Jerusalem Issue Briefs-Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood

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Vol. 9, No. 11    2 October 2009
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Yeshiva Attack in Jerusalem  Post Holocaust Anti-Semitism
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood:  Changing Jewish
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Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari

International Law
Our Fellows' Books
Israeli Security In August 2009, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a unilateral plan to establish a
de facto Palestinian state in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem following a two-year state-
Jerusalem building process. Fayyad's plan is the first serious Palestinian outline of a state-building effort since
the PLO was founded in 1964 and replaces the traditional PLO position of armed struggle to
ME Diplomacy
"liberate Palestine."
U.S. Middle East Policy The Fayyad plan represents a bold anti-Fatah posture and is seen to pose a direct challenge to
Fatah and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas. Fayyad enjoys only limited political backing and his political
EU Middle East Policy
rivals, such as Tawfiq Tirawi, Abu Maher Gneim, and Mahmud al-Alul, who were recently elected to
Radical Islam\Iran the new Fatah Central Committee, have already blasted Fayyad's plans.
Israel supports "bottom up" Palestinian state-building. However, Israeli leaders have voiced legal
Jerusalem Viewpoints
and security-based concerns over Fayyad's intention that the PLO would unilaterally declare
Jerusalem Issue Briefs Palestinian statehood in 2011 based on the June 4, 1967, lines. The one-sided establishment of a
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Palestinian state would contravene a key provision of the Oslo Interim Agreement, according to
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Another direct challenge to Israel is that Fayyad's "blueprint" calls for massive Palestinian Show Publications
Institute for Global development in Area "C" of the disputed West Bank, which is under Israeli civil and security control,
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and which directly challenges the delicate, agreed-upon framework of the 1993 Oslo accords.
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strategically vital Jordan Valley and the high ground surrounding Jerusalem and overlooking Israel's Search Articles
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vulnerable cities along the Mediterranean coast. Hizbullah's 4,000 rocket attacks from the north in
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2006 and Hamas' 10,000 rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza, culminating in the 2009 Gaza war,
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In August 2009, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a unilateral plan to establish a de
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facto Palestinian state in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem following a twenty-four-month state-
building process. Fayyad's 54-page plan to build Palestinian infrastructure and establish Western-style Print page
public institutions is the first of its kind since the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords.
Fayyad's state-building vision has already elicited Western enthusiasm and financial and political support
from the Obama administration and European countries. However, Western optimism may have
underestimated the ominous political tensions which the plan has exacerbated among the fractured
Palestinian leadership. Fayyad, as an unelected prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, has provoked
some in the Palestinian leadership by announcing his far-reaching program without first seeking approval
from the PA Legislative Council or the PLO governing bodies, without whose support such an initiative
cannot be implemented. 1

Israel supports "bottom up" Palestinian state-building. However, Israeli leaders have voiced legal and
security-based concerns over Fayyad's intention that the PLO governing bodies will unilaterally declare
Palestinian statehood in 2011 based on the June 4, 1967, lines. Such a move would be unacceptable to
Israel, as it would contravene the internationally recognized principles of a negotiated settlement and
secure and recognized boundaries - defensible borders - that were firmly established in UN Security
Council Resolution 242 following the 1967 Six-Day War. This resolution, passed in November 1967, has
governed all Arab-Israeli peace negotiations since then, including the Oslo process, the Roadmap, and
Annapolis.

Israel would welcome the opportunity to share its vast experience in state-building to help Fayyad achieve
his "bottom up," state-building vision within a strong Israeli-Palestinian partnership. However, any unilateral
Palestinian declaration of statehood would preclude Israel's vital security requirements, its internationally-
sanctioned legal rights, and could end up derailing the peace process and lead to armed conflict between
PA forces and Israel.

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood

The Fayyad Plan

Fayyad's plan is the first serious Palestinian outline of a state-building effort since the PLO was founded in
1964 and replaces the traditional PLO position of advocating a "struggle of every means" including armed
struggle to "liberate Palestine," that was reaffirmed at the Sixth Fatah Congress in Bethlehem in August
2009. 2 Fayyad's stated intention is to dedicate the next 24 months until 2011 to building physical
infrastructure, public institutions, public services, and tax incentives for foreign investors.3 These state-
building assets would anchor a viable de facto state throughout the West Bank including areas that, in line
with signed agreements between Israel and the PLO at Oslo, fall under Israeli control, such as the hills that
overlook Jerusalem and Israel's coastal cities to the west, as well as the strategically important Jordan
Valley to the east.

