Metaphysics

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy

that examines the fundamental nature of
reality, including the relationship between
mind and matter, between substance and
attribute, and between potentiality and
actuality.[1] The word "metaphysics"
comes from two Greek words that,
together, literally mean "after or behind or
among [the study of] the natural". It has
been suggested that the term might have
been coined by a first century AD editor
who assembled various small selections
of Aristotle’s works into the treatise we
now know by the name Metaphysics (ta
meta ta phusika, 'after the Physics ',
another of Aristotle's works).[2]

Metaphysics studies questions related to

what it is for something to exist and what
types of existence there are. Metaphysics
seeks to answer, in an abstract and fully
general manner, the questions:[3]

1. What is there?
2. What is it like?
Topics of metaphysical investigation
include existence, objects and their
properties, space and time, cause and
effect, and possibility.[4]

Epistemological foundation
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The metaphysical study is conducted

using deduction from that which is known
a priori. Like foundational mathematics
(which is sometimes considered a special
case of metaphysics applied to the
existence of number), it tries to give a
coherent account of the structure of the
world, capable of explaining our everyday
and scientific perception of the world and
being free from contradictions. In
mathematics, there are many different
ways to define numbers; similarly, in
metaphysics, there are many different
ways to define objects, properties,
concepts, and other entities that are
claimed to make up the world. While
metaphysics may, as a special case, study
the entities postulated by fundamental
science such as atoms and superstrings,
its core topic is the set of categories such
as object, property, and causality, which
those scientific theories assume. For
example: claiming that "electrons have
charge" is a scientific theory; while
exploring what it means for electrons to be
(or at least, to be perceived as) "objects,"
charge to be a "property," and for both to
exist in a topological entity called "space"
is the task of metaphysics.

There are two broad stances about what is

"the world" studied by metaphysics. The
durable, classical view assumes that the
objects studied by metaphysics exist
independently of any observer so that the
subject is the most fundamental of all
sciences. The weak, modern view
assumes that the objects studied by
metaphysics exist inside the mind of an
observer, so the subject becomes a form
of introspection and conceptual analysis.
Some philosophers, notably Kant, discuss
both of these "worlds" and what can be
inferred about each one. Some, such as
the logical positivists, and many scientists,
reject the strong view of metaphysics as
meaningless and unverifiable. Others reply
that this criticism also applies to any type
of knowledge, including hard science,
which claims to describe anything other
than the contents of human perception,
and thus that the world of perception is
the objective world in some sense.
Metaphysics itself usually assumes that
some stance has been taken on these
questions and that it may proceed
independently of choice—the item of
which position to take belongs instead to
another branch of philosophy,
epistemology.

Central questions

Ontology (Being) E…

Ontology is the philosophical study of the

nature of being, becoming, existence or
reality, as well as the basic categories of
being and their relations.[5] Traditionally
listed as the core of metaphysics, ontology
often deals with questions concerning
what entities exist and how such entities
may be grouped, related within a hierarchy,
and subdivided according to similarities
and differences.

Identity and change E…

Identity is a fundamental metaphysical

concern. Metaphysicians investigating
status are tasked with the question of
what, exactly, it means for something to be
identical to itself, or – more controversially
– to something else. Issues of identity
arise in the context of time: what does it
mean for something to be itself across
two moments in time? How do we account
for this? Another question of identity
arises when we ask what our criteria ought
to be for determining status, and how the
reality of identity interfaces with linguistic
expressions.

The metaphysical positions one takes on

identity have far-reaching implications on
issues such as the Mind–body problem,
personal identity, ethics, and law.

A few ancient Greeks took extreme

positions on the nature of change.
Parmenides denied change altogether,
while Heraclitus argued that change was
ubiquitous: "No man ever steps in the
same river twice."

Identity, sometimes called numerical

identity, is the relation that a thing bears to
itself, and which no idea bears to anything
other than itself (cf. sameness).

A modern philosopher who made a lasting

impact on the philosophy of identity was
Leibniz, whose Law of the Indiscernibility of
Identicals is still widely accepted today. It
states that if some object x is identical to
some object y, then any property that x
has, y will have as well.

Put formally, it states

However, it does seem that objects can
change over time. If one were to look at a
tree one day, and the tree later lost a leaf, it
would seem that one could still be looking
at that same tree. Two rival theories to
account for the relationship between
change and identity are perdurantism,
which treats the tree as a series of tree-
stages, and endurantism, which maintains
that the organism—the same tree—is
present at every stage in its history.

By appealing to intrinsic and extrinsic

properties, endurantism finds a way to
harmonize identity with change.
Endurantists believe that objects persist
by being strictly numerically identical over
time.[6] However, if Leibniz's Law of the
Indiscernibility of Identicals is utilized to
define numerical identity here, it seems
that objects must be completely
unchanged to persist. Discriminating
between intrinsic properties and extrinsic
properties, endurantists state that
numerical identity means that, if some
object x is identical to some object y, then
any intrinsic property that x has, y will have
as well. Thus, if an object persists, intrinsic
properties of it are unchanged, but
extrinsic properties can change over time.
Besides the object itself, environments
and other objects can change over time;
properties that relate to other objects
would change even if this object does not
change.

Perdurantism can harmonize identity with

change in another way. In four-
dimensionalism, a version of
perdurantism, what persists is a four-
dimensional object which does not change
although three-dimensional slices of the
object may differ.

Space and time E…

Objects appear to us in space and time,
while abstract entities such as classes,
properties, and relations do not. How do
space and time serve this function as a
ground for objects? Are space and time
entities themselves, of some form? Must
they exist before objects? How exactly can
they be defined? How is time related to
change; must there always be something
changing for time to exist?

