CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 1
[No. 11390. March 26, 1918.] In the present case an order was made directing the clerk to mail the required copy to the
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VICENTE PALANCA, administrator
of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.MORTGAGES; FORECLOSURE; JURISDICTION OF COURT OVER NONRESIDENT MORTGAGOR.
—Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives out of the Islands and refuses to
appear or otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter
is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to which the jurisdiction of the court is
based upon the fact that the property is located within the district and that the court, under
the provisions of law applicable in such cases, is vested with the power to subject the property
to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant is nonessential and in fact cannot be acquired.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF CLERK TO SEND NOTICE BY MAIL.—The failure of the clerk to send
notice by mail to the nonresident defendant in a foreclosure proceeding, as required by an
order of the court, does not defeat the jurisdiction of the court over the mortgaged property.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL LIABILITY.—In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a
nonresident defendant who fails to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, no
adjudication can be made which involves a determination of a personal liability of either party
arising out of the contract of mortgage.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ASCERTAINMENT OF AMOUNT DUE.—In a foreclosure proceeding against a
nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the
amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an
order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary precursor
of the order of sale. The mere fact that the court thus ascertains the amount of the debt and
orders the defendant to pay it into court does not constitute the entering of a judgment
against him as upon a personal liability.
1. 5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS.—As applied to judicial proceedings, due process of
law implies that there must be a court or tribunal clothed with power to hear and determine
the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have been lawfully acquired, that the defendant
shall have an opportunity to be heard, and that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful
hearing.
1. 6.ID.; ID.; MORTGAGE; FORECLOSURE.—In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a
nonresident, some notification of the proceedings must be given to the defendant. Under
statutes generally prevailing, this notification commonly takes the form of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and the sending of notice, by mail, by which means the
owner is admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings. The provisions of
law providing for notice of this character must be complied with.
1. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER FOR MAILING OF NOTICE BY CLERK.—In a foreclosure proceeding
against a nonresident defendant, the court is required to make an order for the clerk to mail a
copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at his last place of residence if known.
defendant at Amoy China. No evidence appeared of record showing that such notice had in
fact been mailed by the clerk; but publication was regularly made in a periodical as the law
requires. Held: That the making of the order by the court constituted a compliance with the
law, in so far as necessary to constitute due process of law, and that if the clerk failed to send
the notice, his dereliction in the performance of his duty was an irregularity which did not
constitute an infringment of the provision of the Philippine Bill declaring that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law.
1. 8.JUDGMENT; MOTION TO VACATE; IRREGULARITY IN GlVING OF NOTICE.—A defendant who
seeks to vacate a judgment in a foreclosure proceeding on the ground of irregularity in the
sending of notice by post, or failure to send such notice pursuant to an order of the court,
must show that as a result of such irregularity he suffered some prejudice of which the law
can take account.
1. 9.ID.; ID.; PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT.—In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding the property
was bought in at the public sale by the plaintiff, the mortgagee, at a price much below the
upset value agreed upon in the mortgage. Held: That if any liability was incurred by the
plaintiff by purchasing at a price below that which had been agreed upon as the upset price,
such liability was of a personal nature and could not be the subject of adjudication in a
foreclosure against a nonresident defendant who did not come in and submit to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such act of the plaintiff was, therefore, not such a prejudice to the
defendant as would justify the opening of the judgment of foreclosure.
1. 10.ID.; ID.; DELAY AS AFFECTING RIGHT TO RELIEF.—A party who seeks to open a final
judgment with a view to a renewal of the litigation should show that he has acted with
diligence; and unexplained delay in seeking relief is a circumstance to be considered as
affecting the application adversely.
1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE.—Upon an application made by the
representative of a deceased nonresident to vacate a judgment in a foreclosure proceeding, it
is held that, under the circumstances of the particular case, knowledge of the proceedings, or
of their result, should be imputed to him, upon the legal presumption that things have
happened according to the ordinary habits of life, and that as a consequence his failure to
apply for relief within the year and a half during which he survived the foreclosure
proceedings was a circumstance adversely affecting the application for relief.
1. 12.ID.; UNSETTLEMENT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; PUBLIC POLICY.—An application which
proposes to disturb judicial proceedings long closed cannot be considered with favor, unless
based upon grounds Which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that
judicial proceedings be upheld. The maxim here applicable is Non quieta movere.
1. 13.PRESUMPTIONS; PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.—Where the court makes an order for
the clerk to mail notice of a foreclosure proceeding to a nonresident defendant it will be
presumed in the absence of affirmative proof to the contrary that the duty was performed.

1. 14.ID.; ACTS OF COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.—After jurisdiction has once been
acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to have been rightly done.
This rule is applied to every judgment rendered in the various stages of the proceedings; and
if the record is silent with respect to any fact which should have been established before the
court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its
knowledge.
1. 15.ID.; JURISDICTIONAL FACT.—Where the officer makes a return concerning the manner in
which service was effected, and this service appears to have been insufficient, it cannot be
presumed that other legal service was effected by the same officer or other authorized
person. This rule, however, is not applicable to the case where an affidavit relative to mailing
notice to a nonresident, instead of being made by the proper officer, is made by one acting
without legal authority.
1. 16.JUDGMENTS; MOTION TO VACATE; TlME WlTHIN WHICH MOTION MAY BE MAINTAINED.—
Where a judgment is not void on its face, a motion to vacate the judgment with a view to a
continuation of the litigation, can be maintained in a Court of First Instance only in accordance
with section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which sets a time limit of six months from the
date when the judgment is entered. After the expiration of this period the party who seeks
relief against a judgment alleged to be void for some defect not apparent on its f face must
have recourse to an appropriate original proceeding.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Ostrand, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Aitken & DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan & Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco EspañoI-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage
upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question is dated
June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted
to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of
each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the
property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the
execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China, which appears to have been his
native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1910, without again returning to the Philippine
Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the def fendant by publication
pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained
from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same
time that the order of the court was entered directing that publication should be made in a newspaper,
the court f further directed that the clerk of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped
envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence,
to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the following provision
contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
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"In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known, the judge
must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be f forthwith deposited by the clerk in the post-
office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence."
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however, among the
papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an
employee of the attorneys for the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila
post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies
of the complaint, the plaintiff s affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing publication
as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained
from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter emanated from said office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having
appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had been properly
made in a periodical, but nothing was said about notice having been given by mail. The court, upon this
occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355.32, with interest from
March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver
said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and it was
declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the
mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The payment
contemplated in said order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the
property. The sale took place upon July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the
sum of P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to be precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion
was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that
the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this
action of the court Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has
appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as is related to the action
of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be
the sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the purpose
of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in
the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in this
connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to
proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether those proceedings were conducted
in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain
and the relief it may grant.

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of
the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the
final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in
the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in
favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its
narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the
property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. The action quasi in rem differs from. the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the f
former an individual is named as def fendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to, subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in
these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well-known treatise, has said:
"Though nominally against persons, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they
treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-mentioned, they are substantially
property actions. In the civil law, they are styled hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the
enforcement of the lien against the res; in the common law, they would be different if chancery did not
treat the conditional conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right as an equitable lien;
so, in both, the suit is a real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a
property debt, and an order for the sale of the res." (Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears,
the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect
the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should
therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment,
concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language:
"If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident, that
the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any demand which
may be established against the defendant by the final judgment of the court. But, if there is no
appearance of the defendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes, in its essential
nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment
of the demand which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff." (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
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In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary seizure
is to be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the lien on the
property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the property to that
lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is
not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as
though the property had been seized upon attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed.,
520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an attachment the property may be seized at the
inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody until the time
comes for the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is
that the court is here exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in
rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from the
statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the cause of
action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if acquired at
all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the def fendant or by the personal
service of process upon him within the territory where the process is valid. If, however, the defendant is
a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the court, refuses to come in
voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact
the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is .the subject of the exercise of
judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power
which, under the law, it possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court
over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such an action, is evidently based upon the
following conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2)
that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into its
custody, if necessary, and exposes it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious
corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be enforced against
the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulate the following propositions relative to the
foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who f fails to come in and
submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived f
from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person is not
acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be
enforced against the property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many
expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires personal
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth
the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be acquired by publication and
notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts until after the decision had been
rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S.,
714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions which have subsequently been
rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus
acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a
personal judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a nonresident who does not appear
is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service
by publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the

only exception seems to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or
impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 292; see also
50 L. R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A., [N. S.] 312.)
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from the
tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law requires that
the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process within the State, or by
his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal
liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this point, being based
upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a
nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be
confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him.
(Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S.,
294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom
service has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be
entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends
against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered a
personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases
of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary
precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was entered contains the
following words:
"Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is indebted
in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco Español-Filipino * * * therefore said
defendant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc., etc."
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a compliance
with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the defendant shall be required
to pay it. As a further evidence of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a
personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has
been sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of
the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy,
China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion
that jurisdiction rests upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any f form of notice
that could be given to a resident of a f foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that many
reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of publication or
notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is
sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly
originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between service by publication and personal
service of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision
of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal effects of the two forms of service was
obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which had already been moulded
into legal tradition before that case was decided have been brought down to the present day. But it is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 4
clear that the legal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar language in, which the courts
have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the
proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was
secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act
of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the constitutional
provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from
attempting to define with precision the meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea
expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt at precise
definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down
with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present,
namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To
answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for
the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive,
or substituted service, such notification does not constitute a service of process in any true sense. It is
merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject
of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.
In speaking of notice of this character a distinguished master of constitutional law has used the following
language:
"* * * if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather from
tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall not be
lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that form." (Cooley on Taxation [2d.
ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent
owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact
come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even
where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much. increased, is dependent
upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security
of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of
notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in
the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual
notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of
its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected
with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
"It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some way he
shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this. and fails to get

notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune,
and he must abide the consequences." (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
"If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon constructive notice, then our
statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations, without either force, or
meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, no personal judgment can be
rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate upon the property, then no effective judgment at all can
be rendered, so that the result would be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a
nonresident. Such a result would be a deplorable one." (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep.,
662, 667.)
It is, of course, universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other form
of notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the publication of
notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements of the law has
been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137,
138), it was held that where newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute required
20, the publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the
requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the
court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this to
be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles upon which the
giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the due
process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty,
somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the
parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to him.
This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration that in placing upon the clerk the duty of
sending notice by mail, the performance of that act is put effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in
the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
relates to the sending of notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The question
as to what may be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of compliance with
that requirement will be discussed by us further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity as amounts to a denial of
due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment
in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is. the only form of notice which
the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the
proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it
be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the
matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has
jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a
step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the
failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due
process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once
established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the def fendant to be
heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold
that the failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of
law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 5
violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judged in the
light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of the Act of Congress declaring that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk
to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such
irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of these
conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still necessary,
however, to consider its effects considered as a simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to
pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From this point of view, however, it
is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the irregularity in question must fail
unless it shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be
required of the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had a good defense against the action to
foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit
which accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the proceedings
is usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the relief is sought,
and in addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a general
statement that a party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The necessary facts must be
averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a showing of the existence of a meritorious
defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this connection
we quote the following passage from an encyclopædic treatise now in course of publication:
"Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if permitted to
stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi equitable powers to vacate a
judgment after the lapse of the term at which it was entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends
of justice, and where it appears that the party making the application is himself without fault and has
acted in good faith and with ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is
deemed sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something is
due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this
character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with judgments, and especially where they have
been executed or satisfied. The moving party has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is
shown affirmatively the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor." (15 R. C. L., 694,
695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January
29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in 1906; and the
proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated August 7,
1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man who had placed a
mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from the scene of his life
activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long remained in ignorance of the fact
that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposing that he had no knowledge
of those proceedings while they were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
things that he should have acquired information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and
upon the basis of this rational assumption we are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to
presume that he did have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things have
happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of a situation
more appropriate than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In support of this
presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to consider the probability that the

defendant may have received actual notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice addressed to
him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's attorneys. Adopting almost the exact
words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs. Ordean (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed.,
1363), we may say that in view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making
proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong that this
notice reached the defendant, there being no proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as
undelivered. And if it was delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a
probability that the recipient was a person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or communicate
its contents to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the
mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle and f
frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of applying to
this situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that presumption, supported
by the circumstances of this case, we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the defendant
voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the obligation which he had placed upon
it;- that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to him; and that he acquiesced in the
consequences of those proceedings after they had been accomplished. Under these circumstances it is
clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by
the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an
administrator who only qualified a few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of
the defendant himself existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we
believe that the delay in the appointment of the administrator and institution of this action is a
circumstance which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course if the
minor heirs had instituted an action in their own right to recover the property, it would have been
different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank
became the purchaser of the property at the forclosure sale for a price greatly below that which had
been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it appears that
in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by the notarial
document of July 19,1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value
therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should
remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation
for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the appellant that
when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does
not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings.
(Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim &
Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale,
not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a
case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently not been decided by this court
in any reported decision, and this question need not here be considered, since it is evident that if any
liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability
was a personal liability derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated
such a liability could not be the subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference
between the upset price and the price at which it bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected
by the disposition which the court made of this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such
an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 6
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the action
or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may be permitted
to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial proceedings long ago
closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which appeal to the conscience of
the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The maxim here applicable is non
quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the
United States:
"Public policy requires that judicial: proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those proceedings
be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are adjudged potent to destroy
such titles, a judicial sale will never realize the value of the property, for no prudent man will risk his
money in bidding for and buying that title which he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept
away through some occult and not readily discoverable defect." (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure
proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based erroneously
stated that the absent party was a resident of a certain town in the State of Kansas, when he was in fact
residing in another State. It was held that this mistake did not affect the validity of the proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as
required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper assumption;
and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a legal presumption that the clerk perf
formed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which. presumption is not overcome by any other
facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is -declared that there is a
presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared that
there is a presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These presumptions are
of course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been recognized. Omnia
præsumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium.  There is therefore clearly a legal
presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that strong
considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full force under
the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no control over the clerk of the court; and has
no right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no
control over this officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the
clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is no
principle of law better settled than that, after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of
general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment
or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion
(Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449) ; and if the record is silent with respect to
any fact which must have been established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed
that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11
L. ed., 283.)
"In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to have adjudged
every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the owners; that the
petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was insufficient to pay the debts of the
deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the manner of sale, were within the constitutional
power of the Legislature, and that all the provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the
administrators have been complied with. * * * The court is not bound to enter upon the record the
evidence on which any fact was decided." (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially
does all this apply after long lapse of ime.

Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive discussion
in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to foreclose a
mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that publication should
be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also that the order requiring the defendant to
appear should be posted at the front door of the court house and be published on some Sunday,
immediately after divine service, in such church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment
had been entered against a nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years
later the validity of the proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files
of an ancient periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof
was offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of
the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was void for lack of
jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"The court which made the decree * * * was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. * * * It is to be
presumed that the court before making its decree took care to see that its order for constructive service,
on which its right to make the decree depended, had been obeyed."
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral, or indirect attack, while in
the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is a direct proceeding for relief against it. The same
general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction,
whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack, the only difference being that in case of indirect
attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record affirmatively shows it to be
void, while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity may in certain cases be
overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with
knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to
support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that
there ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required by section 400 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no such
affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose of the law
in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the face of such
an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the proper affidavit is not
present in the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that in the future every title in
the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now before us would depend, for its continued security,
upon the presence of such affidavit among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be
destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for
the security of judicial proceedings and for the interests which have by law been confided to the courts,
would incline to favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of this kind is to hold
that the legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence
from the record of the proper proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the Philippine
Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of papers
which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally deposited in
the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of general information that
no judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the
pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which have been terminated; and in particular, no such
record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code
of Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a
matter of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 7
have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this
judgment and as already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers contained in
the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that
upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at Manila,
Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty
and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo to
send it for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had
affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this order and had directed
the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had
failed to comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the
attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a mistaken address affords
in our opinion very slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right
address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the
evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there
was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than as stated. If, to
give an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was served at a particular
place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was also made at another place or in
a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a person other than the defendant, it
will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant also
(Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we believe that
these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person making the return is the
officer who is by law required to make the return, we do not think that it is properly applicable where, as
in the present case, the affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are
concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is
admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the judgment of
July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed,
proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not been interrupted. The
proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is
merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the litigation may again resume its
regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the
authority of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation
in the same cause. This is as f follows:
"SEC. 113. Upon such term as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from
a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case
exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken."
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The
first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows:
"When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly
deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of First
Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that
court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days
after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have judgment set aside. * * * "

It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy
provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means
recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a
judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it
contains provisions describing with much fulness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of such
proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and concluding
the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is declared that the
procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are therefore of
the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so f far as
relates to the opening and. continuation of a litigation which has been once concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions;
and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot
suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear that, if
based on such an error, the motion came too late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we have
already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction over the
defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can
be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face, that is, if it
were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be something in this. Where
a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the
alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could be
shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party aggrieved thereby
is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles of law and
practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or
review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if not already
carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In
every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken
without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly hold that, assuming the
judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an
original proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure
defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be obtained by motion; and we think it
would only be productive of confusion for this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under
conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved, we refer to
the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a
judgment after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all
cases, after the lapse of such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in
court for that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted
that section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure was taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error, and
the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 8
I dissent. It will not take me long to state my reasons. An immutable attribute—the fundamental idea—
of due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an
opportunity of being heard in his defense. Protection of the parties demands a strict and an exact
compliance with this constitutional provision in our organic law and of the statutory provisions in
amplification. Literally hundreds of precedents could be cited in support of these axiomatic principles.
Where as in the instant case the defendant received no notice and
had no opportunity to be heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due "process of law. Resultantly,
"A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to
demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the
power so to do exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the defendant."
(Mills vs. Dickson, 6 Rich. [S. C.], 487.)
Judgment affirmed.
_______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Samartino vs. Raon
G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002.*
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by
personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted
service be availed of.—In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts
to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the
defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in
person will substituted service be availed of.
Same; Same; Same; The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted
service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed,
otherwise substituted service cannot be upheld; Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.—We have long held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts
exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service
of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service

cannot be upheld. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted
service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of
summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
Same; Same; Same; Service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made
against him; It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be
informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. —There being no valid
substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim
made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an
issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim
against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
Same; Same; Default; Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders
of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the
reopening of the case is intended for delay.—The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring
petitioner in default, considering it had actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default
judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is
intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be
allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial
court.
Same; Petition for Relief; It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a final
and executory judgment.—The period within which to file a petition for relief should have been reckoned
from the date petitioner learned of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It should not have been
counted from the date of the Municipal Trial Court’s decision because, precisely, petitioner appealed the
same. It was the Regional Trial Court’s decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of
the petition for relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a
final and executory judgment.
Same; Same; A verified petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order has been entered or such proceeding has been taken.—
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a verified petition for relief must be
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to
be set aside and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order has been entered or
such proceeding has been taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner’s good and substantial
cause of action or defense.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Precioso D. Sulit for petitioner.
     Alfredo C. Medina for private respondents.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 9
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and
Filomena Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint
for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite. 1 They
alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner
for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended
thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner.2 At the time of service of
summons at petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of
Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996,
where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996,
a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be
unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as
it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be
recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.3
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents’ motion to
declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondents as follows:
“FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming rights under him:
1. 1.To vacate immediately the land in question after the finality of the decision.
2. 2.For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 monthly from January, 1992 up
to the time he surrenders the premises considered as damages for the use of the subject land.
3. 3.For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees with an
additional P800.00 as appearance fees.
4. 4. To pay the plaintiffs P100.00 as filing fee.
SO ORDERED.”4
After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioner’s counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and
docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.5
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the court of origin issued on September 17, 1996 a
writ of execution.6 Petitioner was given a grace period of one month within which to vacate the
premises. His real property situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
283572, was levied and sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the monetary award.7
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for
relief from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393. 8 In support thereof, petitioner submitted an
affidavit of merit,9 alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold
to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December
13, 1988.10

The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment.11 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14, 1997.12 On the same day, a writ of demolition
was issued commanding the sheriff to remove the building and improvements made by petitioner on the
subject premises and to deliver the possession thereof to respondents.13
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
43202.14 On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 15 Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on November 14, 1997.16 Hence this petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the
summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the
defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in
person will substituted service be availed of.17
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant.—Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing
a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service.—If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service
should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of
service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is only under
exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by
evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is
essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted
service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.18
In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 59 was issued on November 19, 1989
to stress the importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service, to wit:
Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty and erroneous implementation of Section 8,
Rule 14, Rules of Court on Substituted Service of Summons.
The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks of Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio
Sheriffs together with the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules of
Court on substituted service as follows:
x x x      x x x      x x x
The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156
SCRA 305, must be strictly complied with, thus:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 10
“The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in
person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of
service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as
prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than authorized by the
statute is considered ineffective.”
For immediate compliance.
In the case at bar, the sheriff’s Return of Summons simply states:
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons, together
with the attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon defendant
REGALADO SAMARTINO thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant acknowledge receipt of
said court processes by affixing his signature at the lower left portion of the original summons hereto
attached.
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby respectfully returned to the court of origin
duly served for information and record purposes.
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.19
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed to
state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown
that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to
substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service is
in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the
defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served
not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending
proceedings. For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.20
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that
petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable
age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.
There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to
give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity
to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be
informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.21
By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner was not duly apprised of the action
against him. Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims against him. He was not given
a chance to be heard on his defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial court had actual
knowledge that petitioner was then indisposed and unable to file his answer to the complaint, as he was
then confined at the NBI-TRC. The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file
his answer violated his right to due process. Perforce, the judgment rendered against petitioner is
nugatory and without effect.
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it had
actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 11

should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in void. Necessarily, the enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the sale at public auction of
cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of petitioner’s real property to satisfy the void judgment must also be declared of no legal effect.
orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over the premises in order to determine who,
obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.22 as between petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess the property in dispute. This can
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we only be done in the proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner will be afforded every
have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are right to present evidence in his behalf.
frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Municipal
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue proceedings in Civil Case No. 744 by
are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is affording petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a chance to file his answer and present evidence in his
empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the case. The Writ of Execution dated September 17, 1996,
application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the Writ of Demolition dated January 14, 1997, and the certificate of sale over Transfer Certificate of
the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against Title No. T-283572, as well as all acts and deeds incidental to the judgment in Civil Case No. 744, are
petitioners. However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and declared NULL AND VOID.
relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial SO ORDERED.
court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not      Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.23
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Case remanded to trial court for further
In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from proceedings.
judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the Regional Trial Court, the petition for relief, Note.—Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due
filed on November 25, 1996, was late because petitioner had actual knowledge of the judgment in the process as of jurisdiction. (Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 343 [1999])
ejectment case since March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for relief should have been
reckoned from the date petitioner learned of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It should not ——o0o——
have been counted from the date of the Municipal Trial Court’s decision because, precisely, petitioner
appealed the same. It was the Regional Trial Court’s decision that became final and, hence, was the
proper subject of the petition for relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only
available against a final and executory judgment.24
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a verified petition for relief
must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order has been
entered or such proceeding has been taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense.25
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when petitioner learned of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What appears is that the said
decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime thereafter.
Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month period prescribed
by the Rules.
Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He
alleged therein that the property from which he was being ejected had been sold to him by its registered
owner. Ownership is a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While possession is the main issue in
ejectment, it is also one of the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that an owner of real property
is entitled to possession of the same. Petitioner can, therefore, properly plead his right of possession to
defeat that of respondents. Indeed, an owner who cannot exercise the seven “juses” or attributes of
ownership—the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or
alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits—is a crippled owner.26
All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did not have
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had as regards petitioner were null and

G.R. No. 111397. August 12, 2002.*
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC., respondents.
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Police Power; The authority of mayors to issue
business licenses and permits is beyond question.—The authority of mayors to issue business licenses
and permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (1), Article II
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads: “Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the
mayor. The general duties and powers of the mayor shall be: x x x. (1) To grant and refuse municipal
licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they
were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the
protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been
granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest.” (Emphasis supplied) On the other
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 12
hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides: “Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers,
Duties and Compensation: x x x. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City
Mayor shall: (3) x x x. (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation
of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; While the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and
permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same, he
must observe, however, due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give
the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. —From the language of the two laws, it is
clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the
corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or
revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these
permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the “violation of the condition(s)” on which the
licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is
premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The
mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even as the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private
commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits, he has no
power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating them. —
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a
police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial
establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok
Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716 which expressly
prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit: “Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall
conduct inspection of food and other business establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules
and regulations, inspecting licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws
and regulations. This responsibility should be properly exercised by Local Government Authorities and
other concerned agencies.” (Emphasis supplied) These local government officials include the City Health
Officer or his representative, pursuant to the Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila, and the City
Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A mayor has no authority to close down a business establishment
without due process of law—there is no provision in the Local Government Code or in the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be
void.—Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila
without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the
mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even
if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim
should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its
licenses and permits. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised
in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the
instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected
under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Prostitution; While a mayor’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution
is commendable, there is no excusing him for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the
operations of a business establishment.—Lim’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable.
The presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents
when he implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no
excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro.
For this reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim.
Actions; Injunctions; Preliminary Injunctions; The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.—Consequently, the Court of
Appeals did not err in upholding the trial court’s orders. The sole objective of a writ of preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be disposed of. In the
instant case, the issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main
case for mandamus. The trial court issued the injunction in view of the disruptions and stoppage in
Bistro’s operations as a consequence of Lim’s closure orders. The injunction was intended to maintain
the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on the merits.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Felix C. Chavez and Angel P. Aguirre for petitioners.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25,
1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The
assailed Decision sustained the orders dated Decem-ber 29, 1992, January 20, 1993 and March 2,
1993,4 issued by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court’s orders enjoined
petitioner Alfredo Lim (“Lim” for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or closing
down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by
respondent Bistro Pigalle, Inc. (“Bistro” for brevity).
The Antecedent Facts
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition5 for mandamus and prohibition, with
prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected
and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This
caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to accept
Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the
year 1993.7
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lim’s refusal to issue the business license and work permits violated
the doctrine laid down by this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit:
“Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.”
Acting on Bistro’s application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed temporary
restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 13
“WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain from inspecting
or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.).”9
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On January
20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistro’s application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s order declared:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners’ application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary
injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting under his authority, are and ( sic)
ordered to cease and desist from inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the
business operations of Petitioner Corporation’s establishments while the petition here is pending
resolution on the merits.
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to his official
duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required.
On the other hand, Petitioners’ application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby denied, for to
grant the same would amount to granting the writ of mandamus prayed for. The Court reserves
resolution thereof until the parties shall have been heard on the merits.”10
However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations
effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order.
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an “Urgent Motion for Contempt” against Lim and the policemen
who stopped Bistro’s operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt on
January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the court’s injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his
agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistro’s business operations.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January 20,
1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate
commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue,
suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in
Section 11 (1), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv)
of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The trial court denied Lim’s motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order
dated March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:
(1)The denial of respondent’s motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
or the dismissal of the instant case;
(2)Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other
impediments which were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and Exotic
Garden Restaurant on February 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively, and thereafter
said establishments are allowed to resume their operations;
(3)All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed establishments
of petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported; and
(4)The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to respondent
to elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court.”11

On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary
injunction.
On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.12 In a resolution dated July
13, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied Lim’s motion for reconsideration.13
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 14 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the
Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order the
police implemented at once.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lim’s petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced.
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
“x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable
injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the
case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a
litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the
principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing prior to
the filing of the case.
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing the
assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while the
petition is pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent correctly points out that the
questioned writ was regularly issued after several hearings, in which the parties were allowed to adduce
evidence, and argue their respective positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise of discretion
of the court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear case of abuse thereof. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED.”16
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. 1.“DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29,
1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH 2, 1993?”
2. 2.“DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN RENDERING ITS
ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF JULY 13,
1993?”
3. 3.“DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 BECOME MOOT AND
ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN RESTAURANT OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO.
7783?”
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 14
Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the trial court or
the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another case, 17 the Court will deal only with
the first two issues raised by petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
Bistro’s cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the
violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation consists of the work disruption in
Bistro’s operations caused by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lim’s refusal to issue a business license
to Bistro and work permits to its staff for the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the
issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim
to accept Bistro’s 1993 business license application and to issue Bistro’s business license. Also, the
mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept the applications of Bistro’s staff for work permits.
The writ of prohibitory injunction seeks to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing
down Bistro’s operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding
or otherwise closing down Bistro’s operations pending resolution of whether Lim can validly refuse to
issue Bistro’s business license and its staffs work permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies
primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse municipal licenses and
business permits as expressly provided for in the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila. Lim argues that the powers granted by these laws implicitly include the power to inspect,
investigate and close down Bistro’s operations for violation of the conditions of its licenses and permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not apply to the
instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim
failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept
Bistro’s business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims that Lim denied Bistro due process
of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
prohibitory preliminary injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly
provides for such authority. Section 11 (1), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads:
“Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor.—The general duties and powers of the mayor shall
be:
x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for
violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal
ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the
business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general
interest.” (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
“Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: x x x.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of
the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the condition upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.” (Emphasis supplied)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 15

From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business disruptions and stoppage in Bistro’s operations as a consequence of Lim’s closure orders. The injunction
licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on the merits.
the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the “violation CA-G.R. SP No. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
of the condition(s)” on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to SO ORDERED.
issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of      Puno (Chairman) and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which      Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.
means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any Notes.—It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They
violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. ( De la Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA
police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial 569 [1983])
establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be
Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 771618 which expressly deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, ‘to do his thing.’ As long as he does not
prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit: prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. The so-called ‘general
“Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business welfare’ is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be
establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as,
permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local
be properly exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned agencies.” (Emphasis governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national
supplied) legislature under the general welfare clause. (Villacorta vs. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986])
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to the
Revised City Ordinances the City of Manila,19 and the City Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the Local ——o0o——
Government Code.20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without
due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local
Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor
authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there
is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should
have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance
with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law.21 Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we
find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or
permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistro’s operations even before the expiration of its business license on
December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993, in effect denying the
application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.
Lim’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted in
good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he implemented his campaign SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court
properly restrained the acts of Lim. G.R. No. 93891. March 11, 1991.*
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial court’s orders. The sole POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE
objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case
can be disposed of.22 In the instant case, the issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did Judgment; Order; Pollution Adjudication Board; Instances when an ex-parte cease and desist
not dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial court issued the injunction in view of the order may be issued by the Pollution Adjudication Board under Sec. 7(a) of P.D. No. 984.—We note that
under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may

be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an “immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or (b) whenever such discharges
or wastes exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” On the one hand, it is not essential that
the Board prove that an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant
life” exists before an ex parte cease and desists order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that
the wastes discharged do exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” In respect of discharges
of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex
parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such
allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter
of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds
at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an “immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life.” Since the applicable standards set by the
Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent
or waste discharge, the general standard of an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,
or to animal and plant life” remains necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Police Power; Ex-parte cease and desist orders issued by
the Pollution Adjudication Board are permitted under the Police Power of the State; Reasons .—Ex parte
cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers
and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the
ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential
appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is
a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police
power. The Board’s ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar
temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply
absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments
are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capital costs and operating expenses and to increase their
profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort,
by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
PETITION for review from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.
     Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board (“Board”) asks us to review the Decision and Resolution
promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
No. SP 18821 entitled “Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board.” In that
Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 16
Corporation’s (“Solar”) petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease
and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated
wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by
Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:
“Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of
about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections
conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater
discharged in the final outfall outside of the plant’s compound was even greater. The result of inspection
conducted on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent’s Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted
unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per
minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant’s
existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-
pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids,
among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are
clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
source installations and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully
complied with all the requirements and until further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED.”1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar’s plant:
1. a.inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution
Control Commission (“NPCC”), the predecessor of the Board;2 and
2. b.the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (“DENR”).
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar’s wastewater treatment plant was non-
operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was
being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining
20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar’s non-operational wastewater treatment
plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar’s effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in
excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued
by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the
Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989
allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation
of Solar’s wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive
Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.

On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar’s petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that
appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was
the proper remedy, and that the Board’s subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had
rendered Solar’s petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed,
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further
proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same
time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:
“x x x. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may
take relative to the projected ‘inspection and evaluation’ of appellant’s [Solar’s] water treatment
facilities.”3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of
petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be
moot and academic, “larger issues” demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner
Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
1. 1.its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
2. 2.the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex
parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such
establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports
before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima
facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board’s own rules and regulations, an ex
parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life.” In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection
reports before the Board made no finding that Solar’s wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar’s contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner
Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
“P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. x x x Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that
the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may
issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or
cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the
necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory  and shall
remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the
allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court.” (Italics supplied)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 17
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and
desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose
an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or (b) whenever
such discharges or wastes exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” On the one hand, it is
not essential that the Board prove that an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or
to animal or plant life” exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the
Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” In
respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the
Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have
not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act
on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved
presents an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life.” Since
the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every
possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an “immediate threat
to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life” remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by
the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an “immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.”
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical
and chemical substances which “effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial
plants” must not exceed “when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC
in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations.” The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are
classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations, 5 which in
part provides that:
“Section 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a
safe and satisfactory condition according to their best usages.  For this purpose, all water shall be
classified according to the following beneficial usages:
(a) Fresh Surface Water
Classification        Best usage
xxx xx xxx
x
Class D        For agriculture, irrigation, livestock
         watering and industrial cooling and
processing.
xxx xx xxx
x
(Emphases    
supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar’s wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November
1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following identical finding:
“a. For legal action in [view of] violation of Section 103 of the implementing rules and regulations of P.D.
No. 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982.”6
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 18

Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside   in mg./l.     mg./l.    
the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:
“Inland         November September h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93  
Waters         1986 1988
(Class C         Report8 Report9   in mg./l.”     mg./l.    

& D7 MBAS

          Station 1 Station 1       i) Dissolved 0  

        Oxygen,    
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125 mg./l.
  platinum     (Apparent           j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
  cobalt     Color)    
        Matter,    
  units          
mg./l.
b) pH 6- b) pH 9.3 8.7
      k) Total Dis 800 610
8.5
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperatur             solved    
e Solids
  ture in oC     (oC)    
        mg./l.    
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in    
“Inland         November Septembe       l) Total Solids 1,400 690
r
        mg./l.    
Waters         1986 1988
      m) Turbidity    
(Class C         Report8 Report9
& D7         NTU/ppm. 70  
          Station 1 Station 1 SiO3
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
  mg./l.     mg.l.     “Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing
Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80 from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and
operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition
thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic).
  solids in     solids in    
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings
during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal
  mg./l.     mg./l. f)  
Division a re-inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is
instituted; hence, this inspection.
f) BOD in 80   BOD (5- 1,100 152 Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
day) Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP.
The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm
  mg./l.     mg./l.    
pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be
instituted immediately against the firm x x x.”10
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease     The September 1988 inspection report’s conclusions were:

1. “1.The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection.
The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30
gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining
20% was channeled into the plant’s existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
2. 2.The WTP was noted not yet fully operational—some accessories were not yet installed. Only
the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The
wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for
primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].
3. 3.A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the
analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and
suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory result).”11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before
the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar’s plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of
physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis
supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the
previous owner of the plant facility—Fine Touch Finishing Corporation—had been issued a Notice of
Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until
the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of
the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13
October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986.
Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986
and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was
confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to
enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its
continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinerejos River, presumably loath
to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant (“WTP”) in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,12 the
Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a
pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
1. “1.No mayor’s permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether
there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation
of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a
town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his
police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the
health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the business.
2. 2.The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor “not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area,” so that petitioner was ordered
to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:
x x x      x x x      x x x
3. (3)Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex
A-2, petition)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 19
1. 3.This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-
B, petition). x x x.
2. 4.The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by
Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the
plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution
device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
x x x      x x x      x x x
3. 6.While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,
1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its
permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the
health of the residents of the community.”
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but
by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of
determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. The Board’s ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have
compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have
avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial
establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and
to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general
welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their implementing
regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex
parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself.
Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of
the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment
would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity
is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in
situations like that we have here. The Board’s decision rendered after the public hearing may then be
tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984
and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely
what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board’s Order and
Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in
fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its
wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and
evaluated.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order
and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that that Order
and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not
err when it dismissed Solar’s petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from
the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution,
as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice
to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board’s Order and Writ of Execution at
a public hearing before the Board.
     Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision and resoluton set aside.
Notes.—Decisions of National Water Resources Council on water rates fixing disputes should be
appealed to Regional Trial Courts. (BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 543.)
There has to be a measure of finality to unappealed administrative decisions insofar as the
department or agency is concerned. (Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 150 SCRA 601.)
——o0o——
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 20
No. L-61689. June 20, 1988.*
RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC., and HONORABLE JUDGE CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CONSOLACION ODRA, respondents.
Banks; Receivership; Due Process; There is no requirement whether express or implied that a
hearing be first conducted before a banking institution may be placed on receivership; Condition
prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines.—It will be observed that there is no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing
be first conducted before a banking institution may be placed under receivership. On the contrary, the
law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the
bank’s assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by the examining department of the
Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that the
bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its continuance in business would involve probable
loss to its depositors or creditors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Theory supported by the ruling of the Court which established the
authority of the Central Bank.—Supportive of this theory is the ruling of this Court, which established the
authority of the Central Bank under the foregoing circumstances, which reads: “As will be noted,
whenever it shall appear prima facie that a banking institution is in ‘a condition of insolvency’ or so
situated ‘that its continuance in business would involved probable loss to its depositors or creditors.’ the
Monetary Board has authority: First, to forbid the institution to do business and appoint a receiver
therefor; and Second, to determine, within 60 days, whether or not: 1) the institution may be
reorganized and rehabilitated to such an extent as to be permitted to resume business with safety to
depositors, creditors and the general public; or 2) it is indeed insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to depositors, creditors and the general public, and public interest requires that it be liquidated. In
this latter case (i.e., the bank can no longer resume business with safety to depositors, creditors and the
public, etc.) its liquidation will be ordered and a liquidator appointed by the Monetary Board. The Central
Bank shall thereafter file a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying for the Court’s assistance in the
liquidation of the bank.” x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contention that Section 29, RA 265 as amended, could not have
intended to disregard and do away the constitutional guarantee that no property shall be taken without
due process of law when it conferred upon the Monetary Board the power to place Rural Banks under
receivership is without merit; The closure and liquidation of a bank may be considered as an exercise of
police power.—Petitioner further argues, that there is also that constitutional guarantee that no property
shall be taken without due process of law, so that Section 29, R.A. 265, as amended, could not have
intended to disregard and do away with such constitutional requirement when it conferred upon the
Monetary Board the power to place Rural Banks under receivership. The contention is without merit. It
has long been established and recognized in this jurisdiction that the closure and liquidation of a bank
may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise may, however, be subject to judicial
inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or a
denial of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board
without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry.—The evident implication of the
law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board without notice
and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the protection of the banking institution.

Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity
to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior
hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process,
fortunes may be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts may interfere with the Central Bank’s exercise of
discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated .—There is no
question that the action of the Monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it
has been held that the courts may interfere with the Central Bank’s exercise of discretion in determining
whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of
the Central Bank Act are under the law final and executory to be set aside only if there is convincing
proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.—It has likewise been held that
resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, such as: forbidding bank
institutions to do business on account of a “condition of insolvency” or because its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to depositors or creditors; or appointing a receiver to take charge
of the bank’s assets and liabilities, or determining whether the bank may be rehabilitated or should be
liquidated and appointing a liquidator for that purpose, are under the law “final and executory” and may
be set aside only on one ground, that is “if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the question of whether or not the action of the Monetary Board is attended by arbitrariness
and bad faith.—There is no dispute that under the above-quoted Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether or not the action of the
Monetary Board directing the dissolution of the subject Rural Bank is attended by arbitrariness and bad
faith. Such position has been sustained by this Court in Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Claim that a resolution of the Monetary
Board should be set aside as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith may be asserted as an affirmative
defense.—In the same case, the Court ruled further that a banking institution’s claim that a resolution of
the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act should be set aside as plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith, may be asserted as an affirmative defense (Sections 1 and 4[b], Rule 6, Rules of
Court) or a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6; Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court) in the proceedings
for assistance in liquidation or as a cause of action in a separate and distinct action where the latter was
filed ahead of the petition for assistance in liquidation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Trial Court has not as yet
inquired into the merits of the claim that the Monetary Board’s action is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith.—It will be noted that in the issuance of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City, dated March 9, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 72-77), there was no trial on the merits.
Based on the pleadings filed, the Court merely acted on the Central Bank’s Motion to Dismiss and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, denying both for lack of sufficient merit. Evidently, the trial court
merely acted on an incident and has not as yet inquired, as mandated by Section 29 of the Central Bank
Act, into the merits of the claim that the Monetary Board’s action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith. It has not appreciated certain facts which would render the remedy of liquidation proper and
rehabilitation improper, involving as it does an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties properly belonging to the trial court and not properly cognizable on appeal.
PETITION for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction to review the orders of the Court of
Appeals. Villaluz, J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 21
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel B. Tomacruz and Rustico Pasilavan for petitioners.
     I.B. Regalado, Jr. and Pacifico T. Torres for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the reversal of
the orders of the Court of Appeals dated March 19, 1982 and March 24, 1982 and its decision ** (HATOL)
promulgated on June 17, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 13944 entitled “Banko Central ng Pilipinas at Consolacion
Odra Laban Kina Rural Bank of Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc.” and praying for a restraining order or a
preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain respondents from enforcing aforesaid orders and decision of
the respondent Court, and to give due course to the petitioners’ complaint in IR-428, pending before
Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje of Branch VII, CFI, Camarines Sur.
The decretal portion of the appealed decision reads:
“DAHIL DITO, and utos ng pinasasagot sa Hukom noong ika-9 ng Marso, 1982, ay isinasang-tabi.
Kapalit nito, isang utos and ipinalabas na nag-uutos sa pinasasagot sa Hukom na itigil ang anumang
pagpapatuloy o pagdidinig kaugnay sa usaping IR-428 na pinawawalang saysay din ng Hukumang ito.
SIYANG IPINAG-UUTOS.”
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
The petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Buhi) is a juridical entity existing
under the laws of the Philippines. Buhi is a rural bank that started its operations only on December 26,
1975 (Rollo, p. 86).
In 1980, an examination of the books and affairs of Buhi was ordered conducted by the Rural Banks
and Savings and Loan Association (DRBSLA), Central Bank of the Philippines, which by law, has charge
of the supervision and examination of rural banks and savings and loan associations in the Philippines.
However, said petitioner refused to be examined and as a result thereof, financial assistance was
suspended.
On January 10, 1980, a general examination of the bank’s affairs and operations was conducted and
there were found by DRBSLA represented by herein respondent Consolacion V. Odra, Director of
DRBSLA, among others, massive irregularities in its operations consisting of loans to unknown and
fictitious borrowers, where the sum of P1,704,782.00 was past due and another sum
of P1,130,000.00 was also past due in favor of the Central Bank (Rollo, p. 86). The promissory notes
evidencing these loans were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result thereof, the bank
became insolvent and prejudiced its depositors and creditors.
Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, submitted a report recommending to the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Section 29 of Republic Act No.
265, as amended, the designation of the Director, DRBSLA, as receiver thereof. On March 28, 1980, the
Monetary Board, finding the report to be true, adopted Resolution No. 583 placing Buhi, petitioner
herein, under receivership and designated respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, as Receiver, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended (Rollo, p. 111).
In a letter dated April 8, 1980, respondent Consolacion V. Odra, as receiver, implemented and carried
out said Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 by authorizing deputies of the receiver to take control,
possession and charge of Buhi, its assets and liabilities (Rollo, p. 109).
Imelda del Rosario, Manager of herein petitioner Buhi, filed a petition for injunction with Restraining
Order dated April 23, 1980, docketed as Special Proceedings IR-428 against respondent Consolacion V.
Odra and DRBSLA deputies in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City,
entitled Rural Bank of Buhi vs. Central Bank, which assailed the action of herein respondent Odra in

recommending the receivership over Buhi as a violation of the provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of
Republic Act No. 265 as amended, and Section 10 of Republic Act No. 720 (The Rural Banks Act) and as
being ultra vires and done with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 120).
Respondents filed their motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1980 alleging that the petition did not allege
a cause of action and is not sufficient in form and substance and that it was filed in violation of Section
29, Republic Act No. 265 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1007 (Rollo, p. 36).
Petitioners, through their counsel, filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss dated June 17, 1980
averring that the petition alleged a valid cause of action and that respondents have violated the due
process clause of the Constitution (Rollo, p. 49).
Later, respondents filed a reply to the opposition dated July 1, 1980, claiming that the petition is not
proper; that Imelda del Rosario is not the proper representative of the bank; that the petition failed to
state a cause of action; and, that the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 had been faithfully
observed (Rollo, p. 57).
On August 22, 1980, the Central Bank Monetary Board issued a Resolution No. 1514 ordering the
liquidation of the Rural Bank of Buhi (Rollo, p. 108).
On September 1, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, in accordance with Republic Act No. 265,
Section 29, filed in the same Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, a petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Buhi, which petition was docketed as SP-IR-553, pursuant to the
Monetary Board Resolution No. 1514 (Rollo, pp. 89; 264).
Meanwhile, respondent Central Bank filed on September 15, 1981, in Civil Case No. IR-428 a
Supplemental Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the receivership of Buhi, in view of the issuance of
the Monetary Board Resolution No. 1514 had completely become moot and academic (Rollo, p. 68) and
the fact that Case SP-IR-553 for the liquidation of Buhi was already pending with the same Court (Rollo,
p. 69).
On October 16, 1981, petitioners herein filed their amended complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428
alleging that the issuance of Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 was plainly arbitrary and in bad faith
under aforequoted Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended, among others (Rollo, p. 28). On the
same day, petitioner herein filed a rejoinder to its opposition to the motion to dismiss (Rollo, p. 145).
On March 9, 1982, herein petitioner Judge Buenviaje, issued an order denying the respondents’
motion to dismiss, supplemental motion to dismiss and granting a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from further managing and administering the Rural Bank of Buhi and to deliver the
possession and control thereof to the petitioner Bank under the same conditions and with the same
financial status as when the same was taken over by herein respondents (defendants) on April 16, 1980
and further enjoining petitioner to post a bond in the amount of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) (Rollo, p. 72).
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in the
light of petitioners’ opposition, for want of sufficient merit is denied. Respondents are hereby directed to
file their answer within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order.” (Rollo, p. 4).
On March 11, 1982, petitioner Buhi through counsel, conformably with the above-mentioned order, filed
a Motion to Admit Bond in the amount of P300,220.00 (Rollo, pp. 78-80).
On March 15, 1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the order admitting the bond of P300,220.00 filed
by the petitioner, and directing the respondents to surrender the possession of the Rural Bank of Buhi,
together with all its equipments, accessories, etc. to the petitioners (Rollo, p. 6).
Consequently, on March 16, 1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the writ of execution directing the
Acting Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur to implement the Court’s order of March 9, 1982 (Rollo, p.
268). Complying with the said order of the Court, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went to
the Buhi premises to implement the writ of execution but the vault of the petitioner bank was locked and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 22
no inventory was made, as evidenced by the Sheriff’s Report (Rollo, pp. 83-84). Thus, the petitioner
herein filed with the Court an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow Sheriff Calope to Force Open Bank Vault”
on the same day (Rollo, p. 268). Accordingly, on March 17, 1982, herein petitioner Judge granted the
aforesaid Ex-Parte Motion to Force Open the Bank Vault (Rollo, p. 269).
On March 18, 1982, counsel for petitioner filed another “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Manager of
City Trust to Allow Petitioner to Withdraw Rural Bank Deposits” while a separate “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Order Manager of Metrobank to Release Deposits of Petitioners” was filed on the same date. The
motion was granted by the Court in an order directing the Manager of Metro Bank-Naga City (Rollo, p.
269) to comply as prayed for.
In view thereof, herein respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13944 against herein petitioners, seeking
to set aside the restraining order and reiterating therein that petitioner Buhi’s complaint in the lower
court be dismissed (Rollo, p. 270).
On March 19, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution (KAPASIYAHAN) in tagalog, restraining
the Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje, from enforcing his order of March 9, 1982 and suspending further
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. IR-428 pending before him while giving the Central Bank counsel, Atty.
Ricardo Quintos, authority to carry out personally said orders and directing the “Punong Kawani” of the
Court of Appeals to send telegrams to the Office of the President and the Supreme Court (Rollo, p. 168).
Herein petitioners did not comply with the Court of Appeals’ order of March 19, 1982, but filed
instead on March 21, 1982 a motion for reconsideration of said order of the Court of Appeals, claiming
that the lower court’s order of March 9, 1982 referred only to the denial of therein respondents’ motion
to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss and that the return of Buhi to the petitioners was already
an accomplished fact. The motion was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated June 1,
1982 (Rollo, p. 301).
In view of petitioners’ refusal to obey the Court of Appeals’ Order of March 19, 1982, herein
respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Cite Petitioners in Contempt, dated April 22,
1982 [Rollo, p. 174).
The Court of Appeals issued on May 24, 1982 an order requiring herein petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi,
Inc., through its then Acting Manager, Imelda del Rosario and herein petitioner Judge Carlos Buenviaje,
as well as Manuel Genova and Rodolfo Sosa, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why they
should not be held in contempt of court, and further directing the Ministry of National Defense or its
representative to cause the return of possession and management of the Rural Bank to the respondents
Central Bank and Consolacion Odra (Rollo, p. 180).
On June 9, 1982, petitioners filed their objection to respondents’ motion for contempt dated June 5,
1982 claiming that the properties, subject of the order, had already been returned to the herein
petitioners who are the lawful owners thereof and that the returning could no longer be undone (Rollo,
p. 181).
Later, petitioners filed another motion dated June 17, 1982 for the reconsideration of the resolution
of June 1, 1982 of the Court of Appeals alleging that the same contravened and departed from the
rulings of the Supreme Court that consummated acts or acts already done could no longer be the subject
of mandatory injunction and that the respondent Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the order
unless it was in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, claiming that the case (CA-G.R. No. 13944) did not come
to it on appeal (Rollo, p. 302).
As aforestated, on June 17, 1982, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision (HATOL) setting
aside the lower court’s restraining order dated March 9, 1982 and ordering the dismissal of herein
petitioners’ amended complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428 (Rollo, p. 186).
On July 9, 1982, petitioners (respondents in CA-G.R. No. 13944) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision dated June 17, 1982 insofar as the complaint with the lower court (Civil Case No. IR-428
was ordered dismissed (Rollo, p. 305). On August 23, 1982, the respondent Court of Appeals issued its

Resolution denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the resolution
issued by the respondent Court of Appeals on June 1, 1982 and set on August 31, 1982 the hearing of
the motion to cite the respondents in CA-G.R. No. SP-13944 (herein petitioner) for contempt (Rollo, p.
193).
At said hearing, counsel for Rural Bank of Buhi agreed and promised in open court to restore and
return to the Central Bank the possession and control of the Bank within three (3) days from August 31,
1982.
However on September 3, 1982, Rosalia Guevara, Manager thereof, vigorously and adamantly
refused to surrender the premises unless she received a written order from the Court. In a subsequent
hearing of the contempt incident, the Court of Appeals issued its Order dated October 13, 1982, but
Rosalia Guevara still refused to obey, whereupon she was placed under arrest and the Court of Appeals
ordered her to be detained until she decided to obey the Court’s Order (Rollo, pp. 273-274).
Earlier, on September 14, 1982 petitioners had filed this petition even while a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of June 17, 1982 was still pending consideration in the Court of Appeals.
In the resolution of October 20, 1982, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to
the petition required respondents to COMMENT (Rollo, p. 225).
Counsel for respondents manifested (Rollo, p. 226) that they could not file the required comment
because they were not given a copy of the petition. Meanwhile, they filed an urgent motion dated
October 28, 1982 with the Court of Appeals to place the bank through its representatives in possession
of the Rural Bank of Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc. (Rollo, p. 237).
On December 9, 1982, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition with urgent motion for the issuance
of a restraining order dated December 2, 1982 praying that the restraining order be issued against
respondent court (Rollo, p. 229).
In the resolution of December 15, 1982, the Court resolved to require petitioners to furnish the
respondents with a copy of the petition and to require the respondents to comment on both the original
and the supplemental petitions (Rollo, p. 243).
In a resolution of February 21, 1983, the Court NOTED Rosalia V. Guevara’s letter dated February 4,
1983 (Rollo, p. 252) addressed to Hon. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, requesting that she be
allowed to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (Rollo, p. 256).
At the hearing of the said petition on February 23, 1983 where the counsel of both parties appeared,
this Court noted the Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the release of petitioner Rosalia V.
Guevara from detention by the National Bureau of Investigation. After hearing aforesaid counsel and
petitioner herself, and it appearing that the latter had resigned since January 18, 1983 as Manager of
the Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. and that the Central Bank might avail of more than adequate legal measures
to take over the management, possession and control of the said bank (and not through contempt
proceedings and detention and confinement of petitioner), with Assistant Solicitor General Andin
manifesting that respondents were not insisting on the continued detention of petitioner, the Court
Resolved to SET the petitioner at liberty and to consider the contempt incident closed (Rollo, p. 339).
On April 11, 1983, respondents filed their comment on the original and supplemental petitions.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, acting on respondents’ urgent motion filed on October 28, 1982
ordered on April 13, 1983 the return to the petitioners (herein respondents) or their duly authorized
representatives of the possession, management and control of subject Rural Bank (Rollo, p. 319),
together with its properties.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed an urgent motion: (1) to give due course to the petition and (2)
for immediate issuance of a Restraining Order against the respondent court to prevent it from enforcing
its aforesaid resolution dated April 13, 1983 and from further proceeding in AC-G.R. No. 13944-SP (Rollo,
p. 315).
On May 16, 1983, this Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 321). On July
25, 1983, petitioners filed their verified Motion for Reconsideration (Rollo, p. 337) praying that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 23
HATOL dated June 17, 1982 of the Court of Appeals be set aside as null and void and that Special
Proceedings No. IR-428 of CFI-Camarines Sur, Iriga City, Branch VII, be ordered remanded to the RTC
of Camarines Sur, Iriga City, for further proceedings.
A Motion for Early Resolution was filed by herein petitioners on March 12, 1984 (Rollo, p. 348).
Petitioners raised the following legal issues in their motion for reconsideration:
1. I.UNDER SEC. 29, R.A. 265, AS AMENDED, MAY THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE
CENTRAL BANK (CB) PLACE A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE
TO SAID RURAL BANK TO ENABLE IT TO BE HEARD ON THE GROUND RELIED UPON FOR
SUCH RECEIVERSHIP?
2. II.UNDER THE SAME SECTION OF SAID LAW, WHERE THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE
CENTRAL BANK (CB) HAS PLACED A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP, IS SUCH ACTION
OF THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW? IF SO, WHICH COURT
MAY EXERCISE SUCH POWER AND WHEN MAY IT EXERCISE THE SAME?
3. III.UNDER THE SAID SECTION OF THE LAW, SUPPOSE A CIVIL CASE IS INSTITUTED SEEKING
ANNULMENT OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ON THE GROUND OF ARBITRARINESS AND BAD FAITH
ON THE PART OF THE MONETARY BOARD (MB), MAY SUCH CASE BE DISMISSED BY THE IAC
(THEN CA) ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT
HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE YET TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND THE PARTIES HAVE NOT YET
PRESENTED EVIDENCE EITHER IN THE TRIAL COURT OR IN SAID APPELLATE COURT?
(Rollo, pp. 330-331).
I. Petitioner Rural Bank’s position is to the effect that due process was not observed by the Monetary
Board before said bank was placed under receivership. Said Rural Bank claimed that it was not given the
chance to deny and disprove such claim of insolvency and/or any other ground which the Monetary
Board used in justification of its action. Relative thereto, the provision of Republic Act No. 265 on the
proceedings upon insolvency reads:
“SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency.—Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising and examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any banking
institution, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of
the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the
Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized
competence in banking, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its
creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing
suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the banking institution.
“The Monetary Board shall thereupon determine within sixty days whether the institution may be
recognized or otherwise placed in such a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with
safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public and shall prescribe the conditions under
which such redemption of business shall take place as the time for fulfillment of such conditions. In such
case, the expenses and fees in the collection and administration of the assets of the institution shall be
determined by the Board and shall be paid to the Central Bank out of the assets of such banking
institution.
“If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the banking
institution is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 24

and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the “As will be noted, whenever it shall appear prima facie that a banking institution is in ‘a condition of
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the insolvency’ or so situated ‘that its continuance in business would involved probable loss to its depositors
court in the liquidation of the banking institution. The Court shall have jurisdiction in the same or creditors,’ the Monetary Board has authority:
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank and enforce individual liabilities of the First, to forbid the institution to do business and appoint a receiver therefor; and
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of the banking institution and to Second, to determine, within 60 days, whether or not:
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
1. 1)the institution may be reorganized and rehabilitated to such an extent as to be permitted to
The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence
resume business with safety to depositors, creditors and the general public; or
in banking, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the
2. 2)it is indeed insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to depositors, creditors and the
Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of
general public, and public interest requires that it be liquidated.
the banking institution to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such bank and he may, in the name of the banking
institution, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover In this latter case (i.e., the bank can no longer resume business with safety to depositors, creditors
accounts and assets of the banking institution. and the public, etc.) its liquidation will be ordered and a liquidator appointed by the Monetary Board.
“The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the actions of the Monetary Board under The Central Bank shall thereafter file a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying for the Court’s
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be assistance in the liquidation of the bank.” x x x (Salud vs. Central Bank, 143 SCRA 590 [1986]).
set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
Petitioner further argues, that there is also that constitutional guarantee that no property shall be taken
faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from
without due process of law, so that Section 29, R.A. 265, as amended, could not have intended to
implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless
disregard and do away with such constitutional requirement when it conferred upon the Monetary Board
there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith
the power to place Rural Banks under receivership (Rollo, p. 333).
and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a
The contention is without merit. It has long been established and recognized in this jurisdiction that
bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order
the closure and liquidation of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise
or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
may, however, be subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier’s check, in an amount twice the amount of the
discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or a denial of the due process and equal protection clauses of
bond of the petitioner, or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or
the Constitution (Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 155 [1981]).
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the
The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by
New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section
the Monetary Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the
shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this
protection of the banking institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior
Section.
hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just
“Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a banking institution to pay
imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in
its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business: Provided, however, that this
panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of
shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank caused by extraordinary
the entire banking community.
demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the banks in the banking
In Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, (106 SCRA 130), the Supreme Court held:
community.
“The pivotal issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the appointment of a receiver by the Court of
“The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of receiver
First Instance on January 14, 1969 was in order.
under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general
Respondent Court correctly stated that the appointment of a receiver pendente lite is a matter
or special, to the contrary notwithstanding.”
principally addressed to and resting largely on the sound discretion of the court to which the application
It will be observed from the foregoing provision of law, that there is no requirement whether express or is made. This Tribunal has so held in a number of cases. However, receivership being admittedly a harsh
implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a banking institution may be placed under receivership. remedy, it should be granted with extreme caution. Sound reasons for receivership must appear of
On the contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board record, and there should be a clear showing of a necessity therefor. Before granting the remedy, the
to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take court is advised to consider the consequence or effects thereof in order to avoid irreparable injustice or
charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by the examining injury to others who are entitled to as much consideration as those seeking it.
department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima x x x      x x x      x x x
facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its continuance in business
This is not to say that a hearing is an indispensable requirement for the appointment of a receiver. As
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
petitioner correctly contends in his first assignment of error, courts may appoint receivers without prior
Supportive of this theory is the ruling of this Court, which established the authority of the Central
presentation of evidence and solely on the basis of the averments of the pleadings. Rule 59 of the
Bank under the foregoing circumstances, which reads:
Revised Rules of Court allows the appointment of a receiver upon an ex parte application.”
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 25

