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Subsidised group
Uninsured in 2007, insured under Jamkesmas in 2014 (IFLS still recorded Jamkesmas in 2014 even
though it was integrated into JKN already)
Control group
Uninsured in 2007 and still uninsured in 2014
Outpatient care
Number of total visit (private) 0.194*** 0.104* 0.120 0.273*** 0.158*** 0.178
Inpatient care
(0.23 (0.61)
Number of total visits (all) 1.41* 4.15***
(0.20) (0.62)
Number of total visits (public) 1.97*** 6.64***
(0.37) (1.30)
Number of total visits (private) 1.01 3.26***
Darius Erlangga @2017 (0.22) (0.69)
Voluntary Subsidised
ATT SE 95% CI ATT SE 95% CI
1. Outpatient care
Prob. of having outpatient visit 8.41%*** 2.27% 3.96% 12.86% 0.61% 1.48% -2.29% 3.50%
Number of total visit (all) 0.154*** 0.066 0.025 0.283 0.043 0.032 -0.020 0.106
Number of total visit (public) 0.116*** 0.025 0.067 0.166 0.056*** 0.020 0.017 0.096
Number of total visit (private) 0.050 0.055 -0.058 0.159 0.001 0.019 -0.039 0.037
2. Inpatient care
Prob. of having inpatient visit 7.55%*** 1.30% 5.01% 10.10% 1.79%*** 0.58% 0.66% 2.92%
Number of total visit (all) 0.097*** 0.020 0.058 0.136 0.025*** 0.009 0.008 0.042
Number of total visit (public) 0.066*** 0.014 0.038 0.093 0.020*** 0.007 0.007 0.033
Number of total visit (private) 0.035*** 0.013 0.010 0.060 0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.016
Note: ATT is calculated by simply taking the difference between treated (either voluntary or subsidised) and control (uninsured) group. The treated group was matched with the control
group through nearest neighbour matching with n=5 and caliper =0.01. The reported standard errors were calculated by bootstrapping with 600 replications.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Darius Erlangga @2017
Prob. Number of Number of Number of Prob. Inpatient Number of Number of Number of
Outpatient care outpatient visits outpatient visits outpatient visits care inpatient visits inpatient visits inpatient visits
(total) (public) private (total) (public) private
Voluntary Subsidised
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Prob. Outpatient care 0.102*** 0.036 0.020 -0.003
Does not necessarily mean a moral hazard effect because the goal of JKN itself is to promote
easier access to health care
Those who chose to enrol might have chosen to forego the care had they had no insurance
Fulfilling the unmet need; Nyman vs Pauli theory
Unnecessary care? Not clear.
Inequity issue (the wealthier uses more services while the government subsidy contributes
more to JKN funding)
172,174,401 100.0%
More research to explore the moral hazard issue and reason for the limited effect among the
poorest
Impact on health status is still not clear