Fayyad's intention is to create facts on the ground that will garner major international support and lead to
pressure to transform recognition of a de facto Palestinian state in 2011 into a de jure state in the event
that the Palestinian Authority and Israel fail to reach a negotiated solution. 4 Fayyad said: "If occupation has
not ended by then (2011) and the nations of the world from China to Chile to Africa and to Australia are
looking at us, they will say that the Palestinian people have a ready state on the ground. The only problem
is the Israeli occupation [the Israeli communities and security presence] that should end."5

Fayyad's Plan Sidelines Fatah

Despite the plan's explicit "full commitment to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) program," the
Fayyad plan represents a bold anti-Fatah posture.6 The plan's opening sentences omit any mention of
Fatah, despite its role as the leading Palestinian political movement that has defined the Palestinian
liberation narrative for nearly half a century. Fayyad writes: "The establishment of a Palestinian state
requires collective dedication to this national goal, which is shared by the various political and social
organizations, academic and cultural institutions, non-government organizations, local government councils,
the private sector, the land-protection and anti-settlements and anti-wall committees, and the national
organizations of women and youth." 7

Fayyad's Western approach in language, substance, and style represents a sharp break from both past PA
governments and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah movement. Fayyad's glaring omission of
mentioning Fatah, and the plan's commitment to political struggle based on "peaceful and popular
movements," together with "building a government based on the principles of justice and the rule of law,
equality and tolerance, safeguarded by a clear separation of powers of the executive, the legislature and
judiciary," is language uniquely befitting the U.S.-trained Palestinian economist, who told Newsweek that
former U.S. President Alexander Hamilton, the New York federalist, was a role model. 8 Fayyad has a
staunch reputation in the West as a "technocrat and pragmatist."9

Western Support for the Fayyad Plan

Fayyad's unilateral Palestinian state program has already earned the broad backing of the UN, the Quartet,
and European leaders, as well as the Obama administration. The Quartet issued a joint statement on
September 24, 2009, that "welcomes the Palestinian Authority's plan for constructing the institutions of the
Palestinian state within 24 months as a demonstration of the PA's serious commitment to an independent
state." 10 On September 22, 2009, Tony Blair, the Middle East Quartet Special Envoy, hosted the UN Ad
Hoc Liaison Committee on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, where donor nations promised $400
million to the PA by the end of 2009. 11 Blair has characterized Fayyad's performance as "absolutely first
class - professional, courageous, intelligent." 12 Norway's foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Store, a committee
member, praised donor support of the Fayyad plan as "an investment in a political project." 13 UN Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry has also publicly backed the Fayyad plan. 14
In fact, on July 12, 2009, Javier Solana, the European Union's top diplomat, reportedly called on the UN
Security Council to recognize a Palestinian state even without a final-status agreement between Israel and
the Palestinians. He said the UN "would accept the Palestinian state as a full member of the UN, and set a
calendar for implementation." 15

While the U.S. administration has not officially announced explicit support for Fayyad's state project,
President Barack Obama has also envisioned a two-year path to Mideast peace. 16 There are other
indications of support as well. Shortly after the plan's publication in August, the Obama administration
announced a $20 million grant to back the effort. 17 A few weeks earlier, the U.S. Congress approved a
$200 million deposit into the PA treasury, which falls under Fayyad's direct control.18 Washington also
committed $109 million in 2009 to finance an expanded, U.S.-backed training program for the PA security
forces that since 2005 have been under Fayyad's control, under the close supervision of U.S. Lt.-Gen.
Keith Dayton.19

Palestinian Opposition to the Fayyad Plan

Despite robust Western support, Fayyad's ambitious plan has enjoyed a mixed reception in Palestinian
circles. Fatah has decided to give Fayyad's plan a chance due to the prospect of his implementing
Palestinian state projects on an unprecedented scale.20 At the same time, Fayyad's agenda has triggered
tensions in Fatah and the PLO and has drawn sharp criticism from the Arab media for co-opting the power

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood

and legitimacy of official PLO bodies.21

Fayyad has emphasized that any decision on a declaration of statehood at the end of two years would be
made by the PLO organs. 22 However, the Fayyad plan is seen to pose a direct challenge to Fatah and its
leader, Mahmoud Abbas, who reiterated, when Fayyad presented the plan, that "negotiations with Israel are
the only option for the Palestinian Authority." 23 Furthermore, Fayyad's approach collides with Fatah's
traditional platform of "armed struggle" to "liberate Palestine" using "all options" available, as confirmed at
the recent Fatah Congress. 24 Fayyad's program also contradicts the Fatah Congress' reaffirmation of a
"one-state" solution in the event that negotiations over a "two-state" solution fail. 25