There is no question that the action of the Monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial
review. Thus, it has been held that the courts may interfere with the Central Bank’s exercise of discretion
in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits
and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos vs. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
It has likewise been held that resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central
Bank Act, such as: forbidding bank institutions to do business on account of a “condition of insolvency”
or because its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors or creditors; or
appointing a receiver to take charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities, or determining whether the bank
may be rehabilitated or should be liquidated and appointing a liquidator for that purpose, are under the
law “final and executory” and may be set aside only on one ground, that is “if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith” (Salud vs. Central Bank, supra).
There is no dispute that under the above-quoted Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether or not the action of the Monetary Board
directing the dissolution of the subject Rural Bank is attended by arbitrariness and bad faith. Such
position has been sustained by this Court in Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (supra).
In the same case, the Court ruled further that a banking institution’s claim that a resolution of the
Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act should be set aside as plainly arbitrary and [No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
made in bad faith, may be asserted as an affirmative defense (Sections 1 and 4[b], Rule 6, Rules of ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
Court) or a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6; Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court) in the proceedings WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
for assistance in liquidation or as a cause of action in a separate and distinct action where the latter was NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
filed ahead of the petition for assistance in liquidation ( ibid; Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA
143 [1981]). 1. 1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the Court of Industrial
III. It will be noted that in the issuance of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
Branch VII, Iriga City, dated March 9, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 72-77), there was no trial on the merits. Based on
the pleadings filed, the Court merely acted on the Central Bank’s Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental 1. 2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—The Court of
Motion to Dismiss, denying both for lack of sufficient merit. Evidently, the trial court merely acted on an Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
incident and has not as yet inquired, as mandated by Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, into the merits Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial
of the claim that the Monetary Board’s action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. It has not merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind
appreciated certain facts which would render the remedy of liquidation proper and rehabilitation in such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et
improper, involving as it does an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to
parties properly belonging to the trial court and not properly cognizable on appeal (Central Bank vs. be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
Court of Appeals, supra, p. 156). justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
Still further, without a hearing held for both parties to substantiate their allegations in their requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
respective pleadings, there is lacking that “convincing proof” prerequisite to justify the temporary
restraining order (mandatory injunction) issued by the trial court in its Order of March 9, 1982.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal primary rights which
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED; We hereby order the
must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right
remand of this case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings, but We LIFT the temporary
to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
restraining order issued by the trial court in its Order dated March 9, 1982.
case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity
SO ORDERED.
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
     Yap (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not
Decision modified. impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
Note.—An administrative law or Central Bank Regulations must conform with the law. ( Tayug Rural namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
Bank vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 146 SCRA 120.) evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
——o0o—— the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a
rational way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession
of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which
it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should
be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth in the decision.
DECISION on motion for reconsideration on motion for new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case
has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. "1.Que un contrato de trabajo, así individual como colectivo, sin término fijo de duración o que
no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada
vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios según costumbre en la localidad o
cuando se termine la obra;
2. "2.Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos
por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fábrica en la cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados
u obreros de la misma;
3. "3.Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
obreros sin tiempo fijo de duración y sin ser para una obra determinada y que se niega a
readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable
de práctica injusta ni incurre en la sanción penal del artículo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 26
un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados suyos
por terminación del contrato en virtud del paro."
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and avers:
1. "1.That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather
soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. "2.That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work.
3. "3.That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. "4.That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S.,
548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. "5.That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. "6.That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American
origin where industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. "7.That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
1. "8.That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. "9.That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be hereinaf ter stated With ref erence to the motion f
or a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary
to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in
the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the
nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 27

proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing f urther industrial or agricultural
evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed
of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
evidentiary value. before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the respected even in proceedings of this character:
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
640 1. (1)The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
640 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, -58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
requirements of fair play."
is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
2. (2)Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed.
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
landlords and tenants or f arm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for
3. (3)"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental
employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties
4. (4)Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the
Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0. G. 1335), but
Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the
the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National
course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) "Substantial
amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Appalachian Electric Power v. National
established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and
Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
adopting f or such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum
Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
"canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) * * * The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence
fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in
that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed.
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
Law. ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220,
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative
just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
force. Mere uncorroboratborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4,
in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 28

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence pre-sented at the hearing, or at least contained relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or Motion for new trial granted and cause remanded with instructions.
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a
provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers
and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall
not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

1. (6)The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that
it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render
final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
2. (7)The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual ,basis upon which to predicate, in a rational
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union,
Inc., from work" and this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers'
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 29

and/or New Trial with the BI; d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC; f)
an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant petition for review.
Same; Same; What due process demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally weigh and
assess the evidence which the subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the recommendation
of said investigating officer.—There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the
recommendation of a subordinate. Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief
of bureau or office or department the power to delegate the task of investigating a case to a
subordinate. What due process demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally weigh and assess
the evidence which the subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the recommendation of said
investigating officer.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), are accorded not only respect
but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.—It is settled that only questions
of law are entertained in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court, in a petition under Rule 45, to scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence all over
again. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the BI and the CSC,
are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 153166. December 16, 2005.* The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
TERESITA L. VERTUDES,1 petitioner, vs. JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,      Glenn G. Hao for petitioner.
respondents.      Horacio R. Makalintal, Jr. for respondent.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to Cross-examination; Where a party has had the PUNO, J.:

opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to review and
to remain in the record.—We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a vital
set aside the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of the
element of due process as follows: The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
government service.
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint examiner at the Alien Registration Division of the
right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to
Bureau of Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter4 dated July 27, 1998, a certain Peng Villas, a news
a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
editor of the Philippine Weekly Newspaper, referred to then BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
complaints of private respondent Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against petitioner.
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will
According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner
be received or allowed to remain in the record.
into paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa, passport and
Same; Same; It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth
complained of.—It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
P29,000.00. However, no visa was delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
money, to no avail.
complained of. This was clearly satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner not only gave
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the complaint of Lao who allegedly told him that he
her sworn written explanation of the charges against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she
paid P60,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa and a passport for Taiwan. Likewise, Villas
also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the charges against her, with all the attached
referred Cosino’s complaint that the latter collected from Virginia Dumbrique, Jaime Santos Flores and
annexes as evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a Motion for Reconsideration
Mariano Evangelista, the amounts of P20,000.00 each, upon petitioner’s word that they would be in

exchange for tourist visas. Both Lao and Cosino claimed that the promised passport and visas did not
materialize and despite many requests for the return of the amounts paid to petitioner, she refused to
comply. Allegedly, “Vertudez threatened them that they cannot force her to pay back the said amount as
she has the back up [of] higher BID officials.”
Acting upon Villas’ letter, Commissioner Rodriguez issued a memorandum,5 directing the petitioner to
submit a sworn written explanation. In her sworn written memorandum, 6 petitioner assailed the
credibility of Villas. She alleged that Villas was not a member of the National Press Club as he claimed to
be. She averred that the sum of P50,000.00, as evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, was
extended to her by private respondent Buenaflor as a loan. She was constrained to borrow money from
private respondent and other close friends when her brother became seriously ill. However, she claimed
that she had fully settled her obligation to private respondent through installment. She also claimed that
private respondent was the one engaged in illegal recruitment through the use of falsified or forged
passports. Private respondent was allegedly using petitioner’s name in dealing with some immigration
officials and employees to expedite the processing of the documents of her (private respondent’s)
clients. Petitioner allegedly informed said officers and employees that she was not connected to private
respondent in any way. Private respondent allegedly resented this “abrupt disassociation.” Also, her
repeated refusal to “escort” private respondent’s clients who were leaving for abroad using falsified
travel documents allegedly led private respondent to threaten her that she could easily use SB Check
Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 as evidence to file charges against petitioner by making it appear that she
(private respondent) gave the money because of petitioner’s promise to facilitate her travel to Japan.
Petitioner denied having received the sum of P29,000.00 from private respondent, contending that such
claim is “pure falsehood because of the absence of document to prove the alleged receipt.” As regards
the complaints of Lao and Cosino, petitioner denied having met or known said persons.
Finding petitioner’s explanation “unsatisfactory and [her] defense weak,” Commissioner Rodriguez
issued Personnel Order No. RBR 98-60,7 preventively suspending her for sixty (60) days pending the
investigation of the case. The instant case was assigned to Special Prosecutor Norberto dela Cruz, who
issued a subpoena8 ordering private respondent and petitioner to appear before him on October 15,
1998 for the formal investigation of the case. It appears that in the meantime, Villas died and private
respondent personally took on the instant complaint with the BI for Grave Misconduct against petitioner,
docketed as Administrative Charge No. 0004. Lao and Cosino filed their respective complaint-
affidavits9 with the BI which became the subject of another administrative case against petitioner.10
On August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Personnel Order No. RBR-98-
60) with Motion to Dismiss.11 On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent Prayer
to Resolve Motion to Dismiss,12 averring that the complaint instituted by Villas in behalf of private
respondent was a harassment case against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the instant action on
the ground that in addition to the instant administrative case, private respondent had personally filed her
complaint-affidavit “of similar nature and character” with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office, docketed as
98-H-44000-1, and with the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-98-1701.
Private respondent narrated the pertinent events in her complaint-affidavit13 as follows:
1. 1.That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Intramuros, Manila sometime in the middle part of 1996;
2. 2.That from that time on, we became friends because we come from the same region and that
she used to tell us that she is capable of deploying job applicants to Japan;
3. 3.That during one of those times that I dropped by her office, she intimated to me that a group
of Immigration Officers are scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that she was the one
who received a call from a Japanese Consul;
4. 4.That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am interested in going to Japan because she will
find a way to accommodate me and I told her that I am deeply interested but my problem
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 30
was that my passport was left in Bacolod City and she volunteered to work-out [and] facilitate
the processing of my passport and visa and that [all] I need to do is give her my picture which
I did;
5. 5.That she even added that she has a brother in Japan who could also help me find a job and I
will be going there along with her son, Jimmy V[e]rtudes Santos. She showed to me her son’s
passport and application for a Visa, copies of which are attached and marked as Annexes “A,”
“B” and “C”;
6. 6.That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory
worker and that should I accept to her offer, all that will be required of me is to give her the
amount of P80,000.00;
7. 7.That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received from me Security Bank Check No.
0014797 in the amount of P30,000.00 which she was able to encash and likewise Security
Bank Check No. 0014798 in the amount of P20,000.00 x x x Annexes “D” and “E”;
8. 8.That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence and persistence that I should deliver the
balance of P30,000.00 to her so that I could leave in a week’s time, I was forced to produce
the said amount by requesting a friend to pawn my jewelry in the amount of P29,000.00 and
the aforesaid amount was handed to Ms. Vertudes in the presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her
office in (BID), Intramuros, Manila;
1. 9.That after that last payment, I have been asking her as to when I am suppose[d] to leave
because I was already prepared to leave and have in fact told my relatives and friends that I
will be leaving soon for Japan but she did not stop making promises;
2. 10.That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to know once and for all whether I could
still leave, I requested my lawyer to write a letter to Ms. Vertudes for her to refund the sums
of money which I delivered to her in the total amount of P79,000.00 for the processing of my
Passport and Visa for job deployment abroad but she did not even answer the letter and
neither called up my lawyer to explain her side; letter is attached as Annex “E”;
3. 11.That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes’ failure to make good her promise to deploy me after
receiving the amount of P79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan, I hereby
charge her for the crime of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa; x x x
Annexed to private respondent’s complaint-affidavit were: a) the affidavit of a certain Jessilyn
Gutierrez14 who attested that she accompanied private respondent in going to the office of petitioner and
she was with private respondent when the latter delivered to petitioner the checks amounting to
P50,000.00 and cash worth P29,000.00 for private respondent’s job placement to Japan; b) copies of the
passport and application for a visa of petitioner’s son, to prove that petitioner showed these documents
to her so she would believe that she would be going to Japan with petitioner’s son; c) copies of SB
Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, to prove petitioner’s receipt of the total amount of P50,000.00 from
private respondent; and d) letter of private respondent’s counsel to petitioner demanding the refund of
P79,000.00 from petitioner.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, and private respondent appeared
before Special Prosecutor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the case.15 The second hearing took
place on October 27, 1998, during which, petitioner submitted her Counter-Affidavit 16 and the affidavits
of her witnesses. Her version was:
1. 4.1.I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I was still assigned at the General Services
Division of the Bureau of Immigration;

2. 4.2.At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that she was connected with a travel agency
assigned to process/facilitate documents of their clients in the Bureau of Immigration;
3. 4.3.Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making follow-ups of documents in the
different Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of Immigration similar to what were being done
by the representatives of other travel agencies transacting business therewith;
4. 4.4.During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became close friends because she frequently
visited me in my office at General Services Division and would even stay thereat while
processing documents and waiting for their release. In fact, she often took her lunch and
merienda with me and sometimes, with the other employees of our division;
5. 4.5.Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I was informed by my relatives in our
hometown that my brother, Mariano “Dido” Vertudes was seriously ill and was thereafter
confined on December 22, 1997 at Gingoog General Hospital located at Gingoog City, Misamis
Oriental;
6. 4.6.The type of illness of my brother required extensive treatment and medication; and for this
reason, they requested for financial assistance to defray the expenses therefor;
7. 4.7.Since I was then in financial distress, I was constrained to borrow money with interests
from Ms. Buenaflor and other close friends of mine. As a kind gesture on the part of Ms.
Buenaflor she extended to me a loan in the total amount of P50,000.00 as represented by
Security Bank check nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective amounts of P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00 (citation omitted);
1. 4.8.It is however our agreement that I would pay the amount of P50,000.00 with the additional
amount of P10,000.00 representing the interests therefore for a total of P60,000.00;
2. 4.9.We further agreed that I would pay my financial obligation to Ms. Buenaflor on or before
the last day of May 1998 from December 1997 on installment basis;
3. 4.10.With the aforementioned amount of P50,000.00 loaned to me by Julie Buenaflor and the
other amounts x x x from other friends, I was able to contribute the total amount of
P100,000.00 for the treatment and hospitalization of my brother. It was, however, to no avail
because my brother died on January 6, 1998;
4. 4.11.Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms. Buenaflor on installment basis the total
amount of P60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the following dates:
     DATE AMOUNT
February 28, 1998 P15,000.00
March 31, 1998 15,000.00
April 30, 1998 15,000.00
May 30, 1998 15,000.00
1. 4.12.I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at my residence on the dates earlier
enumerated in the presence of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes; x x x
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented to her (petitioner’s) son, Jimmy Santos, Jr.,
that she (private respondent) would facilitate his travel to and employment in Japan. She also assailed
the credibility of private respondent by accusing her of using several passports under different names.
Attached to petitioner’s counter-affidavit were: a) a copy of a passport application in the name of Honna
Sumadia Araneta showing the photographs of private respondent; b) referral slip of the Pasay City Police
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 31
Station and the sworn statement of a certain Armando Gambala charging private respondent with Estafa
and Illegal Recruitment;17 c) affidavits of petitioner’s son, Jimmy Santos, Jr.,18 and a certain Enrico
Tuazon, showing that they likewise filed a case for Estafa and Illegal Recruitment against private
respondent; and d) a copy of the Certificate of Business Name and Certification 19 issued by Prudential
Bank, to prove that private respondent misstated the address of her business establishment. Petitioner
also submitted to Special Prosecutor dela Cruz the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of her two
housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes, to prove that she had fully paid her obligation to private
respondent. Likewise, she submitted the handwritten joint sworn statement21 of Ernesto V. Cloma and
Jhun M. Romero, media practitioners, to prove that Villas asked for petitioner’s forgiveness before he
died, admitting that he only sent his letter dated July 27, 1998 to Commissioner Rodriguez in
consideration of the amount given by private respondent.
On the same hearing, the parties agreed to submit the instant case for resolution. 22 Thus, in his
Resolution dated No-vember 12, 1998,23 Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service.
Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman was referred
to the Office of the City Prosecutor, thus:
“After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed against the respondent are not office
related and that the administrative aspect of the case had already been undertaken by the Bureau of
Immigration.
In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.”24 (emphases supplied)
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open 25 with the BI, contending that the finding of the Ombudsman that
“the charges imputed against [petitioner] are not office related” clearly shows that she is not
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She moved for the re-opening of the case “to allow her to
adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Ombudsman.” The motion, however, was
denied for lack of merit.26
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found liable for grave misconduct under PD No.
807 and the Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is ordered dismissed from the service
effective immediately with forfeiture of all benefits under the law, with prejudice to her reinstatement in
this Bureau and all its branches.
SO ORDERED.”27
The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz’s resolution, viz.:
“After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the complainant and the respondent, this Office
is more incline[d] to give credence to complainant’s declarations that she was indeed duped by the
respondent into parting with the hard-earned money of P79,000.00 on the promise of the respondent
that she would secure a passport and visa for the complainant to Japan.
Respondent’s alibi that the said amount was a loan from the complainant, who is her friend, is highly
unbelievable. Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who would so easily part with such big
amount of money without any security without any hope or assurance of being re-paid.
The fact that complainant paid P79,000.00 to the respondent so she could get a passport and a visa
to work in Japan as a factory worker clearly showed that she was desperately in need of a job. For her
to give such amount to the respondent as an unsecured loan is extremely incredulous.

Respondent’s claim that the present complaint is pure harassment by the complainant is completely
bereft of credence. What benefit or advantage would the complainant achieve in fabricating charges
against the respondent?
If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she was wronged by the respondent.
Likewise, respondent’s allegation that the P50,000.00 she received from the complainant was a loan
because she (respondent) was then in a financial distress and she needed money to help her sick
brother in the province was belied by her own son, Jimmy V. Santos, Jr., who declared in his Affidavit
that sometime in December 1997, he gave P50,000.00 to the complainant so that the latter could obtain
a tourist visa for him to Japan. Why should the respondent bother to get a P50,000.00 loan from the
complainant to assist her ailing brother when she could readily obtain this amount from her own son?
As to respondent’s assertion that she was able to pay the P50,000.00 to the complainant, there is
nothing to support such payment. The statements of her two (2) maids—Eliza C[o]mpo and Jocelyn
Reyes—in their Sinumpaang Salaysay that respondent paid to the complainant the total amount of
P60,000.00 during the months of February 1998 to May 1998 cannot be believed. Being the housemaids
of the respondent, it is but natural and to be expected of these persons to come to the aid of their
employe[r].”28
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,29 reiterating her argument in her Motion
to Re-open. Again, the motion was denied.30 Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed
by then Department of Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.31
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,32 raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of substantial
evidence. On November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner’s appeal. It held, in part, that:
“A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of appellant reveals that the requirements of
due process have been duly observed in the proceedings had in this case.
xxx
As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial evidence to prove that respondent
receive[d] money in exchange for her services in facilitating the issuance of passport and visa of Julie
Bernardo (sic).
The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in part as follows: x x x
In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part of the witness to foist said charges on
respondent, the Commission is inclined to give credence to the statements of witness Bernardo ( sic). In
fact Vertudez has admitted that she received money from Buenaflor but argued that the money was a
mere loan. However, if this were true, Buenaflor should have demanded for a collateral, considering the
amount involved. Vertudez failed to present any evidence that she gave any security in return for said
loan which makes her version highly incredible. x x x”33
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration34 of the CSC’s Resolution, to no avail. The CSC held:
“In so far as Vertudez’[s] illegal recruitment activities are concerned, the Commission finds the existence
of clear substantial evidence to establish the same. Evidence presented all point to the fact that Vertudez
solicited money from BI clients in return for a visa to Japan. The witnesses against Vertudez include
Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime
Santos Flores. The affidavits of said witnesses all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI,
where she approaches BI clients and offers them a visa, passport and an employment contract in
exchange for P120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie Buenaflor, she testified that respondent assured
her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee of P80,000.00 and that Vertudez after getting paid
failed to fulfill her promise.
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility of witness Buenaflor by implying that the
former has a pending case for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records, however, show that the charges
against witness Buenaflor all came up after Vertudez was formally charged by the BI and that such
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 32
charges have no reasonable connection with her administrative case pending before the Commission. In
this regard, “There being nothing in record to show that witnesses were actuated by any improper
motive, their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit.” (People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31)”35
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issues of: a) whether or not
the BI and CSC violated petitioner’s right to due process; b) whether or not respondents erred in finding
that the alleged illegal recruitment activity of the petitioner had a direct relation to and connected with
the performance of her duties and responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c) whether or not there
is substantial evidence to support the finding that petitioner is an illegal recruiter, thus, warranting her
removal from public service.36
On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA found that “petitioner
was given more than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and disprove the charges leveled
against her, hence, there can be no denial of her right to due process.” 37 Moreover, it held that “there is
more than substantial evidence proving the charge of grave misconduct against petitioner.” 38 The CA
ratiocinated that:
“In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner, indeed, received and encashed the two (2)
checks given by private respondent in the total amount of Php50,000.00. This fact, therefore, gives
credence to the claim of private respondent that she gave petitioner two (2) checks in consideration of
the latter’s promise to facilitate her employment abroad. This being the case, the burden was shifted to
petitioner to refute this established fact through equally weighty and competent evidence.
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed, the two checks from private respondent
but offered the excuse that the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside from her testimony and that
of her household helpers to prove this assertion, no other independent and unbiased evidence was
offered to prove the fact of loan. As it is, her theory of loan stands on flimsy ground and is not sufficient
enough to overthrow the fact established by complainant. This considering that it is highly improbable
and even contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge amount of money as Php50,000.00
without any document evidencing such loan nor a collateral to secure its payment. Note even that the
two checks were made payable to “cash,” a bearer instrument, and was not even crossed on its face,
hence, can be encashed by any person holding the negotiable instrument. If, indeed, private respondent
gave the two checks to petitioner as a clean loan (without any collateral) without any separate document
embodying their loan agreement, the latter should have at least been made the payee of the checks and
a memorandum written at the back of the check to the effect that it is being extended as a loan, in order
to protect the interest of the lender. This is conventional business practice which is altogether absent in
the case at bar, hence, petitioner’s theory of loan must necessarily crumble.”39
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 contending that the CA failed to resolve the issue of
whether petitioner’s alleged illegal recruitment activities are directly connected with her duties and
responsibilities as a Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This motion was denied.41
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up the issues as follows:
1. 1.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 58766;
2. 2.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED IN THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT;
3. 3.WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT;
4. 4.WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO FACILITATE EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER ABROAD
CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT[;]
5. 5.WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS;

6. 6.WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING GRAVE MISCONDUCT MUST HAVE A DIRECT
RELATION TO THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE HELD BY RESPONDENTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
7. 7.WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER IS DIRECTLY
RELATED TO ANY OF HER
FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT EXAMINER AT THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.42
The petition is denied.
We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner contends that the essential requirements of
due process as laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations43 and Doruelo v. COMELEC44 were
violated in the case at bar. First, she contends that she was denied of her right to a full hearing when
she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her, as provided under
Section 48, par. 5, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She allegedly raised this issue in
her appeal before the CSC.45
The argument is unmeritorious.
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a vital element of due process
as follows:
“The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may
be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record.”46 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was deprived of due process simply
because no cross-examination took place. Nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-
examination during the formal investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. Notably, two
hearings were conducted, during which, both private respondent and petitioner appeared. During the
hearing dated October 27, 1998, both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution after petitioner
submitted her counter-affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses. In fact, when petitioner filed her
Motion to Re-open the case with the BI, she did not question the lack of cross-examination during the
investigation proceedings. She merely based her motion on the order of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding the charge against her as “not office related.” In the same pleading, she admitted that “[a]s early
as October 27, 1998, the instant administrative action has been submitted for resolution after the
contending parties have submitted their respective evidence” and that her move for the re-opening of
the administrative case was merely “to allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman.” Again, in her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of
Commissioner Rodriguez’s order of dismissal, she merely reiterated her arguments in her Motion to Re-
open. She never complained that she was deprived of her right to cross-examination during the
investigation of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. The right to cross-examination being a personal right,
petitioner must be deemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and
not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before the BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration Of the action or ruling
complained of.47 This was clearly satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner not only gave
her sworn written explanation of the charges against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she
also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the charges against her, with all the attached
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 33
annexes as evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial with the BI; d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC; f)
an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant petition for review.
Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner Rodriguez violated the principle that “the tribunal or
body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision” when his
denial of her Motion to Re-open and his order finding her guilty of grave misconduct were based
exclusively on the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.48
This argument is likewise unavailing.
There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the recommendation of a
subordinate. Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief of bureau or office or
department the power to delegate the task of investigating a case to a subordinate. 49 What due process
demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally weigh and assess the evidence which the
subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely on the recommendation of said investigating officer.50
In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez enjoys the disputable presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed. That his decision quotes the resolution of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz does not necessarily imply that he did not personally examine the affidavits and
evidence presented by the parties. Petitioner’s bare assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez did not
personally examine the evidence, without more, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have basis in finding: a) that the affidavits of “Peng
Villas (Deceased), Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores
x x x all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI” as these affidavits were not submitted to
the CSC; and b) that petitioner “solicited money from BI clients” inasmuch as private respondent never
alleged that she was a BI client. Moreover, the CSC’s finding that private respondent “testified that
respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee of P80,000.00 and that
Vertudez, after getting paid, failed to fulfill her promise” is not supported by the complaint-affidavit of
private respondent which merely stated that petitioner “volunteered to work-out and facilitate the
processing of [private respondent’s] passport and visa” and that petitioner “has a brother in Japan who
could also help [private respondent] find a job.” 51 Petitioner also assails the failure of the BI and CSC to
consider the handwritten joint sworn statement of media practitioners Cloma and Romero and the joint
affidavit of the housemaids of petitioner, Compo and Reyes.52
Again, these arguments fail to impress. It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.53 It is not the function of this Court,
in a petition under Rule 45, to scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence all over again. 54 Well-settled is the
rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the BI and the CSC, are accorded not only
respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.55 Substantial evidence is
such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine other-wise.56
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner’s stance, the affidavits of Lao and Cosino do
appear in the re-cords of the CSC.57 In any case, the affidavits of Villas, Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and Flores
are of little relevance to the case at bar. If any, they are merely corroborating evidence. Note that it was
only in the CSC’s resolution on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration that said affidavits were
mentioned. These affidavits were not used as basis for the decision rendered by the BI, the main
decision of the CSC denying the appeal of petitioner and the decision of the CA. We find the unanimous
finding of guilt of the BI, the CSC and the CA amply supported by the following evidence on record: a)
the complaint-affidavit of private respondent; b) the affidavit of Jessilyn Gutierrez; c) copies of the
passport and application for a visa of petitioner’s son; d) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798;
and e) letter of private respondent’s counsel to petitioner demanding from petitioner the refund of the
P79,000.00 that private respondent paid to petitioner.

As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to the self-serving quotations of petitioner from
the complaint-affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-affidavit categorically alleged that petitioner
told private respondent that the latter would “be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory
worker and that should [she] accept [petitioner’s] offer, all that [would] be required of [her was] to give
[petitioner] the amount of P80,000.00.” Private respondent also categorically alleged that she was
charging petitioner for her “failure to make good her promise to deploy [her] after receiving the amount
of P79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan.” Thus, contrary to petitioner’s stance, the
assailed findings of the CSC are supported by private respondent’s complaint-affidavit.
Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set
aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown in
this case.58
We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct warranting
her removal from government service.
Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok,59 petitioner contends that “[m]isconduct, warranting removal from office
of a public officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with the performance of official duties,
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of
the office.” Since the BI is a government agency principally responsible for the administration and
enforcement of immigration, citizenship and alien admission and registration laws, “by no stretch of
imagination” can there be a direct relation between the function of a fingerprint examiner and the
alleged promise to facilitate private respon-dent’s employment abroad.60 Petitioner also capitalizes on the
allegation of private respondent in her complaint-affidavit that she and petitioner “became friends” to
contend that the acts being imputed against her are personal and not officerelated.61
These arguments lack merit.
The allegations in private respondent’s complaint-affidavit indicate that petitioner used her position
as a BI employee to assure private respondent that she could facilitate petitioner’s deployment to Japan.
Private respondent alleged that “during one of those times that [she] dropped by [petitioner’s] office,
[petitioner] intimated to [her] that a group of Immigration officers [were] scheduled to leave for Japan
for training and that [petitioner] was the one who received a call from a Japanese Consul. ” Petitioner
“asked [private respondent] if [she was] interested in going to Japan because [petitioner] will find a way
to accommodate [her].”
Even petitioner’s own admissions show that her position as an employee of the BI may be utilized in
connection with illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner Rodriguez, as reiterated in her
counter-affidavit, petitioner alleged that private respondent was engaged in illegal recruitment and “was
using [petitioner’s] name in her dealings with some immigration officials and employees, presumably to
expedite the processing of the documents belonging to her clients. ” Petitioner likewise claimed that she
“declined [private respondent’s] proposal that [she] ‘escort’ some of [private respondent’s] clients who
would be leaving for foreign countries but with falsified travel documents.” Private respondent even told
her that the “proposed scheme could easily be done because being an employee of this Bureau,
[petitioner has] several connections not only at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) but also in
Mactan International Airport.”
That her position is designated as “fingerprint examiner” is not determinative of the issue of whether
the charge against her is work-related. The allegations in the complaint against petitioner and her own
admissions show that her duties go beyond her job title and that the charge against her is connected
with her position as an employee of the BI.
Finally, petitioner contends that “a promise to find a way to accommodate private respondent and a
representation that petitioner has a brother who could help private respondent find a job are not
misconduct warranting the dismissal of petitioner from office” but, “[a]t most,” only “entitle[s] private
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 34
respondent to civil indemnity.” Petitioner contends that the CA’s finding that petitioner merely made a
“promise to facilitate” private respondent’s employment abroad, as distinguished from the CSC’s finding
that petitioner committed “shameful illegal recruitment activities,” practically absolved petitioner from
the charge of grave misconduct.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official.62 As distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.63 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 64 An
act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes
involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code.65
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges against her. Whether the charges against
petitioner satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to make her criminally liable for such crime is not
the issue at bar. At the very least, petitioner was found to have taken advantage of her position as an
employee of the BI to falsely promise, for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private respondent’s travel to
Japan, including the processing of her passport, visa and other travel documents. Worse, she was found
to have refused to reimburse the amounts paid to her by private respondent even when the promised
passport, visa, and travel documents did not materialize. Undoubtedly, these acts involve “corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule.” Under Section 23(c), Rule XIV
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, these acts constitute a grave offense for which
petitioner must suffer the penalty of dismissal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 12, 2002
and Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
     Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. ( Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405
SCRA 264 [2003])
——o0o——

*
No. L-68288. July 11, 1986.
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON, in his capacity as
President of National University, respondents.
Schools and Universities; Due Process; No disciplinary action may be imposed on students without
abiding by the requirements of due process.—Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents’
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to
determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated “in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted
classes therein” or perpetrated acts of “vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and
other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority.” Parenthetically, the pendency of a
civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot,
without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also
apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which
students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
Same; Same; A school cannot refuse to re-enroll a student it believes guilty of acts inimical to the
school, without first conducting an investigation.—Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, as
students, have the right among others “to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation
of disciplinary regulations.” Petitioners were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due
process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that “(n)o penalty
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 35
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in * * (the) Manual and/or in the school
rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, to declare illegal this act
of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.
Same; Same; Guidelines to be followed by schools before a student may be penalized or refused
re-enrollment.—But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not,
contrary to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must
be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right
to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.
     Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school’s “continued
and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol.” In their petition “for extraordinary legal and equitable
remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction” dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
1. 1)that respondent University’s avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective
courses is “the latter’s participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University”;
2. 2)that this “attitude of the * * (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile
attitude to the student’s exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights already
recorded in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its
utter contempt for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;” and
3. 3)that “in effect, petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or
if there be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the
opportunity to defend themselves. Beriña v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA
581 [1983]).”
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to this
Court’s requirement therefor1, respondents make the claim:
1. 1)that “petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human
rights;”

2. 2)that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 “when the enrolment
period was already closed;”
3. 3)that as regards petitioner Guzman, his “academic showing” was “poor”, “due to his activities
in leading boycotts of classes”; that when his father was notified of this development
sometime in August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son “reform or else we will recall
him to the province”; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled
“Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.,” at the hearing of which on November
23, 1983 this Court had admonished “the students involved (to) take advantage and make the
most of the opportunity given to them to study;” that Guzman “however continued to lead or
actively participate in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit
from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;” that moreover, Guzman
“is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(Crim. Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University on September 12, 1983”, and “is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No.
8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled ‘National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San
Juan et al’, for damages arising from destruction of university properties”;
4. 4)that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman “he continued to lead or actively
participate, contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this * * Court
(in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and
regulations, within university premises but without permit from university officials in activities
that disturbed or disrupted classes;” and
5)that petitioners have “failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing.”
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:
1. 1)“By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to
seek enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution
of higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners,
who continually despise and villify respondent university and its officials and faculty members,
should persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that they hate.”
2. 2)“Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best
interest of all concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.”
3. 3)“In any event, petitioners’ enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be
compelled to enroll them after the end of the semester.”
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
“* * Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and to
require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY INJUNCTION,
enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without prejudice to
any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be subjected with their right to lawful
defense recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there
is a pending criminal charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion
that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him,
that he be allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself,
Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that
whatever protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and peaceful
manner.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 36
Petitioners’ REPLY inter alia—
1. 1)denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was
already closed), it being alleged that “while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to
do so several times before that date, all to no avail, because respondents * * persistently
refused to allow him to do so,” respondents’ ostensible reason being that “Urbiztondo (had)
participated in mass actions * * within the school premises,” although there were no “existing
disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo” at the time;
2. 2)asserted that “neither the text nor the context of the resolution” 2 justifies the conclusion that
“petitioners’ right to exercise their constitutional freedoms” had thereby been restricted or
limited; and
3. 3)alleged that “the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the
permission of the school * * can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently
refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students.”
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:
* * * The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition
for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction as well
as the respondents’ comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for petitioners to the respondents’
comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents’ comment as
ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty
(20) days from notice. * * *.”
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents’ comment and memorandum is the fact that they
had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had
indeed led or participated “in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit
from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein” 3 or perpetrated acts of “vandalism,
coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority.”4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for
malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his
expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this
Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for
poor scholastic standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982,5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others “to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”6 Petitioners
were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools7 that “(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in * * (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”8 This Court is therefore
constrained, as in Beriña v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of
imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to “adopt and enforce such rules as may be
deemed expedient for * * (its) government, * * * (this being)” incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college.”10 The rules may include
those governing student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of “good school discipline” is a duty
specifically enjoined on “every private school” by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools;11
and in this connection, the Manual further provides that—
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 37

“* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly
specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians.
Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may
deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise
specified.”12

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to
petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to re-
enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set
forth.
SO ORDERED.
     Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

——o0o——

De La Salle University, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 127980. December 19, 2007.*
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE,
AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR,
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
Actions; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of procedure are but tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, the Supreme Court has the duty to suspend their operation.—Prefatorily,
there is merit in the observation of petitioners that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the
expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU.
However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of
having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge—CHED ordering the exclusion
of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU
to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation. This is the reason We
opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to
compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise
of Our jurisdiction. This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that
rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid
application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend
their operation.
Colleges and Universities; Administrative Law; Commission on Higher Education (CHED); Republic
Act No. 7722; It is the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), not the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary cases
decided by institutions of higher learn-ing—R.A. No. 7722 transferred to the CHED the DECS’ power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institution of higher learning. —The powers and
functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following: Sec.
8. Powers and functions of the Commission.—The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions: x x x x n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and
functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and o)
perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued
enhancement of growth or development of higher education. Clearly, there is no merit in the contention
of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS’ power of supervision/review
over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its
members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to
arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of
their right to academic freedom.— The policy of R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and
promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with
ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the
continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development
of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and
the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage. It is thus safe to assume that when Congress
passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 38
level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions
of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Proceedings; Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722, if not an
explicit grant of jurisdiction to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), necessarily includes the
transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter. — Section 18 of
R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that “[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-
supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the
Commission [On Higher Education].” This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would
have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. To Our mind, this provision, if not an
explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction
which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
Same; Due Process; Academic Disciplinary Investigations; The Due Process Clause embodies a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. —The Due
Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental
to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. In administrative
cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, “[t]here are withal minimum
standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are:
that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.”
Same; Same; Same; Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings; A formal
trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process—it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy
and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.—Where a party was afforded
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of
due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest
in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. A formal trial-type hearing is not,
at all times and in all instances, essential to due process—it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court—one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to
be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
Same; Same; Same; The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary, and cross
examination is not an essential part thereof.—Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied

due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument
was already rejected in Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), where this Court held that
“x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.”
Same; Academic Freedom; Words and Phrases; According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. —Section
5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
Same; Same; Academic Disciplinary Proceedings; By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline—the right to discipline the student finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.”—It cannot be
gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.”
Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right “to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation,” such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which
includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
Same; Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; Positive identification of accused where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over
the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence—well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the
positive testimonies of the offended parties. —Private respondents interposed the common defense of
alibi. However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, “the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and
(b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.” On the other hand, the defense
of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established by
witnesses. Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants
whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that
denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.
Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Proof; The required proof in administrative cases, such as in
student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but
only substantial evidence.—The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline
cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial
evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), it means “such
reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Penalties; Concept of Proportionality; The power of schools to
instill discipline in their students does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty
which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed—if the concept of proportionality between
the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 39
giving rise to a due process question.—It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their
students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital,
not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.” This power,
however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not
commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense
committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would
give rise to a due process question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of the acts committed by the students where each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for
few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury; Disciplinary measures especially where
they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student—officials of
colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately
construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.
—We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer
any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or
expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a
mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be
anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be
treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure. Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of
exclusion only, not expulsion, imposed on them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the
MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for
being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Yorac, Arroyo, Chua, Caedo & Coronel Law Firm for petitioners.
     Villaraza and Angangco for Alvin S. Aguilar.
     Pedro Tanchuling for James Paul Bungubung and Richard Reverente.
     Jose Atepurado for Roberto A. Valdez, Jr.
REYES, J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot
sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU)
and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive
action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux
Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents’ right to
education vis-a-vis the University’s right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court are the fol-lowing: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing
DLSU’s petition for certiorari against respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for
reconsidera-tion;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila
granting private respondent Aguilar’s motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction; 4 and (4)
Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating

private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion
to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on
March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
“x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March 29,
1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle, when he
overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of
the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while
watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang’s. Then, the
three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in
the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member
of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.
“Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux
Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were
looking for a person whose description matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly
“nambastos ng brod.” As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked “Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya
na lang.”
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard
heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know
what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands
—“parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to
respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya .” What
Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the
Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the incident to the
Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their
head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: “Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang.”
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in
Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez, they
went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for
his friend from another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant,
Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just keep on
walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and
Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: “Ayaw namin ng gulo.” But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without
provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr.
Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two
others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-
upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 40
and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and
Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr.
Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the
members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon
Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy
along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: “Mga putang-ina niyo.” Respondent Reverente hit Mr.
Pascual for the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims,
Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend’s house and waited for almost two hours, or at around
8:00 in the evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there
were three cars roaming the vicinity.”6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and
Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU
charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual
and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled
“De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM /9152105), James Paul
Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325),
Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB 10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-
CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman
Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices
uniformly stated as follows:
“Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints
of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at
the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf.
You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline
Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the
sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present
evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.
For your strict compliance.”13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the
common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
“First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he
was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes
home alone sans driver. But on this particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his
permission to use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is

not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the
elder Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived
at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards
respondent’s house in BF Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15
p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo
arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald’s Taft just before 6:00
p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some medicine at
the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back
to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette
Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez’ alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March
29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the construction workers
who were doing some works in the apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the evening,
the workers according to him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his
classes. The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly attesting
to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar “solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a
meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing.”17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents
guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, 19 pursuant to CHED Order No.
4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby
orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (ABMGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the
charge.
SO ORDERED.”21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-President
for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution 23 dated June 1,
1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition
for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and
assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995
Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office
of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO 24 directing DLSU, its subordinates,
agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from
implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to
immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 41
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an
allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO 26 to conform
to the correction made in the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-
in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary
restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except
James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-in-
intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order 32 denying petitioners’ (respondents
there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents’ (petitioners there) prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
“For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in
its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from—
1. 1.Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University and
the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. 2.Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at
respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow them to enroll and complete their
respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set
by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any
and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed from:
1. 1.Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1,
1995; and
2. 2.Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at
respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-
in-intervention to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of respondent to the effect
that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may
suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are
directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.”33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he
attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September

25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in
contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in
accordance with respondent Judge’s Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995,
respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until
further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates, agents,
representatives, employees and any other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to
immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995
affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of
petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their
degree courses until their graduation from said school.”36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719)
with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent
Judge’s September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to
be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded. 38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR
THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY
IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE
FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.” 39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling
and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters 40 to petitioner DLSU.
In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated
June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed
to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution
No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order
dated September 23, 1996 which states:
“Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University
(DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU)
directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no
other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current
TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU,
through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll,
pending the Commission’s Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.”41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow
private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar’s counsel wrote another demand
letter to petitioner DLSU.42
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a
motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and
academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss
of private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
“THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.”44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
“It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in character, the
pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.”45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED. 46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has
jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719
and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent
motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC
Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private
respondent Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of
the order reads:
“In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby granted, and respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court’s sheriff upon the respondents at
petitioners’ expense.
SO ORDERED.”48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to
the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the
outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO 49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a
TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective
immediately and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long
completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second
trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records 52 issued by DLSU. However, despite
having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of
completion/ graduation in his favor.

Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. 1.Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating
disciplinary rules.
2. 2.Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
1. 2.aWere private respondents accorded due process of law?
2. 2.bCan petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
3. 2.cWas the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
1. 3.Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96
disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from
petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with
the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge—CHED
ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge
ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in
order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the
petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant
the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction. 54 This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-
religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court
has the duty to suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga
desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of
their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3), 57
54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the “Education Act of
1982.”
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS’ power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike
B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop
moral character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the
creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED’s
powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 43
cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED’s “cover-age” of institutions of higher education is limited to
the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has
replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over
student disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as “An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes.”
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
“Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education.—In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage
shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in
all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.”
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the
following:
“Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission.—The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be
necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the
continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.”
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED
the DECS’ power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS
insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision
over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all
post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students
on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is “both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private.” That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary
degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of
all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that
education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic
freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of
students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of highlevel and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our
historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that
disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which
would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic
freedom.

Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education,
which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of
other government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore
be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that “ [j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or
chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be
transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education].”  This provision does not limit or distinguish that
what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and
development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what
petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of
B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. 64 The constitutional behest
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and
inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, “[t]here
are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.”66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings.68 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process—it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. 71 “To be
heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court—one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges
against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 44
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National
University73 where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance
of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross
examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.”
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses aca-demic freedom
which includes determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng
kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of th e Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.74 According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may
be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if
not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to
teach.”76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a
right “to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation,”77 such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards
laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven
by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay
napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in
order that alibi may succeed as a defense, “the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence
(a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.”78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by witnesses. 79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over
the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the
positive testimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the
accused.82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can
easily fabricate an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in

light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were
at the scene of the crime and were the victim’s assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring
of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all
defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail
over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According
to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means “such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente. They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on
March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot
prevail over their positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court’s pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty
of hazing:
“No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who
have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university’s
disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school.
This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university’s academic freedom which has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.”87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a
venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students
currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 88 It must be borne in mind that universities are
established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values,
ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. 89 As for private
respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in
Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was amply
corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that sometime on March 29,
1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan
Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class
7, Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI
from said Batch ’89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our
permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.”90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3
Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp
Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi
assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested
witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape
criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the
identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the
presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 45
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible
defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense
may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate
to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa
kanilang pag-kakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their
academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”94 This power, however, does not give
them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the
misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is
not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer
any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or
expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a
mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be
anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be
treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the
CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names
of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately
issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30,
1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7,
1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private
respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
     Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario and Velasco, Jr.,** JJ., concur.
     Quisumbing,*** J., In the result.
Petition partially granted, resolutions annulled and set aside.
Notes.—Academic freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel.
(University of the Philippines vs. Civil Service Commission, 356 SCRA 57 [2001])
There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness
and justice. (People vs. Nuelan, 366 SCRA 705 [2001])
Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which
both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.
(Go vs. Tan, 412 SCRA 123 [2003])
——o0o——
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 46

G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997.*

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine
Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of substance—procedural due process “refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law
itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and
just.”— Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
Constitution, viz.: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, x x x.” In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due
process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters
of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.” PPA-AO No.
04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Same; Same; As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process.—Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-
AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and
the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of
the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has
stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea,  where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this

constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.”
Same; Same; Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process,
are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the
performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.— Neither does the
fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative
order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due
process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the
performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.
Same; Same; Ships and Shipping; Pilotage; Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right.—There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he
exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process.” He merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the
limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a
wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not
forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” As will be presently
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order
which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Pilotage, Defined.— Pilotage is the act of conducting a
vessel from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a two-mile area offshore to
an assigned berthing area and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “License” and “Licensure,” Defined.—Pilotage, just like other
professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is “the granting of license
especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for professional
practice) in accordance with established standards.” A license is a right or permission granted by some
competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.
Same; Same; Same; The license granted to harbor pilots in the form of an appointment which
allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of 70 years is a vested right.— Their license
is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the
age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, “(a)ll existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid
up to 31 December 1992 only,” and “(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts
shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
Same; Same; Same; An administrative order that provides for pre-evaluation cancellation of a
license is unreasonable and constitutionally infirm—in a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.—It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor
pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure
of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training,
they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA
for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual
cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 47
performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms
which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid
evaluation of performance” which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence,
the use of the term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No.
04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel E. Valenzuela and Jesus P. Amparo for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of
harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23,
1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter. Pursuant to its power of
control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession,1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO
03-852 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring
pilots must be holders of pilot licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three
months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory
performance4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself5 to exercise
harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70,  unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical
unfitness by the PPA General Manager.6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to
organize themselves into pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may be
required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in
floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA
automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent
equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association
concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-927 on July 15,
1992, whose avowed policy was to “instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the
port users through the improvement of pilotage services.” This was implemented by providing therein
that “all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only”  and that “all appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.”
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association,
through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of
Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia
that “the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies exclusively with
its Board of Directors as its governing body.”
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued a Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which laid down
the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying

Factors:9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for
Evaluation:10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years
as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and
age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92,
but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of
Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his
arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992 the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order
was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section
6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was
intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C.
Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. 11 He concluded that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of
Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it “to
control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.”
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
“The exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation
of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO
04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property
rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage
services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or
cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee’s performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPA’s jurisdictional area.” (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged “absence of ample prior consultation” before the issuance of the
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA
to consult with “relevant Government agencies.” Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the
Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance,
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the
National Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA),
and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the
President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in
issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court
rendered the following judgment:12
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
1. 1.Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 48
2. 2.PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null
and void;
3. 3.The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-
92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.”
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage
as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.13 Thus,
abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the
property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any “withdrawal or alteration” of such property right
must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was
apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-
AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From
this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is
convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against deprivation
of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.”
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one
speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and
matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures
by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the pilots
themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the
enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed
in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.”
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times 16 before the
matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade.
While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, “which issues the licenses of pilots after
administering the pilots’ examinations,” was not consulted, 17 the facts show that the MARINA, which took
over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors
of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in
the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need to be consulted.18
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of
the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial

function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor
pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be
“withdrawn or shortened” by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their
argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92
fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even
petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of
one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference
with, property rights without due process.”20 He merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited
context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid,
but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” As will be presently
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order
which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is
“the granting of
_______________
19
 Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989), citing 73 C.J.S.
452-453.
20
 Rollo, p. 38.
42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
license especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for professional
practice) in accordance with established standards.”21 A license is a right or permission granted by some
competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through
the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training
and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
“Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that
here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government
professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice
on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and
practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at
least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least
two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots.”
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they
retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, “(a)ll existing
regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall
remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only,” and “(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all
pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to
renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 49
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso
facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation
of performance” which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of
the term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-AO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-MO No.
03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a
“surplusage”23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO No. 03-85 is a comprehensive order
setting forth the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports.” It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance
evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots—matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92
and its implementing memorandum order.
Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents’ insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the
issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power and
authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial court’s finding of animosity
between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed
in court between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which have reached this Court, cannot
certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of
professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher
administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a
quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
     Martinez, J., No part.
Petition dismissed; Assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process
clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned
with fair procedure. (Azul vs. Castro, 133 SCRA 271 [1984])
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 [1996])

——o0o——
[No. 5060. January 26, 1910.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Luis TORIBIO, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SLAUGHTER OF LARGE CATTLE.—Sections 30 and 33 of Act
No. 1147 construed.
1. 2.ID.; ID.—Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions,
that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent
of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the
statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.—The provisions of Act No.
1147 prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption which are
fit for "agricultural work and draft purposes," held to be a reasonable and justifiable exercise
of the sovereign police power of the State, under the conditions existing in these Islands.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE.—These provisions
held not to constitute an appropriation of private property interests to a "public use" so as to
bring them within the principles of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain
and to entitle the owners to compensation, being no more than a just restraint of an injurious
private use of property.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING USE OF THE POLICE POWER.—"To justify the State"
in the exercise of its sovereign police power "it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 50
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." (Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S., 133,
136.)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. Wislizenus, J.
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a
permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the
provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter 01 large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered
there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances
the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit
of the municipal treasurer.
Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
"SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except
upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of
the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for
the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of
the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
"SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such
animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to
slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.
"SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and
such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of
radiated hair commonly known as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal
for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of
owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.
"A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial
treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date
of permit.
"SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos,
Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of
large cattle f or human consumption in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the

municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor
the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter
of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of these sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the
municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the
words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase
"at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for
food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping
in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter
construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to
make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners, when lost, strayed, or stolen.
To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of
ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to
establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates
of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it
provides also for the disposition of estrays and animals recovered from the possession of thieves or
persons unlawf ully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in
order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his
possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system
of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate
animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were
permitted to be slaughtered for human consumption without requiring proof of ownership and the
production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and
this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner, outside of a
municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the
slaughter f or human consumption or killing f or f ood at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals
without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed
records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it
will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the
brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortive,
since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle could, and naturally would, evade the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the
fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks
might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 51
legislator sought to. attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the
Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large
cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the
"killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is
clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption
anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of
misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the
general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of
municipal slaughterhouses.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human
consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to
the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their
slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and.object of the
legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should be rejected; and,
as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which
we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other
sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was
denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes."
Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in
the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes," is unconstitutional and
in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides
that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."
It is not quite clear f rom the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the
statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of the owners,  or that it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of
opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief
Justice Shaw
(in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the constitutionality
of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner,
of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chelsea), that the law in question
"is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired
and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community."
It may be conceded that the beneficial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao
owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute;
and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an
interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes
with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the regulations in question were
enacted for purely private purposes, the statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be

a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on by appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not
such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise
by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is
no more than "a just restraint of an injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had
authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down
in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the
former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the
sovereign police powers of the State, said:
"We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. *
* * Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
"This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the
police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
""It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise."
Applying these principles, we are of opinion that the restraint placed by the law on the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purposes is not an appropriation of
property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principles of the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain.
It is in fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to
be detrimental to the public welfare. And we think that an examination of the general provisions of the
statute in relation to the public interests which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which
it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of
rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for
private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the
exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and
which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease
had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away
seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals.
Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost
exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they
were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. Large areas of
productive land lay waste for years, and -the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the
Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions
of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the
fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more than sufficient
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 52
for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to
make itself felt, hope sank in the breasts of .the people, and in many provinces the energies of the
breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they
were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the
immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the
United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the
provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to
the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals
fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the
work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the
transportation of the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government
to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this
subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those animals which had been
spared from the ravages of the disease, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need
for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts -were employed, with a view to the discovery and
application of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in
some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual
increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of
the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately result in practically relieving those sections which suffered
most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increased from three to
five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted
prove entirely successf ul, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the
natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the
crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment
of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property
by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the enactment of the statute under consideration that
the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of
special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and the
supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of
the statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the
slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of
the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provisions of the statute
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter f or human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like
manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of
existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disasters
incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports
and records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the
material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of
the disease which swept away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law
under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized
people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or

otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt
reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and
penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights
of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity
and the right of self-protection, and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be
justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the
law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U. S., 133, 136) :
"The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include
everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement,
by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has
been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering
the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of
diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in
cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial
grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsory vaccination of
children; the confinement of the insane or those afflicted with contagious diseases; the restraint of
vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill
fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold.
\Beyond this, however, the State may. interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the
interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public.
generally, as distinguished f rom those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts."
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long
as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation
on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt, 140), said (p. 149) that
by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect
right in the legislature to do which, no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged and general principles,
ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
"It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be
exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict
with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in
number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 53
to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the owners
themselves have fully observed all their duties to their f ellows and to the State, but where,
nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong
instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of
individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army,
or any other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield
to that 'necessity' which 'knows no law/ The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities
and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired
may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this
purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the
general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which
constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a
harbor to f orbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations
to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other
persons. Such regulations are only 'a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature
have authority' to impose.
"So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances,
and without the fault of the owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now
become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes
destroyed upon this ground; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be
detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use
for cemetery purposes."
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States
clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine of the sovereign
police power of the State, and confirm us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question
being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, and is f ound in substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 54

No. L-74457. March 20,1987.*

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of

constitutionality of legislative measures.—This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe
a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.—The closed mind
has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before
an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-
half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based
on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of
the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that
this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias
or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.—In the light
of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor,
so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No.
626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is
no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old
if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another (E.O. 626-
A), their confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being
confiscatory.—But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition

escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after
trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by
the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition
of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that
the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide
and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise
of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property conf iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs
immediate and urgent correction.—It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional
cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to
wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In
the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him
under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court
of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after
trial and conviction of the accused.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 55
Same; Same; Damages; A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation
of E.O. 626-A is not liable for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.
—We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President,
to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J..
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike—but
hear me first!' " It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as f ollows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly
with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent
the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive
Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President     
Republic of the Philippines"     
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
the above measure.1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the
case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, **3 which upheld the trial
court,*** and he has now come bef ore us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim
is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the
improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No, 6 of the 1973
Constitution.4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures.7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made
in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and
of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall
Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance
by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so
heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of
the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force
and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President
"in his judgment," a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we
reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves
to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 56
the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body.10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an
"iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility
must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the
import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process—and in so doing sums
it all up—as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life, liberty or property of any of its subjects except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their
progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing
reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the
law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling af ter examination of the problem not f rom one or the other perspective only but in its
totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes,
the insolence of power.
The minimum .requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case,14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the
due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances
when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of
the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The

passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his
return to the country he has fled.16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals.17 In such instances, previous judicial
hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved
or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in
the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.18 By reason of its
function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and
eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which
affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead—from the womb to beyond the
tomb—in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the
public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the
justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under
certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buff aloes be conserved f or the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for
such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms
on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not
taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio,19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own
carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals
and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn
had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent
increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for
the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid
exercise of the police power and declared in part as f ollows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. x x x      x x x.
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by 'the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long
as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a 'reasonably necessary' limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 57
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are
at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit,
the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could
be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is
no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
E ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to
the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond
of P1 2,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered
by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It
is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural
due process is not necessarily judicial only.20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not
have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 58

to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,21 Executive Order No.      Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and      Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
only after trial and conviction of the accused. Decision reversed.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated Note.—Judicial review exists precisely to test the validity of executive or legislative acts in an
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property appropriate legal proceedings; there is always the possibility of their being declared inoperative and void.
shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the Realism compels the acceptance of the though that there would be a time-lag between the initiation of
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers such presidential or congressional exercise of power and the final declaration of nullity. In the
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis meanwhile, it would be productive of confusion, perhaps at times even of chaos, if the parties affected
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. were left free to speculate as to its fate being one of doom, this leading them free to disobey in the
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain meanwhile. Since, however, the orderly processes of government, not to mention common sense,
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers requires that the presumption of validity be accorded an act of Congress or an order of the President. It
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. would be less than fair, and it may productive of injustice, if no notice of its assistance as a fact be paid
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? to it, even if thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary, in the case of Presidential act, either to the
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see Constitution or a controlling statute. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533.)
fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly ——o0o——
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President,
to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw
them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit.
Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without No. L-77372. April 29, 1988.*
protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights. LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MUNGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTO C.
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive BLAS, JR., ELPIDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.
They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept
bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. Administrative Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Orders or resolutions of the Professional Regulations
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed Commission fall within the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court; Absence of provision in the
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the law creating the Commission that its orders and resolutions are appealable either to the Court of Appeals
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. or to the Supreme Court.—Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action
SO ORDERED. for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike

Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential
Decree No. 223, the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of
the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. Consequently,
Civil Case No. 86–37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the
respondent Professionai Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the
general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Professionat Regulations Commission is attached to the Office of
the President, and even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court ofFirst
Instance, now Regional Trial Court.—What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the
Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President
may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).
Same; Same; Same; To invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court ofAppeals under
BP 129, there must be a final order or ruling by an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions; Meaning of “quasi-judicial adjudication"—In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final
order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its
quasi-judicial functions. In Black’s Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial
adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order
which applies to a specific situation. This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability
issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functionB like
Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations.
Same; Same; Same;Axiom In administrative law that administrative authority should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.—It is an axiom in administrative law
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the
end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 105 prohibiting examinees from attending any review class,
briefing conference conducted by or shall receive any hand-out, review materials or any tip from any
school, college or any university or any review center infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution; Reason. —Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it
also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment
of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to eDjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth.
Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 105 violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
—Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a fullfledged
public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out
their students.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 59
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully
prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like three
(3) days before the date of examination? These are the issues presented to the court by this petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13,1987, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 10591,** declaring nuU and void the Order dated October 21,1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86–37950 entitled “Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional
Regulation Commission.”
The records show the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6,1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as part of its “Additional Instructions to Examinees,” to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following
pertinent provisions:
“No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer. lecturer. instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day.
“Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission."1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed in their own behalf and in
behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a
complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court
had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October
21,1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional,
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13,1987, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the order dated
October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further
directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86–37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof. No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED."2
Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis

its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal
bodies. Thus it held—
“That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional
Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere
with each other’s acts."3
To strengthen its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration
vs. Mendoza,4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna,6 where this
Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interefere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case, We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this
Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and
Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained
that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees with an order or ruling of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of
Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth
the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go to the
Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it, was
stressed that if an order of the Seeurities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate
remedy to take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission.
Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with respect to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide for the procedure that need be
taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for
the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional
Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no
provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that
orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86–37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a
resolution of the respondent Professionai Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should
fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court.7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is
attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination.8 Well settled iii’Our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo,9 this rule was thoroughly propounded
on, to wit:
“In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no
question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this
conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most
important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal
departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 60
powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be
implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of
his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the
law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it
(the law). A judicial review of the President’s decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should
be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative acts of all
administrative officers.’ “10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II,11 is another case in point. Here, “the
Executive Office” of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under
the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the
circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the
contention of petitioner therein that “the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse
and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the
Executive Office which has the force and effect of law.” In resolving the issue, We held:
“x x x x x x, We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 11–
240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense
of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) x x x x x x.
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent’s constitutional right to enter into agreement
not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the thereatened implementation of
Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain
exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the
payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of
his nature wherein a constitutional and statutory righty is allegedly infringed by the administrative action
of a government office. Courts of First Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation  (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as
amended)."12 (Italics supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino,13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the
authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had thereon had been
rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 B.P. Blg. 129, it is
the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
“SEC. 9 Jurisdiction.—The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive appellater jurisdiction over all final judgment decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
provinsional of this Act, of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from
proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black’s
Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public

administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of
rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation. 14 This
does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to
implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by
the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer.15 In this case,
the issue presented was whether or not the Court of Pirst Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving
an order of the CorninissiGn on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an
invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards,
judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that “it is the Supreme Court,
not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions,
orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the
enforcement of election laws."16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in said case, We said:
“We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid
comes within the purview of a ‘final order’ which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on
certiorari. What is contemplated reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicary or quasi-judicial powers. (Italics
supplied.)
x      x      x      x
“We agree with petitioner’s contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to the
bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective
pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of
the commissionwas issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election
purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of merely as an incident of
its inherent administrative functions but conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a ‘final order’ reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.  Being non-judicial in character,
no contempt order may be imposed by the certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question
arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Italics
supplied.)17
One ither case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines.18 Here, petioner Central bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate
Appelate Court. Thus:
“The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is
among the “quasi-judicial” x x boards’ whose judgments are within the exclusive appelate jurisdiction of
the iAC; hence, it is only said Court, ‘to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts,’ that may review the
Monetary Board’s resolutions."19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolutions or orders
of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC,"20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
86–37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 61
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and
for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and
will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which
is “to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations.” However, its good aim cannot be
a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable
in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference  or the like, or receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions x x x.21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any 111 motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Purthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful
eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative au= thorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as
to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfUlment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their
personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:
“The term ‘liberty’ means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the
equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such
callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest
enjoyment."23
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Kespondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a fullfledged
public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out
their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology24 regarding academic freedom, to wit:
x x x x It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for
itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.”
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in
the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days—when
they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing
their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself—would be like uprooting the tree
to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their

loss, then so be it. Pixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or
revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate
means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and
void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
     Grino-Aquino, J., no part. I signed the CA decision.
Decision revesed and set aside,
Note.—Interpretation of officers of laws entrusted to their administration is entitled to great
respect. (Siera Madre Trust vs. Secretary ofAgricutlure and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384).
——o0o——
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR,
INC. and Go CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as to constitutionality of
ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors
who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or
city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be
presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the
necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. Where there was no factual foundation laid for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 62
overthrowing an ordinance which is not void on its face, the presumption of constitution-ality must
prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels, etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating the
operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the
scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. In view of the requirements of certain constitutional guarantees, the exercise of such police
power, however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person, is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust
or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee
may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees.—Municipal license fees can be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are
incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide
discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined
to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who
might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals
in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in
the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations
subject to the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal infirmity.—There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform
in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront
to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What
should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels, etc.— The provision in Ordinance No. 4760
of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment
shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The
prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the

undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover,
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What makes a statute susceptible to a
charge that it is void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either forbidding
or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and diff er as to its application.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
     J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates for intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J,:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more
specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-
stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both
national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood, to not less than
2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged
that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved
on June 14, 1963 by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as
it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other
law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and
void for being unreasonable and violative of due procfess insofar as it would impose ?6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting
any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling
up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 63
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as
his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection
either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in f irst
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion
which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that
the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from
being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by
parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or
motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged
nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to
state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed f or its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar,
Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of
Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of
the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in
Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of
Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b
and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons
stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid
by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conf ormity to
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise
applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments
advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment
declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file
memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then
that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to
the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent
Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question.''" Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines
of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with
what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. x x x The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature
of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the wellbeing of the people.
x x x The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence
to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its f ace, which is not the case here.
The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 64
succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specif ic method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of f acts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the
due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public
needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if
it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included
as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other -than legal" and at the same
time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it,
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 providing a license tax
for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte,12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than
Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and, prohibiting any person
from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is, smoked or
otherwise used,15 all of which are intended ,to protect public morals. ,
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of
the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however,
the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is
subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate. case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state
of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a
remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be
found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance
of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor
does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No.
4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the
curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, f irst-class
motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been
the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above
Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not
be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise
engage in non-usef ul enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue
have frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter
cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable."23
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 65
the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range
of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage
clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter
may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of
the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears
that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
markets under certain conditions is permitted. x x x And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in
the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in
these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different
conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are
being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right
of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. x x x
The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance
of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all."29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government
of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest." 31 What may be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 66

for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify
then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in the petition itself that what
seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific
rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view
of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving
with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with him at about the same
time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt
as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners
or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's
rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.*
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila HON. JOSELITO
cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the
and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision. City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON.
With costs. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN,
     Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur. HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION,
     Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on official leave. JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON.
Judgment reversed. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO,
HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P.
___________ NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E.
HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FE-LIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q.
BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON
R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVENIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA.
LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEO-
NARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of
Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila
and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the

corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to substantive require-ments.—The tests of a valid ordinance are
well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be

partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Same; Same; Local Governments; Police Power; Local government units exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city coun-cil .
—Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case,
the sangguniang panlung-sod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. The inquiry
in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-
reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.—The police power of the City Council, however
broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment
of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process
Distinguished.—Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due
process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must
provide when it takes a particular action. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In
other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government’s action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The police power granted to local government units must
always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law; Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property.— The police power granted to local government units must
always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its
exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to
the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.—To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must
it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 67
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of
these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights
—a violation of the due process clause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.—The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it
substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1
thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3
instructs its own-ers/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert
said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory.
— The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The
directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty
and gathering dust.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation.—Petitioners cannot take refuge in
classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle
finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government
units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this
particular taking.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the
enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause.—The Ordinance does not specify
the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,” “annoy the
inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.” The cited case
supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated,
but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a
result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into
personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute
stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but
only insofar as their property is concerned.—Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be

denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” It limits
governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as
their property is concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements in order that Classification of the Subjects of
Legislation may be Valid.— Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the
classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating
the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions; 2)
It must be germane to the purposes of the law; 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; 4)
It must apply equally to all members of the class.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof .—
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are
necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature
thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general
rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is
tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is
based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and
effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict
with or repugnant to the general law.—Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise
runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already
converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open
storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and
effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict
with or repugnant to the general law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity
or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence .—
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it
has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness
of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 68
     City Legal Officer for petitioners.
     E. C. Tutaan & Associates Law Office for respondent Malate Tourist Dev’t. Corp.
TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad
after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than
if performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court’s commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of
the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it
need be, the Court will not hesitate to “make the hammer fall, and heavily” in the words of Justice
Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to
promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitu-tionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the
City of Manila.4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.8 Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor
on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled— AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M.
Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard
in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any
business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 69

annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community , both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the
such as but not limited to: General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in
case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall
1. 1.Sauna Parlors be closed and padlocked permanently.
2. 2.Massage Parlors SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
3. 3.Karaoke Bars Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
4. 4.Beerhouses Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)
5. 5.Night Clubs
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
6. 6.Day Clubs
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC’s Victoria Court considering
7. 7.Super Clubs
that these were not establishments for “amusement” or “entertainment” and they were not “services or
8. 8.Discotheques
facilities for entertainment,” nor did they use women as “tools for entertainment,” and neither did they
9. 9.Cabarets
“disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants” or “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
10. 10.Dance Halls
community.”11
11. 11.Motels
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following
12. 12.Inns
reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4
(iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to
SEC. 2. The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential
accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section. Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as
enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal
this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5)
allowable within the area, such as but not limited to: The Ordinance violates MTDC’s constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an
invasion of plaintiff’s property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular
1. 1.Curio or antique shop thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6)
2. 2.Souvenir Shops The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for
3. 3.Handicrafts display centers prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
4. 4.Art galleries similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this
5. 5.Records and music shops area.14
6. 6.Restaurants In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
7. 7.Coffee shops Council had the power to “prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and
8. 8.Flower shops moral welfare of the community” as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government
9. 9.Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family Code,16 which reads, thus:
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele. Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
10. 10.Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like. resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
11. 11.Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for
zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or ....
funeral establishments. (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
....
319
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 319 facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance
City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr. halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit

certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the
above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and
amusement.18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III,
Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
(Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
...
Section 18. Legislative powers.—The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
...
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for
the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months’ imprisonment,
or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent
had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and
the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-
Malate area to remain a commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be
assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the
equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and
real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-
parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993,
again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City
of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by
this Court against the defendant. No costs.
“SO ORDERED.”28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they
are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra
vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding
that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 70
establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made
before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the
inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government
units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458
(a) 4 (vii) of the Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not
contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.35
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra
vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the
questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process,
confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the
equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulatediscretion in
the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court’s deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-
Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area’s
many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks
back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that
the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the
lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates
a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of
persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at
rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under
the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should
be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able
to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter.39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify
or violate it.40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of
the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are
endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare
clause, viz.:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case,
the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42 The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of laws.46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.47
A. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat “(N)o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . .”48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,49 and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police
power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to
protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction
without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons
equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.51
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 71
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are “persons” within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
“procedural due process” and “substantive due process.”
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are
concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it
takes a particular action.53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks
to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government’s action.54 Case law in the United States
(U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny
used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due
process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will
meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose.56
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically 57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.59
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights62—a violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of
legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels
and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial notice of the “alarming increase in
the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels,
which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.”64

