Nhsmun 2017 - Unpbc

UNPBC
UN Peacebuilding
Commission
BACKGROUND GUIDE
THE SITUATION IN LIBYA
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
Prepared by:
International Model United Nations Association (IMUNA)
National High School Model United Nations (NHSMUN)
© IMUNA, All Rights Reserved
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 43rd Annual Conference: March 10-13, 2017 | March 15-18, 2017
E: sg.nhsmun@imuna.org T: +1 (212) 652-9992 W: www.nhsmun.org
Dear Delegates,
Secretary-General
I am very excited to welcome you all to this year’s NHSMUN conference and to the United
Jennifer Padilla Nations Peacebuilding Commission! My name is José Carstensen, and I have the pleasure of
University of Southern California co-directing this committee with my partner Dimitri Henry! I am a rising sophomore at the
Director-General University of Monterrey in Mexico, majoring in International Relations. Some of my biggest
Nika Arzoumanian passions include history and politics, and I plan to focus my studies towards Political Science
New York University & Public Administration in school. I also love to travel, watch movies, and follow current
Conference Director events!
Zach Hauser
Pomona College
To my disappointment, my high school never had an MUN program, and it was not until my
Chiefs of Staff junior year of that I first attended a MUN conference. I immediately fell in love with the
Nicholas Rigler simulated debates and consequently I got involved in as many MUN-related activities that I
University of Washington
Joy Cui could find. This ultimately led me to the Regional High School Model United Nations
University of Pittsburgh (RHSMUN) 2014 conference in San Francisco, where I participated as a delegate in the
Economic and Financial Committee (ECOFIN). I realized that the International Model
Chiefs of External Relations
Maunica Malladi United Nations Association (IMUNA), the organization that also runs NHSMUN, had a very
University of Alabama unique and different philosophy, which encouraged me to apply to staff. I was an assistant
Juhee Shah director for ECOFIN at RHSMUN 2015 and migrated to the east coast this year to work as
University of Southern California
the co-director for UNPBC at this year’s NHSMUN conference!
Directors of Security
Suzanne Warshell
Brown University
Our topics this year are very important in current debates, international political discussions,
Elliot Weiss and security talks. If you ever have any doubts or questions, please feel free to ask, and our
Brown University committee team will be happy to assist you. Our job is to guide you, so do not hesitate to
Administrative Affairs reach out. These topics are very special and must be addressed carefully, due to their heavy
Allison Koehler influence on both domestic politics and the current international intervention systems.
University of Connecticut Nonetheless, I promise they get more and more interesting as you learn more about them, and
Under-Secretaries-General this Background Guide will help you get started.
Emily Nielsen
American University It is my complete honor to welcome you to the conference!
Joe Palekas
American University
Christopher Goydos Best,
George Washington University
Summer Starkie
Lipscomb University José Carstensen
Henry Shreffler UNPBC.NHSMUN@IMUNA.org
Harvard College United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
Kelsey Movsowitz
George Washington University Session I
Paige Petrashko
University of California, Berkeley
Emily Chen
Princeton University
NHSMUN is a project of the

International Model United Nations
Association, Incorporated (IMUNA).
IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer
organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary
school level.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 43rd Annual Conference: March 10-13, 2017 | March 15-18, 2017
E: sg.nhsmun@imuna.org T: +1 (212) 652-9992 W: www.nhsmun.org
Dear Delegates,
Secretary-General I could not be more excited to help welcome you to the wonderful experience that is the
Jennifer Padilla United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) at the 2017 National High School
Model United Nations Conference. My name is Dimitri Henry, and I have the absolute
Director-General pleasure to be the director of Session II and co-direct this committee with my partner José
Nika Arzoumanian Carstensen. I am sure that we will get to know each other well in committee; however, in the
New York University
interim, let me tell you a little about myself. I am a sophomore at New York University
Conference Director pursuing a B.A. in Politics from the College of Arts & Sciences and a B.A. in Public Policy
Zach Hauser from the Wagner School of Public Service. After my undergraduate degree, I plan on going to
Pomona College
graduate school - hopefully law school or some other form of public service. Some of my
Chiefs of Staff hobbies and interests include playing the saxophone, reading dystopian novels, playing chess,
Nicholas Rigler
University of Washington and doing Ken-Ken puzzles.
Joy Cui
University of Pittsburgh I started MUN in my junior year of high school, much like José, through the New Jersey
YMCA program known as Y-Civic Engagement. After doing two years of its multi-state
Chiefs of External Relations
Maunica Malladi conference, I graduated and picked up college Model UN. While I have never competed at the
University of Alabama collegiate level, I was selected during my first year to staff the eighth New York University
Juhee Shah Model United Nations Conference as the Vice Chair of Contemporary Hungary. That same
year, I became the assistant director of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission at
Directors of Security NHSMUN 2016. As you can probably tell, I never attended NHSMUN as a delegate, and I am
Suzanne Warshell
Brown University
completely envious of the incredible opportunity that IMUNA has afforded you as you
Elliot Weiss prepare for NHSMUN 2017. Nevertheless, this year I hold the position of Director of
Brown University UNPBC and am so blessed to be able to work such an incredible staff that will put on a
Administrative Affairs conference that is sure to be one of the best conferences you have attended.
Allison Koehler
University of Connecticut Although I may be biased, I cannot convey the exciting evolution that this committee has
Under-Secretaries-General
sustained over the last year. This year, the IMUNA Board of Directors, under-secretaries-
Emily Nielsen general Summer Starkie and Chris Goydos, my co-director José, assistant directors Josh Pliskin
American University and Eunice Huang, and I have broken the typical mold of this committee as seen in the real
Joe Palekas world. Branching into prevalent issues in the Middle East and the Americas, we have
American University
Christopher Goydos committed ourselves to providing you all with a slightly different perspective, yet holistic view
George Washington University of some of the most complex conflicts in our world. We, as facilitators, will try our best to
Summer Starkie provide you with the tools to foster discourse, but this cannot be an uneven relationship. The
Lipscomb University
Henry Shreffler nuances of either topic are far too intricate and scholarly for you to not prepare. Regardless,
Harvard College NHSMUN is a journey and we will be walking it together through each committee session.
Kelsey Movsowitz
George Washington University In closing, I just would like to re-iterate how inexplicably excited I am to have you in this
Paige Petrashko
University of California, Berkeley committee. By the time conference comes around, we all will have put an incredible amount of
Emily Chen work into these topics; it will all be completely worth it and something to be proud of.
Princeton University
Sincerely,
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United Nations
Association, Incorporated (IMUNA).
Dimitri J. Henry
IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer UNPBC.NHSMUN@IMUNA.org
organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
school level. Session II
NHSMUN 2017
UNPBC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference .................................................................................................... 1
A Note on Research and Preparation .................................................................................................... 3
Committee History ................................................................................................................................ 4
Simulation .............................................................................................................................................. 7
Topic A: The Situation in Libya ............................................................................................................ 9
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 9
History and Description of the Issue ........................................................................................................................ 10
Current Status ............................................................................................................................................................... 16
Bloc Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 18
Committee Mission ...................................................................................................................................................... 20
Topic B: The Situation in Haiti ........................................................................................................... 22
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 22
History and Description of the Issue ........................................................................................................................ 23
Current Status ............................................................................................................................................................... 35
Bloc Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 37
Committee Mission ...................................................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix A: Libya Timeline of Important Events .............................................................................. 40
Appendix B: Libyan Civilian Re-Entry ................................................................................................ 42
Appendix C: Internal Conflict in Libya ............................................................................................... 43
Research and Preparation Questions .................................................................................................. 44
Topic A: The Situation in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 44
Topic B: The Situation in Haiti .................................................................................................................................. 44
Important Documents ......................................................................................................................... 45
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 47
Committee History and Simulation ........................................................................................................................... 47
NHSMUN 2017
UNPBC
A NOTE ON THE NHSMUN DIFFERENCE

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Hello and welcome to NHSMUN 2017! My name is Nika Arzoumanian, and I am this year’s
Director-General. I hope you are as excited as I am to prepare for and attend the world’s largest
Model United Nations conference this March.
As a part of the International Model United Nations Association, Inc. (IMUNA), NHSMUN is
dedicated to promoting global issues education through simulation. Our specific programming
teaches students to cultivate excellent communication and decision-making skills by leveraging the
power of compromise, consensus, and cooperation for effective negotiations. To maintain a strong
focus on the educational aspects of Model UN, we have a range of activities that differ from other
organizations’ programming:
Strong knowledge foundations for debate: Substantively rigorous debate requires deep topic
knowledge by both delegates and staff. Beginning with our topic background guides (like this one),
we produce extremely detailed and wide-reaching topic overviews to prepare delegates for the
complexities and nuances inherent in global issues. Our committee directors developed these guides
in a publication process spanning 6 months with multiple editing periods and input from expert
contributors. Because these timely debate topics are always changing on the world stage, we produce
update papers in the two months prior to the conference to bolster our background guides and
assist delegates in focusing on the most up-to-date information. Even with all of that work and
research, we believe these guides should serve as a launching pad for delegates to dive further into
topics, analyzing their country positions and policy suggestions.
Extremely prepared staff: As mentioned, our staff develops deep topic and committee knowledge
through the development of our background guides, but researching is only a piece of our
preparation. The directors and assistant directors who guide debate are trained through a cumulative
108 hours of in-person training sessions, workshops, and virtual training exercises throughout the
year. Our substantive staff members also review every submitted position paper in advance of the
conference to understand delegates’ thoughts, suggested solutions, and potential divisions and adapt
dais committee approaches accordingly. When our staff members say they dream about speakers
lists, heated debates, and draft resolutions, they mean it.
Wide diversity of opinions: Our topics are global, and so are our staff and delegates. Our staff are
top university students from all over the world. In fact, our staff members represent more than 20
countries. This means that each background guide and programming decision incorporates a global
perspective. Additionally, our delegates come from more than 75 countries. Cooperation and
cultural awareness happen not only in our committee rooms but also out in the hallways, elevators,
and friendly interactions throughout the duration of our conference.
Realistic simulation: Like UN delegates, NHSMUN delegates are incorporated into the complete
debate process, from agenda-setting to voting on draft resolutions and amendments. UN
representatives are forced to prioritize topics, even when multiple topics appear equally pressing.
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While each BG contains two topic selections, NHSMUN committees will strive to have a fruitful
discussion on and produce resolutions on a single topic; prioritizing the quality of discussion over
quantity of topics addressed. BGs contain two topics in order to allow delegates to decide which
problem ought to be prioritized, a valuable discussion in and of itself.
Tailored rules of debate and committee practices: NHSMUN uses a set of the Rules of
Procedure that is standardized across all IMUNA-brand conferences. While the general structure
and flow of committee will be familiar to any delegate who has previously participated in Model UN,
there may be slight procedural differences from other conferences. All delegates are encouraged to
review the Rules of Procedure before attending the conference in the Delegate Preparation Guide
and are welcome to direct questions to any member of NHSMUN Staff.
Focused committee time: NHSMUN prohibits the usage of personal electronics during
committee. We feel strongly that the interpersonal connections made during debate are enhanced by
face-to-face communication. Enforcing a strict no-laptops policy also helps us to ensure that all of
our delegates have an equal opportunity to succeed in committee. We staff a dedicated team in our
office to assist in typing and formatting draft resolutions and working papers so that committee time
can be focused on discussion and compromise. Please note: The Dais is permitted a laptop for the
purposes of communicating with respective Under-Secretaries-General and other Senior Staff
members, as well as attending to administrative needs.
Educational emphasis, even for awards: At the core of the NHSMUN philosophy is an emphasis
on education and compromise. While NHSMUN does distribute awards, we feel that it is crucial to
de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity.
NHSMUN seeks to reward schools whose students excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy.
We always prioritize a dedication to teamwork over solitary achievement. As such, we do not
distribute awards to individual delegates, with the exception of committees where students represent
their own separate delegation (our Specialized Agencies such as ICJ and UNSC, for example).
Instead, awards will be distributed to schools whose delegates exhibit excellence across all
committees. The awards system is standardized so as to give equal weight to schools and delegations
of all sizes. Detailed information on the determination of awards at NHSMUN will be available in
our conference program and guides.
As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2017
and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates.
Delegates, your time in the committee room in March will prepare you to become the future leaders
of our world, and I look forward to seeing you grow as both students and global citizens during our
conference.
Best,
Nika Arzoumanian
Director-General, NHSMUN 2017
PROGRAMMING@IMUNA.ORG
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A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United
Nations 2017 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that
will be discussed in your committee. This guide is designed to give you a description of the topics
and the committee, but it is not intended to represent exhaustive research on every facet of the
topics. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to identify and
analyze the intricacies of the issues when they arrive to the conference in March. Delegates must be
prepared to intelligently utilize their knowledge and apply it to their own country’s policy. You will
find that your state has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted by the opinions of
another state and that may not be represented in this Guide.
We have published several Preparation Guides, which, among other sections, contain detailed
instructions on how to effectively participate in committee sessions and how to write a position
paper. The Preparation Guides also give a synopsis of the types of research materials and resources
available to you and where they can be found. The task of preparing and researching for the
conference is challenging, but it is very interesting and rewarding at the same time.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate that
particular state’s views in writing. Accordingly, NHSMUN require each delegate (or double
delegation team) to write a position paper. Position papers should clearly outline the country’s
policies on the topic areas to be discussed, as well as which factors contribute to these policies. In
addition, each paper should address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the
committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the perspective of
the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2017 and should articulate the policies you will
espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-spaced. The papers will be
reviewed by the director of each committee and returned prior to your arrival at the conference,
with brief comments or constructive advice.
Each team is responsible for sending a copy of its papers to the Director-General via email on or
before January 27, 2017. Please email the entire delegation’s papers at one time to
papers.nhsmun@imuna.org. Complete instructions for these submissions may be found in our
Delegate and Faculty Preparation Guides. If delegations are unable to submit an online version of
their position papers, they should contact the Director-General (dg.nhsmun@imuna.org) as soon as
possible to find an alternative form of submission.
Delegations that do not submit position papers will be ineligible for awards.
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COMMITTEE HISTORY
The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) was established as a part of the reform
process that took place during the 60th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 1
Peacebuilding, a precautionary framework aimed at reducing threats that would undermine the
peaceful status of a post-conflict country, has always been a fundamental goal of the United Nations.
However, there was much deliberation throughout the process of creating a separate institution to
address this issue.2
The inception of the UNPBC began in December 2004 when the former Secretary-General Kofi
Annan established the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.3 This panel sought to
assess current global threats to international peace and provide an analysis of future challenges,
identify the contribution of international parties, and recommend changes necessary to ensure
effective collective action. It was within this panel’s report that the Secretary-General first proposed
a new intergovernmental body, the “Peacebuilding Commission”.4 The framework of the
Peacebuilding Commission provided the foundation for the creation of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission the following year.
The UNPBC’s mandate explains the Commission’s peacebuilding capabilities in the international
community. On 20 December 2005, the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly
adopted resolution S/RES/1645 and A/RES/60/180 which established the UNPBC with the
following mandate:
1. To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed
integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
2. To help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial
investment over the medium to long-term;
3. To develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian
and development actors.56
In general, countries targeted by the UNPBC suffer from persistent development challenges such as
poverty, political corruption, and resource scarcity.7 These characteristics make countries highly
vulnerable to conflict resurgence. The UNPBC recognizes the interconnectedness of these factors
and therefore seeks to combat these developments by identifying critical priorities. The Commission
works to analyze the status of post-conflict countries and extend their time in the international
1 S/RES/1645, “Resolution 1645,” 20 December 2005, accessed 17 June 2016,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1645%20(2005).
2 “Peacebuilding and the United Nations,” United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office,
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml.
3 “The Peacebuilding Commission,” Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/un-reform/un-reform-topics/the-
peacebuilding-commission.html.
4 Ibid.
5 A/RES/60/180, “The Peacebuilding Commission,” 30 December 2005, accessed 17 June 2016,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/180.
6 S/RES/1645, “Resolution 1645,” 20 December 2005, accessed 17 June 2016,
7 “Mandate of the Peacebuilding Fund,” United Nations Peacebuilding Commission,
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml.
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spotlight to prevent relapses into violence.8 Additionally, the Commission is unique from other UN
committees in that it directly focuses on the needs and capacities of post-conflict countries and
seeks to organize recovery projects that will ensure peaceful reconstruction.
The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), in addition to intergovernmental and inter-organizational funding,

