraph III (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution; and
   
(b) The Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela1 (together with sealed
attachments) filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos praying that the Court: (1) order the
persons named in the sealed documents impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA
and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence (the sealed attachments to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to
the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the newly discovered evidence.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

A. The Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution

These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency,
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction
with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This
referral was necessary as the investigation by the Philippine National Police–Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP–CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been less than
complete. In all of them, there were significant lapses in the handling of the investigation.
In particular, we highlighted the PNP–CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on
their interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction.

In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal–Arroyo
who was then entitled, as President, to immunity from suit.

The March 15, 2011 CHR Report

On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the
Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22,
2010 Resolution. On the basis of the gathered evidence, the CHR submitted the following
findings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his
constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the Government
have been fully determined.

Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28,
2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and
a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground
floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

xxx

The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang

(Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee–
Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan Restaurant.

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY
AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of
the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he
was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and
group pictures of men taken some years thereafter.

The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper
Edmond M. Dag–uman (Dag–uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry
Baliaga, Jr. Daguman’s Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt.
Baliaga as a Company Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military
service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but under
1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested
and brought to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the
said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and Daguman
did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of
the pathetic plight they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when
they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if they know the
man very well.

Moreover, when the Team asked how certain Jeffrey was or [sic] that it was indeed
Baliaga that he saw as among those who actually participated in Jonas’ abduction. Jeffrey
was able to give a graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow
account of the incident, including the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga,
who even approached, talked to, and prevented him from interfering in their criminal act.

A Rebel–returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified
the face of the female in the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada
refuses to include her identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear
of a backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the
cartographic sketch since both of them were involved in counter–insurgency operations at
the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the battalion from March 2006 until she left
the 56th IB Headquarters in October 2007. Lozada’s involvement in counter–insurgency
operations together with Lt. Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR
Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report dated August
13, 2008.

Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for
what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police
and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the
requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP
but ipso facto created a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were
responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable,
if not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in the
disputable presumption “That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.” (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions,
Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).

In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the
requested documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the
cartographic sketches of two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has
claimed that one of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits
the description of his abductor.

As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt.
HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed
the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true
identity and affiliation with the military have been established by overwhelming
evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag–uman.

For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under
the 1987 Constitution. Of particular importance are the identities and locations of the
persons appearing in the cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses
Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion–Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel and the
alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos
whose case for Murder and Attempted Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of
the lone witness, an army man of the 56th IB to testify against him.

Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and
Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the
cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.

Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)
turned down the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so–called “Erap
5” abduction on the ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition
per its Disposition Form dated September 21, 2010.

Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present
whereabouts cannot be determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission
decided to pursue the same and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the
“Erap 5” on its own time and authority as an independent
body.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
B. The Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution

On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a
Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and referring the habeas
corpus petition to the CA; (2) holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits of
the Amparo aspect of the case; referring back the same to the CA in order to allow
Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a party
to the Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for
Contempt, without prejudice to the re–filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted
by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation. To quote the exact wording of our
Resolution:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons,

we RESOLVE to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA–G.R. SP No. 99839)

II. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that
decided the habeas corpus petition;

III. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R.
No. 183711, and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine
Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army at the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt.
Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under
 the terms the Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos should not be released from detention;

IV. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of
Appeals which shall continue to hear this case after the required Returns shall have
been filed and render a new decision within thirty (30) days after the case is
submitted for decision; and

V. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate
from the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the dropping or
deletion of President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as party–respondent.

IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA–G.R. SP No. 100230)

e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt in CA–G.R. SP No.

100230, without prejudice to the re–filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by
the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this Court has ordered; and

f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as

party–respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge against
her.

IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA)

g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA and

G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to
others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations and
proceedings;

h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a non–extendible period
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.

i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and
then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show cause and explain to this
Court, within a non–extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution,
why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for their defiance of our June 22,
2010 Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a non–extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the documents requested by
the CHR, particularly:
1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt. Aron
Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. – all reportedly assigned with Military
Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
– and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter–insurgency operations of
the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
   
2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and
the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military
operation, including their respective Summary of Information and individual
pictures; and
   
3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry
Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with
their respective profiles, Summary of Information and pictures; including the list of
captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their
corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the
cases filed against them, if any.

These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to
determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public
disclosure.

j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in
representation of their respective organizations, separately from the original respondents
impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as
party–respondent;

k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of

Justice for admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program, subject to
the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and

l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may
investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.3
C. The Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution

On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution resolving among others:

(a) to NOTE the Explanation separately filed by Brigadier Gen. Gilberto Jose C. Roa,
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo A. David, Jr., AFP (ret.),
and Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr., AFP;
   
  xxx
   
(c) to LIMIT the documents to be submitted to this Court to those assigned at the
56th Infantry Battalion (IB) from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, and
to SUBMIT these materials within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution, without prejudice to the submission of the other documents required
under the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution, pertaining to those assigned at the other
units of the AFP, should the relevance of these documents be established during the
Court of Appeal’s hearing;
   
(d) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, of
the Summary of Information and individual pictures of the intelligence operatives
involved in the ERAP 5 incident, in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution;
   
(e) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, of
the profile and Summary of Information and pictures of an alias T.L., reportedly
assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
and of a 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer in the counter–insurgency operations of the
56th IB in 2006 to 2007, in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution.4
The Respondents’ September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion

On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and Motion in

compliance with the Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution. Attached to this Manifestation
and Motion are the following documents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and enlisted personnel of the
56th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence operatives who were
involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando, who was a member of the
56th IB, 7th ID.5

D. The Court’s September 6, 2011 Resolution

On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory
Order praying among others that she be allowed to examine the documents submitted to
the Court pursuant to paragraph III (i) of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution. In our
September 6, 2011 Resolution, we resolved, among others,
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(3) DENY the petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the documents submitted to
this Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution, without
prejudice to our later determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public
 disclosure of those documents/materials;6
E. The Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution

On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio
Eustaquio’s affidavit, and to submit a report of its ongoing investigation of Jonas’
abduction, viz:
(1) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to undertake all available measures to
obtain the affidavit of witness Virgilio Eustaquio in connection with his allegation
that one of the male abductors of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, appearing in the
cartographic sketch, was among the “raiders” who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
(otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”);
   
(2) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court, within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this Resolution, a Report, with its recommendations of its
ongoing investigation of Burgos’ abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio,
if any, copy furnished the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, the incumbent Chiefs of
the AFP, the PNP and the PNP–CIDG, and all the present respondents before the
Court of Appeals.7
F. The Court’s November 29, 2011 Resolution

On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from Commissioner
Jose Manuel S. Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special Investigation Team, requesting
photocopies of the following documents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007;
ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.8

In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR’s request considering the
confidential nature of the requested documents and because the relevance of these
documents to the present case had not been established. We referred the CHR to our July
5, 2011 Resolution where we pointedly stated that these documents shall be “released
exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their relevance to the present
case and the advisability of their public disclosure.”9

We held that “[w]e see no reason at this time to release these confidential documents
since their relevance to the present case has not been established to our satisfaction. It is
precisely for this reason that we issued our October 24, 2011 Resolution and directed the
CHR to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Resolution, a
Report with its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Jonas Burgos’ abduction,
and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any. Simply stated, it is only after the CHR’s
faithful compliance with our October 24, 2011 Resolution that we will be able to
determine the relevance of the requested documents to the present case.”10

G. The March 20, 2012 CHR Progress Report and Eustaquio’s Affidavit

On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure
the affidavit of witness Eustaquio in relation with his allegation that one of the male
abductors of Jonas, appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben
Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”). Attached to this
Report is Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit dated March 16, 2012, which pertinently stated:

1. I was one of the victims in the abduction incident on May 22, 2006 otherwise
known as ERAP 5 and because of that, we filed a case with the Ombudsman
against Commodore Leonardo Calderon, et al., all then ISAFP elements, docketed
as OMB–P–C–06–04050–E for Arbitrary Detention, Unlawful Arrest,
Maltreatment of Prisoners, Grave Threats, Incriminatory Machination, and
Robbery.

2. On March 16, 2012, I was approached again by the CHR Special Investigation
Team regarding the information I have previously relayed to them sometime in
September 2010 as to the resemblance of the cartographic sketch of the man as
described by the two eyewitnesses Elsa Agasang and Jeffrey Cabintoy in the
abduction case of Jonas Burgos;

3. I can say that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic
sketch is among the raiders who abducted me and my four other companions
because the cartographic sketch almost exactly matched and/or resembled to the
cartographic sketch that I also provided and described in relation to the said
incident at my rented house in Kamuning, Quezon City on May 22, 2006.

4. I am executing this affidavit voluntarily, freely and attest to the truth of the
foregoing.11cralawred

H. The March 18, 2013 CA Decision

On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for
appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions.

Petition for Habeas Corpus

The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement
or detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a
victim of enforced disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition
for habeas corpus.

Petition for the Writ of Amparo     

Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA
concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA
found that the totality of the evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that the military
was involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey
Cabintoy’s positive identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached
him and told him not to interfere because the man being arrested had been under
surveillance for drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga – the face he identified
in the pictures because he resembles his friend Raven. The CA also held that Lt.
Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s positive
identification, considering especially the absence of any indication that he was impelled
by hatred or any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt.
Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas.

Based on these considerations, the CA resolved to:

1) RECOGNIZING the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance

covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
     
2) With regard to authorship,
     
  a) DECLARING Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. RESPONSIBLE for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos; and
     
  b) DECLARING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and elements of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine
Army, ACCOUNTABLE for the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos;
     
3) DECLARING the Philippine National Police ACCOUNTABLE for the conduct of
an exhaustive investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos. To this
end, the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP–CIDG, is directed to exercise
extraordinary diligence to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are
still at large and to establish the link between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and
those involved in the ERAP 5 incident.
     
(4) DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Director General of the Philippine National Police, and their successors, to
ensure the continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced
 disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought
before the bar of justice;
     
(5) DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own
independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the
same degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
     
(6) DIRECTING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to extend full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct
of the latter’s investigation.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights are
hereby DIRECTED to submit a quarterly report to this Court on the results of their
respective investigation.

The filing of petitioner’s Affidavit–Complaint against Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., et al.

before the Department of Justice on June 9, 2011 is NOTED. Petitioner
is DIRECTED to immediately inform this Court of any development regarding the
outcome of the case.12

The Respondent’s April 3, 2013 Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the
PNP Director General), filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the March 18, 2013
CA decision. The motion made the following submissions:
5. x x x[T]he Director General, PNP, respectfully takes exception to the Honorable
Court’s findings that the PNP, specifically the CIDG, “failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the conduct of its investigation.” x x x [T]hat this Honorable Court arrived at
a conclusion different from that of the CIDG, or accorded different credence to the
statements of the witnesses presented by the parties, does not necessarily translate to the
CIDG’s failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

6. The Chief of Staff, AFP also takes exception to the Honorable Court’s findings that the
“Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General
should be held accountable for Jonas Burgos disappearance for failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence in conducting an internal investigation on the matter. The
unwillingness of the respondent officers of the 56th IB to cooperate in the investigation
conducted by the CHR is a persuasive proof of the alleged cover up of the military’s
involvement in the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos.”

The AFP and the Philippine Army conducted a thorough investigation to determine the
veracity of the allegations implicating some of its officers and personnel. After the
conduct of the same, it is the conclusion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Army, based on the evidence they obtained, that Jonas Burgos has never been
in custody.

7. The Chief of Staff, AFP, also respectfully takes exception to the finding of the
Honorable Court “recognizing the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced
disappearance.”

xxx

That the Honorable Court found a member of the Philippine Army or even a group of
military men to be responsible for the abduction of Jonas Burgos, does not necessarily
make the same a case of “enforced disappearance” involving the State. There is dearth of
evidence to show that the government is involved. Respondent Baliaga’s alleged
participation in the abduction and his previous membership in the 56th Infantry Battalion
of the Philippine Army, by themselves, do not prove the participation or acquiescence of
the State.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I. The CA Resolution dated May 23, 2013     

On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents’ motion for
partial reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as the PNP was concerned, its failure to
elicit leads and information from Cabintoy who witnessed Jonas’ abduction is eloquent
proof of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation.
As far as the AFP was concerned, the CA held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of the
Philippine Army was positively identified as one of the abductors of Jonas, coupled with
the AFP’s lack of serious effort to conduct further investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP
leadership’s accountability.

To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under Section
19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.14

J. The Petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated April 1, 2013

On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking
the Court to: (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in
CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the
basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3)
refer the cases to the CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.

The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain
anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured
Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
This documentary evidence consists of: (1) After Apprehension Report dated April 30,
2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography
of Jonas. The petitioner also claimed that these are copies of confidential official reports
on file with the Philippine Army.

i. After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007

This report is a photocopy consisting six pages dated April 30, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding Officer, 7MIB, 7ID, LA, Fort Magsaysay, NE. The report detailed the
planning and the objective of apprehending target communist leaders, among them, one
alias “Ramon” who was captured at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth, Quezon City on
April 28, 2007 by joint elements of the 72 MICO and S2, 56th IB. This report also listed
the names of the military personnel belonging to task organization 72 MICO and 56th IB
who conducted the operation.

ii. Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007

This report details Jonas’ abduction and “neutralization”; the results of his interrogation
and the intelligence gathered on his significant involvements/activities within the
CPP/NPA/NDF organization.

iii. Undated Autobiography

This autobiography narrates how Jonas started as a student activist, his recruitment and
eventual ascent in the CPP/NPA as an intelligence officer.

K. The Court’s April 11, 2013 Resolution

In our April 11, 2013 Resolution, the Court resolved to require the respondents to
Comment on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela and its
attachments, within ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution. In the same Resolution,
the Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) required BGen. Roa and Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to fully comply with the
terms of Section III (i) of the dispositive portion of our July 5, 2011 Resolution
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution;
   
(2) required Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to submit a written assurance within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the Resolution that the military personnel listed in the
submitted After Apprehension Report can be located and be served with the
processes that the Court may serve;
   
(3) issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of the petitioner and all the members
of her immediate family;
   
(4) directed the DOJ and the NBI to provide security and protection to the petitioner and
her immediate family and to submit a confidential memorandum on the security
arrangements made;
   
(5) directed the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the CHR
as it may require pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010
Resolution.15
i. The respondents’ Comment from the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela dated June 6, 2013

On June 6, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
comments on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

First, the respondents alleged that the documents submitted by the petitioner do not exist
in the concerned military units’ respective records, nor are they in the custody or
possession of their respective units. To support their allegations, the respondents
submitted the following:

a. Certification dated May 29, 2013 from Maj. Gen. Gregorio Pio P. Catapang, Jr.
Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the
documents16 submitted by the petitioner “do not exist nor in the
possession/custody of this Headquarters.”

b. Certification dated May 29, 2013, from Lt. Col. Louie D.S. Villanueva, Assistant
Chief of Staff, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner
“could not be found nor do they exist in the records of this Command.”

c. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from Lt. Col. Bernardo M. Ona, Commanding
Officer, 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that
the documents submitted by the petitioner “do not exist at this unit.”

d. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from 1Lt. Donal S. Frias, Acting Commanding
Officer, 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Military Intelligence Battalion,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by the
petitioner “do not exist at the records or in the possession of this unit.”17

The respondents also submitted the affidavits of Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Maj.
Allan M. Margarata and Cpl. Ruby Benedicto, viz:
a. In his June 3, 2013 Affidavit, Col. Feliciano stated:

1. That I was assigned as Battalion Commander of 56th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry

Division, PA last 17 January 2007 to 17 August 2007.
 2. That I was showed a photocopy of the After Apprehension Report dated 30 April
2007 wherein members of 56th IB, 7ID, PA were included therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said document and the
participation of my men listed thereat. There were no military operations that I
have authorized or approved regarding Jonas Burgos. The contents thereof are
false and utter fabrication of facts.

b. In his May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Maj. Margarata stated:

1. That I was assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company (72MICO), 7th Infantry

Division, PA from 01 July 2006 to 01 July 2008.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28

April 2007 and After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which
purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that
on the last page of the Pyscho–Social Processing Report appears my name therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the
implication of my name in the said documents. The contents thereof are purely a
product of wild imagination. I have never seen such document until now.

4. I can only surmise that these are plainly a fishing expedition on the part of Mrs.
Edita Burgos. A ploy to implicate any military personnel especially those
belonging to the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.

c. In her May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Cpl. Benedicto stated:

1. That I was never assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Infantry

Division, PA.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28

April 2007 and After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which
purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that
on the last page of the Psycho–Social Processing Report appears my name therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the
implication of my name in the said documents. The contents thereof are false and
utter fabrication of facts. How can I ever be at 72MICO if I was never assigned
thereat.

4. I have never been an interrogator in my entire military service. I have never been a
member of any operation which involves the name of Jonas Burgos or any other
military operation for that matter. I have never seen such document until now.
 5. Furthermore, I have never worked with Maj. Allan Margarata or of his unit,
72MICO.18

Second, the respondents note that none of the documents submitted by the petitioner were
signed; a writ of Amparo cannot be issued and the investigation cannot progress on the
basis of false documents and false information.

Lastly, the respondents argue that since the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
CHR are conducting their own investigations of the case, the petitioner’s motion at this
point is premature; the proceedings to be conducted by the CA will be at the very least
redundant.

ii. The Respondents’ Compliance dated June 7, 2013

On June 7, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of Judge Advocate General,
complied with our April 11, 2013 Resolution by submitting the following documents:

a. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the personnel of

56th Infantry Battalion (IB), 69th IB, and 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army
(PA). These documents were submitted by the 7th ID in sealed nine (9) small and
three (3) big boxes (total of twelve (12) sealed boxes);

b. Investigation Report of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines

(ISAFP) on the 2007 “ERAP 5” incident in Kamuning, Quezon City;
Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the Intel Operatives
involved in the “ERAP 5” incident; and certification issued by the Command
Adjutant of ISAFP concerning T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria
Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air
Force), an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with the Military Intelligence Group
15 of the Intelligence Service, AFP (MIG 15, ISAFP). These documents were
submitted by ISAFP in a sealed envelope;

c. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with a picture of 2LT Fernando PA. This

document was submitted by Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, PA in a
sealed envelope;

d. A certification issued by 56IB and 69IB, 7ID, PA concerning captured/surrendered

rebels;

e. A certification stating the present location and whereabouts of military personnel

listed in the submitted After Apprehension Report, dated April 30, 2007, allegedly
identified as members of the Task Organization –72 MICO and 56th IB with the
inclusion of four (4) separate certifications from Commander, 7ID, PA, Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7ID, PA, Commanding Officer, 72
 MICO, and 56Ib, 71ID, PA, respectively, stating the non–existence of the
following documents: Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007;
After–Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007; Autobiography of Jonas Burgos;
and Picture of Jonas Burgos;

f. Affidavit of Compliance of General Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP, the Chief of

Staff, assuring that the active military personnel mentioned in the purported
apprehension report can be located at their given locations and be served with the
processes that may be issued by the Honorable Court.19

OUR RULING

A. On the relevancy and disclosure of the documents submitted to this Court per
paragraph III(i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution 

The directive for the submission of the above–mentioned documents arose from our
determination in our June 22, 2010 Resolution that the PNP–CIDG failed to identify the
cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas,
based on their interview with eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the Court
directly commissioned the CHR to continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction and the
gathering of evidence.

Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead – a claim made by
Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice, that the male
abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, known as the “ERAP FIVE.”

This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in par. III(i) of
the fallo of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution from General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the
Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP. Gen. Roa initially denied this request but
eventually complied with the Court’s directive of July 5, 2011 to submit the
documents via the September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion and the June 7, 2013
Compliance. In the same July 5, 2011 Resolution, the Court made it plain that these
documents shall be released exclusively to the Court for its examination to determine
their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.

Pursuant to the Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted its March 20,
2012 Progress Report on its continuing investigation of Jonas’ abduction. Attached to this
Progress Report was Virgilio Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit stating that: (1) he was one of
the victims of the abduction incident on May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the “ERAP
FIVE” incident; (2) as a result of this incident, they filed a case with the Ombudsman
against Commodore Leonardo Calderon and other members of the Intelligence Service,
AFP (ISAFP) for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest, maltreatment of prisoners, grave
threats, incriminatory machination and robbery; and (3) the male abductor of Jonas
appearing in the cartographic sketch shown to him by the CHR was among the raiders
who abducted him and his four companions because it resembled the cartographic sketch
he described in relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on May 22, 2006.

After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the CHR21 pursuant to the
Court’s July 5, 2011, August 23, 2011 and October 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to
grant the CHR access to these requested documents to allow them the opportunity to
ascertain the true identities of the persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.

At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to the
resemblance of one of Jonas’ abductors to the abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes
the sought–after missing link that establishes the relevance of the requested documents to
the present case. We note that this lead may help the CHR ascertain the identities of those
depicted in the cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors (one male and one
female) who, to this day, remain unidentified.

In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested documents, we direct the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly–authorized representatives of the
CHR to inspect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of
this Resolution. The documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic
sketches of the two abductors of Jonas, without copying and without bringing the
documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
The inspection of the documents shall be within office hours and for a reasonable period
of time sufficient to allow the CHR to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by
Eustaquio.

To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further investigation
using the standard of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue
the lead provided by Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation
being conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the NBI, on the
disappearance of Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the NBI to coordinate and provide
direct investigative assistance to the CHR as the latter may require, pursuant to the
authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.

For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investigation report to the
DOJ, copy furnished the petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP
and the PNP–CIDG, and all the respondents within sixty days (60) days from receipt of
this Resolution.

B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela 

After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and
considering all the developments of the case, including the March 18, 2013 CA decision
that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we
resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon,
Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an
individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It
is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs.24 The focus is on procedural curative
remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of
administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define
terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr., v.
Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms “responsibility” and “accountability” signify in an
Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed
to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued
by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice
of the fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in
connection with Jonas’ disappearance.27

We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with
finality on the entities responsible and accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon,
Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the
CA found, by substantial evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the
basis of Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one of the abductors of Jonas who
told him not to interfere because the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the
same Decision, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed to
discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following directives to address the
enforced disappearance of Jonas:

(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP–CIDG, to identify and
locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link
between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident;
   
(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Director General of the Philippines National Police, and their successors, to
ensure the continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought
before the bar of justice;
   
(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent
investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of
diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
   
(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
extend full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the
latter’s investigation; and
   
(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General,
Philippine National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to
submit a quarterly report to the Court on the results of their respective
investigation.28

We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the
May 23, 2013 CA resolution denying their motion for partial reconsideration.

Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed
the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities
responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s
prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the
newly discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance
of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be redundant and
superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ through
the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the
continuing investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide
latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without
violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the
investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality
that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.

We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby rule on the
admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner.
We likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the proper investigative and
prosecutory agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation in the
enforced disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future investigations and
proceedings. Considering that the present case has already reached the prosecution stage,
the petitioner’s motion should have been filed with the proper investigative and
prosecutory agencies of the government.

To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered
cases to the DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal
charges in the proper courts against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the
gathered evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the
NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the
sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through
the NBI, of the disappearance of Jonas. This DOJ investigation is without prejudice to the
Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation of
the criminal aspect of this case should the case be determined to be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.29

As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall
continue to be undertaken by the CHR, in close coordination with the NBI, for the
completion of the investigation under the terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the
additional directives under the present Resolution.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to

determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
present case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action
against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are
already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies
envisioned by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been served and
exhausted.Considering the foregoing, the CourtRESOLVES to:

(1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela;

   
(2) REFER the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, this
Resolution and its covered cases to the Department of Justice for investigation for
the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against
the proper parties if such action is warranted by the gathered evidence. The referral
to the Department of Justice is without prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation should the case be
determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan;
   
(3) DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the National Bureau
of Investigation copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,
together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt
of this Resolution;
   
(4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly–authorized
representatives of the Commission on Human Rights to inspect the requested
documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. For this
purpose, the documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic
sketches of the two abductors of Jonas Burgos without copying and bringing the
documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court. The inspection of the documents shall be conducted within office hours and
for a reasonable period of time that would allow the Commission on Human Rights
to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Virgilio Eustaquio;
   
(5) DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to coordinate and provide direct
investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as the latter may
require, pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010
Resolution.
   
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a supplemental
investigation report to the Department of Justice, copy furnished the petitioner, the
National Bureau of Investigation, the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine National Police–
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and all the respondents, within sixty
(60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
   
(7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated, without
prejudice to the concerned parties’ compliance with the above directives and subject
to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 193652               August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA

YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA,
and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 seeking to
set aside the August 17, 20103 and September 6, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had
dismissed petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed
in order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby
Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records
follow:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with

Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the
latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete
the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted
through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid
placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate
son.5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
MedicalCenter, Marikina City.6 Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical
expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a
Deed of Voluntary Commitment7 to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without knowing
about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s
family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial
distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation
and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her
recover and raise the baby.9 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary
Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate10 declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for
Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February
5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina
(Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then
commenced.11

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter
to the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She
alsosaid she wanted her family back together.12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a
Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on
November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a
ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D.
Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty.
Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines.14

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15 to Noel Constantino stating
that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera
informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed relative to the certification on
the availability of the child for adoption and the child’s subsequent placement to
prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the
position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that
should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the
adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary
period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9523.16

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before
the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty.
Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the
DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering
custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of
availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that
all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted
beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of
the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its
Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of
Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to produce the body of
Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to
file their verified written return to the writ pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule,
within five working days from the service of the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010
praying that the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case
relating toa biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring
the child, stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To
give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance as representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file
their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the
appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the
arguments raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting
additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the issues to be discussed by providing for the
following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-

manifestations made by the counsels, the court enjoined the parties to file their respective
position papers on the following issues:

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;

2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and
prayer in the petition; and

3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be
given to his biological mother.
The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers
based on these three main issues. They may include other related issues they deem
essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on
August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.21

In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was
brought before the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs
of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that
Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.22 The
RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as
laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to secure custody of
a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of
Minors.23

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 arguing that since the
RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is
duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC, however, deniedChristina’s
motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the
wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.26

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition,
Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M.
No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for violating the
doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her and
Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the
privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her
son.28

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a
petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss Christina’s
argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has
the plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all adoption and adoption-related
statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is
being violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal
Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had
been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s
representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the
said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD
officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby
Julian’s custody.30

The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31 this Court
held:

[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal

killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the
other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groupsor
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands,
the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the
Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced
disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to
wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of

liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State ora political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to

acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however,
the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating
that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition
before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that
the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing
held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance"
as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or
a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-
10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal
remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

CHAIRPERSON1 OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION,2Petitioner, v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-
MANILA, BRANCH 47 AND JA HOON KU, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 211403]

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, AS THE CHAIRPERSON OF BUREAU

OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, Petitioner, v. HON. PAULINO Q.
GALLEGOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-
MANILA, BRANCH 47 AND JA HOON KU, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 211590]

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE

CHAIRPERSON OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, Petitioner, v. JA HOON KU, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the
special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the
remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing
of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.3redarclaw
For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders
dated 28 January 2014,4 29 January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well as the
Resolution dated 14 March 2014,7 all issued by respondent Presiding Judge Paulino
Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 in SP. PROC.
No. 14-131282.

The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol Manila
requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for
arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd.
Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request9 to
petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the
immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.10redarclaw

On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged

Ku for being a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.11 This finding
was approved by the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued a
Summary Deportation Order.12redarclaw

On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police
District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention
center, Ku was detained.13redarclaw

On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport.14redarclaw

Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
Interim Remedies, docketed as SP PROC. No. 14-131282.15 On 22 January 2014, he also
filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.16 Finding said
supplemental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order
dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).18 Judge Gallegos then
set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.,19 while he set the hearing on
the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30
a.m.20redarclaw

In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ.21 He was then
notified that a hearing on the TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was
already submitted for resolution.22 Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014.23redarclaw

On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion
for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or
its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police
Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family.24 On
29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the transfer
of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG.25 Petitioner challenged these orders
before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.

On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28
and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku, as well as requiring Ku
to comment on the petition.27 In issuing this resolution, the Court intimated the possibility
of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested and placed
under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as one of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.28redarclaw

Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11
February 2014 before the trial court, petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of
the amparo petition.29 On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued the third
assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.30 Thus, petitioner appealed
the matter to the Court via the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition31 docketed as G.R.
No. 211403.

On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order

addressed to the Office of the President (OP).32redarclaw

On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege
of the writ of amparo, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is

ordered immediately released from [petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the
institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner] and/or agents
are ordered to cease and desist from further violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the
members of his family by filing cases to legitimize his detention.33
Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court issued
a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from
further proceeding with the case.34redarclaw

On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or
until his appeal was resolved, whichever came first.35 Ku then moved for the release of
his passport before the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to which he filed a counter-
motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI, given that such was one of the
conditions for the OP’s grant of provisional liberty to Ku.36 In the Order dated 26 March
2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely noted petitioner’s motion for being moot,
considering that he already released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon the personal
request of Ku.37redarclaw

Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in
G.R. No. 211590, essentially assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.

Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions,38 we come to the central question
of whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at
bar.

We rule in the negative.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ

of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule “in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.” It was an exercise for the
first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in
response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced
disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.”40redarclaw

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case
of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it
stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,”
the Court in Navia v. Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting “enforced
disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9851,43 to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.44
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a
procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security,
but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary
disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced
disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of
persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No.
9851.45redarclaw

Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s
circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary
disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on
the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention
to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that
he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for
his arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention,46 the
arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced
themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed
him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa.47redarclaw

More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his
whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was
not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced by the Return of
Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and the After-Mission Report dated 17
January 2014.49 More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed
to the trial court that Ku was in the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order.50redarclaw
These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the
BI to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku
was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on 16 January 2014, and received at the BI Detention Center at
11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014,51 the following day or on 17 January 2014, Ku’s
counsel was immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Reconsideration before the BI,52 thereby showing that Ku’s legal rights were amply
guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of the law.

Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain,

among which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such
threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege
the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a
long period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal
cases against him to hold him under detention.53 According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain
in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person against the actions
of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use
the power of the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in
confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the further the
violation of his guaranteed rights.54redarclaw
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule
requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence.55 Other than making
unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence that he was exposed to
“life-threatening situations” while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary,
the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.

Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the
BI would trump up charges against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains,
however, that even before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly
filed and ruled upon by the BI.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ
of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed,
and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ
of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the
enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never
hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the
case at bar.

It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of

a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is
with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.56 Ku knows this and, in fact, he
filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before the OP. When Ku,
however, injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo, he committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which he had
already solicited from another tribunal.

In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein filed before the trial court a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus seeking to have the detention of her husband declared as illegal and to
order the latter’s release, and where her husband filed before the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) an omnibus motion seeking to question the summary deportation
order issued against him, the Court held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.

The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order
No. 292, the power to deport aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to
the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority
to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from
assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer, such party may file a motion
for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC.58redarclaw
Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is forum shopping when a
party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited,
and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. While a party may avail of
the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not free to resort to them
simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present
simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the
rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order in
availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and
loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling
with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the
administration of justice.

On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded the
Court’s directives as regards this case. The records show that the Court’s Resolution
dated 4 February 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the
Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the impropriety of
the amparo petition, was received by the RTC on 5 February 2014.60 This should have
alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and restraint in granting the privilege of
the writ of amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Court’s pronouncements,
Judge Gallegos proceeded to grant the said privilege.

Also, the records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014, wherein we
issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and
enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the case, was received by the RTC on 20
March 2014 at 9:00 a.m.61 Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the
Resolution dated 14 March 2014 which granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, his
receipt of the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014 should have forewarned him
against releasing Ku’s passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and
unwillingness to follow the Court’s edicts.

It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere
request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply
accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the
Court’s lawful order and directive.62redarclaw

Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals, especially the Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A
resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.63redarclaw

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The
exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary itself.64redarclaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves

to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution

dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional Trial Court which granted the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo;
b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Amparo and the Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ
of Amparo in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282 before the Regional Trial of Manila,
Branch 47; and
c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative
charge/s against Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this
Decision, and to forthwith submit to the Court its report and recommendation
thereon.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015

SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET

SANTIAGO, Petitioners, v. RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, AND ERWIN
TULFO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated August 6,
20122 and January 7, 20133 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City4 (RTC) in SP No.
Q-12-71275, which (a) dismissed the petition for writ of amparo filed by petitioners-
spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin "Raymart" (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago
(Claudine; collectively, petitioners) and (b) dissolved the temporary protection order
(TPO) previously issued therein.

The Facts

At around 11:40 in the morning of May 6, 2012, petitioners arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Terminal 3 (NAIA 3) aboard a Cebu Pacific Airline flight from a
vacation with their family and friends. They waited for the arrival of their baggage but
were eventually informed that it was offloaded and transferred to a different flight.
Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk. As
they were complaining, they noticed a man taking photos of Claudine with his cellular
phone. Ray mart approached the man and asked what he was doing. Suddenly, the man,
later identified as Ramon "Mon" Tulfo (Mon), allegedly punched and kicked Raymart,
forcing the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw the commotion, she approached Mon
and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and pushed her back against the counter. At that
instance, Raymart rushed to defend his wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin Atilano
(Atilano) joined in the brawl. Immediately thereafter, several airport security personnel
came to stop the altercation and brought them to the Airport Police Department for
investigation.5

Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo (respondents), brothers
of Mon, aired on their TV program comments and expletives against petitioners, and
threatened that they will retaliate.6 Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled,
petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents on
May 11, 2012 before the RTC.7
On May 23, 2012, Erwin Tulfo filed a Manifestation and Motion to Deny Issuance of
Protection Order and/or Dismissal of the Petition Motu Proprio8 (May 23, 2012 Motion)
which was opposed by petitioners for being a prohibited pleading.9

On May 24, 2012, then Presiding Judge Bayani Vargas (JudgeVargas) issued a
Resolution10 granting a TPO in favor of petitioners and directed respondents to file their
return/answer.11

In his return/answer,12 Ben Tulfo claimed that the statements he uttered did not involve
any actual threat and that he merely expressed his strong sentiments to defend his
brother.13

On June 29, 2012, Judge Vargas submitted the case for resolution but eventually retired
on July 11, 2012. Consequently, Judge Maria Filomena Singh (Judge Singh) was
designated as the Acting Presiding Judge who assumed office and handled the present
case.14

The RTC Ruling

In a Resolution15 dated August 6, 2012, the RTC, through Judge Singh, dismissed the
petition and ordered the dissolution of the TPO.16 It held that the petition is not a proper
subject of a writ of amparo since the rules were intended to apply solely to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, noting that the purpose of the law is to,
among others, ascertain the whereabouts of an aggrieved party, recover evidence related
to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition, and determine the
facts surrounding the death or disappearance of a missing person. Consequently, it held
that it did not have the authority to issue said writ in favor of petitioners. In this relation,
it explained that while it is true that the May 23, 2012 Motion was a motion to dismiss
and as such, a prohibited pleading under the rules, it still had the discretion to dismiss the
case when in its own determination the case is not covered by the same rule. It expressed
that the prohibition against motions to dismiss was meant to expedite the proceedings;
thus, in line with the same objective, it has the primary duty to so declare if it cannot
grant the remedy at the outset so as not to waste the time and resources of the litigants
and the courts, both in a moot and academic exercise.17

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,18 which was, however, denied for lack of
merit in a Resolution19 dated January 7, 2013; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the RTC's dismissal of
petitioners' amparo petition was correct.

Petitioners argue that the issuance of a writ of amparo is not limited to cases of
extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.20 They submit that they
need not undergo the human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances, as is common to landmark decisions on military and police abuses,
before their right to life, liberty, and security may be protected by a writ
of amparo.21 Further, they insist that the May 23, 2012 Motion was a prohibited pleading
and, hence, should not have been allowed.22

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),23 the Court

has already explained that the writ of amparo, under its present procedural formulation,
namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,24 otherwise known as "The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,"
was intended to address and, thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal
killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal

killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof, x x x. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, while amparo (which literally means "protection" in Spanish) has been regarded

as a special remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the parameters
of protection are not the same in every jurisdiction. In Manalo, the origins
of amparo were discussed as follows:

The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in

Spanish. In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico
and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S.
appealed to many Mexican jurists. One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejon, drafted a
constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to
protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted
pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or
state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in
litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that
motivated the violation.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. If,
after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being
violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to
take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S.
with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual
rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the
entire nation.

The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving
into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. It became, in the
words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-
attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a
shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later
evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of
the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants" rights derived from the agrarian reform process.

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect
the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights. Other
countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental
rights.26

In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has
limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally
characterized as "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings,"27 while "enforced disappearances," according to
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851,28 otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on
Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time." In Navia v. Pardico,29 the Court held that it must be
shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in
an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.30 Notably, the same requirement of government
participation should also apply to extralegal killings, considering that the writ
of amparo was, according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,
intended to "hold public authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution
and enforce our laws, to a high standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to
our people. [In this light] [t]he sovereign Filipino people should be assured that if their
right[s] to life and liberty are threatened or violated, they will find vindication in our
courts of justice."31 Stated differently, the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that
is meant to balance out the government's incredible power in order to curtail human rights
abuses on its end.

Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current writ of amparo to extralegal killings
and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, which reads:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's first paragraph, does
state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person
desiring to avail of it, the same section's second paragraph qualifies that the protection of
such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life,
liberty and security. The two paragraphs should indeed be read together in order to
construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly applicable is the statutory construction
rule that "clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this case,
procedural rule] must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment."32

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not
allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats
thereof, in the senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad
invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to life and security, carried
out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh,
properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal
determination, regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court, indeed,
has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the relief in the
first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of
the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties
through prolonged but futile litigation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for writ of amparo filed by

petitioners-spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin and Claudine Margaret Santiago before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as SP No. Q-12-71275, is
hereby DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryR. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER JAIME H.

MORENTE, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES
COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, AND BRIAN ALAS,
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:**

The Case

This is a petition for a writ of amparo (with Prayer to Issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate
Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention) under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule
on the Writ of Amparo). Petitioner Lorie Marie Tomas Callo (Callo) seeks the immediate
release of Danielle Tan Parker from the Immigration Detention Facility, Camp Bagong
Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City.

The Facts

Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508 issued by
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on 5 March 2010 and valid until 4 March 2015.

On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an undesirable,
undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No.
ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the
United States of America with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her.
Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued
against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker,
upon verification that she arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year. Parker was not in
the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her American
Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State. Thus, she was
considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was
arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker
are one and the same person. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in
Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently detained in the Immigration Detention Facility
as the deportation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with
falsification and use of falsified documents before Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Davao City.

On 12 September 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before

Branch 266, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The Bureau of Immigration was
able to produce the body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then
alleged that as the SDO had become final and executory, it served as the legal authority
to detain Parker. The Bureau of Immigration also argued that Parker cannot be released
or deported without the final disposition of her pending criminal case in Davao City.

The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was legal.1 Parker
then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and
found that Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial
intervention through habeas corpus.2 The CA gave weight to the Certification dated 20
June 2015 issued by the Office of the Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is "no
available data" regarding any record/information from the year 1990 onwards of
Philippine Passport No. XX5678508. Parker no longer appealed the denial of the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus and the decision of the CA became final and executory on 5
January 2016.3

On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue
Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo
argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her to
be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of
Parker is threatened by the respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and
subsequently the award of the interim reliefs.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim reliefs available under
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for the immediate release of Parker. Callo alleges that Parker is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and thus should not have been detained by the Bureau of
Immigration. Moreover, Callo alleges that the life of Parker is endangered in the
detention center; and thus, a writ of amparo with the interim reliefs prayed for should be
issued by this Court.
We disagree.

The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to

violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the writ of amparo covers extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.4 Enforced disappearance is
defined under Republic Act (RA) No. 9851,5 Section 3(g) of which provides:

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or

abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State
or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearance:

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been
defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.6
In Navia v. Pardico,7 this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory definition
of"enforced or involuntary disappearance." Further, elements constituting enforced
disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fute or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.8
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There
is also no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried
out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not
present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in
the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had produced the
body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for the writ of habeas
corpus previously initiated by Parker herself.9 Similarly, there is no intention to remove
Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the Bureau of
Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City,
which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country.

Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats thereof, that
would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not
sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove
that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that
the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge
the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons.10 In
this case, Parker lias not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the
Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against
her.

Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker, a natural-born
Filipino citizen, is a different person from Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom
the SDO was issued.

We disagree.

Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle Nopuente are two
different persons. In particular, we give weight to the fact that the DFA issued a
certificate verifying that there is no available data on Passport No. XX5678508, which
was the Philippine passport used by Parker.11 Moreover, the Certificate of Live
Birth,12 which purportedly shows that Parker was born in the Philippines on 21 March
1975 of Filipino parents, was only registered on 4 January 2010. There was no
explanation given as to why Parker's birth was registered only after almost 35 years.
Moreover, Callo only alleges facts from the year 2005, allegedly for purposes of
brevity.13 We do not see any reason why facts surrounding the existence of Parker should
only be presented from 2005. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly discussed about
her is from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente are two different persons,
the life and existence of Parker should have been alleged and proven since birth. In this
case, there is no allegation nor any proof as to who Parker was, or what she had been
doing, before 2011. Taking all these circumstances into perspective, Parker had failed to
sufficiently prove that she is a different person from Danielle Nopuente.

Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in the Immigration Detention Facility
because of the threats against her by her co-detainees and the living conditions of the
facility which pose health problems for Parker. Unfortunately, these allegations even if
proven - will not support the issuance of a writ of amparo. To repeat, the remedy of a
writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance the government's
awesome power and to curtail human rights abuses.14 The writ covers extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof as specifically defined under RA No.
9851. The circumstances of Parker, as alleged by Callo, do not meet the requirements for
the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Finally, we note that the petition for the writ of amparo was filed by Callo. However,
there was no allegation of her relationshp to Parker.15 In Boac v. Cadapan,16 we
emphasized the importance of the exclusive and successive order of who can file a
petition for a writ of amparo. We held:

Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the
requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to
the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated
that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for filing the petition on his
behalf.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or

(c) Any concerned Citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known

member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known
members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive
order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority
is not without reason - "to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of
petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party."

The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas
corpus on Merino's behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.

It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen
are precluded from filing the application on Merino's behalf as they are not authorized
parties under the Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a
petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no
immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on any of
the familial relationship of Parker as only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and
discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal standing to file
this petition.

Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo, the interim reliefs
sought for are also denied. Moreover, we see no need to address the other issues raised by
Callo in this petition, specifically, the condition of the Immigration Detention Facility
and the treatment of Parker in said detention center. A petition for the writ of amparo is
not the proper action to resolve such issues.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
‘

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 181796, November 07, 2017 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD
OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG),
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), PETITIONER, V. REGINA N.
CAYANAN AND SPO1 ROLANDO V. PASCUA, RESPONDENTS.
 DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ
of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ of amparo the observance
of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced disappearance is established by substantial
evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked to assiduously investigate and
determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may
be responsible for the disappearance.
The Case
The Government, represented by the Director/Head of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), appeals the resolution
issued on December 13, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City
(RTC) maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to continue its investigation
into the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan (Pablo); directing respondent SPO1 Rolando
V. Pascua (Pascua) to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection
order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina N. Cayanan (Regina) in the
Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice.[1]
Also under appeal is the resolution of January 31, 2008, whereby the RTC denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[2]
Antecedents
On August 16, 2007, Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that
Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG;[3] that
on July 9, 2007 a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG,
led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo on Magalang Street, East Avenue, Diliman,
Quezon City without any warrant of arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the
CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not been found or heard from since
then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her relatives, the CIDG operatives
had not produced the body of Pablo.[4]
On August 21, 2007, the CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf
of Pablo. On August 28, 2007, the CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied
having the custody of Pablo or having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpus.[5]
On September 7, 2007, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[6]
On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas
corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo.[7]
On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo.[8]
On November 5, 2007, the CIDG and Pascua submitted their respective comments vis-a-
vis the writ of amparo.[9]
On November 5, 2007, Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection
order and witness protection order. The RTC granted her motion on November 6, 2007.[10]
Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his
non-appearance, specifically: for the initial hearing, he was then suffering acute
gastroenteritis; and for the later hearings, he wanted to protect his identity as part of his
defenses in the criminal case of kidnapping brought against him in the Department of
Justice.[11]
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued the first assailed resolution, [12] disposing thusly:
Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

1) The Court hereby maintains the Writ of Amparo earlier issued;

2) For respondent CIDG Chief/Director to continue the investigation it earlier conducted;

3) For SPO2 Rolando V. Pascua to appear to the proper forum;

4) The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;

5) And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is
hereby retained until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.

It is so ordered.[13]
The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration;[14] however, the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration on January 31, 2008 through the second assailed resolution.[15]
Hence, the CIDG has directly appealed to the Court.

Issues
The CIDG urges the following grounds for review and reversal of the assailed
resolutions, namely: [16]
I.

The trial court gravely erred in granting the writ of amparo, there being no sufficient
evidence to support the same.
A.

The Rule on the writ of amparo did not change the rules on burden of proof.
B.

A mere accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground

for the court to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity.
II.

Petitioner discharged its functions as required in its mandate and exhausted all remedies
available under the law.
On his part, Pascua submits in his comment to the petition that: [17]
I.

Complainant failed to establish by the required burden of proof that respondent SPO2
Pascua, in his personal capacity or as police officer, caused the "forced disappearance" of
Pablo Cayanan within the ambit protected by the rule on the writ of amparo.
A.

Following Mexico's Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the supposed victim to
establish where he is being held. Moreover, Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers
"public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity", which evidently
precludes a government institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP.

B.

Enforced or forced disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the
state perpetrated its commission.

II.

Respondent-Accused Pascua is entitled to presumption of innocence, which cannot be

diminished by the rule on writ of amparo.

The issues for consideration and resolution in this appeal are follows: (1) whether or not
sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the RTC; (2) whether or
not the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
(3) whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo was defective; and
(4) whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua's right
to the presumption of his innocence.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.

We have to indicate as a preliminary observation that although this mode of appeal is

usually limited to the determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the Court of questions of fact or of law or
of both. Accordingly, we shall also determine herein the sufficiency of the evidence
presented in support of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
I.
Substantial evidence existed to warrant
the issuance of the writ of amparo
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as a
remedy against enforced disappearances or threats to life, liberty and personal
security, viz.:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof required from
the petitioner as a respondent named in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx

Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish

the allegations of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege
of the writ of amparo, to wit:
Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[18] This standard was applied in Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo,[19] the first ruling by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ
of amparo.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[20] a case involving the propriety of the trial court's issuance of the
writ of amparo, the Court expounded on the need for substantial evidence to support the
petition for the writ of amparo, viz.:
We see no merit in the petitioners' submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to
support the conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government
complicity in the disappearance x x x. We painstakingly ruled:

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as
in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to
determine the correct import of every piece of evidence - even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence - taking into account the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement x x x.
xxxx

Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners' claim that the Kasim evidence does not
amount to substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a
new issue; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3,
2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the
justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it
to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the
evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered
inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the
circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the
substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility
of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie
every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining
situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available
evidence in the case.
xxxx

Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to
the present case. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation
in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all three was the recognition that the
burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of
circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement
for direct evidence to establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the
petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these lights, we
emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial
evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the
Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious
rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that 'we should
take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece
of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that
we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement.' From these perspectives, we see
no error that we should rectify or reconsider.[21] (Emphases supplied)
The CIDG contends that Regina did not discharge her burden of proof because she did
not present substantial evidence to support her petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
The contention of the CIDG is without merit.

We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in
support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay executed on July 30, 2007 before Special Investigator
Cesar S. Rivera of the Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking and Armed Robbery Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), whereby affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an
eyewitness no less, detailed the events of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon of July
9, 2007, was consistent and credible in itself. Perez's statements therein definitely
recounted how the abductors perpetrated the abduction by blocking the path of Pablo's
Isuzu Sportivo (plate numbered ZCW 283) with their white colored Kia 2-door Sedan
bearing plate numbered YBA 255 and their green-colored Toyota Lite Ace with plate
numbered "___-488." Perez identified one of the perpetrators of the abduction by name
("SPO2 Rolando Pascua") and supplied another identifying circumstance for Pascua
("Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng International Drivers License,
police po siya, dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp
Crame"). He thereby revealed having last seen Pablo on the day of the abduction as being
inside the Isuzu Sportivo that the abductors parked in front of the main office of the
CIDG in Camp Crame.
The relevant portions of the sinumpaang salaysay of Perez are quoted for ready reference
as follows:
4. T. Sino basi PABLO CAYANAN? S. Kliyente ko po si PABLO, nagpapagawa ng
mga rehistro ng mga sasakyan. May pwesto po siya sa Dagupan at namimili at
nagbebenta ng mga second hand car. Mga isang taon mahigit ko na po siyang kilala.
5. T. Kailan at papano siya nawala o dinukot? [When and how did he disappear or
was abducted]
S. Noon pong ika-9 ng Hulyo 2007, nag-text si PABLO sa akin, tinatanong kung ok na
yung papel ng Transfer of Ownership ng sasakyan, at sabi ko po "ok na". Sabi niya
"Sige punta ako diyan." Mga alas-tres (3:00) ng hapon dumating siya sa harap ng
opisina naming sa Cres Eden building sa 8A Magalang St., Pinyahan, Quezon
City. Dala ni PABLO yung Isuzu Sportivo (Plate ZCW-283) na kulay orange.
Hindi na siya bumaba ng sasakyan at tinawag na lang ako para sumakay sa
kanya. Pag-sakay ko po ay may humarang na dalawang sasakyan, isang Kia 2
door Sedan, puti, na may plate number YBA 255, at isang Toyota Lite Ace,
green, plate number ___-488. Tinutukan kami ng Calibre .45 pistol ng 2 lalaking
tumabi sa amin ni PABLO. Lumapit si SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa amin at
pinalipat ako sa Pajero niya (kulay navy blue). May ibang nag-maneho ng
sasakyan ni PABLO na kasama siya doon. Kasama po ni PASCUA yung driver
niya.
6. T. Sino si SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA?
S: Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng International Drivers
License, police po siya, dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division
(FED), Camp Crame.
xxxx
11. T. Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?
S. Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh), tapos
po ay pumasok kami sa loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area.
Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark mga isa't kalahating oras
(3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay
kinakausap nila SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po
ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon, tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa
Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN Jr. bantay siya ng mga
dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA.
12. T. Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?
S. Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking
nakasulat na Criminal Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).[22]
Given that no ill-motive was imputed to Perez for firmly identifying Pascua as the person
leading the abduction of Pablo, the credibility of the identification of Pascua was
unassailable. Indeed, Perez was not likely to falsely incriminate a police officer like
Pascua in the commission of a crime as serious as abduction unless the incrimination was
the truth.

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting
himself as another victim of the same abduction. Pascua's version on the abduction, as
culled from his counter-affidavit, follows:

a) On July 9, 2007, I was at the vicinity of Magalang Street near the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) along East Avenue, Quezon City. I was then processing the application for
International Driver's License of a relative which was coursed and requested through me;

b) To facilitate the processing of the said application for International Driver's License, I
met a friend named Ronaldo F. Perez, who incidentally was [a] known "fixer" in the
area to help him (sic) facilitate the application;
c) At around 3:00 in the afternoon and while I am seated in a "turo turo" (cafeteria)
talking to Ronaldo Perez regarding the license detail, a group of men (referred to herein
as "Malefactor" for brevity) more or less ten (10) brandishing long and short firearms
arrived and in a "Gestapo" like manner hauled several persons including me and Ronaldo
Perez. The incident transpired in no less than a minute. The Malefactor seem to be trained
and have prepared for the incident;

d) At that precise moment, [I] could not identify myself as a police officer yet to the
Malefactors for fear that I would be shot at by the Malefactors. At that time I did not
bear with me my service fire arm - caliber 9mm pistol;
e) We were ordered to board in a vehicle, which vehicle I cannot identify nor their
license plate number. There were Seven persons in the vehicle, four (4) members of the
Malefactors and three (3) person who were hauled including me and Ronaldo Perez;
f) All three (3) of us who were taken by the malefactors were ordered, at gun point, to
bow our head while the vehicle is moving. We were directed not to look anywhere;
g) Same vehicle, together with two more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove
all the way to EDSA southbound passing by the street near the building where the
Department of Interior and Local Government is located;
h) It was along Kamuning or a few minutes after their (sic) hauling when I had the
opportunity to identify myself to one of the Malefactors that I am a bonafide member
of the police force. I was asked if I am is(sic) sure that I am a police officer, to which
I answered "Opo";
i) A few minutes after and upon learning that I am a police officer, the vehicle
stopped and I was required to get off, which I immediately did. I was however
directed by one of the Malefactor not to look back or I would be shot which I
complied;
j) Fearing that what I experienced may be [a] violation of the law, I boarded a taxi cab
and immediately proceeded to the Central Metro Manila Criminal Investigation and
Detection Team located at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City to report the
incident. This is the station that I am quite familiar, hence, I decided to proceed to the
same station x x x.
k) I tried to locate Ronaldo Perez that night but to no avail and so I decided to wait
for any news that may come there after;
1) The next day, July 10, 2007 (Tuesday), I was surprised to learn from Ronaldo
Perez through telephone call, that he was likewise released and that he is now ready
to process the requested International Driver's License of his relative Rizalino Pascua
Gani, Jr. x x x.[23]
Asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction was Pascua's way of denying
his participation in the abduction of Pablo. Yet, he did not furnish details of the abduction
that would have given to the investigators firm leads to quickly comer the perpetrators as
well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His omission as fatal to his
credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the abduction by issuing a blanket
denial. He was expected to furnish details because he was a police officer sworn to
uphold and enforce the law. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful in light
of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the leader of the
perpetrators of the abduction.
Thirdly, Pascua's version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no
consideration. For one, he could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle
that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such inability was uncharacteristic
of a veteran police officer like him. To justify his alleged inability to provide details
about the abductors in his counter-affidavit, he stated that he and Pablo were told to "bow
their heads and not to look." The justification was implausible, however, because it was
incompatible with his declaration in the same counter-affidavit to the effect that the
"[s]ame vehicle, together with two or more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove all
the way to EDSA southbound passing by the street near the building where the
Department of Interior and Local Government is located."[24] Furthermore, he said that he
was released by the abductors only after having introduced himself as a police officer.
But he thereby contradicted himself because he also stated in the same counter-affidavit
that he feared being shot during the abduction if he identified himself as a police officer.
Moreover, he claimed that although he was released he submissively complied with the
order of one of the abductors for him "not to look back or [he] would be shot."[25] The
claim of submissiveness was unnatural for a police officer like him because he was
expected - mainly because of his training and experience as a police officer, or even
because of simple curiosity on his part - to have at least glanced at the fleeing vehicle of
the abductors in order to get a clue for the follow-up investigation. That he did not give
chase or tail the vehicle, or alert other police officers about the abduction soonest added
to the suspiciousness of his denial of participation in the abduction. And, lastly, his
proceeding to a relatively farther police station to report the incident, instead of to the
nearer police station or outpost made his version absolutely suspicious.
Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses, namely: Ricardo Cayanan[26] and Leonila R.
Francisco,[27] to corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the abduction. Such other
witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.
And, fifthly, Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay had no evidentiary value for
being general and bereft of any details. A perusal shows that the recantation did not offer
details of what had really occurred if the abduction of Pablo did not actually happen.
Such details were the only means to directly contradict the details stated in the
recanted sinumpaang salaysay.
It is relevant to note that the RTC, whose ascertainment of the credibility of conflicting
testimonies is generally accorded great respect by the reviewing court, easily disbelieved
Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay, observing as follows:
Even the recantation of Ronaldo Perez of his Sinumpaang Salaysay as presented by the
respondent SPO2 Rolando Pascua is frowned upon by the Court. Jurisprudence has
invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be
secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Considering that the respondents herein belong to the police force, the
motive of Ronaldo Perez in executing his Affidavit of Recantation is doubted by the
Court. Moreover, Ronaldo Perez's defiance of the subpoena sent to him by this Court
proved all the more the doubt of the Court of the veracity of his recantation.[28]
II.
The CIDG did not observe the
required extraordinary diligence
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public
official or employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo,
to wit:
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.
The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its
investigation of the disappearance of Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts.
The CIDG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary.

Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo expressly states what a public official or

employee impleaded as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo should submit
with the verified written return, to wit:
Section 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the
respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which
shall, among other things, contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any
act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the
threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the
threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state
the actions that have or will still be taken:
(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
   
(ii) to recover and preserve the evidence related to the death or disappearance of
the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible;
   
(iii)to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
   
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as
well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;
   
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
   
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution
and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions
to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of them.[29] Said certifications were
severely inadequate. It is almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-
compliant with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the certifications amounted
to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written
return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which
could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and
probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the
abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended in the
search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted, and would have reported the
progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang
salaysay on the abduction itself.
The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various
operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not
thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly
continuous searches had been conducted.

The CIDG pointed out in its return that the CIDG had undertaken an administrative
investigation against Pascua, and submitted in that regard the certification on the pre-
charge evaluation and investigation of Pascua. The CIDG asserts that its investigation of
the disappearance of Pablo was conducted in tandem with that of the NBI; that it had also
formed its own investigating team to conduct a "thorough investigation" of the abduction
of Pablo; and that it had meanwhile verified the vehicle used in the abduction from the
LTO.[30]
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the
RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo's whereabouts
had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard.
To be noted at this juncture is that the CIDG should have exerted greater effort at
complying with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of
Perez's sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the abduction and
disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is
disheartening for us to see the CIDG's investigation having been limited to Pascua despite
the circumstances justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no affirmative showing of
any investigation of the area of the abduction itself despite Regina having presented
witnesses from the area. Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated Perez
on the abduction.[31]
III.
The petition for the writ of amparo
was not defective
In his comment, which the CIDG adopted, Pascua reminds that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo was partly patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo adopted in Mexico. He
posits that it has been an essential requirement in Mexico for the petition for the writ
of amparo to state where the victim of involuntary disappearance was being held. He
argues that upon the recantation by Perez of his sinumpaang salaysay, there was no more
evidence from which to determine where Pablo was being held.
The argument of Pascua is unfounded.

Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the petition
for the writ of amparo:
Section 5. Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall be signed and verified and shall
allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstance of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by
an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with the report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

As Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state the probable
whereabouts of the victim. We have no doubt, however, that Regina was not aware where
Pablo had been kept at the time she filed her petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
Nonetheless, the Court clarifies that the application and implementation of the rule
of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best.
Despite its being patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries,
particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo promulgated by the
Court should not be wholly dependent on how those other rules of amparo have operated,
or have been implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation,
are only best practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all.
Circumstances and needs peculiar to our country, which the Court has well considered in
crafting the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, dictate different operation and implementation.
It was actually presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no evidence at all that
indicated the whereabouts of Pablo following the abduction. There was such evidence,
and it was substantial. Specifically, Perez's sinumpaang salaysay stated the place where
Pablo was detained or was last seen, to wit:
11. T: Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?
S: Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00-3:30 nh), tapos
po ay pumasok sa loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area. Nasa
labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark, mga isa't kalahating oras (3:30-
5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay kinakausap
nila SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po ako mga
bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon; tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa Pinyahan.
Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN, Jr., bantay siya ng mga dumukot sa
kanya, kasama si SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA.
12. T: Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?
S: Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat
na Criminal Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).[32]
Pascua suggests that the State, or any of its agencies or institutions like the CIDG, cannot
be made a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo. He probably bases his
suggestion on the text of Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. (Emphasis supplied)
The suggestion of Pascua lacks substance. Although Section 1 states that the violation
may be committed by the persons therein listed (i.e., public official or employee, or a
private individual or entity), it does not state that only the listed persons can be made
respondents. The rule does not list the State or its agencies as possible violators simply
because the State and its agencies may not be presumed to sanction such violations.
In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be impleaded;
otherwise, the rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered ineffective or toothless. There
may be occasions when the remedy of the writ of amparo can be made effective only
through the State and its agencies. This is because the State is vested with the authority
and responsibility for securing every inhabitant's life, liberty and property. After all, the
State controls the legal, moral and material resources by which to fully enforce the
Constitution and the laws guaranteeing life, liberty and property.
IV.
The issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair
SPO2 Pascua's right to the presumption of innocence
Pascua supposes that the issuance of the writ of amparo issued against him impaired or
diminished his right to the presumption of innocence.
Pascua's supposition entirely misses the point.
The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to
those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is
not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give
the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life,
liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the
prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the
need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
V.
Reliefs to be granted
We next consider the reliefs to be granted in addition to the grant of the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
According to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court hearing the petition
may grant the privilege of the writ of amparo "and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate." This means that the amparo court should enable every act or move to
prevent any violation of another person's right to life, liberty and security or to defeat any
threat of a violation of such right.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is required to also
state in the return the actions that have been or will still be taken: (a) to verify the identity
of the aggrieved party; (b) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of
the person or persons responsible; (c) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from
them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause, manner, location
and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to identify and apprehend the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders
before a competent court.
With the records of the hearing sufficiently indicating the personal participation of
Pascua in the abduction of Pablo, Pascua ostensibly knew more than he cared to reveal
thus far about the abduction. As a start, Pascua, as the leader of the abduction, knew the
identities of the eight or nine other abductors. He should be assiduously investigated for
his participation in the abduction, and, if warranted, he should be promptly but duly held
accountable for it. All those conspiring with him in abducting Pablo should also be held
to account to the full extent of the law. The CIDG and the NBI should not halt in seeing
to this, for they bear the primary responsibility in that respect.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;

and AFFIRMS the resolution rendered on December 13, 2007 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City in all respects subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS of the dispositive portion, as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
 1. The Court hereby grants the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;
   
2. Ordering respondent CIDG Chief/Director and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation to cause the speedy conduct of a thorough investigation
of the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan probably caused by members of the
Philippine National Police then assigned in Camp Crame, presumably with the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group;
   
3. Requiring the full investigation of SPO2 Rolando V. Pascua and other persons
who took part in the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan; and, if warranted,
charging them with the appropriate criminal offense or offenses in the
Department of Justice in relation to the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan;
   
4. The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;

5. And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is
hereby retained until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.
It is so ordered.

The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City
for the implementation of and compliance with this decision with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018 ]
GEN. EMMANUEL BAUTISTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), GEN. EDUARDO AÑO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), GEN.
HERNANDO IRIBERRI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, GEN. BENITO ANTONIO T. DE LEON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION,
AND PC/SUPT. MIGUEL DE MAYO LAUREL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF
THE ISABELA PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICE, PETITIONERS, V. ATTY. MARIA
CATHERINE DANNUG-SALUCON, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The privilege of the writ of amparo may be granted on the basis of the application of the
totality of evidence standard. Such application may extend to the use of relevant
circumstantial evidence. Hearsay testimony that is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced may also be admitted and appreciated. The flexibility in the admission
of evidence derives from the recognition of the State's often virtual, monopoly of access
to pertinent evidence, as well as from the recognition of the deliberate use of the State's
power to destroy pertinent evidence being inherent in the practice of enforced
disappearances.
The Case
[1]
By petition for review on certiorari,  the petitioners, namely: Gen. Emmanuel Bautista,
Gen. Eduardo Año, Gen. Hernando Iriberri, Gen. Benito Antonio T. De Leon, and Chief
Supt. Miguel De Mayo Laurel, hereby assail the decision promulgated on March 12, 2015
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00053-W/A,[2] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of respondent Atty. Maria
Catherine Dannug-Salucon (Atty. Salucon), the petitioner thereat, as well as the
resolution promulgated on December 2, 2015,[3] whereby the CA denied their motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedents
After her admission to the Philippine Bar, Atty. Salucon initially worked for the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO) before resigning to be become a human rights advocate. She co-
founded the National Union of People's Lawyers (NUPL), a national association of
human rights advocates, law students and paralegals principally engaged in public
interest cases and human rights advocacy. She also established her own law firm, and
undertook the defense of several political detainees, most of whom were leaders or
members of peasant and other sectoral organizations and people's organizations,
including human rights defenders labeled or suspected to be members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) or the New People's Army (NPA) who had been harassed
with allegedly trumped-up charges by the agents of the Government.

For purposes of this adjudication, we adopt the CA's summary of the factual antecedents
derived from Atty. Salucon's petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, to wit:
On March 24, 2014, [respondent] was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained
political prisoner client who was allegedly among several leaders of people's
organizations/sectoral organizations who were falsely charged in a murder and frustrated
murder case pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao. As they
were discussing the security risks involved in the handling of the case, William Bugatti,
her paralegal who was working with her on said case and who was also an activist and
human rights defender, informed her that he had personally observed that surveillance
was being conducted on them, including the respondent, especially during hearings for
the above case. Thus, he suggested certain security measures for her own protection.
[Respondent] realized the significance of Bugatti's advice when he was fatally gunned
down later that evening. Parenthetically, [respondent] had asked him (sic) early that very
day to identify the names, ranks and addresses of the handler/s of the prosecution witness
in the Lagawe case, whom [respondent] suspected of lying on the witness stand.
That same evening, [respondent] was informed by a client x x x working as a civilian
asset for the PNP Intelligence Section that the Regional Intelligence of the PNP, through
the PNP Isabela Provincial Police Office, had issued a directive to PNP Burgos, Isabela,
[respondent's] hometown, to conduct a background investigation on her and to confirm
whether she was a "Red Lawyer". She also learned that she was being secretly followed
by agents of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) and
that person looking like military/policemen had been asking people around her office
about her whereabouts and routine. Further, respondent's name was reportedly included
in the military's Watch List of so-called communist terrorist supporters rendering legal
services.

On March 31, 2014, [respondent] again received a call from her confidential informant,
confirming that she was indeed the subject of surveillance and that, in fact, he was tailed
by ISAFP operatives when he came to [respondent's] office a few nights earlier. The day
before, the confidential informant was allegedly cornered by three ISAFP operatives who
interrogated him on the purpose of his visit to respondent's office. They also asked him
why respondent was acquainted with known NPA members such as Randy Malayao and
Grace Bautista, and why she was always the lawyer of several suspected communist
terrorists.

Upon further investigation, respondent discovered the following things:

1) On or about March 12, 19 and 21, 2014, when [respondent] had out-of-town hearings,
different individuals riding on motorcycles and appearing to be soldiers approached
one of the buko and tupig vendors in front of [respondent's] office. Each of them
similarly questioned the vendors as to where [respondent] went, with whom, what
time she usually returned to the office and who stayed behind in the office whenever
she left. The vendor was surprised because the questions of the individuals were
uniform on all occasions and they did not go into [respondent's] office despite the
vendor's advice for them to talk to [respondent's] secretary. The above incidents were
narrated to [respondent] by her driver, Regie Lutao Gamongan, who had gotten the
information from the vendor.
   
2) On March 31, 2014, a member of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG) came to the law office, asking for
the [respondent], but without telling her secretary why he was looking for her. Upon
learning that she was not there, he left, then returned again in the afternoon.
However, he left again upon finding out that [respondent] had decided to stay at the
Hall of Justice longer than expected.
   
3) On the same day, [respondent] received a text message from the Chief Investigator of
the CIDG, asking for a copy of the records of a human rights case involving three
 Bayan Muna members who were allegedly arbitrarily arrested on the basis of
trumped up charges for two counts of frustrated murder and tortured in the hands of
the 86th Infantry Battalion intelligence operatives. Said case was dismissed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor during preliminary investigation. [Respondent]
was surprised at the request because it was the third time that the investigator was
requesting for a copy of the records and he could have easily secured the same from
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. Thus, [respondent] ignored the text message.
   
4) On or about 7:30 AM on April 3, 2014, while [respondent's] driver, Gamongan, was
waiting for her in front of her residence at Poblacion, Burgos, Isabela, a red "Wave"
motorcycle with its plate number cased inside a tinted plastic cover, making it
impossible to read the same, passed by their house. The motorcycle driver, who was
of medium height, with dark complexion, a haircut and demeanor of a
military/policeman, with a tattoo on his left, wearing a white sando shirt and with a
pistol bag slung around his shoulder, looked intently at Gamongan as he passed by,
"as if he wanted to do something wrong". After passing by the [respondent's]
compound, the motorcycle rider suddenly made a u-turn and stared intently at
Gamongan as he passed by. As he headed towards the highway, Gamongan noticed
that the man was continually observing him through the side mirror. In relation to this
incident, witness Gamongan executed a Judicial Affidavit and testified during the
trial proceedings.
   
5) On or about April 7 and 10, 2013, soldiers came to [respondent's] office in the guise
of asking her to notarize documents. Since [respondent] was on out-of-town hearings,
her secretary suggested names of other available notaries public. However, instead of
leaving right away, the military men asked where [respondent] went and with whom,
and insisted on leaving the document and picking it up later on when [respondent]
arrived.
   
6) On April 10, 2014, a known civilian asset of the Military Intelligence Group (MIG)
in Isabela, who also happened to be the "close-in" secretary and part-time driver of an
uncle who was a municipal circuit judge, came to [respondent's] office, trying to
convince her to meet with the head of the MIG Isabela so that the latter could explain
why [respondent] was being watched. However, [respondent] declined. The
following day, the civilian asset returned and told her that she was being watched by
the MIG because of a land dispute which she was handling at a court in Roxas,
Isabela. [Respondent] did not believe him because, just a couple of days prior to that
date, the MIG operatives had talked to the client/confidential informant who had first
informed [respondent] of the purported surveillance operations on her, asking for
[respondent's] phone number and inviting him to join them as civilian asset in their
anti-insurgency operations.[4]
In her petition, thus, [respondent] posited that the above-described acts, taking into
consideration previous incidents where human rights lawyers, human rights defenders,
political activists and defenders, were killed or abducted after being labeled as
"communists" and being subjected to military surveillance, may be interpreted as
preliminary acts leading to the abduction and/or killing of [respondent]. Moreover, while
[respondent] admitted that the purported military and police operatives who conducted,
and were still conducting, surveillance and harassments on [respondent] were still
unidentified, she maintained that the same were identified as members of the ISAFP, the
Philippine Army and the police, and that there was no doubt that they all acted upon
orders of their superiors within the chain of command. [Respondent] reported the
incidents to the NUPL and the human rights group KARAPATAN (Alliance for the
Advancement of People's Rights), who agreed to help her in filing the instant petition.
She also tried reporting the incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Isabela, but, as of present, no positive report had been made identifying the individuals
who conducted the alleged surveillance, although available information specifically
pointed to the military and police units as the ones doing the surveillance.[5]
We also adopt the CA's summary of the petitioners' averments, as follows:

[Petitioners] categorically denied [respondent's] allegations that she was ever under
surveillance by the military and/or police under the command of [petitioners'] officials. x
xx

xxx [Petitioners] also objected to the impleading of other [petitioners] in their official
capacities, allegedly under the doctrine of command responsibility. [Petitioners]
maintained that the doctrine of command responsibility is a substantive rule that
establishes criminal or administrative liability that is different from the purpose and
approach under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Thus, it can only be invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case and not in a summary amparo proceeding.
xxxx

[Petitioners] [also] alleged that upon receipt of the CA Resolution promulgated on April
22, 2014 x x x, they immediately exerted efforts to conduct an inquiry and to gather
information about the purported threats on the life, liberty and security of the
[respondent], to wit:

1. [Respondent] Secretary Gazmin maintained that, aside from sweeping allegations

of surveillance and gathering of information made by alleged unidentified operatives
from the military and the police on [respondent], the latter failed to particularize the
instances of [petitioner] Sec. Gazmin's involvement in said surveillance and
information gathering that would warrant his inclusion as party [respondent] in the
case;
2. Upon receipt of the CA's April 22, 2014 Resolution, [petitioner] Gen. Emmanuel
T. Bautista issued a directive to the ISAFP Chief and Commander of the 5th Infantry
Division to verify the alleged surveillance operations conducted on [respondent]. In
addition, he enjoined the concerned unit/s to immediately investigate and/or submit to
the Higher Headquarters pertinent investigation results already conducted, if any,
relative to the complained acts. Finally, [petitioner] Gen. Bautista affirmed the
continuation of efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of [respondent's]
allegations and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel, if shown
to have participated or to have had complicity in the commission of the alleged acts, to
the court of justice.

3. [Petitioner] Major Gen. Eduardo M. Año denied the ISAFP's involvement in the
alleged surveillance operations on and harassment of [respondent], and the inclusion
of [petitioner's] name in an alleged watchlist. In fact, petitioner Major Gen. Año
claimed that he only came to know of [respondent's] name upon receipt of the Petition,
which he described as a mere product of a fabricated story intended to discredit him, in
particular, and the ISAFP as a whole. Nonetheless, upon obtaining a copy of
the Petition from the Judge Advocate General and the AFP Radio Message directing
his unit to submit results of the verification and inquiry on the Petition, [petitioner]
Major Gen. Año immediately instructed the Group Commanders of the MIG 1 and 2 to
coordinate closely with the military and the PNP in the area to ensure that no
harassment or surveillance will be conducted on [respondent].

4. Upon receipt of [the CA Resolution], [petitioner] Lt. Gen. Hernando DCA Iriberri
immediately informed the Army Judge Advocate, the legal arm of the Philippine
Army, of the same. Having no information on the nature and circumstances
surrounding the case, he coordinated with his staff to look into the matter. Even prior
to the radio message from the Chief of Staff dated April 25, 2014, directing him to
conduct verification on the alleged surveillance on [respondent], [petitioner] Lt. Gen.
Iriberri had already taken the initiative to issue a directive to the Commanding General
of the 5th Infantry Division in Gamu, lsabela, to verify and inquire into the allegations
in the Petitioner pertaining to any operation which may have been conducted or which
was in anyway (sic) related to the transgression of human rights of [respondent].
Finally, he undertook that, should there be any finding that any army personnel was
involved or had committed any of the allegations in the Petition, such personnel shall
be dealt with accordingly pursuant to existing laws and AFP regulations.