Causality E…

Classical philosophy recognized several

causes, including teleological future
causes. In special relativity and quantum
field theory the notions of space, time and
causality become tangled together, with
temporal orders of causations becoming
dependent on who is observing them. The
laws of physics are symmetrical in time,
so they could equally well be used to
describe time as running backward. Why
then do we perceive it as flowing in one
direction, the arrow of time, and as
containing causation flowing in the same
direction?

For that matter, can an effect precede its

cause? This was the title of a 1954 paper
by Michael Dummett,[7] which sparked a
discussion that continues today.[8] Earlier,
in 1947, C. S. Lewis had argued that one
can meaningfully pray concerning the
outcome of, e.g., a medical test while
recognizing that the outcome is
determined by past events: "My free act
contributes to the cosmic shape."[9]
Likewise, some interpretations of quantum
mechanics, dating to 1945, involve
backward-in-time causal influences.[10]

Causality is linked by many philosophers

to the concept of counterfactuals. To say
that A caused B means that if A had not
happened then B would not have
happened. This view was advanced by
David Lewis in his 1973 paper
"Causation".[11] His subsequent papers[12]
further develop his theory of causation.

Causality is usually required as a

foundation for philosophy of science if
science aims to understand causes and
effects and make predictions about them.

Necessity and possibility E…

Metaphysicians investigate questions

about the ways the world could have been.
David Lewis, in On the Plurality of Worlds,
endorsed a view called Concrete Modal
realism, according to which facts about
how things could have been are made true
by other concrete worlds in which things
are different. Other philosophers, including
Gottfried Leibniz, have dealt with the idea
of possible worlds as well. A necessary
fact is true across all possible worlds. A
possible fact is true in some possible
world, even if not in the actual world. For
example, it is possible that cats could
have had two tails, or that any particular
apple could not have existed. By contrast,
certain propositions seem necessarily
true, such as analytic propositions, e.g.,
"All bachelors are unmarried." The view
that any analytic truth is necessary is not
universally held among philosophers. A
less controversial view is that self-identity
is necessary, as it seems fundamentally
incoherent to claim that any x is not
identical to itself; this is known as the law
of identity, a putative "first principle."
Similarly, Aristotle describes the principle
of non-contradiction:

It is impossible that the same quality

should both belong and not belong to
the same thing ... This is the most
certain of all principles ... Wherefore
they who demonstrate refer to this as an
ultimate opinion. For it is by nature the
source of all the other axioms.

Peripheral questions
What is "central" and "peripheral" to
metaphysics has varied over time and
schools; however contemporary analytic
philosophy as taught in USA and UK
universities generally regards the above as
"central" and the following as
"applications" or "peripheral" topics; or in
some cases as distinct subjects which
have grown out of and depend upon
metaphysics:

Cosmology and cosmogony E…

Metaphysical cosmology is the branch of

metaphysics that deals with the world as
the totality of all phenomena in space and
time. Historically, it formed a major part of
the subject alongside Ontology, though its
role is more peripheral in contemporary
philosophy. It has had a broad scope, and
in many cases was founded in religion.
The ancient Greeks drew no distinction
between this use and their model for the
cosmos. However, in modern times it
addresses questions about the Universe,
which are beyond the scope of the
physical sciences. It is distinguished from
religious cosmology in that it approaches
these questions using philosophical
methods (e.g. dialectics).
Cosmogony deals specifically with the
origin of the universe. Modern
metaphysical cosmology and cosmogony
try to address questions such as:

What is the origin of the Universe? What

is its first cause? Is its existence
necessary? (see monism, pantheism,
emanationism and creationism)
What are the ultimate material
components of the Universe? (see
mechanism, dynamism, hylomorphism,
atomism)
What is the ultimate reason for the
existence of the Universe? Do the
cosmos have a purpose? (see teleology)
Mind and matter E…

Different approaches toward resolving the mind–body

problem

Accounting for the existence of mind in a

world composed mainly of matter is a
metaphysical problem that is so large and
important as to have become a
specialized subject of study in its own
right, philosophy of mind.
Substance dualism is a classical theory in
which mind and body are essentially
different, with the mind having some of the
attributes traditionally assigned to the
soul, and which creates an immediate
conceptual puzzle about how the two
interact. This form of substance dualism
differs from the dualism of some eastern
philosophical traditions (like Nyāya), which
also posit a soul; for the soul, under their
view, is ontologically distinct from the
mind.[13] Idealism postulates that material
objects do not exist unless perceived and
only as perceptions. Adherents of
panpsychism, a kind of property dualism,
hold that everything has a mental aspect,
but not that everything exists in a mind.
Neutral monism postulates that existence
consists of a single substance that in
itself is neither mental nor physical, but is
capable of mental and physical aspects or
attributes – thus it implies a dual-aspect
theory. For the last century, the dominant
theories have been science-inspired
including materialistic monism, type
identity theory, token identity theory,
functionalism, reductive physicalism,
nonreductive physicalism, eliminative
materialism, anomalous monism, property
dualism, epiphenomenalism and
emergence.
Determinism and free will E…

Determinism is the philosophical

proposition that every event, including
human cognition, decision and action, is
causally determined by an unbroken chain
of prior occurrences. It holds that nothing
happens that has not already been
determined. The principal consequence of
the deterministic claim is that it poses a
challenge to the existence of free will.

The problem of free will is the problem of

whether rational agents exercise control
over their actions and decisions.
Addressing this problem requires
understanding the relation between
freedom and causation and determining
whether the laws of nature are causally
deterministic. Some philosophers, known
as Incompatibilists, view determinism and
free will as mutually exclusive. If they
believe in determinism, they will, therefore,
believe free will to be an illusion, a position
known as Hard Determinism. Proponents
range from Baruch Spinoza to Ted
Honderich. Henri Bergson defended free
will in his dissertation Time and Free Will
from 1889.

Others, labeled Compatibilists (or "Soft

Determinists"), believe that the two ideas
can be reconciled coherently. Adherents of
this view include Thomas Hobbes and
many modern philosophers such as John
Martin Fischer, Gary Watson, Harry
Frankfurt, and the like.