funds the activities recommended by the UNPBC in post-conflict states. The Peacebuilding Fund,
which sponsors post-conflict reconstruction projects, was launched on 11 October 2006. Its central
purpose is to “establish a crucial bridge between conflict and recovery at a time when other funding
mechanisms may not yet be available.”9 Funds from the PBF are also available to countries deemed
to be in similar circumstances by the Secretary-General.
The standing Organizational Committee is comprised of 31 member states, including the following:
1. 7 members elected by the General Assembly;
2. 7 members of the Security Council;
3. 7 members of the Economic and Social Council;
4. 5 members chosen as the top providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and
of voluntary contributions to the UN funds, programmes and agencies, including a
standing peacebuilding fund;
5. 5 top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions.10
When operating in a given post-conflict country, the Organizational Committee convenes in a

country-specific configuration (CSC), which includes all the members of the organizational
committee plus all the relevant actors operating in the country of interest. Additionally, the UNPBC
also converges as the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL).11 By analyzing previous
peacebuilding tactics, these meetings are intended to “develop forward-looking lessons and
recommendations for post-conflict strategies and implementations.”12
The first session of the UNPBC was held in June 2006. The arrangements set out for the UNPBC in
resolution A/RES/60/180, were reviewed and amended in December 2010, five years after its
adoption. These amendments led to the new format under which the UNPBC operates. Countries
currently on the UNPBC agenda include: Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Central African
Republic.13
Given that UNPBC is a relatively new body, its mandate is constantly changing. For example, in its
2015 report, UNPBC announced that it would begin conducting country case studies of countries
8 Ibid.
9 A/RES/60/180, “The Peacebuilding Commission,” 30 December 2005, accessed 17 June 2016,
10 “Structure and Membership,” United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, accessed 09 May 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/structuremember.shtml.
11 “Working Group on Lessons Learned,” United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, Accessed 17 June 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/sm_lessonslearned.shtml.
12 Ibid.
13“Structure and Membership,” United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.
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both on and off the commission’s agenda, including Burundi, Central African Republic, Sierra
Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste.14
14A/69/674–S/2014/911,“Letter dated 15 December 2014 from the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General,” 17 December 2014, accessed 15 April 2016,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/674.
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SIMULATION
The mission of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) is to establish and rebuild
infrastructure and social systems in post-conflict countries through integrated systems management.
Its role also encompasses providing recommendations for agenda countries and the coordination of
all actors integrated into peacebuilding efforts in each respective country. As delegates, your task will
be to assume the role of UNPBC members in their efforts to solve peacebuilding issues such as
democratic development, governance and stability, disarmament, empowerment of vulnerable
populations, and public sector reform. These issues will all have varying roots and needs based on
the countries that are involved.
The UNPBC is unique in its role as it serves directly as an advisory body to the Security Council and
the General Assembly, thus providing the organization with special capabilities in resolving post-
conflict issues. However, delegates should note that the Security Council is the only committee that
can demand an action or implement economic sanctions. Additionally, delegates should note that
the UNPBC is unique in its simulation, as it will cover countries as case studies, rather than solely as
topics. Although the UNPBC is a relatively new committee, it has made noteworthy
accomplishments in the agenda countries of Burundi, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and the Central African Republic. It will be essential for delegates to reference the extensive actions
taken by the UNPBC in these countries during committee for the most realistic simulation possible.
In particular, delegates should reference the Working Group of Lessons Learned in implementing
the UNPBC’s mandate and programs in other countries.
For the committee, the dais is composed of a Director and an Assistant Director, who are
responsible for the preparations and development of this year’s session. Delegates are highly
encouraged to use both the Director and Assistant Director as valuable resources for substantive
and procedural concerns. The Dais will also manage the proceedings of the committee, moderating
debate and fielding any motions. However, the role of the Director is not to tell you what to discuss,
or what your country’s position is. Delegates will have the opportunity to voice their country’s
position through formal and informal debate, including moderated and unmoderated caucuses, as
well as being added to the speaker’s list. Remember that the delegates are the ones who hold the
power in changing the direction of the debate, not the Director.
There are a multitude of possibilities within the mandate of the UNPBC for the formation of
resolutions. The role of the delegate is all but simple: to maintain your country’s complex positions
on the two following case studies while utilizing diplomacy in consensus building. These two
elements of committee will be critical in the process of debate, forming blocs, writing working
papers, and working toward the common goal of passing resolutions. Though cooperation and
diplomacy are important, always bear in mind your country’s foreign policy and position on the
topics. Delegates should never sacrifice their country’s position for the sake of compromise or to
speed up committee. While debating during the committee sessions is an important component to
committee, remember that preparedness, research, and contributing to working papers are all
invaluable to the flow of a successful committee.
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Once a working paper has been debated and re-written into resolution format, it becomes a draft
resolution to be presented in front of the committee. Any changes to draft resolutions must occur
through unfriendly amendments (all amendments at NHSMUN are considered unfriendly). This
means that the entire committee must hold a simple majority vote on the amendment, regardless of
sponsor support for the amendment. Since this process lengthens voting procedures and eliminates
debate, changes to working papers before submitting draft resolutions are highly encouraged. If this
is not possible or debate is necessary, then the dais will accept any and all amendments. Substantive
debate can be conducted either formally or informally. Formal debate is guided by the Speakers' List,
which records those countries wishing to speak. Delegates should use this time to address their
general stance and their country’s policy on the topic. Delegates can then identify like-minded
parties who can work together to draft a working paper. Informal debate occurs during either
moderated or unmoderated caucusing. With many speakers and a shorter speaking time, moderated
caucuses move at a faster pace than formal debate. These sessions are used to debate specific details
and one dimension of the topic. Unmoderated caucusing suspends the rules for a set period of time,
allowing delegates to convene and converse more freely, discuss possible solutions, and work
together to form resolutions.
While the process may appear long and arduous, active participation, negotiation, and debate will
lead to innovative solutions to the committee’s topics and aid in improving peacebuilding solutions
in our two cases presented.
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TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

INTRODUCTION
On 17 December 2010, the “Arab Spring,” a revolutionary wave that rocked the Middle East and
North African (MENA) region, took hold of countries in North Africa after a young Tunisian street
vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire.15 Exactly two months later, on 17 February 2011,
protests in the same vein began in Libya.16 The day dubbed as a “Day of Rage” would be the start of
an eight-month long ordeal that would claim the lives of as many as 30,000 people between rebels
and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, a force led by Muammar Gaddafi for nearly
four decades prior.17 The presumable end of the conflict came when Muammar Gaddafi was found
hiding in his hometown of Sirte and killed by rebel forces, to the alarm of many international bodies
and countries (read more). It was not long before Gaddafi’s removal turned into a power vacuum
for one of Africa’s wealthiest countries. His removal highlighted and exacerbated several problems
that were once underlying and ignored due to Libya’s relative economic successes.
The State of Libya has faced conflict after conflict almost every year since its independence from
Italy in 1951. Due to its mostly desert terrain yet extremely rich oil field supply, it has always been in
a desirable location for international and intranational groups. In the last ten years, Libya has rid
itself of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year rule and has had two civil wars that have been marred by
ethnic and religious differences. Because of constant struggle for power, government stability has
drastically decreased, and the notion of a consistent rule of law is almost completely absent. Having
once been at the forefront of African economies, this lack of government stability within Libya also
began to threaten the stability of states within its region and abroad.18
Additionally, the ongoing conflict has displaced hundreds of thousands of people and has created a
state of migrant instability within the region. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century
and during Gaddafi’s rule, Libya was known as a formidable country for its role in the international
community, even at one point becoming the chair of both the UN Human Rights Commission and
the chair of the African Union.19 Nevertheless, the country’s proximity to Europe and multi-port
coastline has created a haven for both migrants looking for opportunities in other countries and
terror organizations looking to further their mission abroad.20 Running in tandem with the massive
influx of arms from the Gaddafi era, the migrants and IDPs in Libya and its neighboring countries
have never been more at risk than in the last 50 years.
15 “Libya - Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide,” Cornell University, accessed 21 August 2016,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200751.
16 Ibid.
17 Jessica Rettig, “Death Toll of ‘Arab Spring’ - Libya,” US News, accessed 21 August 2016,
http://www.usnews.com/news/slideshows/death-toll-of-arab-spring.
18 “Libya's Instability Threatens Regional Borderlands,” Stratfor, 19 March 2016, accessed 21 August 2016,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/libyas-instability-threatens-regional-borderlands.
19 "Libya Profile - Timeline," BBC, accessed July 22, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445.
20 Nick Walsh, “ISIS on Europe's Doorstep: How Terror is Infiltrating the Migrant Route,” CNN, 26 May 2016,
accessed 26 August 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/middleeast/libya-isis-europe-doorstep/.
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Now, Libya is in a state of chaos. With many basic aspects of society in flux and constant variability
in the rule of law, the level of accountability in the state has reached an all-time low. Numerous
attempts to help fix the situation have been made by governments, NGOs and international
organizations alike.21 The UNPBC has yet to come across and intervene in a political landscape like
that in Libya. As a member of the commission, new and innovative ways to help fix the problems
and bring peace to the region will be required to surmount the ever-changing circumstance in Libya.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

Please see Appendix A for a comprehensive timeline of events pertinent to the situation in Libya.
Government Stability
With the overthrow of former Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi and the end of the Great Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya regime in 2011, the Libyan government was in an extremely fragile
state of civil war. The void left by the removal of the thirty-year rule left a large power vacuum in
North Africa and the Middle East, prime stomping grounds for militant groups to seize territory.22
To establish a stable system in the country, the international community pushed for the democratic
election of a new Libyan government.
With elections held on 8 August 2012, a new democratically elected government known as the
General National Congress (GNC) took power over the recovering country. After two years, the
GNC had become the subject of considerable discontent for, among other things, allegedly allowing
itself to be dominated by Islamists despite that group holding only formally a minority of
congressional seats; channeling government funds towards some Islamist armed groups and allowing
others to conduct assassinations and kidnappings, voting to declare Sharia Law and establishing "a
special committee" to "review all existing laws to guarantee they comply with Islamic law," and
imposing gender segregation and compulsory hijab at Libyan universities.23 With the power and
influence the GNC had accrued over the past two years, the party extended its electoral mandate
into 2014, unilaterally voting on 23 December 2013 to do so. 24
This extension of their mandate prompted opposition forces, known as the Council of Deputies, to
demand for the GNC’s dissolution and the creation of new elections. Only after General Khalifa
Haftar, a Libyan general and high-ranking opposition leader, launched Operation Dignity on 16 May
2014 against the GNC did the GNC hold elections on 25 May 2014.25 Although the GNC lost in the
21 Ibid.
22 Nick Meo, "Libya: Revolutionaries Turn on Each Other as Fears Grow for Law and Order," The Telegraph, 31 October
2011, accessed 21 July 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionaries-turn-on-
each-other-as-fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html.
23 St. John Ronald Bruce, Historical Dictionary of Libya, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 2014, 201;
Feras Bosalum and Patrick Markey, "Libyan Assembly Votes to Follow Islamic Law," Reuters, 4 December 2013,
accessed 21 July 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/04/us-libya-law-idUSBRE9B30M220131204.
24 "Libya Congress Extends Its Mandate until End-2014," Middle East Institute, accessed 21 July 2016,
http://www.mei.edu/content/libya-congress-extends-its-mandate-until-end-2014.
25 Camille Tawil, "Operation Dignity: General Haftar's Latest Battle May Decide Libya's Future," The Jamestown
Foundation, accessed 22 July 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42443.
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elections, the body rejected the results due to an 18% voter turnout.26 Using the low turnout as a
smoking gun, the now out of power members of the GNC reconvened in Tripoli to try to retain
what influence they had by establishing a government with a more fundamental Islamic rule of law.
Factions soon began to build as conflict mounted over which government had the authority to rule
over Libya. The consequential actions taken by the either party thus resulted in the start of the
second Libyan civil war in a four-year period.
With the country plunged into yet another power vacuum, a massive international effort to form a
stable Libyan government was initiated. This new government, dubbed as Libya’s new “unity
government,” was supported by international bodies and tried to remedy oppositional forces for the
GNC and the Council of Deputies by ensuring representation for both parties in the new
government.27 Initially, the compromise was somewhat accepted by the authorities of both parties.
However, the same individuals would come to reject the “unity government” and its authority.28
Now, with increased turmoil in 2016 such as the United States increased bombing in Libya as well as
the conflicting rulings of the bodies of government present in Libya, the “unity government” is
currently very fragile and is on the verge of collapse via ideological lines (read more).29 These
occurrences are also a grave indication of the great amount of distrust and polarization that the the
Libyan people feel toward each other and in some cases foreign intervention, especially from the
Western world. A collapse of this government would mean the destabilization of the not only Libya
but the Middle East and North Africa as well.
Internal Conflict
The region in which Libya resides has come to know decades, arguably centuries, of conflict. Much
of this conflict stems from deeply rooted ethnic differences seen in both the relationships within the
countries on a domestic level between ethnic groups and political factions and a regional level
between international bodies and other countries. Libya has two distinct main entities that are
separated by their support for the two different government factions. The militant factions
supporting the new General Congress are predominantly Islamic and have a large amount of the
western part of Libya under their control. 30 These groups include the non-jihadist groups of Libya
Dawn, Libya Shield, and the jihadist groups of the Islamic State, Ansar al-Sharia, and the al-Qaeda
affiliated Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura, Derna Mujahidin Shura, and Ajdabiya Revolutionaries
Shura Councils.31 The militant groups in support of the Council of Deputies hold a very large
foothold in the Eastern part of the Libyan country; these groups include the main body of the
Libyan National Army and the Zintan, al-Sawaiq, al-Qaqa Battalions.32 According to the map in
26 "Tarhouna Rejects House of Representatives, Declares Support for Operation Dawn," Libya Herald, 21 August 2014,
accessed 22 July 2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/2014/08/21/tarhouna-rejects-house-of-representatives-declares-
support-for-operation-dawn/.
27 “Libya: Tripoli Authorities Support UN-Backed Government,” Al Jazeera, 6 April 2016, accessed 3 July 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/libya-tripoli-authorities-unity-government-160405203534731.html.
28 Ibid.
29 “UN Backed Tripoli Government Suffers Another Setback, Four Ministers Resign,” Tripoli Post, 2 February 2016,
accessed 3 July 2016, http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=11087.