5. [Petitioner] Major Gen. Benito Antonio T. De Leon pointed out that he assumed
command of the 5th Infantry (STAR) Division only on April 4, 2014, thus, the alleged
surveillance operations would have been conducted prior to his assumption of said
office. Since he assumed command of said unit, he had not given any orders to his
men to conduct surveillance or "casing" operations against any persons within the
unit's area of operation, nor did he receive any similar orders from his superiors.
 Nonetheless, even prior to the receipt of the directive from the higher headquarters and
a copy of the Petition, [petitioner] Major Gen. De Leon, on his own volition and upon
gaining information through print media of the filing of the petition, exerted efforts to
verify with the intelligence unit commanders under his command whether there was
any standing instruction or order for them to conduct "casing" or surveillance
operations against [respondent], to which the commanders responded in the negative.
In addition, he averred that he immediately sent out radio messages to his subordinates
to be law-abiding and that human rights violations have no place in the military.

6. [Petitioner] PCSupt. Miguel de Mayo Laurel clarified that he was currently the
Acting Regional Director of the Police Regional Office 2, and not the Chief of the
Isabela Provincial Police Office, as indicated in the Petition. Said Petition was only
emailed by the Legal Service of Camp Crame to the Office of the Regional Legal
Service, which provided [petitioner] PCSupt. Laurel a copy of the same. [Petitioner]
PCSupt. Laurel maintained that their Office had no memorandum order relating to
[respondent's] allegations, nor are there any documents in their possession concerning
[respondent]. Thus, PCSupt. Laurel immediately sent a Memorandum directing the
Provincial Director of the Isabela Police Provincial Office and the Chief of the
Regional Intelligence Division of Police Regional Office 2, two of the units mentioned
in the Petition which were under his operational control, to submit their comments and
all relevant information and pertinent documents relative to the allegations made by
[respondent] and to identify the persons who are responsible for the alleged
harassment and threats on [respondent's] life, liberty and security. In response thereto,
PSSupt. Ramos, Jr., the Provincial Director of the Isabela Provincial Police Office,
reported that no directive was ever issued to PNP Burgos, Isabela, to conduct a
background investigation and to confirm [respondent's] alleged status as a "Red
Lawyer", or to threaten, intimidate or harass, and conduct continuous surveillance on
her. He likewise denied that his office was in possession of any data or information
which may or would likely violate [respondent's] right to privacy or be used as a
justification to harass or intimidate her. Meanwhile, the Chief of the Regional
Intelligence Division likewise denied the existence of any order or directive to conduct
a background investigation and to confirm [respondent] as a "Red Lawyer", or that
their office was in possession of any data or information on [respondent]. Finally,
[petitioner] PCSupt. Laurel ordered the Isabela Provincial Police Office and the
PSSupt. Ramos, Jr. to investigate the alleged threats on the life, liberty and security of
[respondent], and to identify the persons, if any, who are responsible for the same.
[Petitioners] also noted that [respondent's] testimony consisted of mere unverified
accounts from an unknown person whose identity [respondent] did not want to reveal.
Moreover, [respondent's] allegations against [petitioners] and their respective offices
were, at best, mere conclusions on her part, a mere impression that [respondent] had
based on the physical appearance of the men looking for her, as described by her staff
and according to her own personal assessment of the circumstances. However,
[respondent] could not categorically identify and link any of the said individuals to
[petitioners], claiming only that they were military-looking men.[6]
In substantiation of her petition, Atty. Salucon and her driver, Reggie Lutao Gamongan,
testified. She also submitted documentary evidence consisting of the several criminal
informations filed in various courts against her clients who were either political
detainees, leaders or members of peasant and other sectoral and people's organizations,
human rights defenders or suspected NPA members, and the complainants were either
military or police officers and personnel.

On the part of the petitioners, Maj. Gen. De Leon and Sr. Supt. Ramos, Jr. testified.
Submitted as additional evidence by the petitioners were relevant memoranda, letters, and
radio messages.

On March 12, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision granting the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data,[7] disposing thusly:
Considering the foregoing, we find that petitioner has substantially proven by substantial
evidence her entitlement to the writs of amparo and habeas data. Moreover, she was able
to substantially establish that respondents PCSupt. Laurel, Lt. Gen. Irriberi, Major Gen.
Año and Gen. Bautista are responsible and accountable for the violation of respondent's
rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of the unjustified surveillance operations
and acts of harassment and intimidation committed against petitioner and/or lack of any
fair and effective official investigation as to her allegations. On the other hand, while it is
true that respondent Major Gen. De Leon assumed his office only after the occurrence of
the subject incidents, he is still currently in the best position to conduct the necessary
investigation and perform all other responsibilities or obligations required, if any, by the
writ of amparo and habeas data. However, the instant petition should be dismissed as
against respondent President Aquino on the ground of immunity from suit, against
respondent Secretary Gazmin for lack of merit and against former PNP Dir. Gen.
Purisima for being moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for the Issuance of the Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data is GRANTED.
Accordingly, respondents PCSupt. Miguel De Mayo Laurel, in his capacity as Acting
Regional Director of the Police Regional Office 2; Gen. Hernando Irriberi, in his capacity
as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army; Gen. Eduardo Año, in his capacity
as the Commanding Officer of the ISAFP; and Gen. Emmanuel Bautista, in his capacity
as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence
and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of petitioner Atty. Maria
Catherine Dannug-Salucon and the immediate members of her family, but also to conduct
further investigation to determine the veracity of the alleged surveillance operation and
acts of harassment and intimidation committed against petitioner, as well as to identify
and find the person/s responsible for said violations and bring them to competent court.
The foregoing respondents are likewise DIRECTED to SUBMIT a quarterly report of
their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to
monitor the action of respondents.

The above-named respondents are likewise DIRECTED to produce and disclose to this
Court any and all facts, information, statements, records, photographs, dossiers, and all
other evidence, documentary or otherwise, pertaining to petitioner Atty. Maria Catherine
Dannug-Salucon, for possible destruction upon order of this Court.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives
mandated in this Decision are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the
relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of
court.

Finally, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with respect to the following

respondents: President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, on the ground of immunity from
suits; Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin, for lack of merit; and PNP Gen.
Alan Purisima, for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On December 2, 2015, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General,[9] ruling:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The undated Manifestation of the Solicitor General is NOTED. Accordingly, let the
pleadings, orders and notices be sent to the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions in this case.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal.

Issues
The petitioners submit in support of their appeal that the issues to be considered and
resolved by the Court are the following:

a. Whether or not the CA erred in admitting and considering Atty. Salucon's

evidence despite being largely based on hearsay information;

b. Whether or not the CA erred in finding Atty. Salucon's evidence sufficient to

justify the granting of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data;

c. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the hearsay evidence of Atty. Salucon,
assuming its admissibility for the sake of argument, satisfied the requirement of
substantial evidence;
d. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas
data despite the failure of Atty. Salucon to produce evidence showing that the
petitioners were in possession of facts, information, statements, photographs or
documents pertaining to her; and

e. Whether or not the CA erred in directing the petitioners to exert extraordinary

diligence and efforts to conduct further investigation in order to determine the veracity
of Atty. Salucon's alleged harassment and surveillance.[11]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.

I.
The CA properly admitted Atty. Salucon's
proof even if it supposedly consisted
of circumstantial evidence and hearsay testimonies
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[12] the Court adopted the standard of totality of evidence for
granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, explaining:
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the
unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore
discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be
given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court
to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing
the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
xxxx

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason — i.e., to the relevance of
the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at
all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any
act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject
to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and
objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.
These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-
described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence,
including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.[13]
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis cited the ruling in Velasquez Rodriguez,[14] wherein the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) took note that enforced disappearances could
generally be proved only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical
inference; and that it would be impossible otherwise to prove that an individual had been
made to disappear because of the State's virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence,
or because the deliberate use of the State's power to destroy pertinent evidence was
inherent in the practice of enforced disappearances. Hence, the reliance on circumstantial
evidence and hearsay testimony of witnesses is permissible. In this respect, Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis observed that Velasquez Rodriguez rendered an informative discussion on the
appreciation of evidence to establish enforced disappearances, to wit:
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances
that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the
standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one
hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as
arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-
measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of
another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and
cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely,
the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of
evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence
rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
[15]

Under the totality of evidence standard, hearsay testimony may be admitted and
appreciated depending on the facts and circumstances unique to each petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo provided such hearsay testimony is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. Yet, such use of the standard does not unquestioningly
authorize the automatic admissibility of hearsay evidence in all amparo proceedings. The
matter of the admissibility of evidence should still depend on the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Clearly, the flexibility in the admissibility of evidence adopted and
advocated in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis is determined on a case-to-case basis.
II.
The respondent presented substantial
evidence sufficient to justify
the issuance of the writ of amparo
The petition for the writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to
the petitioner. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence have long
defined substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.[16] It is to be always borne in mind that such
proceeding is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or to allocate liability for damages based on preponderance of evidence, or to
adjudge administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence.[17]
The facts and circumstances enumerated by the respondent's petition consisted of the
following:

a) She was a human rights lawyer who had taken criminal cases in which the accused
were political detainees, including human rights defenders or suspected members of
the CPP-NPA, and the complainants were military or police officials or personnel;
   
b) Her paralegal William Bugatti informed her that he had personally observed various
individuals conducting surveillance operations of their movements (i.e., the
respondent and Bugatti) specially during the trial of a case in Ifugao involving a
political detainee who was a leader of a people's or sectoral organization;
   
c) On the day Bugatti informed her about his observation, and she instructed him to
discover the names, ranks, and addresses of the handlers of the Prosecution witness in
the Ifugao case, he was fatally gunned down;
   
d) On the same day Bugatti was gunned down, a client of hers who was working as a
civilian asset for the PNP Intelligence Section reported to her that the Regional
Intelligence Unit of the PNP, through the PNP Isabela Provincial Office, issued a
directive to conduct a background investigation to confirm if she was a "Red
Lawyer;"
   
e) Said civilian asset also informed her that she was being secretly followed by ISAFP
agents, and that individuals who appeared to be military or police personnel had been
asking people around her office regarding her routine and whereabouts;
   
f) Her secretary informed her that a member of the CIS-CIDG and some purported
military personnel had gone to her law office on several occasions inquiring on her
whereabouts;
   
g) On the same day said CIS-CIDG member went to her law office, she received a text
message from the Chief Investigator of the CIDG requesting, for the third time, a
copy of the records of a case she was handling;
   
h) Gamongan, her driver who testified in support of the petition, notified her that a
vendor outside her law office had told him that several motorcycle-riding personnel
of the military had approached said vendor on separate instances asking about her
whereabouts and the persons she was with, her routine and schedule, as well as the
persons who were left at the law office whenever she went out;
   
i) Gamongan also testified about an incident that occurred while he was waiting outside
her house in which a motorcycle-riding man, who looked like he was military or
police based on his haircut and demeanor, had driven by her house twice intently
observing him and the house "as if he wanted to do something bad;"
   
j) A known civilian asset of the Military Intelligence Group (MIG) tried to convince her
to have a meeting with MIG Isabela so that he could explain why she was being
watched; and
   
k) Upon her refusal of the invitation to meet, the civilian asset returned the next day
telling her that she was being watched by the MIG because of a land dispute case she
was then handling for a client.[18]
Upon due consideration of the foregoing, the CA opined that it would be all the more
difficult to obtain direct evidence to prove the respondent's entitlement to the privilege of
the writ of amparo because no extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance had yet
occurred. Indeed, her petition referred to acts that merely threatened to violate her rights
to life, liberty and security, or that could be appreciated only as preliminary steps to her
probable extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. Even so, it would be
uncharacteristic for the courts, especially this Court, to simply fold their arms and ignore
the palpable threats to her life, liberty and security and just wait for the irreversible to
happen to her. The direct evidence might not come at all, given the abuse of the State's
power to destroy evidence being inherent in enforced disappearances or extrajudicial
killings.
There was no question about the relevance of the hearsay testimony with which the
respondent sought to establish some of the facts and circumstances she alleged.
Flexibility needed to be adopted in the appreciation and consideration of such facts and
circumstances despite hearsay being inadmissible under other judicial situations. Such
flexibility accorded with the following instruction in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[19] to wit:
x x x In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature
and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who
actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused
the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this
Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting
a cause of action showing a violation of the victim's rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality,
rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements
— namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security — are present.[20]
Verily, proceedings related to the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo should
allow not only direct evidence, but also circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court has
made no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred.[21] One kind of evidence is not superior to
the other, for the trier of facts must weigh the evidence upon admission. Only in the event
of a conviction in a criminal case does the Rules of Court require that the circumstantial
evidence should consist of a combination of several circumstances that "produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."[22] Yet, under Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, even hearsay
testimony may be considered by the amparo court provided such testimony can lead to
conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.[23] What the respondent
obviously established is that the threats to her right to life, liberty and security were
neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable. The gunning down of her
paralegal Bugatti after he had relayed to her his observation that they had been under
surveillance was the immediate proof of the threat. The purpose and noble objectives of
the special rules on the writ of amparo may be rendered inutile if the rigid standards of
evidence applicable in ordinary judicial proceedings were not tempered with such
flexibility.
III.
The CA had sufficient basis to issue the writ
of habeas data at the respondent's behest
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.[24] It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to
informational privacy.[25] It seeks to protect a person's right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.[26]
In its decision, the CA, issuing the privilege of the writ of habeas data, directed the
petitioners "to produce and disclose to this Court any and all facts, information,
statements, records, photographs, dossiers, and all other evidence, documentary or
otherwise, pertaining to petitioner Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon, for possible
destruction upon order of this Court.''
The directive was factually and procedurally warranted. There was no question that the
civilian asset of the PNP Intelligence Section relayed to the respondent that there was a
standing order issued by the PNP Isabela Provincial Police Office to the PNP office in
Burgos, Isabela to conduct a background investigation in order to confirm if she was a
"Red Lawyer." She was also under actual surveillance by different individuals who
looked like they were members of the military or police establishments. The objective of
these moves taken against her was unquestionably to establish a pattern of her
movements and activities, as well as to obtain the records of the cases she was handling
for her various clients. These and other established circumstances fully warranted within
the context of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data the directive of the CA for the
handing over and destruction of all information and data on her in order to protect her
privacy and security.
IV.
The directive of the CA for the petitioners
to exert extraordinary diligence in conducting
further investigations was valid and proper
Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the amparo respondent to state in
the return the actions that have been or will still be taken: (a) to verify the identity of the
aggrieved party; (b) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of
the person or persons responsible; (c) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from
them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause, manner, location
and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to identify and apprehend the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders
before a competent court.
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo ordains the diligence required of a public
official or employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo,
to wit:
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. -The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[27] the Court spelled out the two-fold burden that the public
authorities had to discharge in situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, viz.:
Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place
and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose
the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge
in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to
ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by
the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the
production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty
parties.[28]
In Ladaga v. Mapagu,[29] the Court precisely indicated that the failure of
an amparo petitioner to establish by substantial evidence the involvement of military or
police forces was not a hindrance to the Court ordering the conduct of further
investigations, to wit:
Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the
cases of Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner's failure to establish by
substantial evidence the involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of
rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct of further investigation
where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced
disappearance. The Court directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the
modest efforts of police investigators were effectively putting petitioner's right to security
in danger with the delay in identifying and apprehending her abductors. In Razon, Jr., the
Court found it necessary to explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue with
extraordinary diligence the investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a
known activist because not only did the police investigators conduct an incomplete and
one-sided investigation but they blamed their ineffectiveness to the reluctance and
unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the authorities.[30]
It should not be a surprise at all, therefore, that the CA commanded the petitioners as
the amparo respondents “to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect
the life, liberty and security of petitioner Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon and the
immediate members of her family, but also to conduct further investigation to determine
the veracity of the alleged surveillance operation and acts of harassment and
intimidation committed against petitioner, as well as to identify and find the person/s
responsible for said violations and bring them to competent court." Needless to stress, the
directive was unassailable.
The petitioners (and their successors in office), by merely issuing orders to their
subordinates under their respective commands and relying on the latter's reports without
conducting independent investigations on their own to determine the veracity of the
respondent's allegations, did not discharge the two-fold burden. Thereby, they did not
exercise extraordinary diligence. They are reminded of the following dictum regarding
the conduct of investigations that the Court pronounced in In the Matter of the Petition
for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel Rodriguez:[31]
More importantly, respondents also neglect to address our ruling that the failure to
conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of or threat to
Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty, and security. The writ's curative role is an
acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused
not only by a public official's act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The
duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective.[32]
The petitioners' recommendation for the creation of an independent body to investigate
both the harassments suffered by the respondent and the surveillance conducted against
her is rejected as an act of evasion. The military and police establishments certainly had
the competence and resources to conduct such investigation. Although they have
predicated the recommendation on what transpired in Roxas v. Arroyo,[33] the awkward
situation sought to be avoided under Roxas v. Arroyo -"wherein the very persons alleged
to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing are, at the same time,
the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter"[34] - did not obtain herein. For one,
there was no conclusive proof of the actual authorship of the unauthorized surveillance
conducted against the respondent. Thus, it was speculative on the part of the petitioners
and their successors in office to simply say that the investigation, if conducted by them,
would be biased or one-sided. They could not escape the responsibility of conducting the
investigation with extraordinary diligence by deflecting the responsibility to other
investigatory agencies of the Government. The duty of extraordinary diligence pertains to
them, and to no other. Moreover, their higher ranks or positions in the AFP and PNP
hierarchies put them in the best position to obtain or acquire information and to ensure
that the investigation to be conducted would quickly yield results in view of the
investigation going to focus on their subordinate personnel.
It would be within the context of Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo if the
petitioners and their successors in office should instead exhibit a readiness and
willingness to undertake the investigations if only to shed light soon enough on whether
or not their subordinates and personnel over whom they exercised authority and control
had been involved at all in the surveillance of the respondent and the making of threats
against her personal security.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision and resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
March 12, 2015 and December 2, 2015, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00053-W/A;
and REMANDS this case to the Court of Appeals for the monitoring of the investigation
to be hereafter undertaken in accordance with the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on March 12, 2015, and for the validation of the results of the investigation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184769               October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.

SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and
bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under
such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of
an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and
calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the
details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of
the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent
is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON

NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed
about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the
Philippine National Police.2

By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s

Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang
Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt
of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from
unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security."

Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-
President and Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her
transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on
the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due
process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back
entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her
security in this wise:

xxxx

I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of
the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are
credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the
way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be
[sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management
apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will
make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management
which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me
think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it
appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net
result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer
pending resolution of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.