Incompatibilists who accept free will but

reject determinism are called Libertarians,
a term not to be confused with the political
sense. Robert Kane and Alvin Plantinga
are modern defenders of this theory.

Natural and social kinds E…

The earliest type of classification of social

construction traces back to Plato in his
dialogue Phaedrus where he claims that
the biological classification system seems
to "carve nature at the joints." [14] In
contrast, later philosophers such as
Michel Foucault and Jorge Luis Borges
have challenged the capacity of natural
and social classification. In his essay The
Analytical Language of John Wilkins,
Borges makes us imagine a certain
encyclopedia where the animals are
divided into (a) those that belong to the
emperor; (b) embalmed ones; (c) those
that are trained;... and so forth, to bring
forward the ambiguity of natural and
social kinds.[15] According to metaphysics
author Alyssa Ney: "the reason all this is
interesting is that there seems to be a
metaphysical difference between the
Borgesian system and Plato's." [16] The
difference is not obvious, but one
classification attempts to carve entities up
according to objective distinction while the
other does not. According to Quine this
notion is closely related to the notion of
similarity.[17]

Number E…

There are different ways to set up the

notion of numbers in metaphysics
theories. Platonist theories postulate
number as a fundamental category itself.
Others consider it to be a property of an
entity called a "group" comprising other
entities; or to be a relation held between
several groups of entities, such as "the
number four is the set of all sets of four
things." Many of the debates around
universals are applied to the study of
numbers. They are of particular
importance due to its status as a
foundation for the philosophy of
mathematics and for mathematics itself.

Applied metaphysics E…

Although metaphysics as a philosophical

enterprise is highly hypothetical, it also
has practical application in most other
branches of philosophy, science, and now
also information technology. Such areas
generally assume some basic ontology
(such as a system of objects, properties,
classes, and space-time) as well as other
metaphysical stances on topics such as
causality and agency, then build their
particular theories upon these.

In science, for example, some theories are

based on the ontological assumption of
objects with properties (such as electrons
having charge). In contrast, others may
reject objects altogether (such as
quantum field theories, where spread-out
"electronness" becomes property of
space-time rather than an object).

"Social" branches of philosophy such as

philosophy of morality, aesthetics and
philosophy of religion (which in turn give
rise to practical subjects such as ethics,
politics, law, and art) all require
metaphysical foundations, which may be
considered as branches or applications of
metaphysics. For example, they may
postulate the existence of basic entities
such as value, beauty, and God. Then they
use these postulates to make their
arguments about consequences resulting
from them. When philosophers in these
subjects make their foundations, they are
doing applied metaphysics. They may
draw upon its core topics and methods to
guide them, including ontology and other
core and peripheral issues. As in science,
the foundations chosen will, in turn,
depend on the underlying ontology used,
so philosophers in these subjects may
have to dig right down to the ontological
layer of metaphysics to find what is
possible for their theories. For example, a
contradiction obtained in a theory of God
or Beauty might be due to an assumption
that it is an object rather than some other
kind of ontological entity.

Relationship of metaphysics
Relationship of metaphysics
and science
Before the modern history of science,
scientific questions were addressed as a
part of natural philosophy. Originally, the
term "science" (Latin Scientia) simply
meant "knowledge". The scientific method,
however, transformed natural philosophy
into an empirical activity deriving from
experiment, unlike the rest of philosophy.
By the end of the 18th century, it had
begun to be called "science" to distinguish
it from other branches of philosophy.
Science and philosophy have been
considered separate disciplines ever
since. After that, metaphysics denoted
philosophical inquiry of a non-empirical
character into the nature of existence.[18]

Metaphysics continues asking "why"

where science leaves off. For example, any
theory of fundamental physics is based on
some set of axioms, which may postulate
the existence of entities such as atoms,
particles, forces, charges, mass, or fields.
Stating such postulates is considered to
be the "end" of a scientific theory.
Metaphysics takes these postulates and
explores what they mean as human
concepts. For example, do all theories of
physics require the existence of space and
time,[19] objects and properties? Or can
they be expressed using only objects, or
single properties? Do the objects have to
retain their identity over time or can they
change?[20] If they change, then are they
still the same object? Can theories be
reformulated by converting properties or
predicates (such as "red") into entities
(such as redness or redness fields) or
processes ('there is some redding
happening over there' appears in some
human languages in place of the use of
properties)? Is the distinction between
objects and properties fundamental to the
physical world or our perception of it?
Much recent work has been devoted to
analyzing the role of metaphysics in
scientific theorizing. Alexandre Koyré led
this movement, declaring in his book
Metaphysics and Measurement, "It is not by
following experiment, but by outstripping
experiment, that the scientific mind makes
progress."[21] That metaphysical
propositions can influence scientific
theorizing is John Watkins' most lasting
contribution to philosophy. Since
1957[22][23] "he showed the ways in which
some un-testable and hence, according to
Popperian ideas, non-empirical
propositions can nevertheless be
influential in the development of properly
testable and hence scientific theories.
These profound results in applied
elementary logic...represented an
important corrective to positivist
teachings about the meaninglessness of
metaphysics and of normative claims".[24]
Imre Lakatos maintained that all scientific
theories have a metaphysical "hard core"
essential for the generation of hypotheses
and theoretical assumptions.[25] Thus,
according to Lakatos, "scientific changes
are connected with vast cataclysmic
metaphysical revolutions."[26]

An example from the biology of Lakatos'

thesis: David Hull has argued that changes
in the ontological status of the species
concept have been central in the
development of biological thought from
Aristotle through Cuvier, Lamarck, and
Darwin. Darwin's ignorance of
metaphysics made it more difficult for him
to respond to his critics because he could
not readily grasp how their underlying
metaphysical views differed from his
own.[27]