30 “Guide to Key Libyan Militias," BBC News, 11 January 2016, accessed 23 July 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19744533.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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Appendix C, there was a broad delineation of territory either side controlled in the State of Libya; a
more detailed map can be found here.33
For months, these groups have clashed over the power vacuum. The division between these two
groups represents decades of ideological differences that have recently started to surface. By adding
to the fight, each of these militia groups have contributed an additional source of hostility that
brings either side farther from peace for the region. Additionally, each militia through its actions
makes the other side more radical in nature. For example, the Libyan Dawn militia supports the
implementation of a more fundamentalist Islamic rule known as Sharia Law. One of its allies - ISIL -
supports Sharia Law and the creation of a purely Islamic State where Sharia Law can be
implemented. Because of this link, the cause that the two are fighting for ultimately is the
implementation of an Islamic State and and not just a Libya governed by Sharia Law. 34
The conflict between these two sides has also reached the point where the ethnic groups themselves
have had to decide which group to support. For example, tensions in the south between the Tuareg
and the Tebus have reached breaking points as decades of ethnic rivalry, mistrust, and pressure to
choose the winning side has compounded. Members from both groups have used the opportunity to
discriminate against either side due to their ethnic origins - the Tuareg from an “Islamist” Mali and
the Tebus from Chad. While on a surface level the fact that the Tebus originate from Chad does not
seem like a problem, the Tuareg have the belief that the massive Tebus immigration is being used as
a way for Chad to intervene in Libyan politics.35 With limited economic resources in the south of the
country, the Tuareg and the Tebus have had to turn to creating alliances with the Council of
Deputies and the new GNC respectively to preserve their own well-being.36 This reaction is not an
isolated incident as other ethnic groups, such as the Berbers, have taken the same approach in allying
themselves with the main parties that are warring in order to preserve their own interest.37 One
Berber militia commander stated: “We are being pushed towards one side because [local tribes] and
the rest of our enemies are siding with Tobruk. However, we all know that we will end up protecting
ourselves from the Libya Dawn militia,” choosing to convey the decision as one of of necessity and
not choice.38 Bearing in mind that the situation of the warring factions has caused even ethnic
groups to take sides, the potential dangers are as drastic as the human rights violations that can
spawn from the delineation of alliances such as genocide toward a single group.
As an international body, the UNPBC is completely committed to the preservation of peace in the
international community. Its mission of peacebuilding is incredibly important in the world and
especially in Libya. With the identified constantly warring groups, the UNPBC needs to work with
local and international parties to help de-escalate the rising tension of the ethnic factions. It is
important to take stock of the many different perspectives of the factions on either side. For
33 Farouk Chothia, "Islamic State Gains Libya Foothold," BBC News, 24 February 2015, accessed 17 September 2016,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31518698.
34 Michel Cousins, “Ethnic Conflict Adds to Libya’s Crisis," Arab Weekly, 16 October 2015, accessed 23 July 2016,
http://www.thearabweekly.com/Opinion/2447/Ethnic-conflict-adds-to-Libya’s-crisis.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Karlos Zurutuza, “Libya's Berbers Fear Ethnic Conflict," Al Jazeera, 6 April 2015, accessed 7 July 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/libya-berbers-fear-ethnic-conflict-2014123065353199495.html.
38 Ibid.
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example, as prescribed before, there are both jihadist and non-jihadist parties from different clans
that are fighting on both sides. In the same breath, the need for an effective solution is extremely
pressing. The death count of this situation has far surpassed expectations due to the developments
of ethnic militant groups. The UNPBC must be able to address the varying perspectives of the
Libyan people and create a resolution in which long term peace can be obtained.
Arms Reduction
Over the years of the Muammar Gaddafi regime and after its ousting, Libya’s military arms stockpile
increased exponentially. In 1968, Libya became a signatory of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), ratified the treaty in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement in 1980.39 Although the
NPT was signed by Muammar Gaddafi, there have been many reports of unsuccessful attempts to
build nuclear weapons and failed attempts to purchase a nuclear weapon from nuclear-armed
countries. These reports were only bolstered in the 1970s and 1980s when Gaddafi made numerous
attempts to accelerate and push forward his ambitions for an active nuclear weapons program, using
the nuclear black market sources. However, due to U.S. sanctions, Gaddafi agreed to reduce Libya's
nuclear weapons program on December 2003.40
While this arms reduction was seen throughout the county, the 2011 Libyan Civil War quickly
reversed it. During and after the Arab Spring and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, an unprecedented
number of arms were ushered into the country to fuel the revolution that was taking place in Tripoli
and later in Sirte. While the National Transitional Council (NTC) took the reins of the country after
Muammar Gaddafi, one of the bodies’ policy was the disarmament of the weapons used during the
civil war. While hopeful that these policies would come into effect, it was not long until many of the
guns that had flooded the market were used again. With the fall of the NTC came another civil war,
and the demand for guns only increased as more factions requested arms. The 2014 Libyan Civil
War created a constant flow of arms into the country from dealers and created another branch to a
very lucrative industry.
In addition to the influx of weapons, Libya struggles to contain the trade of arms already inside the
country. According to the Armament Research Services (ARES), weapons from handguns and
assault rifles to shoulder-launched anti-aircraft systems are bought and sold through a network of
uncertain size.41 Many of these trades occur over common social media platforms such as Facebook
and are thought to be organized by local militia groups.42 While open marketplaces on social media
are quickly shut down, the study found that more inconspicuous online marketplaces can operate for
several months without being reported.43 The ease of firearms trade poses a security threat to not
only Libya and its civilian populations but also to the surrounding region, as arms circulate through
the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, a 2014 investigation by the UN Security Council's Libya
39 “Libya - Nuclear," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016, accessed 23 July 2016, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/.
40 Ibid.
41 Gabriel Gatehouse, “Weapons for Sale on Facebook in Libya,” BBC News, 6 April 2016, accessed 23 September 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35980338.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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Sanctions Committee concluded that weapons from Libya have been used to wage conflict in
fourteen countries across the region.44
The consequences of the influx of weapons brought into Libya not only included an increase of
violence but also an increase of Libyan deaths. Furthermore, the fighting has extended far past the
main civil war and has allowed rival ethnic groups to attack each other with new means and abilities,
causing death and destruction. The arms problem has compounded upon itself and has begun to
define the state of Libya for the future.
Civilian Re-entry
As with most war, often the main victims are civilians, and Libya is no exception. In times of
conflict, the population of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) spikes because of the
number of people trying to escape from harm’s way. With the ongoing conflict in Libya, there has
been anywhere between 600,000 and 1,000,000 people displaced, as well as nearly one million
members of militias that need to be re-entered into society.45 In fact, in 2013, there were 91,098
people of concern as classified by the UN due to their displacement in Libya. This number is
concerning when compared to 399,935 in 2014 (the start of a new civil war) and the 471,653 in 2015
(an 18% increase from the year prior).46
When discussing how to help civilian re-entry into Libyan society, it is extremely important to
understand exactly how both refugees and IDPs ended up in the situation they are in currently. The
UN has stated that “a refugee is a “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because
of persecution, war, or violence;” “a refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” as per
Resolution 2198 (XXI) passed in 1951.47 The people of Libya and the surrounding region have faced
countless violent terrorist attacks from militant groups causing them to flee to Europe through the
Mediterranean Sea.48 Libya itself has become a hotspot for undocumented migrants, refugees, and
even terrorists escaping prosecution for its centrality and access to the sea. Appendix B depicts many
migration paths through Central & Northern Africa.49
While many of the civilians that are categorized as “refugees” are trying to leave the county, there
are some who simply cannot afford to do so due to their situation. In 2001, the UN defined the
qualifications to be categorized as an internally displaced person as “someone who is forced to flee
44 Michelle Nichols, “Libya Key Source for Illicit Arms, Fueling Conflicts: U.N. Envoy,” Reuters, 10 March 2014,
accessed 23 September 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-crisis-un-idUSBREA291OV20140310.
45 Barbara Slavin, "Tunisia's President Asks US for Help - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East," Al-Monitor, 2014,
accessed 18 May 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/tunisia-africa-summit-terrorists-

helicopters.html.
46 “Libya - Global Focus," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2016, accessed 23 July 2016,
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/12003.
47 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” Geneva: The United Nations, December 2010, accessed
15 September 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-

refugees.html.
48 “ISIS in Libya: A Major Regional and International Threat,” The Meir Amir Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,
January 2016, accessed 31 May 2016, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20943.

49 “Main Migration Routes to and from Libya (to Italy and Greece) May 2016,” UNHCR, accessed 31 May 2016,
https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=105.
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his or her home but who remains within his or her country's borders.”50 Due to militant attacks and
border closures around the region, many civilians cannot find the means to escape conflict areas. In
fact, there is a very serious issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Libya, with 434,869
people internally displaced, needing a place to stay and live.51 The violence that the region is
experiencing exacerbates the situation. Not only do the militant skirmishes and terrorist attacks
claim lives on either side but the IDPs and refugees that are migrating through these areas are also
being killed. At any time, civilians can be killed in their migration to Libya’s port cities, the risk being
heightened even just by traveling in open country. The fact that these civilians understand the costs
of the journey to Libya’s northern coast and still decide to risk their lives speaks volumes to just how
bad the danger is that they are trying to escape and the lengths to which these civilians will go to
protect their families.
On the surface, the main factor driving these refugees and IDPs away and around Libya is violence.
However, there are a myriad of other threats facing these civilians as well. The emerging
humanitarian crisis has equally as dramatic of an effect on these individuals as the amount of
violence they face. Many have died trying to sail to Italy over the North African-Europe path. The
same water pathways seen as chance for opportunity claimed the lives of 2,510 people in the first
five months of 2016.52 This was a 35% increase from the year before during the same period.
Furthermore, throughout the journey the civilians take, the issues of health and hygiene become
more and more pertinent the longer they travel. All in all, an estimated 2.54 million people are of
need of immediate humanitarian assistance in Libya and its surrounding area with 79% of all
affected people are in need of some form of protection from serious violations of International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law. Death rates of theses civilians have skyrocketed in the
eastern and southern conflict areas, as over 60 % of hospitals have been inaccessible or closed in the
last six months. Additionally, the issue of starvation is becoming more and more prevalent; of the
2.54 million, 1.2 million Libyan civilians have limited or no direct access to food.53
The UNPBC continues to support the efforts of the international community in combating the
ongoing refugee and IDP crisis. However, the massive amount of civilians categorized as “refugee”
or IDP has created a heightened sense of danger for the region and the people living in Libya.
Militant groups have consistently placed communities, towns and even entire cities in danger. While
many countries in the region, such as Tunisia, have accepted Libyan refugees, the very real problems
of hygiene, child protection, status determination, and ultimately resettlement have become day to
day priorities for NGOs and international bodies working in the area.54 The UNPBC should assist
the international community with the crisis by utilize the data and information about the area to
their advantage. By ameliorating short term situation in Libya only then can peace be achieved in the
region.
50 “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2001,
accessed 16 September 2016, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GuidingPrinciplesDispl.pdf.
51 Ibid.
52 Adrian Edwards, "Mediterranean Death Toll Soars in First 5 Months of 2016," Refworld, 31 May 2016, accessed 16
September 2016, http://www.refworld.org/docid/574e9dfb4.html.