By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their

continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged
report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and
security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and
security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the

report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
 b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or
information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang
Sector.

By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file
their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted
respondent’s application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds
that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).7

By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent
including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist
from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the
disclosures required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas
data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but
also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized
by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to
her person.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the
place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters
expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor
dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data,
respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her
employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an
employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under
Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of
the Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a management
prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of
TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the
issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or
entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly
not engaged in such activities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the
province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the
writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons
for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right
to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008
letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the
issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of
the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193636               July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed
pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9
September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied
petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was
the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior
Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent
Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial
Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police
Provincial Office.6

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative

Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as
the Zeñarosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its
investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the
President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent
Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).10

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified
her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected
therein:

(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of
PAGs in the Philippines.15

(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task
Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their
activities."16

(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP
and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010,"
which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity,
and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The
first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to
herein petitioner Gamboa.18

(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:

The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in

Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to
 comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan
armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.

Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP
data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been
vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is
largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued
communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP
personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted the
formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body
monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant
General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized
so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19

(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:

Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of
the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that
they revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In
the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred
seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have
been reorganized.20

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of
the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a
PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print
media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of
the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the
Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion
in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also
made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.24

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her
Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports
from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to
higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering
respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining
respondents from making baseless reports.26

The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which
issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its
face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and
reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person acting on
their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any
other government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the
approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ
together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on
23 July 2010.28

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of
their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The
information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which
she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed
as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated
murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and
multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30

Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with
the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in
which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected
the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to
secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information.31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being
limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper
remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32

RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right
to privacy, to wit:

In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold
misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she
essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day the
unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy
her reputation and to transgress her right to life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that
there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that
information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No.
275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies
in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.

x x x           x x x          x x x

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused
respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that
made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering
and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as
unlawful. x x x.34

Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the
ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the
Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled
that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may
have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body
tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her,
should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37

Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38 raising the
following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as
either a necessary or indispensable party;

2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof
to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;

3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;

4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa
Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;

5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an
agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to
present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security
was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she
had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of the
report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40

Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the
mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due
process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be
considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence
showing that the subject information originated from respondents.42

In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second,
explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right
to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state
interest involved in the case at bar.

The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a
constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:

The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved
goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the
periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of
fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect. xxx.

x x x           x x x          x x x

x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five
members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’
in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various
American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear
witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."

x x x           x x x          x x x

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept
of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity
of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization
— operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms,
the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)

In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to
privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized
and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in
section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by
a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer
or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights
and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an
officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the
legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to
thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right
of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over
the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48

Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the
courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

The Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data reads:

Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition
of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander
v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from
interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national
security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a
temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to
a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite
personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the
secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control
Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this
procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would
warrant his classification in the register as a security risk.56

The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to
the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute
the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However,
the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the
personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national
security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication
as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and
release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must
be emphasized:

58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing
social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
(see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p.
22, § 55).

59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the
legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference
involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its
national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with
the applicant’s right to respect for his private life.

There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security,
for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities
power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on
persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability of candidates
for employment in posts of importance for national security.

Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate

interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive
posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is
not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28
August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the
interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own
choosing.

In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the
respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in
particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national
security, was a wide one.

x x x           x x x          x x x

66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly, ensures
the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-
mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).

The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the
Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person
concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in
so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).

67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards
contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2
of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it,
the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of
national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59
above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)

Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the
right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion,
the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an
extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the
alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.

The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state
to dismantle private armies.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is
controlled and administered by a national police commission.61

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the
ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.

To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory
processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the
Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63

Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace
and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and
prevent crimes.64

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in
the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
life, liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the
power to request assistance from the latter.

Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released
information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and
without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a
violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any
further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of
intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative
bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on
their competence.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing
law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality.
Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to
receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom
from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event,
there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag
City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183533               September 25, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.
GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT.
CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL.
ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL
FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST
SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL.
JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY
GOMEZ, Respondents.

For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated September 26, 2010
filed by petitioner Francis Saez of our Resolution2 dated August 31, 2010 denying the
Petition for Review3 he filed on July 21, 2008.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does
not find cogent grounds to warrant setting aside our decision.

Antecedent Facts

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege
of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order,
inspection of place and production of documents.5 In the petition, he expressed his fear of
being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by
the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the
order of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP).
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo
commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court
of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision.The case before the CA was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.

In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains
Lawrence Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents
also alleged that the names and descriptions of "Capt. Alcaydo," "a certain First
Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny," and "Joel" were insufficient to properly identify
some of the persons sought to be included as among the respondents in the petition.

On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt.
Jacob Thaddeus Obligado, Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana,
Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil submitted their affidavits.

The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to
determine specific acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he
was always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel"
pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the
petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him of his marital status and
current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was
still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if
the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in
the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.

CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA

On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial

grounds the reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA ratiocinated:

There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio’s
presence at their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and
what Zaldy Osio was doing there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner’s
right to life, liberty or security. This Court cannot just grant the privilege of the writs
without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s entitlement thereto. This Court
cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation or conjecture. This
Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the rules on the
writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the
privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies
available to address the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.
xxxx

Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the
supposed threat or violation of petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is
committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances attendant to said supposed
violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life, liberty or security to warrant
entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.

xxxx

A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the
aforestated requirements of Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the pertinent
rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how
petitioner’s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include
any allegation as to what recourses he availed of to obtain the alleged documents from
respondents. Neither did petitioner allege what specific documents he prays for and from
whom or [sic] from what particular office of the government he prays to obtain them. The
petition prays "to order respondents to produce any documents submitted to any of them
in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military
intelligence reports."

xxxx

Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC and Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement
to the privilege of the writs applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own
admission that nothing happened between him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of
the petition appears to have been precipitated by his fear that something might happen to
him, not because of any apparent violation or visible threat to violate his right to life,
liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish likewise who among the
respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both writs to constitute
violation or threat to violate petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to
privacy thereof.

xxxx

x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:

"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. x x x."

xxxx

IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.8

On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision with
the following issues submitted for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
AS PARTY RESPONDENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING

FROM THE PETITIONER IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE
LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT FAILED TO CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE
LIST, THREATS AND VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND
SECURITY WERE ACTUALLY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.9

Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010

On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10 denying the petition for review for
the following reasons, viz:

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the
petition was bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents
violated or threatened petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His claim that he was
incommunicado lacks credibility as he was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back
to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that petitioner failed to present
substantial evidence that his right to life, liberty and security were violated, or how his
right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did not specify the particular
documents to be secured, their location or what particular government office had custody
thereof, and who has possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that the
respondents be ordered "to produce any documents submitted to any of them in the matter
of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports."

Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he
had specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the Order
of Battle and promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate and become a
military asset. However, despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices
during the hearing, he still failed to enlighten the appellate court as to what actually
transpired to enable said court to determine whether his right to life, liberty or security
had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the unsubstantiated claims of
petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.

As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-

respondent, we find the same also to be without merit. The Court has already made it
clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that the President, during his or her tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the President be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable the President to fully attend to the
performance of official duties and functions.11 (Citation omitted)

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by the
respondents’ own admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were
threatened. Military personnel, whom the petitioner had named and described, knew
where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a military asset, but under
duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to the CPP and including
him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances were not
denied by the respondents.

The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered
incommunicado as he was even provided with a cellular phone. The petitioner argues that
the phone was only given to him for the purpose of communicating with the respondents
matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal organizations.

The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13 which pronounced that "in
the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the
‘freedom from threat’".14 According to the petitioner, his freedom from fear was
undoubtedly violated, hence, to him pertains a cause of action. Anent the quantum of
proof required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere substantial
evidence is sufficient. The petition "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings".15

Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of proof
than what the rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the respondents’
evidence.

The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno who expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by any citizen
against any governmental agency or register to find out what information is held about
his or her person." The person can likewise "request the rectification or even the
destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her." In the petitioner’s
case, he specifically sought the production of the order of battle, which allegedly
included his name, and other records which supposedly contain erroneous data relative to
his involvement with the CPP.

OSG’s Comment

In the respondents’ comment16 filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the petitioner
advances no cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s Resolution dated August
31, 2010.

The Court’s Disquisition

While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court
nevertheless finds ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The petition conforms to the

requirements of the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data

Section 517 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 618 of
A.M. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the said petitions
should contain.

In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made
specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and those of the respondents.
The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his
rights and the participation of some of the respondents in their commission. As to the pre-
requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was
explained that the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived as
his oppressors, hence, his request for assistance from a human rights organization, then a
direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of
habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been
satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking
the petitioner to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence
reports making references to him. Although the exact locations and the custodians of the
documents were not identified, this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d)
of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises
only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo
Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights.19 Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under
exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules. However,
they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept "hook, line and sinker", so to
speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a
different matter altogether.

No substantial evidence exists to

prove the petitioner’s claims

The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the evidentiary difficulties
attendant to the filing of a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions
may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced.20

With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did not commit a reversible
error in declaring that no substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the reliefs
prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence on record and
finds no reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.

In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the petitioner
if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish
with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored. The encounter happened once and
the petitioner, in his pleadings, nowhere stated that subsequent to the time he was asked
about his involvement with ANAKPAWIS, he still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance
operations on him. He alleged that he was brought to the camp of the 204th Infantry
Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but was sent home at 5:00 p.m. The petitioner and
the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired thereafter. The petitioner
insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in
places under the latter’s control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was
the petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected
as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.

Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings
made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of
the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court
agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed
upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1
of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their
coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security.
Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion
of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense
of "freedom from threat".21

It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the
surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on
the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the
military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the
intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated
earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack
corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand
on nebulous grounds.

The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to a petition for the
issuance of the writs. Unlike, however, the unique nature of cases involving enforced
disappearances or extra-judicial killings that calls for flexibility in considering the gamut
of evidence presented by the parties, this case sets a different scenario and a significant
portion of the petitioner’s testimony could have been easily corroborated. In his
Sinumpaang Salaysay22 dated March 5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet dated December 9,
200723 executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights-Southern
Tagalog (KARAPATAN-ST), the petitioner stated that when he was invited and
interrogated at the military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, he brought with him his
uncle Norberto Roxas, Barangay Captain Mario Ilagan and two of his bodyguards, and
Edwardo Estabillo – five witnesses who can attest and easily corroborate his statement –
but curiously, the petitioner did not present any piece of evidence, whether documentary
or testimonial, to buttress such claim nor did he give any reason for their non-
presentation.This could have made a difference in light of the denials made by the
respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.

The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another
allegation by the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court
notes that such allegation was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008, stated that he "does not have knowledge
about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists
the petitioner as a member of the CPP."24 This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the
petitioner identified as the one who told him that he was included in the order of
battle.25 The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division of the Philippine Army also
conducted an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Esperon,26 and it was shown that the persons identified by the petitioners who allegedly
committed the acts complained of were not connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry
Division.27

Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From
the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought
the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST, there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go
home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances. And while he may have
been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence at the pier, there was no claim by the petitioner that he
was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may transport
him back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile phone; hence, he had
unhampered access to communication and can readily seek assistance from non-
governmental organizations and even government agencies.

The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a
military informant and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be
one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay28 executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted
that he actually knew the petitioner way back in 1998 when they were still students. He
also stated that when he saw the petitioner again in 2007, the latter manifested his
intention to become a military informant in exchange for financial and other forms of
assistance.

The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a
certain "Joel", e.g., the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle
pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances. Such allegation by the
petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere impression that the
petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The petitioner
even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a conversation with "Joel"
sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether he was still connected with
ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything" and no other incident occurred
between them since then.29 There is clearly nothing on record which shows that "Joel"
committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the conclusion arrived at by the
petitioner, especially since the alleged acts committed by "Joel" are susceptible of
different interpretations.

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his
claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to
amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of
proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some
adequate evidence."30

The President cannot be

automatically dropped as a
respondent pursuant to the doctrine
of command responsibility

In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,31 the Court stated:

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of
the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as

superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is
adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government
Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the

Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O.
226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed,
is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his
area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge
of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been
repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as

the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military. (Citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-

Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life,
liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had
exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had
failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules.1âwphi1

The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president’s incumbency.32

Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting

president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.33 Courts look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34

The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial
evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or
omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the
petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party respondent without any
attempt at all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged
violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for
any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus, while the President
cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-
in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.

Compliance with technical rules of

procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy

Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs
of amparo and habeas data was the defective verification which was attached to the
petition. In Tagitis,35 supporting affidavits required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition and it was ruled that the
defect was fully cured when the petitioner and the witness personally testified to prove
the truth of their allegations in the hearings held before the CA. In the instant case, the
defective verification was not the sole reason for the CA’s denial of the petition for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that
although rules of procedure play an important rule in effectively administering justice,
primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where there was at
least substantial compliance with the requirements and where petitioner himself testified
in the hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be

accorded primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to
prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the defect in
the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to
the petition was deemed cured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is

DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191805               November 15, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA,
P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL.
REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA,
CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents.
x------------------------x

G.R. No. 193160              

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN.
JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE
VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA,
ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A.
CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on
Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April
2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.

Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa,
PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt.
Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their official
posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within
five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to
petitioner – covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost
marshal reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th
Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports
in any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents
are ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents having any
reference to petitioner.

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General

Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are
DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and
security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
account of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED
with respect to respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is
DENIED.

Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R.
No. 193160. He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director
General (PDG.) Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W.
Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.)
Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz
(Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the
events relevant to the present Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo was the
President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) in Region II.

Antecedent Facts

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.2

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel,
Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men
forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in
civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more
persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car,
while the others rode on the tricycle.3

The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back
and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission
and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced
Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he
remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There
were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on
it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.4

Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to
confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell
asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation,
two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.5

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded
him and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit
him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes,
the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to
being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on
the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied
his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be
poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the
waist.6

On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to
Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his
contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his
head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained silent, the soldiers
beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m.,
where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp
and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to
answer.7

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him
their guide on their way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man
named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member who had surrendered
to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a member of the NPA. He also
heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a
man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to
Tabbak, Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the
name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed
him as "sir."8

Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain
Elvis and told him that Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers
forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the location of the NPA camp. They
brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death. When the
soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA
camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day.
The soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9

On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the
location of the NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they
would beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to
the same room where he had first been detained, and two soldiers mauled him again.
They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and gave
him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body
pain. The soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper,
they ordered him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the
soldiers maltreated him once more.10

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he
had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and

that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he
refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to
sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was merely coerced.11

The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he
knew the men appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the
individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write down the name of his
school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper,
making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the
document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the
soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive
another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.12

At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military

operation in the mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13

In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent.
When they stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location
of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked
him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the
Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.14 When the
doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he
sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s
medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area,
chest and sternum.15
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took
pictures of him while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in
front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see
his mother. 16

Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of
paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to
end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.17

Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath.
They gave him a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two
soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to the media his
experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the military.18

At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived
surrounded by several men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col.
Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the
military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him
that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and
Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the
CHR employees took photographs of his bruises.19

A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two
weeks to supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog
also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become military assets. Rodel
refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers
reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter
will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.20

Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied
them to the CHR office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he
was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to
sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they
had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR
Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board
followed them.21

The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon
reaching a mall in Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two
other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon
reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and
called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a
cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey
back home.22

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010.
Callagan and two soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video
footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as
evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely.
Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued
and only left thirty minutes later.23

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International

Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical
Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.24

Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel
Robles, noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail
Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.25

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December
2009.26 The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac
(Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:

a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.

b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or

approaching Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.

c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co.,
5th Infantry Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where
Rodriguez was brought.

d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any

report on Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of
the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.1âwphi1
 e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in
the custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from
being used.27

On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by
members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered
respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009
and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we directed the
Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10
days after its submission for decision.30

During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to
submit affidavits and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27
January 2010.31

On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed their Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on
the petition.32 In their Return, respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered
to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as
"Ka Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel

B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA
operating in Cagayan Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and
Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in exchange for his protection.35

Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of
Loyalty and an Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society
and become a military asset.36 Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the
NPA to gather information.37 However, he feared that his NPA comrades were beginning
to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the
soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a
double agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40

Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated
15 January 2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating
Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and securing their journey back
home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma
sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls
to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.42 Cruz was able to
speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This
information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in
turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry
Division.44

When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry
Battalion at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion
Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as
evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latter’s
Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the
soldiers.46 In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to
any maltreatment. Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter,
Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were made to sign a certification to this
effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not witness any
threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47

During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he
was very much at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt.
Matutina.48 Neither was there any force or intimidation when the soldiers took pictures of
his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.49

During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and
position papers and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of
these pleadings.50

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently,

on 28 April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52 Before the
Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the
instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following
assignment of errors:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary
protection order.

b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ
of amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of
violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is
ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing
respondent from approaching petitioner."

c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo had command responsibility.53

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
 a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure
of office or actual incumbency.

b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less
substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated,
were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as
well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection
order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on
the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.54

On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina,
Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They
alleged that Rodriguez –

Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence,
to establish his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with
violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is
not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data.56

In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its
assailed Decision and Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:

I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the

basis of the presidential immunity from suit.

III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases.

IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were
promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and
security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.58 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February
2008.60

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.63 It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an
independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to
informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does
not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in
the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access
to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the
database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion,
destruction or rectification.67

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary
protection order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before
final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:

Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the
court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate
family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private
institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the
protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions
that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of
the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall
expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to
the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature
of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or
to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
(Emphasis supplied)

We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the
court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim
reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any
case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted,
necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner
the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near
Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal

liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As
we held in Razon v. Tagitis:69

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather,
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed
to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision71 found respondents in G.R.
No. 191805 – with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the
violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. 72 The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her
presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a
respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or
accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’
rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her
presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.

In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We
emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right, to wit:

We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must
first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution
No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing
to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President
who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:

"x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then
his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision
says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard
Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's
associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that
he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable
to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded
that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in
a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further
held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts."
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of
Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial
conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential

immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity

from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of
the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is
a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity
for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed
arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention
that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers
his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has
relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity
from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing
litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas:

The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez:

So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas:

There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez:

On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from
suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.76 (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President
Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial
scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez

contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in
Rubrico v. Arroyo,77 command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."78 Although
originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine
has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States,
for example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v.
Garcia – civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Protection Act.80 This development in the use of command responsibility in civil
proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even
to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As
we held in Rubrico:

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold

military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

x x x           x x x          x x x

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,

at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable
the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory
to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the
Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:

That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil
or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in
proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command
responsibility to Amparo cases.

Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its
contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. It further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice.

Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in
principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who
were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organizations
accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the
personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the
Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command
responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act
on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as
a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html -
fnt20cm Such limited treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose
and not intended to rule out the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to
other appropriate cases.

Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and
police officers from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. The explicit adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility in the present
case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.

In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to
be if it truly wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a
genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the
ponencia’s hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent
to the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82 (Emphasis supplied.)

This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v.
Cadapan,83 likewise penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases

to determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement
as far as amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command

responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable
individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,

at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable
the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory
to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order
to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a

preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in
the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of
the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as

superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses

control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine. 86

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is
adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government
Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other
Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be
held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite
such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities,
crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government
official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed
within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.90

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as

the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military.91

b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through
substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his
abduction. We rule in the negative.

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced
disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA.92 Without even attaching,
or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points
to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count
of forcible disappearance.93 Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece
of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction.
Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the
violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate,
punish or prevent it.

Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s
ruling in Razon,94 to wit:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words,
we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus,
even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.95 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the
records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez
indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in G.R. No.
191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.

a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or

accountability of respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life,
liberty and security.

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court
of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6
September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.

Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and

straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in
which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the
NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical
surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his
abduction, detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the
CHR representatives who appeared during his release.98

More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.

As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr.
Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the
soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. According to the
Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,100 she examined Rodriguez
in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and
arrived at the following findings:

FACE

- 10cm healed scar face right side

 - 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)

- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)

- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side

- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)

- both leg arm

- hip area/lumbar area101

Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September

2009, the results of which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted
through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus issued a Medical Report dated 23 September
2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured during his detention by the
military, to wit:

X. Interpretation of Findings

The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the
torture and ill-treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots
found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was
forced to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the
conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found
on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of
tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming
punching and kicking on his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom
experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological trauma he encountered
during his detention.

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to
the torture and ill-treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The
physical injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is compatible with the alleged
date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)

In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the
medical finding that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the
maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he sustained showed that he
could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’ claim
highly implausible.

Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the
allegations of Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805
still stubbornly clung to their argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather,
they claimed that he was a double agent, whose relationship with the military was at all
times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary
human experience.

If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he
should have unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among
friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In
fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made
the following averments:

18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil
sa mukha syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.

19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag

ko syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;

x x x           x x x          x x x

23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng
dalawang linggo sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob
ng kampo;

24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;

x x x           x x x          x x x

33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa

kaligtasan ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105

Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 3 December 2009:106
 24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya,
malaki ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;

25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil
nakilala ko syang masigla at masayahin;

26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito,
papatayin nila ako."

27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang
linggo ang aking kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.

28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107

Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly
contradictory, contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had
complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he
nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become a double-
agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:

In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his
military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he
experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again
because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return,
respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and
wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the
movement directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and
desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become
an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he
dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction,
detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had
violated and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording
of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:

In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the
house of petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos
of the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of
the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said
videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his
family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner
and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be
free from the watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of
a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not –
condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioner’s right to security
guaranteed by the fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)

Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the
contradictory defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his
claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.

It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan,
there was no substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation,
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the
CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its
criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The
CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations
thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and
address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed
their insufficient competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez
after his ordeal.

b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or

threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right
to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official.111 Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to
the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.113

In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo114 that

the right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to
ensure the observance of the duty to investigate, viz:

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human
rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to
security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing
a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR
interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not
been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's
right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the
very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his
or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities
to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has
been taken into custody and has not been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible
or accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on
account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his
ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory
investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into
consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the
military. The ruling of the appellate court must be emphasized:

In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina
are accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject
incident, the investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided.
The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained of,
depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt.
Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the
military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident
and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction of petitioner.

Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of

Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest
of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." In this
case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to
unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG
Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action
against him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to
effectively and aggressively investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty
and security by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of
Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must
be held responsible or accountable.

Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any

responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already
been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months
before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were
maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through
substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible
and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the
basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009,
and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus,
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a
result, there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege
of these writs already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from
violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President
Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of
the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez
failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible
or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise
failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of
respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No.
191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or
liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been incurred by
respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the
results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives
mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the
incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing
shall constitute contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 202666               September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID

SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which
dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were,
during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took
digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s
high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.
Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn,
they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia
and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there
were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not
confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook
user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s
Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the
identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s
Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains

sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading
pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr.
Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during
the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the
conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller,
and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as
part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled
on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan
(Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against
STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants
therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining
the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined
the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594
filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as
annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing
the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement
exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained
unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following
considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends
Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have

known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew
or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing
constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ
of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with
the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data,
and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated
July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents
were directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits,
within five (5) working days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written
return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a)
petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in
forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and
(d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data.
The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded
on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for
a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas
datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy,
however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in
this case.

Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a
habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this
requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that
it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users,
sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which
are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for
the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section
2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of
Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay
also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being
an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a
point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and
of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about
the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To

"engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity
must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason
or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting
to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological

advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where
he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is
relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the
right of individuals to control information about themselves.23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions,
there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information
should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information
and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South
African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on
January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities
not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the
people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times,
acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what
may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized
that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time,
the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of
which would have otherwise remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the
sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by
the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or
"walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her
bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and
videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of
the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon
has paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one
involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its
developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s
going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they
can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or
her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the
latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but
did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the
user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks
of the Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers
to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and
photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect
their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to
put others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting
will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to
withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer
Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable

expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not
the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said
to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile
will view the information they post or upload thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to
keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto
or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy
right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools
would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any
personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me"
or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or
information within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did
the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that
the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated,
insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded
copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the
minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or
"Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their
children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public
viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends,
including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos
which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not
appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are
senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They
then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of
these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account
[sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there
had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in
Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason:
failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their
allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence
to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere
the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas
here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would
have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission
is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe
chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital
images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in
view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who
are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her
own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can
share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether
the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the
post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person
who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which
was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not
Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends,"
the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300
(A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting).
As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very
large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity
towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it
encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have
facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of
fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends
Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to
petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to
Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act
of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the
photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions
that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or
to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within
the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means
that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best
means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one
has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many
OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be
mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have
already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their
respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to
every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity
of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are
wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace,
the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a
good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is
believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing
that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they
engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that,
by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically
and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is
outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information,
otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings
and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the
vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves
take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing
to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights,
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated

August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP
No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of
respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).

The Facts

In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a
while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital
camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office
regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera
involving Ilagan and another woman.  Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to
return the camera, but to no avail.5  During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed
Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized
the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the
“Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).8  Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts
of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper
echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right
to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to
produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject
video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days
from date of receipt thereof.

In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the
memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that
she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She
also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under
disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the
subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee
contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be
dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against
Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to
turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing
the same.14

The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of
reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM
officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation
and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as
evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its
reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the
aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other tribunals.15

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the
right to informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right to control
the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”18

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as

“a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.”  Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ,
Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently
alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened
and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In
other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports
a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find
its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to
explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty
or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either
account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally
be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all
that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which
hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas
Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to
commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty
or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that
Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.  Contrastingly, Lee
even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject
video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative
cases that she filed against Ilagan.23  Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as
well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the
RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018 ]
GEN. EMMANUEL BAUTISTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), GEN. EDUARDO AÑO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), GEN.
HERNANDO IRIBERRI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, GEN. BENITO ANTONIO T. DE LEON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION,
AND PC/SUPT. MIGUEL DE MAYO LAUREL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF
THE ISABELA PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICE, PETITIONERS, V. ATTY. MARIA
CATHERINE DANNUG-SALUCON, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The privilege of the writ of amparo may be granted on the basis of the application of the
totality of evidence standard. Such application may extend to the use of relevant
circumstantial evidence. Hearsay testimony that is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced may also be admitted and appreciated. The flexibility in the admission
of evidence derives from the recognition of the State's often virtual, monopoly of access
to pertinent evidence, as well as from the recognition of the deliberate use of the State's
power to destroy pertinent evidence being inherent in the practice of enforced
disappearances.
The Case
By petition for review on certiorari,[1] the petitioners, namely: Gen. Emmanuel Bautista,
Gen. Eduardo Año, Gen. Hernando Iriberri, Gen. Benito Antonio T. De Leon, and Chief
Supt. Miguel De Mayo Laurel, hereby assail the decision promulgated on March 12, 2015
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00053-W/A,[2] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of respondent Atty. Maria
Catherine Dannug-Salucon (Atty. Salucon), the petitioner thereat, as well as the
resolution promulgated on December 2, 2015,[3] whereby the CA denied their motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedents
After her admission to the Philippine Bar, Atty. Salucon initially worked for the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO) before resigning to be become a human rights advocate. She co-
founded the National Union of People's Lawyers (NUPL), a national association of
human rights advocates, law students and paralegals principally engaged in public
interest cases and human rights advocacy. She also established her own law firm, and
undertook the defense of several political detainees, most of whom were leaders or
members of peasant and other sectoral organizations and people's organizations,
including human rights defenders labeled or suspected to be members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) or the New People's Army (NPA) who had been harassed
with allegedly trumped-up charges by the agents of the Government.

For purposes of this adjudication, we adopt the CA's summary of the factual antecedents
derived from Atty. Salucon's petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, to wit:
On March 24, 2014, [respondent] was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained
political prisoner client who was allegedly among several leaders of people's
organizations/sectoral organizations who were falsely charged in a murder and frustrated
murder case pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao. As they
were discussing the security risks involved in the handling of the case, William Bugatti,
her paralegal who was working with her on said case and who was also an activist and
human rights defender, informed her that he had personally observed that surveillance
was being conducted on them, including the respondent, especially during hearings for
the above case. Thus, he suggested certain security measures for her own protection.
[Respondent] realized the significance of Bugatti's advice when he was fatally gunned
down later that evening. Parenthetically, [respondent] had asked him (sic) early that very
day to identify the names, ranks and addresses of the handler/s of the prosecution witness
in the Lagawe case, whom [respondent] suspected of lying on the witness stand.

That same evening, [respondent] was informed by a client x x x working as a civilian

asset for the PNP Intelligence Section that the Regional Intelligence of the PNP, through
the PNP Isabela Provincial Police Office, had issued a directive to PNP Burgos, Isabela,
[respondent's] hometown, to conduct a background investigation on her and to confirm
whether she was a "Red Lawyer". She also learned that she was being secretly followed
by agents of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) and
that person looking like military/policemen had been asking people around her office
about her whereabouts and routine. Further, respondent's name was reportedly included
in the military's Watch List of so-called communist terrorist supporters rendering legal
services.

On March 31, 2014, [respondent] again received a call from her confidential informant,
confirming that she was indeed the subject of surveillance and that, in fact, he was tailed
by ISAFP operatives when he came to [respondent's] office a few nights earlier. The day
before, the confidential informant was allegedly cornered by three ISAFP operatives who
interrogated him on the purpose of his visit to respondent's office. They also asked him
why respondent was acquainted with known NPA members such as Randy Malayao and
Grace Bautista, and why she was always the lawyer of several suspected communist
terrorists.

Upon further investigation, respondent discovered the following things:

1) On or about March 12, 19 and 21, 2014, when [respondent] had out-of-town hearings,
different individuals riding on motorcycles and appearing to be soldiers approached
one of the buko and tupig vendors in front of [respondent's] office. Each of them
similarly questioned the vendors as to where [respondent] went, with whom, what
time she usually returned to the office and who stayed behind in the office whenever
she left. The vendor was surprised because the questions of the individuals were
uniform on all occasions and they did not go into [respondent's] office despite the
vendor's advice for them to talk to [respondent's] secretary. The above incidents were
narrated to [respondent] by her driver, Regie Lutao Gamongan, who had gotten the
information from the vendor.
   
2) On March 31, 2014, a member of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG) came to the law office, asking for
the [respondent], but without telling her secretary why he was looking for her. Upon
learning that she was not there, he left, then returned again in the afternoon.
However, he left again upon finding out that [respondent] had decided to stay at the
Hall of Justice longer than expected.
   
3) On the same day, [respondent] received a text message from the Chief Investigator of
the CIDG, asking for a copy of the records of a human rights case involving three
Bayan Muna members who were allegedly arbitrarily arrested on the basis of
trumped up charges for two counts of frustrated murder and tortured in the hands of
the 86th Infantry Battalion intelligence operatives. Said case was dismissed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor during preliminary investigation. [Respondent]
was surprised at the request because it was the third time that the investigator was
requesting for a copy of the records and he could have easily secured the same from
 the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. Thus, [respondent] ignored the text message.
   
4) On or about 7:30 AM on April 3, 2014, while [respondent's] driver, Gamongan, was
waiting for her in front of her residence at Poblacion, Burgos, Isabela, a red "Wave"
motorcycle with its plate number cased inside a tinted plastic cover, making it
impossible to read the same, passed by their house. The motorcycle driver, who was
of medium height, with dark complexion, a haircut and demeanor of a
military/policeman, with a tattoo on his left, wearing a white sando shirt and with a
pistol bag slung around his shoulder, looked intently at Gamongan as he passed by,
"as if he wanted to do something wrong". After passing by the [respondent's]
compound, the motorcycle rider suddenly made a u-turn and stared intently at
Gamongan as he passed by. As he headed towards the highway, Gamongan noticed
that the man was continually observing him through the side mirror. In relation to this
incident, witness Gamongan executed a Judicial Affidavit and testified during the
trial proceedings.
   
5) On or about April 7 and 10, 2013, soldiers came to [respondent's] office in the guise
of asking her to notarize documents. Since [respondent] was on out-of-town hearings,
her secretary suggested names of other available notaries public. However, instead of
leaving right away, the military men asked where [respondent] went and with whom,
and insisted on leaving the document and picking it up later on when [respondent]
arrived.
   
6) On April 10, 2014, a known civilian asset of the Military Intelligence Group (MIG)
in Isabela, who also happened to be the "close-in" secretary and part-time driver of an
uncle who was a municipal circuit judge, came to [respondent's] office, trying to
convince her to meet with the head of the MIG Isabela so that the latter could explain
why [respondent] was being watched. However, [respondent] declined. The
following day, the civilian asset returned and told her that she was being watched by
the MIG because of a land dispute which she was handling at a court in Roxas,
Isabela. [Respondent] did not believe him because, just a couple of days prior to that
date, the MIG operatives had talked to the client/confidential informant who had first
informed [respondent] of the purported surveillance operations on her, asking for
[respondent's] phone number and inviting him to join them as civilian asset in their
anti-insurgency operations.[4]
In her petition, thus, [respondent] posited that the above-described acts, taking into
consideration previous incidents where human rights lawyers, human rights defenders,
political activists and defenders, were killed or abducted after being labeled as
"communists" and being subjected to military surveillance, may be interpreted as
preliminary acts leading to the abduction and/or killing of [respondent]. Moreover, while
[respondent] admitted that the purported military and police operatives who conducted,
and were still conducting, surveillance and harassments on [respondent] were still
unidentified, she maintained that the same were identified as members of the ISAFP, the
Philippine Army and the police, and that there was no doubt that they all acted upon
orders of their superiors within the chain of command. [Respondent] reported the
incidents to the NUPL and the human rights group KARAPATAN (Alliance for the
Advancement of People's Rights), who agreed to help her in filing the instant petition.
She also tried reporting the incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Isabela, but, as of present, no positive report had been made identifying the individuals
who conducted the alleged surveillance, although available information specifically
pointed to the military and police units as the ones doing the surveillance.[5]
We also adopt the CA's summary of the petitioners' averments, as follows:

[Petitioners] categorically denied [respondent's] allegations that she was ever under
surveillance by the military and/or police under the command of [petitioners'] officials. x
xx

xxx [Petitioners] also objected to the impleading of other [petitioners] in their official
capacities, allegedly under the doctrine of command responsibility. [Petitioners]
maintained that the doctrine of command responsibility is a substantive rule that
establishes criminal or administrative liability that is different from the purpose and
approach under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Thus, it can only be invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case and not in a summary amparo proceeding.
xxxx

[Petitioners] [also] alleged that upon receipt of the CA Resolution promulgated on April
22, 2014 x x x, they immediately exerted efforts to conduct an inquiry and to gather
information about the purported threats on the life, liberty and security of the
[respondent], to wit:

1. [Respondent] Secretary Gazmin maintained that, aside from sweeping allegations

of surveillance and gathering of information made by alleged unidentified operatives
from the military and the police on [respondent], the latter failed to particularize the
instances of [petitioner] Sec. Gazmin's involvement in said surveillance and
information gathering that would warrant his inclusion as party [respondent] in the
case;

2. Upon receipt of the CA's April 22, 2014 Resolution, [petitioner] Gen. Emmanuel
T. Bautista issued a directive to the ISAFP Chief and Commander of the 5th Infantry
Division to verify the alleged surveillance operations conducted on [respondent]. In
addition, he enjoined the concerned unit/s to immediately investigate and/or submit to
the Higher Headquarters pertinent investigation results already conducted, if any,
relative to the complained acts. Finally, [petitioner] Gen. Bautista affirmed the
continuation of efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of [respondent's]
 allegations and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel, if shown
to have participated or to have had complicity in the commission of the alleged acts, to
the court of justice.

3. [Petitioner] Major Gen. Eduardo M. Año denied the ISAFP's involvement in the
alleged surveillance operations on and harassment of [respondent], and the inclusion
of [petitioner's] name in an alleged watchlist. In fact, petitioner Major Gen. Año
claimed that he only came to know of [respondent's] name upon receipt of the Petition,
which he described as a mere product of a fabricated story intended to discredit him, in
particular, and the ISAFP as a whole. Nonetheless, upon obtaining a copy of
the Petition from the Judge Advocate General and the AFP Radio Message directing
his unit to submit results of the verification and inquiry on the Petition, [petitioner]
Major Gen. Año immediately instructed the Group Commanders of the MIG 1 and 2 to
coordinate closely with the military and the PNP in the area to ensure that no
harassment or surveillance will be conducted on [respondent].