In physics, new metaphysical ideas have

arisen in connection with quantum
mechanics, where subatomic particles
arguably do not have the same sort of
individuality as the particulars with which
philosophy has traditionally been
concerned.[28] Also, adherence to a
deterministic metaphysics in the face of
the challenge posed by the quantum-
mechanical uncertainty principle led
physicists such as Albert Einstein to
propose alternative theories that retained
determinism.[29] A.N. Whitehead is famous
for creating a process philosophy
metaphysics inspired by
electromagnetism and special relativity.[30]

In chemistry, Gilbert Newton Lewis

addressed the nature of motion, arguing
that an electron should not be said to
move when it has none of the properties
of motion.[31]

Katherine Hawley notes that the

metaphysics even of a widely accepted
scientific theory may be challenged if it
can be argued that the metaphysical
presuppositions of the theory make no
contribution to its predictive success.[32]

Rejections of metaphysics
Several individuals have suggested that
much or all of metaphysics should be
rejected. In the 16th century, Francis
Bacon rejected scholastic metaphysics,
and argued strongly for what is now called
empiricism, being seen later as the father
of modern empirical science. In the 18th
century, David Hume took a strong
position, arguing that all genuine
knowledge involves either mathematics or
matters of fact and that metaphysics,
which goes beyond these, is worthless. He
concludes his Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding with the statement:

If we take in our hand any

volume; of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance; let us
ask, Does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerni ng
 quantity or number? No. Does it
contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of
fact and existence? No. Commit
it then to the flames: for it can
contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion. [33]

Thirty-three years after Hume's Enquiry

appeared, Immanuel Kant published his
Critique of Pure Reason. Although he
followed Hume in rejecting much of
previous metaphysics, he argued that
there was still room for some synthetic a
priori knowledge, concerned with matters
of fact yet obtainable independent of
experience. These included fundamental
structures of space, time, and causality.
He also argued for the freedom of the will
and the existence of "things in
themselves," the ultimate (but
unknowable) objects of experience.

Wittgenstein introduced the concept that

metaphysics could be influenced by
theories of aesthetics, via logic, vis. a
world composed of "atomical facts".[34][35]

In the 1930s, A.J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap

endorsed Hume's position; Carnap quoted
the passage above.[36] They argued that
metaphysical statements are neither true
nor false but meaningless since, according
to their verifiability theory of meaning, a
statement is meaningful only if there can
be empirical evidence for or against it.
Thus, while Ayer rejected the monism of
Spinoza, he avoided a commitment to
pluralism, the contrary position, by holding
both views to be without meaning.[37]
Carnap took a similar line with the
controversy over the reality of the external
world.[38] While the logical positivism
movement is now considered dead, (with a
major proponent AJ Ayer admitting in a TV
interview that "it was a lot of fun ... but it
was false") it has continued to influence
philosophy development.[39]

Arguing against such rejections, the

Scholastic philosopher Edward Feser held
that Hume's critique of metaphysics, and
specifically Hume's fork, is "notoriously
self-refuting".[40] Feser argues that Hume's
fork itself is not a conceptual truth and is
not empirically testable.

Some living philosophers, such as Amie

Thomasson, have argued that many
metaphysical questions can be dissolved
just by looking at the way we use words;
others, such as Ted Sider, have argued
that metaphysical questions are
substantive and that we can make
progress toward answering them by
comparing theories according to a range
of theoretical virtues inspired by the
sciences, such as simplicity and
explanatory power.[41]

Etymology
The word "metaphysics" derives from the
Greek words μετά (metá,"after") and
φυσικά (physiká, "physics").[42] It was first
used as the title for several of Aristotle's
works, because they were usually
anthologized after the works on physics in
complete editions. The prefix meta-
("after") indicates that these works come
"after" the chapters on physics. However,
Aristotle himself did not call the subject of
these books metaphysics: he referred to it
as "first philosophy." The editor of
Aristotle's works, Andronicus of Rhodes, is
thought to have placed the books on first
philosophy right after another work,
Physics, and called them τὰ μετὰ τὰ
φυσικὰ βιβλία (tà metà tà physikà biblía)
or "the books [that come] after the [books
on] physics."

However, once the name was given, the

commentators sought to find other
reasons for its appropriateness. For
instance, Thomas Aquinas understood it
to refer to the chronological or
pedagogical order among our
philosophical studies so that the
"metaphysical sciences" would mean
"those that we study after having
mastered the sciences that deal with the
physical world." [43]

The term was misread by other medieval

commentators, who thought it meant "the
science of what is beyond the physical".[44]
Following this tradition, the prefix meta-
has more recently been prefixed to the
names of sciences to designate higher
sciences dealing with ulterior and more
fundamental problems: hence
metamathematics, metaphysiology, etc.[45]

A person who creates or develops

metaphysical theories is called a
metaphysician.[46]

Common parlance also uses the word

"metaphysics" for a different referent from
that of the present article, namely for
beliefs in arbitrary non-physical or magical
entities. For example, "Metaphysical
healing" to refer to healing using remedies
that are magical rather than scientific.[47]
This usage stemmed from the various
historical schools of speculative
metaphysics which operated by
postulating all manner of physical, mental
and spiritual entities as bases for
particular metaphysical systems.
Metaphysics as a subject does not
preclude beliefs in such magical entities,
but neither does it promote them. Instead,
it is the subject that provides the
vocabulary and logic with which such
views might be analyzed and studied, for
example, to search for inconsistencies
both within themselves and with other
accepted systems such as Science.