53 “Humanitarian Response Plan: Libya,” OCHA, 19 November 2015,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/programme-cycle/space/document/2016-libya-humanitarian-response-
plan.
54 Ibid.
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Economic Development
Libya has seen a myriad of economic problems in the last decade due to its instability. That being
said, the Libyan young people have demonstrated their innovative spirit in a difficult context. The
use of innovative public-private partnerships to support young entrepreneurs, job placement, and
on-the-job training, and improving labor contracts in the private sector for nationals and non-
nationals alike have been seen to improve the economic viability of the country. Becoming a more
desirable place for investors will help bring stability and ultimately peace to the region.55
There are many places in Libya in which a change of the economic and social structures is absolutely
necessary. In the South, the people have resorted to smuggling to make money.56 The absence of
economic opportunity for people outside of the coastal and industrial cities has only resulted in an
increase in violence for the people and the civilians in the area. As these areas conflict spiral further
into their current states, the amount of negative and mostly illegal actions these areas partake in only
rise.
Libya’s economic woes can in part be traced to its dependency on oil resources. As seen with other
resource-driven economies, Libya is subject to economic shocks with the increase and decrease of
oil prices.57 Instability and violence has also reduced oil production by an estimated 0.4 million
barrels per day.58 Decreased oil production and decreased oil prices have attributed to an estimated
10% decrease in the country’s GDP between 2012 and 2015, and inflation continues to run rampant
as Libyan citizens can no longer afford to purchase basic necessities.59 Faced with Libya’s dire
economic situation, the World Bank recommended the implementation of programs aimed at the
long-term goal of diversifying the country’s economy beyond the oil sector.60 This would also
include creating more sustainable jobs, specifically in the private sector and encouraging more civic
participation. One of the challenges Libya faces is that the economic decisions made are often not in
the best interest of the people, therefore transitioning to a system where more civic participation is
encouraged would be helpful in making a long-term change.61 The African Development Bank
(AfDB) warned, however, that long term economic success depends on the country’s ability to
effectively govern itself.62
CURRENT STATUS
Currently, the state of conflict in Libya is dire, involving numerous problems such as religious
division, power struggles, and government distrust. In order to re-establish the peaceful
characteristic of Libya in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Gaddafi, the members of the
55 "Public-Private Partnerships for Jobs in Libya Are Key for Youth and Women, Now More Than Ever," World Bank,
accessed 19 May 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/05/03/public-private-partnerships-for-jobs-
in-libya-are-key-for-youth-and-women.
56 “Libya - Global Focus," UNHCR, 2016, accessed 23 July 2016, http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/12003.
57 “Libya: Overview,” World Bank, 31 March 2016, accessed 23 September 2016,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 “Libya Economic Outlook,” African Development Bank, 2016, accessed 24 September 2016,
http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/libya/libya-economic-outlook/.
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United Nations Peacebuilding Commission must come together in order to find viable options to
restore Libya’s potential for peace.
Regarding the conflict between the government based in the country’s capital, Tripoli, and the
government that controlled the rest of the country, development in reaching a middle ground has
slowly been achieved. The General National Congress (GNC), also known as the Salvation National
Government, negotiated with the Council of Deputies, also known as the House of Representatives
or Tobruk Government, about the possibility of a unity government with members of both parties.63
For background, the GNC is an Islamic opposition government based in Tripoli, strongest in
western Libya.64 The GNC was originally the government that took over after the 2010 revolution.65
After 2012, the GNC expanded its mandate without elections and passed laws that supported an
Islamic society prompting the Council of Deputies to launch a campaign to successful elect a new
assembly in 2014.66 Those members of the GNC who rejected the election results due to low voter
turnout, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, reconvened to create The New General National Congress
in May 2014.67 The negotiations took place in October of 2015 but ultimately failed to reach a
mutual agreement.68 In spite of the fact that Libya was in dire need of assistance to build one
government and solidify its institutions in order to reach peace, the proposals ended up being later
revised by more government officials from both groups and even the UN, prompting more
negotiations and the adoption of a resolution, commonly known as the Libyan Political Agreement.69
On 17 of December 2015 the “Libyan Political Agreement” was signed and supported unanimously
by the UN Security Council with Resolution 2259.70 The new Unity Government would be
composed by compromise Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, a nine-member presidential council and a
seventeen-member Government of National Accord.71 The Council of Deputies would still be active
as a legislative and advisory institution, serving as the High Council of State, with its members
nominated by the General National Congress.72 Despite the progress in unifying a politically
fractured country, serious division and separation inside each party has complicated the process. A
faction on the General National Congress went ahead and even rejected the agreement they had
already accepted.73 The unrecognized Prime Minister of the General National Congress made a
63 “UN Welcomes ‘Historic’ Signing of Libyan Political Agreement," United Nations News Centre, 17 December 2015,
accessed 5 August 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52845.
64 Adam Chandler, “We Are Muslims Like All Libyans," The Atlantic, 16 October 2015, accessed 5 August 2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/libya-gnc-civil-war/410179/.
65 Ibid.
66 “Libya Profile - Timeline," BBC, 20 April 2016, accessed 5 August 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
13755445.
67 Ibid.
68 Patrick Kingsley, “Libyan Politicians Sign UN Peace Deal to Unify Rival Governments," The Guardian, 17 December
2015, accessed 5 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/libyan-politicians-sign-un-peace-

deal-unify-rival-governments.
69 “Libyan Political Agreement," United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 17 October 2015, accessed 5 August 2016,
https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language=fr.
70 S/RES/2259, “Resolution 2259 (2015)," 23 December 2015, accessed 29 May 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2259(2015).; “Libyan Political Agreement,” ," United

Nations Support Mission in Libya.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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statement directed to the other ministers and members of his government not to resign due to the
arrival of the UN-backed government: "Given the requirements of public interest... you are
requested to continue your mission in accordance with the law.”74 Either side refuses to make any
compromise meanwhile tens of thousands are dying in the conflict zones around the area.
Much like the stalemate in government talks, the two parties fighting have seen more or less a
stalemate on the battlefield with few victories standing out on either side. Militant groups have
continued to seize towns and territory, and the Libyan Army continues to fight back in order to win
back its territorial integrity. However, recently, the Libyan Army has received notable help from
western powers. In particular, the United States has stepped up drone strikes in Libya that aided in
the potential retaking of Sirte from ISIL.75 Nevertheless, due to the high prevalence of powerful
militia groups and Islamic State terrorist cells, the government has struggled to obtain recognition.76
These groups are a major inhibitor to peacebuilding and are a danger to civilians.
Libya has been marred by ethnic tensions and mistrust between the current democratically elected
government and the people, leading to breakdown in a number of social, political and economic
sectors in the Libyan way of life. Additionally, the refugee crisis in Libya has not ceased. In fact,
more people are dying than ever before as more people try to cross the north African regions for a
better situation. The unrest has completely disheveled the balance and peace that was once prevalent
no more than 50 year prior. However, until the UNPBC comes to a consensus about how to appeal
to the many ethnic groups that Libya has as well secure the country from militant groups that seek
to control the country that semblance of peace will be far from reality.77
BLOC ANALYSIS
There are numerous problems in Libya, but many stem from the differences between the elected
Council of Deputies, the opposition of the General National Congress, and either party’s claim to
territory and power. Additionally, religious differences and political ideologies play a major role in
the separation of blocs.
Supporters of the Council of Deputies

Previously recognized by the UN and other international players as “the Libyan Government," the
Council of Deputies is supported by the Libyan Army and has enjoyed support from Egypt and the
United Arab Emirates.78 The UAE gave asylum for Mahmoud Jibril, a leading nationalist Libyan
politician. Additionally, Egypt remains a strong supporter of Khalifa Haftar as he continues to lead
74 “Libya's Tripoli Authority Rejects UN-Backed Government," Al Jazeera, 7 April 2016, accessed 5 August 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/libya-tripoli-authority-rejects-backed-government-160407041526033.html.
75 Ibid.
76 Ahmed Elumami, "Libya's Self-Declared National Salvation Government Stepping Down," Reuters UK, 2016, accessed
19 May 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-politics-idUKKCN0X22MD.

77 Marie-Louise Gumuchin, "Libya Struggles to Contain Tribal Conflicts," Reuters, 8 April 2012, accessed 19 May 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-violence-idUSBRE83702Z20120408.
78 "Libya's Legitimacy Crisis," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014, accessed 19 May 2016,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/06/libya-s-legitimacy-crisis/hr9j.
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the Libyan National Army.79 Countries that welcomed the death of Muammar Gaddafi even though
he did not get a trial would also fall in this category because they prioritized the fact that it opened
the door for a possible democracy and an elected government. This led to support by most Western
countries and the recognition of this government as legitimate due to their similarities in political
ideology.
Supporters of the New General National Congress

The New GNC has enjoyed the support of an Islamic coalition known as "Libya Dawn" and has
been aided by Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey.80 Qatar hosted Ali Salabi and Abdelhakim Belhadj, two of
Libya’s most influential Islamist politicians and one even a former jihadist, when the violence in
Tripoli scaled up with the battles against other militias and the country’s army.81 The religious and
political similarities between these countries allowed them to cooperate and become supporters of
the Tripoli Government. A UN panel of experts suggested that some Turkish companies may have
delivered weapons to General National Congress (GNC).82 Sudan is also believed to have
contributed troops in support of the GNC.83 Although these are all de facto and implicit forms of
support, Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan appear to have a regional, ideological and religious group of
similarities that prompted them to support this government.
Countries Supporting International Intervention

Numerous countries that do not have a particular stake in Libya’s internal conflicts also see it as
necessary to intervene in an effort to prevent human suffering. The United States and EU countries
tend to fall in this bloc, supporting humanitarian aid for civilians and sanctions against those they
see as perpetrators of violence; as they did on 2011 when the internationally led military intervention
took place. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has been active in providing assistance and
services to the country. These efforts include training Libyan professionals as mediators, assessing
the prison system and its standards, and putting together regional task forces to help increase
security.84 Even though western countries also fall on the first bloc, the newly renowned effort
against terrorist networks and groups like ISIL and Al-Qaeda would once again prompt western
countries to intervene in Libya for humanitarian reasons. These countries also tend to support the
development of new industries to vary the economic landscape of the country.
Countries Supporting State Sovereignty

Countries that believe that any type of intervention aimed at influencing the policies of another
country should be considered a violation of state sovereignty. This bloc is also interested in
79 Chris Stephen, "War in Libya - the Guardian Briefing," The Guardian, 29 August 2014, accessed 19 May 2016,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya.; “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players,”
European Council on Foreign Relations accessed 17 October 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.
80 Ibid; Imed Lamloum, "Libya Power Handover Agreed as Airport Battle Rages On," 2014, accessed 19 May 2016,
https://www.yahoo.com/news/libyas-congress-says-hand-power-parliament-august-4-115948954.html?ref=gs;
"Tarhouna Rejects House of Representatives, Declares Support for Operation Dawn.”
81 Chris Stephen, “War in Libya - the Guardian briefing,” The Guardian.; “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players,”
European Council on Foreign Relations.

82 Ibid.
83 “Sudan Militarily Backs Libyan Rebels: Bashir to Youm,” The Cairo Post, 23 May 2015, accessed 19 May 2016,
http://thecairopost.youm7.com/news/143075/news/sudan-militarily-backs-libyan-rebels-bashir-to-youm7.
84 “The Current Situation in Libya,” United States Institute of Peace, 16 May 2016, accessed 28 September 2016,
http://www.usip.org/publications/the-current-situation-in-libya.
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promoting a sovereign state’s right to self-determination. Russia, China, and their allies tend to fall
into this bloc, as they have been known to veto Security Council peacekeeping proposals. These
states remain reluctant to impose sanctions or any other demands. This is especially true in the case
of Russia which continues to hold vested interested in the form of oil resources in Libya. 85 This bloc
is also interested in promoting a sovereign state’s right to self-determination. Many African countries
have also rejected the idea of yet another intervention due to their disapproval over the first one;
Nigeria and Lebanon for instance. Countries that have even had interventions on them, such as
Mali, condemned the killing of Muammar Gaddafi. One of the main concerns here is the issue of
more interventions having an adverse effect, instead of making the situation better. Overall, these
countries believe that Libya’s sovereignty is the main priority in addressing this issue, which is
important to keep in mind.
COMMITTEE MISSION
The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate asserts its responsibility to bring together
all relevant actors from post-conflict zones and provide integrated strategies for peacebuilding and
recovery. Libya is currently in a very vulnerable situation, ranking in the alert category as the 25th
most fragile country in the 2016 Fragile State Index.86
Thus, it is imperative that the UNPBC addresses the issue as promptly as possible and suggest short
and long term peace building issues for Libya. The UNPBC must therefore develop a multifaceted
plan that can ensure peacebuilding and recovery measures for Libya. Delegates will then need to use
a wide variety of resources, such as official documents published by the UN, annual reports, official
statements in regards to the issue from world leaders, and of course the committee’s framework. In
order to fully understand the situation delegates should also consult past resolutions the UN Security
Council has taken in response to the situation in Libya.
The political uncertainty, social unrest, violent terrorism, and barely bettering but shattered
multifaceted analytically aware Libya with a challengingly dangerous future that can even transcend
and destabilize the region as well. It is crucial for the UNPBC to provide an innovative and
comprehensive solution that can help the reconstruction of this country. It is important to keep in
mind that it is not within this committee’s competencies to suggest financial aspects for the funding
of the proposed solutions, nor is it required to imply authority over institutions like the European
Union, the Peacebuilding Fund, or even particular countries.
This committee is solely dedicated to creating multifaceted, analytically comprehensive measures to

suggest to the UN Security Council with the objective of achieving peacebuilding, prosperity, and
social integration results whilst respecting a State’s national sovereignty rights. The on-going dispute
between the institutions claiming to be the legitimate government will challenge the delegates to
come up with stable and conflict reducing socioeconomic ways to approach the wide variety of
85 Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia and Libya: A Brief History of an On-Again Off-Again Friendship,” Brookings, 1
September 2016, accessed 1 October 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/09/01/russia-
and-libya-a-brief-history-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship/.
86 “Fragile States Index 2016," Fund for Peace, accessed 5 August 2016,
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2016.pdf.
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issues in both the short and long term scopes. Achieving unity and establishing a strong government
capable to defend its territory is crucial for the rule of law and integrity in Libya, as well as for the
infrastructural and economical development of the country.87
87"UNSMIL Mandate," United Nations, accessed 17 September 2016,

http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3544.
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TOPIC B: THE SITUATION IN HAITI

INTRODUCTION
Haiti, a Caribbean island neighbored by the Dominican Republic, has experienced alarming levels of
social, political, and economic strife since its slave-led revolution against France. Unable to pay the
reparations of war, Haiti’s period of autonomy began with poor conditions for mass production of
goods and resources, a crippling debt, and difficulty receiving recognition as an independent state
from other countries.88 In its most recent history, Haiti has faced multiple coup d’états, and even rule
by a military regime.89 Currently, riots in the streets are common due to the country’s political
instability. It also suffered from an earthquake of a magnitude of 7.0 in 2010, which devastated the
country’s already shaky infrastructure.90 In 2016, Haiti was hit by a Category 5 hurricane in early
October of 2016. Hurricane Matthew killed 900 in Haiti and led to a resurgence of cholera
throughout the country.91 These hardships have made Haiti one of the poorest countries in the
Americas in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and 58.5% of its population lives
under the poverty line.92 The collective ruin facing the country has led to high levels of immigration
to neighboring countries, and Haiti has subsequently encountered a number of border disputes with
the Dominican Republic.93
Hundreds of thousands of people have been devastated by Haiti’s natural disasters; thus, the country
faces a significant internally-displaced population problem.94 As of March 2015, it is believed there
are now only 62,590 IDP, although information has been lacking and the number is expected to be
even higher.95 A lack of infrastructure and constant changes in the government have prevented both
the public and private sectors of the country from achieving stability.96 Unable to diversify its
economic markets and improve its infrastructure, Haiti’s current debt has risen over USD two
billion since the 2010 earthquake, and over 20% of its annual budget comes from foreign aid or
direct budget support.97 Law enforcement is weak, and political violence and social unrest are
88 Ishaan Tharoor, “Is It Time for France to Pay its Real Debt to Haiti?," Washington Post, 13 May 2015, accessed 26 July
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/13/does-france-owe-haiti-reparations/.
89 “Timeline: Haiti," BBC News, 17 October 2012, accessed 26 July 2016,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1202857.stm.
90 Ibid.
91 Joseph Delva and Scott Malone, “Hurricane Matthew Kills Almost 900 in Haiti before Hitting U.S.,” Reuters, 8
October 2016, accessed 15 October 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-matthew-idUSKCN1250G2.