Fayyad, who is not a member of the ruling Fatah movement, enjoys only limited political backing in the
Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, particularly following the latest central committee elections in August 2009.
Fatah's rejection of Fayyad was manifested in the rejection of his candidacy to the PLO executive
committee, which, had he been elected, would have empowered him to declare a Palestinian state as part
of the PLO political hierarchy. However, Fayyad reached a limited understanding with powerful Fatah
warlord Mohammed Dahlan. In fact, Dahlan is currently one of Fayyad's staunchest supporters in the
complex constellation of Palestinian politics. However, Fayyad's political rivals, such as Tawfiq Tirawi, Abu
Maher Gneim, and Mahmud al-Alul, who support "armed resistance" against Israel and were recently
elected to the new Fatah Central Committee, have already blasted Fayyad's plans as being a
"governmental intifada" that contradicted the "armed struggle."

Fayyad will also face a major challenge in financing his state-building program. International donor
countries have not yet fulfilled the billions of dollars in pledges made at the 2007 Paris donors conference,
as well as the nearly $5 billion pledged at the 2009 Gaza war donors conference in Cairo.26 Fayyad has
faced difficulties in the past simply paying the monthly salaries of the 130,000 employees on the PA
payroll. Nevertheless, lately salaries have been paid on time, and Fayyad is inaugurating development
projects on a daily basis due to the support his plan is receiving from the donor community. 27

One potentially prohibitive roadblock to Fayyad's statehood plan is that it calls for a reconnection of the
Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip to the Fatah-ruled West Bank. This would imply that Hamas would have to
accede to holding elections in January 2010 which it currently opposes, relinquish its de facto rule over
Gaza, and once again accept living under Fatah control. Yet it seems more likely that Hamas would initiate
a military confrontation with Fayyad's PA forces, as it did in its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Indeed, following
Fayyad's most recent appointment as prime minister in May 2009, Hamas officials labeled him a "traitor"
and promised an "earthquake" of a response. 28 A few days later, Fayyad-led PA security forces and
Hamas engaged in a deadly firefight in the West Bank town of Kalkilya in which three PA security forces
and three Hamas operatives were killed. 29

The Fateful 2010 Palestinian Elections

Fayyad has launched his state-building plan as his opening gambit for the scheduled elections in January
2010, when the terms of Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Legislative Council are
due to expire. Since Fayyad now serves as Abbas' appointed prime minister, he will be able to advance his
state-building project and unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood in 2011 only if he wins by a landslide
either in a bid for the presidency or as a newly-elected prime minister. Fayyad has already hit the
campaign trail, admitting to Newsweek's Kevin Peraino: "Part of what you have to do is to be on a
campaign all year long."30 Competition for Abbas' job will be fierce and will likely be led by extremist Fatah
leaders such as Abu Maher Gneim and Tawfiq Tirawi who vehemently oppose Fayyad. However, Fayyad's
grassroots popularity has blossomed significantly in recent months among West Bankers in smaller towns
and villages, where he has delivered essential services such as upgraded water projects, electricity, and
other basic infrastructure that Fatah and PA organs had failed to deliver. Analysts estimate that Fayyad
could win as much as 15 percent of the vote in the next elections, currently scheduled for January 2010. 31

Israel's Legal and Security Concerns

Aside from formidable challenges on the Palestinian front, Fayyad's plan creates serious legal and security
concerns for Israel. It is true that Israel has long supported Palestinian institution-building and has even
based its current policy towards the Palestinian Authority on "bottom up" state-building and "economic
peace."32 However, Israel strongly opposes any unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood, as this
would contravene the principle of a negotiated solution between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as enshrined
in UN Security Council Resolution 242, of November 22, 1967, which has governed all Arab-Israeli peace
efforts for the past 42 years.