History and schools of

metaphysics
metaphysics

Pre-history E…

Cognitive archeology, such as analysis of

cave paintings and other pre-historic art
and customs suggests that a form of
perennial philosophy or Shamanic
metaphysics may stretch back to the birth
of behavioral modernity, all around the
world. Similar beliefs are found in present-
day "stone age" cultures such as
Australian aboriginals. Perennial
philosophy postulates the existence of a
spirit or concept world alongside the day-
to-day world, and interactions between
these worlds during dreaming and ritual, or
on special days or at special places. It has
been argued that perennial philosophy
formed the basis for Platonism, with Plato
articulating, rather than creating, much
older widespread beliefs.[48][49]

Bronze Age E…

Bronze Age cultures such as ancient

Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt (along
with similarly structured but
chronologically later cultures such as
Mayans and Aztecs) developed belief
systems based on mythology,
anthropomorphic gods, mind-body
dualism, and a spirit world, to explain
causes and cosmology. These cultures
appear to have been interested in
astronomy and may have associated or
identified the stars with some of these
entities. In ancient Egypt, the ontological
distinction between order (maat) and
chaos (Isfet) seems to have been
important.[50]

Pre-Socratic Greece E…
The circled dot was used by the Pythagoreans and
later Greeks to represent the first metaphysical being,
the Monad or The Absolute.

The first named Greek philosopher,

according to Aristotle, is Thales of Miletus,
early 6th century BCE. He made use of
purely physical explanations to explain the
phenomena of the world rather than the
mythological and divine explanations of
tradition. He is thought to have posited
water as the single underlying principle (or
Arche in later Aristotelian terminology) of
the material world. His fellow, but younger
Miletians, Anaximander and Anaximenes,
also posited underlying monistic
principles, namely Apeiron (the indefinite
or boundless) and air respectively.

Another school was the Eleatics, in

southern Italy. The group was founded in
the early fifth century BCE by Parmenides,
and included Zeno of Elea and Melissus of
Samos. Methodologically, the Eleatics
were broadly rationalist and took relevant
standards of clarity and necessity to be
the criteria of truth. Parmenides' chief
doctrine was that reality is a single
unchanging and universal Being. Zeno
used reductio ad absurdum, to
demonstrate the illusory nature of change
and time in his paradoxes.

Heraclitus of Ephesus, in contrast, made

change central, teaching that "all things
flow." His philosophy, expressed in brief
aphorisms, is quite cryptic. For instance,
he also taught the unity of opposites.

Democritus and his teacher Leucippus, are

known for formulating an atomic theory
for the cosmos.[51] They are considered
forerunners of the scientific method.
Classical China E…

The modern "yin and yang symbol" (taijitu)

Metaphysics in Chinese philosophy can be

traced back to the earliest Chinese
philosophical concepts from the Zhou
Dynasty such as Tian (Heaven) and Yin
and Yang. The fourth century BCE saw a
turn towards cosmogony with the rise of
Taoism (in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi)
and sees the natural world as dynamic and
constantly changing processes which
spontaneously arise from a single
immanent metaphysical source or
principle (Tao).[52] Another philosophical
school which arose around this time was
the School of Naturalists which saw the
ultimate metaphysical principle as the
Taiji, the "supreme polarity" composed of
the forces of Yin and Yang which were
always in a state of change seeking
balance. Another concern of Chinese
metaphysics, especially Taoism, is the
relationship and nature of Being and non-
Being (you 有 and wu 無). The Taoists held
that the ultimate, the Tao, was also non-
being or no-presence.[52] Other important
concepts were those of spontaneous
generation or natural vitality (Ziran) and
"correlative resonance" (Ganying).

After the fall of the Han Dynasty (220 CE),

China saw the rise of the Neo-Taoist
Xuanxue school. This school was very
influential in developing the concepts of
later Chinese metaphysics.[52] Buddhist
philosophy entered China (c. 1st century)
and was influenced by the native Chinese
metaphysical concepts to develop new
theories. The native Tiantai and Huayen
schools of philosophy maintained and
reinterpreted the Indian theories of
shunyata (emptiness, kong空) and
Buddha-nature (Fo xing 佛性) into the
theory of interpenetration of phenomena.
Neo-Confucians like Zhang Zai under the
influence of other schools developed the
concepts of "principle" (li) and vital energy
(qi).

Socrates and Plato E…

Socrates is known for his dialectic or

questioning approach to philosophy rather
than a positive metaphysical doctrine.

His pupil, Plato, is famous for his theory of

forms (which he places in the mouth of
Socrates in his dialogues). Platonic
realism (also considered a form of
idealism)[53] is considered to be a solution
to the problem of universals; i.e., what
particular objects have in common is that
they share a specific Form which is
universal to all others of their respective
kind.

The theory has several other aspects:

Epistemological: knowledge of the

Forms is more specific than mere
sensory data.
Ethical: The Form of the Good sets an
objective standard for morality.
 Time and Change: The world of the
Forms is eternal and unchanging. Time
and change belong only to the lower
sensory world. "Time is a moving image
of Eternity."
Abstract objects and mathematics:
Numbers, geometrical figures, etc., exist
mind-independently in the World of
Forms.

Platonism developed into Neoplatonism, a

philosophy with a monotheistic and
mystical flavor that survived well into the
early Christian era.

Aristotle E…
Plato's pupil Aristotle wrote widely on
almost every subject, including
metaphysics. His solution to the problem
of universals contrasts with Plato's.
Whereas Platonic Forms are existentially
apparent in the visible world, Aristotelian
essences dwell in particulars.

Potentiality and Actuality[54] are principles

of a dichotomy which Aristotle used
throughout his philosophical works to
analyze motion, causality and other
issues.

The Aristotelian theory of change and

causality stretches to four causes: the
material, formal, efficient, and final. The
efficient cause corresponds to what is
now known as a cause simplicity. Final
causes are explicitly teleological, a
concept now regarded as controversial in
science.[55] The Matter/Form dichotomy
was to become highly influential in later
philosophy as the substance/essence
distinction.