92 “Haiti GDP Per Capita,” Trading Economics, accessed 2 October 2016, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/haiti/gdp-
per-capita.
93 “Haiti," The CIA World Factbook, 17 August 2016, accessed 26 July 2016,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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frequent in the country.98 The government has even had to postpone legislative and executive
elections on multiple occasions, which has resulted in empty cabinet spots and parliament seats.99
2.5 million Haitians live in extreme poverty, and Haiti is considered one of the poorest countries in
the northern hemisphere and in the Americas.100 Haiti is in a current state of unrest, with its social,
political, and economic realms facing grim outlooks. It is imperative for the international community
to unite and provide aid for the issues this country is currently facing. As a post-conflict state still in
struggle to sustain itself, Haiti is in dire need of assistance from the international community to help
reconstruct the country, and the UNPBC must work to help finally bring the peace to the Haitian
population.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

Political History of Haiti
Haiti elected President Jean-Bertrand as its first democratically chosen president in 1991, until a
military-led coup d’ état removed him from office, consequently beginning the de facto military
government of Raoul Cédras from 1991 to 1994.101 Following a concentrated effort by the
international community, Cédras resigned, and Jean-Bertrand finished his term as the legitimate
president.102 Jean-Bertrand was re-elected in 2001, but could not finish his term due to another coup
d’ état in 2004 organized by a rebel group known as the National Revolutionary Front for the
Liberation of Haiti.103 The lack of political stability resulted in a country devastated by social unrest,
violent conflict, and a crippled economy. On 26 February 2004, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council passed a resolution that recognized the interim government of President Boniface
Alexandre and authorized a peacekeeping intervention, which was carried out by the Multinational
Interim Force in coordination with the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM).104
Several UN institutions were established in Haiti to conduct peacekeeping measures ever since the
first democratic elections the country were organized in 1990. Initially, the UN’s involvement was
directed at supervising the elections with the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of
the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), but over time the UN began to assist with other matters, like
training the Haitian police, supervising peaceful transition governments, and several other
stabilization and peacekeeping missions.105 All of these institutions were eventually consolidated into
the current United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established in
98 Ibid.
99 “2210 - Parlement Haitien: Le Sénat de la République," Haiti Référence, 2016, accessed 19 June 2016, http://haiti-
reference.com/pages/plan/politique/pouvoir-legislatif/senat/; “La Chambre des Députés," Haiti Référence, 2016,
accessed 19 June 2016, http://haiti-reference.com/pages/plan/politique/pouvoir-legislatif/chambre-des-deputes/.
100 “Haiti Overview," World Bank, 2016, accessed 18 June 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.
101 “Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995," United States Department of State, accessed 18 June 2016,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti.
102 Ibid.
103 “The Haiti Coup One Year Later: A Look Back at the U.S. Role in the Overthrow of Aristide," Democracy Now! 28
February 2005, accessed 18 June 2016, http://www.democracynow.org/2005/2/28/the_haiti_coup_one_year_later.

104 S/RES/1529, “Resolution 1529 (2004)," 29 February 2004, accessed 18 June 2016.
105 “MINUSTAH Background,” United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2016, accessed 10 September 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml.
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2004 by Security Council Resolution 1542. MINUSTAH was initially established to continue
peacekeeping efforts after the coup that ousted Jean-Bertrand for the second time. Its mandate has
been renewed several times since 2004, though the number of deployed troops to the mission has
steadily decreased over the past few years. Currently, MINUSTAH operates with 6,685 military,
2,607 police, and 443 civilian personnel.106
While MINUSTAH has operated and carried out distinct measures for stabilization, some of these
projects have had little success, negative results, or have worsened the mission’s reputation. For
example, in 2006, an UN led initiative by former Haitian President René Prevál sought to disarm
gang members by offering them immunity and developing rehabilitation programs that provided
food, money, and job training in exchange for their guns.107 The program failed to persuade the
1,000 gang members it hoped to attract, and only collected 200 firearms in total.108 President Prevál
started then implementing a new more aggressive security strategy, deploying the 8,000 UN
peacekeepers to conduct raid missions in order to take over the country’s gang-ran strongholds.109
Fierce shootouts between Haiti’s armed gangs and the UN peacekeepers started sprawling in the
country’s poorest communities, such as the case in Cité Soleil.110 Peacekeepers were accused of
committing human rights violations during these raids, with violent mass shootings that often
resulted in many civilians, including children, dying in the crossfire, sullying MINUSTAH’s
reputation and integrity.111
Notwithstanding its controversial past, MINUSTAH has also carried out very successful and
impactful projects in numerous Haitian communities. For instance, MINUSTAH led the effort for
clearing the rubble off the streets in a major-scale project after the earthquake hit Port-au-Prince,
managing to clear out 40% of the ten million cubic meters of rubble from the streets. 112
Furthermore, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization
for Migration (OIM) also provided aid to local communities. The organizations launched massive
projects in the community of Cité Soleil. One project included providing vaccinations for 20,000
children and 30,000 women against common preventable diseases, improving water and sanitation
to 40 schools, and distributing essential supplies to 201 schools. Such projects could not have been
carried out without MINUSTAH’s security strategies in the community and helped improve the
public health of the community.113
106 S/RES/1529, “Resolution 1529 (2004); S/RES/2243 , “Resolution 2243 (2015)," 14 October 2015.
107 Stevenson Jacobs, “Haitian Gang Members Surrender Guns," Washington Post, 11 September 2006, accessed 12
September 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091100989.html.
108 “Haiti — Gun Facts, Figures and the Law: Collection, Amnesty and Destruction Programmes," Gun Policy, 2016, 12
September 2016, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/haiti.

109 Marc Lacey, “U.N. Troops Fight Haiti Gangs One Street at a Time," New York Times, 10 February 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/10/world/americas/10haiti.html.
110 Ibid.
111 Sandra Jordan, “Haiti's Children Die in UN Crossfire," The Guardian, April 2007,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/01/sandrajordan.theobserver.
112 “UN-Led Effort Helps Haitians Clear Half of Quake Rubble in Large-Scale Operation," UN News Centre, 12 October
2011, accessed 14 September 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40026.

113 “Haiti: UN Helps Refurbish Schools in Slums Where Guns Once Ruled Supreme," UN News Centre, 22 September
2006, accessed 17 October 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=19971&cr=haiti&cr1=.
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Years after these events, Haiti is still in a very fragile state. The country has frequently struggled to
organize elections, postponing them due to fraud allegations, violence in the streets, protests, and
boycotts, resulting in vacant seats in the country’s parliament. The electoral crisis started during the
2010-2011 presidential election, when local observers, news outlets like CBC, and international
organizations such as the OAS and CARICOM started highlighting fraud cases and electoral
irregularities, leading some individuals to call for the results to be invalidated.114 Ever since, Haiti’s
political status has been unstable, leading to the current political stalemate. The current de facto
president, Jocelerme Privert, had been elected by the parliament as an interim president whose term
was to finish on 15 June 2016; however, he remains in power as of September 2001 due to another
round of postponed elections.115
National Rebuilding
As aforementioned, on 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shocked the Haitian capital
Port-au-Prince, destroying the infrastructure that held the city together.116 The earthquake’s
epicenter was in the nearby town of Léogâne, about 15.5 miles (25 kilometers) away from the
outskirts of Port-au-Prince.117 In the days following the first wave, 52 aftershocks continued to
devastate the island until 24 January 2010.118 Some of these aftershocks reached magnitudes of 4.5.119
This resulted in an estimated death toll between 220,000 and 316,000 people, though estimates
varied between government figures and other international organizations, such as the United States
Agency for International Development’s (USAID) and the International Disaster Database’s (EM-
DAT).120 300,000 people were injured, and 1.5 million were internally displaced; although it is
estimated the number of IDP has significantly decreased due to relocation and camp set up
strategies.121
Furthermore, 15,000 primary schools and 1,500 secondary schools were damaged, accounting for
nearly half of the schools in the entire country.122 Additionally, three of Haiti’s main universities were
almost completely destroyed, aggravating the country’s already low education standards. 123
114 “Report of the Joint Electoral Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean
Community (Caricom)," Organization of American States, November. 2010, accessed 11 September 2016,
http://www.oas.org/es/sap/deco/moe_informe/haiti_November2010_mar20_2011_e.pdf; “Haiti election a 'massive
fraud'," CBC News, 28 November. 2010, accessed 10 September 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/haiti-election-a-
massive-fraud-1.941996.
115 Nick Miroff, “Haiti Needs Food, Jobs, Doctors — and Now a President," Washington Post, 16 June 2016, accessed 18
June 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/haiti-needs-food-jobs-doctors--and-now-a-

president/2016/06/15/6eb20928-3171-11e6-ab9d-1da2b0f24f93_story.html.
116 S/RES/1529, “Resolution 1529, 2004”; S/RES/2243 (2015), 14 October 2015, accessed 18 June 2016,
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/haiti-earthquake-fast-facts/.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 “The PSI Global Resilience Project: Building Disaster-Resilient Communities and Economies," United Nations
Environment Programme Financial Initiative, June 2014, accessed 10 September 2016,

http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/building_disaster-resilient_communities_economies_01.pdf.
121 Andrew Cawthorne, “Haitian Education System ‘Totally Collapsed,” Reuters, 18 January 2010, accessed 10 September
2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-quake-haiti-education-interview-idUSTRE60H12G20100118.
122 “Haiti Earthquake Fast Facts," CNN Library, 13 December 2015, accessed 10 September 2016,
123 Ibid.
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Responding to the destruction, the then Minister of Education said the catastrophe caused a “total
collapse of the Haitian education system.”124 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also reacted, stating that “...the human loss of teachers and
students, is a catastrophic setback for a country already hit by other disasters.”125 The UN’s response
team, peacekeepers, and members of MINUSTAH also sustained casualties with the death of 96
peacekeepers.126
The monetary loss inflicted by the earthquake was estimated at USD 7.8 billion, with damages
sustained by schools, roads, housing communities, means of transportation, buildings, hospitals, and
access to basic services.127 Even the National Palace, the president’s base of operations, was
destroyed.128 Then Haitian President René Préval survived with his wife Elisabeth Delatour, who
were both at their private residence at the time of the earthquake.129 60% of the country's
government buildings were also affected, including the Haiti’s Legislative Palace, leaving parliament
without a place to run its sessions until a temporary one was built.130
MINUSTAH’s Headquarters in the Christopher Hotel were also severely damaged.131 The
international community was quick to react and provide rescue efforts, aid, and monetary relief to
the country following the catastrophe. In 2010 alone, USD 3,587,439,948 was contributed in
funding, in addition to the USD 921,175,483 in uncommitted pledges and smaller funding
projects.132 In grand total, the UN Office of the Special Envoy says Haiti received USD 13.34 billion
to be used from 2010 to 2020, while UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
received USD 9.49 billion to be used to help Haiti recover.133 To put this in perspective, the latter
figure is three times the revenue the government of Haiti received between the years 2010 and 2012,
according to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN.134
124 Andrew Cawthorne, “Haitian Education System ‘Totally Collapsed.’”

125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 “Haiti.”
128 Randal C. Archibald, “Palace in Haiti, Damaged by Quake, Is Being Razed," New York Times, 13 September 2012,
accessed 10 September 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/americas/haitis-national-palace-being-

demolished.html.
129 Ibid.
130 Chris Pleasance, “Living Among the Rubble: Five Years Since Giant Earthquake Killed 300,000 People and Left 1.5
Million Homeless, the People of Haiti are Still Waiting for the Country to be Rebuilt," Daily Mail, 12 January 2015,
accessed 11 September 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2906191/5-years-later-AP-revisits-sites-
devastated-Haiti-quake.html; “Haiti - Reconstruction : Inauguration of the new Parliament building in Haiti," Haiti Libre,
21 November. 2011, accessed 14 September 2016, http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-4302-haiti-reconstruction-
inauguration-of-the-new-parliament-building-in-haiti.html.
131 “Up to 200 U.N. Staff Missing after Haiti Quake," Reuters, 14 January 2010, accessed 10 September 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-quake-haiti-missing-idUSTRE60D32I20100114.
132 “Haiti in 2010 - Related Emergencies: List of Outstanding Pledges and Funding in 2010 - Report as of 12-September-
2016," UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affair, 12 September 2016, accessed 12 September 2016,
https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10c_C91_Y2010_asof___1609110230.pdf.
133 “Haiti Relief: Key Statistics," Office of the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Community-Based Medicine & Lessons from
Haiti, 2012, accessed 10 September 2016, http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/lessons-from-haiti/key-statistics/.

134 Ibid.
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However, only 48.2% of the financial aid has been disbursed or allocated, and Haitians still question
where the money went.135 The recipients of financial aid included the government of Haiti, via its
national system for Public Financial Management (PFM), Haitian NGOs, and foreign contractors. 136
This led to inefficiencies in spending, accompanied by a lack of accountability and transparency.
Compared to government institutions, foreign contractors have more lenient disclosure policies. 137
Critics have called out the financial aid structure in Haiti, claiming that there are almost no
monitoring measures for how these foreign contractors or nonprofits operate, complicating the
accountability of deliberate or accidental mismanagement of funds.
The government of Haiti only received around 9.6% of the aid money, which might be one of the
reasons as to why progress and action have been slow and faulty.138 New settlements were built for
the 1.5 million IDPs as an alternative to the set-up camps, such as Canaan-Jerusalem, a village made
of wooden and tin houses. However, these settlements have no running water, electricity, or
sanitation infrastructure.139 Corruption cases have also been frequent, with absurdly large amounts of
money going missing.
In 2015, an investigation carried out by Propublica and National Public Radio found that the Red
Cross raised over USD 500 million for a home building project called LAMIKA, which targeted the
community of Campeche in Haiti, but the results of the project were exponentially short of the
campaign goal, leading to uncertainty about what happened to the money.140 The project was
intended to serve 130,000 people, but in reality, a mere six permanent homes were built.141 Despite
this apparent disappearance of donated funds, the Red Cross claims it has helped “more than 4.5
million” Haitians “get back on their feet,” and asserted that it fully discloses the money it uses for
each project.142
In other corruption scandals, former Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Vice-
president Jack Warner and his successor Jeffrey Webb were accused of embezzling of USD 750,000
of funds donated by FIFA for relief and development following the earthquake.143 Six years after the
earthquake, important infrastructure is still damaged and useless to the public. Hurricane Matthew
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid; Tracy Connor, Hannah Rappleye, and Erika Angulo, “What Does Haiti Have to Show for $13 Billion in
Earthquake Aid?”
137 Alan Yuhas, “The Red Cross, Haiti and the 'Black Hole' of Accountability for International Aid," The Guardian, 5 June
2015, accessed 10 September 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/red-cross-haiti-black-hole-

accountability-international-aid.
138 Lucy Rodgers, “Haiti Quake: Why Isn't Aid Money Going to Haitians?" BBC News, 13 January 2013, accessed 10
September 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20949624.