Alan Baker, former legal advisor to Israel's Foreign Ministry and one of the legal "engineers" of the Oslo
accords, warned that Fayyad's one-sided establishment of a Palestinian state contravenes a key provision
of the Oslo Interim Agreement, according to which: "Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will
change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status
agreement." 33 Baker noted: "The intention of the parties during the negotiations was clear: the Palestinian
side will not declare a unilateral Palestinian state and the Israelis will not declare annexation."34

Another direct challenge to Israel is that Fayyad's "blueprint" calls for massive Palestinian development in
Area "C" of the disputed West Bank, which is under Israeli civil and security control, and which directly
challenges the delicate, agreed-upon framework of the 1993 Oslo accords. 35 Palestinian plans include
building an airport in the Jordan Valley, taking control of Atarot airport near Jerusalem, establishing new rail
links to neighboring states, and water installation projects near Tulkarem and Kalkilya close to the pre-1967

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood

"green line." 36 Israeli security echelons firmly oppose Palestinian airport development plans near Jerusalem
and in the Jordan Valley. 37 Furthermore, Fayyad's agenda has broader designs on Area "C." Fayyad told
the Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat in a September 1, 2009, interview: "Many think that zone "C" areas have
become disputed territories rather than occupied territories in the public consciousness. We assert that
these are PNA territories where the state will be established."38

The Israeli government is aware of the possibility of unilateral Palestinian moves in the ongoing dispute
over the future of the West Bank. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told Quartet envoy Tony Blair and
EU policy chief Javier Solana soon after the plan's release in August 2009: "Palestinian unilateral initiatives
do not contribute to a positive dialogue between the parties and if the unilateral initiative presented by
Salam Fayyad is promoted, Israel will respond." 39 In a September 17, 2009, interview, Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his rejection of the Palestinian demand that the 1967 lines will become
Israel's eastern border, which is a central part of Fayyad's plan. Netanyahu told the Israeli daily Israel
Today: "There are those who prophesized that the 1967 lines would be (Israel's eastern) border, but these
are indefensible, something that is unacceptable to me. Israel needs defensible borders and also the
ongoing ability to defend itself."40

Netanyahu's comments were not made in a vacuum. They were based on Israel's international legal rights
as preserved in UN Security Council Resolution 242. Netanyahu's insistence on "defensible borders" also
stems from understandings Israel has secured with the U.S. in the past. The concept of "defensible
borders" was a central element in President George W. Bush's letter to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
of April 14, 2004, with a commitment made by the White House as a diplomatic quid pro quo for Israel's
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. 41 The Bush letter was approved overwhelmingly by both
houses of the U.S. Congress immediately afterward.

President Bush reiterated his public commitment to defensible borders for Israel on January 10, 2008,
during his first visit to Israel as president. 42 Prime Minister Netanyahu also emphasized Israel's requirement
for "defensible borders" in his first major policy address on June 15, 2009, at Bar-Ilan University. The
achievement of "defensible borders" was one of several key security requirements that would anchor
Israel's agreement to the establishment of a future demilitarized Palestinian state.43

Israel's requirement of "defensible borders" involves its continuing control in Area "C," including the
strategically vital Jordan Valley and the high ground surrounding Jerusalem and overlooking Israel's
vulnerable cities along the Mediterranean coast. The Jordan Valley serves as a vital barrier against any
potential invasion from the east. Despite the treaty of peace with Jordan and the U.S. military occupation in
Iraq and Afghanistan, potential threats from the east are still tangible. The Iranian-backed Hizbullah's 4,000
rocket attacks from the north in 2006 and the Iranian-backed Hamas' 10,000 rocket and mortar attacks
from Gaza, culminating in the 2009 Gaza war, both underscore the potential rocket threat against Israel's
cities that could emerge if Israel withdrew to the pre-1967 lines.

Former IDF Intelligence Assessment Chief Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror notes that the Jordan Valley
now serves as an important natural barrier to the potential flow of rockets to the West Bank hilltops
overlooking Israel's coastline, where they could easily strike Israel's main airport, key utilities, and most of
Israel's major cities. 44 Former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz made a similar assessment to the Israeli
cabinet in 2000 at the time of the Clinton proposals,45 while his successor as chief of staff, Moshe Yaalon,
underscored the same requirement for defensible borders in the West Bank in 2008. 46

Conclusions

PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's two-year, unilateral, state-building plan signals a positive shift away
from the politics of armed struggle that has characterized the Fatah leadership to date. The current policy
of the State of Israel advocates "bottom up" state-building as well as security, political, and educational
reform and economic peace as necessary stages to achieve a demilitarized Palestinian state. In this sense,
Fayyad has demonstrated political boldness in unilaterally transforming the failed Fatah policies of the past
and in standing firm against Hamas.