The opening arguments in Aristotle's

Metaphysics, Book I, revolve around the
senses, knowledge, experience, theory, and
wisdom. The first main focus in the
Metaphysics is attempting to determine
how intellect "advances from sensation
through memory, experience, and art, to
theoretical knowledge." [56] Aristotle claims
that eyesight provides us with the
capability to recognize and remember
experiences, while sound allows us to
learn.

Classical India E…

More on Indian philosophy: Hindu

philosophy

Sāṃkhya E…

Sāṃkhya is an ancient system of Indian

philosophy based on a dualism involving
the ultimate principles of consciousness
and matter.[57] It is described as the
rationalist school of Indian philosophy.[58]
It is most related to the Yoga school of
Hinduism, and its method was most
influential on the development of Early
Buddhism.[59]

The Sāmkhya is an enumerationist

philosophy whose epistemology accepts
three of six pramanas (proofs) as the only
reliable means of gaining knowledge.
These include pratyakṣa (perception),
anumāṇa (inference) and śabda
(āptavacana, word/testimony of reliable
sources).[60][61][62]
Samkhya is strongly dualist.[63][64][65]
Sāmkhya philosophy regards the universe
as consisting of two realities; puruṣa
(consciousness) and prakṛti (matter). Jiva
(a living being) is that state in which
puruṣa is bonded to prakṛti in some
form.[66] This fusion, state the Samkhya
scholars, led to the emergence of buddhi
("spiritual awareness") and ahaṅkāra (ego
consciousness). The universe is described
by this school as one created by purusa-
prakṛti entities infused with various
permutations and combinations of
variously enumerated elements, senses,
feelings, activity and mind.[66] During the
state of imbalance, one of more
constituents overwhelm the others,
creating a form of bondage, particularly of
the mind. The end of this imbalance,
bondage is called liberation, or moksha, by
the Samkhya school.[67]

The existence of God or supreme being is

not directly asserted, nor considered
relevant by the Samkhya philosophers.
Sāṃkhya denies the final cause of Ishvara
(God).[68] While the Samkhya school
considers the Vedas as a reliable source
of knowledge, it is an atheistic philosophy
according to Paul Deussen and other
scholars.[69][70] A key difference between
Samkhya and Yoga schools, state
scholars,[70][71] is that Yoga school
accepts a "personal, yet essentially
inactive, deity" or "personal god".[72]

Samkhya is known for its theory of guṇas

(qualities, innate tendencies).[73] Guṇa, it
states, are of three types: sattva being
good, compassionate, illuminating,
positive, and constructive; rajas is one of
activity, chaotic, passionate, impulsive,
potentially good or bad; and tamas being
the quality of darkness, ignorance,
destructive, sluggish, negative. Everything,
all life forms, and human beings, state
Samkhya scholars, have these three
guṇas, but in different proportions. The
interplay of these guṇas defines the
character of someone or something, of
nature and determines the progress of
life.[74][75] The Samkhya theory of guṇas
was widely discussed, developed and
refined by various schools of Indian
philosophies, including Buddhism.[76]
Samkhya's philosophical treatises also
influenced the development of various
theories of Hindu ethics.[59]

Vedānta E…

Realization of the nature of Self-identity is

the principal object of the Vedanta system
of Indian metaphysics. In the Upanishads,
self-consciousness is not the first-person
indexical self-awareness or the self-
awareness which is self-reference without
identification,[77] and also not the self-
consciousness which as a kind of desire is
satisfied by another self-
consciousness.[78] It is Self-realisation; the
realisation of the Self consisting of
consciousness that leads all else.[79]

The word Self-consciousness in the

Upanishads means the knowledge about
the existence and nature of Brahman. It
means the consciousness of our real
being, the primary reality.[80] Self-
consciousness means Self-knowledge, the
knowledge of Prajna i.e. of Prana which is
Brahman.[81] According to the Upanishads
the Atman or Paramatman is
phenomenally unknowable; it is the object
of realisation. The Atman is unknowable in
its essential nature; it is unknowable in its
essential nature because it is the eternal
subject who knows about everything,
including itself. The Atman is the knower
and also the known.[82]

Metaphysicians regard the Self either to be

distinct from the Absolute or entirely
identical with the Absolute. They have
given form to three schools of thought –
a) the Dualistic school, b) the Quasi-
dualistic school and c) the Monistic school,
as the result of their varying mystical
experiences. Prakrti and Atman, when
treated as two separate and distinct
aspects form the basis of the Dualism of
the Shvetashvatara Upanishad.[83] Quasi-
dualism is reflected in the Vaishnavite-
monotheism of Ramanuja and the
absolute Monism, in the teachings of Adi
Shankara.[84]

Self-consciousness is the Fourth state of

consciousness or Turiya, the first three
being Vaisvanara, Taijasa and Prajna.
These are the four states of individual
consciousness.
Three distinct stages are leading to Self-
realisation. The First stage is in mystically
apprehending the glory of the Self within
us as though we were distinct from it. The
Second stage is in identifying the "I-within"
with the Self, that we are in essential
nature entirely identical with the pure Self.
The Third stage is in realizing that the
Atman is Brahman, that there is no
difference between the Self and the
Absolute. The Fourth stage is in realizing "I
am the Absolute" – Aham Brahman Asmi.
The Fifth stage is in realizing that
Brahman is the "All" that exists, as also
that which does not exist.[85]
Buddhist metaphysics E…

In Buddhist philosophy, various

metaphysical traditions have proposed
different questions about the nature of
reality based on the teachings of the
Buddha in the early Buddhist texts. The
Buddha of the early texts does not focus
on metaphysical questions but ethical and
spiritual training and in some cases, he
dismisses certain metaphysical questions
as unhelpful and indeterminate Avyakta,
which he recommends should be set
aside. The development of systematic
metaphysics arose after the Buddha's
death with the rise of the Abhidharma
traditions.[86] The Buddhist Abhidharma
schools developed their analysis of reality
based on the concept of dharmas which
are the ultimate physical and mental
events that makeup experience and their
relations to each other. Noa Ronkin has
called their approach "phenomenological."
[87]