139 Tracy Connor, Hannah Rappleye, and Erika Angulo, “What Does Haiti Have to Show for $13 Billion in Earthquake
Aid?”
140 Justin Elliott and Laura Sullivan, “How the Red Cross Raised Half a Billion Dollars for Haiti and Built Six Homes,"
Propublica, NPR, 3 June 2015, accessed 10 September 2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-red-cross-

raised-half-a-billion-dollars-for-haiti-and-built-6-homes.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Martyn Ziegler, ”Fifa Corruption: Caribbean Football Bosses Jack Warner and Jeffrey Webb ‘Took Aid for Haiti
Earthquake,” The Independent, 3 December 2015, accessed 10 September 2016,

http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/fifa-corruption-caribbean-football-chiefs-jack-
warner-and-jeffrey-webb-took-aid-for-haiti-earthquake-a6759651.html.
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disrupted much of the progress that the country had made in rebuilding and development. Much of
the land hit by the hurricane was fishing areas and farmlands. This damage means that the somewhat
stable livelihoods of fishermen and farmers have been seriously negatively impacted, and the food
supply will be disrupted. The UN has already cited that at least 1.4 million people are in need of
immediate assistance in order to recover from the destruction left by Matthew.144 Since the
hurricane, there has been a resurgence of cholera as well as violence between Haitians and UN Peace
keepers. Prior to the arrival of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon on 15 October, a skirmish broke
out between the two parties that led to the use of tear grass to diffuse the violence.145 Ban Ki Moon
assessed the damage in Haiti to be able to best determine how aid should be allocated to the country
which the UN announce it would provide two months ago to work to address the affects of the
cholera outbreak that began in 2010.146 In order to progress the development of the state, the
UNPBC needs to find a solution to rebuild Haiti, revitalize its economy and education, restore its
infrastructure, as well as to find a way to restructure its financial aid and relief systems. Furthermore,
the UNPBC is tasked with the job of ensuring aid money is properly used to operate rebuilding
initiatives and programs that improve the people’s livelihoods.
The IDP and Migrant Crises

Since the earthquake in 2010, many Haitians have struggled to return to their normal lifestyles due to
destitute living conditions and failing infrastructure. Out of the 1.5 million IDP in Haiti, more than
1.4 million have left the camps and relocated.147 Additionally, 74% of surveyed families that were
uprooted by the 2010 earthquake consider themselves displaced, even though they do not live in
camps.148 In order to seek economic and social opportunity, an unprecedented number of migrants
and IDPs have moved from Haiti to neighboring countries such as the Dominican Republic and
Mexico. It is estimated that there are around one million Haitians, mostly undocumented, living in
the Dominican Republic.149 This has led to countries in the area implementing discriminatory
migrant policies, adding to the instability of the region. UN assessments have indicated that Haitian
migrants are subjected to poor living conditions and human rights violations in the Dominican
Republic.150 The report also cited that Haitian migrants were denied food, safe drinking water, and
adequate shelter while seeking refuges in the Dominican Republic.151
144 “The Misery of Hurricane Matthew is Deepened by Human Failure,” The Economist, 15 October 2016, accessed 15
October 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21708664-why-haiti-did-worse-cuba-protecting-its-people-
misery-hurricane-matthew.
145 David McFadden and Ben Finley, “UN Chief in Haiti Gets Glimpse of Matthew’s Destruction,” The Washington Post,
15 October, accessed 15 October 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/un-chief-in-haiti-to-

get-glimpse-of-matthews-destruction/2016/10/15/39d6576a-9308-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html.
146 David McFadden and Ben Finley, “UN Chief in Haiti Gets Glimpse of Matthew’s Destruction.”
147 “Haiti – Overview,” World Bank.
148"Four Years After the Haiti Earthquake, the Search for Solutions to Displacement Continues," The Brookings Institution,
13 July 2014, accessed June 18, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/01/13-haiti-earthquake-

anniversary-bradley.
149 “Haiti: Migration Profiles," UNICEF, 2015, accessed 10 September 2016,
https://esa.un.org/miggmgprofiles/indicators/files/Haiti.pdf.
150 A/HRC/31/77, “Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human,” 12 October 2015 Accessed 1 June
2016. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_776.pdf.
Rights in Haiti," 12 October 2015.
151 Ibid.
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Although information regarding the number of IDPs living outside established camps is scarce,
there is an estimated 62,590 IDPs currently living in Haiti.152 The region also suffers from a severe
stateless people problem. In 2013, the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic made a
constitutional ruling that stripped citizenship from hundreds of thousands Dominicans born after
1929 that had migrant descent, mostly of Haitian origin.153 This resulted in 995 stateless people in
Haiti alone, with around 250,000 immigrants left in uncertainty in the Dominican Republic.154
The UN weighed in on the matter, expressing concern about the ruling and warning that it could
lead to a potential human rights crisis. Spokesperson for the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCR), Ravina Shamdasani, said the move by the Supreme Court could have
disastrous implications.155 Being stateless could mean the affected people are left without access to
fundamental and basic services that would require identifications or personal documents. Soon after,
from 2014 to 2015, 288,000 people applied into a “regularization” plan that would legalize the status
of migrants, mostly Haitians who had been living and working in the Dominican Republic prior to
2011.156
However, not everyone was able to enroll in the program, and consequently, 66,000 immigrants
were forced to return to Haiti, purely based on ethnic appearance or because of their last name, in a
move reported by the Dominican Republic as a voluntary decision.157 However, several human rights
groups challenged the voluntary nature of the returns and reported some cases of migrants who
were forced to move.158 In some cases, migrants were reportedly intimidated by the possibility of
mob violence, and some feared for their personal safety after the emergence of vigilante violence in
the Dominican Republic.159
In February 2015, a Haitian man was lynched and his body was left hanging from a tree in a public
park at Santiago de los Caballeros, the Dominican Republic’s second largest city.160 Local police
reported the murder was likely related to a robbery that happened simultaneously, but human rights
groups denounced the action as an act of hate and a consequence of the fierce and xenophobic
debate about immigration happening since the court’s ruling.161 This sparked demonstrations and
protests in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, marching to the Dominican Republic Consulate objecting
and complaining about the racism and hate crimes unfolding in the neighboring country against their
152 “Haiti – Overview,” World Bank.

153 Ricardo Rojas, “Dominican Court Ruling Renders Hundreds of Thousands Stateless," Reuters, 12 October 2013,
accessed 26 August 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dominicanrepublic-citizenship-
idUSBRE99B01Z20131012.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Rene Lewis, “Haitian Man Apparently Lynched in Dominican City Amid Rising Tensions," Al Jazeera America, 12
February 2015, accessed 26 August 2016, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/12/Haiti-Dominican-

lynching.html.
161 Roque Planas, “Haitian Man Lynched Amid Dominican Republic Immigration Controversy," Huffington Post, 11
February 2015, accessed 26 August 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/11/haitian-lynched-

dominican_n_6664276.html.
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fellow Haitians.162 The problem led to a high tension in the diplomatic ties between both countries.
Rights groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN Refugee Agency,
have raised concerns on the lack of clear deportation protocols and the threat of a systematic racial
profiling in these deportation process.163 This comes off as a crisis for both countries, and a
challenge for this committee to find a solution to the internally displaced people and migrant
problems affecting both states.
The UNPBC must focus on working diligently to not only minimize the suffering of the displaced,
but to ease tensions between Haiti and its neighbor to the East. This committee’s mandate asserts
that it is its mission to bring together all relevant actors and international donors to provide
peacebuilding efforts. By working in coordination with regional organizations such as the
CARICOM and the OAS, UN institutions such as the UN Refugee Agency, the UNHRC, the IOM
and MINUSTAH, and both the Haitian Government and the Dominican Republic Government,
this committee must draft a comprehensive set of proposals that address the deportation of people
of Haitian descent, the unclear nationality of stateless people, and the relocation of Haitian IDPs.
Political Instability, Violence, and Postponed Elections

Haiti has hosted a UN presence and experienced UN supervision of its elections since 1990, when
the country’s provisional government asked the UN for assistance. The electoral crisis and absences
in parliament can be traced back to the same era, when after the 1994 coup d’état ousted President
Aristide, parliament had dozens of empty seats.164 It was then that the political gridlock and awe at
current events started preventing the National Assembly to legislate, having an agenda that only
questioned the coup, with little attendance and not enough votes to pass any laws. One of the
reasons why the senators and deputies did not attend session was due to the fear of being
prosecuted by the military regime of Cedrás. This became a recurring event, with current members
of parliament not showing up to committee or even accepting their victory as candidates in
legislative elections due to fear of violence or because of threats.
In January of 2015, Haiti’s parliament was dissolved because the lower house did not reach an
agreement on a new electoral law aimed at addressing the postponed elections of 2011 and 2015. 165
The Senate remained active, but ultimately could not function because it only had ten active
senators, thus the legislative body failed to achieve the required quorum. The inactive lower house
162 “Haiti - Social: The Haitian flag waving on the Dominican Consulate!" Haiti Libre, 26 February 2015, accessed 26
August 2016, http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-13260-haiti-social-the-haitian-flag-waving-on-the-dominican-
consulate.html.
163 “Dominican Republic,” Human Rights Watch, 2015, accessed 10 September 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2016/country-chapters/dominican-republic; “Haiti/Dominican Republic: Reckless Deportations Leaving

Thousands in Limbo," Amnesty International, 15 June 2016, accessed 10 September 2016,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/haiti-dominican-republic-reckless-deportations-leaving-thousands-
in-limbo/.
164 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “The Politics Of Empty Chairs Brings Haiti’s Staggering Government To Halt," Chicago
Tribune, 2 August 1992, accessed 12 September 2016, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-08-

02/news/9203090591_1_marc-bazin-change-and-democracy-jean-claude-roy.
165 Jacqueline Charles, “As Haiti Misses Presidential Runoff Deadline, Protests Scheduled," Miami Herald, 23 April 2016,
accessed 17 October 2016, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-

world/world/americas/haiti/article73540982.html.
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and the underpopulated Senate consequently stagnated the legislative operations of the country.166
Eventually the parliament assembled again and started legislating as usual. Considering the events
between August and October of 2015, as well as the cancellation of April 2016 elections on the
grounds of political protests and fraud allegations, the UN and other international players have
called attention to the “institutional vacuum” that has left Haiti without an elected president.167
The current de facto head of state, President Jocelerme Privert, had been appointed by the parliament
in February of 2016 as a provisional president with the goal of setting up new elections, establishing
a permanent electoral council and providing a peaceful transition of power, all within a term of 120
days.168 However, his mandate has already expired, and Privert is still acting as president merely
because parliament has not voted him out of office and presidential elections to replace him have
not yet been organized. His task of organizing new elections was not achieved. The country’s
parliament currently has 27 seats vacant in the Lower House and six seats in the Senate because of
the unfinished and postponed round of legislative elections.169 This has resulted in political gridlock
that is impacting local communities: the postponed elections and incomplete parliament led to
President Jocelerme Privert being unable to appoint a prime minister or form a full cabinet due to a
lack of quorum in parliament.170
Major political parties that can represent a threat to the ruling party are excluded from elections in
Haiti, as has been the case with Fanmi Lavalas, the Verité party, and Ligue Alternative pour le
Progress et L'Emancipation Haitienne (LAPEH). In the case of the Verité, they withdrew from the
elections because of violent attacks on polling stations around Port-au-Prince.171 On the other hand,
Fanmi Lavalas, a major popular political party that has won every election it has participated in, has
been barred from participating in the elections in the past.172 LAPEH pulled out of the race due to
complete mistrust of the electoral process, accusing the Provisional Electoral Council of allowing
fraud and the government for not controlling the sporadic violence in the failed elections.173
An untrusted system, a lack of a permanent body overseeing the elections, arbitrary banning of
political parties, and fraud plagued elections continue stagnate Haiti in its ongoing electoral crisis.
This situation has extremely negative consequences, hurting Haiti’s most vulnerable populations that
166 Ibid.
167 "Haiti: UN and Partners Warn against ‘Institutional Vacuum,’ Call for Return to Constitutional Order," UN News
Center, June 15, 2016, accessed June 19, 2016,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54239#.V2YcwvkrKhc.
168 Jacqueline Charles, “Jocelerme Privert is Haiti’s New Provisional President," Miami Herald, 14 February 2016,
accessed 16 September 2016, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-

169 “2210 - Parlement Haitien: Le Sénat de la République," Haiti Référence, 2016; “2220.- La Chambre des Députés," Haiti
Référence, 2016.
170 Jacqueline Charles, “Interim Haiti Prime Minister, Government Finally Take Charge,” Miami Herald, 24 March 2016.
Accessed 19 June 2016. http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article68189602.html.

171 Peter Granitz, “Leading Political Party Pulls Out of Haiti's Legislative Elections," 8 September 2015, accessed 16
September 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-election-idUSKCN0R82TS20150908.

172 Dan Beeton, “Haiti’s Elections: Parties Banned, Media Yawns," Center for Economic and Policy Research, May 2011,
accessed 16 September 2016, http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/haitis-elections-parties-banned-media-yawn.