4. Upon receipt of [the CA Resolution], [petitioner] Lt. Gen. Hernando DCA Iriberri
immediately informed the Army Judge Advocate, the legal arm of the Philippine
Army, of the same. Having no information on the nature and circumstances
surrounding the case, he coordinated with his staff to look into the matter. Even prior
to the radio message from the Chief of Staff dated April 25, 2014, directing him to
conduct verification on the alleged surveillance on [respondent], [petitioner] Lt. Gen.
Iriberri had already taken the initiative to issue a directive to the Commanding General
of the 5th Infantry Division in Gamu, lsabela, to verify and inquire into the allegations
in the Petitioner pertaining to any operation which may have been conducted or which
was in anyway (sic) related to the transgression of human rights of [respondent].
Finally, he undertook that, should there be any finding that any army personnel was
involved or had committed any of the allegations in the Petition, such personnel shall
be dealt with accordingly pursuant to existing laws and AFP regulations.

5. [Petitioner] Major Gen. Benito Antonio T. De Leon pointed out that he assumed
command of the 5th Infantry (STAR) Division only on April 4, 2014, thus, the alleged
surveillance operations would have been conducted prior to his assumption of said
office. Since he assumed command of said unit, he had not given any orders to his
men to conduct surveillance or "casing" operations against any persons within the
unit's area of operation, nor did he receive any similar orders from his superiors.
Nonetheless, even prior to the receipt of the directive from the higher headquarters and
a copy of the Petition, [petitioner] Major Gen. De Leon, on his own volition and upon
gaining information through print media of the filing of the petition, exerted efforts to
verify with the intelligence unit commanders under his command whether there was
any standing instruction or order for them to conduct "casing" or surveillance
operations against [respondent], to which the commanders responded in the negative.
 In addition, he averred that he immediately sent out radio messages to his subordinates
to be law-abiding and that human rights violations have no place in the military.

6. [Petitioner] PCSupt. Miguel de Mayo Laurel clarified that he was currently the
Acting Regional Director of the Police Regional Office 2, and not the Chief of the
Isabela Provincial Police Office, as indicated in the Petition. Said Petition was only
emailed by the Legal Service of Camp Crame to the Office of the Regional Legal
Service, which provided [petitioner] PCSupt. Laurel a copy of the same. [Petitioner]
PCSupt. Laurel maintained that their Office had no memorandum order relating to
[respondent's] allegations, nor are there any documents in their possession concerning
[respondent]. Thus, PCSupt. Laurel immediately sent a Memorandum directing the
Provincial Director of the Isabela Police Provincial Office and the Chief of the
Regional Intelligence Division of Police Regional Office 2, two of the units mentioned
in the Petition which were under his operational control, to submit their comments and
all relevant information and pertinent documents relative to the allegations made by
[respondent] and to identify the persons who are responsible for the alleged
harassment and threats on [respondent's] life, liberty and security. In response thereto,
PSSupt. Ramos, Jr., the Provincial Director of the Isabela Provincial Police Office,
reported that no directive was ever issued to PNP Burgos, Isabela, to conduct a
background investigation and to confirm [respondent's] alleged status as a "Red
Lawyer", or to threaten, intimidate or harass, and conduct continuous surveillance on
her. He likewise denied that his office was in possession of any data or information
which may or would likely violate [respondent's] right to privacy or be used as a
justification to harass or intimidate her. Meanwhile, the Chief of the Regional
Intelligence Division likewise denied the existence of any order or directive to conduct
a background investigation and to confirm [respondent] as a "Red Lawyer", or that
their office was in possession of any data or information on [respondent]. Finally,
[petitioner] PCSupt. Laurel ordered the Isabela Provincial Police Office and the
PSSupt. Ramos, Jr. to investigate the alleged threats on the life, liberty and security of
[respondent], and to identify the persons, if any, who are responsible for the same.
[Petitioners] also noted that [respondent's] testimony consisted of mere unverified
accounts from an unknown person whose identity [respondent] did not want to reveal.
Moreover, [respondent's] allegations against [petitioners] and their respective offices
were, at best, mere conclusions on her part, a mere impression that [respondent] had
based on the physical appearance of the men looking for her, as described by her staff
and according to her own personal assessment of the circumstances. However,
[respondent] could not categorically identify and link any of the said individuals to
[petitioners], claiming only that they were military-looking men.[6]
In substantiation of her petition, Atty. Salucon and her driver, Reggie Lutao Gamongan,
testified. She also submitted documentary evidence consisting of the several criminal
informations filed in various courts against her clients who were either political
detainees, leaders or members of peasant and other sectoral and people's organizations,
human rights defenders or suspected NPA members, and the complainants were either
military or police officers and personnel.

On the part of the petitioners, Maj. Gen. De Leon and Sr. Supt. Ramos, Jr. testified.
Submitted as additional evidence by the petitioners were relevant memoranda, letters, and
radio messages.

On March 12, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision granting the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data,[7] disposing thusly:
Considering the foregoing, we find that petitioner has substantially proven by substantial
evidence her entitlement to the writs of amparo and habeas data. Moreover, she was able
to substantially establish that respondents PCSupt. Laurel, Lt. Gen. Irriberi, Major Gen.
Año and Gen. Bautista are responsible and accountable for the violation of respondent's
rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of the unjustified surveillance operations
and acts of harassment and intimidation committed against petitioner and/or lack of any
fair and effective official investigation as to her allegations. On the other hand, while it is
true that respondent Major Gen. De Leon assumed his office only after the occurrence of
the subject incidents, he is still currently in the best position to conduct the necessary
investigation and perform all other responsibilities or obligations required, if any, by the
writ of amparo and habeas data. However, the instant petition should be dismissed as
against respondent President Aquino on the ground of immunity from suit, against
respondent Secretary Gazmin for lack of merit and against former PNP Dir. Gen.
Purisima for being moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for the Issuance of the Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data is GRANTED.
Accordingly, respondents PCSupt. Miguel De Mayo Laurel, in his capacity as Acting
Regional Director of the Police Regional Office 2; Gen. Hernando Irriberi, in his capacity
as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army; Gen. Eduardo Año, in his capacity
as the Commanding Officer of the ISAFP; and Gen. Emmanuel Bautista, in his capacity
as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence
and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of petitioner Atty. Maria
Catherine Dannug-Salucon and the immediate members of her family, but also to conduct
further investigation to determine the veracity of the alleged surveillance operation and
acts of harassment and intimidation committed against petitioner, as well as to identify
and find the person/s responsible for said violations and bring them to competent court.
The foregoing respondents are likewise DIRECTED to SUBMIT a quarterly report of
their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to
monitor the action of respondents.

The above-named respondents are likewise DIRECTED to produce and disclose to this
Court any and all facts, information, statements, records, photographs, dossiers, and all
other evidence, documentary or otherwise, pertaining to petitioner Atty. Maria Catherine
Dannug-Salucon, for possible destruction upon order of this Court.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives
mandated in this Decision are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the
relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of
court.

Finally, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with respect to the following

respondents: President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, on the ground of immunity from
suits; Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin, for lack of merit; and PNP Gen.
Alan Purisima, for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On December 2, 2015, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General,[9] ruling:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The undated Manifestation of the Solicitor General is NOTED. Accordingly, let the
pleadings, orders and notices be sent to the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions in this case.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal.

Issues
The petitioners submit in support of their appeal that the issues to be considered and
resolved by the Court are the following:

a. Whether or not the CA erred in admitting and considering Atty. Salucon's

evidence despite being largely based on hearsay information;

b. Whether or not the CA erred in finding Atty. Salucon's evidence sufficient to

justify the granting of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data;

c. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the hearsay evidence of Atty. Salucon,
assuming its admissibility for the sake of argument, satisfied the requirement of
substantial evidence;

d. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas
data despite the failure of Atty. Salucon to produce evidence showing that the
petitioners were in possession of facts, information, statements, photographs or
documents pertaining to her; and

e. Whether or not the CA erred in directing the petitioners to exert extraordinary

diligence and efforts to conduct further investigation in order to determine the veracity
of Atty. Salucon's alleged harassment and surveillance.[11]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
 I.
The CA properly admitted Atty. Salucon's
proof even if it supposedly consisted
of circumstantial evidence and hearsay testimonies
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[12] the Court adopted the standard of totality of evidence for
granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, explaining:
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the
unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore
discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be
given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court
to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing
the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
xxxx

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason — i.e., to the relevance of
the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at
all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any
act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject
to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and
objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.
These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-
described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence,
including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.[13]
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis cited the ruling in Velasquez Rodriguez,[14] wherein the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) took note that enforced disappearances could
generally be proved only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical
inference; and that it would be impossible otherwise to prove that an individual had been
made to disappear because of the State's virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence,
or because the deliberate use of the State's power to destroy pertinent evidence was
inherent in the practice of enforced disappearances. Hence, the reliance on circumstantial
evidence and hearsay testimony of witnesses is permissible. In this respect, Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis observed that Velasquez Rodriguez rendered an informative discussion on the
appreciation of evidence to establish enforced disappearances, to wit:
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances
that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the
standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one
hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as
arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-
measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of
another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and
cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely,
the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of
evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence
rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
[15]

Under the totality of evidence standard, hearsay testimony may be admitted and
appreciated depending on the facts and circumstances unique to each petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo provided such hearsay testimony is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. Yet, such use of the standard does not unquestioningly
authorize the automatic admissibility of hearsay evidence in all amparo proceedings. The
matter of the admissibility of evidence should still depend on the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Clearly, the flexibility in the admissibility of evidence adopted and
advocated in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis is determined on a case-to-case basis.
II.
The respondent presented substantial
evidence sufficient to justify
the issuance of the writ of amparo
The petition for the writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to
the petitioner. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence have long
defined substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.[16] It is to be always borne in mind that such
proceeding is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or to allocate liability for damages based on preponderance of evidence, or to
adjudge administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence.[17]
The facts and circumstances enumerated by the respondent's petition consisted of the
following:

a) She was a human rights lawyer who had taken criminal cases in which the accused
were political detainees, including human rights defenders or suspected members of
the CPP-NPA, and the complainants were military or police officials or personnel;
   
b) Her paralegal William Bugatti informed her that he had personally observed various
individuals conducting surveillance operations of their movements (i.e., the
respondent and Bugatti) specially during the trial of a case in Ifugao involving a
 political detainee who was a leader of a people's or sectoral organization;
   
c) On the day Bugatti informed her about his observation, and she instructed him to
discover the names, ranks, and addresses of the handlers of the Prosecution witness in
the Ifugao case, he was fatally gunned down;
   
d) On the same day Bugatti was gunned down, a client of hers who was working as a
civilian asset for the PNP Intelligence Section reported to her that the Regional
Intelligence Unit of the PNP, through the PNP Isabela Provincial Office, issued a
directive to conduct a background investigation to confirm if she was a "Red
Lawyer;"
   
e) Said civilian asset also informed her that she was being secretly followed by ISAFP
agents, and that individuals who appeared to be military or police personnel had been
asking people around her office regarding her routine and whereabouts;
   
f) Her secretary informed her that a member of the CIS-CIDG and some purported
military personnel had gone to her law office on several occasions inquiring on her
whereabouts;
   
g) On the same day said CIS-CIDG member went to her law office, she received a text
message from the Chief Investigator of the CIDG requesting, for the third time, a
copy of the records of a case she was handling;
   
h) Gamongan, her driver who testified in support of the petition, notified her that a
vendor outside her law office had told him that several motorcycle-riding personnel
of the military had approached said vendor on separate instances asking about her
whereabouts and the persons she was with, her routine and schedule, as well as the
persons who were left at the law office whenever she went out;
   
i) Gamongan also testified about an incident that occurred while he was waiting outside
her house in which a motorcycle-riding man, who looked like he was military or
police based on his haircut and demeanor, had driven by her house twice intently
observing him and the house "as if he wanted to do something bad;"
   
j) A known civilian asset of the Military Intelligence Group (MIG) tried to convince her
to have a meeting with MIG Isabela so that he could explain why she was being
watched; and
   
k) Upon her refusal of the invitation to meet, the civilian asset returned the next day
telling her that she was being watched by the MIG because of a land dispute case she
was then handling for a client.[18]
Upon due consideration of the foregoing, the CA opined that it would be all the more
difficult to obtain direct evidence to prove the respondent's entitlement to the privilege of
the writ of amparo because no extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance had yet
occurred. Indeed, her petition referred to acts that merely threatened to violate her rights
to life, liberty and security, or that could be appreciated only as preliminary steps to her
probable extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. Even so, it would be
uncharacteristic for the courts, especially this Court, to simply fold their arms and ignore
the palpable threats to her life, liberty and security and just wait for the irreversible to
happen to her. The direct evidence might not come at all, given the abuse of the State's
power to destroy evidence being inherent in enforced disappearances or extrajudicial
killings.
There was no question about the relevance of the hearsay testimony with which the
respondent sought to establish some of the facts and circumstances she alleged.
Flexibility needed to be adopted in the appreciation and consideration of such facts and
circumstances despite hearsay being inadmissible under other judicial situations. Such
flexibility accorded with the following instruction in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[19] to wit:
x x x In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature
and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who
actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused
the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this
Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting
a cause of action showing a violation of the victim's rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality,
rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements
— namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security — are present.[20]
Verily, proceedings related to the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo should
allow not only direct evidence, but also circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court has
made no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred.[21] One kind of evidence is not superior to
the other, for the trier of facts must weigh the evidence upon admission. Only in the event
of a conviction in a criminal case does the Rules of Court require that the circumstantial
evidence should consist of a combination of several circumstances that "produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."[22] Yet, under Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, even hearsay
testimony may be considered by the amparo court provided such testimony can lead to
conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.[23] What the respondent
obviously established is that the threats to her right to life, liberty and security were
neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable. The gunning down of her
paralegal Bugatti after he had relayed to her his observation that they had been under
surveillance was the immediate proof of the threat. The purpose and noble objectives of
the special rules on the writ of amparo may be rendered inutile if the rigid standards of
evidence applicable in ordinary judicial proceedings were not tempered with such
flexibility.
III.
The CA had sufficient basis to issue the writ
of habeas data at the respondent's behest
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.[24] It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to
informational privacy.[25] It seeks to protect a person's right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.[26]
In its decision, the CA, issuing the privilege of the writ of habeas data, directed the
petitioners "to produce and disclose to this Court any and all facts, information,
statements, records, photographs, dossiers, and all other evidence, documentary or
otherwise, pertaining to petitioner Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon, for possible
destruction upon order of this Court.''
The directive was factually and procedurally warranted. There was no question that the
civilian asset of the PNP Intelligence Section relayed to the respondent that there was a
standing order issued by the PNP Isabela Provincial Police Office to the PNP office in
Burgos, Isabela to conduct a background investigation in order to confirm if she was a
"Red Lawyer." She was also under actual surveillance by different individuals who
looked like they were members of the military or police establishments. The objective of
these moves taken against her was unquestionably to establish a pattern of her
movements and activities, as well as to obtain the records of the cases she was handling
for her various clients. These and other established circumstances fully warranted within
the context of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data the directive of the CA for the
handing over and destruction of all information and data on her in order to protect her
privacy and security.
 IV.
The directive of the CA for the petitioners
to exert extraordinary diligence in conducting
further investigations was valid and proper
Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the amparo respondent to state in
the return the actions that have been or will still be taken: (a) to verify the identity of the
aggrieved party; (b) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of
the person or persons responsible; (c) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from
them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause, manner, location
and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to identify and apprehend the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders
before a competent court.
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo ordains the diligence required of a public
official or employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo,
to wit:
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. -The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[27] the Court spelled out the two-fold burden that the public
authorities had to discharge in situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, viz.:
Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place
and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose
the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge
in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to
ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by
the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the
production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty
parties.[28]
In Ladaga v. Mapagu,[29] the Court precisely indicated that the failure of
an amparo petitioner to establish by substantial evidence the involvement of military or
police forces was not a hindrance to the Court ordering the conduct of further
investigations, to wit:
Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the
cases of Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner's failure to establish by
substantial evidence the involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of
rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct of further investigation
where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced
disappearance. The Court directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the
modest efforts of police investigators were effectively putting petitioner's right to security
in danger with the delay in identifying and apprehending her abductors. In Razon, Jr., the
Court found it necessary to explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue with
extraordinary diligence the investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a
known activist because not only did the police investigators conduct an incomplete and
one-sided investigation but they blamed their ineffectiveness to the reluctance and
unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the authorities.[30]
It should not be a surprise at all, therefore, that the CA commanded the petitioners as
the amparo respondents “to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect
the life, liberty and security of petitioner Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon and the
immediate members of her family, but also to conduct further investigation to determine
the veracity of the alleged surveillance operation and acts of harassment and
intimidation committed against petitioner, as well as to identify and find the person/s
responsible for said violations and bring them to competent court." Needless to stress, the
directive was unassailable.
The petitioners (and their successors in office), by merely issuing orders to their
subordinates under their respective commands and relying on the latter's reports without
conducting independent investigations on their own to determine the veracity of the
respondent's allegations, did not discharge the two-fold burden. Thereby, they did not
exercise extraordinary diligence. They are reminded of the following dictum regarding
the conduct of investigations that the Court pronounced in In the Matter of the Petition
for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel Rodriguez:[31]
More importantly, respondents also neglect to address our ruling that the failure to
conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of or threat to
Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty, and security. The writ's curative role is an
acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused
not only by a public official's act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The
duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective.[32]
The petitioners' recommendation for the creation of an independent body to investigate
both the harassments suffered by the respondent and the surveillance conducted against
her is rejected as an act of evasion. The military and police establishments certainly had
the competence and resources to conduct such investigation. Although they have
predicated the recommendation on what transpired in Roxas v. Arroyo,[33] the awkward
situation sought to be avoided under Roxas v. Arroyo -"wherein the very persons alleged
to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing are, at the same time,
the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter"[34] - did not obtain herein. For one,
there was no conclusive proof of the actual authorship of the unauthorized surveillance
conducted against the respondent. Thus, it was speculative on the part of the petitioners
and their successors in office to simply say that the investigation, if conducted by them,
would be biased or one-sided. They could not escape the responsibility of conducting the
investigation with extraordinary diligence by deflecting the responsibility to other
investigatory agencies of the Government. The duty of extraordinary diligence pertains to
them, and to no other. Moreover, their higher ranks or positions in the AFP and PNP
hierarchies put them in the best position to obtain or acquire information and to ensure
that the investigation to be conducted would quickly yield results in view of the
investigation going to focus on their subordinate personnel.
It would be within the context of Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo if the
petitioners and their successors in office should instead exhibit a readiness and
willingness to undertake the investigations if only to shed light soon enough on whether
or not their subordinates and personnel over whom they exercised authority and control
had been involved at all in the surveillance of the respondent and the making of threats
against her personal security.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision and resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
March 12, 2015 and December 2, 2015, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00053-W/A;
and REMANDS this case to the Court of Appeals for the monitoring of the investigation
to be hereafter undertaken in accordance with the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on March 12, 2015, and for the validation of the results of the investigation.
SO ORDERED.