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable
regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the
worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be achieved
through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than
by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, 65 it is baseless and insupportable
to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs,
super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the
accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are
not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal
prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human
frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute
establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were
to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a
court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or
court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will not be
exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no “pure” places where there are impure men.
Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence
and universality of sin in man’s history. (Catechism of the Catholic Church, Definitive Edition, p. 101;
ECCE and Word & Life Publications, Don Bosco Compound, Makati)
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said
to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of
ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that
were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would
be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and
cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out
of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City
Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the
detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners’ earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they
unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of “wholesome,” “innocent” establishments. In the
instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires
to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 72
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these
violations;66 and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses,
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-
Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which “to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other
kinds of business allowable within the area.” Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the “premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.”
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
fundamental right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare.” 67 In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.68
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,69 sought to clarify the meaning of
“liberty.” It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that
the meaning of “liberty” must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making
these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State.70
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of
the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their
bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel’s premises—be it stressed that their consensual sexual

behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.71 Adults
have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the
right to make this choice.72 Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the
law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the
beginning of all freedom—it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.73
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,74 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his
will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of
himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.75
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court
chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous
pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal
conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees
their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer the
consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of
the beneficial use of its property. 76 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the
enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind
up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed
businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.77 It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that “private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.” The provision is the most important protection of property
rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property.
The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of
some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person’s
property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is “to bar
the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.78
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 73
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.79
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,80 it was held that a taking also could be found
if government regulation of the use of property went “too far.” When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.81
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was “a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions.” On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme
Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts
in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by
public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or
whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.82
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.83 A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land is, from the owner’s point of view, equivalent to a “taking” unless principles of nuisance or
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable.84 When the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.85
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a
complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government
action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.86
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a “taking” if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.87
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The
directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty
and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire
establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build
the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent
that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options—to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businesses—are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private
property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the
Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional
burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered
solution does not put an end to the “problem,” it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is
unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How
may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge
without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the
government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed
permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a
whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs
restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended
for a public use or purpose and is therefore “wholesome.”88 If it be of public benefit that a “wholesome”
property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public should bear the
cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use.89
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners’ actions. It in no
way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments
covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of
prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon
no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities
as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.90
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit
of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions.91
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,92 as cited in People v. Nazario,93 the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance that had made it illegal for “three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and
there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.” The ordinance was nullified as it
imposed no standard at all “because one may never know in advance what ‘annoys some people but
does not annoy others.’”
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to
disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of
the community.” The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 74
the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which
the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional
guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry
from the illconsidered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,94 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating
“sexually oriented businesses,” which are defined to include adult arcades, book-stores, video stores,
cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter
centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel
owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance.
The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce adequate
support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime
and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of
motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first
contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined
with a study which the city considered, was adequate to support the city’s determination that motels
permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme.
As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have
no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for
fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It
imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,95 it
needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure
which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or
equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is
not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.96
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it
cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. 97 The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 98 The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws.”99 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.100
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
. . . What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: “The ideal
situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.” There is recognition, however,
in the opinion that what in fact exists “cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the

reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee
then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the
general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by
the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason.” Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to
quote from the Tuason decision anew “that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest.101
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the
law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection
clause.102 The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
1. 1)It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2. 2)It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
1. 3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
2. 4)It must apply equally to all members of the class.103
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in
the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair
relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitution—one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish—is not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less
grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral
activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important
government objectives.104 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with
prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 75
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which
provides that:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
...
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
...
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
...
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
...
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such
other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit
certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Clearly, with respect to cafés, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto
is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila105 that:
The word “regulate,” as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and
includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but “regulate” should not be construed as
synonymous with “suppress” or “prohibit.” Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the
municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or
business shall be exercised.106

And in People v. Esguerra,107 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban
which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is
empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to
license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.108
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners’ assertion109 that they were modified by the Code vesting
upon City Councils prohibitory powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the
first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend “such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or
annoy the inhabitants” and to “prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community” are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively
of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the
clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify
being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. 110 These powers, therefore, should not be
confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation,
suppression and prohibition.111
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment
subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 [iv]), public dancing schools, public dance halls,
sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4
(vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among “other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants” or “certain forms of amusement or entertainment” which the City Council may suspend,
suppress or prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the
nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out
of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. 112 Moreover, it is a
general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is
tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is
based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.113
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general
welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without
merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,114 is instructive. It held that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the
Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code,
and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving
away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold
that, under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in
question, notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and
nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and
dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 76
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must
necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two
laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later
prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will.115 If there is an inconsistency or repugnance
between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair
and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must
prevail and override the earlier.116
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions
contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been
divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with
an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act
covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such
a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail.117
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which
are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”
Thus, submitting to petitioners’ interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City
Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the
Code as it is at variance with the latter’s provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to
the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per
se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.118
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
...
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to
obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications,
and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
...
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms
by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 77

the City Council’s powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern
effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such
in their establishment, operation and maintenance. character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary—we reiterate our support for it. But in spite of
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand
these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the
Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without
operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws—not even under the
among the “contractors” defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined “amusement” guise of police power.
as a “pleasurable diversion and entertainment,” “synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;” WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
and “amusement places” to include “theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances.” Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate SO ORDERED.
enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that      Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous,      Panganiban, J., In the result.
even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration      Ynares-Santiago, J., Concurs in the result only.
appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.119
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of Petition denied, judgment of the trial court affirmed.
P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate Note.—It must be remembered that the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of constitutional rights. (Posadas vs. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388 [2000])
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop,
gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for ——o0o——
an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the
council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. 120 As
succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:121
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes
is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but
must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which
are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute.122

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it
has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness
of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.123

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.*
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent.
Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; Standing or
locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from
the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case. —Standing or locus standi is
the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or
action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of
standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
Same; Same; Same; The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine
of transcendental importance.—The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system
derived directly from the Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a
direct and personal interest” presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a
petitioner’s standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the
meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions
such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines,
the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Same; Same; Same; Third-Party Standing; American jurisprudence is replete with examples where
parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal
protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.—The concept of third
party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court wrote that: “We have recognized the right of litigants
to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant
must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the
outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must
exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.” Herein, it is clear
that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the
patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest
groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 78
construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. American jurisprudence is replete with examples
where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or
equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the
constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that: “The rights of husband and
wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a
suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.”
Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties—generally applied to statutes infringing
on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights; Motel operators have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame. —Assuming arguendo  that
petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter,
the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing
on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a
sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in
the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners418have a
right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate”
time frame.
Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; Requisites for Validity.—The test of a valid
ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Police Power; Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.—Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of
presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.—The apparent goal of the Ordinance
is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of
its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli,
and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Judicial Review; Courts; If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent
emotions that motivate many political decisions, 419judicial integrity is compromised by any perception

that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. —Even as we design the precedents
that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are
naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their
political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form
of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that
motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is
merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals
of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that
end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the
courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process; The purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. —The primary
constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due
process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and
partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property; Substantive due process completes the
protection envisioned by the due process clause—it inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. —The due pro-cess guaranty has
traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,
“procedural due process” and “substantive due process.” Procedural due process refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when
it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level
of formality of a hearing. If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise
absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection420envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires
whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Same; Same; Same; The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of
law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms; The due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.—The
question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power,
traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can
be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency
with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should
sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency
because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds
for its application.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; “Strict Scrutiny,” “Rational Basis,” and,
“Intermediate Review,” Explained.—The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote 4 of the Carolene
Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.”
Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 79
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation. A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976),  after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). While the test may have
first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all
substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in
analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the421presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict
scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
Same; Same; Liberty; Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution,
is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done, but rather an
atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they
interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent,
without doing harm or injury to others.—One might say that the infringed rights of these customers were
are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of
cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of
Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those “trivial” yet fundamental freedoms—which the
people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence
—that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated
as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may
or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored
under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner
innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
Same; Same; Police Power; A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police
power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.—That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of422private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment
of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22
SCRA 424 (1968),  the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property
is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police
power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.

Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and
vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world—the solution to
such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product, rather,
cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the
dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.—The Court has professed its deep
sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, and it is skeptical of those who
wish to depict our capital city—the Pearl of the Orient—as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the
Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to
accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities
such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the
world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a
legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout
up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. The behavior
which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply
by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the
strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes
can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.423
Same; Same; Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare—the State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. —We reiterate that individual
rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.
The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to
protect. The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.
The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of
morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is
conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so
long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different
interests.
Same; Same; Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty
to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. —The oft-quoted American maxim
that “you cannot legislate morality” is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by
Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail
if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. Our penal laws, for one, are
founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right
and wrong, they will remain so oriented. Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not
only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 80
key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not
with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition
that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.
Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as
the em-424bodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take
the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon  for petitioners.
  The City Legal Officer  for respondent City of Manila.
TINGA, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the
Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in
tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1  the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the
operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition
at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering
short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier
decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and
equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the
Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 The
Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
“SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the
youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title.—This ordinance shall be known as “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s].—Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room
rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day
or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean
the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause.—Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or
imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the
persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent
conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.

SEC. 6. Repealing Clause.—Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary
to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity.—This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was
authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to
charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and
Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of
the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the
Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the
same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC’s motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on
January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an
Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from
the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his
Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision
without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby
declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.”17
The RTC noted that the ordinance “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution.”18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate
economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the
law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of
preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban
on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari  with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the
petition as a petition for certiorari  and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 81
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local
government units, the power:
“[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports.”22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section
18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
“to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or
both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.”23
429Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable
and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful
object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims
to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents
in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,  liberty
is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and
Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They
contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
establishments offering “wash-up” rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being
interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite
standing to plead for protection of their patrons’ equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to
and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case. More
importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, 26 sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal
branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which
concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a direct and
personal interest” presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner’s
standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning
of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v.
Wright.30

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that:
“We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three
important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a
“sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close
relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his
or her own interests.”33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise
injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability
which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in
constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties
Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to
advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes
of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held
that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as
accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held
that:
“The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to
them.”36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States
Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of
a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of
21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing “by acting as advocates of the rights
of third parties who seek access to their market or function.”38
Assuming arguendo  that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to
assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis,
challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally
applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute
needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the
Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on
the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients
to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Manila  ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a
prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and
occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to
the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 82
However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate  was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted
with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core,
this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions
and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements
as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 43 Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance
halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use
has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights
stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities
animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal
protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of
government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or
legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same
passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is
compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We
derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters
of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and
sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.

B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the
guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.” Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of
notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of
arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected
dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms.
Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of
analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality thought of constitutional due process has not been
predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the
libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause
has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the
proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested
when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene
Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a
“fundamental right.”52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for
laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard
of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55  after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While
the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since
been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further
a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 83
focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the
438scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access63 and
interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only
on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would
warrant the application of the most deferential standard—the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we
recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons—
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since
they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that,
when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not
shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those “trivial” yet fundamental freedoms—which the people
reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that
accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a
fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or
what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored
under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner
innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City
of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
“Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare.”[65] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of
“liberty.” It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be
broad indeed.”67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual
behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as
venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere

for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers.’ ”68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding
therein retains significance for our purposes:
“The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his
civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are,
broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal
to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of
himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its
69 “Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate
their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel’s premises—be it stressed that their consensual
sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.
(See Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004) Adults
have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the
right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the
law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the
beginning of all freedom—it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.” City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at pp. 337-338.
441identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental
powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.”70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There
are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire
families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in
their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate
purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of
comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal
drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 84
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc,  the exercise of police power is subject to judicial
review when life, liberty or property is affected. 73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away
from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the COMELEC resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates,
this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places
frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of
Section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all
susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime
home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city—the Pearl of the Orient—as a
modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of
the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its
problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted
by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring
a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of
the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the
Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to
protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as
Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role
of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is
conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 85

long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different
interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that “you cannot legislate morality” is
ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately
interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public
attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and
as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-
wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the
fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration
on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make
the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges
themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by
reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are
entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance,
that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And
while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna,
Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura  and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ.,  concur.
Carpio  and Peralta, JJ.,  On Official Leave.
Brion, J.,  On Sick Leave.
Petition granted, judgment reversed. That of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 9 reinstated.
Note.—Unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially private matters is
moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society: individualism. Every
member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the
right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, ‘to do his thing.’ As long as he does not prejudice
others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. Proper care should attend the exercise
of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the
individual. The so-called ‘general welfare’ is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official
arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the
individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. (Villacorta vs.
Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986])
——o0o——

Beltran vs. Secretary of Health

G.R. No. 133640. November 25, 2005.*
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON
BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business
under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business
under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing
business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES;

EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK,
in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, respondent.
G.R. No. 133661. November 25, 2005.*
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, respondent.
G.R. No. 139147. November 25, 2005.*
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON
BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business
under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business
under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing
business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES;
EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style,
RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, respondent.
Health; Blood Banks; The National Blood Services Act of 1994 (R.A. No. 7719); Delegation of
Powers; In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other
appointee or delegate of the Legislature; The National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself—it
is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of
the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective; Congress may validly delegate
to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies.—In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the
administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail
that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures
to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law
has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out
its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood
through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the
Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may
validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has been given, under
Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion
as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law—the first cannot be done; to the latter no
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 86
valid objection can be made.—Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out
period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on
the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” This power
to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of
extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to
make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; Requisites; Class Legislation; What may be
regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No
rule that will cover every case can be formulated.—What may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can
be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The classification made by the National Blood Services Act of 1994
between nonprofit blood banks or centers and commercial blood banks is valid and reasonable. —Based
on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between
nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and
reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates
for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also,
while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of
commodity. Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood
by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks
based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from
paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the
USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. Three, the Legislature intended for the
general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the
situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all
commercial blood banks without exception.
Same; Same; Same; Police Power; Requisites; The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State—the health of the people is a primordial governmental concern; In serving the
interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it
necessary to phase out commercial blood banks—this action may seriously affect the owners and
operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the public.—The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the
National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote
and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the
State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the earlier discussion, the Court has
mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by ensuring an adequate

supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires
the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system. In
serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed
it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and
operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
Same; Same; Same; Non-Impairment Clause; Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government—the right granted by
this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation; The
concern of the Government in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms
—in the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation. —The
State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government,
the rights of the individual may be subordinated. Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must
submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court understands
the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case,
however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The freedom to contract is not absolute—all contracts and all rights
are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the
general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience
may demonstrate the necessity.—The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established
by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of
Agrarian Relations where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give
way to police power exercised for public welfare.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; The wisdom of the Legislature in the
lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court—doing so would be in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers; Between “is” and “ought” there is a far cry.—As for
determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the
wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the
Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers. That, under the
circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective
of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the
law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.
Courts; Contempt; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude,
a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court. —With regard to the petition for contempt in
G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation
satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the
Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law. Contempt of court presupposes a
contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court. There is nothing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 87
contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that were
distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist
from distributing the same.
Same; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality—for a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and the ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.—The
fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must
be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation,
considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Mandamus and Contempt.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Justinian E. Adviento and Oscar C. Maglaque for petitioners.
     Morales, Sayson & Rojas for Doctors’ Blood Bank Center.
     The Solicitor General for respondents Secretary of Health and Department of Health.
     Jimenea and Associates Law Office for intervenors.
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719, otherwise known as the “National Blood Services Act of 1994,” and the validity of Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.
G.R. No. 133640,1 entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health ” and G.R. No. 133661,2 entitled “Doctors
Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health” are petitions for certiorari and mandamus, respectively,
seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory
injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and commanding
the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners’ license to operate free standing blood banks
(FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.3
G.R. No. 139147,4 entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady
of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health,” on the other hand, is a petition to show cause
why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R.
Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.5
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood
Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks.
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly
involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question.

The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2,
1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May
15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect
on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health
(DOH).6
Section 7 of R.A. 77197 provides:
“Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks.—All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over
a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2)
years by the Secretary.”
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
“Section 23. Process of Phasing Out.—The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial
blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the
effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review
of the blood supply and demand and public safety.”8
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories:
blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private
hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the
Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories.” The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.
The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to
regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was
created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure requirements for blood banks as
well as clinical laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was
issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which
was characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such
suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with blood
banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial difficulties
constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks.9
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified
when the dreaded disease Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In
1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood
Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an
infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy outlining certain principles
that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS
testing of blood and blood products for transfusion.10
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative
Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on
the services they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this classification. For instance,
floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The new guidelines likewise required
Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.11
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 88
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood
Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the
NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the
program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled “An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation,
Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes” was introduced in the Senate.12
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being
deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Sub-
sequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently
consolidated.13
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood
banking system entitled “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System.” It was
revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4% were supplied by commercial blood banks,
14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-
based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered or
licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind,
the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five times more blood than the Red Cross
and fifteen times more than the government-run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the
Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the
donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are
paid donors. Paid donors are those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of
the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary.14
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are
three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible
diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than
those donated to PNRC.15
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of this
arrangement, many of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately.
Since they need the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history.
Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social history are about
three times much safer than blood from paid donors.16
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the
specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and
do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not
matter to them where the blood comes from.17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood
banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial
blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the
Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition
for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled “Rodolfo S.

Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank,” docketed as G.R.
No. 133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal
provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1995, on the following grounds:19
1. 1.The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules
violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood
banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of the law;
2. 2.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules
represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and,
3. 3.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before this
Court entitled “Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health,” docketed as G.R. No. 133661.20 This
was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.21
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing
rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks
beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the
following questions22 for resolution:
1. 1.Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?
2. 2.Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?
3. 3.Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
4. 4.With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the
same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated
comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent
to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its
implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court.23
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the petitions
for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.24
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial
blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close down
commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No.
1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando
Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of
Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood banks.
So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 89
“ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE
SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE
NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE
SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.”
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System.” This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance
of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying
and selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very
heart of my amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of
commerce of man.
...
The Presiding Officer Senator Aquino: What does the sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a
commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on
Section 3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and
engages in the buying and selling of blood or its components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
...
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of
Staff, Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health. In
recommendation No. 4, he says:
“The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the
Department of Health enough time to build up government’s capability to provide an adequate supply of
blood for the needs of the nation. . .the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale
of commodity.”
Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in
making the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a
hospital that does not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their
relatives or have to get volunteers who would donate blood. . .
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut
corners because it will protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk
category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national
voluntary blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
“Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment
for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as
sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive
drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are
required only for four diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not
yet screen for and there could be others where there are no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his
expenses. Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper

manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have
infections in them. Because there is no existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner
can usually get away with many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated
blood was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They
were protecting their profits.25
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:
...
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak
Filipinos, who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a
commercial blood bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their
age, their medical history. They will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will
receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the
next bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood
will now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this
buying and selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient.
Patients come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient
comes in for an appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for
a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane
dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it. . .
For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests
among medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive
system for collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe
blood and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen for
the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the
patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will
be no blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood.
We cannot allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a
humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work because their interest in blood donation is merely
monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only
the Government can do it, and the Government must do it.”26
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for
the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of
commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only,
and committing similar acts “that will ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners’ blood banks.”27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion
stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had
likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that
“blood banks are closed or will be closed.” According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed
and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No.
7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO.28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 90
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public
respondent’s willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said
case. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining
order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of justice. 29 Petitioners
added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in
his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading information
under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating, among others,
that “this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will
have to rely on government blood banks.” 30 Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of
Health announced in a press conference during the Blood Donor’s Week that commercial blood banks
are “illegal and dangerous” and that they “are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the
basis that their commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people.” These were all
posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other
medical and health centers.31
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should
Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by
the department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets
pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the
Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998.32 Public respondent further claimed
that the primary purpose of the information campaign was “to promote the importance and safety of
voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from
commercial blood banks.”33 In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as
the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main
proponent of the voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly
Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary
blood donation shall be promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional
education, establishment of blood services network, and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the
program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood
voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor
promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the commercial
businesses of petitioners.34
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens,
a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the
issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals
who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time.35
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers
and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.36
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned
petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August
9, 1999.
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale of
blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that “blood donation is a humanitarian act” and “blood
transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of
Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even
penalized under Section 12.”37

Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions
raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661
as summarized hereunder:
I blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER;
II
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
III
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;
V extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,
VI
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention
of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because
it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was
incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the
Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the
two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of
commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus
constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or
delegate of the Legislature. 38 Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 91
Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.39
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from
the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people
and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial
Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a
safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred
the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.40 The Secretary of Health has
been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11
of the Act states:
“SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations.—The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in
accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days
from the approval hereof. . .”
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body’s authority
and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order No. 9 effectively filled in the
details of the law for its proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the result
of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” This power to
ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of
make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.41
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said
phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
“SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of
the state:
1. a)to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
1. b)to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service
and not a sale of commodity;
2. c)to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood
products; d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards
caused by the commercial sale of blood;
3. e)to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects
of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal
system;

4. f)to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-
profit collection of blood;
5. g)to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion
Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply
of blood;
6. h)to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and
providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from
patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-governmental
entities;
7. i)to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;
8. j)to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and
blood banks/ centers in the Philippines;
9. k)to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and
banking of blood; and,
10. l)to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to
control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.”
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal
protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates
against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the
law.42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily
determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily
or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the
class.43
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of
public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe,
and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and
syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the
study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who
are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or
social history during the blood screening.44
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the
importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from
healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to
improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood,
and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the government.
In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to
professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.45
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which
unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was
made between nonprofit blood banks/ centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification
to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 92
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons
and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages
voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the
purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than
a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who
are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on
the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely
to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing
conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719
constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise
of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.46
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection
of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood
donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of
the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature
deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners
and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary
and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.47
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be
unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the
freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be
outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification,
petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart,
the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human
blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human
organs would constitute invalid classification.48
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous
to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health
institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment
clause provided by the Constitution.

As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.49
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,50 settled is the
rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State’s power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in
question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government
regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the
police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the
necessity.51 This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian
Relations52 where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to
police power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the
general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we
maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be
inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.53
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to
achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be
arguing on what the law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a
far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.54
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court
finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters
were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the
law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in
defiance of the court.55 There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained
in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering
the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of
the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to
be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The
ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 56 Those who petition this Court to declare
a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition
must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a
wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.57
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 93
1. 1.In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
2. 2.In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court
is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Garcia, JJ., concur.
     Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
Petitions in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 dismissed, validity of Section 7, National Blood Service Act
of 1994 (RA No. 7719) and Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7719 (Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 1995) upheld. Petition in G.R. No. 139147 denied.
Notes.—The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is subject to the police power
of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting public health, morals, safety and welfare.
(Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 296 SCRA
108 [1998])
The phrase “affected with public interest” means that an industry is subject to control for the public
good, and has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power.”
Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away their
police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation. (Del Mar vs. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485 [2000])
When the government temporarily takes over a business affected with public interest pursuant to
Article XII, Section 17 of the Constitution, it is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of
the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary, and the private
entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of
said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in the exercise of its
police power and not of its power of eminent domain. (Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 612 [2003])
——o0o——
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 94

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs.

Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO,FLORENCIO PADRIGANO,RUFINO, ROXAS,MARIANO DE LEON,ASENCION
PACIENTE,BONIFACIO VACUNA,BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.

Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a democracy.—In a

democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as
an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.—The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.—The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates
insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse
to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
Same; Same.—The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as
well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.—While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms
are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position. —In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such "priority
gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property rights disclosed.—The
superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose—that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice
Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It
should be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas, Black and
Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as
of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief Justice Vinson is
partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.—whether the gravity
of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to
avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration against police abuses did
not violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.—Tested against the foregoing principles, the conclusion
of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioners by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969
before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer,
herein private respondent firm. Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees against police abuses.
—As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its
members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein respondent firm to
rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work
free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of collective bargaining
agreement.—As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 95
of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization—becomes Our Duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce
economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by any court.—The
mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers,
even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to a particular shift
may join demonstration.—The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift
from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted.
This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor
union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum persuasive force that will gain for them not only
public sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third,
then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At any rate,
the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company
could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of
the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ... There was a lack of human
understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a
ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is
gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration against police abuse
guilty of unfair labor practice.—Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for redress of grievances,
the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3
of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual aid or protection"; while Section
4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The insistence on the part of
the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the
mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means not such loss was sustained.
—While the respondent Court found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations
of the complainant company," the said court did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually
sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only means that the firm did not sustain any loss
or damage.

Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of leaders of demonstration
against police abuses constitutes denial of social justice.— Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor xxx". Respondent Court as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate
that said court failed to implement this policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void.
—Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot prevail over basic
constitutional rights.—Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two days late
defeat the rights of the petitioning employees for their reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic
tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules
and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of
the constitutional right over the aforesaid court procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Same.—It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a
creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even
before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said
charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic
law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a CIR rule which impinges on such human rights.
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.—It is an accepted principle that the
Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion
in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under this authority, this Court is
enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square
with the need to do justice..." If we can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to
the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.—The suspension of the application
of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of C.A.
103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms."
PETITION FOR REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     L.S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J. C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
     Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 96
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage
a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those
in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the
respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties—
1. "3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration
at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the
regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4,
1969;
2. "4.That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthus L. Ang, (2)
Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
1. "5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
2. "6.That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of
the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
3. "7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March
3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all
workers may join the Malacanang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of
March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work;
and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning

that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The
union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacanang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
"8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company
which was received 9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH
4, 1969.' " (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec)
. reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for
the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969,
with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first
shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' "
(Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and
Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated
April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan
(Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing
CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech
against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34,
rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.);
and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to
law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.).
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent
Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September
17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27,
1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64,
rec.).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 97
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October
11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28,
1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969
and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on
time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner
Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and
clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969,
herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp.
88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the
case at bar.
1. (1)In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent
in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2
2. (2)The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw
"certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.  One's rights
to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski
proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by
which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was
entitled to exercise."5
1. (3)The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the

majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one
are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.7
2. (4)The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration
of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
1. (5)While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;10 and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose—that
the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion
of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong
vs. Ferrer.13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices
Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan,14 believes that the freedoms of speech and
of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed,"15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests
test.16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
of work," herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested
by the foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 98
was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their
civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses.
As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union
and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they
can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace
for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the
local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the
more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution—the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer
that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended
loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality—abused, harassed and persecuted
as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired
or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being—broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit—can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing
salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights has been sustained.18 Emphatic reiteration of
this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization—becomes Our duty, if freedom and
social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that
can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty x x x to observe
regular working hours." The strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the

workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as
the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of
a temporary stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the
complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to
generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of
the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local
police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression.21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-
third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The
more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the
absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their
ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the
Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company
could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of
the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union
reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of
the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on
the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order
to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration
held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition
for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-
1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section
3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for x
x x mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guraranteed in Section
Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses,
denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a
common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the
part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in
the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech."22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least equal protection as
the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank
employees.23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come
within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 99
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests.24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court
dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their
one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses.
But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers
proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that
day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to
deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the
form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by
reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of
the Constitution imposes upon the State "the pomotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section
6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor x x x". Respondent
Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning
and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of

their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court
of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy
and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission—its raison d'etre—as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.
V petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction;
and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain
the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even after the
accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years.27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated
the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and
protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a mere
procedural rule promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative
power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these
human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration.
It is a continuing immunity, to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there
are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best and dedicated counsel
who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services.28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of its order or writ
should be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion
shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As
above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation.29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on
September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that
they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights
of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply
with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered
by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 100
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution
and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1,
Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations rule insofar as circumstances of
the instant case are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based
on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and
facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to
file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on
October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such
supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners
received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp.
74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or
where the arguments in support of such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of reconsideration
becomes final and unappealable.29-a But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression,
free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived.
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the
very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the
dispute can be made.30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives
way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations,
a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even
before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said
charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is
a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights.30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules
or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr.
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo30-c reiterated this principle and
added that

"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of
time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this
Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are
spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error
of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction, We can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. It is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power
of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave
abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a
certain proceeding any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw
of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this
Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here
and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower courts for the sole
purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.)30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in this particular case at
bar would be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural niceties," which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be accorded supremacy over
the property rights of their employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially
when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has been demonstrated as having been inflicted
on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders
more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clashes with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It
should be stressed that the application in the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial
Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm, is unreasonable and therefore such application
becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the
light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms x x."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo,
speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et al.,30-e thus:
"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold
that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and
power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision, the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary
courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties  but may issue such
orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling
any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No. 46496, Feb. 17,
1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 101
provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous
ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence.x x x x (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)." (italics supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is
to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert and competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because
their counsel—erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969,
instead of September 22, 1969—filed his motion for reconsideration on September 29, 1969, which
practically is only one day late, considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased to be instruments
of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on
this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta,30-f stated:
"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor
decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano
v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided
as far back as 1910, 'technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.' (Ibid., p, 322.) To that
norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil.
124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never 'sacrifice
the ends of justice.' While 'procedural laws are no other than technicalities' to view them in their
entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts have been
organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization of the administration of the law and of
justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language of
Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice.' (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161
[1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they 'should give way to the realities of the situation.'
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point,
promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, L-24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968,
Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that
rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense'; but are intended 'to help secure
substantial justice.' (Ibid., p. 843).xx"30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal
or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did
not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who
participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of
the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed, and only the Union
itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice
charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-
30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employees participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in
the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm
continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty—if it deserves any penalty at all—should have been simply to charge said
one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages
for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal

blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the
localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
"The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of government, but from men of goodwill—good men who allow their proper concerns to blind
them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
"x x The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is
that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppressor be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
"x x The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
"x x In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
"x x But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we
belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of
fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe.31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than
to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of
local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the
respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and simple
selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter x x x to the
Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment
and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice
Castro, We ruled:
"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter
acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected
for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act x x x).
This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
XX      XX     XX     XX     XX
"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xx     xx     xx     xx     xx
"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel
in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is
not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 102
discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960)
is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by
interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 [1941]).
XX     XX
xx     xx     xx     xx     xx
"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action,  and/or as a refusal
to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section
4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act." (Italics supplied.)33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all
the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not
against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. (1)setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
2. (2)directing the reinstatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the
date of their separation from the service until reinstated, minus one day's pay and whatever
earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
     Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
     Makalintal, C.J., took no part.
     Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
     Barredo, J., dissents.
     Antonio, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.
BARREDO, J.: Dissenting—
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts upon which the
decision under review is based. It is as follows:
1. "1.That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666
Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of respondent;
2. "2.That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor
organization, and the respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO or members
thereof;
3. "3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the

regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4,
1969;
4. "4.That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2)
Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. "5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
1. "6.That Management, thru Atty. C. S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of
the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
2. "7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company
represented by Atty. C. S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March
3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all
workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of
March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work;
and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: "NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning
that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The
union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
3. "8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company
which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH
4, 1969.' "
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur and in the process
paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company".(p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed with said court a
complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that:
1. "3.That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those in the first shift, in
violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement and without filing the necessary
notice as provided for by law, failed to report for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 103
2. "4.That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) sub-paragraph 6, in relation to Sections
13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining agreement." (Pars. 3
and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further committing the same and
its representatives namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod who are directly
responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status
as employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc." (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this decision on September
23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they were actually served therewith on September
22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated
October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days after they were
notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial
court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion
for Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for the filing
thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days
after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent private firm,
namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also
their arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of
Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of
October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts hereof is the decision
of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:
"August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
"August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in
support thereof.
"August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in support of its motion
to reconsider.
"August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion seeking
reconsideration.
"September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for reconsideration. Ground
therefor was that the arguments were 'filed out of time'.
"October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the present
petition with this Court.
"Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief (respondents did not file their brief), the
case is now before us for resolution.
1. "1.That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment—not merely an interlocutory order—
there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado's
overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the
Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees

Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining
Division or his representative to compute the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly
delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not
believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And the
report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very
terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the
decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough
in the implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-
8718, May 11, 1956).'
2. "2.But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no longer be
disturbed?
"CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question
in the affirmative.
"Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of the trial
judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the decision, subject
of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that the motion must be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the
same section commands that 'the movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of his motion for reconsideration'. Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that '(f)ailure
to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be'.
"Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the enforceability
thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether
the arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers
& Tenants Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion
to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes final. And so
also, where the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration although seasonably filed must
nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs.
Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the
motion for reconsideration is denied upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed
out of time, the order or decision subject of the motion becomes 'final and unappealable'.
"We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in the case
before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez
aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider—without arguments in support thereof—of August 12 was
filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments in support of the said motion were
submitted to the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15)
days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out of time—five (5) days late. And the judgment had
become final.
"3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which
to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition before this Court pleads that the
foregoing motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel' which would
not enable him to do so within the stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed
on August 27—five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
"The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the motion for
expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which is August 22.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 104
It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the
fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
"To be underscored at this point is that 'obviously to speed up the disposition of cases', CIR 'has a
standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting arguments'. That no-
extension policy should have placed petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit by
supinely, and relied on the court's generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments
only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the reglementary period had expired.
"Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect
denied the motion for extension.
"We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not review the same."
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been in any way modified,
much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but
also to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an exposition of the
constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so
scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the
light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual
freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most
valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the
subject matter is unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with
substantive and procedural due process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed
in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as niceties, but as far as I know,
this principle is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible
denial of due process. I have not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited in the well-
documented main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside
upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless
such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any judicial precedent or
reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally
established and accepted as an absolute rule, that "a violation of a constitutional right divests the court
of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that
"relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is
correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres,2 which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple
reason that in both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was
compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied
his request to be allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's
evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far cry from the
one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend
that in denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and
private firm trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities . . .," contrary to the statement to such

effect in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of
petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the
respondent court as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
"Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent
Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by your petitioners.
"Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court
to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court."
"x     x     x     x     x.
"The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and narrow technical
rules of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and substantial merits of the case."
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in their brief runs
thus:
"III
ISSUES
"1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
"Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that the union was
guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly responsible therefor?
"2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act one way or
another on the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petitioner union guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such conclusion is contrary
to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
"As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and petition the duly
constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and then condemned
of bargaining in bad faith.
"The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne out by the
records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and which the
respondent company tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a
violation of the provisions of the 'no-lockout—no strike' clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
However, this allegation and proof submitted by the respondent company were practically resolved when
the respondent court in the same decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a
strike. We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' (Italics supplied, p. 4, 5th
paragraph, Decision.)
"The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith is not tenable
because:
"First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 105
"Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent company convened
twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested that the employees
and workers be excused but the respondent company instead of granting the request or even settling
the matter so that the hours of work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of
mass dismissal;
"Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that the first shift
shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith because the
company knew that the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go
and lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be stated that the company intends to prohibit
its officers to lead and join the demonstration because most of them belonged to the first shift; and
"Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will practically give
the union the right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a conclusion of facts,
opinionated and not borne by any evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically change the
terms or conditions of employment because it was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
before it went through. We can even say that it was the company who bargained in bad faith, when
upon representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company
tacitly approved the same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP
Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
"Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated in the
demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed from the union
thus losing their status as employees of the respondent company. The respondent court should have
taken into account that the company's action in allowing the return of more or less three hundred ninety
two (392) employees/members of the union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8)
officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R. No.
L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the court, while there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it will
change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and
above the constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as
provided for in Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it will appear that the rights of
the union is solely dependent upon the CBA.
"One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in proceedings before the Court of
Industrial Relations is that 'the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.' (Interstate Commerce Commission
vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know and
meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
"The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of evidence to support the
findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the
dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law."
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1. "1)That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and consequently lost their status as employees of the respondent company did not meet the
meaning and comprehension of 'substantial merits of the case.' Bargaining in bad faith has not
been alleged in the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the hearing of the case.
The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under the facts and circumstances
alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by the petitioners
amounted to on 'illegal strike' and therefore in violation of the 'no strike—no lock out' clause
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit,

that the respondent court had altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does
not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of
the charges against them. Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own
findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having 'bargained in faith.' The
stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as 'non-siquitor';
2. "2)That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble peaceably to air
grievances against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is subject
to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental
rights of the petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the provision in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the constitutional provision
would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken into
consideration in the deliberation of the case by the respondent court;"
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any issue of due process.
They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground.
True it is that they fault the respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement herein involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they
allege or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a
nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere
error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to
roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental
law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question,
when that specific issue has not been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair
and unjust, for the simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the
opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of jurisdiction by
finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the
complaint was for having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional
color. Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving
preferential importance to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management
and proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm—still, We cannot rightly hold that such
disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed
by law; litigations would be endless; no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would
become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future".3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation, construction or
application of a constitutional precept, not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any
difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned
violation of an ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or misapplied constitutional injunction affecting
his individual freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for
the more paramount considerations that inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare
say this must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion does not cite any
constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that
infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction
to render valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities vs. Secretary of Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that "it is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 106
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically
raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the
petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued the
constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the erroneous
resolution by a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders its
judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or
decision has become final and executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the
views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his
well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to
stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with petitioners under the
authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the
1935 Constitution of the Philippines6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) (e) of the
1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to Us to review
decisions of lower courts involving questions of law (and these include constitutional issues not affecting
the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only
in the manner provided in the law or the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise
appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be, there must first
be a showing of compliance with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing
appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a
judgment of the industrial court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and
authority to review, much less alter or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect
of jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely whether or
not We should pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be
sure, could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather, the real
problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated
earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by
the main opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its four-square
applicability to the facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of the failure
of the petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but even their argument supporting the
same within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against them) has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and enforceability of their
judgments are made contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that
in truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always dependent upon combined opinion
of the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members
themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful
administration of justice than the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want
of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside or
reopened in instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments
once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence
of fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and
executory judgments may be set aside,9 and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive
period.10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Tho vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against

any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
"x x x. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were
instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time
limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge
were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after
term, to bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely
and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might become more intolerable
than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil.,
257.)."
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles, L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41
SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the
correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar,
I said then:
"The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention. Neither am I
overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling
that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to
emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and
binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of maintaining
faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I
am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I
believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge
Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have
been, and, by this opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view, is the
true and correct meaning and implications of the decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's."
The main opinion calls attention to many instances, precisely involving cases in the industrial court,
wherein this Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to
accord substantial justice to the parties. I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by
me. I am certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already
final and executory. It is too obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference to any precedent
or authority that the principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may
be considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy and cannot,
therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently bent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the main opinion
goes far as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions
for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations Rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have
the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not
a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as
circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 107
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed
objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical
view of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
"MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
"Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the date on which he
receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified
under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof,
personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies,
duly verified under oath.
"Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments supporting the same.
If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon notice to the Court, the
movant shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.
The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the
arguments submitted by the movant.
"Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the
arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for
resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary to hear oral arguments, in which case
the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to that effect.
"Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion
for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be.
(As amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.)."
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted with proceedings in
the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than
a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a
brief statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the
same by making the necessary exposition, with citations of laws and authorities, in the written
arguments to be filed ten (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has the effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree with the judgment due to
fundamental defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to
apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to be sought, and
thereby enable the parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation,
in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must be borne in mind that cases in the industrial
court may involve or affect the operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems might
require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and all concerned that the attitude of
each party at every important juncture of the case be known to the other so that other avenues for
earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In
fact, the motion filed by petitioners was no more than the following:
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
"COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most respectfully moves for
the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground
that the same is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the
above-entitled case.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 108

"Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective arguments within ten neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L 4039, 29 January
(10) days pursuant to Sections 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court. 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be admitted. judgment as to be a grave abuse of discretion." (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
"Manila, September 27, 1969."
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to me simply For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present
incomprehensible. What is worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken the trouble of giving case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
an explanation of their inability to comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to
days in filing their written arguments in support of their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
delay is that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to SEPARATE OPINION
do what they were instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as I shall explain anon,
"is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural
TEEHANKEE,J., concurring:
requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality
abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer company, as
of judgments are in a sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation
against the latter's insistence that the first shift1 should not participate but instead report for work, under
they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular
pain of dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual
judgment concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of
petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass demonstration.
jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character. Moreover,
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint of bargaining in
because they have the effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said
bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding
rules partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the twin
that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent
predicates of prescription are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period.
employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union officers, manifestly constituted grave abuse of
On the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment,
discretion in fact and in law.
particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since respondent firm
lost by prescription, and he has no reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must
conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution"
be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
and the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles to the case of
first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining agreement's "no-strike"
this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to
clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass
whether we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly one that is not under our supervisory
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the
jurisdiction, being an administrative agency under the Executive Department. Withal, if, in order to
protagonists, but merely "the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to
hasten the administration of substantial justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its reserve
exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
power to amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has never done it for the purpose of reviving a case
grievance against alleged police excesses.
in which the judgment has already become final and executory.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred in their petition, in a belated effort to
been filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to
salvage their cause, petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a petition for relief
the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a
alleging that their failure to file their "Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration" within
manifest act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse
the reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and
consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such negligence—which was
honest mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union and of the office clerk of the
not acted upon by respondent court—should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice
counsel for respondents as shown and attested in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, K-1, and
that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment,
K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of the said President's having forgotten his appointment with his
simply because they sought in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the
lawyer "despite previous instructions" and of the said office employee having also coincidentally
Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the oneday stoppage of work
forgotten "to do the work as instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was too busy with
was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its insistence on
clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked by these allegations, for, under probably more justifying
dismissal of the union leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration
circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation in a previous case this wise:
against its wishes was but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
"We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his fail ure to
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the constitutional
perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to
injunction to afford protection to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be
hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail
deprived of such basic rights without due process—which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of
to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
this kind of commonplace excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are

avoided . . . Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness."2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court and concur in
the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Judgment set aside and directing the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners.
Notes.—The rule is that the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly
excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed (Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-25389, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1105; National Development Company
vs. Unlicensed Crew Members of Three Doña Vessels (PMIU), L-25390, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1105).
It has also been held that as a matter of principle the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act granting
freedom to employees to organize themselves and select their representatives for entering into
bargaining agreements, should be subordinated to the constitutional provision protecting the sanctity of
contracts. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Victorias Manapla Workers Organization PAFLU, L-18467, Sept.
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 154).
No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.*
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN
C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC
refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication.—After a careful study of this
provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion,
we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Same; Same; The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed
with.—lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
Same; Same; For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws"
refer not only to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws;
administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the
Central Bank Act; but not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 109
internal operations only.—The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does
not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Same; Same; Same.—We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Same; Same; Same.—Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Same; Same; Same.—Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Same; Same; Same.—Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding
that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after
a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Same; Same; Local Governments; Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not
covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed
by the Local Government Code.—However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say,
the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all. —We agree that
the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in
which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Same; Same; Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere.—At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of
a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to
the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the

political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we
have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days
from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
Same; Same; Laws must be published as soon as possible.—We also hold that the publication
must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said
Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication
as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
FERNAN, J., concurring:
Statutes; The requirement of prior publication seeks to prevent abuses by the lawmakers and
ensure the people's right to information.—The categorical statement by this Court on the need f or
publication bef ore any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers
and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information
on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; To interpret Art 2, NCC literally so as to authorize a statute to be
effective upon its promulgation without publication is to make it collide with the due process clause. —A
statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as
provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of
publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by
the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable
by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical
governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental
principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.
Same; Same; Specification by law that the Official Gazette shall be the organ where statutes must
be published before they take effect may be amended to authorize publication in other newspapers. —At
the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil
Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the
Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional
problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute
is in fact enacted. Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 110
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ha ve no
binding f orce and eff ect.''
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.1 Specifically, they ask the f ollowing questions:
1. 1.What is meant by '' law of public nature'' or " general applicability"?
2. 2.Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. 3.What is meant by "publication"?
4. 4.Where is the publication to be made?
5. 5.When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.2
In the Comment3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein
was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official
Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the
supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or f or particular persons
did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court.5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that
a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would
be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may af fect bef ore they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It
is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements, The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enf orce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inf
orm the public of the contents of the laws, As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention
of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 111
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.7 The evident purpose
was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as
long as the people were sufficiently informed.9 One reserved his vote10 and another merely
acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to
lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind
of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we
have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive,
for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need
to examine at this time. Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a
request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work
of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, J., I concur. I add a few observations in a separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., I concur. Please see separate opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
FERNAN, J.:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I
took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated
and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the
law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the
whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days,
it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number,
although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing
number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then
President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner.
This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeff rey Moore and Dennis George Still.
The categorical statement by this Court on the need forpublication before any law may be made
effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.
CONCURRING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the
same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as
provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of
publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by
the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable
by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical
governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental
principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil
Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the
Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional
problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute
is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 112
All laws shall immediately upon their approval, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from publication.
——o0o——
No. L-44143. August 31, 1988.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
Statutory Construction; Vague Statutes: A vague statue is one that lacks comprehensible
standards that men of “Common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.—As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Statutes; To be declared null and void, an act must be
utterly vague on its face i.e. it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.—But the
act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
that had made it illegal for “three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.” Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at
all “because one may never know in advance what ‘annoys some people but does not annoy others.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; A “perfectly vague” act is to be distinguished from a legislation couched in
imprecise language.—Coates highlights what has been referred to as a “perfectly vague” act whose
obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise
language—but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased—in which case, it may
be “saved” by proper construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A “perfectly vague” act is to be distinguished also from a statute
which is apparently ambiguous, yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.—It must further be
distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities.
In Parker v. Levy, a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting,
specifically, “conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman”), the defendant, an army officer who had
urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and
murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted

military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that
his conduct was impermissible.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Managers” as used in Municipal Ordinance No. 4 of Pagbilao, Quezon
covers the actual operators of fishponds who finance their construction, etc.—In no way may the
ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very
provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes
within the term “manager.” He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds,
introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears
that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they
had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
Same; Taxation; Tax Ordinances; Dates of payment not ambiguous in Ordinance No. 15 and
Ordinance No. 12.—Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to
the claim that “the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three
years after the ‘approval of the fishpond’ by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the
fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals.”
Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable “after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date
said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries,” is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its
amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder “beginning and taking effect from the
year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964,” does not give rise to any ambiguity.
In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has
been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates—as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965 and
1966 is con-cerned—presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances
vague.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Law; Municipal Ordinance No. 4 is not an ex post facto measure since
it does not penalize acts or events occurring before its passage.—The next inquiry is whether or not they
can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: “Amendment No. 12
passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall ‘beginning
and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964,’ In other
words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior
thereto.” The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, “Municipal Ordinance
No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955.” Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No.
12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of
enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to
facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the original act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed.
Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be
said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant
amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty,
much less, a retrospective one.
Taxation; Local Governments; Statutes; Fishpond are not forest lands within the purview of RA
2264, the Local Autonomy Act.—The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of
Pagbilao to tax “public forest lands.” In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan,  we held that
local governments’ taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act
No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited
municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.) First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on
property, although the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds (“P3.00 per hectare”). Secondly,
fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. By definition,
“forest” is “a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large wood.”
(Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been
taxes on forest products.)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 113
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. 2.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of
Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having
committed the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their
constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event.
The facts are not disputed:
This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the
provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and
operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of
THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him as
fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of
repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
Contrary to law.
For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon—
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked in
his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in
the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes and the catching of fish.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I worked with the accused up to March 1964.
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon—
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused since
1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up
to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married—
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before I was
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit
B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter
demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not pay up to the
present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit

C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if
accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The
accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3,
E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were not
admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and general
manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
declared in substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at San
Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila and my family lives at
Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a
fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine
Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was
still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were
translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the ordinances. There
were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of
the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of
the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the
letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its
condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and
he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A,
4-B and 4-C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I
copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another
letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966,
Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I
received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the
same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he
said none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether
I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for
taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes
lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen
are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to
pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A,
6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court.
From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or
operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal
taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance
No. 12, series of 1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to
be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances
taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a
forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 114
that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being
operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period
covered by the taxes sought to be collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power
of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance
in question is ambiguous and uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest
land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No.
1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the
defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into fishpond and used as
such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in
question.1
The trial court2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance
No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal
Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
SO ORDERED.3
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS
AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO.
12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTIONS, AS AMENDED, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY
OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC
LANDS.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID,
CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER
NON-RESIDENTS.4

The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and
Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this
appeal, the salient portions thereof are herein-below quoted:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon,
shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum.5
xxx
Sec. 1(a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the
territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin
after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of
Fisheries.6
xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall
pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.7
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly “ambiguous and uncertain.” 8 The petitioner
contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of
“owner or manager.” He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of
payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment “after the lapse of
three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.” 9 Ordinance
No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues “beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964.”10
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
“of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” 11 It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that had made it illegal for “three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.”13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no
standard at all “because one may never know in advance what ‘annoys some people but does not annoy
others.’ ”14
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a “perfectly vague”15 act whose obscurity is evident on its
face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language—but which
nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrase—din which case, it may be “saved” by proper
construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against
such activities. In Parker v. Levy,16 a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military
Justice (prohibiting, specifically, “conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman”), the defendant, an
army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight
there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise
that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a
fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,17 a divided Court sustained an act of
Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing “the too early nomination of candidates,” 18 limiting the
election campaign period, and prohibiting “partisan political activities”), amid challenges of vagueness
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 115
and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an “enumeration of the acts deemed included
in the terms `election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ ” 19 that would supply the standards. “As
thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at
rest.”20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be prohibited
“is not clearly defined at all.”21 “As worded in R.A. 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire
spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political parties.” 22 He was unimpressed with the
“restrictions” Fernando’s opinion had relied on: “ ‘Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts
concerning the election’ and expression of ‘views on current political problems or issues’ leave the reader
conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance
(‘simple expressions of opinion and thoughts’) or the subject of the utterance (‘current political problems
or issues’).”23
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the “balancing-of-interests” test, 24 insofar as the statute’s
ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: “The rational connection between the prohibition
of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech
and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan
political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not
offend the Constitution.”25 In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor of State
authority at the “expense” of individual liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro’s separate opinion, the balancing test finds
a close kin, referred to as the “less restrictive alternative” 26 doctrine, under which the court searches for
alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for “less drastic means” 27 open to
the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel,28 legislation was
assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in
any case, a screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to identify
dangerous elements holding defense positions.29 In that event, the balance would have been struck in
favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said,
however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic
rights,30 or as in the Levy case, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which
the competence of the legislature is presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is
unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual
operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term “manager.” He does not deny the fact that he
financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed
laborers to maintain them.31 While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them,32 the
Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders
the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the
owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that
the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been
making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fisponds in question, and as the recipient of profits
brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He
cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that
“the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the
‘approval of the fishpond’ by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 116

started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or      Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortés, Griño-
individuals.”34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable “after the lapse of three (3) years starting Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries,” 35 is unequivocal about the date of      Melencio-Herrera, J., no part. Concurred in Court of Appeals decision under review.
payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability there-under “beginning and taking      Gancayco, J., on leave.
effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964,” 36 does not give rise to      Regalado, J., no part; did not participate in deliberations.
any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the Appeal dismissed.
appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates—as far as his liability for the years Note.—Rule that if words and phrases of Statute are not obscure or are unambiguous, meaning and
1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned—presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the intention of the legislature is determined from language employed. No room for construction when there
ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is is absence of ambiguity in words of a Statute. (Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 321.)
not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior ——o0o——
thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of
Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted
amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and
15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined
ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the
intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant
argues that they are: “Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the
payment of the imposed tax shall ‘beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964.’ In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage,
that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto.”37
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, “Municipal Ordinance No.
4 was passed on May 14, 1955.38 Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No.
12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of
enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to
facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had
prescribed.39 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable,
and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates
to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a
penalty, much less, a retrospective one.
The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax “public forest
land.”40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan ,41 we held that local governments’ taxing
power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local
Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing
percentage taxes on sales.)
First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based on the
area of fishponds (“P3.00 per hectare” 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have
held them to the agricultural lands.43 By definition, “forest” is “a large tract of land covered with a natural
growth of trees and underbush; a large wood.”44 (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed
on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest products.)
They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not
charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon
Lumber,45 but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264.46 They are what have
been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.
There is, then, no merit in the last objection.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

No. L-29646. November 10, 1978.*
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE
FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Local Governments; Taxation; A city ordinance of Manila which imposes a fee of P50.00 to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the City is a revenue measure.—The contention that Ordinance No.
6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no
merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit
from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or
disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character, the second
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee’s fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure.
There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment.
It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
Same; The fee off P50.00 imposed by a city ordinance of Manila on alien’s employment is
unreasonable because it failed to consider valid differences in situation among aliens required to pay it.
—The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification
should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount to P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether
he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive.
Same; A city ordinance which does not lay down any standard to guide the city mayor in the
issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee is null and void.—Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that
where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit
the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions
for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
Same; Constitutional law; A city ordinance which requires aliens to secure a mayor’s permit before
they can earn a means of livelihood in the City of Manila is void and unconstitutional.—Requiring a
person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in
a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within
its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 117
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Arca, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
     Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge
Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents,
declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is hereby
made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
Judge”1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
“AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE
EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS
OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT
FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 65374 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate
in any position of occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six
(6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and
imprisonment, upon conviction.5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797,
praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null
and void.6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the
ordinance declared null and void:
1. 1)As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537
is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;

2. 2)As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the
cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action
of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative
powers:
3. 3)It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution.7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17,
1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction.8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the
present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by
respondent Judge in the latter’s decision of September 17, 1968:9
“I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING
THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING
THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE
CONSTITUTION.”
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the
ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation
applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue
measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in
nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal
purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the
alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and
judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and
therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee’s
fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from
aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise
money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 118
should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether
he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose to be attained
by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se  lawful.10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a
government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme
Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an
arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or
controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse
permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not
uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide
the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Santos,  and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
     Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
     Fernando, J.,  concurring in the result, relies primarily on the ultra vires character of the
ordinance and expresses comformity with the concurring opinion of Justice Teehankee.
     Teehankee, J., concurs on a separate opinion.
     Concepcion Jr., J., did not take part.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court’s judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of
aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the
national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of
Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz,
the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 119

gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national
policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its
officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass’n. vs. Earnshaw , 59 Phil. 129:
“The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government . . . . . .). When the
Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set
at naught the action of the superior authority.” Indeed, “not only must all municipal powers be exercised
within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public policy
of the particular state. . .” (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, p. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our
foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in
such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those
of subordinate and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts
to the contrary.
Decision affirmed.
Notes.—The City can validly Tax the sales of matches outside the city as long as the orders for
matches are booked and paid for in the company’s branch office in the city. ( Philippine Match Co., Ltd.
vs. City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99).
An increase in the rate of tax alone would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust
and confiscatory; municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of
imposable license fees, even in cases of purely police-power measures. There must be proof of the
existing municipal conditions and the nature of the business being taxed, as well as other factors that
would be relevant to the issue of arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the questioned rates. ( Northern
Philippines Tobacco Corp. vs. Municipality of Agoo, La Union, 31 SCRA 304).
Persons selling in public markets are engaged in an occupation or business and a city can impose
upon market vendors or retailers fees designed to obtain revenue for the city, above or in addition to the
amount needed to reimburse it for strictly supervening services. (Chamber of Filipino Retailer, Inc. vs.
Villegas, 44 SCRA 405). [No. 45987. May 5, 1939]
The power of a municipal corporation to tax in order to exist, must be granted expressly, never THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CAYAT, defendant and
impliedly or inferentially. (Icard vs. City Council of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870). appellant.
The general welfare clause found in city charters cannot be used as legal basis or source of taxing
power. (Lacson vs. Bacolod City, 4 SCRA 1001).
Municipal power to tax should be strictly construed. (City of Ozamer vs. Lumapas, 65 SCRA 33.) 1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTY OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; LEGISLATION
The taxing power of municipal corporations was broadened by Local Autonomy Act of 1959. ( City of BASED ON REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.—It is an established principle of constitutional law
Bacolod vs. Enriquez, 65 SCRA 381). that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
Under the Local Autonomy Act a municipal ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between volume of reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (!) must rest on substantial
sales and amount of tax is a sales tax beyond a municipality’s power to enact. (Arabay, Inc. vs. Court of distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, 66 SCRA 617). existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The City of Manila has power to regulate and fix the license fees for slot machines which include juke
boxes, pinball machines and other coin-operate contrivances. (Morcoin Co., Ltd. vs. City of Manila , 1 1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-CHRISTIAN TRIBES.—Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
SCRA 310). classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is
not based upon "accident of birth or parentage" but upon the degree of civilization and
——o0o—— culture. The term "non-Christian tribes" refers, .not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to

meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of

certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—That the classification is germane to the purposes of law cannot be
doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits,
ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the socalled native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to
the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among
the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the
lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes
have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of
its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act
was not predicated upon the assumption that the nonChristians are "impermeable to any
civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a
people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and
security.
1. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—That the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a
perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its
application.
1. 7.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—To constitute due process of law, notice and
bearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. Due process of
law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its
operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a
class.
1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.—Neither is the Act an improper exercise of
the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and
least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power
coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure
intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to
increase the industries of -the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or
capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
1. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-
Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and,
eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.
Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 120
Philippines. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or
less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF "SALUS POPULI SUPREMA EST LEX.—In the
constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether
the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist,
the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the
measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon.
And, if in the application of the law, the educated. non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the
justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex.
1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS.—When the public safety or
the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons,
the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any
incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests
of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer
Co. vs. Mass., 97 U. S., 25; 24 Law. ed., 989).
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. Carlos, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant.
Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio,
Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of
five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal to the Court of First
Instance, the following information was filed against him:
"That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member
of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and
have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor,
other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639."
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the
information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted
the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to
pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now
before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

"SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian
tribe within the meaning of Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in
his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than
the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it
shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial,
municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in
the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
"SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court."
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
1. (1)That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
2. (2)That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution; and
3. (3)That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as
these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any
attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable race and less
entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is
questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised
in the light of the policy of the government towards the nonChristian tribes adopted and consistently
followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with
conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards
these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones"
(communities) had been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and
temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish
Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living
"in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community
life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General
of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period.
President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission 'of April 7, 1900, said:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs."
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of
determining ''those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in
the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in
accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior,
quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 121
firesides have been brought, in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and
communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even
the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has
passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate,
and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that
the Act must be understood and applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N. W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S., 61;
55 Law. ed., 369; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for
the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes'
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural
equality with their Christian brothers,
cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have
in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other
than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and
order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the
observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-
Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel
for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process
and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof.
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of nonChristians by reason of their degree
of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of
law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to
constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular
cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable
in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 122

and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class. (U. S. vs. Ling Su Judgment affirmed.
Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U. S., 302:54 Law. ed.,
1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial ____________
hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U. S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or
when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,
442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the
police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been
aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling
necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the
people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth. and
prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless
shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same
must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so
as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual- growth and, eventually, to hasten their
equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose
21
VOL. 68, MAY 5, 1939 21
People vs. Cayat
can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines,
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race."
On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest
upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by
their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no
equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the
non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world,"
as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and-coming people eager to
take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there 'are now lawyers, doctors and
other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the
multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a
source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as
to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the
prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this
court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the
power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under
existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority
to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer,
the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the
public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of
persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any
incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such
members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U. S.,
25; 24 Law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

No. L-23794. February 17, 1968.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS, as Mayor of Ormoc City
"and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
Constitutional law; Equal protection of law; Reasonable classification ; Requisites.—T he eq ual
protec tion c lause a only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 123
Same; Same; Same; Ta x ordinan ce sho uld no t be sin and exclusive. —When the taxing
ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. was the only sugar central in the City. A reasonable
classification should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not
be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central from the coverage of
the tax. A subsequently established sugar central cannot be subject to tax because the ordinance
expressly points to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Taxation; Tax; Refund of; No interest can be claimed; Reasons.—Appellant is not entitled to
interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected. There is sufficient basis to
preclude arbitrariness. The constitutionality of the statute is presumed until declared otherwise.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and
     Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-appellant.
     Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed1 Ordinance No, 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrif ugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc ., in
Or moc C ity a mu pal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries,"2
Payments fo r s aid tax were made, unde r protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20 , 196
4 f or P 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000 , o r a to ta P12,087.5
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, In c. f iled be- fore the Court of First Instan ce of Le yte,
with s of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity
of taxation (Sec. 22 [1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a
license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to
a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the
tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to
enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional
limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on
August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the
taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other
forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges
the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal s ugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporate d , in Ormoc C Ity, a
m uni cipal tax e qui val ent centum (1%) per sale to the Un ited S tates of America and othe r  fore
ign countr ies." Though referr tax: on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 124

Company, Inc, For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is whe n t In relation to equal protection of the laws, see also Rafael vs. The Embroidery and Apparel Control
sugar produced is exported. and Inspection Board, L-19978, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 336; Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Appellant questions the authorit y of the deffen dant icipal Board to levy such an expor t ta x , in vie Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693, Oct. 23,1967, 21 SCRA 449 (Resolution); Viray vs.
w of tion 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code whic h d nies from municipal councils the power to City of Caloocan, L-23118, July 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 791; and Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, 18
impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council SCRA 606.
to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out Aside from being declared unconstitutional, the municipal ordinance in the Ormoc Sugar Company,
of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an Inc. case subject of these notes was also held, in Ormoc Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc., L-23793,
unreasonable charge f or wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void." Feb. 23, 1968, post, to be violative of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4497.
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered
cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, ____________
licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas,  4 he ld the fo
rm er t o ha ve been re pea led by And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental ef- fects that
municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial
measures to f orestall any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Sec. 1[1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas,5 ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A .perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it
taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan) .6 At the time of collection, the ordinance
provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until
declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to ref und the P12,087.50 plaintiff-
appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
     Concepcion,
C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed.
Notes.—For other cases on the rule that a statute is an operative fact and, therefore, produces
effects before it is declared unconstitutional, see Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 and Manila Motor Co. vs.
Flores, 99 Phil. 738. The same rule has been applied with respect to an executive order (Fernandez vs.
P. Cuerva & Co., L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.*
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati
and Pasay, Metro Manila ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid,
JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, QUEZON
CITY and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President, REINATO
QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and
in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts
and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners, vs. HON. PETE PRADO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP.,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers,
the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress.—Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.)
The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid)
case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 125
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.—The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of
the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
ORIGINAL PETITION to declare the unconstitutionally of Republic Act No. 7354.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here
challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that
should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do
so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable
duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will
be prejudiced by the abovenamed measures . The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before
it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, that attack
against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I impossible.3 As has been correctly explained:
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing that “Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or “log-rolling” legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3)
to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith.”
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
1. a)to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender
to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
2. b)to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c)to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing
needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d)to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the
overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well
as the expansion and continuous upgrading of services standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition reads as follows:
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause.—All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice-
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 126
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to
be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its
execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170
Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: “The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith.”4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject
of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in
its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title
of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Articles VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as
follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers . They stress that Sec 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as
an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the
House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.) 8 The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs.
Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege
from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines; the Vice-President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census
and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National
Language; the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor);
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 127
the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors;
and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
separate clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor
to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of
the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees
been chosen pell-mell, as it were without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect,
however, that not enough care (or attention) was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable
that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the
major and equal departments of the government. The same observations are made if the importance or
status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed
by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of
justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial
revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between
the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show
that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of
this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of
judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00 and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents’

conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege
must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege
should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former
Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a
person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can
save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it
seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mails as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions
for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the
many advantages it enjoys under its charter, like exemption from taxes, customs and tariff
duties.14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail for certain
offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the tax exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege by the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of
judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts
of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial
process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative
and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is
allotted to the Judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they
have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 128
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees
of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that
it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law
as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall “be deprived of the
equal protection of the laws.”
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling
against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through
the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept. As judges,
we cannot even debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as the law imposes
on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds to
all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2,
1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Petition partially granted; Sec. 35 of RA No. 7354 declared unconstitutional.
Note.—The “equal protection” clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable arbitrary
(Basco vs. Philippine Amusements & Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52).
——o0o——
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 129

No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.*

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.