The Obama administration has indicated its support for Fayyad's state-building project. However, the risks
and dangers of such a plan in view of the growing tensions and competition for power in the Palestinian
arena likely outweigh the plan's potential to unify Palestinian ranks and end the conflict with Israel.

Furthermore, the Fayyad plan would unilaterally transform the diplomatic paradigm between the Palestinian
Authority and the State of Israel from a legally-sanctioned, negotiated process to a unilateral Palestinian
initiative that has far-reaching and even troubling legal, political, and security implications for Israel and, by
extension, for the Palestinians and other regional actors. A unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood
would also free Israel from the restrictions and obligations it accepted under the Oslo agreements, with all
that implies, 47 and would further complicate the Middle East peace process.

Fayyad's strategy to enlist U.S. and international support for his unilateral steps to pressure Israel to
withdraw to the 1967 lines could very well backfire. Far from building the foundations of a Palestinian state,
a unilaterally declared state that claims the pre-1967 lines as its borders could end up thrusting Israel, the
PA, and other regional actors into a storm of instability and possibly armed conflict.

*     *     *

Notes

1. Salam Fayyad interview with Ali al Salih in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2009. Al Salih charged that
Fayyad has been subject to personal attack and his unilateral plan "strongly criticized by some Palestinian
factions including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Hamas." Ali attacked Fayyad

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood

saying, "every Fatah official I have talked to criticized your initiative and considered it encroachment, an
attack on the powers of the President."

2. See the political program of Fatah, as affirmed at the Sixth Fatah Conference, Bethlehem, Palestinian
Authority, August, 2009, http://www.fatehconf.ps/pdfs/fatehpolitical.pdf.

3. Salam Fayyad, Palestine National Authority, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, Program of
the Thirteenth Government, August 2009. See also "Palestinian PM: ‘We'll Form De Facto State by 2011',"
Ha'aretz, August 25, 2009.

4. "Palestinian PM Expounds Plan to Proclaim Statehood by 2011," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1,

2009.

5. Fayyad interview.

6. Ibid.

7. Fayyad, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, p. 3.

8. Kevin Peraino, "Palestine's New Perspective," Newsweek, September 14, 2009.

9. Ibid.

10. Joint Statement by the Quartet, Washington, D.C., September 24, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/129602.htm.

11. Press Conference of Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to Palestinians, United Nations,
September 22, 2009, http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/090922_AHLC.doc.htm. See also Avi
Issacharoff, "Abbas: Palestinians Can't Negotiate with Netanyahu," Ha'aretz, September 24, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1116693.html.

12. Peraino.

13. Press Conference of Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to Palestinians.

14. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=221642.

15. "Solana Wants UN to Establish Palestine," Jerusalem Post, July 12, 2009,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1246443786047.

16. Barak Ravid and Akiva Eldar, "Obama Envisions Two Years until Mideast Peace Deal," Ha'aretz,
September 1, 2009.

17. USAID official Hayward Sumka confirmed the $20 million U.S. financial assistance package to support
the Fayyad vision during a September 2009 visit to the West Bank. See also Maan news agency (Arabic),
August 27, 2009, http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=222018.

18. Peraino.

19. Jim Zanotti, "U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority," Congressional Research Service,
June 24, 2009, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/R40664.pdf.

20. Meeting with senior Fatah source and former senior Palestinian official in Jerusalem, September 10,
2009.

21. Fayyad interview. See also note 1 for attacks on Fayyad by Palestinian factions.

22. Fayyad interview. Fayyad said, "I absolutely do not cast doubts on  the fact that the PLO is responsible
for proclaiming the state."

23. Maan news agency (Arabic), August 17, 2009, http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?

ID=219746.

24. Pinhas Inbari, "Will Fatah Give Up the Armed Struggle at Its Sixth General Congress?" Jerusalem
Issue Brief, Vol. 9, No. 6, August 4, 2009.

25. Ibid.

26. Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari, "Is the Palestinian Authority Stable Enough for Peace Talks? Assessing
the Resignation and Return of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 9, No. 3, June
16, 2009.

27. Maan news agency (Arabic), September 23, 2009, http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?

ID=227336.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Peraino.

31. This assessment of Fayyad's dramatically increased popularity was made to the authors by three
senior Palestinian analysts in separate meetings in Jerusalem, September 28-30, 2009.

32. Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Yaalon coined the term "bottom up" in 2008 as a new approach
to Palestinian society-building. See Moshe Yaalon, "A New Strategy for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,"
Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 8, No. 10, September 2, 2008, http://www.jcpa.org/Templates/ShowPage.asp?
DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=2515&TTL=A_New_Strategy_for_the_Israeli-
Palestinian_Conflict. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coined the phrase "economic peace" in 2008 with

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood

regard to developing the Palestinian Authority's economy as a key prerequisite for viable and stable
Palestinian statehood.

33. Alan Baker, "De Facto Deliberations," Jerusalem Post, August 26, 2009,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1251145125233&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.

34. Ibid.

35. According to the 1993 Oslo Accords that were signed on September 13, 1993, at the White House by
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
until a final status accord was established, the West Bank and Gaza would be divided into three zones:
Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority; Area B - Palestinian civil control, Israeli military control;
Area C - full Israeli control.

36. Fayyad, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, p. 35. Fayyad's aggressive plans to build in
Area "C" of the West Bank is the most far-reaching attempt by the Palestinian Authority to establish de
facto control outside of Palestinian Areas "A" and "B" as defined at Oslo. See also Alan Baker, "De Facto
Deliberations." Baker, former legal advisor to Israel's Foreign Ministry and a legal architect of the Oslo
accords, notes: "The concept of a one-sided establishment of a de facto state outside the agreed-upon
process would appear to ignore a central component of the framework in which Fayyad himself is
permitted to function, and from which he derives his own authority." The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "still remains the valid source of authority for the
Palestinian administration in the territories, as well as for the entire functioning of Palestinian governance.
This agreement sets out and enables the establishment and functioning of the Palestinian Council (which
serves as the parliament of the Palestinian Authority), details the mode of election of its members and
appointment of its ministers, and defines its jurisdiction, its legislative and other powers, structure and
prerogatives." 

37. Meeting with a former senior IDF source who was directly involved in security aspects of the previous
negotiations with the PA that included plans for airports and other transportation projects mentioned in the
Fayyad plan, Jerusalem, September 23, 2009.

38. Fayyad interview in Al-Sharq al-Awsat. 

39. "FM: Bilateral Steps Will Bring Peace," Jerusalem Post, August 31, 2009.

40. Shlomo Tzna and Mati Tuckfeld, "The Prime Minister in a Special Holiday Interview: The Land Is
Already Divided," Israel Today, September 16, 2009, 
http://www.israelhayom.co.il/site/newsletter_article.php?a=3738. Netanyahu's opposition to returning to the
June 4, 1967, lines is based on the internationally sanctioned legal principle of "secure and recognized
boundaries" - "defensible borders" in diplomatic shorthand - that has been a fundamental security doctrine
of Israeli governments since the June 1967 war and which was also enshrined in UN Security Council
Resolution 242. Netanyahu's insistence on defensible borders follows the same demand made by former
prime ministers Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Golda Meir, and Levi Eshkol. Prime Minister Rabin told the
Knesset in 1995 that Israel's future borders would "include the Jordan Valley in the broadest meaning of
that term."

41. The 2004 Bush letter stated: "The United States remains committed to the security of Israel including
secure, recognized and defensible borders and to preserving and strengthening the capability of Israel to
deter enemies and defend itself against any threat." See Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace.
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, 2008, Appendix 3, p. 73.

42. Herb Keinan, "Bush Tells Israel: End the Occupation," Jerusalem Post, January 10, 2008.

43. For the Netanyahu speech, see

http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechbarilan140609.htm.

44. See also Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, "Israel's Requirement for Defensible Borders," in Defensible
Borders for a Lasting Peace," pp. 17-39.

45. In December 2000, former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz had emphasized similar resultant dangers to
those that the new Fayyad plan poses to Israel when he warned the Israeli cabinet on behalf of the IDF
General Staff that the Clinton parameters, which were also based on the June 4, 1967, lines, "would
endanger Israel's security." Mofaz's  professional opposition to the adoption of the Clinton parameters,
which like the Fayyad plan called for Israel to return to the June 4, 1967, lines, was headlined in Israel's
Yediot Ahronot newpaper on December 29, 2000. See Dore Gold, The Fight for Jerusalem (Washington:
Regnery, 2007), p. 9.

46. Moshe Yaalon, "The Second Lebanon War, from Territory to Ideology," in Iran's Race for Regional
Supremacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, 2008, p. 33.

47. Baker, "De Facto Declarations."

*     *     *

Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari are senior foreign policy analysts at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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