173Jude Célestin, “I Will Not Participate in Haiti’s Farce of a Presidential Election," Miami Herald, 21 January 2016,
Accessed 16 September 2016, http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article55927660.html.
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depend on government run programs like healthcare and government run hospitals 174 With the new
elections postponed, an incomplete parliament stuck in gridlock, and the current interim president’s
expired term, the instability in the government and the fracturing of resolute institutions is inhibiting
the peace and rebuilding process. The UNPBC must, in coordination with electoral observers and in
conjunction with MINUSTAH, provide a draft that helps lessen Haiti’s political instability and
provide a solution to its recurring electoral crisis.
One of the reasons why the country has difficulty organizing and carrying out its elections is the
presence of political violence, protests, boycotting, and social unrest. In 2010, the December
elections had about 1,326 voting booths (11.9% of all booths) with tally sheets were never received
by the Provisional Electoral Council of Haiti or were scrapped because of irregularities in their
format.175 These sheets comprised around 12.7% of the total votes of the country, which
exacerbated a violent response accompanied by turmoil in the streets after the election.176
Irregularities like these have become so frequent that this is merely one example of fraud taking
place in the elections. After fours years of not having elections, Haiti’s attempt of organizing
elections in August 2015 erupted into sporadic violence after more cases of fraud were found.177
While fraud was recorded to happen, it is unclear on what scale it decreased. The National Network
for the Protection of Human Rights reported five murders related to the election in July 2015, as
well as 26 people being injured.178 Additionally, 26 of the 1,508 voting centers had to be suspended
because of violent disturbances.179
Economic Development
With a GDP per capita of USD 846 in 2014, Haiti ranks as the poorest country in the Americas and
one of the poorest in the world, with significant needs in infrastructure reparation and creation.180
The earthquake in 2010 inflicted a USD 7.8 billion in damage and devastated the country's roads,
hospitals, schools, and other infrastructure.181 More than six million out of 10.4 million Haitians live
under the national poverty line of USD 2.42 per day, and over 2.5 million live under the national
extreme poverty line of USD 1.23 per day. The country’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has
declined dramatically since the early 2000s, but lately has seen a steady increase from USD 99 million
(2014) to USD 104 million (2015) according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC).182 Many businessmen have attributed this decline in FDI to crime and gang
activities, but speculation by researchers challenge this view.183
174 Will Grant, “Haiti’s Political Stalemate Hurts the Most Vulnerable," BBC News, 1 July 2016, accessed 15 September
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36655580.
175 Jake Johnston and Mark Weisbrot, “Haiti's Fatally Flawed Election," Center for Economic and Policy Research, January
2011, accessed 13 September 2016, http://cepr.net/publications/reports/haitis-fatally-flawed-election.

176 Ibid.
177 Peter Granitz, “Haiti's First Election in Four Years Marred by Sporadic Violence.”
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 “Haiti GDP Per Capita,” Trading Economics, accessed 2 October 2016, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/haiti/gdp-
per-capita.
181 “Haiti," The CIA World Factbook.
182 “Haiti - Economy : Low rise of Foreign Direct Investment (2015)," Haiti Libre, 16 June 2016, accessed 26 August
2016, http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-17753-haiti-economy-low-rise-of-foreign-direct-investment-2015.html.
183 Stevenson Jacobs, “Haiti, U.N. to Disarm Gang Members," Washington Post, 4 September 2006, accessed 26 August
2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/04/AR2006090400570_pf.html.
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Transparency International, an organization dedicated to combating global corruption, evaluated

Haiti in the Corruption Perception Index for 2016 as the most corrupt country in the Caribbean,
matching Venezuela as the most corrupt country in all of Latin America with a final score 158 out of
164 (164 representing the most corrupt country surveyed).184 A study carried out by experts in the
region determined that if Haiti worked to even marginally decrease its corruption, its economy
would exponentially increase and its development would accelerate.185 The study included data
figures from several indexes and evaluations from reports carried out by many international
organizations, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).186 Using a number of indexes and evaluations for
each country, the study created theoretical “units” to measure corruption.187 In the case of Haiti, the
study determined that a one “unit” improvement in the country’s corruption would increase Haiti’s
gross national product (GNP) by 206%.188 There would also be an estimated USD 860 million
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), along with a USD five billion increase in capital
formation.189 This could result in a USD 2.3 billion increase in domestic savings for the Haitian
population.190 The issue of corruption ultimately is the issue of economic stagnation. The increase in
revenue collection for the government must be administered effectively and responsibly.
In addition to corruption, there is an alarming dependence of foreign aid and economic assistance in
Haiti for its fiscal sustainability. Over 20% of its annual budget is composed of direct budget
support or foreign aid from the international community.191 According to the UN Secretariat Office
of the Special Envoy for Haiti’s main contributors in aid were recorded to be Venezuela, the United
States (U.S.), Canada, Spain, France, Brazil, Germany, Japan, the Chinese Taipei territory (Taiwan)
and Cuba, in coordination with informal groups of donors under the auspices of the Inter-American
Development Bank, the European Commission, the IMF, and the World Bank.192 Additionally,
2016’s scheduled election marks the first time in four elections that the Haitian government is set to
pay for its election without international funding.193 In recent years, turmoil and riots have unfolded
under the notion that the government has made poor decisions for the country’s economy and the
wellbeing of its people.
Haiti’s economy would likely see an improvement by opening its markets and diversifying its
commercial partners; however, the process must be handled delicately in order to prevent
184 “Corruption Perception Index 2015," Transparency International, 2016, accessed 26 August 2016,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Michael W. Collier, “The Effects of Political Corruption on Caribbean Development” Miami: Latin American and
Caribbean Center Florida International University, 2002, Accessed 27 August 2016,

http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2009/02799.pdf.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid
191 Ibid.
192 “New York Conference Recovery Pledge Status and Modalities as of December 2012 in USD Millions," Office of the
Special Envoy for Haiti, 12 December 2012, accessed 10 September 2016,

http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/International_Assistance/6-ny-pledge-status.pdf.
193“Haiti," The CIA World Factbook; David McFadden, “Haiti Council Unveils $55 Million Election Budget," Washington
Post, 17 August 2016, accessed 27 August 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/haiti-council-

unveils-55-million-election-budget/2016/08/17/24d3ca2c-64d8-11e6-b4d8-33e931b5a26d_story.html.
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counterproductive trade deals for its fragile economy. This is a task that Haiti has had trouble with
in the past. In 1994, Haiti accepted a set of recommendations from the IMF, which suggested that if
Haiti cut tariffs from 35% down to 3% in the rice industry, under the premise that this would lead to
a gradual increase on the country’s FDI.194
The deal was also met by new trade policies implemented by former U.S. President Bill Clinton,
which started shifting the American farm policy to direct payments for farmers, and indirectly
subsidize the rice industry in the U.S. state of Arkansas.195 The new trade policies in the U.S. were a
strategic trade move in response to the lower tariffs in Haiti’s exports with the goal of increasing
domestic exports in the U.S. and freeing developing countries from having to focus on its
agricultural production instead of its industrial development.196 However, the economic
repercussions Haiti’s agricultural production suffered were atrocious. Haiti’s rural and farming
populations were hit with markets flooded with American rice at incredibly low prices, and farmers
were ultimately unable to compete without the technology and infrastructure at disposal of foreign
farmers. Its economy went from importing only 19% of its food to 65% of its food over the course
of 20 years.197 Haiti is now the world’s fifth-largest importer of American rice, and the second-largest
in all of Central America and the Caribbean, despite only having a population of around 10 million
people.198 Even former President Bill Clinton himself, now the UN’s Special Envoy for Haiti, has
come out and apologized for the repercussions that the trade policies had, calling them a “devil's
bargain” and expressing his regret for their implementation.199 Economic interdependence on its
imports is rampant in Haiti, and it is imperative for this committee to discuss measures that might
lead to stimulating self-growth and agricultural self-sufficiency.
A sluggish Haitian economy does not only negatively impact companies, however; it also has had
implications on employee rights. For example, a movement from textile industry workers that
protested for an increase of the minimum wage was ignored for months, and progress on the issue
was stalled by pressure from the U.S., which frowned upon the demonstration.200 While the issue
eventually was addressed and resolved, the initial goal from the protesters was never met. They were
calling for an increase leading to a salary of USD 11.36 for an eight hour work day, but the Haitian
Parliament negotiated with President Michel Martelly and only raised it from USD 4.50 to USD
194 Josiane Georges, “Trade and the Disappearance of Haitian Rice," Ted Case Studies, No. 725, June 2004, 14 September
2016, http://www1.american.edu/TED/haitirice.htm; R. O’Connor, Maura, Subsidizing Starvation.
195 Maura O’Connor, “Subsidizing Starvation: How American tax dollars are keeping Arkansas rice growers fat on the
farm and starving millions of Haitians," Foreign Policy, 11 January 2013, accessed 13 September 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/11/subsidizing-starvation/.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Josiane Georges, “Trade and the Disappearance of Haitian Rice.”
199 Kim Ives, “‘We Made a Devil's Bargain’: Fmr. President Clinton Apologizes for Trade Policies that Destroyed Haitian
Rice Farming," Democracy Now! 1 April 2010, accessed 13 September 2016,

http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/1/clinton_rice.
200 Dan Coughlin and Kim Ives, “WikiLeaks Haiti: Let Them Live on $3 a Day," The Nation, 1 June 2011, 27 August
2016, https://www.thenation.com/article/wikileaks-haiti-let-them-live-3-day/; Roshan Lall, Rashmee, “Haiti minimum

wage increase ignites competition row in textile industry," The Guardian, 31 December 2013, accessed 26 August 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/dec/31/haiti-minimum-wage-increase-
ignites-row-textile-industry.
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5.11.201 Although it sounds like this would affect a limited number of Haitians, the country’s
economy is mostly based on the agricultural, textile, and tourism industry; this means one of the
three largest sectors of its industry and economy was affected.202 This is one example of how at the
local level social unrest was ignited due to government’s inaction on economic matters.
It is imperative for the UNPBC to produce a resolution with economic recommendations that Haiti
can pursue, and a strategy to follow for the international community. UNPBC has tackled similar
economic issues in post-conflict countries, such as Sierra Leone. Advised by the UNPBC, the
United Nations Environment Programme’s Sierra Leone’s Economic Development Plan laid out a
course of action to diversify Sierra Leone’s economy and responsibly develop its natural resources.
While no two countries are the same, UNPBC can use this plan as a foundation to build a unique
plan for Haiti’s economic situation. The role of the World Bank and the IMF must also be discussed
to coordinate efforts from the International Community to aid the country’s economy.
CURRENT STATUS
Haiti, in its current state, is far from successful in economic, political, and social realms. As a country
with a struggling economy, an unstable government, and failing infrastructure, the Republic of Haiti
has faced extreme challenges, simultaneously as it deals with its troubled relationship with the
international community. The Fund for Peace’s 2016 Fragile State Index reported that Haiti is the
only country in the Western Hemisphere in the top 60 entries, thus entering in the “High Alert”
category as the tenth most fragile state in the world.203
Most of the problems that the Haiti currently faces have left the government’s transitional state over
the last four years in a permanent stagnation. As recently as late June 2016, the Republic of Haiti has
faced violent protests from the populous over the delayed elections in Port-au-Prince, with several
clashes between polices forces using tear gas against civilians.204 In the wake of Hurricane Matthew,
the elections have been delayed while the state addresses the impacts of the disaster on the country.
The most recent delay marks the fifth time in the last two years that the democratic process has been
postponed by the government. These postponements have reached a level of international concern,
as the UN and other bodies have expressed regret and have condemned the acts of the current
administration, calling for a vote as soon as possible.205 Several international organizations, like the
OAS, the CARICOM, UN Security Council, and previous UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
have made public their concern over Haiti’s political future and their disappointment over the
postponed elections.206 The variability of the leadership in Haiti has caused problems not only for
201 “Haiti: Minimum Wage Increases," Washington Post, 6 May 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/americas/haiti-minimum-wage-increases.html?_r=0.
202 Ibid.
203 "Fragile State Index 2016," The Fund for Peace, 2016, accessed 28 July 2016, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/.
204 David McFadden, “Haiti Leaders Seek Way Out of Political Crisis,” U.S. News, 26 January 2016, accessed 28 July
2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-01-26/haiti-leaders-seek-way-out-of-political-crisis.
205 “Haiti: UN and Partners Express Regret Over Failed Deliberations on Provisional Governance,” UN News Centre, 16
July 2016, accessed 28 July 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54475.

206 “Haiti Politics," Global Security, 2016, accessed 13 September 2016,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/politics.htm; “CARICOM joins OAS in calling for free and fair

elections in Haiti," 21 July 2016, accessed 13 September 2016, http://today.caricom.org/2016/07/21/caricom-joins-oas-
in-calling-for-free-and-fair-elections-in-haiti/.
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the country’s international image, but also its image in the eyes of its people. It was not until recently
that the elections were finally set on a schedule once again. These elections are expected to happen
on the 20 November of 2016 for the first round and 29 January 2017 for the second round: critics
doubt whether they will develop as scheduled, due to the country’s murky past with organizing
elections.207 The initial reports from the UN state that the hurricane affected 70% of the election
cites, so it was impossible to hold the election on 9 October as previously planned.208
Regarding the migrant crisis and tensions with the Dominican Republic, in September 2016, the
High Commissioner of the UNHRC, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, expressed his regret that the
Dominican Republic was unable to respond to his request of going over deportation files with his
Office.209 The cooperation regarding this issue has been limited, and there appears to be little
progress in the matter.
Still suffering from the earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince in 2010, the people of Haiti have
experienced a number of social issues. The lack of government stability has caused more than a
dozen government-run hospitals in Haiti to stop functioning properly.210 Additionally, since the
hospitals are government run, the lack of government stability has equated to the insufficient 4.7%
spending in the health care system, thus leading to miniscule pay for doctors under dangerous
conditions.211 In response, many doctors and specialists have participated in labor strikes throughout
the summer of 2016, overwhelming the few functioning hospitals and the NGOs that provide
similar services.212 In the midst of medical field corruption, Haiti is also dealing with a dire medical
crisis: a cholera outbreak. The outbreak, which has been traced back to MINUSTAH peacekeepers,
has killed about 10,000 people and has sickened more than 800,000, with other estimates being
higher.213 It was not until recently that the UN, after years of rejecting any relation to the problem,
finally recognized its involvement in the outbreak, with a moral obligation to make amends and
provide reparations for the damage it caused.214 In conjunction with the lack of government-
provided medical resources and the lack of trust in the government and now the UN, rule of law is
deteriorating. In October, much of the country was devastated by Hurricane Matthew, which led to
a rise in skirmishes between people and the UN Peacekeepers. The full effects of the hurricane are
not yet apparent; however, delegates should watch this story closely in the coming months for a
better understanding of how the UNPBC can best address the aid that Haiti will be in need of in the
coming months.
207 Joseph Delva, “Haiti to Hold Presidential Vote in November, after Hurricane Delay,” Reuters, 16 October 2016,
accessed 15 October 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-election-idUSKBN12E24W.
208 Ibid..”
209 “UN Regrets Dominican Republic’s Refusal to Verify Repatriations: EFE," Dominican Today, 14 September 2016,
accessed 14 September 2016, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2016/9/13/60583/UN-regrets-Dominican-

Republics-refusal-to-verify-repatriations-EFE.
210 Jacqueline Charles, “Forget Zika, Haiti Has Bigger Problems — a Doctors’ Strike,” Miami Herald, 1 July 2016,
accessed 1 July 2016, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article87279407.html.