Public Utility; Due process; The BOT need not first summon taxicab operators to a conference on
public hearing before issuing circulars phasing-out more than 6-year old taxicabs.—It is clear from the
provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in
gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to
the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that
they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars.
Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may
be desired by the BOT.
Same; Same; Same.—Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is
neither violative of procedural due process.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Fixing by BOT of the lifetime ceiling of six (6) years to taxicab is
not unreasonable or arbitrary.—Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years
is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadwor-thiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition
should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public respondents contend, however, it
is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that
it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and
justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained.
They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public
specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of
eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the
requirement of due process has been met.

Same; Same; Same; Fixing lifetime of taxicab to six (6) years in Metro Manila due to heavier
traffic, safety and comfort of riding public is based on reasonable standards.— The Board's reason for
enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other

places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that
infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the
preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers possed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare
of society. It may also regulate property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Non-applicability of phase-out rule on taxis to other vehicles not violative of
equal protection clause.—In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the
same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly
situated, It permits of classification of the object of subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded
the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars
satisfy the foregoing criteria.
PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to review the order of the
Board of Transportation.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace
Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977,
of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau
of Land Transportation.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the
City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an
operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
"WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as
public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against,
and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety,
a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 130
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that
in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made
reasonable profit for his investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years
shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and
regulations:
1. 1.As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the
registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for
registration and allowed for operation;
2. 2.As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service
and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars
for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980—Model 1974
1981—Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public
service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be
surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation
Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be
effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro-Manila shall be carried out only after the
project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the
Board."1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular,
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances. To quote said Circular:
"Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now
banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be
considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further
dropping order from the BOT.
"Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall
be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of
all concerned:

"Year Model Automatic Phase-Out Year
  1980
1974 1981
1975 1982
1976 1983
1977  
etc. etc.
Strict compliance here is desired."2
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model
1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553,
seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were
phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying
for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented
testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit
additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners'
pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for
Resolution."3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion
to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than
December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under
the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1,
1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later
informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed
for consideration by this Court:
1. "A.Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the
manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners'
constitutional right to procedural due process?
2. B.Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed
by Presidential Decree No. 101,would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
1. (1)Equal protection of the law;
2. (2)Substantive due process; and
3. (3)Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 131
"4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service
to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles."
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its
powers:
"Sec. 2. Exercise of powers.—In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board
shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation
and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway
Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful
information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation
of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents,
information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this
Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry."
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that
they were not called upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any
conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a
wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or
program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position
papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the
options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably
claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with
certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the
challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and
information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of
procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA
307 (1972):
"Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection
of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in
consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event
which has to be established or ascertained. It is not'essential to the validity of general rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law
provides otherwise." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive
because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which
they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at
the time of registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every
taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the
adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard
must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years
supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they
are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 132

that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been to safeguards constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizens or a group of
met. citizens to abstract unreasonably the enactment of such salutory measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. (Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195.)
On Equal Protection of the Law: Municipal corporations allowed with discretion in determining the rates of improbable license fees
including police power measures. (Procter & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation vs.
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because Municipality of Jagna, Bokol, 94 SCRA 899.)
the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the
outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in ——o0o——
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
"For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be
effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the
project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the
Board."4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already
being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in
other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city,
compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This
is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration
is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The
State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety
and welfare of society.5 It may also regulate property rights.6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It
permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based
on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class.8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by
legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear,
categorical and undeniable.10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed, No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., in the result.

Writs denied and petition dismissed.

Notes.—The police power is a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the State and imposing upon its government limitations

No. L-78164. July 31, 1987 *
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in
their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the
school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
Constitutional Law; Writ of preliminary injunction issued only if a case of unconstitutionality is
strong enough to overcome presumption of constitutionality of statute or administrative order assailed.—
It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the
petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong
enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing
a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed.
Same; There must be substantial compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power.—ln the trial court, petitioners had
made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 133
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the
necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle
of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from and reinforces the more fundamental rule
of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government, must be
applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects
as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day
world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The
Public Service Commission: "One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of
separation of powers and that is the the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas
non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine,
Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law
(d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government,  giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the United States
and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318,
1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts." The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta—"The standard may be either
expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.  What is
sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe transit upon the roads.' " We believe and so hold
that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute
itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again,
petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary
requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of
1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical
schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or
desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority:
this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or
utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the political
departments of the government not to the courts.
Political Law; Legislative and administrative provisions of the statute that is impugned constitute
valid exercise of police power of the state.— There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments
must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the
Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the
important interests and needs—in a word, the public order—of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This

question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine
in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and
pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements—i.e., the completion
of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school—for admission to the medical profession, has also
been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us
in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development,
are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of
America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably in other countries with far
more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the f failure or inability of
the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful
to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 37.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT
and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 134
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"Section 1. Objectives.—This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." (Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the
Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly
authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative;
(e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine,
University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools;
and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of
the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
1. "(a)To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
2. (b)To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of
medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for out patient services, and others, used for didactic and practical
instruction in accordance with modern trends;
3. (c)To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including studentteachers ratio;
4. (d)To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of
Doctor of Medicine;
5. (e)To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that
has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act;
Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
6. (f)To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register
of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five
pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;'
1. (g)To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training
which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b)
hereof; and
2. (h)To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions." (Italics supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements.—The medical college may admit any student  who has not been convicted by
any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a
record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance
to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued
by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.

x x x      x x x      x x x" (Italics supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as
an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:
1. "2.The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection
of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality
of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on
the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education
after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under
existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility
for admission into the medical colleges.
1. 3.Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may
give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility
for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to
complement the information derived from the NMAT.
2. xxx      xxx      xxx
3. 8.No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or
admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school
year, 198687, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order." (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance
to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent
Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 19871988.
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and
administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing
a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome,
in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to
the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order
assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as f ollows:
1. (a)Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect of human rights."
2. (b)Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 135
3. (c)Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to
promote total human liberation and development."
4. (d)Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all."
5. (e)Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail
collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the
constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in
behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive
of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in
tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to
speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly
offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have
failed to demonstrate
that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note
—in anticipation of discussion infra—that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in
fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads
Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter
phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish
to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify
under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education. The general principle of nondelegation of legislative power, which both flows
from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the
three great departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes
which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical
education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47
years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is
that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this
practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol.
2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18.3) has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the prac-tice by the courts. "3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4—
"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe transit upon
the roads.' "5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act:
"the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act,
the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners
have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or
"inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when
added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other
admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or
private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither
commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or
administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs—in a word, the
public order—of the general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements—i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school—for admission
to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of
the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related:
the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates
the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 136
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT])11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS
Order which provides that
"the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges." (Italics supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than
that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the
MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different
cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those
years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of
places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the
current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a
permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may
well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being
arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to
meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
     Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortés, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed. Order affirmed.
——o0o——
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 137

G.R. No. 113811. October 7, 1994.*

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO
MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.

Philippine National Police; Preventive Suspension; Statutes; R.A. No. 6975; The suspension from

office of a member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or
more shall last until the termination of the case, and the suspension cannot be lifted before that time. —
The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It
gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with
grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the
case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the
same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does
not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to
the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The preventive suspension of the accused member of the PNP will
not be lifted even if the trial is not terminated within ninety (90) days.—Suppose the trial is not
terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer
is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within
ninety (90) days,” there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the
accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to
decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions
and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Speedy Trial; If the trial is unreasonably delayed, the accused may
ask for the dismissal of the case. —If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such
that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal
by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Service Law; The provisions of the Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the PNP insofar as the provisions, rules
and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975, and Sec. 42 of P.D. 807 which limits the preventive
suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975
provides differently.—Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly
shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in
criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to
ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that “The Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department” simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service

Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National
Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly,
Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot
apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 provides differently, that is, the suspension
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced as these cases
all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019, which is silent on the duration of preventive
suspension.— Petitioner’s reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from
charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The ninety-day duration mentioned in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 refers to
the trial of the case not to the period of preventive suspension.—ZIt is readily apparent that Section 13
of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based is
silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused
therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the
instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that
he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until
the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected
to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for
trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to
the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When the words
and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.—The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, and a distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.—The equal protection clause
exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based
on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal
protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant
case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the
law; applies to all members of the same class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. A
distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as
that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 138
PETITION for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional
Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and
the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder 1 and attempted
murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the
trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section
47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which
provides:
SEC. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.—Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated.  Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. (Italics ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, 3 relying on Section 42
of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and,
also, on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In his order dated
December 14, 19936 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.7 Hence, the petition for certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner’s
preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder
under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to
members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90
days, considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with
grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office
“until the case is terminated,” the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which
shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the
accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which
reads:
SEC. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of
the Department,
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which
limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
SEC. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.—When the
administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by
the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law
and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the
requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that “the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated” and the succeeding sentence, “Such case shall be subject to continuous trial
and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused” are both substantive
and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of
preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Himagan vs. People
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other.
The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial
should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the
phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days,” there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be
subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal8 or
civil liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of
his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should
the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows
that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in
criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to
ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that “The Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department” simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National
Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly,
Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot
apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 provides differently, that is, the suspension
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner’s reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges
in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which,
unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as
follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 139
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended
after an information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his
preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the “equal protection
clause” and shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not
expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of
suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance
or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this
instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal
action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be
justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question.
For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they
had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance
of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A
denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the
order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal
protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof:
“In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension.” It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary.
According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: “To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer
appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely,
would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself
without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the
Civil Service law.” Further: “In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be
shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due
hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution
frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is
facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To
do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.11
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who was preventively suspended as
provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual
circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case “in relation to the principles of due
process and equal protection.”
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the
accused in Layno and Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive
suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of
time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under

the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which
categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence
of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law
does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted.
The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension.
Nothing else should be read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says.12
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative
to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of
suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong ‘Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?’ What is this
all about?
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a
crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. ‘Preventive Sus-pension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing
of a com-plaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated.’
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29—Preventive Suspension.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin
at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan, e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. x x x
x x x      x x x
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa ‘Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.’ Okay ito but I think we should
also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba ‘the suspension of the
accused from office until the case is terminated?’ Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa
ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed
out, can run to six years bago ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we
should mandate . . .
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial  must be done within ninety days.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 140
SEN PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maaari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be
terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you
put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let’s have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that’s really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the
same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on having it
quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive
suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Himagan vs. People
which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman may be
anti-graft in nature . . .
SEN PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know anti-
graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let’s say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That’s
why it is in that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal
case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be already a
grave felony.
xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . . What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that’s too short, that’s what I am saying. The feeling here is, for
policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case. What Rene is just trying to say is,
he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated, but he just wants some
administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could be done along
that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. ‘Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . . .’
whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let’s study that. if there are any further amendments to
Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission. .....13
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of
the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of
imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 141

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his
case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition
of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as
the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial
differences;15 is germane to the purpose of the law;16 applies to all members of the same class;17 and
applies to current as well as future conditions,18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations
related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious
nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
     Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., On leave.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse of the
prerogatives of the office, intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the Sandiganbayan is not
bereft of remedies or sanctions. The accused may still be suspended but for specifically expressed
reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
(Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409 [1989])

——o0o—

G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.*
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; The “equal protection” clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate—
so long as the classification is not unreasonable.—It is settled in constitutional law that the “equal
protection” clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operate—so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held
in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, and reiterated in a long line of cases: The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation
of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
Same; In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers
(SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and executives—it was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-
file, and the resulting discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and
entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.—Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class. In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers
(SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-
file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-
file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not
palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on
the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by
the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.—That the provision was a product of amendments
introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947
and reiterated in subsequent cases, this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to
refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no
such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Same; Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality; A statute valid at one time may become void at
another time because of altered circumstances.—The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 142
instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in
its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.
Same; Same; Government Financial Institutions (GFIs); Salary Standardization Law (R.A. No.
6758); It is noteworthy that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share the common proviso
of a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly. —We
take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the
amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to
2004, viz.: 1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); 2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for
Social Security System (SSS); 3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation, (SBGFC); 4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); 5.
R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); 6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC); and 7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC). It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs
share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL,
expressly or impliedly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards of Review; Strict Scrutiny; Two-Tier Analysis; While the
prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, which was found reasonable because there were
substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes, subsequent enactments
involving the exemption of all rank and file employees of other GFIs constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.
—The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there
were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes. The above-mentioned
subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter
the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. The scrutiny relates to the
constitutionality of the classification—albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight
other laws—between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs.  The classification must not
only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class.  The proviso may be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The second level of inquiry deals with the
following questions—Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage
of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in
the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congress’ power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply
because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law
bounded in time and space?—Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following
questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the
SSL, can the exclusion of the rankand-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light
of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress’

power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the
inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively,
through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time
and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately,
as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b)
is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or
ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-à-
vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; In the second level of
scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests
“on a policy consideration by the legislature”—there is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy
determination by Congress or by the Executive as it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of
protection of the Constitution; The “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file and the offices of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs’ who are similarly situated; In the field of equal
protection, the guarantee includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination directly or indirectly.—In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot
be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests “on a
policy determination by the legislature.” All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy
determination—even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could
serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by
Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the
Constitution. In fine, the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs’ who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is
at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive
results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the
seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress
in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no
person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting
laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As regards the exemption from the coverage of
the SSL, there exists no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate the BSP rank-and-file from the
other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs—our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other government entities. —It is against this standard that
the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For
as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our
legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from
other governmental entities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that the rank-and-file employees of the
seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution’s mandate cannot stand any
more than an empty sack can stand.—It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant
or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need “ to fulfill the mandate of the
institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in
character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 143
not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining
competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were  [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up
plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of
exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding
variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental. ” The fragility of this argument is
manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority, and the banker of the government and all its
political subdivisions. It has the sole power and authority to issue currency; provide policy directions in
the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-
bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs. Hence, the
argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance
of their institution’s mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is patent that the classification made between the
BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and not intended, i.e., it was not
based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. —It is certainly
misleading to say that “the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution.” Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion
of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs
and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress
deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the
BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over
a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from
that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d’être of the SSL-exemption was inextricably
linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they
play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry
out the GFI’s mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not
competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the
first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish
between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP
rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not
based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the
exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to
those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs, underscoring
that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is precisely the unpremeditated discrepancy in
treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP—made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential
grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs—that cannot be rationalized or justified. If
Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the
SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or
material basis.—It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the
BSP—made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the
SSL to the other GFIs—that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC—which is
not a GFI—was given leave to have a compensation plan that “shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],” then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and
its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP. The violation to
the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable
truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the
coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any
substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a

direct result arising from one law. “Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum.”
No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which
BSP rank-and-file employees were denied—the distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but
also arbitrary.—In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC
getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other
GFIs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; While the granting of a privilege
per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or
legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review; The disparity in treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bear the
unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination.—It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is
a “privilege” fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the
rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached
the latter’s right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter
of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the
exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. So when the distinction made is superficial, and
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it
becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct. As held in the
United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,  once the State has chosen
to confer benefits, “discrimination” contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already
afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that
favorable treatment. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the
other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination—no one can, with
candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of
the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as
unalikes without any rational basis.
Same; Standards of Review; In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection
challenges in the main have followed the “rational basis” test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications.—In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in
the main have followed the “rational basis” test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.
Same; Same; International Law; The equality provisions in the international instruments do not
merely function as traditional “first generation” rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with
constraining rather than requiring State action—they imposed a measure of positive obligation on States
Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.—Most, if not all, international human rights
instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality. The general
international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the broader international context, equality is also
enshrined in regional instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights; the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 144
Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of
particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted
the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of
the League. The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional “first
generation” rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State
action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires “guarantee[s]” of “equal and effective protection against
discrimination” while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties
“to ensure . . . the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination” and
to “secure without discrimination” the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. These provisions impose a
measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; Two-Tier Analysis; The two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the
challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence
and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law.—Thus, the
two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive
trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal
protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our
society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and
protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The deference to Congressional discretion stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution, and when these violations arise, the Supreme Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations—rational basis should not suffice.—Congress retains its wide discretion in
providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the
courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Foreign Jurisprudence; Foreign decisions and authorities are
not per se controlling in this jurisdiction—at best, they are persuasive and have been used to support
many of our decisions—and we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard
them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the
employment of our own endowments.—Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this
jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We
should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own
interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own
concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own
lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other
local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public
interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public
interest is distinct and different from others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Activism; The quest for a better and more “equal” world calls
for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention. —Further, the quest for a better
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 145

and more “equal” world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention. Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble before it can pass muster.
proclaims “equality” as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The
command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in “all phases of national development,” PANGANIBAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
further explicated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the
Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality; From the manner in which it has been utilized in American
direction of greater equality . . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal
and Philippine jurisprudence, the novel theory of relative constitutionality finds relevance only when the
support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
factual situation covered by an assailed law changes, not when another law is passed pertaining to
Same; Same; Social Justice; Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
subjects not directly covered by the former.—The ponencia advocates the application of the theory
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege
of relative constitutionality to the present case. The theory says that a statute valid at one time may
in life should have more in law.—Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social
become unconstitutional at another, because of altered circumstances or changed conditions that make
and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice,
the practical operation of such a statute arbitrary or confiscatory. Thus, the provisions of that statute,
the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
which may be valid as applied to one set of facts but invalid as applied to another, cannot be merely
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford
compared with those applicable under the Constitution. From the manner in which it has been utilized in
protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
American and Philippine jurisprudence, however, this novel theory finds relevance only when the factual
judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and
situation covered by an assailed law changes, not when another law is passed pertaining to subjects not
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
directly covered by the former. Thus, the theory applies only when circumstances that were specifically
secular conception may at least be approximated.
addressed upon the passage of the law change. It does not apply to changes or alterations extraneous
Same; Same; Same; Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
to those specifically addressed.
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising
Same; A statute that is declared invalid because of a change in circumstances affecting its validity
its legislative power.—Concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
belongs only to a class of emergency laws; Unlike congested traffic or motor-driven vehicles on public
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress,
roads, the payment of salaries at differing scales in various GFIs vis-à-vis in the BSP, is not such a
which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing
change in conditions as would cause deprivation of property without due process of law. —With due
the exemption of the BSP rank and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most
respect, the ponencia’s reference to “changed conditions” is totally misplaced. In the above-cited US
circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
cases, this phrase never referred to subsequent laws or executive pronouncements, but rather to
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny
the facts and circumstances that the law or ordinance specifically addressed upon its passage or
would be based on the “rational basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
adoption. A statute that is declared invalid because of a change in circumstances affecting its validity
treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
belongs only to a class of emergency laws. Being a manifestation of the State’s exercise of its police
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial
power, it is valid at the time of its enactment. In contrast thereto, RA 7653 cannot be regarded as an
scrutiny ought to be more strict.  A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
emergency measure that is merely temporary in operation. It is not even a statute limited to the
Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines.
exigency that brought it about. The facts and circumstances it specifically addressed upon its passage
This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
have not been shown to have changed at all. Hence, the assailed provision of such a declaratory statute
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or
cannot be invalidated. Unlike congested traffic or motor-driven vehicles on public roads, the payment of
nature of the actor.
salaries at differing scales in various GFIs vis-à-vis in the BSP, is not such a change in conditions as
Same; Same; Same; Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of
would cause deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner’s members have not been
people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
deprived of their right to income as mandated by law. They have not received less than what they were
they—and not the officers—who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. —In the
entitled to ever since RA 7653 was passed eleven years ago.
case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
Same; Separation of Powers; Applying the concept of relative constitutionality strongly advocated
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients
in the ponencia not only goes beyond the parameters of traditional constitutionalism, but also finds no
of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
express basis in positive law; In a constitutional order that commands respect for coequal branches of
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees
government, speculation by the judiciary becomes incendiary and deserves no respectable place in our
are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
judicial chronicles.—Applying the concept of relative constitutionality strongly advocated in the ponencia,
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank—possessing
therefore, not only goes beyond the parameters of traditional constitutionalism, but also finds no express
higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement—are given higher compensation
basis in positive law. While it has been asserted that “a statute valid when enacted may become invalid
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist
by change in conditions to which it is applied ,” the present case has shown no such change in conditions
of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
that would warrant the invalidation of the assailed provision if applied under such conditions. Hence, no
they—and not the officers—who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment.  This is in
semblance of constitutional impuissance, other than its conjured possibility, can be seen. In a
accord with the policy of the Constitution “to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
constitutional order that commands respect for coequal branches of government, speculation by the
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all.” Any act of
judiciary becomes incendiary and deserves no respectable place in our judicial chronicles.

Same; International Law; Government employees at the BSP with salary grades 19 and below are
not entities vested with international personality—any possible discrimination as to them, in the light of
the principles and application of international law would be too far-fetched. —The ponencia further
contends that the principles of international law can operate to render a valid law unconstitutional. The
generally accepted definition states that international law is a body of legal rules that apply between
sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international personality. Government
employees at the BSP with salary grades 19 and below are not such entities vested with international
personality; any possible discrimination as to them, in the light of the principles and application of
international law would be too far-fetched.
Same; The ponencia overlooks the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not a GFI but a regulatory body
of GFIs and other financial-banking institutions—it should not be compared with them as there is no
parity.—The dangerous consequences of the majority’s Decision in the present case cannot and should
not be ignored. Will there now be an automatic SSL exemption for employees of other GFIs and financial
regulatory agencies? Will such exemption not infringe on Congress’ prerogative? The ponencia overlooks
the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not a GFI, but a regulatory body of GFIs and other financial/banking
institutions. Therefore, it should not be compared with them . There is no parity. The Bangko Sentral is
more akin to the Insurance Commission, the National Telecommunications Commission, and the Energy
Regulatory Commission. Should not more appropriate comparisons be made with such regulatory bodies
and their employees?
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Activism; The trust reposed in this Court is “not to formulate
policy but to determine its legality as tested by the Constitution”; Judicial activism should not be allowed
to become judicial exuberance.—The trust reposed in this Court is “not to formulate policy but to
determine its legality as tested by the Constitution.” “It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into
that broad and legitimate sphere of discretion enjoyed by the political branches to determine the policies
to be pursued. This Court should ever be on the alert lest, without design or intent, it oversteps the
boundary of judicial competence.” Judicial activism should not be allowed to become judicial
exuberance. “As was so well put by Justice Malcolm: ‘Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to enact corrective
legislation is a resort, not to the Supreme Court, but to the bar of public opinion. —Since Congress itself
did not commit any constitutional violation or gravely abusive conduct when it enacted RA 7653, it
should not be summarily blamed for what the ponencia calls “altered circumstances.” Congress should
be given the opportunity to correct the problem, if any. I repeat, I am not against exemption from the
SSL of Bangko Sentral employees with salary grades 19 and below. Neither am I against increases in
their pay. However, it is Congress, not this Court, that should provide a solution to their predicament, at
least in the first instance. The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to enact corrective
legislation is a resort, not to this Court, but to the bar of public opinion. The electorate can refuse to
return to Congress members who, in their view, have been remiss in the discharge of their constitutional
duties. Our Constitution presumes that, absent any inference of antipathy, improvident legislative
decisions “will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes”; and that judicial intervention is
unwarranted, no matter how unwisely a political branch may have acted.
Same; Same; Same; To compel this Court to make a more decisive but unnecessary action in
advance of what Congress will do is a downright derogation of the Constitution itself, for it converts the
judiciary into a super-legislature and invests it with a power that to it has never belonged. —It is only the
legislature, not the courts, that “must be appealed to for the change. ” If, however, Congress decides to
act, the choice of appropriate measure lies within its discretion. Once determined, the measure chosen
cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not the best solution, or that it is unwise or inefficacious. A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 146
law that advances a legitimate governmental interest will be sustained, even if it “works to the
disadvantage of a particular group, or x x x the rationale for it seems tenuous. ” To compel this Court to
make a more decisive but unnecessary action in advance of what Congress will do is a downright
derogation of the Constitution itself, for it converts the judiciary into a super-legislature and invests it
with a power that to it has never belonged.
Same; It is equally true that the levels of difficulty and responsibility for BSP employees with
salary grades 19 and below are different from those of other BSP employees with salary grades 20 and
above; To assert, as petitioner does, that the statutory classification is just an “artifice based on
arbitrariness,” without more, is nothing more than throwing a few jabs at an imaginary foe.—While it is
true that all employees of the BSP are appointed under the authority of the Monetary Board, observe the
same set of office rules and regulations, and perform their work in practically the same offices, it is
equally true that the levels of difficulty and responsibility for BSP employees with salary grades 19 and
below are different from those of other BSP employees with salary grades 20 and above. All those
classes of position belonging to the Professional Supervisory Category of the Position Classification
System under RA 6758, for instance, are obviously not subjected to the same levels of difficulty,
responsibility, and qualification requirements as those belonging to the Professional Non-Supervisory
Category, although to both categories are assigned positions that include salary grades 19 and 20. To
assert, as petitioner does, that the statutory classification is just an “ artifice based on arbitrariness ,”
without more, is nothing more than throwing a few jabs at an imaginary foe.
Same; The BSP and the GFIs cited in the ponencia do not belong to the same category of
government institutions, although it may be said that both are, broadly speaking, “involved” in banking
and finance—while the former performs primarily governmental or regulatory functions, the latter
execute purely proprietary ones.—In like manner, petitioner’s denunciation of the proviso for allegedly
discriminating against its members vis-à-vis the rank and filers of other GFIs ignores the fact that the
BSP and the GFIs cited in the ponencia do not belong to the same category of government institutions,
although it may be said that both are, broadly speaking, “involved” in banking and finance. While the
former performs primarily governmental or regulatory functions, the latter execute
purely proprietary ones.
Same; Judicial Review; Canons of Judicial Avoidance; One such canon of avoidance is that the
Court must not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it;
Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis brilliantly summarized, this Court
may choose to ignore the constitutional question presented by petitioner, since there is indeed some
other ground upon which this case can be disposed of. —In the United States more than sixty years ago,
Justice Brandeis delineated the famous canons of avoidance under which their Supreme Court had
refrained from passing upon constitutional questions. One such canon is that the Court must “ not
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it x x x. It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.” In addition, the Court must not “pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of.” Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis brilliantly
summarized, this Court may choose to ignore the constitutional question presented by petitioner, since
there is indeed some other ground upon which this case can be disposed of—its clear lack of urgency,
by reason of which Congress should be allowed to do its primary task of reviewing and possibly
amending the law.
Same; Same; Same; Since the authority to declare a legal provision void is of a “delicate and
awful nature,” the Court should “never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.” —Taking
cognizance of this case and disposing of, or altogether ignoring, the constitutional question leads us to
the same inevitable conclusion: the assailed provision should not be declared “ unconstitutional, unless it
is clearly so.” Whichever path is chosen by this Court, I am of the firm belief that such provision cannot

and should not be declared unconstitutional. Since the authority to declare a legal provision void is of a
“delicate and awful nature,” the Court should “never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent
case.” If ever there is doubt—and clearly there is, as manifested herein by a sharply divided Court—“the
expressed will of the legislature should be sustained.”
Same; Same; Same; Future changes in both legislation and its executive implementation should
certainly not be the benchmark for a preemptive declaration of unconstitutionality, especially when the
said provision is not even constitutionally infirm to begin with. —Indeed, this Court is of the unanimous
opinion that the assailed provision was at the outset constitutional; however, with recent amendments
to related laws, the majority now feels that said provision could no longer pass constitutional muster.  To
nail my colors to the mast, such proclivity to declare it immediately unconstitutional not only imprudently
creeps into the legislative sphere, but also sorely clings to the strands of obscurantism. Future changes
in both legislation and its executive implementation should certainly not be the benchmark for a
preemptive declaration of unconstitutionality, especially when the said provision is not even
constitutionally infirm to begin with.
Same; Same; Same; This Court should bide its time, for it has neither the authority nor the
competence to contemplate laws, much less to create or amend them. —The congressional enactment
into law of pending bills on the compensation of BSP employees—or even those related thereto—will
certainly affect the assailed provision. This Court should bide its time, for it has neither the authority nor
the competence to contemplate laws, much less to create or amend them. Given the current status of
these pending bills, the arguments raised by petitioner against the assailed provision become all the
more tenuous and amorphous. I feel we should leave that provision untouched, and instead just accord
proper courtesy to our legislators to determine at the proper time and in the manner they deem best the
appropriate content of any modifications to it. Besides, there is an omnipresent presumption of
constitutionality in every legislative enactment. No confutation of the proviso was ever shown before;
none should be considered now.
Same; Same; Same; A judicial determination is fallow when inspired by purely cerebral casuistry
or emotional puffery, especially during rowelling times. —It would be wise “not to anticipate the serious
constitutional law problems that would arise under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated
by prudence.” Attempts “at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.” A judicial determination is fallow when inspired by purely
cerebral casuistry or emotional puffery, especially during rowelling times.
Same; Same; Standards of Review; Under the first tier or the rational relationship or rational basis
test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a rational relationship to an accepted governmental end
—it must be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” —Under the first tier or the rational
relationship or rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a rational relationship to an
accepted governmental end. In other words, it must be “ rationally related to a legitimate state interest. ”
To be reasonable, such classification must be (1) based on substantial distinction that makes for real
differences; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
equally applicable to all members of the same class.
Same; Same; Same; The retention of the best and the brightest officials in an independent
central monetary authority is a valid governmental objective that can be reasonably met by a
corresponding exemption from a salary standardization scheme that is based on graduated salary levels.
—Murphy states that when a governmental classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, such
classification is in most instances reviewed under the standard rational basis test. Accordingly, courts will
not overturn that classification, unless the varying treatments of different groups are so unrelated to the
achievement of any legitimate purpose that the courts can only conclude that the governmental actions
are irrational. A classification must “ be reasonable, not arbitrary, and x x x rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” All these conditions are met in the present case. The
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retention of the best and the brightest officials in an independent central monetary authority is a valid
governmental objective that can be reasonably met by a corresponding exemption from a salary
standardization scheme that is based on graduated salary levels. The legislature in fact enjoys a wide
berth in continually classifying whenever it enacts a law, provided that no persons similarly situated
within a given class are treated differently. To contend otherwise is to be presumptuous about the
legislative intent or lack of it.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate
that our lawmakers be given sufficient time and leeway to address the alleged problem of differing pay
scales—“Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible
to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” —The Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is also a government regulatory agency almost on the same level
of importance as the BSP. However, its charter was only amended very recently—to be more precise, on
July 27, 2004. Consequently, it would be most unfair to implicitly accuse Congress of inaction,
discrimination and unequal treatment. Comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that our
lawmakers be given sufficient time and leeway to address the alleged problem of differing pay
scales. “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible
to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” Besides, it is a
cardinal rule that courts first ascertain whether construction of a statute is fairly possible by which any
constitutional question therein may be avoided.
Same; Same; Same; The validity of a law is to be determined not by its effects on a particular
case or by an incidental result arising therefrom, but by the purpose and efficacy of the law in
accomplishing that effect or result.—The validity of a law is to be determined not by its effects on a
particular case or by an incidental result arising therefrom , but by the purpose and efficacy of the law in
accomplishing that effect or result. This point confirms my earlier position that the enactment of a law is
not the same as its operation. Unlike Vera in which the Court invalidated the law on probation because
of the unequal effect in the operation of such law, the assailed provision in the present case suffers from
no such invidious discrimination. It very well achieves its purpose, and it applies equally to all
government employees within the BSP. Furthermore, the application of this provision is not made
subject to any discretion, uneven appropriation of funds, or time limitation. Consequently, such a law
neither denies equal protection nor permits of such denial.
Same; Same; Same; Under the second tier or the strict scrutiny test, the Court will require the
government to show a compelling or overriding end to justify (1) the limitation on fundamental rights or
(2) the implication of suspect classes.—Under the second tier or the strict scrutiny test, the Court will
require the government to show a compelling or overriding end to justify (1) the limitation on
fundamental rights or (2) the implication of suspect classes. Where a statutory classification impinges
upon a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class, such classification is subjected to strict scrutiny. It
will be upheld only if it is shown to be “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. ” Therefore,
all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a suspect class, like a single racial or ethnic group, are
immediately suspect. “That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. ” Pressing public necessity, for instance, may justify
the existence of those restrictions, but antagonism toward such suspect classes never can.
Same; Same; Same; Salary grade or class of position is not a fundamental right like marriage,
procreation, voting, speech and interstate travel.—To date, no American case—federal or state—has yet
been decided involving equal pay schemes as applied either to government employees vis-à-vis private
ones, or within the governmental ranks. Salary grade or class of position is not a fundamental right like
marriage, procreation, voting, speech and interstate travel. American courts have in fact even refused to
declare government employment a fundamental right.

Same; Same; Same; For purposes of equal protection analysis, financial need alone does not
identify a suspect class.—In fact, for purposes of equal protection analysis, financial need alone does not
identify a suspect class. And even if it were to consider government pay to be akin to wealth, it has
already been held that “where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages.” After all, a law does not become invalid “because of simple
inequality,” financial or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Since employment in the government is not a fundamental right and
government employees below salary grade 20 are not a suspect class, the government is not required to
present a compelling objective to justify a possible infringement under the strict scrutiny test. —Since
employment in the government is not a fundamental right and government employees below salary
grade 20 are not a suspect class, the government is not required to present a compelling objective to
justify a possible infringement under the strict scrutiny test. The assailed provision thus cannot be
invalidated via the strict scrutiny gauntlet. “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”
Same; Same; Same; Under the third tier or the intensified means test, the Court should accept
the legislative end, but should closely scrutinize its relationship to the classification made; There exist
classifications, which have not been deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental rights thus not
subjected to the strict scrutiny test, are subjected to a higher or intermediate degree of scrutiny than
the deferential or traditional rational basis test.—Under the third tier or the intensified means test, the
Court should accept the legislative end, but should closely scrutinize its relationship to the classification
made. There exist classifications that are subjected to a higher or intermediate degree of scrutiny than
the deferential or traditional rational basis test. These classifications, however, have not been deemed to
involve suspect classes or fundamental rights; thus, they have not been subjected to the strict scrutiny
test. In other words, such classifications must be “substantially related to a sufficiently important
governmental interest.” Examples of these so-called “quasi-suspect” classifications are those based on
gender, legitimacy under certain circumstances, legal residency with regard to availment of free public
education, civil service employment preference for armed forces veterans who are state residents upon
entry to military service, and the right to practice for compensation the profession for which certain
persons have been qualified and licensed.
Same; Same; Same; Non-exempt government employees may be a sensitive but not a suspect
class, and their employment status may be important although not fundamental; In the area of
economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect.—Non-exempt government employees may be
a sensitive but not a suspect class, and their employment status may be important although not
fundamental. Yet, the enactment of the assailed provision is a reasonable means by which the State
seeks to advance its interest. Since such provision sufficiently serves important governmental interests
and is substantially related to the achievement thereof, then, again it stands. “In the area of economics
and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” “The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that x x x the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.”
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Since relative constitutionality was not discussed by the
parties in any of their pleadings, fundamental fairness and evenhandedness still dictate that Congress be
heard on this concept before the Court imposes it in a definitive ruling.—In our jurisdiction, relative
constitutionality is a rarely utilized theory having radical consequences; hence, I believe it should not be
imposed by the Court unilaterally. Even in the US, it applies only when there is a change in factual
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circumstances covered by the law, not when there is an enactment of another law pertaining to subjects
not directly covered by the assailed law. Whether factual conditions have so changed as to call for a
partial or even a total abrogation of the law is a matter that rests primarily within the constitutional
prerogative of Congress to determine. To justify a judicial nullification, the constitutional breach of a
legal provision must be very clear and unequivocal, not doubtful or argumentative. In short, this Court
can go no further than to inquire whether Congress had the power to enact a law; it cannot delve into
the wisdom of policies it adopts or into the adequacy under existing conditions of measures it enacts.
The equal protection clause is not a license for the courts “ to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
legislative choices.” Since relative constitutionality was not discussed by the parties in any of their
pleadings, fundamental fairness and evenhandedness still dictate that Congress be heard on this concept
before the Court imposes it in a definitive ruling.
CARPIO,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Judicial Review; Judicial Legislation; The majority opinion does not annul a law but enacts a
pending bill in Congress into law.—The majority opinion does not annul a law but enacts a pending bill in
Congress into law. The majority opinion invades the legislative domain by enacting into law a bill that
the 13th Congress is now considering for approval. The majority opinion does this in the guise of
annulling a proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 (“RA 7653”).
Equal Protection; Government Financial Institutions (GFIs); The majority opinion erroneously
classifies the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (“BSP”), a regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions, in
the same category as non-regulatory corporations exercising purely commercial functions.—The majority
opinion erroneously classifies the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (“BSP”), a regulatory agency exercising
sovereign functions, in the same category as non-regulatory corporations exercising purely commercial
functions like Land Bank of the Philippines (“LBP”), Social Security System (“SSS”), Government Service
Insurance System (“GSIS”), Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”), Small Borrowers Guarantee
Fund Corporation (“SBGFC”), and Home Guarantee Corporation (“HGC”).
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Salary Standardization Law (SSL); The Supreme Court
cannot simply ordain an exemption from SSL without considering serious ramifications on fiscal policies
of the government—the Court cannot intrude into fiscal policies that are the province of the Executive
and Legislative Departments.—The grant of SSL exemption to GFIs has ramifications on the deepening
budget deficit of the government. Under Republic Act No. 7656, all GFIs are required to remit to the
National Treasury at least 50% of their annual net earnings. This remittance forms part of the
government revenues that fund the annual appropriations act. If the remittances from GFIs decrease,
the national revenues funding the annual appropriations act correspondingly decrease. This results in
widening even more the budget deficit. A bigger budget deficit means there are no revenues to fund
salary increases of all government employees who are paid out of the annual appropriations act. The
exemption of GFIs from SSL may delay or even prevent a general increase in the salary of all
government employees, including rank-and-file employees in the judiciary. This Court cannot simply
ordain an exemption from SSL without considering serious ramifications on fiscal policies of the
government. This is a matter better left to the Executive and Legislative Departments. This Court cannot
intrude into fiscal policies that are the province of the Executive and Legislative Departments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Supreme Court cannot exercise its power of
judicial review before Congress has enacted the questioned law.—The power of judicial review of
legislative acts presumes that Congress has enacted a law that may violate the Constitution. This Court
cannot exercise its power of judicial review before Congress has enacted the questioned law. In this
case, Congress is still considering the bill exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL. There is
still no opportunity for this Court to exercise its review power because there is nothing to review.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to exempt a government agency from the SSL is a
legislative power, not a judicial power.—
The majority opinion, however, claims that because of the failure of Congress to enact the bill
exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL, this Court should now annul the proviso in Section
15(c) of RA 7653 to totally exempt BSP from the SSL. This is no longer an exercise of the power of
judicial review but an exercise of the power of legislation—a power that this Court does not possess. The
power to exempt a government agency from the SSL is a legislative power, not a judicial power. By
annulling a prior valid law that has the effect of exempting BSP from the SSL, this Court is exercising a
legislative power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By annulling the proviso in Section 15(c) of R.A. 7653, BSP is not
reverted to its previous situation but brought to a new situation that BSP cannot attain without a new
legislation.—The power of judicial review is the power to strike down an unconstitutional act of a
department or agency of government, not the power to initiate or perform an act that is lodged in
another department or agency of government. If this Court strikes down the law exempting PDIC from
the SSL because it is discriminatory against other government agencies similarly situated, this Court is
exercising its judicial review power. The effect is to revert PDIC to its previous situation of being subject
to the SSL, the same situation governing BSP and other agencies similarly situated. However, by
annulling the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653, BSP is not reverted to its previous situation but
brought to a new situation that BSP cannot attain without a new legislation . Other government agencies
similarly situated as BSP remain in their old situation—still being subject to the SSL. This is not an
annulment of a legislative act but an enactment of legislation exempting one agency from the SSL
without exempting the remaining agencies similarly situated.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Equal Protection Clause; Standards of Review; In the United States, from where the equal
protection provision of our Constitution has its roots, the Rational Basis Test remains a primary standard
for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute. —The Rational Basis Test has been described as adopting
a “deferential” attitude towards legislative classifications. As previously discussed, this “deference” comes
from the recognition that classification is often an unavoidable element of the task of legislation which,
under the separation of powers embodied in our Constitution, is primarily the prerogative of Congress.
Indeed, in the United States, from where the equal protection provision of our Constitution has its roots,
the Rational Basis Test remains a primary standard for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute.
Same; Same; Strict scrutiny is applied when the challenged statute either (1) classifies on the
basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or (2) infringes fundamental constitutional rights. —While in
the Philippines the Rational Basis Test has, so far, served as a sufficient standard for evaluating
governmental actions against the Constitutional guaranty of equal protection, the American Federal
Supreme Court, as pointed out in the main opinion, has developed a more demanding standard as a
complement to the traditional deferential test, which it applies in certain well-defined circumstances. This
more demanding standard is often referred to as Strict Scrutiny. Briefly stated, Strict Scrutiny is applied
when the challenged statute either (1) classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or
(2) infringes fundamental constitutional rights. With respect to such classifications, the usual
presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and it is incumbent upon the government to demonstrate
that its classification has been narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests, otherwise
the law shall be declared unconstitutional for being violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
Same; Same; The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to eliminate racial
discrimination from official sources in the States.—The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. Like other rights
guaranteed by the post-Civil War Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause (also known as the
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Fourteenth Amendment) was motivated in large part by a desire to protect the civil rights of African-
Americans recently freed from slavery. Thus, initially, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to limit the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimination claims brought by African-Americans. In Strauder
v. West Virginia, the American Supreme Court in striking down a West Virginia statute which prohibited a
“colored man” from serving in a jury, traced the roots of the Equal Protection Clause.
Same; Same; Over the years the Equal Protection Clause has been applied against unreasonable
governmental discrimination directed at any identifiable group.—Over the years however, the Equal
Protection Clause has been applied against unreasonable governmental discrimination directed at any
identifiable group. In what Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf call the most famous footnote in
American constitutional law, Justice Stone in U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. maintained that state-
sanctioned discriminatory practices against discrete and insular minorities are entitled to a diminished
presumption of constitutionality.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The use of the term “suspect” originated in the case of
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).—The use of the term “suspect” originated in the case
of Korematsu v. U.S. In Korematsu, the American Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which
directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from San Leandro California, a military
area, beginning May 9, 1942. However, in reviewing the validity of laws which employ race as a means
of classification, the Court held: It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; The underlying rationale of the suspect classification theory is that where
legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because
traditional political processes may have broken down.—Racial classifications are generally thought to be
“suspect” because throughout the United States’ history these have generally been used to discriminate
officially against groups which are politically subordinate and subject to private prejudice and
discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has “consistently repudiated distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry as being odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.” The underlying rationale of the suspect classification theory is that where
legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because
traditional political processes may have broken down. Moreover, classifications based on race, alienage
or national origin are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded on such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the
burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.
Same; Same; Precisely because statutes infringing upon fundamental constitutionally protected
rights affect fundamental liberties, any experiment involving basic freedoms which the legislature
conducts must be critically examined under the lens of Strict Scrutiny. —The application of Strict Scrutiny
has not been limited to statutes which proceed along suspect lines but has been utilized on statutes
infringing upon fundamental constitutionally protected rights. Most fundamental rights cases decided in
the United States require equal protection analysis because these cases would involve a review of
statutes which classify persons and impose differing restrictions on the ability of a certain class of
persons to exercise a fundamental right. Fundamental rights include only those basic liberties explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. And precisely because these statutes affect,
fundamental liberties, any experiment involving basic freedoms which the legislature conducts must be
critically examined under the lens of Strict Scrutiny. Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny
include the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such

as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote.
Same; Same; Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an
inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of
constitutionality is reversed—such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government
demonstrates otherwise.—Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of
an inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of
constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the
government demonstrates otherwise. The government must show that the statute is supported by a
compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest are narrowly
tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as follows: . . . The intensive review associated with the new equal
protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation
qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the
rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
“necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not merely “reasonably related.” Moreover, equal protection
became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be
justified by “compelling” state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of “legitimate” state ends.
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means available for
achieving the governmental objective.
Same; Same; Since the United States’ conception of the Equal Protection Clause was largely
influenced by its history of systematically discriminating along racial lines, it is perhaps no surprise that
the Philippines which does not have any comparable experience has not found a similar occasion to
apply this particular American approach to Equal Protection of applying Strict Scrutiny to certain
legislative classifications.—While Strict Scrutiny has, as yet, not found widespread application in this
jurisdiction, the tenet that legislative classifications involving fundamental rights require a more rigorous
justification under more stringent standards of analysis has been acknowledged in a number of Philippine
cases. Since the United States’ conception of the Equal Protection Clause was largely influenced by its
history of systematically discriminating along racial lines, it is perhaps no surprise that the Philippines
which does not have any comparable experience has not found a similar occasion to apply this particular
American approach of Equal Protection.
Same; Same; The U.S. Supreme Court has generally applied Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny
when the challenged statute’s classification is based on either (1) gender or (2) illegitimacy—gender-
based classifications are presumed unconstitutional as such classifications generally provide no sensible
ground for differential treatment, and classifications based on illegitimacy are also presumed
unconstitutional as illegitimacy is beyond the individual’s control and bears no relation to the individual’s
ability to participate in and contribute to society.—Despite numerous criticisms from American legal
luminaries, the U.S. Supreme Court has not done away with the Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny
as they continue to remain viable approaches in equal protection analysis. On the contrary, the American
Court has developed yet a third tier of equal protection review, falling between the Rational Basis Test
and Strict Scrutiny—Intermediate Scrutiny (also known as Heightened Scrutiny). The U.S. Supreme Court
has generally applied Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny when the challenged statute’s classification is
based on either (1) gender or (2) illegitimacy. Gender-based classifications are presumed
unconstitutional as such classifications generally provide no sensible ground for differential treatment.
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,  the United States Supreme Court said: “[W]hat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability ... is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.” Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)  (plurality opinion). Rather
than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes
in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women. In
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 150
the same manner, classifications based on illegitimacy are also presumed unconstitutional as illegitimacy
is beyond the individual’s control and bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and
contribute to society. Similar to Strict Scrutiny, the burden of justification for the classification rests
entirely on the government. Thus, the government must show at least that the statute serves an
important purpose and that the discriminatory means employed is substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.
Same; Same; I fail to see the justification for the use of a “double standard” in determining the
constitutionality of the questioned proviso—why a “deferential test” for one comparison (between the
executives and rank and file of the BSP) and a “strict test” for the other (between the rank and file of
the BSP and the rank and file of the other GOCCs /GFIs).—As noted earlier, the main opinion, in arriving
at its conclusion, simultaneously makes use of both the Rational Basis Test and the Strict Scrutiny Test.
Thus, in assessing the validity of the classification between executive and rank and file employees in
Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act, the Rational Basis Test was applied. In evaluating the
distinction between the rank and file employees of the BSP and the rank and file employees of the LBP,
DBP, SSS and GSIS, the Strict Scrutiny Test was employed. Despite my best efforts, I fail to see the
justification for the use of this “double standard” in determining the constitutionality of the questioned
proviso. Why a “deferential test” for one comparison (between the executives and rank and file of the
BSP) and a “strict test” for the other (between the rank and file of the BSP and the rank and file of the
other GOCCs/GFIs)?
Same; Same; Legal Research; Foreign Jurisprudence; To my knowledge, the American Court has
never applied more than one standard to a given set of facts, and where one standard was found to be
appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court has deliberately eschewed any discussion of another; Assuming
that the equal protection standards evolved by the U.S. Supreme Court may be adopted in this
jurisdiction, there is no reason why the exclusive manner of their application should not be adopted also.
—As the preceding review of the standards developed by the U.S. Federal Supreme Court shows, the
choice of the appropriate test for evaluating a legislative classification is dependent on the nature of the
rights affected (i.e. whether “fundamental” or not) and the character of the persons allegedly
discriminated against (i.e. whether belonging to a “suspect class” or not). As determined by these two
parameters, the scope of application of each standard is distinct and exclusive of the others. Indeed, to
my knowledge, the American Court has never applied more than one standard to a given set of facts,
and where one standard was found to be appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court has deliberately
eschewed any discussion of another. Assuming that the equal protection standards evolved by the U.S.
Supreme Court may be adopted in this jurisdiction, there is no reason why the exclusive manner of their
application should not be adopted also.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality; “Substantial distinctions” must necessarily be
derived from the objective factual circumstances of the classes or groups that a statute seeks to
differentiate.—“Substantial distinctions” must necessarily be derived from the objective factual
circumstances of the classes or groups that a statute seeks to differentiate. The classification must be
real and factual and not wholly abstract, artificial, or contrived. Thus, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union, this Court stated: We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop
security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up
with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions.  There is such
real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the
same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs,
manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied
forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of
religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the

lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than
before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important and should not be ignored.
(Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of factual changes which may have occurred vis-à-vis the
BSP personnel, it is difficult to see how relative constitutionality may be applied in the instant petition.—
In the case at bar, however, petitioner does not allege a comparable change in the factual milieu  as
regards the compensation, position classification and qualifications standards of the employees of the
BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank and file) since the enactment of The New Central
Bank Act. Neither does the main opinion identify the relevant factual changes which may have
occurred vis-à-vis the BSP personnel that may justify the application of the principle of relative
constitutionality as above-discussed. Nor, to my knowledge, are there any relevant factual changes of
which this Court may take judicial knowledge. Hence, it is difficult to see how relative constitutionality
may be applied to the instant petition.
Same; Same; While it is true that the Equal Protection Clause is found in the Bill of Rights of both
the American and Philippine Constitutions, for strict scrutiny to apply there must be a violation of a
Constitutional right other than the right to equal protection of the laws. —Strict Scrutiny cannot be
applied in the case at bar since nowhere in the petition does petitioner allege that Article II, Section 15
(c) of the New Central Bank Act burdens a fundamental right of its members. The petition merely states
that “the proviso in question violates the right to equal protection of the laws of the BSP rank and file
employees who are members of the petitioner.” While it is true that the Equal Protection Clause is found
in the Bill of Rights of both the American and Philippine Constitutions, for strict scrutiny to apply there
must be a violation of a Constitutional right other than the right to equal protection of the laws. To hold
otherwise would be absurd as any invocation of a violation of the equal protection clause would
automatically result in the application of Strict Scrutiny.
Same; Same; The main opinion fails to show that financial need is an inherently suspect trait. —
The main opinion however seeks to justify the application of Strict Scrutiny on the theory that the rank
and file employees of the BSP constitute a suspect class “considering that majority (if not all) of the rank
and file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they—and not the officers—who have the real economic and financial
need for the adjustment.” The ponencia concludes that since the challenged proviso operates on the
basis of the salary grade or office-employee status a distinction based on economic class and status is
created. With all due respect, the main opinion fails to show that financial need is an inherently suspect
trait. The claim that the rank and file employees of the BSP are an economically disadvantaged group is
unsupported by the facts on record. Moreover, as priorly discussed, classifications based on financial
need have been characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court as not suspect. Instead, the American Court
has resorted to the Rational Basis Test.
Same; Same; Legal Research; Foreign Jurisprudence; After an excessive dependence by the main
opinion to American jurisprudence it contradicted itself when it stated that “American jurisprudence and
authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit.” —Notably, the main opinion,
after discussing lengthily the developments in equal protection analysis in the United States and Europe,
and finding no support thereto, incongruously concluded that “in resolving constitutional disputes, this
Court should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they
have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs.” After an excessive dependence by the
main opinion to American jurisprudence it contradicted itself when it stated that “American jurisprudence
and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit.”
Same; Salary Standardization Law (R.A. 6758); Neither the text nor the legislative record of the
Salary Standardization Law manifests the intent to provide “favored treatment” for GOCCs and GFIs. —
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 151
Neither the text nor the legislative record of the Salary Standardization Law manifests the intent to
provide “favored treatment” for GOCCs and GFIs. Thus, Section 3 (b), erroneously cited by the main
opinion, provides for the general principle that compensation for all government personnel, whether
employed in a GOCC/GFI or not, should generally be comparable with that in the private sector.
Same; Same; During the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations, the sentiment was that
exemptions from the general Compensation Classification System applicable to all government
employees would be limited only to key positions in order not to lose these personnel to the private
sector.—During the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations, the sentiment was that exemptions
from the general Compensation Classification System applicable to all government employees would be
limited only to key positions in order not to lose these personnel to the private sector. A provision was
moreover inserted empowering the President to, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher
compensation, exceeding Salary Grade 30, to the chairman, president, general manager, and the board
of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions.
Same; Same; The basis for the exemption of certain employees of GOCCs or GFIs from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law rests not on the mere fact that they are employees of
GOCCs or GFIs, but on a policy determination by the legislature that such exemption is needed to fulfill
the mandate of the institution concerned. —In sum, the basis for the exemption of certain employees of
GOCCs or GFIs from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law rests not on the mere fact that they
are employees of GOCCs or GFIs, but on a policy determination by the legislature that such exemption
is needed to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the
GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with
their counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provision of goods or services, but also
in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were experiencing
difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The
need for and the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely
incidental.
Same; Same; The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not
automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification. —There
can be no doubt that the employees of the BSP share a common attribute with the employees of the
LBP, SSS, GSIS and DBP in that all are employees of GOCCs performing fiduciary functions. It may also
be reasonable to assume that BSP employees with SG 19 and below perform functions analogous to
those carried out by employees of the other GOCCs with the corresponding salary grades. Nonetheless,
these similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the
BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation,
position classification and qualifications standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in
common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative
classification.
Same; Judicial Review; Judicial Legislation; Considering that the record fails to show (1) that the
statutory provision in question affects either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and, more
importantly, (2) that the classification contained therein was completely bereft of any possible rational
and real basis, it would appear that judicial restraint is not merely preferred but is in fact mandatory,
lest this Court stray from its function of adjudication and trespass into the realm of legislation. —While
the main opinion acknowledges the propriety of judicial restraint “under most circumstances” when
deciding questions of constitutionality, in recognition of the “broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power,” it nevertheless advocates active intervention with respect to the
exemption of the BSP rank and file employees from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary
Standardization Law. Considering, however, that the record fails to show (1) that the statutory provision
in question affects either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and, more importantly, (2) that the

classification contained therein was completely bereft of any possible rational and real basis, it would
appear that judicial restraint is not merely preferred but is in fact mandatory, lest this Court stray from
its function of adjudication and trespass into the realm of legislation. To be sure, inasmuch as exemption
from the Salary Standardization Law requires a factually grounded policy determination by the legislature
that such exemption is necessary and desirable for a government agency or GOCC to accomplish its
purpose, the appropriate remedy of petitioner is with Congress and not with the courts. As the branch of
government entrusted with the plenary power to make and amend laws, it is well within the powers of
Congress to grant exceptions to, or to amend where necessary, the Salary Standardization Law, where
the public good so requires. At the same time, in line with its duty to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments, this Court is naturally hesitant to intrude too readily into the
domain of another co-equal branch of government where the absence of reason and the vice of
arbitrariness are not clearly and unmistakably established.
Same; Same; Same; For the Supreme Court to intervene now, when no intervention is called for,
would be to prematurely curtail the public debate on the issue of compensation of the employees of the
GOCCs and GFIs, and effectively substitute this Court’s policy judgments for those of the legislature,
with whom the “power of the purse” is constitutionally lodged. —Whether any of the foregoing measures
will actually be implemented by the Congress still remains to be seen. However, what is important is that
Congress is actively reviewing the policies concerning GOCCs and GFIs with respect to the Salary
Standardization Law. Hence, for this Court to intervene now, when no intervention is called for, would be
to prematurely curtail the public debate on the issue of compensation of the employees of the GOCCs
and GFIs, and effectively substitute this Court’s policy judgments for those of the legislature, with whom
the “power of the purse” is constitutionally lodged. Such would not only constitute an improper exercise
of the Court’s power of judicial, review, but may also effectively stunt the growth and maturity of the
nation as a political body as well.
Same; Same; Same; Surely to grant the rank and file of the BSP exemption solely for the reason
that other GOCC or GFI employees have been exempted, without regard for the reasons which impelled
the legislature to provide for those exemptions, would be to crystallize into our law what Justice Holmes
sardonically described as “merely idealizing envy.”—How then are the aims of social justice served by
removing the BSP rank and file personnel from the ambit of the Salary Standardization Law? In the
alternative, what other public purpose would be served by ordering such an exemption? Surely to grant
the rank and file of the BSP exemption solely for the reason that other GOCC or GFI employees have
been exempted, without regard for the reasons which impelled the legislature to provide for those
exemptions, would be to crystallize into our law what Justice Holmes sardonically described as “merely
idealizing envy.”
Same; Social Justice; Certainly, social justice is more than picking and choosing lines from
Philippine and foreign instruments, statutes and jurisprudence, like ripe cherries, in an effort to justify
preferential treatment of a favored group.—Certainly, social justice is more than picking and choosing
lines from Philippine and foreign instruments, statutes and jurisprudence, like ripe cherries, in an effort
to justify preferential treatment of a favored group. In the immortal words of Justice Laurel in Calalang
v. Williams: The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is “neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 152
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Equal Protection; If BSP needs an exemption from R.A. No. 6758 for key positions in order that it
may hire the best and brightest economists, accountants, lawyers and other technical and professional
people, the exemption must not begin only in SG 20—under the circumstances, the cut-off point, the
great divide, between SG 19 and 20 is entirely arbitrary as it does not have a reasonable or rational
foundation.—Classification in law is the grouping of persons/objects because they agree with one
another in certain particulars and differ from others in those same particulars. In the instant case,
however, SG 20 and up do not differ from SG 19 and down in terms of technical and professional
expertise needed as the entire range of positions all “require intense and thorough knowledge of a
specialized field usually acquired from completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher courses.”
Consequently, if BSP needs an exemption from Rep. Act No. 6758 for key positions in order that it may
hire the best and brightest economists, accountants, lawyers and other technical and professional
people, the exemption must not begin only in SG 20. Under the circumstances, the cut-off point, the
great divide, between SG 19 and 20 is entirely arbitrary as it does not have a reasonable or rational
foundation. This conclusion finds support in no less than the records of the congressional deliberations,
the bicameral conference committee having pegged the cut-off period at SG 20 despite previous
discussions in the Senate that the “executive group” is “probably” SG 23 and above.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Edgardo G. Pena for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that
its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of
the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs),
the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
I. The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank
(now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority.—In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
x x x      x x x      x x x

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral’s human resource
development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely
as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization
Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758 . [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner’s challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two
classes of employees in the BSP, viz.: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and
below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that
this classification is “a classic case of class legislation,” allegedly not based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s position. Petitioner also claims
that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the
following sub-set of arguments:
1. a.the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in
the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate
Bill No. 1235;2
2. b.subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the
SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at
all levels in the BSP;4 (emphasis supplied)
1. c.the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even
admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;5
2. d.GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus
within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP
rankand-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
3. e.the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted
in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers’.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653
has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in
question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as
some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law,
respondents’ implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 153
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the
legal issue involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection
clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of
the same law, such as “fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP,” and the mandate of the Monetary
Board to “establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management.”
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the
provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation,
even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence
within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.11
II. Issue
Thus, the sole—albeit significant—issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that “No person shall
be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws.”12
III. Ruling
1. A.UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF
R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created
by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the “equal protection” clause does not prevent the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate—so long as
the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,13 and
reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary
that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is

it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification
may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. 15 The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. 17 The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and
above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the
end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms
of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely,
and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate
Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, 20 this Court
has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the
ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the
bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is
presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
1. B.THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS—EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-
FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL—RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, we hold that the
enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity
out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid
as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of
Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the
plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area. Later
amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of
automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an
invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 154
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of
property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public
health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not
be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of
the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance
valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its
operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater
part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. 28 (citations
omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional
as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality
of the moratorium law—its enactment and operation being a valid exercise b the State of its police
power30—but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be
unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country’s business, industry and
agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory
and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants
to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with
a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present
circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who
suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War
Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a
period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission.
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving
them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have
gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war
and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in
force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still
inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.
This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and
should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the
mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits
are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to
pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
x x x      x x x      x x x
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only
course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the
present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of
Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and
without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 155

2. Applicability of the equal protection clause. 3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 = consequential
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of
double damages plus attorney’s fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS
right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the
were not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also
enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying “equal protection of the law,” in discriminated upon.
view of changed conditions since their enactment. Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from
unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it 1995 to 2004, viz.:
was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that
the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and 1. 1.R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property…. Of course, there were 2. 2.R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor 3. 3.R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks 4. 4.R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet,
under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same 1. 5.R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies 2. 6.R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
for killing them on their private rights of way. 3. 7.R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters , 294
U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, “A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share
change in the conditions to which it is applied.  The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL,
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” A number of prior opinions of that court are cited expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq.
imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad 1. 1.LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
company was liable for double damages and an attorney’s fee for killing livestock by a train without the
owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by Section 90. Personnel.—
motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor x x x      x x x      x x x
vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and
operation of its equipment. Said the court, “This certainly is not equal protection of the law.” 34 (emphasis qualification standards approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis
supplied) and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz.: prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 35 (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted) x x x      x x x      x x x
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it 1. 2.SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition….. In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation…. If a law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. ….36 (emphasis supplied, citations Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
omitted) x x x      x x x      x x x

(c) The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such
other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and
other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to
insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this
Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be
appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President,
except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the
Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service
eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be
exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis
supplied)
1. 3.SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
x x x      x x x      x x x
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:
x x x      x x x      x x x
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular
No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management , the Board of
Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel
thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently
enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions.
(emphases supplied)
1. 4.GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
x x x      x x x      x x x
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees.—The Board of Trustees shall have the
following powers and functions:
x x x      x x x      x x x
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS’
organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and
adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper
for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
x x x      x x x      x x x
1. 5.DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees.—The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and
staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 156
their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation
plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be
subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly
merit or increases based on the Bank’s productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be
exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform
as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
1. 6.HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. —The Board shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
x x x      x x x      x x x
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and
administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)
shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards
approved by the Corporation’s Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of
actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic
Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and
regulations on salaries and compensations;  and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the
Corporation’s and the employee’s contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
x x x      x x x      x x x
1. 7.PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
x x x      x x x      x x x
3.
x x x      x x x      x x x
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board’s
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation’s human resource development
program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position
classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall
be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly
merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be
exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as
possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were
granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP.  And as if to add insult

to petitioner’s injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket
exemption from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP,  found reasonable because there were substantial
distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious
scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification—albeit made indirectly
as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws— between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the
seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all
members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be
grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who
are without differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress
chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-
and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not
exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress’ power to classify so unbridled as to
sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not
instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of
Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can
only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination
that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to
determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or
exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the lack thereof,
among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion
that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests “on a policy determination by the
legislature.” All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination—even those that have
been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the
validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is
nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot
run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
In fine, the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment between the
rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP
rank-and-file and other GFIs’ who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in
the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of
Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other
GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person
shall be … denied the equal protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that
allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs
cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no
substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the
seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising
one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 157
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide
equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to
address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension
among government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus,
Section 2 also provided, “[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all
employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial
institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical
positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies.”42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b)
provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the
Government is that: “[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned
or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the
private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum
wages.”
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position
Classification System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of,
among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation
and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable
wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b)
basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on
minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for
preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following
factors:46
1. (1)the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
positions;
2. (2)the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
3. (3)the kind of supervision received;
1. (4)mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
2. (5)nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
3. (6)kind of supervision exercised;
4. (7)decision-making responsibility;
5. (8)responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
6. (9)accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
7. (10)hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects
pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the
1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP,  implicitly exempting the Monetary
Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation and
wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically
limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.

Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed.  Significantly, each government
financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted—without distinction as to salary grade or
position—all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the
SSL, based on the perceived need “to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among
others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct
competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of
goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or
GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel
and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the
particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by
the employees is merely incidental.”
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and
the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to
issue currency;50 provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise
banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking
functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the
seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution’s mandate cannot stand any
more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that “the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies
with the particular circumstances of each institution.”  Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent
basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-
file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in
so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the
SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI,
enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate
different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d’être of the SSL-
exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight
GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified
and effective personnel to carry out the GFI’s mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation
package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering
further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of
other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the
classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent,
and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular
circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference
to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees
and personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of
government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP—made
manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the
other GFIs—that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC—which is not a GFI—
was given leave to have a compensation plan that “shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],”53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and
its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with
this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight
GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 158
devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. “Nemo potest facere per alium quod non
potest facere per directum.” No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that “similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that
rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs
for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain
persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class
with respect to a legislative classification.” Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 “this finding of
similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not
sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain
the statute’s different treatment of the two groups.”
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the
classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress,
which formed a rational basis for the classification  limiting educational benefits to military service
veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics
as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative
civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two
years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year commitment . . .
x x x      x x x      x x x
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are
qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service
careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military establishment,
subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar
disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need
for readjustment benefits . . .55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which
BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The
distinction made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not—as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales
would put it—whether “being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for
exemption” from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government
agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291,
8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a “preferred sub-class within government
employees,” but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal
conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only
by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal
effects brought about by seven separate exercises—albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged “a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the
compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of
the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act” is of no
moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that
claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the
constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not
only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the

challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the
constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a “privilege” fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs
and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the
domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise  of this prerogative is subject
to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness
that this Court has the duty and the power to correct. 59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits,
“discrimination” contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is
refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment.61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs
definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination—no one can, with candor and
fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven
other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the
equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
IV. Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed
the “rational basis” test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications 63 and a reluctance
to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.64
1. A.Equal Protection
in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static “rational basis” test.  Professor Gunther
highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily,
the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment
“except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.” The old variety of
equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the
classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process,
equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying “fundamental values” and
restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the
courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means
and ends was not required.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 159
x x x      x x x      x x x
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court’s “new equal protection” and
the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during
the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of
the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by
equal protection remained as minimal as ever . . . But the Court launched an equal protection revolution
by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier
approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential “old” equal protection, a “new” equal
protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose . . . The intensive review associated with the new equal
protection imposed two demands—a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation
qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the
rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
“necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not merely “reasonably related” ones.  Moreover, equal protection
became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be
justified by “compelling” state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of “legitimate” state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two
characteristics: the presence of a “suspect” classification; or an impact on “fundamental” rights or
interests. In the category of “suspect classifications,” the Warren Court’s major contribution was to
intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases
also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for
example. But it was the ‘fundamental interests” ingredient of the new equal protection that proved
particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous . . . . [Other fundamental interests included voting,
criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel . . . .]
x x x      x x x      x x x
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best
established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier
formulations of the Warren Court’s equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an
interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection . . . . [Among the
fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while “suspect”
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
x x x      x x x      x x x
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an
increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential “old” and interventionist
“new” equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions
of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review.
The most elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed
most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories
which dictate the appropriate standard of review— strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court’s
[decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it
has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal
protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court
will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance
of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn.

Justice Marshall’s “sliding scale” approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a
formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court’s results indicate at least two
significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the “old” equal protection formula no
longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a
virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the
minimal “rationality” “hands-off” standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute
unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection
review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the “old” equal protection, are less
demanding than the strictness of the “new” equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established
example of an “intermediate” level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that “classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.” That standard is “intermediate” with respect to both ends and means: where ends
must be “compelling” to survive strict scrutiny and merely “legitimate” under the “old” mode, “important”
objectives are required here; and where means must be “necessary” under the “new” equal protection,
and merely “rationally related” under the “old” equal protection, they must be “substantially related” to
survive the “intermediate” level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
1. B.Equal Protection
in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in
discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most
extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as “sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.” This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and
religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny.  A further indication that certain forms of
discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4,
which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency,
prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of “race, colour, language,
religion or social origin.”67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies
with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard
of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate
aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of
grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required in respect
of those regarded as “suspect” (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of
others. Thus, in Abdulaziz,70 the European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the
Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference
of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that “very weighty reasons would have to be put
forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of
nationality as compatible with the Convention.”72 The European Court will then permit States a very
much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the
application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for
example, large and small landowners. 73
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 160
1. C.Equality under
International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without
any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination
and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or
equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);76 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the
American Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights;79 the
European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social
Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European
states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in
1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional “first generation”
rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action.  Article
26 of the ICCPR requires “guarantee[s]” of “equal and effective protection against discrimination” while
Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties “to ensure . . . the full
and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination” and to “secure without
discrimination” the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. 82 These provisions impose a measure of positive
obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of
discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions administered by
the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body.84 Additionally, many of the other
international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment. 85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the
prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights. 86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-
de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch
Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted
that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right
was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the
rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of
taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights
contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights
beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social
security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain
any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for
example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such
legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State’s sovereign power, then such legislation must comply
with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down
if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes

that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90 took into account the
definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . “discrimination” as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise  by all persons, on
an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive
trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal
protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our
society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and
protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.92 Apropos the special protection afforded to labor
under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing:93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities.” The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, “in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No.
111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation—all embody the general
principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace—the factory, the office or the field—but include as
well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all.”
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall “ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed.” It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes
to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
[favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 161
x x x      x x x      x x x
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism
of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot
come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different
ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.96 Our
laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More
importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all
of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: “[A]merican
jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these
are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not
be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs.”98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution
can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged.99
Further, the quest for a better and more “equal” world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool
of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims “equality” as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The
command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in “all phases of national development,”
further explicated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the
direction of greater equality . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support
for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. 101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this
pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.104
V. A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has
been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has
the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of
the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial
scrutiny ought to be more strict.  A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines.
This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or
nature of the actor.106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act,
not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations—particularly those prescribed or
imposed by the Constitution—would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue
and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of
government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon
said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation—made particularly more exacting and peremptory by
our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution—to settle
it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a “duty, rather than a power”, to
determine whether another branch of the government has “kept within constitutional limits.” Not
satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it
may be amended—as it is in our 1935 Constitution—“then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary
as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid.” In fact, this very Court—
speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as
one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution—
declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that “(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments” of the
government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients
of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees
are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing
higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement—are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist
of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
they—and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment.  This is in
accord with the policy of the Constitution “to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all.” 108 Any act of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 162
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court.  They represent
the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector,
have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are
they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653
effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file
employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political
solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any
waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court’s
duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Azcuna, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
     Panganiban and Carpio, JJ., See Dissenting Opinion.
     Corona and Callejo, Sr., JJ., On Leave.
     Carpio-Morales, J., Pls. see my dissenting opinion.
     Garcia, J., Concur with dissenting opinion of J. Carpio.
DISSENTING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
With all due respect, I dissent. I believe that it would be uncalled for, untimely and imprudent for this
Court to void the last proviso of the second paragraph of Section 15(c) of Chapter 1 of Article II of
Republic Act (RA) 7653. In the first place, the assailed provision is not unconstitutional, either on its face
or as applied, and the theory of relative constitutionality finds no application to the case at bar. In
the second place, a becoming respect on the part of this Court for Congress as a coequal and coordinate
branch of government dictates that Congress should be given ample opportunity to study the situation,
weigh its options and exercise its constitutional prerogative to enact whatever legislation it may deem
appropriate to address the alleged inequity pointed out by petitioner.
For the record, I am not against the exemption from the Salary Standardization Law of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) rank and file employees (with Salary Grade 19 and below). Neither am I
against increases in their pay. I simply submit that (1) the factual milieu of this case does not show a
denial of equal protection, (2) the theory of relative constitutionality does not come into play, and (3)
petitioner should have addressed its plaint, not to this Court, but to Congress in the first instance. I am
confident that given sufficient opportunity, the legislature will perform its constitutional duty accordingly.
Hence, there is no need or warrant for this Court to intervene in legislative work.
Theory of Relative Constitutionality
Not Applicable to Extraneous Circumstances
The ponencia advocates the application of the theory of relative constitutionality to the present case.
The theory says that a statute valid at one time may become unconstitutional at another, because
of altered circumstances or changed conditions that make the practical operation of such a statute
arbitrary or confiscatory. Thus, the provisions of that statute, which may be valid as applied to one set

of facts but invalid as applied to another, cannot be merely compared with those applicable under the
Constitution.
From the manner in which it has been utilized in American and Philippine jurisprudence, however, this
novel theory finds relevance only when the factual situation covered by an assailed law changes , not
when another law is passed pertaining to subjects not directly covered by the former. Thus, the theory
applies only when circumstances that were specifically addressed upon the passage of the law change. It
does not apply to changes or alterations extraneous to those specifically addressed. To prove my point,
allow me then to tackle seriatim the cases relied upon in the ponencia.1
Cited American Cases Not Applicable to and Not in Pari Materia with Present Facts
Medill.2 The constitutionality issue in Medill v. State was raised by a bankruptcy trustee in regard to a
statute exempting damages that were awarded to the claimants who suffered as a result of an
automobile accident.3 Specifically, the contested provision exempted from “attachment, garnishment, or
sale on any final process issued from any court ” (1) general damages and (2) future special damages
awarded in rights of action filed for injuries that were caused to the person of a debtor or of a relative.4
The Supreme Court of Minnesota said that the general damages portion of the right of action filed by
claimants for personal injuries sustained in fact represented the monetary restoration of the physically
and mentally damaged person; hence, claims for such damages could never constitute unreasonable
amounts for exemption purposes.5 Such claims were thus fully exempt. It added that the legislature had
assigned the role of determining the amounts that were reasonable to the state’s judicial process.6
While a statute may be constitutional and valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another, the said Court limited its discussion only to the set of facts as presented before
it7 and held that the statute was “not unconstitutional.”8 Distinguishing the facts of that case from those
found in its earlier rulings,9 it concluded that—by limiting the assets that were available for distribution to
creditors10—the contested provision therein was a bankruptcy relief for protecting not only human
capital,11 but also the debtor’s fundamental needs.
Cook.12 The bankruptcy trustee in In re Cook also objected to the same statutory exemption, inter
alia, asserted by the debtors in another personal injury claim.
The US Bankruptcy Court, following Medill, held that such exemption was “violative of x x x the
Minnesota Constitution,”13 as applied to pre-petition special damages, 14 but not as applied to general
damages.15 The statute did not provide for any limitation on the amount of exemption as to the former
type of damages.16 Neither did it set any objective criteria by which the bankruptcy court may limit its
size.17
Nashville.18 The plaintiff in Nashville v. Walters questioned the constitutionality of a Tennessee
statute imposing upon railroad companies one half of the total cost of grade separation in every instance
that the state’s Highway Commission issued an order for the elimination of a grade crossing. The plaintiff
rested its contention not on the exercise of police power that promoted the safety of travel, but on the
arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the imposition that deprived it of property without due process of
law.19
Reversing the judgment that the Supreme Court of Tennessee had rendered against the plaintiff, the
US Supreme Court however did not declare the statute unconstitutional. 20 Instead, it remanded the case,
because the determination of facts showing arbitrariness and unreasonableness should have been made
by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the first place. 21 It enumerated the revolutionary changes incident to
transportation wrought in the 1930s by the widespread introduction of motor vehicles; the assumption
by the federal government of the functions of a road builder; the resulting depletion of rail revenues; the
change in the character, construction and use of highways; the change in the occasion for the
elimination of grade crossings, and in the purpose and beneficiaries of such elimination; and the change
in the relative responsibility of railroads and vehicles moving on the highways. 22 In addition, it held that
the promotion of public convenience did not justify requiring a railroad company—any more than others
—to spend money, unless it was shown that the duty to provide such convenience rested upon that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 163
company.23 Providing an underpass at one’s own expense for private convenience, and not primarily as a
safety measure, was a denial of due process.24
Atlantic.25 In Atlantic v. Ivey, the plaintiff filed an action for damages against the railroad company
for the killing of a cow on an unfenced right of way of the railway. The defendant pointed out that the
original Florida Act of 1889 and its later amendments in the 1940s had required railroad companies to
fence their tracks for the protection and safety of the traveling public and their property against livestock
roaming at large. Thus, the defendant averred that—without imposing a similar fencing requirement on
the owners of automobiles, trucks and buses that carry passengers upon unfenced public highways of
the state where such vehicles operated—the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal
constitutions would be violated.26
Reversing the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
application of the contested statutes under then existing conditions was violative of the equal protection
clause.27 Citing Nashville, that Court took judicial notice of the fact that there were no motor carriers on
public roads when the statutes were originally enacted. It also reasoned that the statutes were enacted
in the exercise of the state’s police power28 and were intended for the protection of everyone against
accidents involving public transportation. Although motor-driven vehicles and railroad carriers were
under a similar obligation to protect everyone against accidents to life and property when conducting
their respective businesses, the hazard of accidents by reason of cattle straying onto the line of traffic of
motor-driven vehicles was greater than that which arose when cattle strayed onto the line of traffic of
railroad carriers.29 Yet the burden of expenses and penalties that were rendered in favor of individuals
who were neither shippers nor passengers was imposed only on railroad carriers.30
In addition, the railroad carriers would be held liable for attorney’s fees and double the value of the
animals killed in their railways, without even requiring the plaintiffs who had sued them to prove the
negligence of such carriers in operating their equipment.31 Although it was argued that motordriven
vehicles had no authority to fence on state and county highways over which they operated, the
legislature could nevertheless authorize and require them to provide similar protection; or, in default
thereof, to suffer similar penalties that were incidental to using such public roads for generating profit
and serving the public.32
Louisville.33 The plaintiff in Louisville v. Faulkner also filed an action against defendant-railroad
company to recover the value of her mule that had strayed from her premises and got struck and killed
by the company’s train.34 The judgment of the lower court for the plaintiff was based on the fact that the
defendant did not offer any evidence to rebut the prima facie presumption of the latter’s negligence
under Kentucky statutes.35
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the contested provision unconstitutional and reversed the said
judgment.36 Citing both Nashville and Atlantic, the appellate court said that because such legislation
applied to all similar corporations and was aimed at the safety of all persons on a train and the
protection of their property, it was sustained from its inception in 1893; however, under changed
conditions, it could no longer be so. The court recognized the fact that, in the 1950s, the inauguration
and development of transportation by motor vehicles on public highways created even greater risks, not
only to the occupants of such vehicles but also to domestic animals. 37 Yet, the operators of these
vehicles were not subjected to the same extraordinary legal responsibility of proving that for the killing
of those animals on public roads, they were free from negligence, unlike railroad companies that struck
and killed such animals on private rights of way.38
Vernon.39 The plaintiff in Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon sought to declare unconstitutional a city
zoning ordinance which had limited the business use of its realty, locally known as the “Plaza,” only to
the parking of automobiles and its incidental services.40
The Court of Appeals of New York ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. 41 That ruling also
affirmed the unanimous judgment earlier rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Again citing Nashville, the
New York court ruled in the main that, no matter how compelling and acute the community traffic

problem might be as to reach a strangulation point, the solution did not lie in placing an undue and
uncompensated burden on a landowner in the guise of a regulation issued for a public
purpose.42 Although for a long time the plaintiff’s land had already been devoted to parking, the
ordinance that prohibited any other use for it was not “a reasonable exercise of the police power.”43
While the city’s common council had the right to pass ordinances respecting the use of property
according to well-considered and comprehensive plans designed to promote public health, safety and
general welfare, the exercise of such right was still subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not
be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Thus, the zoning ordinance could not preclude the use of
property for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted. 44 Although valid when adopted in 1927,
the ordinance was stricken down, because its operation under changed conditions in the 1950s proved
confiscatory, especially when the value of the greater part of the land—to be used, for instance, in the
erection of a retail shopping center—was destroyed.45
Finally, Murphy v. Edmonds.46 An automobile driver and her husband brought action against a
tractor-trailer driver and his employer and sought damages for the severe injuries she had sustained in a
collision. Raised in issue mainly was the constitutionality of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages
in personal injury actions.47
Affirming the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals rejecting all challenges to the validity of the
law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there was no irrationality, arbitrariness, or violation of
equal protection in the legislative classification drawn between (1) the less seriously injured tort
claimants whose noneconomic damages were less than the statutory cap; and (2) the more seriously
injured tort claimants whose noneconomic damages were greater than, and thus subject to, the
statutory cap.48 Although no express equal protection clause could be found in Maryland’s Constitution,
the due process clause therein nevertheless embodied equal protection to the same extent as that found
in the Fourteenth Amendment49 of the federal Constitution.50
Indeed, the right to recover full damages for a noneconomic injury was recognized by common law
even before the adoption of the state’s Constitution, but the said court declared that there was no
vested interest in any rule ordained by common law.51 Concluding that only the traditional “rational basis
test” should be used, the appellate court also rejected the lower court’s view of the right to press a claim
for pain and suffering as an “important right” requiring a “heightened scrutiny test” of the legislative
classification.52 Under the “rational basis test,” such legislative classification enjoyed a strong
presumption of constitutionality and, not being clearly arbitrary, could not therefore be invalidated.53
Moreover, the law was an economic response to a legislatively perceived crisis concerning not only
the availability, but also the cost of liability insurance in the state. 54 Putting a statutory cap on
noneconomic damages was “reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective ,”55 for it led to a
greater ease in the calculation of insurance premiums, thus making the market more attractive to
insurers. Also, it ultimately reduced the cost of such premiums and made insurance more affordable to
individuals and organizations that perform needed medical services.56
From the foregoing discussion, it is immediately evident that not one of the above-cited cases is
either applicable to or in pari materia with the present case.
Medill not only upheld the constitutionality of the contested provision therein, but also categorically
stated that the peculiar facts of the case prompted such declaration. General damages were declared
exempt; the law allowing their exemption was constitutional. Cook simply affirmed Medill when the same
contested provision was applied to an issue similar to that which was raised in the latter case, but then
declared that provision unconstitutional when applied to another issue. Thus, while general damages
were also declared exempt, the claims for special damages filed prior to the filing of a petition for relief
were not, and the law allowing the latter’s exemption was unconstitutional.
The court’s action was to be expected, because the issue on special damages in Cook was not at all
raised in Medill, and there was no precedent on the matter in Minnesota, other than the obiter dictum—if
it can be called one—in the latter case.57 Had that issue been raised in Medill, a similar conclusion would
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 164
inevitably have been reached. In fact, that case already stated that while the court “need not decide
whether special damages incurred prior to judgment x x x [were] to be exempt in order to decide the
question”58 on general damages raised therein, it felt that exempting special damages appeared
reasonable and likely to be applied, following an earlier ruling in another case.59
Moreover, the facts of both Medill and Cook are not at all akin to so-called “changed conditions”
prompting the declarations of constitutionality in the former and unconstitutionality in the latter. Such
“altered circumstances” or “changed conditions” in these two cases refer to the non-exemption of special
damages—a subject matter distinct and separable, although covered by the same assailed statute. In
fact, Cook precisely emphasized that “where a statute is not inherently unconstitutional, it may be found
constitutional as applied to some separable subject matters, and unconstitutional as applied to
others.”60 In other words, it was the application of the contested provision therein to an entirely different
and separable subject matter—not the contested provision itself—that was declared unconstitutional, but
the statute itself was not inherently unconstitutional to begin with.
Equally important, Nashville skirted the issue on constitutionality. The “changed conditions” referred
to in that case, as well as in Atlantic and Louisville, were the revolutionary changes in the mode of
transportation that were specifically covered by the statutes respectively imposing additional costs upon
railroad companies only, requiring the fencing of their tracks, or solely compelling them to present
evidence to rebut the presumption of their negligence. In Vernon, these “changed conditions” were
deemed to be the economic changes in the 1950s, through which the normal business use of the land
was unduly limited by the zoning ordinance that was intended to address the acute traffic problem in the
community. Nashville simply took judicial notice of the change in conditions which, together with the
continued imposition of statutory charges and fees, caused deprivation of property without due process
of law. Atlantic, Louisville and Vernon all relied upon Nashville, but then went further by rendering their
respective contested provisions unconstitutional, because—in the application of such provisions under
“changed conditions”—those similarly situated were no longer treated alike.
Finally, Murphy—obviously misplaced because it made no reference at all to the quoted sentence in
the ponencia—even upheld the validity of its contested provision. There was no trace, either, of any
“changed conditions.” If at all, the legislative classification therein was declared constitutional, because it
was in fact a valid economic response to a legislatively perceived crisis concerning the availability and
cost of liability insurance.
In the present case, no “altered circumstances” or “changed conditions” in the application of the
assailed provision can be found. It verily pertains to only one subject matter, not separable subject
matters as earlier pointed out in both Medill and Cook. Hence, its application remains and will remain
consistent. Not inherently unconstitutional to begin with, it cannot now be declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, herein petitioner miserably fails to demonstrate—unlike in Nashville, Atlantic, Louisville,
and Vernon—how those similarly situated have not been treated alike in the application of the assailed
provision.
Ponencia’s Reference to
“Changed Conditions” Misplaced
From Nashville to Murphy, it can be seen that all the contested statutes were passed in the exercise of
police power—the inherent power of the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare.61 The police measure may be struck down when an activity or property that ought to be
regulated does not affect the public welfare; or when the means employed are not reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the statute’s purpose, and they become unduly oppressive upon
individuals.62 As Justice Brandeis stresses in Nashville, “it may not be exerted arbitrarily or
unreasonably.”63
In the case before us today, the assailed provision can be considered a police measure that
regulates the income of BSP employees. Indisputably, the regulation of such income affects the public

welfare, because it concerns not only these employees, but also the public in general—from whose
various credits the banks earn their income, the CB generates its revenues, and eventually these
employees get their salaries and other emoluments.
Additionally, with the passage of RAs 6758 and 7653, the means employed by the State to
accomplish its objectives are not unduly oppressive. They are in fact reasonably necessary, not only to
attract the best and brightest bank regulatory personnel, but also to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP in accordance with sound principles of management. Nothing, therefore, is
arbitrary in the assailed provision; it cannot be stricken down.
With due respect, the ponencia’s reference to “changed conditions” is totally misplaced. In the
above-cited US cases, this phrase never referred to subsequent laws or executive pronouncements , but
rather to the facts and circumstances that the law or ordinance specifically addressed upon its passage
or adoption. A statute that is declared invalid because of a change in circumstances affecting its validity
belongs only to a class of emergency laws.64 Being a manifestation of the State’s exercise of its police
power, it is valid at the time of its enactment.
In contrast thereto, RA 7653 cannot be regarded as an emergency measure that is merely
temporary in operation. It is not even a statute limited to the exigency that brought it about. The facts
and circumstances it specifically addressed upon its passage have not been shown to have changed at
all. Hence, the assailed provision of such a declaratory statute cannot be invalidated.
Unlike congested traffic or motor-driven vehicles on public roads, the payment of salaries at differing
scales in various GFIs vis-à-vis in the BSP, is not such a change in conditions as would cause deprivation
of property without due process of law. Petitioner’s members have not been deprived of their right to
income as mandated by law. They have not received less than what they were entitled to ever since RA
7653 was passed eleven years ago.
To repeat, the factual situation that the assailed provision specifically addressed upon
passage of this law has not changed. The same substantive rights to a competitive and
structured human resource development program existing then still exist now. Only the
laws external to and not amendatory of this law did. Even if these new laws were to be
considered as “changed conditions,” those who have been affected in the BSP (as will be
shown later) are not at all similarly situated as those in the GFIs to compel their like
treatment in application.
In addition, the rulings in all the above-cited American cases—although entitled to great weight65—
are merely of persuasive effect in our jurisdiction66 and cannot be stare
decisis.67 These are not direct rulings of our Supreme Court 68 that form part of the Philippine legal
system.69
Granting gratia argumenti that the cited cases are to be considered binding precedents in our
jurisdiction, Nashville—the only one federal in character—does not even make a categorical declaration
on constitutionality. Furthermore, Murphy maintains that “[s]imply because a legal principle is part of the
common law x x x does not give it any greater degree of insulation from legislative change. ”70 Common
law, after all, is “a growing and ever-changing system of legal principles and theories x x x.”71
Every statute is presumed constitutional.72 This axiom reflects the respect that must be accorded to
the wisdom, integrity and patriotism of the legislature that passed it and to the executive who approved
it.73 Understandably, therefore, the judiciary should be reluctant to invalidate laws. 74 Medill precisely
emphasizes that the “court’s power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with
extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary. ”75 Although that case continues by saying that
unless it is inherently unconstitutional, a law “must stand or fall x x x not upon assumptions” the court
may make, the ponencia is still dauntless in relying thereon to support its arguments.
Rutter Does Not Even Apply
Again with due respect, the ponencia’s citation of a local case, Rutter,76 is also inappropriate. In the said
case, appellant instituted an action to recover the balance, and interest thereon, of a contract of sale
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 165
entered into barely four months prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. 77 The lower court,
however, rendered judgment78 for appellee who set up as defense79 the moratorium clause embodied in
RA 342.80 The lower court reasoned further that the obligation sought to be enforced was not yet
demandable under that law.81
Reversing the judgment, this Court invalidated82 the moratorium clause,83 not because the law was
unconstitutional, but because both its continued operation and enforcement had become unreasonable
and oppressive under postwar circumstances of observable reconstruction, rehabilitation and recovery of
the country’s general financial condition.84 The forced vigil suffered by prewar creditors was not only
unwittingly extended from eight to twelve years, but was also imposed without providing for the
payment of the corresponding interest in the interim.85
Thus, the success of their collection efforts, especially when their credits were unsecured, was
extremely remote.86 Moreover, the settlement of claims filed with the United States-Philippine War
Damage Commission was not only uncertain but was also practically futile, for it depended entirely on
the appropriations to be made by the US Congress.
The contested clause in Rutter was definitely a remedial measure passed to accord prewar debtors
who suffered the ravages of war an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves within a reasonable time and
to pay their prewar debts thereafter, thus preventing them from being victimized in the interim by their
prewar creditors. The purpose having been achieved during the eight-year period, there was therefore
no more reason for the law. Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason for the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. But it does not become unconstitutional.
The altered circumstances or changed conditions in Rutter were specifically the very circumstances
that the law addressed at its passage; they were not at all extraneous circumstances like subsequent
laws or executive pronouncements. The eight-year moratorium period having lapsed, the debtors’
concerns had been adequately addressed. It was now the turn of the creditors to be protected for the
pre-war loans they granted.
In stark contrast, the contested proviso in the instant case is not a remedial measure. It is not
subject to a period within which a right of action or a remedy is suspended. Since the reason for the law
still subsists, the law itself including the challenged proviso must continue in existence and operation.
Relative Constitutionality
Not Based on Positive Law
Applying the concept of relative constitutionality strongly advocated in the ponencia, therefore, not only
goes beyond the parameters of traditional constitutionalism, but also finds no express basis in positive
law.87 While it has been asserted that “a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in
conditions to which it is applied,”88 the present case has shown no such change in conditions that would
warrant the invalidation of the assailed provision if applied under such conditions. Hence, no semblance
of constitutional impuissance, other than its conjured possibility, can be seen. In a constitutional order
that commands respect for coequal branches of government, speculation by the judiciary becomes
incendiary and deserves no respectable place in our judicial chronicles.
The ponencia further contends that the principles of international law can operate to render a valid
law unconstitutional. The generally accepted definition states that international law is a body of legal
rules that apply between sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international
personality.89 Government employees at the BSP with salary grades 19 and below are not such entities
vested with international personality; any possible discrimination as to them, in the light of the principles
and application of international law would be too far-fetched.
The dangerous consequences of the majority’s Decision in the present case cannot and should not
be ignored. Will there now be an automatic SSL exemption for employees of other GFIs and financial
regulatory agencies? Will such exemption not infringe on Congress’ prerogative? The ponencia overlooks
the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not a GFI, but a regulatory body of GFIs and other financial/banking

institutions. Therefore, it should not be compared with them . There is no parity. The Bangko Sentral is
more akin to the Insurance Commission, the National Telecommunications Commission, and the Energy
Regulatory Commission. Should not more appropriate comparisons be made with such regulatory bodies
and their employees?
Respect for
Coequal Branch
The trust reposed in this Court is “not to formulate policy but to determine its legality as tested by the
Constitution.”90 “It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into that broad and legitimate sphere of
discretion enjoyed by the political branches to determine the policies to be pursued. This Court should
ever be on the alert lest, without design or intent, it oversteps the boundary of judicial
competence.”91 Judicial activism should not be allowed to become judicial exuberance. “As was so well
put by Justice Malcolm: ‘Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.’ ”92
Since Congress itself did not commit any constitutional violation or gravely abusive conduct when it
enacted RA 7653, it should not be summarily blamed for what the ponencia calls “altered
circumstances.”93 Congress should be given the opportunity to correct the problem, if any. I repeat, I am
not against exemption from the SSL of Bangko Sentral employees with salary grades 19 and below.
Neither am I against increases in their pay. However, it is Congress, not this Court, that should provide a
solution to their predicament, at least in the first instance.
The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to enact corrective legislation is a resort, not to
this Court, but to the bar of public opinion. The electorate can refuse to return to Congress members
who, in their view, have been remiss in the discharge of their constitutional duties. 94 Our Constitution
presumes that, absent any inference of antipathy, improvident legislative decisions “will eventually be
rectified by the democratic processes”;95 and that judicial intervention is unwarranted, no matter how
unwisely a political branch may have acted.96
It is only the legislature, not the courts, that “ must be appealed to for the change. ”97 If, however,
Congress decides to act, the choice of appropriate measure lies within its discretion. Once determined,
the measure chosen cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not the best solution, or that it is unwise
or inefficacious.98 A law that advances a legitimate governmental interest will be sustained, even if it
“works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or x x x the rationale for it seems tenuous. ”99 To
compel this Court to make a more decisive but unnecessary action in advance of what Congress will do
is a downright derogation of the Constitution itself, for it converts the judiciary into a super-legislature
and invests it with a power that to it has never belonged.100
In the words of the great Sir William Blackstone, “there is no court that has power to defeat the
intent of the Legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it
was the intent of the Legislature, or no[t].”101 As Rousseau further puts it, “according to the fundamental
compact, only the general will can bind the individuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular
will is in conformity with the general will, until it has been put to the free vote of the people. ”102 Thus,
instead of this Court invalidating a sovereign act, Congress should be given the opportunity to enact the
appropriate measure to address the so-called “changed conditions.”
We cannot second-guess the mind of the legislature as the repository of the sovereign will. For all
we know, amidst the fiscal crisis and financial morass we are experiencing, Congress may altogether
remove the blanket exemption, put a salary cap on the highest echelons, 103 lower the salary grade scales
subject to SSL exemption, adopt performance-based compensation structures, or even amend or repeal
the SSL itself, but within the constitutional mandate that “at the earliest possible time, the Government
shall increase the salary scales of x x x officials and employees of the National
Government.”104 Legislative reforms of whatever nature or scope may be taken one step at a time,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 166
addressing phases of problems that seem to the legislative mind most acute. 105 Rightly so, our legislators
must have “flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial
efforts.”106 Where there are plausible reasons for their action, the Court’s “inquiry is at an end.”107
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and the concomitant respect for coequal and coordinate
branches of government, the exercise of prudent restraint by this Court would still be best under the
present circumstances.
Not Grossly Discriminatory
There is no question that Congress neither violated the Constitution nor gravely abused its discretion
when it enacted “The New Central Bank Act” to establish and organize the BSP in 1993. 108 Indeed, RA
7653 is a valid legislative measure. Even the majority concedes that in enacting that law, Congress was
well within its legislative powers. However, the ponencia argues that the subsequent enactment of laws
granting “blanket exemption” from the coverage of the SSL of all employees in seven GFIs109 has made
the contested proviso “grossly discriminatory in its operation”110 and therefore unconstitutional.
This conclusion, to my mind, is a non sequitur. The mere possible effect of related or unrelated laws
on another law does not ipso facto make the latter unconstitutional. Besides, as already discussed, the
theory of relative constitutionality is plainly inapplicable to the present facts. Moreover, the ponencia has
assumed without proof that the BSP rank and file employees are factually and actually similarly situated
as the rank and filers of Land Bank, SSS, GSIS, etc., and it is clear from the discussion in Mme. Justice
Carpio Morales’ Dissenting Opinion that that is not really the case. In fact, there exist some substantial
differences in scope of work, job responsibilities and so forth that would negate
the ponencia’s assumption.
No Indicium of Urgency
Other than its bare assertion that the continued implementation of the assailed provision 111 would cause
“irreparable damage and prejudice”112 to its members, petitioner also fails to show a minimum indicium
of such extreme urgency as would impel this Court to second-guess Congress.
Briefly, petitioner contends that (1) the creation of two classes of employees within the BSP based
on the salary grade corresponding to their positions113 is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious class
legislation;114 and (2) the law itself discriminates against rank and file employees of the BSP vis-à-
vis those of GFIs.115
These contentions are utterly unsubstantiated. They find no support in law for granting the relief
prayed for.
While it is true that all employees of the BSP are appointed under the authority of the Monetary
Board, observe the same set of office rules and regulations, and perform their work in practically the
same offices,116 it is equally true that the levels of difficulty and responsibility for BSP employees with
salary grades 19 and below are different from those of other BSP employees with salary grades 20 and
above. All those classes of position belonging to the Professional Supervisory Category117 of the Position
Classification System118 under RA 6758, for instance, are obviously not subjected to the same levels of
difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements as those belonging to the Professional Non-
Supervisory Category,119 although to both categories are assigned positions that include salary grades 19
and 20.120 To assert, as petitioner does, that the statutory classification is just an “ artifice based on
arbitrariness,”121 without more, is nothing more than throwing a few jabs at an imaginary foe.
In like manner, petitioner’s denunciation of the proviso for allegedly discriminating against its
members vis-à-vis the rank and filers of other GFIs ignores the fact that the BSP and the GFIs cited in
the ponencia do not belong to the same category of government institutions, although it may be said
that both are, broadly speaking, “involved” in banking and finance. 122 While the former
performs primarily governmental or regulatory functions, the latter execute purely proprietary ones.

Moreover, the extent of damage or prejudice inflicted upon the BSP rank and file employees as a
result of the proviso is not shown by any evidence on record. Indeed, neither the petitioner nor
the ponencia demonstrate the injuries sustained.123
There is no indication whatsoever of the precise nature and extent of damages caused or to be
caused to petitioner’s members by the continued implementation of such provision. Surely, with no leg
to stand on, the allegation of petitioner that there is great disparity in compensation, allowances or
benefits, cannot be considered to be stigmatizing and wounding to the psyche of thousands of its
members.124 In fact, BSP employees, in general, also share the same tribulations of workers and
employees in other regulatory government offices.125 Not even petitioner’s broad and bare claim of
“transcendental importance”126 can ipso facto generate alacrity on the part of this Court.
In the United States more than sixty years ago, Justice Brandeis delineated the famous canons of
avoidance under which their Supreme Court had refrained from passing upon constitutional questions.
One such canon is that the Court must “ not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it x x x. It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”127 In addition, the Court must not “pass
upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”128
Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis brilliantly summarized, this
Court may choose to ignore the constitutional question presented by petitioner, since there is indeed
some other ground upon which this case can be disposed of—its clear lack of urgency, by reason of
which Congress should be allowed to do its primary task of reviewing and possibly amending the law.
Taking cognizance of this case and disposing of, or altogether ignoring, the constitutional question
leads us to the same inevitable conclusion: the assailed provision should not be declared
“unconstitutional, unless it is clearly so.”129 Whichever path is chosen by this Court, I am of the firm
belief that such provision cannot and should not be declared unconstitutional. Since the authority to
declare a legal provision void is of a “delicate and awful nature,”130 the Court should “never resort to that
authority, but in a clear and urgent case.”131 If ever there is doubt—and clearly there is, as manifested
herein by a sharply divided Court—“the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained.”132
Indeed, this Court is of the unanimous opinion that the assailed provision was at the outset
constitutional; however, with recent amendments to related laws,133 the majority now feels that said
provision could no longer pass constitutional muster. To nail my colors to the mast, such proclivity to
declare it immediately unconstitutional not only imprudently creeps into the legislative sphere, but also
sorely clings to the strands of obscurantism. Future changes in both legislation and its executive
implementation should certainly not be the benchmark for a preemptive declaration of
unconstitutionality, especially when the said provision is not even constitutionally infirm to begin with.
Moreover, the congressional enactment into law of pending bills 134 on the compensation of BSP
employees—or even those related thereto—will certainly affect the assailed provision. This Court should
bide its time, for it has neither the authority nor the competence to contemplate laws, much less to
create or amend them.
Given the current status of these pending bills, the arguments raised by petitioner against the
assailed provision become all the more tenuous and amorphous. I feel we should leave that provision
untouched, and instead just accord proper courtesy to our legislators to determine at the proper time
and in the manner they deem best the appropriate content of and modifications to it.  Besides, there is
an omnipresent presumption of constitutionality in every legislative enactment. 135 No confutation of the
proviso was ever shown before; none should be considered now.
Congress Willing
to Perform Duty
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Far from being remiss in its duty, Congress is in fact presently deliberating upon HB 00123, which
precisely seeks to amend RA 7653 by, inter alia, exempting from the SSL136 all positions in the
BSP.137 Accordingly, this Court should not preempt Congress, especially when the latter has already
shown its willingness and ability to perform its constitutional duty.138 After all, petitioner has not proven
any extreme urgency for this Court to shove Congress aside in terms of providing the proper solution.
Lawmaking is not a pool this Court should wade into.
The Monetary Board has enough leeway to devise its own human resource management system,
subject to the standards of professionalism and excellence that are in accordance with sound principles
of management.139 This system must also be in close conformity to the principles provided for, as well as
with the rates prescribed, under RA 6758.
More specifically, there should be “equal pay for substantially equal work” and any differences in pay
should be based “upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions.”140 In determining the basic compensation of all government personnel,
due regard should be given by the said Board to the prevailing rates for comparable work in the private
sector.141 Furthermore, the reasonableness of such compensation should be in proportion to the national
budget142 and to the possible erosion in purchasing power as a result of inflation and other factors. 143 It
should also abide by the Index of Occupational Services prepared by the Department of Budget and
Management in accordance with the Benchmark Position Schedule and other factors prescribed
thereunder.144
This Court has not been apprised as to how precisely the human resource management system of
the BSP has been misused. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is therefore presumed that
the law has been obeyed,145 and that official duty has been regularly performed146 in implementing the
said law. Where additional implementing rules would still be necessary to put the assailed provision into
continued effect, any “attack on their constitutionality would be premature.”147
Surely, it would be wise “not to anticipate the serious constitutional law problems that would arise
under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated by prudence. ”148 Attempts “at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.”149 A judicial determination is fallow when inspired by purely cerebral casuistry or emotional
puffery, especially during rowelling times.
No Denial of Equal Protection
Even if the matter of urgency is set aside for the nonce, and the Court exercises its power of judicial
review150 over acts of the legislature, 151 I respectfully submit that the Petition should still be dismissed
because the assailed provision’s continued operation will not result in a denial of equal protection.
Neither the passage of RA 7653 nor its implementation has been “committed with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”152 Every statute is intended by the legislature to
operate “no further than may be necessary to effectuate ”153 its specific purpose. In the absence of a
clear finding as to its arbitrary, whimsical or capricious application, the assailed provision cannot be
struck down as violative of the fundamental law.
Moreover, “[u]nder the ‘enrolled bill doctrine,’154 the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the [s]ecretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed, are conclusive”155 “not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.”156 It is therefore
futile to welter in the thought that the original and amended versions of the corresponding bill have no
reference to the proviso in question.157 Floor deliberations are either expansive or restrictive. Bills filed
cannot be expected to remain static; they transmute in form and substance. Whatever doubts there may
be as to the validity of any provision therein must necessarily be resolved in its favor.
Brief Background of the Equal Protection Clause
Despite the egalitarian commitment in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal,”
the framers of the original Constitution of the United States omitted any constitutional rule of equal

protection. Not until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment thereto was ratified by the legislatures of
the several states of the Union,158 did the concept of equal protection have a constitutional basis; 159 and
not until the modern era did the United States Supreme Court give it enduring constitutional significance.
From its inception, therefore, the equal protection clause in “ the broad and benign provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment”160 already sought “to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of
equality and to render it impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment. ”161 Its original
understanding was the proscription only of certain discriminatory acts based on race,162 although its
proper construction, when called to the attention of the US Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases, first involved exclusive privileges.163 Eventually, other disfavored bases of governmental action
were identified. Labeled as morally irrelevant traits, gender, illegitimacy and alienage were included in
this list.
Today, this clause is “the single most important concept x x x for the protection of individual
rights.”164 It does not, however, create substantive rights.165 Its guaranty is merely “a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.”166 Its “promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws
must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with
resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.”167
As mirrored in our Constitution,168 this clause enjoys the interpretation given by its American
framers169 and magistrates. In fact, a century ago, this Court already enunciated that “ the mere act of
cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend the [US] Constitution here, except such
parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights
formulated in the [US] Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the
general spirit of the [US] Constitution, and except those express provisions of the [US] Constitution
which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their contravention under any circumstances x x
x.”170 Being one such limitation in favor of personal rights enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment, equal
protection is thus deemed extended to our jurisdiction.
Notably, Justice Malcolm himself said that the constitutional law of Spain, then in effect, was
“entirely abrogated by the change of sovereignty.”171 As a result, it was the constitutional law of the
United States that was transposed to our fledgling political and legal system. To be precise, the principal
organic acts of the Philippines included President McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission of April 7, 1900, to which this Court recognized the United States Constitution as a
limitation172 upon the powers of the military governor then in charge of the Philippine Islands.173
In a catena of constitutional cases decided after the change in sovereignty, this Court consistently
held that the equal protection clause requires all persons or things similarly situated to “ be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects x x x should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.”174
Being a constitutional limitation first recognized175 in Rubi176—citing Yick Wo177—as one “derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ,”178 this clause prescribes certain
requirements for validity: the challenged statute must be applicable to all members of a class,
reasonable, and enforced by the regular methods of procedure prescribed, rather than by purely
arbitrary means.179 Its reasonableness must meet the requirements enumerated in Vera180 and later
summarized in Cayat.181
Three Tests Passed by Assailed Provision
I respectfully submit that the assailed provision passes the three-tiered standard of review for equal
protection that has been developed by the courts through all these years.
The Rational Basis Test
Under the first tier or the rational relationship or rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it
bears a rational relationship to an accepted governmental end.182 In other words, it must be “rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. ”183 To be reasonable, such classification must be (1) based on
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 168
substantial distinction that makes for real differences; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the same class.184
Murphy states that when a governmental classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, such
classification is in most instances reviewed under the standard rational basis test.185 Accordingly, courts
will not overturn that classification, unless the varying treatments of different groups are so unrelated to
the achievement of any legitimate purpose that the courts can only conclude that the governmental
actions are irrational.186 A classification must “be reasonable, not arbitrary, and x x x rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”187
All these conditions are met in the present case. The retention of the best and the
brightest officials in an independent central monetary authority188 is a valid governmental objective that
can be reasonably met by a corresponding exemption from a salary standardization scheme that is based
on graduated salary levels. The legislature in fact enjoys a wide berth in continually classifying whenever
it enacts a law,189 provided that no persons similarly situated within a given class are treated differently.
To contend otherwise is to be presumptuous about the legislative intent or lack of it.
Whether it would have been a better policy to make a more comprehensive classification “is not our
province to decide.”190 The absence of legislative facts supporting a classification chosen has no
significance in the rational basis test.191 In fact, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-
finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.”192 Requiring Congress to justify its efforts may even “ lead it to refrain from acting at all. ”193 In
addition, Murphy holds that the statutory classification “enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality,
and a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it.”194
Respectfully, therefore, I again differ from the ponencia’s contention that the amendments of the
charters of the seven GFIs from 1995 to 2004195 have already “unconstitutionalized” the continued
implementation of the BSP proviso. Be it remembered that the first six GFIs mentioned by Mr. Justice
Puno—namely the LBP, SSS, SBGFC, GSIS, DBP and HGC—do not stand in the same class and category
as the BSP.196
While the BSP, as mentioned earlier, is a regulatory agency performing governmental functions, the
six aforementioned GFIs perform proprietary functions that chiefly compete with private banks and other
non-bank financial institutions. Thus, the so-called concept of relative constitutionality again finds no
application. Under the rational relationship test, there can be no unequal protection of the law between
employees of the BSP and those of the GFIs. Further, the equal protection clause “guarantees equality,
not identity of rights.”197 A law remains valid even if it is limited “in the object to which it is directed.”198
“Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement x x x inevitably requires that some
persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of
the line, and the fact that the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.”199 In fact, as long as “the basic classification is rationally
based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional
concern.”200 “It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”201
On the other hand, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is also a government
regulatory agency almost on the same level of importance as the BSP. However, its charter was only
amended very recently—to be more precise, on July 27, 2004. 202 Consequently, it would be most unfair
to implicitly accuse Congress of inaction, discrimination and unequal treatment. Comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that our lawmakers be given sufficient time and leeway to address
the alleged problem of differing pay scales. “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of
judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence

and its ability to function.”203 Besides, it is a cardinal rule that courts first ascertain whether construction
of a statute is fairly possible by which any constitutional question therein may be avoided.204
To explain further, while the possible changes contemplated by Congress in HB 00123 are similar, if
not identical, to those found in the amended charters of the seven other GFIs already mentioned, the
governmental objectives as explicitly stated in the explanatory note remain—to ascertain BSP’s
effectiveness and to strengthen its supervisory capability in promoting a more stable banking system.
This fact merely confirms that the present classification and distinction under the assailed provision still
bear a rational relationship to the same legitimate governmental objectives and should, therefore, not be
invalidated.
The validity of a law is to be determined not by its effects on a particular case or by an incidental
result arising therefrom, but by the purpose and efficacy of the law in accomplishing that effect or
result.205 This point confirms my earlier position that the enactment of a law is not the same as
its operation. Unlike Vera in which the Court invalidated the law on probation because of the unequal
effect in the operation of such law,206 the assailed provision in the present case suffers from no such
invidious discrimination. It very well achieves its purpose, and it applies equally to all government
employees within the BSP. Furthermore, the application of this provision is not made subject to any
discretion, uneven appropriation of funds, or time limitation. Consequently, such a law neither denies
equal protection nor permits of such denial.
The Strict Scrutiny Test
Under the second tier or the strict scrutiny test, the Court will require the government to show a
compelling or overriding end to justify (1) the limitation on fundamental rights or (2) the implication of
suspect classes.207 Where a statutory classification impinges upon a fundamental right or burdens a
suspect class, such classification is subjected to strict scrutiny.208 It will be upheld only if it is shown to be
“suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”209
Therefore, all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a suspect class, like a single racial or
ethnic group, are immediately suspect. “That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”210 Pressing public necessity, for
instance, may justify the existence of those restrictions, but antagonism toward such suspect classes
never can.
To date, no American case—federal or state—has yet been decided involving equal pay schemes as
applied either to government employees vis-à-vis private ones, or within the governmental ranks. Salary
grade or class of position is not a fundamental right like
marriage,211 procreation,212 voting,213 speech214 and interstate travel.215 American courts have in fact even
refused to declare government employment a fundamental right.216 As to suspect classes, non-exempt
government employees (those with salary grades below 20) are not a group “ saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness, as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.”217 They are a group so much unlike race,218 nationality,219 alienage220 or denominational
preference221—factors that are “seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy x x x.”222
Again, with due respect, the ponencia’s223 reference to Yick Wo,224 therefore, is unbefitting. Indeed
that case held that “[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the [C]onstitution. ”225 The facts in Yick
Wo clearly point out that the questioned ordinances therein—regulating the use of wooden buildings in
the business of keeping and conducting laundries—operated in hostility to the race and nationality to
which plaintiffs belonged, being aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China.226 To a board of supervisors
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 169
was given the arbitrary power to withhold permits to carry on a harmless and useful occupation on
which the plaintiffs depended for livelihood.227
In contrast, no such arbitrariness is found in the case at bar. Neither is there any allegation of abuse
of discretion in the implementation of a human resource development program. There is also no
allegation of hostility shown toward employees receiving salaries below grade 20.
In fact, for purposes of equal protection analysis, financial need alone does not identify a suspect
class.228 And even if it were to consider government pay to be akin to wealth, it has already been held
that “where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages.”229 After all, a law does not become invalid “ because of simple
inequality,”230 financial or otherwise.
Since employment in the government is not a fundamental right and government employees below
salary grade 20 are not a suspect class, the government is not required to present a compelling objective
to justify a possible infringement under the strict scrutiny test. The assailed provision thus cannot be
invalidated via the strict scrutiny gauntlet. “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”231
The Intensified Means Test
Under the third tier or the intensified means test, the Court should accept the legislative end, but should
closely scrutinize its relationship to the classification made. 232 There exist classifications that are
subjected to a higher or intermediate degree of scrutiny than the deferential or traditional rational basis
test. These classifications, however, have not been deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental
rights; thus, they have not been subjected to the strict scrutiny test. In other words, such classifications
must be “substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.”233 Examples of these so-
called “quasi-suspect” classifications are those based on gender,234 legitimacy under certain
circumstances,235 legal residency with regard to availment of free public education, civil service
employment preference for armed forces veterans who are state residents upon entry to military service,
and the right to practice for compensation the profession for which certain persons have been qualified
and licensed.236
Non-exempt government employees may be a sensitive but not a suspect class, and their
employment status may be important although not fundamental. Yet, the enactment of the assailed
provision is a reasonable means by which the State seeks to advance its interest. 237 Since such
provision sufficiently serves important governmental interests and is substantially related to the
achievement thereof, then, again it stands.
“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” 238 “The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that x x x the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality.”239
A statute, therefore, “is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it
did, or because it may not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce.”240 Congress
does not have to “strike at all evils at the same time. ”241 Quoting Justice Holmes, a law “aimed at what is
deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset
by thinking up and enumerating other instances to which [the law] might have been applied equally
well, so far as the court can see. That is for the legislature to judge[,] unless the case is very
clear.”242 This Court is without power to disturb a legislative judgment, unless “there is no fair reason for
the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched. ”243 To
find fault with a legislative policy “is not to establish the invalidity of the law based upon it.”244