Later philosophical traditions include the

Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna, which
further developed the theory of the
emptiness (shunyata) of all phenomena or
dharmas which rejects any kind of
substance. This has been interpreted as a
form of anti-foundationalism and anti-
realism which sees reality as having no
ultimate essence or ground.[88] The
Yogacara school meanwhile promoted a
theory called "awareness only" (vijnapti-
matra) which has been interpreted as a
form of Idealism or Phenomenology and
denies the split between awareness itself
and the objects of awareness.[89]

Islamic metaphysics E…

Major ideas in Sufi metaphysics have

surrounded the concept of weḥdah (‫)وﺣﺪة‬
meaning "unity", or in Arabic ‫ ﺗﻮﺣﻴﺪ‬tawhid.
waḥdat al-wujūd means the "Unity of
Existence" or "Unity of Being." The phrase
has been translated "pantheism."[90] Wujud
(i.e. existence or presence) here refers to
Allah's wujud (compare tawhid). On the
other hand, waḥdat ash-shuhūd, meaning
"Apparentism" or "Monotheism of Witness,"
holds that God and his creation are entirely
separate.

Scholasticism and the Middle Ages E…

More on medieval philosophy and

metaphysics: Medieval Philosophy

This section does not cite any sources.

Learn more
Between about 1100 and 1500, philosophy
as a discipline took place as part of the
Catholic church's teaching system, known
as scholasticism. Scholastic philosophy
took place within an established
framework blending Christian theology
with Aristotelian teachings. Although
fundamental orthodoxies were not
commonly challenged, there were
nonetheless deep metaphysical
disagreements, particularly over the
problem of universals, which engaged
Duns Scotus and Pierre Abelard. William
of Ockham is remembered for his principle
of ontological parsimony.
Rationalism and Continental
Rationalism
E…

In the early modern period (17th and 18th

centuries), the system-building scope of
philosophy is often linked to the rationalist
method of philosophy, which is the
technique of deducing the nature of the
world by pure reason. The scholastic
concepts of substance and accident were
employed.

Leibniz proposed in his Monadology a

plurality of non-interacting substances.
Descartes is famous for his dualism of
material and mental substances.
 Spinoza believed reality was a single
substance of God-or-nature.

British empiricism E…

British empiricism marked something of a

reaction to rationalist and system-building
metaphysics, or speculative metaphysics
as it was pejoratively termed. The skeptic
David Hume famously declared that most
metaphysics should be consigned to the
flames (see below). Hume was notorious
among his contemporaries as one of the
first philosophers to doubt religion openly
but is better known now for his critique of
causality. John Stuart Mill, Thomas Reid
and John Locke were less skeptical,
embracing a more cautious style of
metaphysics based on realism, common
sense and science. Other philosophers,
notably George Berkeley, were led from
empiricism to idealistic metaphysics.

Wolff E…

Christian Wolff had theoretical philosophy

divided into an ontology or philosophia
prima as a general metaphysics,[91] which
arises as a preliminary to the distinction of
the three "special metaphysics"[92] on the
soul, world and God:[93][94] rational
psychology,[95][96] rational cosmology[97]
and rational theology.[98] The three
disciplines are called empirical and
rational because they are independent of
revelation. This scheme, which is the
counterpart of religious tripartition in
creature, creation, and Creator, is best
known to philosophical students by Kant's
treatment of it in the Critique of Pure
Reason. In the "Preface" of the 2nd edition
of Kant's book, Wolff is defined "the
greatest of all dogmatic philosophers."[99]

Kant E…

Immanuel Kant attempted a grand

synthesis and revision of the trends
already mentioned: scholastic philosophy,
systematic metaphysics, and skeptical
empiricism, not to forget the burgeoning
science of his day. As did the systems
builders, he had an overarching framework
in which all questions were to be
addressed. Like Hume, who famously
woke him from his 'dogmatic slumbers,' he
was suspicious of metaphysical
speculation, and also places much
emphasis on the limitations of the human
mind. Kant described his shift in
metaphysics away from making claims
about an objective noumenal world,
towards exploring the subjective
phenomenal world, as a Copernican
Revolution, by analogy to (though opposite
in direction to) Copernicus' shift from man
(the subject) to the sun (an object) at the
center of the universe.

Kant saw rationalist philosophers as

aiming for a kind of metaphysical
knowledge he defined as the synthetic
apriori—that is the knowledge that does
not come from the senses (it is a priori).
Still, it is nonetheless about reality
(synthetic). Since it is about reality, it
differs from abstract mathematical
propositions (which he terms analytical
apriori), and being apriori, it is distinct
from empirical, scientific knowledge
(which he terms synthetic aposteriori).
The only synthetic apriori knowledge we
can have is of how our minds organize the
data of the senses; that organizing
framework is space and time, which for
Kant have no mind-independent existence,
but operate uniformly in all humans.
Apriori knowledge of space and time is all
that remains of metaphysics as
traditionally conceived. There is a reality
beyond sensory data or phenomena, which
he calls the realm of noumena; however,
we cannot know it as it is in itself, but only
as it appears to us. He allows himself to
speculate that the origins of phenomenal
God, morality, and free will might exist in
the noumenal realm. Still, these
possibilities have to be set against its
basic unknowability for humans. Although
he saw himself as having disposed of
metaphysics, in a sense, he has generally
been regarded in retrospect as having a
metaphysics of his own, and as beginning
the modern analytical conception of the
subject.

Kantians E…

Nineteenth-century philosophy was

overwhelmingly influenced by Kant and his
successors. Schopenhauer, Schelling,
Fichte and Hegel all purveyed their
panoramic versions of German Idealism,
Kant's caution about metaphysical
speculation, and refutation of idealism,
having fallen by the wayside. The idealistic
impulse continued into the early twentieth
century with British idealists such as F.H.
Bradley and J.M.E. McTaggart. Followers
of Karl Marx took Hegel's dialectic view of
history and re-fashioned it as materialism.