211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 “The Cholera Epidemic Left Behind in Haiti," New York Times, 6 July 2016, accessed 28 July 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/opinion/the-cholera-epidemic-the-un-left-behind-in-haiti.html.
214 “The U.N. Finally Owns Up to its Role in Haiti’s Cholera Outbreak,” Washington Post, 18 August 2016, accessed 24
August 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-un-finally-owns-up-to-its-role-in-haitis-

cholera-outbreak/2016/08/18/0d2a513a-6581-11e6-96c0-37533479f3f5_story.html?utm_term=.3574169528c8.
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The Republic of Haiti is in an intense state of conflict, and its future is unpredictable due to the
barely visible progress it has made on its crisis. Its unique set of problems seems to be leading Haiti
towards a challenging future, and only with the cooperation of the international community can
Haiti progress. The type of cooperation the international community can provide is up to discussion,
and it is this committee’s responsibility to suggest the best possible tactic to approach the issue. The
committee as a whole will need to seriously reevaluate the previous work MINUSTAH has done and
decide whether to advise a heavier UN presence or for the UN to scale back its presence based on
the consequences of its past actions.
BLOC ANALYSIS
Countries Supporting Intervention
This bloc would seek to assist in monitoring and planning the country’s peacebuilding process.
Ideologically, the Western countries of this bloc share a common objective: to strengthen Haiti’s
democratization process and align the country with other western values. These countries are
expected to support the increase of foreign direct investment as well. The U.S., Canada, France,
Spain, Japan, and other countries in the West or allying with Western policies would fall into this
category, because these countries have supported and led the effort on previous intervention
measures taken in Haiti. As a result, they are interested in continuing in being involved in the
situation in Haiti, and in some cases, providing aid as well. Numerous countries without a stake in
Haiti’s internal conflicts promote international intervention in an effort to prevent human suffering.
These blocs are also interested in promoting self-determination. Members of the European Union
(EU) tend to fall in this bloc, supporting humanitarian aid for civilians and sanctions against those
they see as perpetrators of violence. Though some countries of this bloc could also fall into the
second bloc, the renewed effort for social reform and increased overall well-being would once again
prompt these countries to intervene in Haiti for humanitarian reasons.
Members of this bloc also support long term economic development and the establishment of a
truly democratic system in Haiti. The U.S. State Department, for example, has provided assistance
with elections and infrastructure development with the hope that the country’s “authoritarian history
becomes increasingly part of its past rather than its future.”215 Similarly, the EU has provided several
aid packages since the 2010 earthquake with the goal of promoting human rights and democracy.216
Countries Supporting State Sovereignty

Countries that believe that MINUSTAH has indirectly contributed to the instability and problems
Haiti has, ultimately deeming it counterproductive, would be in this bloc. These countries believe
that MINUSTAH has failed to effectively support the Haitian government in the peacebuilding
process and should therefore be limited in its mandate. Countries that disapprove of MINUSTAH
and believe it is a tool for Western countries to increase their presence in the region would also fit in
this bloc. Countries such as Venezuela, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and
215 “US Relations with Haiti,” United States Department of State, 15 March 2016, accessed 23 September 2016,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm.
216 “EU Relations with Haiti,” European Union, 6 January 2016, accessed 23 September 2016,
http://eeas.europa.eu/haiti/index_en.htm.
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many countries adhering to non-interventionist policies would also be included in this bloc due to
their similar interest in the Caribbean. Fanmi Lavalas, a major political party in Haiti, criticizes
MINUSTAH and accuses it for being repressive against the party aligning with numerous local
groups of people that have grown tired of MINUSTAH and seek its withdrawal from Haiti. Non-
interventionist and isolationist countries would also fall into this category, oppose economic
interdependence, and promote self-growth through a supported increase in domestic production.
This bloc includes countries that believe any type of intervention aimed at influencing the policies of
another country should be considered a violation of state sovereignty. Russia, Venezuela, China, and
their like-minded allies tend to fall into this bloc and have been known to veto Security Council
peacekeeping proposals. Countries that have experienced international intervention, such as Mali,
oppose Western agendas of intervention in similarly poor countries because of the adverse effect it
tends to have.
COMMITTEE MISSION
The UNPBC’s mandate states that it is this committee’s responsibility to bring together all relevant
actors from post-conflict zones and provide integrated strategies for peacebuilding and recovery. 217
Haiti has struggled to overcome a number of challenges ranging from natural disasters to political
instability. However, these issues, while objectively negative, allow for the UNPBC to incite great
change for the better for the country.
The UNPBC must develop a multifaceted plan that can ensure peacebuilding and recovery measures
for Haiti. Delegates will then need to use a wide variety of resources, such as official documents
published by the UN, annual reports, official statements in regards to the issue from world leaders,
and of course the committee’s framework. In order to fully understand the situation, delegates
should also consult past resolutions the UN Security Council has passed in response to the Situation
in Haiti. In adherence to the mandate put out for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), the international community will “continue to assist and support the economic,
social, and institutional development of Haiti over the long term.”218 It is crucial for the UNPBC to
provide an innovative and comprehensive solution that can help the reconstruction of this country.
It is important to keep in mind that it is not within this committee’s competencies to suggest
financial aspects for the funding of the proposed solutions, nor is it required to imply authority over
institutions like the European Union, the Peacebuilding Fund, or even particular countries. This
committee is solely dedicated to creating multifaceted, comprehensive measures to suggest to the
UN Security Council with the objective of achieving peacebuilding, prosperity, and social integration
results whilst respecting a State’s national sovereignty rights. The on-going dispute between the
institutions claiming to be the legitimate government will challenge the delegates to come up with
stable and conflict reducing socioeconomic means by which to approach the wide variety of issues in
both the short and long term. Achieving unity and establishing a strong government able to defend
217 “MINUSTAH Mandate,” United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2016, accessed 17 September 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/mandate.shtml.
218 “Security Council Establishes UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for Initial Six-Month Period," United Nations, 30 April
2004, accessed 30 July 2016, http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8083.doc.htm.
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its territory is crucial for the rule of law and integrity in Haiti, as well as for the infrastructural and
economic development of the country.
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APPENDIX A: LIBYA TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT

EVENTS 219
1969 – Colonel Muammar Gaddafi ascends to the Libyan hierarchy after a bloodless coup d'etat,
removing King Idris I from the throne.
This marked the beginning of Muammar Gaddafi's rule, a period in which many private industries and land
in the public sector were nationalized. Gaddafi also championed social reform claiming his accession to the
throne as a people’s rebellion giving his rule a mandate of the people.
2011 – February: Violent Anti-Gaddafi protests break out in Benghazi inspired by revolts in other
Arab countries, especially neighboring Egypt and Tunisia, leading to escalating clashes between
security forces and anti-Gaddafi rebels
The event known as “Arab Spring” prompted many regime changes in the earlier half of that 2010 decade
on an unprecedented level.
2011 – July: The international Contact Group on Libya formally recognizes the main opposition
group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), as the legitimate government of Libya.
This is the first time an international body has recognized a group of authority in Libya other than Gaddafi
for the first time in over 40 years.
2011 – October: Gaddafi is killed by rebel forces.
2012 – August: Transitional government hands power to the General National Congress, which was
elected in July. The Congress elects Mohammed Magarief of the liberal National Front Party as its
chairman, thereby making him interim head of state.
This event marked the first “peaceful” transition of power since Arab Spring.
2012 – September: US ambassador and three other Americans are killed when Islamist militants,
including Ansar al-Sharia, storm the consulate in Benghazi.
In response to an American movie questioning Islam, violent protests of mostly fundamentalist Muslims at
the US Consulate claimed the lives of American embassy workers causing international outrage. This also
revealed a very violate underlying core despite some of the progress made in the region.
2014 – February: Protests erupt in response to the General National Congress refusal to disband
after mandate expires.
"Libya Profile - Timeline," BBC News, BBC, Accessed July 22, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
219
13755445.
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After taking control over Libya in 2012, the GNC had a mandate of rule until February 2014. Rather
than relinquishing the power, the congress voted to extend its mandate without the people’s vote.
2014 – June: Prime Minister Maiteg resigns after supreme court rules his appointment illegal. New
parliament chosen in elections marred by a low turn-out attributed to security fears and boycotts;
Islamists suffer heavy defeat. Fighting breaks out between forces loyal to outgoing GNC and new
Parliament.
During the new elections, the GNC was voted out, however, massive protest from GNC loyalist occurred due
to the incredibly low turnout to the elections. GNC loyalists used this reason, among others, to refute the
election results, setting the stage for the two governments currently “ruling” over Libya today.
2016 – January: UN announces new, Tunisia-based interim government, but neither Tobruk nor
Tripoli parliaments agree to recognize its authority.
This unity government is the formation of a new Libyan government – officially creating a legitimate,
internationally recognized opposition in the region.
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APPENDIX B: LIBYAN CIVILIAN RE-ENTRY 220
220 “Main migration routes to and from Libya (to Italy and Greece) May 2016,”UNHCR.
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APPENDIX C: INTERNAL CONFLICT IN LIBYA 221
221 Farouk Chothia, "Islamic State Gains Libya Foothold.”
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RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, delegates must answer each of these questions in their position papers.

1. How has your country responded to the many changes in power Libya has gone through
over the last ten years? What measures should be taken in order to ensure political stability
and reduce violence in Libya?
2. How can the UNPBC help to deescalate the refugee crisis currently plaguing Libya?
3. What non-governmental organizations in your country and abroad can help bring aid to
Libya?
4. Does your country have any alliances with any of the main players of conflict in Libya? Are
there any third-party influences that may limit your country’s ability in Libya?
5. How can your country and its position in the UNPBC combat the illicit small arms trade and
lack of government security in Libya?
6. What is the best possible way to promote economic growth and self-sustainability in Libya?
7. What steps should the UNPBC ultimately take to implement peacebuilding and
peacekeeping initiatives in Libya?

1. Has your country contributed in any type of aid to Haiti, or issued a statement regarding its
situation? Is there an economic or humanitarian relationship between your country and
Haiti?
2. Would your country consider it feasible to intervene in Haiti based on its current status and
political history?
3. How can ethnic tensions be eased between Haitians and Dominicans? What can be done
about IDP in Haiti and stateless people in both countries?
4. What measures should be taken in order to ensure political stability and reduce violence in
Haiti?
5. What is the best possible way to promote economic growth and self-sustainability in Haiti?
6. What institutions may be key for the UNPBC’s resolutions?
7. What should UNPBC focus on for short term and long term solutions to Haiti’s situation?
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IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS
“A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players. European Council On Foreign Relations.” Accessed 23
August 2016. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Lybias_Main_Players.pdf
This document gives a very good summary of the players involved in the conflict.
Chossudovsky, Michel. “Destroying a Country’s Standard of Living: What Libya Had Achieved,
What has been Destroyed”. Global Research, 12 March 2013. Accessed 3 July 2016.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/destroying-a-country-s-standard-of-living-what-libya-had-
achieved-what-has-been-destroyed/26686.
This reports presents the information as to what Libya as a country has lost for its economy due to its conflict.
“Libya IDP Figures Analysis.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Accessed 3 July 2016.
http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/figures-analysis.
This articles gives an analysis of the IDP situation in Libya as a result of the recent civil war.
Martin, Philip and Weber, Christina. “Ethnic Conflict in Lybia: Toubou.” The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs of Carleton University, 21 June 2012. Accessed 3 July 2016.
http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1394.pdf.
This article details the troubles of the ethnic tribes in Libya specifically the Toubous tribe and how the tensions have
affected them after the fall of Muammar Qaddafi and the resulting Arab Spring.
Squassoni, Sharon A. and Andrew Feickert. “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress, 22 April 2016. Accessed 3 July 2016.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/32007.pdf.
This report gives an assessment of the weapon circumstances of Libya and the possible threats they present to the
international community.

A/HRC/31/77. “Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human
rights in Haiti.” 12 October 2015. Accessed 1 June 2016.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_776.pdf.
This report by the Security Council provides a detailed account on the developing of Haiti’s human rights situation.
“Briefing on Electoral Crisis in Haiti.” What’s in the Blue. 11 May 2016. Accessed 16 July 2016.
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/05/briefing-on-electoral-crisis-in-haiti.php.
This article discusses the timeline of events related to Haiti’s electoral crisis.
Connor, Tracy, Hannah Rappleye, and Erika Angulo. “What Does Haiti Have to Show for $13
Billion in Earthquake Aid?” NBC News, 12 January 2015. Accessed 10 September 2016.
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http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/what-does-haiti-have-show-13-billion-
earthquake-aid-n281661.
This article discusses Haiti’s problem to rebuild and the structural spending of its aid relief funds.
“Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission.” United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. 2016. Accessed
10 July 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml.
This article discusses the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate.
“MINUSTAH Mandate.” United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2016. Accessed 14 September
2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/mandate.shtml.
This article discusses the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti’s mandate.
R. O’Connor, Maura. “Subsidizing Starvation: How American tax dollars are keeping Arkansas rice
growers fat on the farm and starving millions of Haitians.” Foreign Policy, 11 January 2013.
Accessed 13 Sept. 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/11/subsidizing-starvation/.
This article discusses Haiti’s trade crisis in depth by talking about the rice industry.
S/2015/667. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in

Haiti.” United Nations Security Council, 31 August 2015. Accessed 10 July 2016.
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/667
This article discusses a report annually made by the Secretary General’s office evaluating MINUSTAH’s work and
performance.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
COMMITTEE HISTORY AND SIMULATION
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A/69/674–S/2014/911.“Letter Dated 15 December 2014 from the President of the General

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“UN Welcomes ‘Historic’ Signing of Libyan Political Agreement.” UN News Centre, 17 December
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THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

NHSMUN is a project of the

A NOTE ON THE NHSMUN DIFFERENCE

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

1 S/RES/1645, “Resolution 1645,” 20 December 2005, accessed 17 June 2016,

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), in addition to intergovernmental and inter-organizational funding,

When operating in a given post-conflict country, the Organizational Committee convenes in a

TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

accessed 26 August 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/middleeast/libya-isis-europe-doorstep/.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

Foundation, accessed 22 July 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42443.

accessed 3 July 2016, http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=11087.

accessed 18 May 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/tunisia-africa-summit-terrorists-

15 September 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-

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September 2016, http://www.refworld.org/docid/574e9dfb4.html.

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http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2259(2015).; “Libyan Political Agreement,” ," United

Supporters of the Council of Deputies

19 May 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-politics-idUKKCN0X22MD.

Supporters of the New General National Congress

Countries Supporting International Intervention

Countries Supporting State Sovereignty

European Council on Foreign Relations.

This committee is solely dedicated to creating multifaceted, analytically comprehensive measures to

87"UNSMIL Mandate," United Nations, accessed 17 September 2016,

TOPIC B: THE SITUATION IN HAITI

October 2016, accessed 15 October 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-matthew-idUSKCN1250G2.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

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Environment Programme Financial Initiative, June 2014, accessed 10 September 2016,

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