Epilogue
After that rather lengthy discourse, permit me to summarize. I respectfully submit that the assailed
provision is not unconstitutional either on its face or as applied.
First, the theory of relative constitutionality is inapplicable to and not in pari materia with the present
facts. It pertains only to the circumstances that an assailed law specifically addressed upon its passage,
and not to extraneous circumstances.
The American cases cited in the ponencia prove my point. The laws therein that have been declared
invalid because of “altered circumstances” or “changed conditions” are of the emergency type passed in
the exercise of the State’s police power, unlike the law involved in the present case. Moreover, our ruling
in Rutter does not apply, because the assailed provision in the present case is not a remedial measure
subject to a period within which a right of action or a remedy is suspended. Since the reason for the
passage of the law still continues, the law itself must continue.
Second, this Court should respect Congress as a coequal branch of government. No urgency has
been shown as to require the peremptory striking down of the assailed provision, and no injuries have
been demonstrated to have been sustained as to require immediate action on the judiciary’s part.
The legislative classification of BSP employees into exempt and non-exempt, based on the salary
grade of their positions, and their further distinction (albeit perhaps not by design) from the employees
of various GFIs are nevertheless valid and reasonable in achieving the standards of professionalism and
excellence within the BSP—standards that are in accordance with sound principles of management and
the other principles provided for under RA 6758. They are employees not subjected to the same levels of
difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements. Besides, the BSP performs primarily
governmental or regulatory functions, while the GFIs cited in the ponencia execute purely
proprietary ones.
Congress is in fact presently deliberating upon possible amendments to the assailed provision. Since
there is no question that it validly exercised its power and did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
enacted the law, its will must be sustained. Under the doctrine of separation of powers with concomitant
respect for coequal and coordinate branches of government, this Court has neither the authority nor the
competence to create or amend laws.
Third, the assailed provision passes the three-tiered standard of review for equal protection. It is
both a social and an economic measure rationally related to a governmental end that is not prohibited.
Since salary grade, class of position, and government employment are not fundamental or constitutional
rights, and non-exempt government employees or their financial need are not suspect classes, the
government is not at all required to show a compelling state interest to justify the classification made.
The provision is also substantially related to the achievement of sufficiently important governmental
objectives. A law does not become invalid because of simple inequality, or because it did not strike at all
evils at the same time.
At bottom, whichever constitutional test is used, the assailed provision is not unconstitutional.
Moreover, a thorough scrutiny of the Petition reveals that the issue of equal protection has been raised
only in regard to the unconstitutionality of the proviso at its inception, 245 and not by reason of the
alleged “changed conditions” propounded by the ponencia. With greater reason then that the Petition
should be denied.
In our jurisdiction, relative constitutionality is a rarely utilized theory having radical consequences;
hence, I believe it should not be imposed by the Court unilaterally. Even in the US, it applies only when
there is a change in factual circumstances covered by the law, not when there is an enactment of
another law pertaining to subjects not directly covered by the assailed law . Whether factual conditions
have so changed as to call for a partial or even a total abrogation of the law is a matter that rests
primarily within the constitutional prerogative of Congress to determine. 246 To justify a judicial
nullification, the constitutional breach of a legal provision must be very clear and unequivocal, not
doubtful or argumentative.247
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 170
In short, this Court can go no further than to inquire whether Congress had the power to enact a
law; it cannot delve into the wisdom of policies it adopts or into the adequacy under existing conditions
of measures it enacts.248 The equal protection clause is not a license for the courts “to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices. ”249 Since relative constitutionality was not discussed by the parties
in any of their pleadings, fundamental fairness and evenhandedness still dictate that Congress be heard
on this concept before the Court imposes it in a definitive ruling.
Just a final observation at this juncture. It seems to me that when RA 7653 was enacted, the real
focus of the second paragraph of Section 15(c) of Chapter 1 of Article II of the statute was to enable
the officers and executives of the BSP to enjoy a wider scope of exemption from the Compensation
Classification System than that stated in the last part of Section 9 of the Salary Standardization Law. As
can be gleaned from the deliberations on the bill, the mention of BSP employees with salary grade 19
and below seems to have been purely incidental in the process of defining who were part of the
executive and officer corps. It appears that the “classification” (if we can call it that) of the rank and
filers with salary grade 19 and below, via the challenged proviso, came about not by design. And it was
only after the later pieces of legislation were promulgated affecting the charters of the LBP, GSIS, SSS,
DBP, etc. that the proviso came to be considered as “discriminatory.”
In these trying times, I cannot but sympathize with the BSP rank and filers on account of the
situation they have found themselves in, and I do not mean to begrudge them the opportunity to receive
a higher compensation package than what they are receiving now. However, they are operating on the
simplistic assumption that, being rank and file employees employed in a GFI, they are automatically
entitled to the same benefits, privileges, increases and the like enjoyed by any other rank and file
employee of a GFI, seeing as they are all working for one and the same government anyway.
It could also have something to do with the fact that Central Bank employees were quite well paid in
the past. They may have overlooked the fact that the different GFIs are regulated by their respective
charters, and are mandated to perform different functions (governmental or proprietary). Consequently,
their requirements and priorities are likewise different, and differ in importance in the overall scheme of
things, thus necessitating some degree of differentiation and calibration in respect of resource allocation,
budgets and appropriations, and the like.
The long and short of it is that there can be no such thing as an automatic entitlement to increases
in compensation, benefits and so forth, whether we consider the BSP rank and filers similarly situated
along with other rank and filers of GFIs, or as being in a class by themselves. This is because the BSP is,
strictly speaking, not a GFI but rather, the regulatory agency of GFIs.
The foregoing becomes even more starkly clear when mention is again made of the fiscal/budget
deficit hobbling the national government, which has, not surprisingly, triggered waves of belt tightening
measures throughout every part of the bureaucracy. This particular scenario puts Congress somewhat at
odds with itself. On the one hand, it is studying HB 00123 with the end in view of precisely addressing
the principal concern of the petitioner. On the other hand, it is also looking into how the various
exemptions from the Salary Standardization Law can be rationalized or done away with, in the hope of
ultimately reducing the gargantuan deficit.
Thankfully, the Court is not the one having to grapple with such a conundrum. It behooves us to
give Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate and prerogative, as much elbow room and
breathing space as it needs in order to tackle and perhaps vanquish the many headed monster.
And while we all watch from the sidelines, we can all console ourselves and one another that after
all, whether we find ourselves classified-out as BSP rank and filers, or officers and executives, or
employees and members of the judiciary, we are—all of us—in the same boat, for we have all chosen to
be in “public service,” as the term is correctly understood. And what is public service if it does not entail
a certain amount of personal sacrifice on the part of each one of us, all for the greater good of our
society and country. We each make our respective sacrifices, sharing in the burden today, in the hope of

a better tomorrow for our children and loved ones, and our society as a whole. It makes us strong. For
this we can be thankful as well.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. I maintain that the last proviso of the second
paragraph of Section 15(c) of Chapter 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is constitutional. Congress
should be given adequate opportunity to enact the appropriate legislation that will address the issue
raised by petitioner and clear the proviso of any possible or perceived infringement of the equal
protection clause. At the very least, Congress and herein respondents should be given notice and
opportunity to respond to the possible application of the theory of relative constitutionality before it is, if
at all, imposed by this Court.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
First, the majority opinion does not annul a law but enacts a pending bill in Congress into law. The
majority opinion invades the legislative domain by enacting into law a bill that the 13th Congress is now
considering for approval. The majority opinion does this in the guise of annulling a proviso in Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 (“RA 7653”).
Second, the majority opinion erroneously classifies the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (“BSP”), a
regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions, in the same category as non-regulatory corporations
exercising purely commercial functions like Land Bank of the Philippines (“LBP”), Social Security System
(“SSS”), Government Service Insurance System (“GSIS”), Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”),
Small Borrowers Guarantee Fund Corporation (“SBGFC”), and Home Guarantee Corporation (“HGC”).
Usurpation of Legislative Power
There is a bill now pending in Congress, House Bill No. 123, seeking to exempt the rank-and-file
employees of BSP from the Salary Standardization Law (“SSL”). A similar bill was filed in the 12th
Congress together with the bill exempting from the SSL all officials and employees of Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“PDIC”). The bill exempting PDIC employees from SSL was approved on 27 July
2004 in the dying days of the 12th Congress. However, due to lack of time, the bill exempting BSP rank-
and-file employees did not reach third reading.
What the majority opinion wants is to preempt Congress by declaring through a judicial decision that
BSP rank-and-file employees are now exempt from the SSL. The majority opinion seeks to legislate the
exemption from SSL by declaring void the proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653 (“proviso”),
which states:
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board’s
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral’s human resource
development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely
as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758. Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19
and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758 .
(Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion justifies its action by saying that while the proviso was valid when first enacted, it
is now invalid because its continued operation is discriminatory against BSP rank-and-file employees. All
officials and employees of other government financial institutions (“GFIs”) like GSIS, LBP, DBP, SSS,
SBGFC, HGC and PDIC are now exempt from the SSL. Congress granted the exemptions over the years,
for LBP in 1995, SSS in 1997, GSIS in 1997, SBGFC in 1997, DBP in 1998, HGC in 2000, and PDIC in
2004.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 171
Among the GFIs granted exemption from SSL, only PDIC is a regulatory agency. PDIC received its
SSL exemption only this year—2004. PDIC is the first regulatory GFI whose rank-and-file employees are
exempt from the SSL. Rank-and-file employees of BSP, a GFI exercising regulatory functions, cannot at
this time claim any unreasonable or oppressive delay in securing legislative exemption from SSL,
assuming Congress is disposed to grant an exemption.
At this time, this Court cannot say that the continued validity of the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA
7653 is unreasonable and oppressive on BSP rank-and-file employees. This Court cannot say that
Congress gravely abused its jurisdiction in not exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL at
the same time as PDIC. Congress is now considering BSP’s exemption, and this Court cannot imperiously
conclude that Congress had more than enough time to act on BSP’s exemption.
Even if Congress does not act on BSP’s exemption for more than one year, it does not follow that
this Court should then exempt BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL. As the law now stands, PDIC
is the only regulatory GFI whose rank-and-file employees are exempt from SSL. All other GFIs exercising
regulatory functions are not exempt from the SSL, including BSP whose rank-and file employees are
subject to the SSL.
The grant of exemption to PDIC is the legislative act that is questionable for being discriminatory
against all other self-sustaining government agencies exercising regulatory functions. Such grant to one
regulatory agency, without a similar grant to other regulatory agencies whose incomes exceed their
expenses, creates a class of exemption that has dubious basis. In short, the singular exemption of PDIC
from the SSL discriminates against all other self-sustaining government agencies that exercise regulatory
functions.
The grant of SSL exemption to GFIs has ramifications on the deepening budget deficit of the
government. Under Republic Act No. 7656,1 all GFIs are required to remit to the National Treasury at
least 50% of their annual net earnings. This remittance forms part of the government revenues that
fund the annual appropriations act. If the remittances from GFIs decrease, the national revenues funding
the annual appropriations act correspondingly decrease. This results in widening even more the budget
deficit.
A bigger budget deficit means there are no revenues to fund salary increases of all government
employees who are paid out of the annual appropriations act. The exemption of GFIs from SSL may
delay or even prevent a general increase in the salary of all government employees, including rank-and-
file employees in the judiciary. This Court cannot simply ordain an exemption from SSL without
considering serious ramifications on fiscal policies of the government. This is a matter better left to the
Executive and Legislative Departments. This Court cannot intrude into fiscal policies that are the province
of the Executive and Legislative Departments.
Indeed, Congress should pass a law rationalizing the exemptions of all government agencies from
the SSL. The piecemeal grant of exemptions is creating distortions in the salary structure of government
employees similarly situated. Such rationalization, however, is not the function of the Court. Even as a
practical matter, this Court does not have the necessary data to rationalize the exemptions of all
government agencies from the SSL.
The power of judicial review of legislative acts presumes that Congress has enacted a law that may
violate the Constitution. This Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review before Congress has
enacted the questioned law. In this case, Congress is still considering the bill exempting BSP rank-and-
file employees from the SSL. There is still no opportunity for this Court to exercise its review power
because there is nothing to review.
The majority opinion, however, claims that because of the failure of Congress to enact the bill
exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL, this Court should now annul the proviso in Section
15(c) of RA 7653 to totally exempt BSP from the SSL. This is no longer an exercise of the power of
judicial review but an exercise of the power of legislation—a power that this Court does not possess. The
power to exempt a government agency from the SSL is a legislative power, not a judicial power. By

annulling a prior valid law that has the effect of exempting BSP from the SSL, this Court is exercising a
legislative power.
The power of judicial review is the power to strike down an unconstitutional act of a department or
agency of government, not the power to initiate or perform an act that is lodged in another department
or agency of government. If this Court strikes down the law exempting PDIC from the SSL because it is
discriminatory against other government agencies similarly situated, this Court is exercising its judicial
review power. The effect is to revert PDIC to its previous situation of being subject to the SSL, the same
situation governing BSP and other agencies similarly situated.
However, by annulling the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653, BSP is not reverted to its previous
situation but brought to a new situation that BSP cannot attain without a new legislation.  Other
government agencies similarly situated as BSP remain in their old situation—still being subject to the
SSL. This is not an annulment of a legislative act but an enactment of legislation exempting one agency
from the SSL without exempting the remaining agencies similarly situated.
The majority opinion cites Rutter v. Esteban2 as precedent for declaring the proviso in Section
15(c) of RA 7653 unconstitutional. Rutter is not applicable to the present case. In Rutter, the Court
declared on 18 May 1953 that while the Debt Moratorium Law was valid when enacted on 26 July 1948,
its “continued operation and enforcement x x x is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer.” With the discontinuance of the effectivity of the Debt Moratorium Law, the
debtors who benefited from the law were returned to their original situation prior to the enactment of
the law. This meant that the creditors could resume collecting from the debtors the debts the payment
of which was suspended by the Debt Moratorium Law. The creditors and debtors were restored to their
original situation before the enactment of the Debt Moratorium Law. No debtor or creditor was placed in
a new situation that required the enactment of a new law.
In the present case, declaring the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653 no longer legally
effective does not restore the BSP rank-and-file employees to their original situation,  which subjected
them to the SSL. Instead, the discontinuance of the validity of the proviso brings the BSP rank-and-file
employees to a new situation that they are not entitled without the enactment of a new law. The effect
of the majority decision is to legislate a new law that brings the BSP rank-and-file employees to a new
situation. Clearly, the Rutter doctrine does not apply to the present case.
Erroneous Classification of BSP as GFI Similar to LBP, DBP and Others
The majority opinion classifies BSP as a GFI just like GSIS, LBP, DBP, SSS, SBGFC, HGC and PDIC. Here
lies the basic error of the majority opinion. GSIS, LBP, DBP, SSS, SBGFC and HGC are GFIs but are not
regulatory agencies. BSP and PDIC are GFIs but are also regulatory agencies just like other
governmental regulatory agencies. The majority opinion is comparing apples with oranges. GFIs that do
not exercise regulatory functions operate just like commercial financial institutions. However, GFIs that
exercise regulatory functions, like BSP and PDIC, are unlike commercial financial institutions. BSP and
PDIC exercise sovereign functions unlike the other non-regulatory GFIs.
Non-regulatory GFIs derive their income solely from commercial transactions. They compete head on
with private financial institutions. Their operating expenses, including employees’ salaries, come from
their own self-generated income from commercial activities. However, regulatory GFIs like BSP and PDIC
derive their income from fees, charges and other impositions that all banks are by law required to pay.
Regulatory GFIs have no competitors in the private sector. Obviously, BSP and PDIC do not belong to
the same class of GFIs as LBP, SSS, GSIS, SBGFC, DBP and HGC.
Exempting non-regulatory GFIs from the SSL is justified because these GFIs operate just like private
commercial entities. Their revenues, from which they pay the salaries of their employees, come solely
from commercial operations. None of their revenues comes from mandatory government exactions. This
is not the case of GFIs like BSP and PDIC which impose regulatory fees and charges.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 172
Conclusion
Under the Constitution, Congress is an independent department that is a co-equal of the Supreme Court.
This Court has always accorded Congress the great respect that it deserves under the Constitution. The
power to legislate belongs to Congress. The power to review enacted legislation belongs to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has no power to declare a pending bill in Congress as deemed enacted into
law. That is not the power to review legislation but the power to usurp a legislative function.
The majority opinion is leading this Court into usurping the primary jurisdiction of Congress to enact
laws. The majority opinion brings this Court and Congress into a needless clash of powers—whether the
power of judicial review of legislative acts includes the power to initiate legislative acts if this Court
becomes impatient with the pace of legislative process. Clearly, this Court does not have the power to
legislate. Congress has a right to guard zealously its primary power to enact laws as much as this Court
has a right to guard zealously its power to review enacted legislations.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Is being an employee of a Government Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC) or a Government
Financial Institution (GFI) a reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption from the compensation and
position classification system for all government personnel provided in Republic Act No. 6758, 1 entitled
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, also known as the Salary Standardization Law?
The main opinion, by simultaneously applying two different standards for determining compliance
with the constitutional requirement of equal protection—the “rational basis test” and the “strict scrutiny
test”—under the rubric of “relative constitutionality,” holds that it is.
Upon studied reflection, however, I find that such conclusion is contrary to the weight of the
applicable legal authorities; involves an evaluation of the wisdom of the law and a pre-emption of the
congressional power of appropriation, which are both beyond the scope of judicial review; and results in
increased, rather than reduced, inequality within the government service—creating, as it does, a
preferred subclass of government employees, i.e. employees of GFIs, devoid of either a rational factual
basis or a discernable public purpose for such classification.
Consequently, I am constrained to respectfully register my dissent.
The relevant antecedents of this case are as follows:
On August 21, 1989, R.A. No. 6758 (the Salary Standardization Law), amending Presidential Decree
No. 985 (the Old Salary Standardization Law), was enacted2 in response to the mandate to provide for a
standardized compensation scale for all government employees, including those employed in GOCCs,
under Section 5, Article IX-B, of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking
into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.
This provision was taken from the 1973 Constitution in order to address the wide disparity of
compensation between government employees employed in proprietary corporations and those strictly
performing governmental functions, the disparity, having been brought about by the increasing number
of exemptions of proprietary corporations through special legislation from the coverage of the then
Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972.3 Part III, Chapter II, Article II of the latter stated:
Article II—Reexamination of the WAPCO4 Plans

After thirteen years in operation, the WAPCO Plans have been undermined by the increasing number of
exemptions from its coverage through special legislation. Moreover, through court decisions and the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the so-called proprietary corporations are no longer subject to the
Plans. Through collective bargaining, employees of government corporations have been able to secure
not only higher salaries but liberal fringe benefits as well. As revealed by the 1970 Presidential
Committee to Study Corporate Salary Scales, the average compensation in some of these corporations,
using the average compensation of positions covered by the WAPCO Plans as base (100%), is as follows:
DBP - 203%, CB - 196%, GSIS -147%, SSS - 150%, and NWSA - 111%.5
Thus, the stated policy behind the Salary Standardization Law is to provide equal pay for substantially
equal work and-to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions, while giving due regard to, among others, prevailing rates in
the private sector for comparable work:
SECTION 2. Statement of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal
pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences
in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In
determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the
private sector for comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Managements
(DBM) is hereby directed to establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System, hereinafter referred to as the System, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as
amended, that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by the Constitution.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Salary Standardization Law applies to all positions, whether elective or appointive within the entire
length and breadth of the Civil Service including those in the GOCCs and GFIs:
Sec. 4. Coverage.—The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall
apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or
hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and government financial institutions.
The term “government” refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus,
offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes,
state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term “government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions” shall include all corporations and financial
institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial
institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Nota bene, Section 21 of the Salary Standardization Law provides that “[a]ll provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597, which are not inconsistent with this Act
and are not expressly modified, revoked or repealed in this Act shall continue to be in full force and
effect.” Thus, the definition of terms found in Section 3 of P.D. No. 985 continues to be applicable to the
Salary Standardization Law, including:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Decree, the following shall mean:
xxx
1. c.Class (of position)—The basic unit of the Position Classification System. A class consists of all
those positions in the system which are sufficiently similar as to (1) kind or subject matter of
work, (2) level of difficulty and responsibility, and (3) the qualification requirements of the
work, to warrant similar treatment in personnel and pay administration.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 173
2. d.Class Specification or Standards—A written description of a class of position(s). It
distinguishes the duties, responsibilities and qualification requirements of positions in a given
class from those of other classes in the Position Classification System.
3. e.Classification—The act of arranging positions according to broad occupational groupings and
determining differences of classes within each group.
xxx
4. g.Compensation or Pay System—A system for determining rates of pay for positions and
employees based on equitable principles to be applied uniformly to similar cases. It consists,
among others, of the Salary and Wage Schedules for all positions, and the rules and
regulations for its administration.
5. h.Grade—Includes all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or
subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibility
and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of
positions within one range of basic compensation.
xxx
6. m.Position—A set of duties and responsibilities, assigned or delegated by competent authority
and performed by an individual either on full-time or part-time basis. A position may be filled
or vacant.
7. n.Position Classification—The grouping of positions into classes on the basis of similarity of kind
and level of work, and the determination of the relative worth of those classes of positions.
8. o.Position Classification System—A system for classifying positions by occupational groups,
series and classes, according to similarities or differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements. It consists of (1) classes and class specifications and (2) the rules
and regulations for its installation and maintenance and for the interpretation, amendment
and alternation of the classes and class specifications to keep pace with the changes in the
service and the positions therein.
xxx
1. q.Reclassification or Reallocation—A change in the classification of a position either as a result
of a change in its duties and responsibilities sufficient to warrant placing the position in a
different class, or as result of a reevaluation of a position without a significant change in
duties and responsibilities.
2. r.Salary or Wage Adjustment—A salary or wage increase towards the minimum of the grade, or
an increase from a non-prescribed rate to a prescribed rate within the grade.
3. s.Salary or Wage Grade—The numerical place on the salary or Wage Schedule representing
multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class.
4. t.Salary or Wage Schedule—A numerical structure in the Compensation System consisting of
several grades, each grade with multiple steps with a percentage differential throughout the
pay table. A classified position is assigned a corresponding grade in the Schedule.
5. u.Salary or Wage Step Increment—An increase in salary or wage from one step to another step
within the grade from the minimum to maximum. Also known as within grade increase.
xxx
At the same time, Section 16 of the Salary Standardization Law expressly repealed all laws, decrees,
executive orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof that exempted government
agencies, including GOCCs and GFIs from the coverage of the new Compensation and Position
Classification System:

Sec. 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations.—All laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate
charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the coverage of the System,
or that authorize and fix position classification, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified positions, or
groups of officials and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with the System, including the
proviso under Section 2, and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 985 are hereby repealed.
Thus, all exemptions from the integrated Compensation Classification System granted prior to the
effectivity of the Salary Standardization Law, including those under Sections 26 and 167 of Presidential
Decree No. 985 (the Old Salary Standardization Law) as well as under the respective GOCC and GFI
charters, were repealed,8 subject to the non-diminution provision of Section 12.9 As a result, the general
rule is that all government employees, including employees of GOCCs and GFIs, are covered by the
Compensation Classification System provided for by the Salary Standardization Law.
Nonetheless, Congress acknowledged the need of GOCCs and GFIs performing proprietary functions
to maintain competitive salaries comparable to the private sector with respect to key top-level
positions in order not to lose these personnel to the private sector. Thus, Section 9 of the Salary
Standardization Law empowers the President, in truly exceptional cases, to approve higher
compensation, exceeding Salary Grade 30, to the chairman, president, general manager, and the board
of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions:
SECTION 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions.—For positions below the Officials mentioned
under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government
units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget
and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the
Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and
experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the nature and
complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical
strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for
accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10)
hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
xxx
In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or administrator,
and the board of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions exceed Salary Grade 30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional
cases, approve higher compensation for the aforesaid officials.  (Emphasis and italics supplied)
On July 3, 1993, Republic Act No. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, took effect. Section 15 (c) thereof
authorizes the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to institute a compensation
structure based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys as an integral component of the BSP’s
human resource development program, thereby implicitly providing for a wider scope of exemption from
the Compensation Classification System than that found in the last paragraph of Section 9 of the Salary
Standardization Law, to wit:
SEC. 15. Exercise of Authority.—In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall;
xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 174
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral’s human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make
its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No.
6758. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
However, the last proviso of Section 15 (c) expressly provides that the compensation and wage structure
of employees whose positions fall under Salary Grade (SG) 19 and below shall, like all other government
employees, be in accordance with the rates prescribed under the Salary Standardization Law.
Thus, on account of the above-quoted provision, BSP rank and file employees with (SG) 19 and
below, like their counterparts in the other branches of the civil service, are paid in accordance with the
rates prescribed in the New Salary Scale under the Salary Standardization Law, while officers with SG 20
and above are exempt from the coverage of said law, they being paid pursuant to the New Salary Scale
containing Salary Grades A to J10 issued by the Monetary Board which took effect on January 1, 2000.
The Case for the Petitioner
The Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc., via the instant petition
for prohibition filed on June 8, 2001, seeks to prohibit herein respondents BSP and the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President from further implementing the last proviso of Chapter I, Article
II, Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act, which it assails as unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause,11 hence, null and void.
It is petitioner’s allegation that the application of the Compensation Classification System under the
Salary Standardization Law to the rank and file employees, but not the BSP’s officers, would violate the
equal protection clause as the former are placed in a less favorable position compared to the latter.
Petitioner asserts that the classification of BSP employees into two classes based solely on the SG of
their positions is not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences. For, so petitioner
contends, all BSP personnel are similarly situated since, regardless of the salary grade, they are
appointed by the Monetary Board and required to possess civil service eligibilities, observe the same
office rules and regulations, and work at the same national or regional offices, and, even if their
individual duties differ, directly or indirectly their work would still pertain to the operation and functions
of the BSP.12 More specifically, it argues that there is “nothing between SGs 19 and 20 that should
warrant the parting of the BSP ‘Red Sea’ of civil servants into two distinct camps of the privileged and
the less privileged.”13
Petitioner further submits that the personnel of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Social Security
System (SSS) are all exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. Thus, within the
class of rank and file personnel of government financial institutions, the BSP rank and file personnel are
also discriminated upon.14
The Case for Respondent Executive Secretary
On the other hand, respondent Executive Secretary, through the Solicitor General, contends that the
assailed proviso does not violate the equal protection clause. He submits that the classification of BSP
employees relative to compensation, structure is based on actual and real differentiation between
employees exercising managerial functions and the rank and file,15 even as it strictly adheres to the
enunciated policy in The New Central Bank Act to establish professionalism and excellence within the
BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.16

In addition, he notes that Article II, Section 15 (c) serves as an exemption to the Salary
Standardization Law which, for all intents and purposes is a general law applicable to all government
employees. As such, the provision exempting certain BSP employees from its coverage must be strictly
construed.17
The Case for Respondent Bangko Sentral
Likewise advancing the view that the assailed proviso is constitutional, respondent BSP argues that
Congress, in passing the New Central Bank Act, has in fact determined that there are substantial reasons
for classifying BSP employees into those covered by the Salary Standardization Law and those not
covered by the Salary Standardization Law.18
However, BSP additionally claims that while the assailed proviso is constitutional, the manner by
which it is implemented may give rise to the question of constitutional infirmity.19 It thus proffers that
the assailed provision should be interpreted together with the other provisions of The New Central Bank
Act, such as that vesting it with “fiscal and administrative autonomy” and that directing the Monetary
Board to “establish professionalism and excellence in all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management.”20 It concludes that the assailed provision does not adopt provisions of the Salary
Standardization Law in their entirety, but refers only to the basic pay of the employees and does not
cover other benefits which it (the BSP) may deem necessary to grant its employees.21
Admittedly, the BSP Monetary Board has endeavored to grant additional allowances to the “rank and
file” so that they may be given substantially similar benefits being enjoyed by the officers. The
Commission on Audit (COA), however, disallowed these additional allowances on the ground that the
grant of the same violates the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law and The New Central Bank
Act.22
Issues for Resolution
In essence, petitioner asserts that its members are similarly situated to both the executive/officer corps
of the BSP and the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS such that the operation of
the equal protection guaranty in either case would entitle them to be placed under a compensation and
position classification system outside of that mandated by the Salary Standardization Law.
Clearly, the resolution of the instant petition hinges on a determination of whether the right of
petitioner’s members to the equal protection of the laws has been violated by (a) the classification in The
New Central Bank Act between the executive personnel (those with SG 20 and above), who are exempt
from the Compensation Classification System mandated under the Salary Standardization Law, and the
rank and file employees (those with SG 19 and below) who are covered by the latter; and/or (b) the
disparity in treatment between the rank and file employees of the BSP and the rank and file employees
of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, who were subsequently exempted from said Compensation Classification
System by their amended charters.
Put differently, the instant Petition presents two principal issues for resolution: (1) whether the
distinction between managerial and rank and file employees in The New Central Bank Act partakes of an
invidious discrimination proscribed by the equal protection clause; and (2) whether, by operation of the
equal protection clause, the rank and file employees of the BSP are entitled to exemption from the
Compensation Classification System mandated under the Salary Standardization Law as a consequence
of the exemption of the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS.
Standards for Equal Protection Analysis
Before proceeding to resolve these issues, it may serve the ends of clarity to first review the basic
framework by which the courts analyze challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as well as the
standards by which compliance with the equal protection clause may be determined.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 175
Presumption of Constitutionality
It is a basic axiom of constitutional law that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality
and a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted. Thus, if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, the same should
be upheld. Consequently, the burden is squarely on the shoulders of the one alleging unconstitutionality
to prove invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt by negating all possible bases for the constitutionality of a
statute.23Verily, to doubt is to sustain.24
The rationale for this presumption in favor of constitutionality and the corresponding restraint on the
part of the judicial branch was expounded upon by Justice Laurel in the case of People v. Vera,25 viz.:
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved
by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of
upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. “The question of
the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.”
(U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil. 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil. 250,
276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil. 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the
sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken
an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to
this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate
the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn
declarations of two of the three grand departments of the government. (6 R. C. L., p. 101.)
Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the
wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.26 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Indeed, it has been observed that classification is the essence of legislation. 27 On this point, the
observation of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney28 is illuminating:
The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States all power
of classification. Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the
law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described by the
law. When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a
class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern. The calculus of effects, the manner in which a
particular law reverberates in a society is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility. In
assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is called upon only to measure the basic validity of the
legislative classification. When some other independent right is not at stake and when there is
no “reason to infer antipathy,” it is presumed that “even improvident decisions will
eventually
be rectified by the democratic process . . .”29(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Hence, in enacting laws, the legislature is accorded the widest scope of discretion within the bounds of
the Constitution; and the courts, in exercising their power of judicial review, do not inquire into the
wisdom of the law. On this point, this Court in Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and
Sarmiento,30 stated:
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.—
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must
not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of
police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force

of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom,
of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to
implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts,
although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a
reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so
early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of
the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy,
and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Only by faithful adherence to this principle of judicial review is it possible to preserve to the legislature
its prerogatives under the Constitution and its ability to function.32
The presumption of constitutionality notwithstanding, the courts are nevertheless duty bound to strike
down any statute which transcends the bounds of the Constitution including any classification which is
proven to be unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive.
The question that arises then is by what standard(s) should the reasonableness, and therefore the
validity, of a legislative classification be measured?
The Rational Basis Test
It may be observed that, in the Philippines, the traditional and oft-applied standard is the so-called
“rational basis test,” the requisites of which were first summarized by Justice (later Chief Justice) Moran
in the case of People v. Cayat,33 to wit:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to
all members of the same class.34 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
To the foregoing may be added the following observations of the Court in Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado,35 to wit:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age,
would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is
meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars.36 (Emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 176
The Rational Basis Test has been described as adopting a “deferential” attitude towards legislative
classifications. As previously discussed, this “deference” comes from the recognition that classification is
often an unavoidable element of the task of legislation which, under the separation of powers embodied
in our Constitution, is primarily the prerogative of Congress.
Indeed, in the United States, from where the equal protection provision of our Constitution has its
roots, the Rational Basis Test remains a primary standard for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute.
Thus, in Lying v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW,37 where a statute providing that no household may become eligible to
participate in the food stamp program while any of its members are on strike, or receive an increase in
the allotment of food stamps already being received because the income of the striking member has
decreased, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
Because the statute challenged here has no substantial impact on any fundamental interest
and does not “affect with particularity any protected class,” we confine our consideration to
whether the statutory classification is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.” We have stressed that this standard of review is typically quite deferential;
legislative classifications are “presumed to be valid,” largely for the reason that “the
drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and
unavoidable one.”
xxx
We have little trouble in concluding that § 109 is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes. The Senate
Report declared: “Public policy demands an end to the food stamp subsidization of all strikers who
become eligible for the program solely through the temporary loss of income during a strike. Union strike
funds should be responsible for providing support and benefits to strikers during labor-management
disputes.” It was not part of the purposes of the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would
serve as a weapon in labor disputes; the Act was passed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and to
strengthen the agricultural economy. The Senate Report stated that “allowing strikers to be eligible for
food stamps has damaged the program’s public integrity” and thus endangers these other goals served
by the program. Congress acted in response to these problems.
xxx
It is true that in terms of the scope and extent of their ineligibility for food stamps, § 109 is harder
on strikers than on “voluntary quitters.” But the concern about neutrality in labor disputes does not arise
with respect to those who, for one reason or another, simply quit their jobs. As we have stated in a
related context, even if the statute “provides only ‘rough justice,’ its treatment ... is far from
irrational.” Congress need not draw a statutory classification to the satisfaction of the most
sharp-eyed observers in order to meet the limitations that the Constitution imposes in this
setting. And we are not authorized to ignore Congress’ considered efforts to avoid
favoritism in labor disputes, which are evidenced also by the two significant provisos
contained in the statute. The first proviso preserves eligibility for the program of any household that
was eligible to receive stamps “immediately prior to such strike.” The second proviso makes clear that
the statutory ineligibility for food stamps does not apply “to any household that does not contain a
member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a
strike or lockout.” In light of all this, the statute is rationally related to the stated objective of
maintaining neutrality in private labor disputes.38 (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations and footnotes
omitted)
More recently, the American Court summarized the principles behind the application of the Rational Basis
Test in its jurisdiction in Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 39 as
follows:

Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of
social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485, 110 S.Ct. 2499,
2504, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-603, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 3016-
3018, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-
179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459-462, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-485, 90
S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). Where there are “plausible reasons” for Congress’
action, “our inquiry is at an end.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S., at
179, 101 S.Ct, at 461. This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. “The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
branch has acted.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).
On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act comes to us
bearing a strong presumption of validity, see Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 370, 108
S.Ct. 1184, 1192, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988), and those attacking the rationality of the legislative
classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it.” Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d
351 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-332, 101
S.Ct. 2376, 2387, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981). Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate
its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. United States Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S., at 179, 101 S.Ct., at 461.  See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 612, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). Thus, the absence of “ ‘legislative facts’ ”
explaining the distinction “[o]n the record,” 294 U.S.App.D.C, at 389, 959 F.2d, at 987,  has no
significance in rational-basis analysis. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15, 112 S.Ct. 2326,
2334, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. See Vance v.
Bradley, supra, 440 U.S., at 111, 99 S.Ct., at 949, See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981). “ ‘Only by faithful adherence to this
guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative
branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.’ ” Lehnhausen, supra, 410 U.S., at
365, 93 S.Ct., at 1006 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510, 57 S.Ct.
868, 872, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937).
These restraints on judicial review have added force “where the legislature must
necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S., at 179, 101 S.Ct, at 461. Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory
requirement—much like classifying governmental beneficiaries—“inevitably requires that
some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on
different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at
some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration. ” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The distinction at issue here represents such a line: By excluding
from the definition of “cable system” those facilities that serve commonly owned or managed buildings
without using public rights-of-way, § 602(7)(B) delineates the bounds of the regulatory field. Such
scope-of-coverage provisions are unavoidable components of most economic or social legislation. In
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 177
establishing the franchise requirement, Congress had to draw the line somewhere; it had to choose
which facilities to franchise. This necessity renders the precise coordinates of the resulting
legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway
to approach a perceived problem incrementally. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955):
“The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire
definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring
different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than
the invidious discrimination.”40 (Emphasis and italics supplied; footnotes omitted)
Deferential or not, in the Philippines, the Rational Basis Test has proven to be an effective tool for
curbing invidious discrimination.
Thus, in People v. Vera,41 this Court held as unconstitutional Section 11 of Act No. 4221, which
provided that the Probation Law “shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals.”42 The Court held that the challenged provision was an undue delegation of legislative
power since it left the operation or non-operation of the law entirely up to the absolute and unlimited
(and therefore completely arbitrary) discretion of the provincial boards.43 The Court went on to
demonstrate that this unwarranted delegation of legislative power created “a situation in which
discrimination and inequality [were] permitted or allowed”44 since “a person otherwise coming within the
purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another
person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits,” 45 despite the
absence of substantial differences germane to the purpose of the law. For this reason the questioned
provision was also held unconstitutional and void for being repugnant to the equal protection clause.46
In Viray v. City of Caloocan,47 the Court invalidated on equal protection grounds, among others, an
Ordinance providing for the collection of “entrance fees” for cadavers coming from outside Caloocan City
for burial in private cemeteries within the city. The city government had sought to justify the fees as an
exercise of police power claiming that policemen using the city’s motorcycles or cars had to be assigned
to escort funeral processions and reroute traffic to minimize public inconvenience. 48 This Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes held that:
While undeniably the above-described activity of city officers is called for by every funeral procession,
yet we are left without explanation why the Ordinance should collect the prescribed fees solely in the
case of cadavers coming from places outside the territory of Caloocan City for burial
in private cemeteries within the City. Surely, whether the corpse comes from without or within the City
limits, and whether interment is to be made in private or public cemeteries, the City police must regulate
traffic, and must use their City cars or motorcycles to maintain order; and the City streets must suffer
some degree of erosion. Clearly, then, the ordinance in question does unjustifiably discriminate against
private cemeteries, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, a defect adequate to
invalidate the questioned portion of the measure.49 (Italics in the original)
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,50 this Court ruled that Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354,51 withdrawing the franking privileges of the Judiciary52 but retaining the same for the President,
the Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, and others, 53 violated the
equal protection clause. In analyzing the questioned legislative classification, the Court concluded that
the only reasonable criteria for classification vis-à-vis the grant of the franking privilege was “the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial

revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between
the government and the people.”54 The Court then went on to state that:
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
xxx
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.
xxx
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees
of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.55
More recently, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,56 this Court ruled that the
proviso in Section 18 of P.D. No. 1146,57 which prohibited a dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension, was unconstitutional for, among others, violating the equal
protection clause. Said the Court:
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor’s benefits under a pension
system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a
certain period before the employee’s death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain.
One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivor’s annuity benefits to a surviving spouse
who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the employee’s death. The Illinois
pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a member’s death and
those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of
deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person
becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employee’s Retirement System of Illinois, the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and
circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 178
may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more
than three years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship
pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The
object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If
the purpose of the proviso is to prevent “deathbed marriages” then we do not see why the proviso
reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the
date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the
classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
(Footnotes omitted)
Even in the American context, the application of the “deferential” Rational Basis Test has not
automatically resulted in the affirmation of the challenged legislation.
Thus, in City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 58 a city’s zoning ordinance requiring a special
permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded was challenged on equal protection
grounds. The American Court, ruling that the Rational Basis Test was applicable and limiting itself to the
facts of the particular case, held that there was no rational basis for believing that the mentally retarded
condition of those living in the affected group home posed any special threat to the city’s legitimate
interests any more than those living in boarding houses, nursing homes and hospitals, for which no
special permit was required. Thus, it concluded, the permit requirement violated the respondent’s right
to equal protection.59
And, in Romer v. Evans,60 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2 of the Colorado State
Constitution which precluded all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local
government designed to protect the status of persons based on their homosexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships.61
Strict Scrutiny
While in the Philippines the Rational Basis Test has, so far, served as a sufficient standard for evaluating
governmental actions against the Constitutional guaranty of equal protection, the American Federal
Supreme Court, as pointed out in the main opinion, has developed a more demanding standard as a
complement to the traditional deferential test, which it applies in certain well-defined circumstances. This
more demanding standard is often referred to as Strict Scrutiny.
Briefly stated, Strict Scrutiny is applied when the challenged statute either (1) classifies on the basis
of an inherently suspect characteristic or (2) infringes fundamental constitutional rights.62 With respect to
such classifications, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and it is incumbent upon the
government to demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests,63 otherwise the law shall be declared unconstitutional for being violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating
from official sources in the States. 64 Like other rights guaranteed by the post-Civil War Amendments, the
Equal Protection Clause (also known as the Fourteenth Amendment) was motivated in large part by a
desire to protect the civil rights of African-Americans recently freed from slavery. Thus, initially, the U.S.
Supreme Court attempted to limit the scope of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimination claims
brought by African-Americans.65 In Strauder v. West Virginia,66 the American Supreme Court in striking

down a West Virginia statute which prohibited a “colored man” from serving in a jury, traced the roots of
the Equal Protection Clause:
This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race
recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights
that the superior race enjoy. The true spirit and meaning of the amendments, as we said in
the Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall. 36), cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of
the times when they were adopted, and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish. At the
time when they were incorporated into the Constitution, it required little knowledge of human nature to
anticipate that those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that State laws
might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed. x x x To quote the
language used by us in the Slaughter-House Cases, “No one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in all the amendments, lying at the foundation of each, and without which
none of them would have been suggested,—we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them.” So again: “The
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied, and by it [the
Fourteenth Amendment] such laws were forbidden. If, however, the States did not conform their laws to
its requirements, then, by the fifth section of the article of amendment, Congress was authorized to
enforce it by suitable legislation.” And it was added, “We doubt very much whether any action of a
State, not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes, as a class, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision.”
x x x It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this
but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored
race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made
against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,—
the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of
a subject race.
That the West Virginia statute respecting juries-the statute that controlled the selection of the grand
and petit jury in the case of the plaintiff in error—is such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor
would it be if the persons excluded by it were white men. If in those States where the colored people
constitute a majority of the entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury
service, thus denying to them the privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the administration
of justice, we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of
the equal protection of the laws. Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen,
would there by any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment. The very fact that
colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the
administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other
respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.67
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 179
Over the years however, the Equal Protection Clause has been applied against unreasonable
governmental discrimination directed at any identifiable group.68 In what Laurence H. Tribe and Michael
C. Dorf call the most famous footnote in American constitutional law, 69 Justice Stone in U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co.70 maintained that state-sanctioned discriminatory practices against discrete and insular
minorities are entitled to a diminished presumption of constitutionality:
x x x the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in
the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators. [FN4] x x x
FN4 There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 370, 51 S.Ct.
532, 535, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949,
decided March 28, 1938.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47
S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458; on
restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713—714, 718-
720, 722, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630, 632, 633, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56
S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations,
see Stromberg v. California, supra, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R.
1484; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373-378, 47 S.Ct. 641, 647, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed.
1066; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138; as to
prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81
L.Ed. 278.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468,
or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446; Bartels v.
Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 406,
71 L.Ed. 646, or racial minorities. Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon,
supra; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428, 4 L.Ed. 579; South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,  303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734, decided February 14,
1938, note 2, and cases cited.71 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The use of the term “suspect” originated in the case of Korematsu v. U.S.72 In Korematsu,73 the American
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding
General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry
should be excluded from San Leandro California, a military area, beginning May 9, 1942. However, in
reviewing the validity of laws which employ race as a means of classification, the Court held:

It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can.74 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Racial classifications are generally thought to be “suspect” because throughout the United States’ history
these have generally been used to discriminate officially against groups which are politically subordinate
and subject to private prejudice and discrimination.75 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has “consistently
repudiated distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry as being odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”76 The underlying rationale of the suspect
classification theory is that where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of
constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken down.77 Moreover,
classifications based on race, alienage or national origin are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded on such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.78
Almost three decades after Korematsu, in the landmark case of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,79 the U.S. Supreme Court in identifying a “suspect class” as a class saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process,80 articulated that suspect classifications were not limited to classifications based on race,
alienage or national origin but could also be applied to other criteria such as religion.81
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that suspect classifications deserving of Strict Scrutiny include
those based on race or national origin,82 alienage83 and religion84 while classifications based on
gender,85 illegitimacy,86 financial need,87 conscientious objection88 and age89 have been held not to
constitute suspect classifications.
As priorly mentioned, the application of Strict Scrutiny has not been limited to statutes which proceed
along suspect lines but has been utilized on statutes infringing upon fundamental constitutionally
protected rights. Most fundamental rights cases decided in the United States require equal protection
analysis because these cases would involve a review of statutes which classify persons and impose
differing restrictions on the ability of a certain class of persons to exercise a fundamental
right.90 Fundamental rights include only those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution.91 And precisely because these statutes affect, fundamental liberties, any experiment
involving basic freedomswhich the legislature conducts must be critically examined under the lens of
Strict Scrutiny.
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation,92 the right to
marry,93 the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such as free speech, political expression, press,
assembly, and so forth,94 the right to travel,95 and the right to vote.96 Because Strict Scrutiny involves
statutes which either classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or infringes
fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such
legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The
government must show that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental interest and the
means chosen to accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored.97 Gerald Gunther explains as follows:
. . . The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands a demand not
only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit
between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated
by the old equal protection: means had to be shown “necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not merely
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 180
“reasonably related.” Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in
the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by “compelling” state interests, not merely the
wide spectrum of “legitimate” state ends.98
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means available for
achieving the governmental objective.99
While Strict Scrutiny has, as yet, not found widespread application in this jurisdiction, the tenet that
legislative classifications involving fundamental rights require a more rigorous justification under more
stringent standards of analysis has been acknowledged in a number of Philippine cases.100 Since the
United States’ conception of the Equal Protection Clause was largely influenced by its history of
systematically discriminating along racial lines, it is perhaps no surprise that the Philippines which does
not have any comparable experience has not found a similar occasion to apply this particular American
approach of Equal Protection.
Intermediate Scrutiny
The Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny form what Gerald Gunther termed as the two-tier approach to
equal protection analysis—the first tier consisting of the Rational Basis Test (also called by Gunther as
the old equal protection) while the second tier consisting of Strict Scrutiny (also called by Gunther as the
new equal protection).101 Gunther however described the two-tier approach employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court as being rigid, criticizing the aggressive new equal protection for being “strict in theory
and fatal in fact”102 and the deferential old equal protection as “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact.”103
Gunther’s sentiments were also shared by certain members of the Burger Court, most notably Justice
Marshall who advocated a Sliding Scale Approach which he elaborated on in his dissenting opinion in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:104
To begin, I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-521, 90 S.Ct 1153, 1178-1180, 25
L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90, 92 S.Ct. 254, 261, 30
L.Ed.2d 231 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal
protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-
strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court’s decisions in the field of equal protection defy such
easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a
spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn. I find in fact that many of the Court’s recent decisions embody the very sort of
reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously argued—that is, an approach in
which ‘concentration (is) placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not
receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.’ Dandridge v. Williams, supra,
397 U.S., at 520-521, 90 S.Ct., at 1180 (dissenting opinion).105
Shortly before his retirement in 1991, Justice Marshall suggested to the Supreme Court that it adopt a
Sliding Scale that would embrace a spectrum of standards of review.106
Other sources of discontent in the U.S. Supreme Court are Justice Stevens who argues for a return
to the Rational Basis Test which he believes to be adequate to invalidate all invidious forms of
discrimination and Chief Justice Rehnquist who is disgruntled with the Court’s special solicitude for the
claims of discrete and insular minorities.107
Yet, despite numerous criticisms from American legal luminaries, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
done away with the Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny as they continue to remain viable approaches
in equal protection analysis. On the contrary, the American Court has developed yet a third tier of equal
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 181

protection review, falling between the Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny—Intermediate Scrutiny not based on
(also known as Heightened Scrutiny).
The U.S. Supreme Court has generally applied Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny when the gender or
challenged statute’s classification is based on either (1) gender or (2) illegitimacy.108 illegitimacy.
Gender-based classifications are presumed unconstitutional as such classifications generally provide
Legislative Must Must be compelling. Must be important.
no sensible ground for differential treatment. In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 109 the
United States Supreme Court said: Purpose be legitimate
“[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability . . . is that .
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
Relationship Classification Classification must Classification must
society.” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)
(plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and of must be necessary and be substantially
burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative Classification be rationally narrowly tailored to related to the
capabilities of men and women.110
to Purpose related to the achieve the legislative legislative purpose.
In the same manner, classifications based on illegitimacy are also presumed unconstitutional as legislative purpose.
illegitimacy is beyond the individual’s control and bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate purpose.
in and contribute to society.111 Similar to Strict Scrutiny, the burden of justification for the classification
rests entirely on the government. 112 Thus, the government must show at least that the statute serves an Appropriate Standard for Evaluating the Present Case
important purpose and that the discriminatory means employed is substantially related to the Which of the foregoing three standards should be applied in arriving at a resolution of the instant
achievement of those objectives.113 petition?
Summary of the American Supreme Court Approach to Equal Protection Impropriety of a double standard for evaluating compliance with the equal protection
In fine, the three standards currently employed by the U.S. Federal Supreme Court for determining the guaranty
constitutional validity of a statutory classification in the light of the equal protection clause may be As noted earlier, the main opinion, in arriving at its conclusion, simultaneously makes use of both the
summarized114 as follows: Rational Basis Test and the Strict Scrutiny Test. Thus, in assessing the validity of the classification
between executi0ve and rank and file employees in Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act, the
  Equal Protection Standards Rational Basis Test was applied. In evaluating the distinction between the rank and file employees of the
BSP and the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, the Strict Scrutiny Test was
  Rational Strict Scrutiny Intermediate employed.
Basis Scrutiny Despite my best efforts, I fail to see the justification for the use of this “double standard” in
Applicable Legislative Legislative Legislative determining the constitutionality of the questioned proviso. Why a “deferential test” for one comparison
(between the executives and rank and file of the BSP) and a “strict test” for the other (between the rank
To classification classifications affectin classifications base and file of the BSP and the rank and file of the other GOCCs/GFIs)?
s in g fundamental rights d on gender or As the preceding review of the standards developed by the U.S. Federal Supreme Court shows, the
general, such or suspect classes. illegitimacy choice of the appropriate test for evaluating a legislative classification is dependent on the nature of the
rights affected (i.e. whether “fundamental” or not) and the character of the persons allegedly
as those discriminated against (i.e. whether belonging to a “suspect class” or not). As determined by these two
pertaining to parameters, the scope of application of each standard is distinct and exclusive of the others. Indeed, to
economic or my knowledge, the American Court has never applied more than one standard to a given set of facts,
and where one standard was found to be appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court has deliberately
social eschewed any discussion of another.115
legislation, Assuming that the equal protection standards evolved by the U.S. Supreme Court may be adopted in
which do not this jurisdiction, there is no reason why the exclusive manner of their application should not be adopted
also.
affect In the present case, the persons allegedly discriminated against (i.e. the rank and file employees of
fundamental the BSP) and the rights they are asserting (to be exempted from the Compensation Classification System
rights or prescribed by the Salary Standardization Law) remain the same, whether the classification under review
is between them and the executive officers of the BSP or the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP,
suspect SSS and GSIS.
classes; or is

It therefore stands to reason that the test or standard—whether Rational Basis, Strict Scrutiny or
Intermediate Scrutiny—against which petitioner’s claims should be measured should likewise be the
same, regardless of whether the evaluation pertains to the constitutionality of (1) the classification
expressly made in Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act or (2) the classification resulting from the
amendments of the charters of the other GOCCs/GFIs.
To illustrate further, if petitioner’s constitutional challenge is premised on the denial of a
“fundamental right” or the perpetuation of prejudice against a “suspect class,” as suggested (but not
fully explicated) in the closing pages of the main opinion; then, following the trend in American
jurisprudence, the Strict Scrutiny Test would be applicable, whether the classification being reviewed is
that between the officers and rank and file of the BSP or between the rank and file of the BSP and the
rank and file of the other GOCCs/GFIs.
But certainly, the same group of BSP rank and file personnel cannot be considered a “non-suspect
class” when compared to the BSP executive corps, but members of a “suspect class” when compared to
the rank and file employees of the other GOCCs/GFIs. Neither could the rights they assert be
simultaneously “fundamental” and “less than fundamental.” Consequently, it would be improper to apply
the Rational Basis Test as the standard for one comparison and the Strict Scrutiny Test for the other. To
do so would be to apply the law unevenly and, accordingly, deny the persons concerned “the equal
protection of the laws.”
“Relative Constitutionality” Not A Justification for the Double Standard
It would appear that the employment of a “double standard” in the present case is sought to be justified
somehow by the concept of relative constitutionality invoked by the main opinion. Thus, the main
opinion holds that the “subsequent enactments, however, constitute-significant changes in circumstance
that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15 (c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, and exposes the proviso to more serious scrutiny.”
The ponencia likewise invites this Court to reflect on the following questions: “Given that Congress
chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-
and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not
exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress’ power to classify unbridled as to
sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested not instantly
through a single overt act, but gradually through seven separate acts? Is the right to equal protection
bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can be invoked only against classification made directly
and deliberately, as opposed to discrimination that arises indirectly as a consequence of several other
acts? and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the
statute x x x thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the groupings or the lack thereof among
several similar enactments made over a period of time?”116
To clarify, it was never suggested that judicial review should be confined or limited to the questioned
statute itself without considering other related laws. It is well within the powers of this Court to resolve
the issue of whether the subsequent amendments of the charters of other GOCCs and other GFIs altered
the constitutionality of Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act.
It is, however, what to me is the improper resort by the main opinion to relative constitutionality,
and as to be subsequently demonstrated, the use of an inappropriate standard for equal protection
analysis, that constrained me to register my dissent.
As illustrated in the main opinion, “relative constitutionality” refers to the principle that a statute may
be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another set of
facts. Thus, a statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered factual
circumstances.
This principle is really a corollary to the requirements that a valid classification (a) must be based on
real and substantial (not merely superficial) distinctions and (b) must not be limited to existing
conditions only.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 182
“Substantial distinctions” must necessarily be derived from the objective factual circumstances of the
classes or groups that a statute seeks to differentiate. The classification must be real and factual and not
wholly abstract, artificial, or contrived. Thus, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 117 this Court
stated:
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies
employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those
who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those
whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs,
feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different
religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they
are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination.
There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There
are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be
articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do
exist, and these differences are important and should not be ignored.118 (Emphasis supplied)
In the words of Justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court in Walters v. City of St. Louis, Missouri:119
x x x Equal protection does not require identity of treatment. It only requires that classification
rest on real and not feigned differences, that the distinctions have some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not so
disparate, relative to the difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary . x x
x120 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
For this reason, in reviewing legislation challenged on equal protection grounds—particularly when a
statute otherwise valid on its face is alleged to be discriminatory in its application—a court must often
look beyond the four corners of the statute and carefully examine the factual circumstances of the case
before it.
Thus, in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Associations, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila,121 this Court, in reversing a trial court decision invalidating an ordinance regulating the operation
of motels and hotels in Manila, held:
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: “The presumption is all in favor of validity . . . . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature
of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people
. . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.”
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through
Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: “The statute here questioned deals
with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the
ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the

absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.” No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.122 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
And in Peralta v. Commission on Elections,123 this Court stated:
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What [it] proscribes is a classification
which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally
to all those belonging to the same class. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and
those who do not. There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary
classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such
question may be resolved. The determination must be made in accordance with the facts
presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by the authorities,
is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon material differences between the
persons, activities or things included and those excluded.’ There must, in other words, be a
basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose
of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in
substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike. x x x 124 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
A similar thought was expressed in Medill v. State of Minnesota,125 cited in the main opinion,126 where the
State Supreme Court of Minnesota127 reversed a decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and held that a
statute exempting “[r]ights of action for injuries to the person of the debtor or of a relative” from
“attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued from any court,” did not contravene the
provisions of the Minnesota Constitution limiting exemptions to a “reasonable amount” to be determined
by law. The Minnesota Court held:
x x x we must determine here whether there is an objective measure which limits the amount or extent
of the personal injury right of action exemption since there is no dollar limit or “to the extent reasonably
necessary” limiting language on the face of the provision. The trustee argues that the case is “incredibly
simple” because there is no language on the face of the statute purporting to limit the exemption. The
state and debtors argue that the judicial determination of general damages in a personal injury action is
based on objective criteria; therefore, the amount of the exemption is reasonable and “determined by
law” under article 1, section 12. We think that the latter interpretation is reasonable and that the trustee
has failed to meet his burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the provision is
unconstitutional.
xxx
Here, the resolution of the Medills’ personal injury action involved a judicial determination of an
amount that reasonably compensated them for their injuries. The Medills’ recovery was reasonably
limited by a jury’s determination of damages, which was then approved by a court. Contrary to the
trustee’s argument, we believe that the limits on out-of-court settlements are similarly reasonable. First,
unless a statute is inherently unconstitutional, “its validity must stand or fall upon the
record before the court and not upon assumptions this court might [otherwise] make * *
*.” Grobe v. Oak Center Creamery Co.,  262 Minn. 60, 63, 113 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1962). Moreover, even
in the case of an out-of-court settlement, the “inherent” limitation on the right of action still exists; the
amount of a settlement is limited to or by the extent of injury, and no party will agree to an
“unreasonable” settlement.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 183
The trustee vigorously argues that the court must go considerably beyond the plain language of the
statute and rules of statutory construction to impose the required constitutional limit on the exemption
provision at issue here. However, the constitutionality of a statute cannot in every instance be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with the applicable provisions of the
constitution. A statute may be constitutional and valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another. Grobe, 262 Minn. at 62, 113 N.W.2d at 460. Thus, unless we
find the exemption unconstitutional on its face, it must be unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the instant case in order to be stricken. 128 (Emphasis supplied)
This does not mean that the factual differences must be prominent for the distinction between two
classes to be substantial. Nor are fine distinctions between two classes, otherwise sharing several
common attributes, prohibited. Thus, the Court in Peralta, went on to state:
x x x It is, however, conceded that it is almost impossible in some matters to foresee and provide for
every imaginable and exceptional case. Exactness in division is impossible and never looked for
in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general, some
reasonable basis on general lines for the division. Classification which has some reasonable
basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety . (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The pronouncement in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,129 is also instructive:
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within
its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that
the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation.
Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions , for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and
legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.130 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
To be sure, this Court has adjudged as valid statutes providing for differences in treatment between:
inter-urban buses and provincial buses;131 taxpayers receiving compensation income and other
taxpayers;132 male overseas workers and female overseas workers;133 electric cooperatives and other
cooperatives;134 businesses inside the secured area of the Subic Special Economic Zone and those
outside the secured area;135 public officers with pending criminal cases which have not yet gone to trial
and those with cases wherein trial has already commenced;136 and City and Municipal Election Officers of
the Commission On Elections (COMELEC) and other COMELEC officials.137
Nevertheless, to be substantial, these distinctions, no matter how finely drawn, must still be rooted
on some objective factual foundation; and cannot be left to the arbitrary, whimsical or capricious
imagination of the law maker.
Thus, relative constitutionality, as I understand it, merely acknowledges that the factual
circumstances which form the bases for the substantial and real distinctions between two classes may
change over time. Thus, it is entirely possible that a legislative classification held to be valid at one
time upon a particular state of facts may be subsequently invalidated if the factual basis for the
substantial distinctions that existed between the two classes has ceased to exist. Cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex.138
Just such a possibility was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chastleton Corporation v.
Sinclair,139 where the Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, declared:
The original Act of October 22, 1919, c. 80, tit. 2, 41 Stat. 297, considered in Block v. Hirsh, was limited
to expire in two years. Section 122. The Act of August 24, 1921, c. 91, 42 Stat. 200, purported to
continue it in force, with some amendments, until May 22, 1922. On that day a new act declared that

the emergency described in the original title 2 still existed, reenacted with further amendments the
amended Act of 1919, and provided that it was continued until May 22, 1924. Act of May 22, 1922, c.
197, 42 Stat. 543.
We repeat what was stated in Block v. Hirsh, as to the respect due to a declaration of this kind by
the Legislature so far as it relates to present facts. But even as to them a Court is not at liberty to shut
its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared.
And still more obviously so far as this declaration looks to the future it can be no more than prophecy
and is liable to be controlled by events. A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or
other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the
facts change even though valid when passed. x x x140 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, this appears to be the thrust of the cases cited 141 by the main opinion to illustrate relative
constitutionality:
The case of Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon142 concerned a parcel of land adjacent to a
railroad station and located in the middle of a highly developed business district had continually been
used as a car park. In 1927 it was placed in a Residence ‘B’ district under a zoning ordinance under
which its use as a car park remained a valid nonconforming use. In 1951, the area was sold to Vernon
Park Realty which applied for, but did not obtain, a permit to build a retail shopping center (prohibited
under the 1927 ordinance). In 1952, after Vernon Park had brought suit to declare the 1927 ordinance
unconstitutional, the city’s common council amended the zoning ordinance to prohibit the use of the
property for any purpose except the parking and storage of automobiles and the continuance of prior
nonconforming uses. The Court of Appeals of New York found the 1927 zoning ordinance and the 1952
amendment illegal and void, ruling that:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of
property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public
health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not
be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of
the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid
when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under
changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is
destroyed for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. 143 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
In Nashville, Chatanooga & St. Louise Railways v. Walters, 144 the petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of a provision of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1921, which authorized the state highway
commissioner to require the separation of grades whenever a state highway crosses a railroad if in its
discretion “the elimination of such grade crossing is necessary for the protection of persons traveling on
any such highway or any such railroad” and requiring the railroad company to pay in every case, one-
half of the total cost of the separation of grades. In remanding the case to the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, the U.S. Federal Supreme Court declared:
The Supreme Court [of Tennessee] declined to consider the Special facts relied upon as showing that the
order, and the statute as applied, were arbitrary and unreasonable; and did not pass upon the question
whether the evidence sustained those findings. It held that the statute was, upon its face, constitutional;
that when it was passed the state had, in the exercise of its police power, authority to impose upon
railroads one-half of the cost of eliminating existing or future grade crossings; and that the court could
not “any more” consider “whether the provisions of the act in question have been rendered burdensome
or unreasonable by changed economic and transportation conditions,” than it “could consider changed
mental attitudes to determine the constitutionality or enforceability of a statute.” A rule to the contrary is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 184
settled by the decisions of this Court. A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another.
A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The
police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or
unreasonably. To this limitation, attention was specifically called in cases which have applied most
broadly the power to impose upon railroads the cost of separation of grades.
First. Unless the evidence and the special facts relied upon were of such a nature that they could not
conceivably establish that the action of the state in imposing upon the railway one-half of the cost of the
underpass was arbitrary and unreasonable, the Supreme Court [of Tennessee] obviously erred in
refusing to consider them. The charge of arbitrariness is based primarily upon the revolutionary
changes incident to transportation wrought in recent years by the widespread introduction
of motor vehicles; the assumption by the federal government of the functions of road
builder; the resulting depletion of rail revenues; the change in the character, the
construction, and the use of highways; the change in the occasion for elimination of grade
crossings, in the purpose of such elimination, and in the chief beneficiaries thereof; and the
change in the relative responsibility of the railroads and vehicles moving on the highways as
elements of danger and causes of accidents. x x x
xxx
Second. x x x The promotion of public convenience will not justify requiring of a railroad, any more than
of others, the expenditure of money, unless it can be shown that a duty to provide the particular
convenience rests upon it.145 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey,146 an action for damages was filed against the Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company for the killing of a cow on an unfenced right of way under certain Florida statutes
authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney’s fees for animals killed on unfenced railroad
right of way, without proof of negligence. The railroad company alleged that several changes in
economic, transportation and safety conditions had occurred since these statutes were passed in
1899147 and that, in view of these changes, it was unfair, unjust and inequitable to require railroad
companies to fence their tracks to protect against livestock roaming at large without making a similar
requirement for the owners of automobiles, trucks and buses carrying passengers on the unfenced
public highways. In ruling that the questioned statutes violated the equal protection guaranty, the
Supreme Court of Florida reasoned:
It stands adjudicated that the purpose of the statutes, supra, is the protection against accidents to life
and property in conducting public transportation and that such statutes are in the exercise of the police
power. It cannot be questioned that those transportation companies engaged as common carriers on the
public roads and those so engaged on their privately owned roads such as railroad companies, owe like
duties to the public and are under like obligations for the protection against accidents to life and
property in conducting such business.
It is well settled that a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in
conditions to which it is applied. The allegations of the pleas are sufficient to show, and the
demurrer admits, that compliance with the statute places a burden of expense on the railroad company
to provide for the safety of life and property of those whom it assumes to serve which is not required to
be borne by competitive motor carriers which subject the lives and property of those whom they assume
to serve to greater hazards of the identical character which the railroad is required to so guard against
and it is also shown that under the statutes penalties are imposed on the railway earlier in favor of
individuals who are neither shippers nor passengers.
Under the statutes, as shown by the record here, the railway common carrier is not only required to
carry the burden of fencing its traffic line for the protection of the persons and property it transports,

while other common carriers are not required to provide the like protection, but in addition to this, there
is another gross inequality imposed by the statute, viz.: Under the statutes the plaintiff to whom
the carrier, as such, was under no obligations, was allowed to recover double the value of
the animal killed, plus $50 as attorney’s fees, and was not required to prove any act of
negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its equipment, while if a common
carrier bus or truck had by the operation of its equipment killed the same animal in the
same locality, the plaintiff would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of
the equipment and the common carrier would have been liable only for the value of the
animal. This certainly is not equal protection of the law. 148 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Similarly, the case of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Faulkner 149 concerned an action to recover the
value of a mule killed by the railroad company’s train under a Kentucky statute which made the killing or
injury of cattle by railroad engines or cars prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad’s
agents or servants. The Kentucky Supreme Court, following the rulings in Nashville and Atlantic
Coast, adjudged the questioned statute to be unconstitutional, viz.:
The present statute which places the duty upon a railroad company to prove it was free from negligence
in killing an animal upon its track is an act of 1893. The genesis of the legislation, however, goes back to
the beginning of railroad transportation in the state. The constitutionality of such legislation was
sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of
persons on a train and the protection of property. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Belcher, 89 Ky.
193, 12 S.W. 195, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 393, a decision rendered in 1889.
Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and
development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common
carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of
the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the
operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same
extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad
companies for killing them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, ‘A statute valid when enacted may
become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to
the limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.’ A number of prior opinions of that
court are cited in support of the statement. See 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 102.
The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A, § 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary
and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for
double damages and an attorney’s fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove
any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of his train. In Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co. v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So.2d 244, 247, 139 A.L.R. 973, it was held that the changed
conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute
unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the
owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said
the court, ‘This certainly is not equal protection of the law.’
As stated in Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S.W.2d 516, 127 A.L.R. 416,  appeal
dismissed Friedman v. Markendorf, 309 U.S. 627, 60 S.Ct. 610, 84 L.Ed. 987, the purpose of the
provisions of §§ 3 and 59 of the Kentucky Constitution  and of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution is to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of equality
and to render it impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment.  Applying this
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 185
proscription of inequality and unreasonable discrimination, we held invalid an amendment to a statute
regulating motor transportation for hire which exempted from the operation of the statute such vehicles
engaged in transporting farm products. Priest v. State Tax Commission, 258 Ky. 391, 80 S.W.2d 43.
We, therefore, hold that the part of KRS 277.330 which imposes a duty upon a railroad company of
proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars is invalid
and unconstitutional.150 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Finally, in Rutter v. Esteban,151 this Court invalidated Section 2 of R.A. No. 342 providing for an eight-
year moratorium period within which a creditor could not demand payment of a monetary obligation
contracted before December 8, 1941 (counted from the settlement of the war damage claim of the
debtor) after taking judicial notice of the significant change in the nation’s economic circumstances in
1953, thus it held:
x x x We do not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can see it and feel it as we gaze around
to observe the wave of reconstruction and rehabilitation that has swept the country since liberation
thanks to the aid of America and the innate progressive spirit of our people. This aid and this spirit have
worked wonders in so short a time that it can now be safely stated that in the main the financial
condition of our country and our people, individually and collectively, has practically returned to normal
notwithstanding occasional reverses caused by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance of peace
and order in our midst. Business, industry and agriculture have picked up and developed at such stride
that we can say that we are now well on the road to recovery and progress. This is so not only as far as
our observation and knowledge are capable to take note and comprehend but also because of the official
pronouncements made by our Chief Executive in public addresses and in several messages he submitted
to Congress on the general state of the nation. x x x
xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations , and consistent with what we believe to be as the
only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us
under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement
of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive,  and should not be
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without
effect. x x x152 (Emphasis supplied)
As the financial ruin and economic devastation which provided the rationale for the enactment of R.A.
No. 342 was no longer present, this Court did not hesitate to rule that the continued enforcement of the
statute was “unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer.”
In the case at bar, however, petitioner does not allege a comparable change in the factual milieu  as
regards the compensation, position classification and qualifications standards of the employees of the
BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank and file) since the enactment of The New Central
Bank Act. Neither does the main opinion identify the relevant factual changes which may have
occurred vis-à-vis the BSP personnel that may justify the application of the principle of relative
constitutionality as above-discussed. Nor, to my knowledge, are there any relevant factual changes of
which
this Court may take judicial knowledge. Hence, it is difficult to see how relative constitutionality may be
applied to the instant petition.
Moreover, even if such factual changes were alleged and proved or judicially discoverable, still there
is absolutely nothing in any of the cases above-cited which would justify the simultaneous application of
both the Rational Basis Test and the Strict Scrutiny Test. In fact, in the case of Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co.,153 wherein a statute previously held to have complied with the requirements of the equal
protection clause in 1889 was subsequently ruled to have violated the equal protection guaranty in 1957
due to changed factual conditions, the only test applied in both instances was the Rational Basis Test.154