Early analytical philosophy and

positivism
E…

During the period when idealism was

dominant in philosophy, science had been
making significant advances. The arrival
of a new generation of scientifically
minded philosophers led to a sharp
decline in the popularity of idealism during
the 1920s.

Analytical philosophy was spearheaded by

Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. Russell
and William James tried to compromise
between idealism and materialism with
the theory of neutral monism.

The early to mid-twentieth century

philosophy saw a trend to reject
metaphysical questions as meaningless.
The driving force behind this tendency was
the philosophy of logical positivism as
espoused by the Vienna Circle, which
argued that the meaning of a statement
was its prediction of observable results of
an experiment, and thus that there is no
need to postulate the existence of any
objects other than these perceptual
observations.

At around the same time, the American

pragmatists were steering a middle course
between materialism and idealism.
System-building metaphysics, with a fresh
inspiration from science, was revived by
A.N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Continental philosophy E…
The forces that shaped analytical
philosophy—the break with idealism, and
the influence of science—were much less
significant outside the English speaking
world. However, there was a shared turn
toward language. Continental philosophy
continued in a trajectory from post
Kantianism.

The phenomenology of Husserl and others

was intended as a collaborative project for
the investigation of the features and
structure of consciousness common to all
humans, in line with Kant's basing his
synthetic apriori on the uniform operation
of consciousness. It was officially neutral
with regards to ontology but was
nonetheless to spawn several
metaphysical systems. Brentano's concept
of intentionality would become widely
influential, including on analytical
philosophy.

Heidegger, author of Being and Time, saw

himself as re-focusing on Being-qua-being,
introducing the novel concept of Dasein in
the process. Classing himself an
existentialist, Sartre wrote an extensive
study of Being and Nothingness.

The speculative realism movement marks

a return to full-blooded realism.
Process metaphysics E…

There are two fundamental aspects of

everyday experience: change and
persistence. Until recently, the Western
philosophical tradition has arguably
championed substance and perseverance,
with some notable exceptions, however.
According to process thinkers, novelty,
flux, and accident do matter, and
sometimes they constitute the ultimate
reality.

In a broad sense, process metaphysics is

as old as Western philosophy, with figures
such as Heraclitus, Plotinus, Duns Scotus,
Leibniz, David Hume, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph
von Schelling, Gustav Theodor Fechner,
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Charles
Renouvier, Karl Marx, Ernst Mach, Friedrich
Wilhelm Nietzsche, Émile Boutroux, Henri
Bergson, Samuel Alexander, and Nicolas
Berdyaev. It seemingly remains an open
question whether major "Continental"
figures such as the late Martin Heidegger,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze,
Michel Foucault, or Jacques Derrida
should be included.[100]

In a strict sense, process metaphysics

may be limited to the works of a few
founding fathers: G.W.F. Hegel, Charles
Sanders Peirce, William James, Henri
Bergson, A.N. Whitehead, and John Dewey.
From a European perspective, there was a
very significant and early Whiteheadian
influence on the works of outstanding
scholars such as Émile Meyerson (1859–
1933), Louis Couturat (1868–1914), Jean
Wahl (1888–1974), Robin George
Collingwood (1889–1943), Philippe
Devaux (1902–1979), Hans Jonas (1903–
1993), Dorothy M. Emmett (1904–2000),
Maurice Merleau Ponty (1908–1961),
Enzo Paci (1911–1976), Charlie Dunbar
Broad (1887–1971), Wolfe Mays (1912–
2005), Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003), Jules
Vuillemin (1920–2001), Jean Ladrière
(1921–2007), Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995),
Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928–2014), and
Reiner Wiehl (1929–2010).[101]

Contemporary analytical philosophy E…

While early analytic philosophy tended to

reject metaphysical theorizing, under the
influence of logical positivism, it was
revived in the second half of the twentieth
century. Philosophers such as David K.
Lewis and David Armstrong developed
elaborate theories on a range of topics
such as universals, causation, possibility,
and necessity and abstract objects.
However, the focus of analytical
philosophy generally is away from the
construction of all-encompassing systems
and toward a close analysis of individual
ideas.

Among the developments that led to the

revival of metaphysical theorizing was
Quine's attack on the analytic–synthetic
distinction, which was generally taken to
undermine Carnap's distinction between
existence questions internal to a
framework and those external to it.[102]

The philosophy of fiction, the problem of

empty names, and the debate over
existence's status as a property have all
come of relative obscurity into the
limelight, while perennial issues such as
free will, possible worlds, and the
philosophy of time have had new life
breathed into them.[103][104]

The analytic view is of metaphysics as

studying phenomenal human concepts
rather than making claims about the
noumenal world, so its style often blurs
into philosophy of language and
introspective psychology. Compared to
system-building, it can seem very dry,
stylistically similar to computer
programming, mathematics or even
accountancy (as a commonly stated goal
is to "account for" entities in the world).

See also
Category:Metaphysical fiction novels
Feminist metaphysics
Metaphilosophy
Metaethics
Metacognition
Metaphysics of presence
Philosophical logic
Philosophical realism
Philosophical theology
Philosophy of physics
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Further reading
 Neil A. Manson, Robert W. Barnard
(eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to
Metaphysics, Bloomsbury, 2014.

External links
Metaphysics at PhilPapers
Metaphysics at the Indiana Philosophy
Ontology Project
"Metaphysics" . Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Metaphysics at Encyclopædia
Britannica
The London Philosophy Study Guide
offers many suggestions on what to
read, depending on the student's
familiarity with the subject: Logic &
Metaphysics .
Metaphysics public domain
audiobook at LibriVox
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