It is true that petitioner alleges that its members’ claim to exemption from the Compensation
Classification System under the Salary Standardization Law was bolstered by the amendments to the
charters of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, which exempted all the employees of these GOCCs/GFIs from
said Compensation Classification System. However, these subsequent amendments do
not constitute factual changes in the context of relative constitutionality. Rather, they
involve subsequent legislative classifications which should be evaluated in accordance with the
appropriate standard.
To assess the validity of the questioned proviso in the light of subsequent legislation, all that need
be applied is the familiar rule that statutes that are in pari materia155 should be read together. As this
Court declared in City of Naga v. Agna,156 viz.:
x x x Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation . . . . It will also be
noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter—enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In
this respect they can be considered in pari materia. Statutes are said to be in pari materia when
they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have
the same purpose or object.  When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because  enactments of
the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one
uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter,
whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision
in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an
express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together .157 (Emphasis and italics
supplied; citations omitted)
Here, it can be said that the Salary Standardization Law, the New Central Bank Act, and the amended
charters of the other GOCCs and GFIs are in pari materia insofar as they pertain to compensation and
position classification system(s) covering government employees. Consequently, the provisions of these
statutes concerning compensation and position classification, including the legislative classifications
made therein, should all be read and evaluated together in the light of the equal protection clause.
Consequently, the relevant question is whether these statutes, taken together as one uniform system of
compensation for government employees, comply with the requisites of the equal protection guaranty.
Rational Basis Test Appropriate to the Case at Bar
Turning then to the determination of the standard appropriate to the issues presented by the instant
petition, it is immediately apparent that Intermediate Scrutiny, inasmuch as its application has been
limited only to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy, finds no application to the case at bar.
The choice of the appropriate standard is thus narrowed between Strict Scrutiny and the Rational
Basis Test. As has been observed, Strict Scrutiny has been applied in the American context when a
legislative classification intrudes upon a fundamental right or classifies on the basis of an inherently
suspect characteristic.
Strict Scrutiny cannot be applied in the case at bar since nowhere in the petition does petitioner
allege that Article II, Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act burdens a fundamental right of its
members. The petition merely states that “the proviso in question violates the right to equal protection
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 186
of the laws of the BSP rank and file employees  who are members of the petitioner.” 158 While it is true
that the Equal Protection Clause is found in the Bill of Rights of both the American and Philippine
Constitutions, for strict scrutiny to apply there must be a violation of a Constitutional right other than the
right to equal protection of the laws. To hold otherwise would be absurd as any invocation of a violation
of the equal protection clause would automatically result in the application of Strict Scrutiny.
In Vacco v. Quill,159 several physicians challenged a New York statute which prohibits assistance to
suicide. They argued that although it was consistent with the standards of their medical practice to
prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent, terminally ill patients who are suffering great pain
and desire a doctor’s help in taking their own lives, they are deterred from doing so by New York’s ban
on assisting suicide.160 They contend that because New York permits a competent person to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment and because the refusal of such treatment is “essentially the same thing”
as physician-assisted suicide, the ban violates the Equal Protection Clause.161 A unanimous U.S. Supreme
Court applied the Rational Basis Test as the statute did not infringe fundamental rights. Moreover, the
Court held that the guarantee of equal protection is not a source of substantive rights or liberties.
The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” This provision creates no substantive rights.  San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973);
id., at 59, 93 S.Ct., at 1310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Instead, it embodies a general rule that States
must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102
S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)  (“ ‘[T]he Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same’ ”) (quoting Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 [1940]). If a legislative classification or
distinction “neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct.
1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).
New York’s statutes outlawing assisting suicide affect and address matters of profound
significance to all New Yorkers alike. They neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve
suspect classifications. Washington v. Glucksberg, at 719-728, 117 S.Ct., at 2267-2271; see 80 F.3d,
at 726; San Antonio School Dist., 411 U.S., at 28, 93 S.Ct, at 1294 (“The system of alleged
discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness”); id., at 33-35,
93_ S.Ct., at 1296-1298 (courts must look to the Constitution, not the “importance” of the asserted right,
when deciding whether an asserted right is “fundamental”). These laws are therefore entitled to a
“strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d
257 (1993).162 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Neither does the main opinion identify what fundamental right the challenged proviso of the New Central
Bank Act infringes upon. Instead the ponencia cites the following Constitutional provisions:
PREAMBLE:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
ARTICLE II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies
SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate

social service, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for
all.
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.
ARTICLE III: Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
ARTICLE IX: Constitutional Commissions
B. The Civil Service Commission
SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking
into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.
ARTICLE XII: National Economy and Patrimony
SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State
shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be
considered inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be
provided by law.
ARTICLE XIII: Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and
its increments.
Labor
SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and oversea, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organizations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 187
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.
With the exception of Section I, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII, the foregoing Constitutional
provisions do not embody any particular right but espouse principles and policies.163 As previously
discussed, mere reliance on the Equal Protection Clause which is in the Bill of Rights is not sufficient to
justify the application of Strict Scrutiny. While Section 3 of Article XIII enumerates the seven basic rights
of workers—the right to organize, the right to conduct collective bargaining or negotiation with
management, the right to engage in peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike in
accordance with law, the right to enjoy security of tenure, the right to work under humane conditions,
the right to receive a living wage, and the right to participate in policy and decision-processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law—I fail to see how Article II, Section 15 (c) of the
New Central Bank Act can impinge on any of these seven rights.
Another reason why Strict Scrutiny is inappropriate is the absence of a classification which is based
on an inherently suspect characteristic. There is no suspect class involved in the case at bar. By no
stretch of the imagination can the rank and file employees of the BSP be considered a suspect class—a
class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. As examined earlier, in applying this definition of suspect class, the U.S.
Supreme Court has labeled very few classifications as suspect. In particular, the Court has limited the
term suspect class to classifications based on race or national origin, alienage and religion. It is at once
apparent that Article II, Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act, in exempting the BSP officers from
the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law and not exempting the rank and file employees of the
BSP, does not classify based on race, national origin, alienage or religion.
The main opinion however seeks to justify the application of Strict Scrutiny on the theory that the rank
and file employees of the BSP constitute a suspect class “considering that majority (if not all) of the rank
and file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they—and not the officers—who have the real economic and financial
need for the adjustment.” The ponencia concludes that since the challenged proviso operates on the
basis of the salary grade or office-employee status a distinction based on economic class and status is
created.
With all due respect, the main opinion fails to show that financial need is an inherently suspect trait.
The claim that the rank and file employees of the BSP are an economically disadvantaged group is
unsupported by the facts on record. Moreover, as priorly discussed, classifications based on financial
need have been characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court as not suspect. Instead, the American Court
has resorted to the Rational Basis Test.
The case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez 164 is instructive. In the said case,
the financing of public, elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local
participation. Almost half of the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program designed to
provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each district supplements state aid
through an ad valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. A class action suit was brought on behalf of
school children said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts having a low property
tax base. They argue that the Texas system’s reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent
and violates the equal protection clause because of substantial inter-district disparities in per pupil
expenditures resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable property among the districts.

The Court held that wealth discrimination alone does not provide adequate basis for invoking strict
scrutiny.165
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court in this case, and by several other courts that
have recently struck down school-financing laws in other States, is quite unlike any of the forms of
wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than focusing on the unique features of
the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect
classification through a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the traditional systems of
financing public schools, some poorer people receive less expensive educations than other
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth.  This approach
largely ignores the hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for
purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged ‘poor’
cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and whether the
relative—rather than absolute—nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant
consequence. Before a State’s laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed more
closely than they were in the court below.
The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation
of the disfavored class. Examination of the District Court’s opinion and of appellees’ complaint, briefs,
and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which the discrimination
claimed here might be described. The Texas system of school financing might be regarded as
discriminating (1) against ‘poor’ persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level
of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally indigent, or (2) against those who
are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal
incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts. Our task must be to ascertain
whether, in fact, the Texas system has
been shown to discriminate on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting classification
may be regarded as suspect.
The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of
individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to
pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.  In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956),  and its progeny the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an
indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for
use at several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment requirements in each case were
found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were totally
unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been shown if the State had provided some ‘adequate substitute’ for a full stenographic
transcript.
xxx
Only appellees’ first possible basis for describing the class disadvantaged by the Texas school-
financing system-discrimination against a class of defineably ‘poor’ persons—might arguably meet the
criteria established in these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, demonstrates that neither
of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. First in support of
their charge that the system discriminates against the ‘poor,’ appellees have made no effort
to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as
indigent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any designated poverty
level. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the
poorest property districts. x x x
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 188
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of
the foregoing cases, lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation
of the desired benefit.  The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from
the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount
of money expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees’ argument is that, at least where wealth is
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages. Nor indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any
system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the
Minimum Foundation Program provides an ‘adequate’ education for all children in the State. By providing
12 years of free public-school education, and by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating
funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to ‘guarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that
all people shall have at least an adequate program of education. x x x
For these two reasons—the absence of any evidence that the financing system
discriminates against any definable category of ‘poor’ people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education—the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of
identification in traditional terms.
xxx
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the classification scheme might be defined—district
wealth discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by the evidence is between district property
wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might be found without regard to the
individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district
property wealth and expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be viewed as
encompassing every child in every district except the district that has the most assessable wealth and
spends the most on education. Alternatively, as suggested in Mr. Justice MARSHALL’S dissenting opinion
the class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property
which falls below the statewide average, or median, or below some other artificially defined level.
However described, it is clear that appellees’ suit asks this Court to extend its most
exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse,
and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that
happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged
discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness:
the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any
suspect class. But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees
have not relied solely on this contention. x x x166 (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations and footnotes
omitted)
To further bolster the theory that a classification based on financial need is inherently suspect, the main
opinion cites a number of international conventions as well as foreign and international jurisprudence,
but to no avail.
The reliance by the main opinion on these international conventions is misplaced. The ponencia cites
the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter of 1996 and the Arab Charter on

Human Rights of 1994. It should be noted that the Philippines is not a signatory to any of these
conventions.
The main opinion also cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
While it is true that these instruments which the Philippines is a party to include provisions prohibiting
discrimination, none of them explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of financial need.
While certain conventions mention that distinctions based on “other status” is prohibited, the scope
of this term is undefined. Even Gay Moon, on whom the main opinion relies, explains thus:
The [UN Human Rights] Committee provides little guidance on how it decides whether a difference in
treatment comes within the rubric of “other status”. Its approach to this issue lacks consistency and
transparency.167
Furthermore, the U.K. cases cited in the main opinion are not in point since these cases do not support
the thesis that classification based on financial need is inherently suspect. In Hooper v. Secretary of
State for Work and Pension168 the discrimination in question was based on gender, that is, whether the
widowers are entitled to the pension granted by the State to widows. In Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. United Kingdom169 the discrimination was based on sex and race; In Wilson and Others v.
United Kingdom170 the questioned law allows employers to discriminate against their employees who
were trade union members.
Notably, the main opinion, after discussing lengthily the developments in equal protection analysis in
the United States and Europe, and finding no support thereto, incongruously concluded that “in resolving
constitutional disputes, this Court should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are
hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs.”171 After an excessive dependence by the main opinion to American jurisprudence it contradicted
itself when it stated that “American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution,
are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit.”172
Intrinsic Constitutionality of Section 15(c) of the New Central Bank Act
Is the classification between the officers and rank and file employees in Section 15 (c) of the New
Central Bank Act in violation of the equal protection clause?
Petitioner, contending that there are no substantial distinctions between these two groups of BSP
employees, argues that it is.
On the other hand, the main opinion, applying the Rational Basis Test, finds the classification
between the executive level and the rank and file of the BSP to be based on substantial and real
differences which are germane to the purpose of the law. Thus, it concludes:
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and
above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the
end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms
of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely,
and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
and declines to grant the petition on this ground.
For her part, Justice Chico-Nazario, in her separate concurring opinion, sides with petitioner believing
that the difference in treatment is “purely arbitrary” and thus violates the Constitutional guaranty of
equal protection of the laws.
On this point, I am in accord with the main opinion.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 189
For ease of reference, Section 15 (c) is reproduced hereunder:
SEC. 15. Exercise of Authority.—In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral’s human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make
its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No.
6758. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied)
It is readily apparent that Section 15 (c), by implicitly exempting the executive corps of the BSP (those
with SG 20 and above) from the Compensation Classification System under the Salary Standardization
Law, makes a classification between the officers and the rank and file of the BSP and, who, like all other
government employees, are squarely within the ambit of the Compensation Classification System by the
Salary Standardization Law.
To be valid, therefore, the difference in treatment as to compensation between the executive level
and the rank and file of the BSP must be based on real differences between the two groups. Moreover,
this classification must also have a rational relationship to the purpose of the New Central Bank Act.
An examination of the legislative history of the New Central Bank Act may thus prove useful.
Legislative History of the New Central Bank Act
An examination of the legislative deliberations of both the House of Representatives and the Senate
shows that it was never the intention of both houses to provide all BSP personnel with a blanket
exemption from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law.
Thus, while House Bill No. 7037 (the House of Representatives version of the New Central Bank Act)
did not expressly mention that the Salary Standardization Law was to apply to a particular category of
BSP employees, the deliberations in the lower house show that the position and compensation plans
which the BSP was authorized to adopt were to be in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws,
including the Salary Standardization Law:
MR. JAVIER (E.). No, Mr. Speaker, we have that phrase in Section 14 (c). The power to organize, the
power to classify positions, the power to adopt compensation plans are subject to the provisions of
applicable laws. The bill is clear, so I do not think we should have a quarrel on whether the Monetary
Board has absolute power over the organization and compensation plans of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. Of course, this power is subject to applicable laws, and one of these laws is the
Salary Standardization Law, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ARROYO. To cut the argument short, Mr. Speaker, in effect, he is now saying that the proposed bill
will authorize the Bangko Sentral to fix its own salary scale for its employees?
MR. JAVIER (E.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker, but in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws.
MR. ARROYO. I am only asking if it will be able to fix its own salary scale.
MR. JAVIER (E.). Yes, in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws.
MR. ARROYO. May I know Mr. Speaker, what is the applicable law that will curtail this?
MR. JAVIER (E). The Salary Standardization Law.
MR. ARROYO. So, the Gentleman is now suggesting that the Standardization Law will apply to
this?
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 190

MR. JAVIER (E.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.173 (Emphasis supplied) Senator If that is an amendment, Mr. President, I
In fact, the deliberations show that, in keeping with the recognition in Section 9  of the Salary
174
Osmeña. move that we reconsider the prior approval of my
Standardization Law that compensation higher than SG 30 might be necessary in certain exceptional amendment which was accepted by the Sponsor, and I
cases to attract and retain competent toplevel personnel, the initial intention of the drafters of the House
will accept the amendment of Senator Maceda that the
Bill was to exempt only the Governor and the Monetary Board from the coverage of the Compensation
Classification System: grade level should not be Grade 9 but Grade 22 instead.
MR. LACSON. Mr. Speaker, Section 12 mentions only the remuneration of the governor and Senator After consulting the principal Author
the members of the monetary board.
Maceda. of the Standardization Law, the distinguished
MR. CHAVES. So, it will not cover any other employees of the Central Bank because the
limitation set forth under the Salary Standardization Law will apply to them. I just want Majority Leader, he confirms that the executive
to make that sure because if it is not clear in the law, then we can refer to the debates group
on the floor.
      is really Grade 23 and above. I think that is where
MR. LACSON. Mr. Speaker, Section 12 mentions only the governor and the members of the
monetary board. All the rest in the lower echelons are covered by law. the Gentleman really wants to have some leeway to
MR. CHAVES. In other words, I just want to make it clear whether or not they are covered by the Salary get some people in at the executive level. So I
Standardization Law because later on if there is any conflict on the remuneration of employees lower
propose the amendment to the amendment to Grade
than the governor and members of the Monetary Board, we have limits set under the Salary
Standardization Law. 22 and below.177 (Italics supplied; emphasis in the
MR. LACSON. Under the Salary Standardization Law.175 (Emphasis and italics supplied) original)
Ultimately, the Bicameral Conference Committee on Banks, in consultation with the BSP, determined that
The application of the Salary Standardization Law to all other personnel of the BSP raised some
the BSP’s executive level began at SG 20 and resolved to exempt those at that level and above from the
concerns, however, on the part of some legislators. They felt the need to reconcile the demand for
Compensation Classification System under the Salary Standardization Law, leaving the rank-and-file
competent people to help in the management of the economy with the provisions of the Salary
employees, or those personnel with a SG of 19 and below, under the coverage of the said compensation
Standardization Law.176 The Senate thus sought to address these concerns by allowing the BSP to
system. This is clear from the deliberations as reproduced by the petitioner itself:
determine a separate salary scale for the executive level.
The purpose behind the exemption of officers with SG 20 and above from the Salary Standardization CHAIRMAN x x x      x x x      x x x
Law was to increase the BSP’s competitiveness in the industry’s labor market such that by offering ROCO.
attractive salary packages, top executives and officials would be enticed and competent officers would   Number 4, on compensation of personnel. We have
be deterred from leaving.
checked. The exemption from the Salary Standardization
Senator Maceda. x x x
Law shall apply only from Salary Grade 21 and above.
  We have a salary grade range, if I am not
The division chief is salary grade 22.
mistaken, Mr. President, up to Grade 32. Those executive
CHAIRMAN I understood, Mr. Chairman, from the Central
types are probably between Grade 23 to Grade 32.
ZAMORA. Bank itself that their range for rank-and-file starts
If we really want to make sure that the vice-
from range 19 and downward.  So what we should
president types of the banks will come in, it should
propose is that we subject all personnel to salary
be cut off at around Grade 23 level and that the
standardization starting from range 19 going
Standardization Act should still refer to those
down, and exempt them from range 20 and going
around Grade 22 and below. But if we cut it off at
up.
Grade 9 and below, we are just hitting only the drivers,
CHAIRMAN That will cover also assistant division chiefs?
the janitors, the filing clerks, the messengers.
ROCO.
  The Gentleman will only be cutting off a part of my
CHAIRMAN That includes assistant division chiefs, division chiefs, and
heart again if he does that. My heart
ZAMORA. obviously higher personnel.
bleeds for this people, Mr. President.
CHAIRMAN Yes, because in terms of x x x We are being more

ROCO. generous than original. So assistant division
chiefs shall be exempted already from the salary
standardization.178 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The Classification is Based on Real Differences between the Officers and the Rank and File
of the BSP, and is Germane to the Purpose of the Law
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, 179 the foregoing classification of BSP personnel into
managerial and rank-and-file is based on real differences as to the scope of work and degree of
responsibility between these two classes of employees. At the same time, the exemption of the BSP
managerial personnel from the Salary Standardization Law bears a rational relationship to the purpose of
the New Central Bank Act.180 In the words of the Solicitor General:
x x x Article II, Section 15 (c) of RA 7653 was purposely adopted to attract highly
competent personnel, to ensure professionalism and excellence at the BSP  as well as
to ensure its independence through fiscal and administrative autonomy in the conduct of
monetary policy. This purpose is undoubtedly being assured by exempting the
executive/management level from the Salary Standardization Law so that the best and the
brightest may be induced to join the BSP. After all, the managers/executives are the ones
responsible for running the BSP and for implementing its monetary policies. 181 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
In the light of the foregoing, Justice Chico-Nazario’s conclusion that the distinction is “purely arbitrary”
does not appear to hold water.
In support of her view, Justice Chico-Nazario cites Section 5 (a) of the Salary Standardization Law,
which provides that positions in the Professional Supervisory Category are assigned SG 9 to SG 33. Thus,
she argues:
x x x SG 20 and up do not differ from SG 19 and down in terms of technical and professional expertise
needed as the entire range of positions all require intense and thorough knowledge of a specialized field
usually acquired from completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher courses.
Consequently, if BSP needs an exemption from R.A. No. 6758 for key positions in order that it may
hire the best and brightest economists, accountants, lawyers and other technical and professional
people, the exemption must not begin only in SG 20.
However, it is clear that while it is possible to group classes of positions according to the four main
categories as provided under Section 5 of the Salary Standardization Law, viz.:
SECTION 5. Position Classification System.—The Position Classification System shall consist
of classes of positions grouped into four main categories, namely: professional supervisory,
professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, and sub-professional non-
supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its implementation.
Categorization of these classes of positions shall be guided by the following considerations:
(a) Professional Supervisory Category.—This category includes responsible positions of a managerial
character involving the exercise of management functions such as planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating, controlling and overseeing within delegated authority the activities of an organization, a
unit thereof or of a group, requiring some degree of professional, technical or scientific knowledge and
experience, application of managerial or supervisory skills required to carry out their basic duties and
responsibilities involving functional guidance and control, leadership, as well as line supervision. These
positions require intensive and thorough knowledge of a specialized field usually acquired from
completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree courses.
The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 9 to Salary Grade 33.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 191
1. (b)Professional Non-Supervisory Category.—This category includes positions performing task
which usually require the exercise of a particular profession or application of knowledge
acquired through formal training in a particular field or just the exercise of a natural, creative
and artistic ability or talent in literature, drama, music and other branches of arts and letters.
Also included are positions involved in research and application of professional knowledge and
methods to a variety of technological, economic, social, industrial and governmental functions;
the performance of technical tasks auxiliary to scientific research and development; and in the
performance of religious, educational, legal, artistic or literary functions.
These positions require thorough knowledge in the field of arts and sciences or learning
acquired through completion of at least four (4) years of college studies.
The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 8 to Salary Grade 30.
2. (c)Sub-Professional Supervisory Category.—This category includes positions performing
supervisory functions over a group of employees engaged in responsible work along technical,
manual or clerical lines of work which are short of professional work, requiring training and
moderate experience or lower training but considerable experience and knowledge of a limited
subject matter or skills in arts, crafts or trades. These positions require knowledge acquired
from secondary or vocational education or completion of up to two (2) years of college
education.
The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 4 to Salary Grade 18.
3. (d)Sub-Professional Non-Supervisory Category.—This category includes positions involves in
structured work in support of office or fiscal operations or those engaged in crafts, trades or
manual work. These positions usually require skills acquired through training and experience
of completion of elementary education, secondary or vocational education or completion of up
to two (2) years of college education.
The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 1 to Salary Grade 10. (Emphasis supplied)
the same does not preclude classifying classes of positions, although different with respect to kind or
subject matter of work, according to level of difficulty and responsibility and level of
qualification requirements—that is, according to grade.182
It should be borne in mind that the concept of “grade” from the Old Salary Standardization Law is
maintained in the present one. Thus Sections 8 and 9 of the present Salary Standardization Law provide
for the general assignment of the various salary grades to certain positions in the civil service according
to the degree of responsibility and level of qualifications required:
SECTION 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their Equivalent.—Pursuant to Section 17, Article
XVIII of the Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be in accordance with the Salary
Grades indicated hereunder:
Salary Grades
President of the Philippines 33
Vice-President of the Philippines 32
President of the Senate 32
Speaker of the House of Representatives 32
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 32
Senator 31
Member of the House of Representatives 31
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 192

Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 31 Secretaries and Undersecretaries shall be deferred for one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act and for
Secretaries, until
Chairman of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 1987 31
Constitution July 1, 1992: Provided, finally, That in the case of Assistant Secretaries, Undersecretaries and
Secretaries, the salary rates authorized herein shall be used in the computation of the retirement
Member of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 1987 30
benefits for those who retire under the existing retirement laws within the aforesaid period.
Constitution SECTION 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. —For positions below the Officials
The Department of Budget and Management is hereby authorized to determine the officials who are of mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local
equivalent rank to the foregoing Officials, where applicable, and may be assigned the same Salary government units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department
Grades based on the following guidelines: of Budget and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be
GRADE 33—This Grade is assigned to the President of the Republic of the Philippines as the highest guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the
position in the government. No other position in the government service is considered to be of education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the
equivalent rank. nature and complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental
GRADE 32—This Grade is limited to the Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines and those and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and
positions which head the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the government, namely: the Senate external relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8)
President, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No other responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment;
positions in the government service are considered to be of equivalent rank. and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
GRADE 31—This Grade is assigned to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and
those with equivalent rank as follows: the Executive Secretary, Department Secretary, Presidential Benchmark Position Schedule
Spokesman, Ombudsman, Press Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank, Presidential Adviser,
Position Title Salary Grade
National Economic and Development Authority Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice,
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the House of Representatives, Laborer I 1
and President of the University of the Philippines. Messenger 2
An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and wide area of coverage ranging from top level Clerk I 3
policy formulation to the provision of technical and administrative support to the units under it, with Driver I 3
functions comparable to the aforesaid positions in the preceding paragraph, can be considered Stenographer I 4
organizationally equivalent to a Department, and its head to that of a Department Secretary.
GRADE 30—Positions included are those of Department Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary, Mechanic I 4
Presidential Assistant, Solicitor General, Government Corporate Counsel, Court Administrator of the Carpenter II 5
Supreme Court, Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President, National Economic and Development Electrician II 6
Authority Deputy Director General, Presidential Management Staff Executive Director, Deputy
Ombudsman, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Secretary I 7
Special Prosecutor, University of the Philippines Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State University Bookkeeper 8
President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines President of and President of other state universities Administrative Assistant 8
and colleges of the same class.
Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar entities whose operations cut across offices or Education Research Assistant I 9
departments or are serving a sizeable portion of the general public and whose coverage is nationwide or Cashier I 10
whose functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in the preceding paragraph, may be placed Nurse I 10
at this level.
Teacher I 10
The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or those that may be created hereafter shall be Agrarian Reform Program Technologist 10
determined based on these guidelines.
Budget Officer I 11
The Provisions of this Act as far as they upgrade the compensation of Constitutional Officials and
their equivalent under this section shall, however, take effect only in accordance with the Chemist I 11
Constitution: Provided, That with respect to the President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Agriculturist I 11
Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Senators, and
Social Welfare Officer I 11
the Members of the House of Representatives, no increase in salary shall take effect even beyond 1992,
until this Act is amended: Provided, further, That the implementation of this Act with respect to Assistant Engineer I 12
Veterinarian I 13

Benchmark Position Schedule
Position Title Salary Grade
Legal Officer I 14
Administrative Officer II 15
Dentist II 16
Postmaster IV 17
Forester III 18
Associate Professor I 19
Rural Health Physician 20
In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or administrator, and the board
of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions exceed Salary
Grade 30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher compensation for
the aforesaid officials. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while the positions of Agriculturist I with SG 11 and the President of the Philippines with SG 33
may both belong to the Professional Supervisory Category because of the nature of their duties and
responsibilities as well as the knowledge and experience required to discharge them, nevertheless, there
can be no doubt that the level of difficulty and responsibility of the latter is significantly greater than that
of the former.
It may be that the legislature might have chosen the four categories of the position classification
system as the basis for the classification in Section 15 (c), as suggested by Justice Chico-Nazario, or
even that no distinction might have been made at all. But these are matters pertaining to the wisdom of
the legislative classification and not to its constitutional validity as measured against the requirements of
the equal protection clause. As this Court stated in Ichong v. Hernandez:183
x x x Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature’s classification. To this we
answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power.  Since the Court finds that the
classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike,
and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is
on duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution. 184(Emphasis and
italics supplied)
At this juncture, it is curious to note that while the main opinion initially states that the classification
contained in Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act “has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely,
and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense,” and is thus valid on its face; the same opinion
subsequently opines that:
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of salary grade or officer-
employee status. It is a distinction based on economic class and status,  with the higher grades
as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Significantly, petitioner never advanced this argument anywhere in its pleadings. Moreover, there is
absolutely nothing in the pleadings or records of this petition to suggest that: (1) petitioner’s members
belong to a separate economic class than those with SG 20 and above; and (2) that the distinction
between the officers and the rank and file in Section 15(c) is based on such economic, status.
What is more, the foregoing statement flies in the face of a basis of classification well-established in
our law and jurisprudence.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 193
Indeed, the distinction between “officers” and “employees” in the government service was clearly
established as early as 1917 with the enactment of the Old Revised Administrative Code and later
incorporated into the language of the Constitution:
In terms of personnel, the system includes both “officers and employees.” The distinction between these
two types of government personnel is expressed by Section 2 of the Old Revised Administrative Code
(1917) thus:
Employee, when generally used in reference to persons in the public service, includes any person in the
service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. Officer, as distinguished
from clerk or employee, refers to those officials whose duties, not being of a clerical or
manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance
of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not.
Officer, when used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular function in the exercise of governmental power, shall include any Government employee,
agent, or body having authority to do the act or exercise of the function in question.
It is in these senses that the terms “officers and employees” are used in the Constitution
and it is this sense which should also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to officers and
employees of government-owned and or controlled corporations with original
charter.185 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Clearly, classification on the basis of salary grade or between officers and rank and file employees within
the civil service are intended to be rationally and objectively based on merit, fitness and degree of
responsibility, and not on economic status. As this Court summarized in Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan:186
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking
into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.
This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII
thereof, contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then President Marcos, in the exercise of his
legislative powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985.
However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State “to provide equal pay for substantially
equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions.”
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to “(take) into account the nature
of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required” for the positions of government
officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions
with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar
salaries. This scheme is known as the “Grade,” defined in P.D. No. 985 as:
Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of
work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic
compensation.
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions “sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty
and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work” so that they may be lumped
together in “one range of basic compensation.”

Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades of officials holding
constitutional positions, as follows x x x
xxx
x x x Congress delegated the rest of this tedious task (of fixing Salary Grades) to the DBM, subject to
the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758, by authorizing the DBM to “determine the officials who are of
equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable,” and to assign them the same Salary Grades
subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the
“Index of Occupational Services” guided by (a) the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9, and (b)
the following factors:
1. (1)the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
position;
2. (2)nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
3. (3)the kind of supervision received;
4. (4)mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
5. (5)nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
6. (6)kind of supervision exercised;
7. (7)decision-making responsibility;
8. (8)responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
9. (9)accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
10. (10)hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
Pursuant to such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. x x x187 (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing, the statement in the latter portion of the main opinion to the effect that the
classification between the officers and the rank and file of the BSP is founded on economic status, and
not on the level of difficulty and responsibility as well as the qualification requirements of the work to be
performed, must be considered extremely suspect—a conclusion without legal or factual tether bordering
on sophistry.
En passant, it may be observed that the distinction between the managerial personnel and the rank
and file of the BSP in the New Central Bank Act is similar to the distinction between Justices, Judges and
those of equivalent judicial rank on the one hand and other court personnel on the other hand in R.A.
No. 9227.188 In furtherance of the declared policy “to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary x x x
ensure impartial administration of justice, as well as an effective and efficient system worthy of public
trust and confidence,”189 Section 2 of R.A. No. 9227 provides:
Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances.—All justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws shall be granted special allowances equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the
basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as
amended, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for a period of four
(4) years.
The grant of special allowances shall be implemented uniformly in such sums or amounts equivalent
to twenty-five percent (25%) of the basic salaries of the positions covered hereof. Subsequent
implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by
the funding source specified in Section 3 hereof.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 194
Under the foregoing, personnel with judicial rank 190 are entitled to the grant of certain special allowances
while the other personnel of the judiciary are not. The reason for the difference in treatment may be
gleaned from the legislative deliberations191 wherein the legislature, while acknowledging the need to
augment the salaries and emoluments of members of the judiciary in order to attract and retain
competent personnel and insulate them from possible outside influence, nevertheless had to take into
consideration the limited resources of the government as well as the primary aim of the law, and
consequently prioritized those holding judicial offices or with judicial rank over other court personnel.
The Subsequent Amendment of the Charters of the other GOCCs and GFIs Did Not Alter the
Constitutionality of Section 15 (c)
By operation of the equal protection clause, are the rank and file employees of the BSP entitled to
exemption from the Compensation Classification System provided for under the Salary Standardization
Law as a consequence of the exemption of the rank and file employees of certain other GOCCs and
GFIs?
Petitioner argues in the affirmative maintaining that:
This Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the rank-and-file employees of the other
government financial institutions, such as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and the Social Security System
(SSS), together with the officers of such institutions, are exempted from the coverage of the SSL under
their respective charters x x x Thus, within the class of rank-and-file employees of the government
financial institutions, the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are also discriminated upon. 192 (Emphasis
supplied)
The charters, of the GOCCs/GFIs adverted to by petitioner, together with their relevant provisions are as
follows:
(1) R.A. No. 7907, which took effect on February 23, 1995 and amended Section 90 of R.A. 3844,
the Agrarian Land Reform Code, giving the Board of Directors of the LBP authority to approve the bank’s
own compensation, position classification system and qualification standards:
SECTION 10. Section 90 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 90. Personnel.—The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers
and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, appoint and fix their
remunerations and other emoluments, and remove such officers and employees: Provided, That the
Board shall have exclusive and final authority to promote, transfer, assign or reassign personnel of the
Bank, any provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis
and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board
no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall
however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles
under Republic Act No. 6758.
The Bank officers and employees, including all members of the Board, shall not engage directly or
indirectly in partisan activities or take part in any election except to vote.
No officer or employee of the Bank subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied)

1. (2)R.A. No. 8282, the Social Security System Act of 1997, approved on May 1, 1997, Section 3
(c) of which exempts all SSS employees from the provisions of the Salary Standardization
Law:
Section 3. x x x
(c) The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and
such other personnel as may be deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and
other benefits, prescribe, their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary
to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this
Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice-President shall be
appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President,
except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the
Commission: Provided, further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service
eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be
exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430 . (Emphasis
supplied)
1. (3)R.A. No. 8291, the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, approved on May 31,
1997, which empowers its Board of Trustees of the GSIS to approve a compensation and
position classification system and qualifications standards for its employees:
SECTION 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees.—The Board of Trustees shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS’
organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and
adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and the employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper
for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act
No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
1. (4)R.A. No. 8523, which amended the Charter of the DBP on May 31, 1997 and exempted the
bank from the coverage of the existing Salary Standardization Law:
SECTION 6. Section 13 of the same Charter is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 13. Other Officers and Employees.—The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization
and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank,
fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation
plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be
subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly
merit or increases based on the Bank’s productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be
exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification
and qualification standard. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 195
as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758, as amended).
No officer or employee of the Bank subject to Civil Service Law shall be dismissed except for cause
as provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied)
Following this second line of argument, it appears that petitioner bases its claim to exemption from the
Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law not only on (1) a direct challenge
to the constitutionality of the proviso in Section 15(c) of The New Central Bank Act, which expressly
places the rank and file employees of the BSP under the coverage of the former; but also on (2) an
indirect assertion that the rank and file employees of the BSP are entitled to benefit from the subsequent
exemptions of the rank and file personnel of certain GOCCs/GFIs from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law.
This second argument, that the rank and file employees of the BSP may benefit from subsequent
classifications in other statutes pertaining to other GFI employees, on the theory that the former and the
latter are identically or analogously situated (i.e. members of the same class), is not entirely new and is
apparently founded on the fourth requisite of the Rational Basis Test—that is, that a reasonable
classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Thus, in Rubio v. People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation,193 the Court applied Section 76 of B.P. Blg.
337, the old Local Government Code, to benefit employees of the People’s Homesite & Housing
Corporation who had been illegally dismissed some 23 years earlier, even though the latter were not
local government employees. The Court, speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Andres Narvasa
held:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was passed by the
legislature and became effective on February 10, 1983. Section 76 thereof (under Title Four: Personnel
Administration) provides as follows:
SEC. 76. Abolition of Position.—When the position of an official or employee under the civil service is
abolished by law or ordinance the official or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant
position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be available, the official or employee
affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over
and above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law.
To be sure, the provision on its face is apparently intended for the benefit only of officers
and employees in the local political subdivisions. The Court however sees no reason why it
should not be applied as well to other personnel of the government, including those in the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, which was then considered part of the Civil
Service. A contrary conclusion would make the provision questionable under the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as there appears to be no substantial distinction
between civil servants in the local government and those in other branches of government
to justify their disparate treatment. Since the petitioners are “employees under the civil service,”
the matter of their reinstatement to their former positions at this time should logically and justly be
governed by the above cited statute although enacted many years after the abolition of their positions.
And since, too, it may reasonably be assumed that reinstatement to their former positions is no longer
possible, or feasible, or even desired or desirable, the petitioners or their heirs must be deemed entitled
to receive the separation pay provided by said BP Blg. 337.194 (Emphasis supplied)
Some Basic Principles of Legislative Classification
Considering that the thrust of petitioner’s second argument is that its members belong to the same
class as other GFI employees (such that they are also entitled to exemption from the Compensation

Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law), a brief discussion on legislative classification is
in order.
As adverted to earlier, classification has been defined as “the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all other in these same particulars.” 195 To this may be
added the following observations of Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek in their influential
article196 on The Equal Protection of the Laws,197 viz.:
We begin with an elementary proposition: To define a class is simply to designate a quality or
characteristic or trait or relation, or any combination of these, the possession of which, by
an individual, determines his membership in or inclusion within the class. A legislature defines
a class, or “classifies,” when it enacts a law applying to “all aliens ineligible for citizenship,” or “all
persons convicted of three felonies,” or “all citizens between the ages of 19 and 25” or “foreign
corporations doing business within the state.”
This sense of “classify” (i.e., “to define a class”) must be distinguished from the sense in which “to
classify” refers to the act of determining whether an individual is a member of a particular class, that is,
whether the individual possesses the traits which define the class. x x x
It is also elementary that membership in a class is determined by the possession of the
traits which define that class. Individual X is a member of class A if, and only if, X possesses the
traits which define class A. Whatever the defining characteristics of a class may be, every member of
that class will possess those characteristics.
Turning now to the reasonableness of legislative classifications, the cue is to be taken from our
earlier reference to the requirement that those similarly situated be similarly treated. A reasonable
classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not. The
question is, however, what does that ambiguous and crucial phrase “similarly situated”
mean? And in answering this question we must first dispose of two errors into which the
Court has sometimes fallen.
First, “similarly situated” cannot mean simply “similar in the possession of the
classifying trait.” All members of any class are similarly situated in this respect and
consequently, any classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test. x x x
xxx
The second error in the interpretation of the meaning of similarly situated arises out of
the notion that some classes are unnatural or artificial. That is, a classification is sometimes
held to be unreasonable if it includes individuals who do not belong to the same “natural”
class. We call this an error without pausing to fight the ancient controversy about the natural status of
classes. All legislative classifications are artificial in the sense that they are artifacts, no matter what the
defining traits may be. And they are all real enough for the purposes of law, whether they be the class of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, or the class of makers of margarine, or the class of stockyards
receiving more than one hundred head of cattle per day, or the class of feebleminded confined to
institutions.
The issue is not whether, in defining a class, the legislature has carved the universe at a natural
joint. If we want to know if such classifications are reasonable, it is fruitless to consider whether or not
they correspond to some “natural” grouping or separate those who naturally belong together.
But if we avoid these two errors, where are we to look for the test of similarity of situation which
determines the reasonableness of a classification? The inescapable answer is that we must
look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one
which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law.198 (Emphasis and italics supplied; italics in the original)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 196
Moreover, Tussman and tenBroek go on to describe the task of the courts in evaluating the
reasonableness of a legislative classification:
Since it is impossible to judge the reasonableness of a classification without relating it to
the purpose of the law, the first phase of the judicial task is the identification of the law’s
purpose. x x x
xxx
It is thus evident that the attempt to identify the purpose of a law—an attempt made mandatory by
the equal protection requirement—involves the Court in the thornier aspects of judicial review. At best,
the Court must uncritically and often unrealistically accept a legislative avowal at its face value. Wt
worst, it must challenge legislative integrity and push beyond the express statement into unconfined
realms of inference. Having accepted or discovered the elusive “purpose” the Court must then, under the
discriminatory legislation doctrine, make a judgment as to the purity of legislative motive and, under
substantive equal protection, determine the legitimacy of the end. Only after the purpose of the law has
thus been discovered and subjected to this scrutiny can the Court proceed with the classification
problem.
x x x Except when the class in the law is itself defined by the mischief [to be eliminated],  the assertion
that any particular relation holds between the [classifying trait and the purpose] is an
empirical statement. The mere assertion that a particular relation exists does not establish
the truth of the assertion. A legislature may assert that all “three-time felons” are “hereditary
criminals” and that all “hereditary criminals” are “three-time felons.” But whether this is the case is a
question of fact, not fiat.
Consequently, the Court, in determining the actual relation between the classes [i.e. the
classifying trait and the purpose of the law] is engaged in fact-finding or in criticism of legislative
fact finding. Thus the Court is confronted with a number of alternative formulations of the question: 1)
what is the legislative belief about the relation between the classes? and, 2) is this belief reasonable? or
simply, 3) what relation exists between the two classes?199
With the foregoing in mind, the relevant question then (as regards petitioner’s second line of argument)
is whether in fact petitioner’s members and the other GFI employees are so similarly situated as to
members of a single class for purposes of compensation and position classification.
There is no Basis for the Classification of GFI Employees as a Discrete Class, entitled to “Special
Treatment” with respect to Compensation Classification
Without identifying the legislative purpose for exemption from the coverage of the Compensation
Classification System mandated by the Salary Standardization Law, the main opinion concludes that
the classifying trait among those exempted from the coverage is their status as GFI employees. On this
basis, it would grant the instant petition upon the assumption that “there exist no substantial distinctions
so as to differentiate the BSP rank and file from the other rank and file of the [other] GFIs.”
The foregoing tacitly rests on the assumptions that, with respect to their compensation, position
classification and qualifications standards, (1) the rank-and-file employees of the BSP together with the
rank-and-file employees of the LBP, SSS, GSIS and DBP belong to a single class; and (2) there are no
reasonable distinctions between the rank-and-file employees of the BSP and the exempted employees of
the other GOCCs/GFIs.
However, these assumptions are unfounded, and the assertion that “GFIs have long been recognized
as one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities” is demonstrably false.
As previously discussed, Section 2 of P.D. 985 200 cited in support of the foregoing proposition has
been expressly repealed by Section 16 of Salary Standardization Law.
Sec. 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations.—All laws, decrees, executive orders,
corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the

coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position classification, salaries, pay rates or
allowances of specified positions, or groups of officials and employees or of agencies, which are
inconsistent with the System, including the proviso under Section 2, and Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 985 are hereby repealed. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, neither the text nor the legislative record of the Salary Standardization Law manifests the
intent to provide “favored treatment” for GOCCs and GFIs. Thus, Section 3 (b), erroneously cited by the
main opinion, provides for the general principle that compensation for all government personnel,
whether employed in a GOCC/GFI or not, should generally be comparable with that in the private sector,
to wit:
SECTION 3. General Provisions.—The following principles shall govern the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government:
1. (a)All government personnel shall be paid just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions
must necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those
occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at equitable levels,
giving due consideration to higher percentage of increases to lower level positions and lower
percentage increases to higher level positions;
2. (b)Basic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned
or controlled corporations and financial institutions  shall generally be comparable
with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages;
3. (c)The total compensation provided for government personnel must be maintained at a
reasonable level in proportion to the national budget;
4. (d)A review of government compensation rates, taking into account possible erosion in
purchasing power due to inflation and other factors, shall be conducted periodically.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
Indeed, Section 4 of the Salary Standardization Law expressly provides the general rule that GFIs, like
other GOCCs and all other members of the civil service, are within the coverage of the law:
SECTION 4. Coverage.—The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided
shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or
hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and government financial institutions.
The term “government” refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus,
offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes,
state colleges and Universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term “govern-
ment-owned or controlled corporations and financial institu-tions” shall include all
corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National Government,
whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary
functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Furthermore, a reading of the deliberations on what eventually became the Salary Standardization Law
leaves no doubt that one of its goals was to provide for a common compensation system for all so that
the stark disparities in pay between employees of the GOCCs and GFIs and other government employees
would be minimized if not eliminated, as the following excerpt plainly shows:
Senator Guingona. Mrs. President, the PNB and DBP transferred nonperforming assets and liabilities to
the National Government in the sum of over P120 billion in 1986. They are reportedly having profits of, I
think over P1 billion. They have not declared dividends so that the National Government is the one that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 197
absorbed the indebtedness. The financial institutions are enjoying clean books and increased profits. Yet,
employees of these institutions are receiving far more, whereas, the employees of the National
Government which absorbed the nonperforming assets are receiving less. And the Central Bank is
dumping into the National Government liabilities of more than P5 billion...
Senator Romulo. Eventually P34 billion.
Senator Guingona. And, yet, the janitor in the Central Bank is receiving a higher rate of salary
than the clerk or even the minor executives in some National Government agencies and bureaus. This
does not seem just and violates the equal pay for equal work principle which the distinguished Sponsor
has nobly established in the policy statement.201
Thus, during the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations, the sentiment was that exemptions
from the general Compensation Classification System applicable to all government employees would be
limited only to key positions in order not to lose these personnel to the private sector. A provision was
moreover inserted empowering the President to, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher
compensation, exceeding Salary Grade 30, to the chairman, president, general manger, and the board of
directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions:202
SEC. CARAGUE. Actually, we are requesting that government corporations that are
performing proprietary functions and therefore competing with the private sector should
evolve a salary structure in respect to key positions.  There are some positions in banking, for
example, that are not present in the ordinary government offices.
I can understand for example, if the government corporation, like NIA, it is performing a
governmental function. I believe it is not strictly a proprietary function—NIA and NAWASA. But there are
government corporations that are engaged in very obviously proprietary type of function. For example,
transportation companies of the government; banking institution; insurance functions. I feel that they
have to be competitive with the private sector, not with respect to all positions. Like, for
example, janitor or messenger, because there is no danger of losing this out to the private
sector; you can always get this. But there are certain key position—even the key men of the
government corporations performing proprietary functions, sometimes they got—the
market analyst, commodities analyst and so on—they have certain functions that are not
normal in government, and it is very difficult to get this specialists.
So, I was wondering if we could provide a provision that government corporations engaged in
proprietary activities, that positions that are peculiar to them should be allowed a different compensation
structure.
THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Andaya). But that can be solved, when implemented, you just assign him
a higher rate.203 (Italics supplied)
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (Sen. Rasul). Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering if perhaps we should also
include “financial institutions,” not just “government-owned or controlled corporation.”
SEC. CARAGUE. I think it is broad enough, Madam Senator.
THE CHAIRMAN (Sen. Rasul). Broad enough?
SEC. CARAGUE. Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Andaya). It covers everybody. Everybody is covered that way.
REP. LAGUDA. Mr. Chairman, if we go back to the amendment of Senator Rasul, I think what she
has put there is that it is the President’s discretion, because in the House version, it is an across-the-
board-thing. There is no mention of the President’s discretion here. So maybe we should accept the
amendment of Senator Rasul that “it is the President who shall decide.” In other words, when she said
“the President may,” it is the discretion of the President rather than automatic.

SEC. CARAGUE. Yes. Like for example, there are, I think, quite a number of Vice Presidents that
really are also important because it is very difficult if the President will have a salary that is so way, way
above the Vice Presidents. And usually the Vice Presidents are the ones that support, that provided
teamwork for the President.
Sometimes there are certain key people, like money market specialists that are difficult to keep
because they easily transfer to another company.
xxx
SEC. CARAGUE. In the end, Your Honor, it may be more expensive to limit the salaries of these
kind of people because if you don’t get good people, the viability of the corporation, the profitability goes
down. So you actually, in the end, lose more. You don’t see it because it is just loss of revenue, in lack
of profitability, but actually it costs you more. And that is the problem of this kind of. . . .204 (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
What is more, the exemption of the personnel of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from
the coverage of the Compensation Classification System, as pointed out in the main opinion, 205 only
underscores the error in maintaining employment in a GFI as the defining trait of employees exempted
from said System.
In actual fact, the employees of a number of GFIs remain within the coverage of the Compensation
Classification System,206 while employees of several other GOCCs207 and government agencies208 have
been exempted from the same. Hence, GFI employment, as advocated by the main opinion, cannot be
reasonably considered to be the basis for exemption for the Compensation Classification System of the
Salary Standardization Law.
Curiously, how could the exemption of the SEC personnel “add insult to petitioner’s injury” when,
going by what the main opinion holds to be the defining characteristic of the class to which petitioner’s
members belong—that is, employment in a GFI, the two groups of employees would obviously not be
comparable?
Mere Employment in a GOCC or GFI is not Determinative of Exemption from the Salary Standardization
Law
More importantly, an examination of the legislative proceedings leading up to the amendment of the
charters of the GOCCs and GFIs exempted from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System
discloses that mere employment in a GFI was not  the decisive characteristic which prompted the
legislature to provide for such exemption.
Thus, Republic Act No. 3844 (R.A. No. 3844) otherwise known as the “Agrarian Reform Code”
created the Land Bank which is mandated to be the financing arm of the Agrarian Reform Program of
the government. More specifically, the Land Bank is tasked to be the primary government agency in the
mobilization and the provision of credit to the small farmers and fisher folk sector in their various
economic activities such as production, processing, storage, transport and the marketing of farm
produce. Since its inception, the Land Bank has transformed into a universal bank, seeking to continually
fortify the agricultural sector by delivering countryside credit and support services.
In order to continue performing its mandate of providing non-traditional banking services and
developmental assistance to farmers and fishermen, Congress saw the need to strengthen the bank by
introducing amendments to R.A. No. 3844. Republic Act No. 7907 (R.A. No. 7907) amended R.A. No.
3844 by strengthening the Land Bank not only for the purpose of implementing agrarian reform, but also
to make it more competitive with foreign banks.209
One of the salient points of R.A. No. 7907 is the exemption of all of the Land Bank’s personnel from
the Salary Standardization Law, authorizing at the same time its board of directors to provide
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 198
The discussion of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries
reveals the surrounding circumstances then prevailing, which prompted Congress to exempt the Land
Bank from the Salary Standardization Law. The Committee likewise recognized the role of the rank and
file employees in fulfilling its unique task of providing credit to support the agricultural sector.
MR. GOLEZ. Madam Speaker, the points of the distinguished sponsor are very well taken. But what I
would like to emphasize is that the Land Bank as already stated, is not just almost unique, it is
unique. It cannot be likened to a conventional commercial bank even in the case of the Philippine
National Bank where its employees can very easily move from one bank to another. An employee, an
average employee in the Philippine National Bank can easily transfer to a private commercial bank
and vice-versa. So in fact we are witnessing almost on a daily basis these periodic
transfers, piracy of executives, employees from one commercial bank to another.
However, in the case of the Land Bank precisely because of its very unique operations,
the very life of the viability of the Land Bank of the Philippines depends decisively and
critically on its core group, which in this particular case would be the rank and file, the
technical employee below the level of managers. They are not substitutable at all. They
are very critical. And as such, the position of this Representation, Madam Speaker, Your Honor, is
that that critical role gives them the importance as well as the inherent right to be represented in the
highest policy making body of the bank.210 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
MR. APOSTOL. Now, may I know why the employees of Land Bank should be exempted from the
compensation and position classification?
MR. FUENTEBELLA. Are we now in Section 87, your Honor?
MR. APOSTOL. Yes.
MR. FUENTEBELLA. The present compensation package of the employees of the bank are no
longer competitive with the banking industry. In fact, the turnover of bank personnel is
concerned, I think they had a turnover of more than 127 rank and file and more than 43
or 50 officer level. For the reason that the present compensation through bank officers and
personnel are no longer competitive with the other banks despite the fact that there is a provision in
our Constitution and this is sanctioned by existing provisions of the Civil Service, that we may enact
laws to make the position classification of certain sectors in the government comparable with the
same industry. That is the reason why. . .
MR. APOSTOL. Is it not that the compensation of officials and employees of the Land Bank must be
similar or comparable to the salaries and compensation of government banks or financial
institutions?
MR. FUENTEBELLA. Yes. In fact, the Philippine National Bank has a better financial compensation
package compared to the Land Bank.
MR. APOSTOL. Yes, it should and it must because PNB is already privatized, Land Bank is not yet.
MR. FUENTEBELLA. Not yet, your Honor.
MR. APOSTOL. If the compensation package of the employees of Land Bank should be similar to
PNB, then why not privatize so that Land Bank will be exempted from this...
MR. FUENTEBELLA. Well, as I said, your Honor, in due time, we can go into that aspect of
privatization. We are not closing our eyes to that possibility. But for the moment that the bank is still
tasked with numerous problems, particularly on agrarian reform, and for as long as the bank has not
been able to perform its major task in helping the government provide the necessary mechanisms to
solve and address the problems of agrarian reform, then we cannot talk about privatization yet.
Because the function of the bank is not purely for profit orientation, your Honor. Whatever profits
are generated under the commercial banking transactions are channeled to the agrarian sector,
which is a losing proposition actually.211 (Emphasis supplied)

Like the Land Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the country’s premier development
bank, was also exempt from the Salary Standardization Law. Republic Act No. 8523 (RA 8523) amended
Executive Order No. 81 otherwise known as the “1986 Revised Charter of the Development Bank of the
Philippines” to enable DBP to effectively contribute to the nation’s attainment of its socio-economic
objectives and fill the gaps left by the private sector which might be unwilling or unprepared to take on
critical projects and programs.
The bottom line of this bill which seeks to amend the existing charter of the Development Bank
of the Philippines is to enable the DBP as the country’s premier development bank to effectively
contribute to the nation’s attainment of its socio-economic objectives, such as the alleviation of poverty,
creation of employment opportunities, and provision of basic needs such as food, shelter, health and
education.
Given the present state of financial intermediation and capital markets in the Philippines, economic
activities and projects still remain which private financial institutions may not be willing to finance
because of the risks involves. And even if some of these private institutions are willing to do so, they
may not have the capability to assist such projects and activities. Development lending is much more
than simply providing medium to long-term funds to economically viable projects.
The proposed DBP charter amendment will help remodel DBP in the financial community as a
predominantly development bank that works closely with individuals, institutions and associations which
can provide resources and other types of assistance to projects with clearly-defined development
impact.212
In order to achieve DBP’s vision as the country’s premier development bank in a rapidly growing
economic environment, the legislature sought to (1) increase the authorized capital of DBP from P5
billion to P10 billion; and (2) restructure DBP’s organization into one which is market-responsive, product
focused, horizontally aligned, and with a lean, highly motivated work force by removing the DBP from
the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. The DBP’s exemption from the Salary Standardization
Law was justified by the fact that it is an institution engaged in development activities which should be
given the same opportunities as the private sector to compete.213
The exemption from the Salary Standardization Law does not only involve banks but government entities
that manage pension funds such as the SSS and the GSIS.
Republic Act No. 1161 (R.A. No. 1161) established the SSS pursuant to a state policy of providing
meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies, resulting in loss of income or financial burden.
Republic Act No. 8282 amended R.A. No. 1161 by providing for better benefit packages, expansion of
coverage, flexibility in investments, stiffer penalties for violators of the law, condonation of penalties of
delinquent employers and the establishment of a voluntary provident fund for members.
The fund that the SSS administers comes from the compulsory remittances of the employer on
behalf of his employees. The House of Representatives noted that the fund in 1996 amounted 5.5 billion
dollars, the sheer enormity of which necessitated that it be exempt from the Salary Standardization Law
in order for it to attract quality personnel to ensure that the funds will not be mismanaged, abused or
dissipated due to the negligence of its personnel. Moreover, the SSS, like the Land Bank and the DBP,
was facing a massive exodus of its personnel who were migrating to greener pastures.
MR. VALENCIA. x x x Now, the other law refers to the law on salary standardization. Again, we are in
a situation where we are competing for personnel with the private sector, especially the
financial institutions. We compete with banks, we compete with insurance companies
for people. So what happens invariably is we lost our people after we have trained them,
after they have proven themselves with a track record, with the very low pay that is
being given to our people. We believe that with the magnitude of the accountability that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 199
we have, (We are accountable for 5.5 billion dollars, some 132 million pesos) ah, we
think that we deserve the quality of people to ensure that these funds . . . and the pay
out by the billions of pesos in terms of benefits and we collect by the billions of pesos,
we believe that the magnitude of money and accountability we have is even higher than
that of the local financial institutions. And the pay, for example, of the Administrator is similar
to a small branch in a bank. So, I don’t think our pay will be very competitive but certainly it’s too
low considering the accountability that is on the shoulder of the employees. If we end up with poor
quality of personnel, what would happen is these funds could be mismanaged, abused or just out of
pure negligence could be dissipated.
HON. PADILLA. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Congressman Padilla.
HON. PADILLA. With the Standardization Law, how can we resolve that problem just mentioned by the
Administrator?
MR. VALENCIA. What will happen, Sir, is that we will ask outside assistance to work out a salary
structure that would be modest but at the same time at least make it more difficult ( sic) that will
attract new people, new blood to the System—quality personnel, and will also help make it a bit
more difficult for private sector to pirate from the institution.214 (Emphasis supplied)
As the SSS exercises the same functions as the GSIS—the handling of sensitive and important funds—
the GSIS’ exemption from the Salary Standardization Law was easily justifiable, viz.:
HON. TUAZON. x x x Now, the GSIS and the SSS, they are more or less performing the same
functions. So I am asking whether in the proposed amendments on the charter of the GSIS they
also have similar proposal, because if I still recall, there was a time when the GSIS employees were
the envy—not the SSS because the SSS has never been the envy of government employees because
they really never have been paid very good salaries.—There was a time when the GSIS was the envy
of other government employees because they had fat bonuses, they had quarterly bonus, they had
mid-year bonus, they had 3 months bonus, Christmas bonus and their salaries were very much
higher than their counterparts in the government and they are saying, “By golly, the GSIS, they are
only using the funds of the government employees and yet they are receiving fat salaries from the
contributions of the government employees. That was one of the complaints I was hearing at that
time—I was still First Year College—, so the next time I realized, all these fat salaries of the Central
Bank . . . Central Bank was also the envy of the other government employees, PNB, but SSS has
never been noted to be paying fat salaries that will be sufficient to attract well qualified employees
from the other sectors. So, the reason for my question is that, if we grant SSS, we have also
to grant GSIS on the rationale that they are both performing the same
functions.215 (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the basis for the exemption of certain employees of GOCCs or GFIs from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law rests not on the mere fact that they are employees of GOCCs or GFIs, but on
a policy determination by the legislature that such exemption is needed to fulfill the mandate of the
institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in
character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their counterparts in the private sector, not
only in terms of the provision of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent
personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with
competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for and the scope of exemption
necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in
the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental.
There are real differences between the Rank & File of the BSP and the Exempted Rank & File Employees
of the other GOCCs/GFIs

There can be no doubt that the employees of the BSP share a common attribute with the employees of
the LBP, SSS, GSIS and DBP in that all are employees of GOCCs performing fiduciary functions. It may
also be reasonable to assume that BSP employees with SG 19 and below perform functions analogous to
those carried out by employees of the other GOCCs with the corresponding salary grades.
Nonetheless, these similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file
employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes
of compensation, position classification and qualifications standards. The fact that certain persons have
some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect
to a legislative classification. Thus, in Johnson, et al. v. Robison, et al.,216 involving the alleged violation
of a conscientious objector’s right to equal protection, the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to observe:
Of course, merely labeling the class of beneficiaries under the Act as those having served on active duty
in the Armed Services cannot rationalize a statutory discrimination against conscientious objectors who
have performed alternative civilian service, if, in fact, the lives of the latter were equally disrupted and
equally in need of readjustment. The District Court found that military veterans and alternative service
performers share the characteristic during their respective service careers of “inability to pursue the
educational and economic objectives that persons not subject to the draft law could pursue.” But this
finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries
alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one
group rationally explain the statute’s different treatment of the two groups.  Congress
expressly recognized that significant differences exist between military service veterans and alternative
service performers, particularly in respect of the Act’s purpose to provide benefits to assist in readjusting
to civilian life. These differences “afford the basis for a different treatment within a constitutional
framework.”217 (Italics and emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, from the foregoing examination of the legislative records of the amended charters of the exempt
GOCCs and GFIs, the following real and material differences are readily manifest:
First, unlike the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, the BSP, in particular the Central Monetary
Authority,218 performs a primarily government function, not a proprietary or business function. In this
respect it is more similar to the other government agencies involved in the management of the economy,
such as the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), than a commercial bank.
Second, while the importance of its functions is undoubted, the BSP, unlike the LBP, DBP, SSS and
GSIS, is not subject to cut throat competition or the pressures of either the financial or job markets.
Third, there is no indication in the record that the BSP, unlike the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, is
experiencing difficulty in filling up or maintaining competent personnel in the positions with SG 19 and
below.
The Questioned Proviso Cannot be Considered Oppressive or Discriminatory in Its Implementation
Given the factual basis for the classification between exempt and non-exempt employees (i.e. real
distinctions as to the proprietary or governmental character of the GOCC/GFI, competition with the
private sector, and difficulty in attracting and maintaining competent personnel) and the reasonable
relationship of this classification to the attainment of the objectives of the laws involved, the
questioned proviso cannot be considered oppressive or discriminatory in its implementation.
Significantly, neither the petitioner nor the main opinion demonstrates what injuries petitioner’s
members have sustained as a result of the proviso in Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act,
whether or not the same is read together with subsequent legislative enactments. This is unsurprising
for how could a provision which places the BSP rank and file at par with all other government employees
in terms of compensation and position classification be considered oppressive or discriminatory?
Moreover, Congressional records show that House Bill 123 has been filed with the present Thirteenth
Congress219 seeking to amend The New Central Bank Act by, among other things, exempting all positions
in the BSP from the Salary Standardization Law. Thus, it cannot be said that Congress has closed its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 200
mind to all possibility of amending the New Central Bank Act to provide for the exemption of the BSP
rank and file from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law.
In fine, judged under the Rational Basis Test, the classification in Section 15 (c) of the New Central
Bank Act complies with the requirements of the equal protection clause, even taken together with the
subsequent amendments of the charters of the other GOCCs and GFIs.
Petitioner’s Members’ Remedy is with Congress and Not With The Courts
While the main opinion acknowledges the propriety of judicial restraint “under most circumstances”
when deciding questions of constitutionality, in recognition of the “broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power,” it nevertheless advocates active intervention with respect to the
exemption of the BSP rank and file employees from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary
Standardization Law.
Considering, however, that the record fails to show (1) that the statutory provision in question
affects either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and, more importantly, (2) that the classification
contained therein was completely bereft of any possible rational and real basis, it would appear that
judicial restraint is not merely preferred but is in fact mandatory, lest this Court stray from its function of
adjudication and trespass into the realm of legislation.
To be sure, inasmuch as exemption from the Salary Standardization Law requires a factually
grounded policy determination by the legislature that such exemption is necessary and desirable for a
government agency or GOCC to accomplish its purpose, the appropriate remedy of petitioner is with
Congress and not with the courts. As the branch of government entrusted with the plenary power to
make and amend laws,220 it is well within the powers of Congress to grant exceptions to, or to amend
where necessary, the Salary Standardization Law, where the public good so requires. At the same time,
in line with its duty to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments,221 this Court is naturally hesitant to intrude too readily into the domain of another co-equal
branch of government where the absence of reason and the vice of arbitrariness are not clearly and
unmistakably established.
The contention in the main opinion that herein petitioner represents the “politically powerless,” and
therefore should not be compelled to seek a political solution, rings hollow.
First, as pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center,222 “[a]ny minority can be said to be powerless to assert direct control over the legislature, but if
that were a criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social legislation would
now be suspect.”223
Second, there is nothing of record which would explain why the rank and file employees of the BSP
in particular should be considered more “powerless” than the rank and file employees of the other
GOCCs and GFIs, particularly those to whom Congress has granted exemption.
Third, as already mentioned, House Bill 123, providing for, among others, the exemption of all BSP
employees from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization
Law is already pending in Congress. Thus, it would seem that the petitioner and its members are not
without any support from within that legislative body.
Moreover, in view of the tight fiscal and budgetary situation confronting the national government,
both the executive and legislative branches of the government are actively reassessing the statutes
which have exempted certain GOCCs and GFIs from the Salary Standardization Law, as reported in a
number of newspapers of general circulation.224
Thus, in line with the austerity program set under Administrative Order 130 issued by the President
on August 31, 2004, the Department of Budget and Management is reviewing the pay packages of 1,126
GOCCs and their subsidiaries,225 particularly those which have been exempted from the Compensation
Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law,226 to bring their salaries at par with national
agencies.227 Additionally, the Department of Budget has moved for the removal of all the exemptions of

the GOCCs from the Salary Standardization law and the slashing of salaries of some GOCC officials to
help ease the government’s financial problems.228
There have also been suggestions to shift to a performance-based compensation structure, 229 or to
amend the charters of the GOCCs exempted from the Salary Standardization Law to allow the President
to set limits on the compensation230 received by their personnel. Budget Secretary Emilia Boncodin has
also disclosed that the President had mandated “a cut in pay of members of the board and officers of
GOCCs that are not competing with the private sector,” adding that those who “d[o] not compete with
the private sector would have to observe the Salary Standardization Law.”231
Together with these developments, House Majority Leader Prospero Nograles has called on Congress
to step in and institute amendments to existing charters of GFI’s and GOCCs 232 which have been
exempted from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law; and,
thereafter, pass a law standardizing the salaries of GOCC and GFI employees and executives.233 Other
members of the House of Representatives, particularly the party-list lawmakers, have suggested a cut on
the salary schemes of GOCC executives, with the funds saved to be channeled to a “special fund” for
giving lowly paid government employees a salary increase.234
Whether any of the foregoing measures will actually be implemented by the Congress still remains to
be seen. However, what is important is that Congress is actively reviewing the policies concerning
GOCCs and GFIs with respect to the Salary Standardization Law.
Hence, for this Court to intervene now, when no intervention is called for, would be to prematurely
curtail the public debate on the issue of compensation of the employees of the GOCCs and GFIs, and
effectively substitute this Court’s policy judgments for those of the legislature, with whom the “power of
the purse” is constitutionally lodged. Such would not only constitute an improper exercise of the Court’s
power of judicial, review, but may also effectively stunt the growth and maturity of the nation as a
political body as well.
In this regard, it may be worthwhile to reflect upon the words of Mr. Chief Justice Berger of the
American Court in his dissenting opinion in Plyler v. Doe,235 to wit:
The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress’ lack of
“effective leadership” in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of
uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders. The failure of enforcement of the immigration
laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have
combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma. It is a dilemma that has not yet been fully
assessed, let alone addressed. However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide
“effective leadership” simply because the political branches of government fail to do so.
The Court’s holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy
and wholesale formulation of “remedies” for the failures—or simply the laggard pace—of the
political processes of our system of government. The Court employs, and in my view abuses,
the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem
solver. That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the fact
that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of
others.
xxx
The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with
a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Moreover, when this Court rushes
to remedy what it perceives to be the failing of the political processes, it deprives those
processes of an opportunity to function.  When the political institutions are not forced to
exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles
not used, tend to atrophy. Today’s cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 201
unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of
our political processes. 236 (Emphasis supplied; citations and footnotes omitted)
The Social Justice Provisions of the Constitution do not Justify the Grant of the Instant Petition
May this Court depart from established rules in equal protection analysis to grant a group of government
employees, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ rank and file, adjustments in their salaries and wages? Can
the exemption from a law mandating the salary standardization of all government employees be justified
based on the economic and financial needs of the employees, and on the assertion that those who have
less in life should have more in law? Can the social justice provisions in the Constitution override the
strong presumption of constitutionality of the law and place the burden, under the test of “strict
scrutiny”, upon the government to demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly tailored to
further compelling governmental interests?
Notwithstanding the lack of support from both local and foreign jurisprudence to justify the grant of
the instant petition, the main opinion maintains that the policy of social justice and the special protection
afforded to labor237 require the use of equal protection as a tool of effective intervention, and the
adoption of a less deferential attitude by this Court to legislative classification.238
The citation of the social justice provisions of the Constitution, are non sequitur. As previously
discussed, neither the petitioner nor the main opinion has clearly explained how a provision placing the
rank and file of the BSP on equal footing with all other government employees in terms of compensation
and position classification can be considered oppressive or discriminatory.
In this regard, the citation of International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing239 is doubly
ironic. For to demonstrate the institutionalization of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” in our
legal system, footnote 22 of the decision refers specifically to the Salary Standardization Law as
embodying said principle:
Indeed, the government employs this rule “equal pay for equal work” in fixing the compensation of
government employees. Thus, Republic Act No. 6758 (An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in Government and for Other Purposes) declares it “the policy of the State
to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. See also the
Preamble of Presidential Decree No. 985 (A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation
Systems in the National Government, and Integrating the same)240
At the same time, the General Provisions of the Salary Standardization Law clearly incorporate the spirit
and intent of the social justice provisions cited in the main opinion, to wit:
SECTION 3. General Provisions.—The following principles shall govern the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government:
1. (a)All government personnel shall be paid just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions
must necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those
occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at equitable levels,
giving due consideration to higher percentage of increases to lower level positions and lower
percentage increases to higher level positions;
2. (b)Basic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in
the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on
minimum wages;
3. (c)The total compensation provided for government personnel must be maintained at a
reasonable level in proportion to the national budget;

4. (d)A review of government compensation rates, taking into account possible erosion in
purchasing power due to inflation and other factors, shall be conducted periodically.
How then are the aims of social justice served by removing the BSP rank and file personnel from the
ambit of the Salary Standardization Law? In the alternative, what other public purpose would be served
by ordering such an exemption? Surely to grant the rank and file of the BSP exemption solely for the
reason that other GOCC or GFI employees have been exempted, without regard for the reasons which
impelled the legislature to provide for those exemptions, would be to crystallize into our law what Justice
Holmes sardonically described as “merely idealizing envy.”241
Similarly, the justification that petitioner and its members represent “the more impotent rank and file
government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific rights to organize
as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions for employment, nor the
power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices” is unconvincing. This Court’s discussion of the
differences between employment in the GOCCs/GFIs and the private sector, to my mind, is more
insightful:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that “the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law”
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article, 277, the Labor Code, P.D.
No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector
are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment,
however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment.
And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements. x x x
Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the civil
service. It would not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted activities to wring higher
salaries or fringe benefits from Government even as other civil service personnel such as the
hundreds of thousands of public school teachers, soldiers, policemen, health personnel, and
other government workers are denied the right to engage in similar activities.
To say that the words “all employers” in P.D. No. 851 includes the Government and all its agencies,
instrumentalities, and government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in nightmarish
budgetary problems.
For instance, the Supreme Court is trying its best to alleviate the financial difficulties of courts,
judges, and court personnel in the entire country but it can do so only within the limits of budgetary
appropriations. Public school teachers have been resorting to what was formerly unthinkable, to mass
leaves and demonstrations, to get not a 13th-month pay but promised increases in basic salaries and
small allowances for school uniforms. The budget of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports has to
be supplemented every now and then for this purpose. The point is, salaries and fringe benefits of those
embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. Any increases must come from law, from appropriations
or savings under the law, and not from concerted activity.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 202
The Government Corporate Counsel, Justice Manuel Lazaro, in his consolidated comment for
respondents GSIS, MWSS, and PVTA gives the background of the amendment which includes every
government-owned or controlled corporation in the embrace of the civil service:
xxx
“ ‘Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision of the management of the
public service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is further emphasized that government agencies in
the performance of their duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers and
must always maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It
would be highly incompatible with these requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders from
union leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above solidarity with the Government.
This would be inimical to the public interest.
xxx
“Similarly, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing support for the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations in the Civil Service, argued:
“‘It is meretricious to contend that because Government-owned or controlled corporations yield
profits, their employees are entitled to better wages and fringe benefits than employees of Government
other than Government-owned and controlled corporations which are not making profits. There is no
gainsaying the fact that the capital they use is the people’s money.’ (see: Records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention).
“Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of
Government-owned or controlled corporations, Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila
University Professional School of Law, stated that government-owned corporations came under
attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher than their
counterparts in the various branches of government, while the capital of these corporations
belongs to the Government and government money is pumped into them whenever on the
brink of disaster, and they should therefore come under the stric[t] surveillance of the Civil
Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524).”
xxx
Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why the government
employees represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment in matters of salaries
different from that extended to all other government personnel. The provision states:
“SEC. 6. The National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions
concerned.”
It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not
the collective bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from
management that determine how much the workers in government-owned or controlled
corporations may receive in terms of salaries, 13th month pay, and other conditions or
terms of employment. There are government institutions which can afford to pay two weeks, three
weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their budgetary appropriations. However,
these payments must be pursuant to law or regulation.242 (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, social justice is more than picking and choosing lines from Philippine and foreign instruments,
statutes and jurisprudence, like ripe cherries, in an effort to justify preferential treatment of a favored
group. In the immortal words of Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams:243

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is “neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.244 (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
Postscript
I agree wholeheartedly with the main opinion’s statement that “[t]here should be no hesitation in using
the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society.”
However, because I find that the classification contained in the questioned proviso is based on real
differences between the executive level and the rank and file of the BSP; is rationally related to the
attainment of the objectives of the new Central Bank Act; and, further, that the subsequent amendments
to the charters of certain other GOCCs and GFIs did not materially affect the rational basis for this
classification, I do not believe that the classification in the case at bar is impressed with the vice of
irrationality.
The mere fact that petitioner’s members are employees of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, admittedly perhaps the biggest among the GFIs, does not, to my mind, automatically justify
their exemption provided for by the Salary Standardization Law. In my humble view, the equal protection
clause ought not to be used as a means of “reserving greener pastures to sacred cows” in contravention
of the Constitutional mandate to “provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for their positions.”
WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the instant petition.
CONCURRING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Does Sec. 15(c), Article II, Republic Act No. 6753, 1 which allows the exemption of BSP employees
occupying salary grade (SG) 20 and above from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 67582 result in a denial of
petitioner’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law?
I submit that it does and said provision should therefore be declared unconstitutional on the ground
that the division between BSP employees covered from SG 19 down and from SG 20 up is purely
arbitrary. Even given the wide discretion vested in Congress to make classifications, it is nonetheless
clear that the lawmaking body abused its discretion in making such classification.
It is not disputed that all that is required for a valid classification is that it must be reasonable, i.e.,
that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions and it must apply equally to each
member of the class.3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 203
In the instant case, the classification was justified on the need of the BSP to compete in the labor
market for economists, accountants, lawyers, experts in security, printing, commercial and rural banking,
financial intermediation fund management, and other highly technical and professional personnel, 4 which
it could not do unless personnel occupying top positions are exempted from the coverage of Rep. Act
No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law. Under Rep. Act No. 6758, however, professional supervisory
positions are covered by SG 9 to SG 33 which includes:
(R)esponsible positions of a managerial character involving the exercise of management functions such
as planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and overseeing within delegated authority
the activities of an organization, a unit thereof or of a group, requiring some degree of professional,
technical or scientific knowledge and experience, application of managerial or supervisory skills required
to carry out their basic duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance and control, leadership,
as well as line supervision. These positions require intense and thorough knowledge of a specialized field
usually acquired from completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree courses.
The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 9 to Salary Grade 33.5 (Italics supplied)
SG 33 is assigned to the President of the Philippines; SG 32 is for the Vice-President, Senate President,
Speaker of the House and Chief Justice of this Court. SG 31 is for senators, associate justices of this
Court, chairpersons of the constitutional commissions, department secretaries and other positions of
equivalent rank while SG 30 is assigned to the constitutional commissioners and other positions of
equivalent rank.6
Economists, accountants, lawyers and other highly technical and professional personnel are covered
under SG 9 to 29 as already adverted to.
Classification in law is the grouping of persons/objects because they agree with one another in
certain particulars and differ from others in those same particulars. In the instant case, however, SG 20
and up do not differ from SG 19 and down in terms of technical and professional expertise needed as
the entire range of positions all “require intense and thorough knowledge of a specialized field usually
acquired from completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher courses.”
Consequently, if BSP needs an exemption from Rep. Act No. 6758 for key positions in order that it
may hire the best and brightest economists, accountants, lawyers and other technical and professional
people, the exemption must not begin only in SG 20.
Under the circumstances, the cut-off point, the great divide, between SG 19 and 20 is entirely
arbitrary as it does not have a reasonable or rational foundation. This conclusion finds support in no less
than the records of the congressional deliberations, the bicameral conference committee having pegged
the cut-off period at SG 20 despite previous discussions in the Senate that the “executive group” is
“probably” SG 23 and above.7
Moreover, even assuming that the classification is reasonable, nonetheless, its continued operation
will result in hostile discrimination against those occupying grades 19 and below.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Puno, some other government corporations, by law, now
exempt all their employees from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 6758. BSP employees occupying SG 19
and below, however, shall remain under Rep. Act No. 6758 considering the rule that the subject
classification, to be valid, must not be limited only to conditions existing as of the time the law was
passed. Thus, while BSP employees from SG 19 down will continue to be covered under Rep. Act No.
6758, other government employees of the same class and occupying the same positions in government
corporations will be exempt.
I therefore concur with Justice Puno in that respect and, considering his thorough discussion, I have
nothing more to add thereto.
Section 15(c), Article II, RA No. 7653 declared unconstitutional.

Notes.—So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and
here in the Philippines, being in the agreeable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our
decision to rest on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one of blind adherence to
tradition and precedent. (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920])
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in
law. Rightly, we have stressed that social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our
workers, must not be hampered in its application by longwinded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be
asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. (Uy vs. Commission on Audit, 328 SCRA
607 [2000])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003.*
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.
AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN
THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003.*
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the
constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is “to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”—The petitions were filed by the
petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and
registered voters. Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is “to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; The principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which the Court had declared in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 779 (1991), as deriving
its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly
repealed by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006, is one of “overarching significance” that justifies the
Court's adoption of a liberal stance vis-a-vis the procedural matter on standing .—Certainly, the principal
issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court
had declared in Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of
public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of “overarching
significance” that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on
standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to
confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 204
quite apropos: . . . All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be
added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest,
and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce
our stand.
Same; Statutory Construction; The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.—Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is equally well-established, however, that the
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute
enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And where the acts of
the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred
duty to nullify the same.
Statutes; Riders; The proscription in Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution requiring every
bill passed to embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is aimed against the
evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered
encroaches; Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.—The proscription is aimed
against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title. To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that—
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
Same; Same; An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.—The Court is convinced that the title and
the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported
dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials
who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the
“one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Policy matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court—
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.—The
legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of

society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
Same; Same; Same; Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 of Omnibus Election
Code by the ruling in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement
in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose.—Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by
its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may
find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws—the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members
of Congress—is achieved.
Same; Same; The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should
be embraced in its title page is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public; It cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively
deliberated upon by members of the House of Representatives.—Moreover, the avowed purpose of the
constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this
case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members
of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their
reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of
the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Equal Protection Clause; Public Officers; Administrative Law; Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials.—Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title
I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
Statutes; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing
of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment .—The petitioners, thus,
urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the
“enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and
the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 205
due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds
no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners
mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference
Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules
of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep.
Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules,
in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’
Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’ ”
Same; Effectivity Clauses; An effectivity clause which provides that the law “shall take
immediately upon its approval” is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid—the law takes
effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazzette or a newspaper of general circulation .—
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule: . . . the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every
case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or
extended . . . . Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No.
9006 notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Rodolfo Fariñas for petitioners in G.R. No. 147387.
     Eduardo F. Sanson for petitioner in G.R. No. 152161.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare
as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly
repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office.—Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas,
Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as

respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member
of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,” is a consolidation of the following bills originating
from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled “AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE ‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;”1
...
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled “AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES.”2
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate 3 and sixteen (16)
members of the House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report,5 signed by its
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment
thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his
objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees 7 to
the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio
R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been
recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference
Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion
of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other members were given a
copy thereof.11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved
the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative
votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep.
Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior
to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bi-cameral Conference
Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular.12
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 206
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the
Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives
Robert P. Nazareno as “the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742,” and “finally
passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001.”
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the
other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding
in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in
the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.—Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains—
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended
its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
“Accountability of Public Officers:”14

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust.—Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those
members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents’ Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the
petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present
suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the
House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of
the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the
assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Invoking the “enrolled bill” doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners’ allegations that
“irregularities” attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries
of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,” is so broad that it encompasses all the
processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective
officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the gen-eral subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as
expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official
by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently
holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove
the “unfairness” of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are
now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any
office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be
expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the
act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing
each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution
merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details
need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67,
leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to
appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials
occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials
are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 207
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the “Effectivity” clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due
process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the
formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be
entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue
about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act
No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members
thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied
with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised by
the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions
at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its en-
forcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is “to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
“overarching significance to our society,”17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad
v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of
standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator
Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of
Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734
(Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly, the
Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners,
which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the
validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del
Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23 Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the constitutional
provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, is one of “overarching significance” that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-a-
vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months away,

it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following
pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
. . . All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of
public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our
stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law.30 And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of
the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the
petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10
and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office.—Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act
relating to its subject finding expression in its title.33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that—
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.” Section 2 of the law provides not only the
declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 208
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles.—The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or
information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time
and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates
and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The State shall ensure that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
      Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
  So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it
broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that
correct? That’s all. Because I believe . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
  We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the
nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
  Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that
even with the term “fair election practice,” it really covers it,
because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted
earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and,
      therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable with the title “Fair Election
Practice” so that we can get over with these things so that we
don’t come back again until we find the title. I mean, it’s one
provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in
election practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
  Yes.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 209

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: because . . .

  So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
with. To me, ha, it’s not a very touchy issue. For me, it’s even a   Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this,
very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was but we are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we
voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the. . . have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think that’s the
para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title. theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Is that what you’re. . .?   Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):   Maybe we should say the special provision on elected officials. So
  It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly how is that? Alam mo ito . . .
bear with us. I’m happy that there is already one comfortable REP. MARCOS:
senator there among . . . several of us were also comfortable with   I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
we’re all comfortable with it.   Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): REP. MARCOS:
  Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.   What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be
REP. MARCOS: changed. . .
  Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda   O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal . . .
and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that REP. PADILLA:
indulge full coverage. It says “An Act to enhance the holding of   Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use “An Act rationalizing the holding
free, orderly, honest . . . elections through fair election practices.” of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending
But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one. for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus
  Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section Election Code?”
2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any   Why don’t we remove “fair” and then this shall be cited as
form-of harassment and discrimination. “Election Practices Act?”
  Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the REP. PICHAY:
existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or   That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.
discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a   Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
rider. REP. MARCOS:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:   The Fair Election.
      I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
had very clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of   O, Fair Election Act.
Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope REP. MACARAMBON:
that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can       Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title
finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 210

ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election short title “This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act.”38
practices? The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
REP. PICHAY: Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
  Fair election practices? society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
REP. MACARAMBON: political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. 39 It is not for this Court to look into
  Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair . the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
.. whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
  Wala nang practices nga. does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from
REP. PICHAY: repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the
  Wala nang practices. provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws—the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
  It shall be cited as Fair Election Act. deserving members of Congress—is achieved.
  (Informal discussions) Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
REP. PICHAY: and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
  Approve na iyan. the legislators and the public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively
deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of
  Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be “Fair Election Act.” The
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.
rest wala nang problema ano? Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
VOICES: Omnibus Election Code.
  Wala na. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
REP. MACARAMBON: Is Not Violative of the Equal
  Wala na iyong practices? Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
  Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh. O, wala na? We equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
will clean up. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
REP. MARCOS:
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.44 The Court has explained
  Title? the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
  The short title, “This Act . . .”
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
  You’re back to your No. 21 already. alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
REP. MARCOS:
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
  The full title, the same? making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.45
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
      Iyon na nga. The full title is “An Act to enhance the holding . . .”
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.46 On the other hand, appointive officials
That’s the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive

officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure 47 while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the
same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously
expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of
this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006. i.e., elected officials vis-a-
vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist
that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said
law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
1. a.Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House
during its session on February 5, 2001;
2. b.No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the
BCC on November 29, 2000;
3. c.The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the members;
4. d.The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not
signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it was
presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
5. e.There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was
instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
6. f.The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened
on November 23, 2000;
7. g.The “Effectivity” clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise
bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that
comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
. . . Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in §16, R.A. No. 9006,
with the provision that “This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;”
8. h.The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same §16 as it now
appears in RA No. 9006, but §16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for
which no objection thereto was made;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 211
1. i.The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not “ contain a
detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure”; and
2. j.The disappearance of the “Cayetano amendment,” which is Section 12 of the compromise bill
submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to
the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision
states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials.—Any elected official who runs for president and vice-president
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy.50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
persuaded. Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed
are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases 51 reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the
rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd
Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and with their observance the courts have no concern. 52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Rep. Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,53 viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules,
in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’
Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’ ”
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
. . . the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication.
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended . . . .55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code 56 and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette
or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is
the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends

constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petitions dismissed.
Notes.—A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show
“not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way.” (Bayan [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 [2000])
Where a petition for mandamus involves the enforcement of constitutional rights—to information and
to the equitable diffusion of natural resources—matters of transcendental public importance, a citizen
has the requisite locus standi. (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 190582.  April 8, 2010.*
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.—As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under
Republic Act No. 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.—We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under
any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC
claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad .—Our
Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.—We are not blind to the fact that, through the
years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 212
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure—religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these “generally accepted public morals” have not
been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; “Nuisance,” Defined .—Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.—A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system .—We hold that moral disapproval,
without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion
that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent jurisprudence
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme
Court will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.—Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we declared that “[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal
protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force to Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.—From the standpoint of the political
process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-
list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb .—Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for
the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is

certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence or puts
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom
of association guarantee.—A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly
debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.
Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy
does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of non-discrimination requires that
laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation.—The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation
is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR
Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be construed to
include “sexual orientation.” Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses, these
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are
—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines .—Using even
the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on
the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the “soft law”
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the
support of either State practice or opinio juris.
PUNO, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the assailed Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.—The
assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment
clause of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in
legal—much less constitutional—terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration as a sectoral
party principally on the ground that it “tolerates immorality which offends religious ( i.e., Christian and
Muslim)  beliefs.” To be sure, the COMELEC’s ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule
that “[t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order,
the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it
sanctions.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
are violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.—The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive
that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Ang Ladlad’s
right of political participation was unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and
personal prejudices of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or
worse, a morality police.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) capitalized on Ang
Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men
who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality; This position would deny homosexual and bixesual individuals a fundamental element of
personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty .—The COMELEC capitalized on Ang
Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 213
who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a
fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty. For,
the “ability to [independently] define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty” cannot truly
be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”
Same; Same; Same; View that at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life .—It has been said that freedom
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the due process clause. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Same; Same; Same; View that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-
suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review .—The ponencia  of Mr. Justice Del
Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the
equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis
of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only show that the
challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. I humbly submit,
however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification,
as to trigger a heightened level of review.
Same; Same; Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection
despite some recent political progress.—It would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are
entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress. The discrimination
that they have suffered has been so pervasive and severe—even though their sexual orientation has no
bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or perform in society—that it is highly unlikely that
legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-
genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the
product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.—It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state
action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.
Same; Same; Same; View that the position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
(LGBT) community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is not a “marginalized and
underrepresented sector” is belied by the Supreme Court ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
vs. COMELEC, where the Court held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors
is not exclusive.—It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list
system because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented sector” enumerated either in the
Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC , 359 SCRA 698 (2001), where we clearly held that
the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system is essentially a
tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting
of national laws.—The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool
for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting
of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that the advancement of the interests of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 214

marginalized sectors contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nation’s requires that a general word or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
democratic ideals. the same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to
persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that the Constitution left the matter of determining the mentioned.
groups or sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands of Congress .—The Constitution left the Same; Same; Same; View that even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the
matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands of Congress. community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system.—Even assuming that petitioner was
able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First,
only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past.—In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
petitioner is not included in the sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
Labor Party, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for
Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot
those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show its
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own
professionals and even those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate).
peculiar interests and agenda.
They are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to
Same; Same; Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those sectors mentioned
participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are also
in Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system .—In this
traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest.
instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under
enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain
the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be
sectors as qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for
significant in our legal tradition.—The concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the
that policy and fidelity to the Court’s duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that only
party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be
sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are
significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is, specific
qualified to participate in the party-list system.
sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution, namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
Same; Same; Same; View that until and unless Congress amends the law to include the Lesbian,
cultural communities, women, youth, veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to
professionals.
Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.—The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through
in this case by strictly adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized
the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they
sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and
deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society .—
expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and
The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are
exclusively vests the authority to determine “such other [marginalized] sectors” qualified to participate in
intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social,
the party-list system to Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT
economic and political aspects of discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role
and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.
of a particular sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a
Same; Same; Same; View that the party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate
whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list
tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.—While bigotry, social
system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they deserve to be
stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a truly just, democratic and
heard on account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.
libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short
designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector .—The
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are,
enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in
by nature and history, also the nation’s but which interests have not been sufficiently brought to public
the implementing law (RA 7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts
attention because of these sectors’ underrepresentation.
of the Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party’s
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine
eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties, sectors or organizations “must
what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented, the Court’s task is to respect that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.” For this
legislative determination by strictly adhering to it .—Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion
reason, I submit the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of
to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court’s task is to
whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner.
respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system
congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of
but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly
judicial judgment.
enacted by Congress.—Marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not
ABAD, J., Separate Opinion:
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the underlying policy of Republic
Congress. It is also consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which
Act No. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of

society an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land .—The underlying policy of
R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),  359 SCRA 698 (2001),  the Court laid down
guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more
perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral
parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating this
case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when it denied Ang
Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds—the COMELEC has
never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress .—Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC
erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral
grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no
reason for it to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this
point.
Same; Same; Same; View that a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the
Court’s reading, neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941 intends the excessively limited
coverage that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) now suggests.—The COMELEC’s proposition
imposes an unwarranted restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution
and the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani  will show that, based on the Court’s reading, neither the
Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In
fact, the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list
system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the
marginalized and underrepresented in general.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and
underrepresented.”—Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and
underrepresented.” Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is
possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting such term. No doubt, Congress
crafted that term—marginalized and underrepresented—from its reading of the concrete examples that
the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor,
the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors.
Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of what they are, which was what those
who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them.
Same; Same; Same; View that an interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined
groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the
mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives .—An interpretation that will allow
concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will
result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of
Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster
enough votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There
will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; View that applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10
persons is a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should
now stand at about 8.7 million.—In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally
accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs
should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not
brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC
denied Ang Ladlad’s petition on religious and moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 215
Same; Same; Same; View that Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for
sectoral party accreditation—their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.—
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their
members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow
definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub-group within the
class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a
national presence.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  F.D. Nicholas B. Pichay, Clara Rita A. Padilla  and Ibarra M. Gutierrez  for petitioner.
  R.A.V. Saguisag  for intervenor Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.
                                       Justice Robert A. Jackson
                                             West Virginia State Board of
                                             Education v. Barnette1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices—choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices
that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because
they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a
core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and
respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those
theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox—philosophical justifications
about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This
Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons
of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution)
and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-
list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that
the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative

societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction
to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender,
or more than one gender.
 This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use
of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women “ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds.” (7.81) “And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone):
Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!” (7:84) “He said: “O my
Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief” (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par.
6F: ‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex
with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of
Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are
deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.—
The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 216
2.  (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;
(b)  Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent
or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or
religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it “or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have
not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.” Furthermore,
should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does
not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the
U.S.A. said in one article that “older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth.” As an agency of
the government, ours too is the State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.”8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while
three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo
T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad  is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s
expressed sexual orientations per se  would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list
race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-
list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nation’s—only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of
the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when  Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do
not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a “special class” of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental

right, and that “nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the
social or legal equality of homosexual relations,” as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be
no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male
or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are
being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly
religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500
52
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections
years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor  upon “Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals.” It penalizes “immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows.” “Ang Ladlad”  apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: “Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission x x x or
anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality
x x x.” These are all unlawful.”10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also
sought the issuance ex parte  of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January
25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on
behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner’s
application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it
to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2,
2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on
January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the
denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 217
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion was
granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties’ Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner
also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioner’s application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality.
It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been
recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of
petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that
there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time  that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements
of the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the
sectors in the enumeration. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani  stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections ,20 “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims
that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that “save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.”21
This argument that “petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence” is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was “not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.” Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 218

belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
procedural due process. Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality,
Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, or lack thereof.
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least Religion as the Basis for Refusal
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition
its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be “a national LGBT umbrella for Registration
organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:” Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
€ Abra Gay Association establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
€ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” 24 Clearly, “governmental
€ Albay Gay Association reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” 25 We thus find that it was
€ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
€ Boys Legion – Metro Manila justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
€ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)     Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
€ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
€ Cebu Pride – Cebu City conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
€ Circle of Friends ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
€ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte “x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the
€ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY) dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. “Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the
€ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms.”
€  Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
€ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs
€ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
€ Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion,” anathema to religious freedom. Likewise,
€  Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP) if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
€ LUMINA – Baguio City thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
€ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
€ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
€ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
€ ONE BACARDI law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
€ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila because it is “detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
€ PUP LAKAN progress of human society” and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
€ RADAR PRIDEWEAR the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on
€ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
€ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions
€ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the
€ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
€ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it
€ The Link – Davao City must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion
€ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
€ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila society, however, the Philippine constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
€ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23 neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests
but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang state interests.”27
Ladlad’s principal place of business. Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The
COMELEC argues:
“Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in
our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.”28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind
this censure—religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation,
even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall
that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
“generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
Even the OSG agrees that “there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members
have committed or are committing immoral acts.”30 The OSG argues:
“x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or
more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC
would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the “straights” and the gays.” Certainly
this is not the intendment of the law.”31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral
fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate
matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will
and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of
an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation.
In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 219
a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides “ nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws ,” courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. “Equality,” said Aristotle, “consists in the same treatment of similar
persons.”33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,36 we declared that “[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges
x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.”37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to
criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if
we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here—
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority—is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would
benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the
same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the
OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made “an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.”
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade
society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It is in the public square that
deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor:40
“In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these

citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited
from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a
necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is
finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e.,
the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution
and the limits it specifies—including protection of religious freedom “not only for a minority, however
small—not only for a majority, however large—but for each of us”—the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.”
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex
conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on
both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected
on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while
not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s
analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free
speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition
of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by
“something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint.”43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its
vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a
political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses
legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The
ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise
of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or
the majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to
publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46
 
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs
and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of
the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 220
express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well
may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional
analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public
opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and
we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate,
then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
“There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely
take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the
right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlad’s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of
its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x”47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the
party-list system, and—as advanced by the OSG itself—the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was
not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on
an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and
humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental
support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced
in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to
electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating
to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR,
the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be
construed to include “sexual orientation.”48 Additionally, a variety of United Nati
ons bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.49  international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives.
 Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b)  To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention ,  the scope of the right to electoral participation
is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public
Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
“1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on
the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to
stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation.
No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person’s candidacy.
States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category
of persons from elective office.”50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving
effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not
the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles  (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are
not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 221
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society—or a certain segment of society—wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added
to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a
much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that
rights, and is a result of the notion that if “wants” are couched in “rights” language, then they are no
longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more
than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53
   As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are
divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to
apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the
knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez  and Mendoza,
JJ.,  concur.
Puno (C.J.),  See Separate Opinion.
Corona, J.,  Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J.,  I join J. Abad., concurring opinion.
Nachura, J.,  I join concurring opinion of J. Abad.
Brion, J.,  I join dissent of J. Corona.
Peralta, J., I join the concurring opoinion of J.
Abad.
Abad, J., I certify that J. Abad write a separate concurring opinion—Puno, C.J. 
_______________
of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the
International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly
fall under this category.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion to underscore some points that I deem
significant.

FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-
establishment
clause1 of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its
reasoning in legal—much less constitutional—terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration as
a sectoral party principally on the ground that it “tolerates immorality which offends religious ( i.e.,
Christian2 and Muslim3)  beliefs.” To be sure, the COMELEC’s ruling is completely antithetical to the
fundamental rule that “[t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including the
morality it sanctions.”4 As we explained in Estrada v. Escritor,5 the requirement of an articulable
and discernible secular purpose is meant to give flesh to the constitutional policy of full religious freedom
for all, viz.:
“Religion also dictates “how we ought to live” for the nature of religion is not just to know, but often,
to act in accordance with man’s “views of his relations to His Creator.” But the Establishment Clause puts
a negative bar against establishment of this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies
the affirmative “establishment” of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This
agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the “war of all sects against all”; the
establishment of a secular public moral order is the social contract produced by religious truce.
Thus, when the law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public morals” in the Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in the
New Civil Code, or “moral character” in the Constitution, the distinction between public and secular
morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality
referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio
holds. “Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms.” Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals
would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-
believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion;” anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires
that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”6 (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive
that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights .7 Ang Ladlad’s
right of political participation was unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and
personal prejudices of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or
worse, a morality police.
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this “excessive entanglement”8 with religion by
arguing thatwe “cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing, whether Christian or Muslim”9 since the
“moral precepts espoused by [these] religions have slipped into society and … are now publicly accepted
moral norms.”10 However, as correctly observed by Mr. Justice Del Castillo, the Philippines has not seen
fit to disparage homosexual conduct as to actually criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State has legislated
to this effect, the law is vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy grounds.11 These alleged “generally
accepted public morals” have not, in reality, crossed over from the religious to the secular sphere.   “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans
Some people may find homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and offensive. Nevertheless,
private discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be attributed or ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 222
Kennedy, speaking for the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v.
Texas,12 opined:
“It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for
centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The
condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and
respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the
course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is
whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the … law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code.”13
SECOND.  The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual orientation,” 14 as
well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men,15 as basis for the declaration
that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality. This position, however, would deny
homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a
legitimate exercise of personal liberty. For, the “ability to [independently] define one’s identity that
is central to any concept of liberty” cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the
“emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”16 As Mr. Justice Blackmun so eloquently said in his
stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick17 (overturned by the United States Supreme Court seventeen
years later in Lawrence v. Texas18):
“Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is “a sensitive, key
relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of
human personality[.]”19 The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be
many “right” ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship
will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.20
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals
freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will
make different choices. For example, in holding that the clearly important state interest in public
education should give way to a competing claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal
schooling threatened their way of life, the Court declared: “There can be no assumption that today’s
majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are ‘wrong.’ A way of life that is odd or even erratic
but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”21 The
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all
individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others.” (italics supplied)
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 22 Liberty presumes an autonomy of
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. 23 These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause. 24 At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.25 Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.26 Lawrence v. Texas27 is again instructive:
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are,
to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and

purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the
meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship
in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”  (italics supplied)
THIRD.  The ponencia  of Mr. Justice Del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals
as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the
assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to
which government need only show that the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest.
I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-
suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.
Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main
have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and
a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.28 However, Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,29 carved out an exception to this general rule, such that prejudice to
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires stricter judicial scrutiny than mere
rationality, viz.:
“Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.” (citations omitted and
italics supplied)
Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our fundamental law, the
Court ruled in favor of the Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. in this wise:
“While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, we hold that the
enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity
out of the challenged proviso.
xxxx
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative
of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS
were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the
SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also
discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also
undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from
1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxxx
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 223
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share
this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL,
expressly or impliedly...
xxxx
The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.
This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification—albeit made indirectly as a
consequence of the passage of eight other laws—between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven
other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of
the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are
without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress
chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-
and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not
exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress’ power to classify so unbridled as to
sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not
instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of
Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can
only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination
that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to
determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or
exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the lack thereof,
among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion
that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests “on a policy determination by the
legislature.” All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination—even those that have
been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the
validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is
nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot
run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
xxxx
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which
BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The
distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
xxxx
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs
definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination—no one can, with candor and
fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven
other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis.
xxxx
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive

trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal
protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our
society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and
protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we
held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution
and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights exhorts Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities.” The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, “in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation—all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this
principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.”
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace—the factory, the office or the field
—but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote “equality of employment opportunities for
all.” Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall “ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed.” It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.
xxx   xxx   xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7
thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i.  Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
   xxx   xxx   xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 224
   x x x x
  Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial
scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it
enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-
employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades
as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank
—possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement—are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they—and not the officers—who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution “to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for
all.” Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.” (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal protection grounds is
subject to one of three levels of judicial scrutiny. The level of review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with
the type of classification utilized and the nature of the right affected.30
If a legislative classification disadvantages a “suspect class” or impinges upon the exercise of a
“fundamental right,” then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall unless the
government can demonstrate that the classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.31 Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect
classes for equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage, national
origin, and ancestry.32 The underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation affects discrete
and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political processes
may have broken down.33 In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the
government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.34
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to
recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a “quasi-suspect class,” it will be
treated under intermediate or heightened review.35 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not
only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the
justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.36 Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include
classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.37
(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the legislation;42
(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class member’s
ability to contribute to society;43

(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is “immutable” or beyond the class members’
control;44 and
(4) The political power of the subject class.45
These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, as to individually demand a certain weight.46 The U.S. Supreme Court has applied
the four factors in a flexible manner; it has neither required, nor even discussed, every factor in every
case.47 Indeed, no single talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications
offensive to the equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny;
experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide.48
In any event, the first two factors—history of intentional discrimination and relationship of classifying
characteristic to a person’s ability to contribute—have always been present when heightened scrutiny
has been applied.49 They have been critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to
concluding a group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.50 However, the last two factors—immutability of
the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group—are considered simply to supplement the
analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny exists.51
 Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex or gender—
albeit on a male/
female, man/woman basis—have been previously held to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully
submit that classification on the basis of sexual orientation (i.e.,  homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a
quasi-suspect classification that prompts intermediate review.
The first consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful unequal
treatment because of their sexual orientation.52 One cannot, in good faith, dispute that gay and lesbian
persons historically have been, and continue to be, the target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination
due solely to their sexual orientation.53 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration for
party-list accreditation in fact state:
“6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence perpetuated against the
LGBT Community, among which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or guardians to make them
conform to standard gender norms of behavior;
(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch lesbians to be raped[, so as]
to “cure” them into becoming straight women;
(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school, NGOs, and choirs because of their
identity;
(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused admission from (sic)  certain
schools, are suspended or are automatically put on probation;
(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work benefits once one’s sexual orientation and
gender identity is (sic)  revealed;
(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age, are
broken up by their parents or guardians using the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;
(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on gays and lesbians to “reform”
them;
(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric counseling and therapy to cure
them[,] despite the de-listing (sic)  of homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association;
(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail (sic) but who self-identity as women and dress
as such, are denied entry or services in certain restaurants and establishments; and
(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against gay men, but were not
acknowledged by police as hate crimes or violent acts of bigotry.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 225
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testified that as a young gay
person in the Philippines, he was subjected to a variety of sexual abuse and violence, including repeated
rapes[,] which he could not report to [the] police [or speak of] to his own parents.”
Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden placed on lesbian and
gay people as a class is “more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative
rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.”54
A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to the person’s ability to
contribute to society.55 Heightened scrutiny is applied when the classification bears no relationship to this
ability; the existence of this factor indicates the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and
prejudice.56 Insofar as sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health,57 viz.:
“The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person’s ability to
participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts have acknowledged, as well. x x x If
homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to
society, the entire phenomenon of ‘staying in the [c]loset’ and of ‘coming out’ would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status. x x x In this critical respect, gay persons stand in stark contrast to
other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class recognition, despite a history of
discrimination, because the distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or
capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in society.58
Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, “homosexuality bears no relation at all to
[an] individual’s ability to contribute fully to society.”59 Indeed, because an individual’s homosexual
orientation “implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational
capabilities”;60 the observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national
origin—all suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection—“are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations
are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy”61 is no less applicable to gay persons.” (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person’s ability to perform and contribute to
society than is heterosexual orientation.62
A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a class are
entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is whether the attribute or characteristic
that distinguishes them is immutable or otherwise beyond their control.63 Of course, the characteristic
that distinguishes gay persons from others and qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete
group is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism, namely, their
attraction to persons of the same sex.64
Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because the inability of a
person to change a characteristic that is used to justify different treatment makes the discrimination
violative of the rather “ ‘basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility.’ ”65 However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not
reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is absolutely impossible to
change.66 That is, the immutability prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when the
identifying trait is “so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize
a person for refusing to change [it].”67
Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his
or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment, because a person’s sexual
orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity.68 Consequently, because sexual orientation “may be
altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual’s sense of self,”
classifications based thereon “are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class
than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic.” 69 Stated differently,

sexual orientation is not the type of human trait that allows courts to relax their standard of review
because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-help.70
The final factor that bears consideration is whether the group is “a minority or politically
powerless.”71 However, the political powerlessness factor of the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require
a showing of absolute political powerlessness. 72 Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be
“whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and
discrimination through traditional political means.”73
Applying this standard, it would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to
heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress.74 The discrimination that they
have suffered has been so pervasive and severe—even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at
all on their ability to contribute to or perform in society—that it is highly unlikely that legislative
enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination. 75 Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT
community plays a role in the political process, it is apparent that their numbers reflect their status as a
small and insular minority.76
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is
not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.77
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the intermediate level of
review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and intolerance; they raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected 78 (that
is, lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based
classification undertaken for its own sake cannot survive.79
FOURTH.  It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list system
because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented sector” enumerated either in the
Constitution80 or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. 81 However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC ,82 where we clearly held that the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the LGBT community as
marginalized and underrepresented, considering their long history (and indeed, ongoing narrative) of
persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my humble view, marginalization for purposes of
party-list representation encompasses social marginalization as well. To hold otherwise is
tantamount to trivializing socially marginalized groups as “mere passive recipients of the State’s
benevolence” and denying them the right to “participate directly [in the mainstream of representative
democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them.”83 The party-list system could not have
been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I believe the basic issue
here is simple: does petitioner Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify, under the terms of the Constitution and
RA 7941, as a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the party-list system?
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks accreditation by the
respondent Commission on Elections as a political organization of a marginalized and underrepresented
sector under the party-list system. Finding that petitioner is not a marginalized sector under RA 7941,
the Commission on Elections denied its petition.
A System For Marginalized
And Underrepresented Sectors
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 226
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the
advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws.
It is premised on the proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors
contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nation’s democratic ideals.
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-list system was
designed?
The Texts of the Constitution
And of RA 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the fundamental law be
consulted. Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the course of our present inquiry. It
provides:
“SEC. 5. x x x
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
Representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.” (emphasis supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as
“marginalized” to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-
List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law provides:
“Section 2. Declaration of policy.—The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
x x x   x x x   x x x
Section 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from
the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.— The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)  It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. (emphasis supplied)
The Court’s Previous Pronouncements
As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list system and defined its
meaning in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections:2
“That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party—or any organization or group for that matter—may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. x x x
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means
of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,”
and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
“labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization
or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.”
Finally, “lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points
again to those with disparate interests identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 227
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
“marginalized and underrepresented” become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more
law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
“to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives.”
111
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010 111
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections
Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a
statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may
be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
x x x   x x x   x x x
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG’s position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In
contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders
political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not
necessarily emanate from the size of one’s constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one’s bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted—to
give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers
the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and

underrepresented in the past—the farm hands, the fisherfolk, the urban poor, even those in
the underground movement—to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out
and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
x x x   x x x   x x x
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-
list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by
those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be
snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties
and other organizations under the party-list system.” (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the Court stressed that the party-list system is
reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, professionals and even those in the underground movement who wish to come out
and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of
an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are
also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest. That is why Section
2 of RA 7941 speaks of “marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.”
How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national interest (and
therefore beneficial to the nation as a whole) be determined? Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
opinion3 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission
on Elections4 offers valuable insight:
“… Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties
from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to
“reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good”; the right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the
right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force;
the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the
consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies,
and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.”
As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to national interest
and therefore beneficial to the nation as a whole because the Constitution declares a national policy
recognizing the role of these sectors in the nation’s life. In other words, the concept of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples
involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a
constitutional bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution, namely,
labor,5 peasant,6 urban poor,7 indigenous cultural
communities,  women,  youth,  veterans,  fisherfolk,12 elderly,13 handicapped,14 overseas workers15 and
8 9 10 11
professionals.16
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 228
The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet traditionally and
historically marginalized sectors promotes the national interest. The Filipino people as a whole are
benefited by the empowerment of these sectors.
The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are
intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social,
economic and political aspects of discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role
of a particular sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a
whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list
system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they deserve to be
heard on account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.
A Unifying Thread
Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise of its function as
official interpreter of the Constitution, the Court should always bear in mind that judicial prudence means
that it is safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face.17
With regard to the matter of what qualifies as marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the
party-list system, Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mentions “the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.” On the other hand, the law speaks of “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”18
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the
fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA 7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them
is to disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party’s eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties, sectors
or organizations “must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of
RA 7941.”19
For this reason, I submit the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of
the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner:
“The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.”
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-to-case basis not
tethered to the enumeration of the Constitution and of RA 7941 invites the exercise of unbridled
discretion. Unless firmly anchored on the fundamental law and the implementing statute, the party-list
system will be a ship floating aimlessly in the ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden waves of flux
and tipped by shifting winds of change in societal attitudes towards certain groups. Surely, the
Constitution and RA 7941 did not envision such kind of a system.
Indeed, the significance of the enumeration in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
5 of RA 7941 is clearly explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party:
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law ; namely,
“labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization
or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list

candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.”
x x x   x x x   x x x
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a
statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute
may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.”20 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
More importantly, in defining the concept of a “sectoral party,” Section 3(d) of RA 7941 limits
“marginalized and underrepresented sectors” and expressly refers to the list in Section 5 thereof:
“Section 3. Definition of Terms.—x x x
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector, x x x.” (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941. (Its charges
of violation of non-establishment of religion, equal protection, free speech and free association are all
leveled at the assailed resolutions of the Commission on Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts
that its case must rise or fall based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with established rules of
statutory construction and the Court’s pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the
meaning of “marginalized sectors” under the party list system is limited and qualified. Hence, other
sectors that may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection to the
sectors mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system refer only to the labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, professionals and other related or similar sectors.
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the fundamental law and of its
implementing statute. It is coherent with the mandate of the Constitution that marginalized sectors
qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are “such
other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by Congress. It is also consistent with
the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase
that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.21 Moreover, it reins in the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 229
subjective elements of passion and prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral or
religious implications as it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under
the party-list system? What are the family resemblances that would characterize them?22
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the pronouncements of
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party  and BANAT, the following factors are significant:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the sectors mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and historically regarded as vital
to the national interest but they have long been relegated to the fringes of society and deprived
of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity of sectors to those
expressly mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 is a constitutional provision specifically recognizing
the special significance of the said sectors (other than people’s organizations, unless such
people’s organizations represent sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941) 23 to the
advancement of the national interest and
(d) while lacking in well-defined political constituencies, they must have regional or national
presence to ensure that their interests and agenda will be beneficial not only to their respective
sectors but, more importantly, to the nation as a whole.
For Purposes of the Party-List System,
Petitioner is Not a Marginalized Sector
In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a marginalized and
underrepresented sector under the party-list system. However, the Commission on Elections disagrees.
The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the contentious issues of
morality, religion, equal protection, and freedom of expression and association, by granting the petition,
the majority effectively rules that petitioner is a qualified marginalized and underrepresented sector,
thereby allowing its accreditation and participation in the party-list system.
I disagree.
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the
party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the
LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not
even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct
sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Second, petitioner’s interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition of its members’
sexual orientation as a right, cannot be reasonably considered as an interest that is traditionally and
historically considered as vital to national interest. At best, petitioner may cite an emergent awareness of
the implications of sexual orientation on the national human rights agenda. However, an emergent
awareness is but a confirmation of lack of traditional and historical recognition. 24 Moreover, even the
majority admits that there is no “clear cut consensus favorable to gay rights claims.”25
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs through the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. It lacks the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a
provision in the fundamental law that specifically recognizes the LGBT sector as specially significant to
the national interest. This standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create the necessary link of a
particular sector to those sectors expressly mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 5 of RA 7941.
Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the promotion of the LGBT
agenda and “gay rights” as a national policy as beneficial to the nation as a whole is debatable at best.

Even the majority (aside from extensively invoking foreign practice and international conventions rather
than Philippine laws) states:
“We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims….”26
This is so unlike the significance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA 7941 which are,
without doubt, indisputable.
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court can only apply and
interpret the Constitution and the laws. Its power is not to create policy but to recognize, review or
reverse the policy crafted by the political departments if and when a proper case is brought before it.
Otherwise, it will tread on the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.
In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it
enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list
system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Court’s duty in our scheme of government require us
to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section
5 of RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system. That is the tenor of the Court’s rulings
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party  and BANAT.
As there is no strong reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a similar conclusion in
this case.
The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to, rather than
expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in
Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941
in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine
“such other [marginalized] sectors” qualified to participate in the party-list system to Congress. Thus,
until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system,
deference to Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.
A Final Word
To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioner’s claim of
discriminatory and oppressive acts against its members. I am in no position to make that claim. Nor do I
claim that petitioner has no right to speak, to assemble or to access our political departments,
particularly the legislature, to promote the interests of its constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and
other moral issues may change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens
that its view of such matters is the best.27 But persuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing and insisting
on a right to participate in the party-list system is something else. Considering the facts, the law and
jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly insist on its entitlement to use the party-list system as a vehicle
for advancing its social and political agenda.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a truly
just, democratic
and libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not
designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are,
by nature and history, also the nation’s but which interests have not been sufficiently brought to public
attention because of these sectors’ underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may qualify as
marginalized and underrepresented. The Court’s task is to respect that legislative determination by
strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such congressional determination, we will be
dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of judicial judgment.
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 230
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia  of Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo because I arrived at the same conclusion following a different path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more about what the
Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 intends in the case of the party-list system to abate the
aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming overnight proliferation of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land.
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),1  the Court laid down
guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more
perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral
parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating this
case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party
accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular
candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But
the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELEC’s claim in its comment on the petition that the Ang
Ladlad sectoral party was not marginalized and underrepresented since it is not among, or even
associated with, the sectors specified in the Constitution and in R.A. 7941.2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not
qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented group of people like those representing labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals. This is effectively the COMELEC’s frame of mind in adjudicating
applications for accreditation.
But, the COMELEC’s proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is inconsistent with the
purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani  will show that,
based on the Court’s reading, neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited
coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941
is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was envisioned
as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the identity of the sectors that
will make up the party-list system is found in the examples it gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the
urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth segments of society. Section
5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the  labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.” (Underscoring supplied.)
Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in Section 2 of R.A. 7941
a broad standard for screening and identifying those who may qualify for the party-list system. Thus:
“Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.—The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 231

organizations and parties, and who lack well defined political constituencies but who could Bagong Bayani, these examples are not exclusive. For instance, there are groups which are pushed to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the the margin because they advocate an extremist political ideology, such as the extreme right and the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, extreme left of the political divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants, as qualified sectors.
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow rather than a specific
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in definition of the class of people they seek to represent. For example, the Constitution uses the term
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.” (Underscoring supplied.) “labor,” a narrower definition than the broad and more abstract term, “working class,” without slipping
down to the more specific and concrete definition like “carpenters,” “security guards,” “microchips
The above speaks of “marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or organizations x x x lack factory workers,” “barbers,” “tricycle drivers,” and similar sub-groupings in the “labor” group. See the
well defined political constituencies x x x who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of other illustrations below.
appropriate legislation.” But, as the Court said in Ang Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to
ascertaining whether the party seeking accreditation belongs to the “marginalized and Broad *Narrow Specifically Defined Groups
underrepresented.”3 Definition Definition
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and Working Labor Carpenters, security guards, microchip
underrepresented.” Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is
possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting such term. No doubt, Congress Class factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers
crafted that term—marginalized and underrepresented—from its reading of the concrete examples that Economically Urban Informal settlers, the jobless, persons
the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, Deprived Poor displaced by domestic
the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors.
Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of what they are, which was what those wars
who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them. The Women Working women, battered women,
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of “a dog, a cat, a horse, an elephant, and a Vulnerable victims of slavery
tiger” and concluding that it is a gathering of “animals.” Here, it looked at the samples of qualified
groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth) and found a Work Handi- Deaf and dumb, the blind, people on
common thread that passes through them all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the Impaired Capped wheelchairs
“marginalized and underrepresented.” *The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples.
So what is the meaning of the term “marginalized and underrepresented?” The examples given Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 for the
(labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth) should be the starting party-list system is the second, the narrow definition of the sector that the law regards as “marginalized
point in any search for definition. Congress has added six others to this list: the fisherfolk, the elderly, and underrepresented.” The implication of this is that, if any of the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the
the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas workers, and the professionals.4 Thus, the pertinent portion security guards, the microchips factory workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example) within
of Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides: the sector desires to apply for accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups
“Sec. 5. Registration.—x x x Provided, that the sector shall include labor, for the seat allotted to the “labor sector” in the House of Representatives. This is the apparent intent of
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, the Constitution and the law.
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.” An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a
separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of qualified parties, it should be grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list
evident that they represent the working class (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, overseas workers), system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and
the service class (professionals), the economically deprived (urban poor), the social another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the vulnerable (women, youth) and the work In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part in the party-list
impaired (elderly, handicapped, veterans). This analysis provides some understanding of who, in the system must state if they are to be considered as national, regional, or sectoral parties. Thus:
eyes of Congress, are marginalized and underrepresented. “Sec. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just lobby or interest organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC
groups. They must have an authentic identity that goes beyond mere similarities in background or not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
circumstances. It is not enough that their members belong to the same industry, speak the same dialect, secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
have a common hobby or sport, or wish to promote public support for their mutual interests. The group a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these organizations, x x x.”
apply to their groups. This is in keeping with the statutory objective of sharing with them seats in the
House of Representatives so they can take part in enacting beneficial legislation. This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample sectors provided by the
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 merely provide by Constitution and R.A. 7941, indicates that every sectoral party-list applicant must have an
examples a sense of what the qualified organizations should look like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural minorities) or a national presence (all the rest).
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – BILL OF RIGHTS 232

The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of provinces, cities, or Notes.—A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real
municipalities. A sectoral group representing the sugar plantation workers of Negros Occidental, for or substantial differences.  (Mirasol vs. Department of Public Works and Highways,  490 SCRA 318
example, will not qualify because it does not represent the inherently national character of the labor [2006])
sector. While PDP-Laban and Bayan Muna both have members in Congress, the former, unlike the latter, is
Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to claim that it not represented therein as a party-list organization, thus entitling Bayan Muna to participate in the
represents the marginalized and underrepresented. That is easy to do. The party must factually and truly legislative process in a way that cannot be said of PDP-Laban. ( Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita,  495
represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It must present to the COMELEC clear and convincing SCRA 170 [2006])
evidence of its history, authenticity, advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The COMELEC must reject Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
those who put up building props overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so party-list system. (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs.
they can get through the door of Congress without running for a seat in a regular legislative district. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA  210 [2009]).
In sum, to qualify for accreditation: ——o0o——
One, the applying party must show that it represents the “marginalized and underrepresented,”
exemplified by the working class, the service class, the economically deprived, the social outcasts, the
vulnerable, the work impaired, or some such similar class of persons.
Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting
basic human rights as these apply to the sector it represents.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as shown above. If
such party is a sub-group within that sector, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat
allocated to their sector.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent regional or national
presence.132
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party applying for
accreditation must prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out
of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind,5 the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7
million. Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the
mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s petition on
religious and moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs have been
documented. At home, effeminate or gay youths are subjected to physical abuse by parents or guardians
to make them conform to standard gender norms of behavior, while lesbian youths are raped to cure
them of their perceived affliction. LGBTs are refused admission from certain schools, or are suspended
and put on probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or benefits which are
otherwise available to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is bigotry for their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their
members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow
definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub-group within the
class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a
national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities are our brothers,
sisters, friends, or colleagues who have suffered in silence all these years. True, the party-list system is
not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance or acceptance of their practices or beliefs. But it does
promise them, as a marginalized and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement
in crafting legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity for true and effective
representation which is the very essence of our party-list system.
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Petition granted, resolutions set aside.