E.

Property regime of unions without marriage

1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53

Valdes v. QC RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are
free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a
joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Carino vs. Carino, GR 132539, February 3, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao
Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of
Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with
Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required
marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death
benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trialcourt.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within
any of those exceptionsand a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed
validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The
marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of
Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Gonzales vs Gonzales, 478 SCRA 327

 
 
Diño v Diño, GR 178004, January 19, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the  liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.

FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.

HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule appliesonly to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgmentunder Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x
x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

Salas, Jr., v Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, SEP 23 2013

Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014After the marriage of petitioner and
respondent has been declared void, petitioner filed a complaint for the partition of the house and lot
obtained by them during their marriage.
 
The SC ruled that what governs them is Art. 147 of the Family Code. Under this article, property acquired
by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
 
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. (MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V.
NONATO,G.R. No. 176492 ,October 20, 2014)
2. Unions under FC 148, 35, 37, 38

Belcodero v. CA 227 SCRA 303FACTS:

FACTS:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of property acquired by a husband living with a
paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children.
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and had 3 children. In 1946, he abandoned them and lived
with Josefa Rivera whom he acknowleged as a common-law wife Josefa Bosing. They had one child,
Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
He married Josefa Bosing in 1958 while still married to Juliana.
Alayo purchased a land on installment basis in 1949 and in his deed he named Josefa Bosing as his wife
and transferred the lot in her name. Final deed executed in 1959.
Alayo died in March 1967. In 1970 , Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extra judicial partition
and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property. Josefa’s share went to Josephine for
P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published.
In October 1980, Juliana (real widow) and 3 children filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Court and
CA ruled in favor of Juliana.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said property registered under the name of the common-law wife is not an exclusive
property but a conjugal property of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.

HELD:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 116) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), “all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at
Alayo’s request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was
acquired by Alayo and it was just transferred to Josefa.

Agapay vs Agapay, 276 SCRA 340

FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few
months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found
evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good
in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and
Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted
this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get
back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their
marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-
sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the
subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel
who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its
unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to
justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by
CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property
and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was
22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed
Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and
Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the
last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the
other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made
several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the
construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the
said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the
property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was
not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except
for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with
Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation
governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one
who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is
not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Atienza vs.de Castro,G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

Facts:Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two corporations (Enrico Shipping Corporation
and EurasianMaritime Corporation) in 1983Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a
married man! They livedtogether in thelater part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child
they parted ways. Then Lupo filed acomplaint against Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between
them in the Bel- Air subdivision Lupo said Yolandabought the said property with his own funds Yolanda
on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds. TrialCourt said that the contested property is
owned common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts. CA reversed the
TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.Issues:WON the disputed property is the
exclusive property of Yolanda

Held:Yes

Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under
thisregime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall be owned bythem in proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be
presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land while the
accountant showed bank accounts whichapparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said
land. Evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of dealingswith clients, bank account
statements, and business transactions = had financial capacity on the other hand Atienzamerely
provided evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t provide for evidence
regarding hisown capacity to pay for such property

Signey v SSS, GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008

Borromeo vs Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009

FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However,
when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his
name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent
alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and assign any
rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the owner
thereof.

RULINGS:

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties,
Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house.
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute
Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed
as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim
to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming
the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true
owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.

Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009

FACTS:
Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag
Vicenta Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto Maramag) and his
concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the killing of Loreto and his illegitimate children
are claiming for his insurance.
Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified from claiming
RTC: Granted - civil code does NOT apply
CA: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary period

ISSUE: W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation

HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED. 

Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary
of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him
If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid, but
the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under
Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. 
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in
whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.
GR: only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the
beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.
EX: situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the
same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and
claim from the insurer
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated
beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured

Lacbayan v Samoy, GR 165427, March 21, 2011

Go- Bangayan v Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013TOPIC: Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)

DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.

FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition
for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the
seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.

ISSUES:

Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license
Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:
YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.

YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We
have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.

3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null
and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being
no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence
of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Facts:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a... foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot
be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna

(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the
Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same... date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the
first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the... condominium unit belonging
to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz
& Associates.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,[9] holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between

Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]

Issues:
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100
pro indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court

Reports).

Ruling:

Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia... subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to... follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the...
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family

Code,[16] even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such... defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage
and the annulment of the marriage.

Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,... was void; properties acquired during their
marriage... were governed by the rules on co-ownership

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was
void for being bigamous,[22] on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
but... n the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as... determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab
initio.[24]

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed... by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in this case proof
that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article

148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would... govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were
not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there... still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article
148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of... money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal.
However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was... required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was
validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such... valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.

Tambuyat v.  Tambuyat,  G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015

Fullido v Grilli, G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016

Facts:
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot from her parents which was registered in her name.
On the said property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon completion, they
maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines
twice a year. In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, to define their respective rights over
the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated, among others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot,
registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50) years, to be automatically renewed for another
fifty (50) years upon its expiration in the amount of
P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from
selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. Their harmonious
relationship turned sour after 16 years of living together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They
could not agree who should leave the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido
demanding that she vacate the property, but these were unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido before
the MCTC.
Fullido argues that she could not be ejected from her own lot based on the contract of lease and the MOA
because those documents were null and void for being contrary to the Constitution, the law, public policy,
morals and customs; that the MOA prevented her from disposing or selling her own land, while the
contract of lease favoring Grilli, a foreigner, was contrary to the Constitution as it was a for a period of
fifty (50) years, and, upon termination, was automatically renewable for another fifty (50) years.
Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could not question the validity of the said contracts in the
present ejectment suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is
confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of unlawful
detainer.
The MCTC dismissed the case after finding that Fullido could not be ejected from their house and lot.
The MCTC opined that she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by supervising its
construction. The RTC reversed and set aside the MCTC decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli
had the exclusive right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease executed by
the parties.
The CA upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the only issue to be
resolved would be the physical possession of the property. The CA was also of the view that as Fullido
executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of the house
and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the better right of physical
possession.

Issue:
May patently null and void contracts be a basis of an ejectment order?

Held:
No. A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in
fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity. It is one which has no force
and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever
either against or in favor of anyone. Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum. Article 1409 of the New
Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the
defense of illegality be waived. Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or inexistent
contract.
A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate to set aside a void contract
even in an action for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, which involves an action for
unlawful detainer, the petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was already sold to them
by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their defense and held that the contract of sale was void
because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner to sell the subject land.
Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer because,
precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source of any rights. To emphasize,
void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court proceeding, including an
ejectment suit. The next issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the assailed lease contract
and MOA are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

XII. THE FAMILY, FC 149- 151, NCC 2035

Tribiana vs.Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004

FACTS:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union
only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC
claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana ("Khriza"). Edwin
has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4)
months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina Tribiana
("Rosalina"). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family
Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss claiming that there were
prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification
to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring
Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwin’s petition on 2 July 1998. The
appellate court also denied Edwin’s motion for reconsideration.
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not
dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the
parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the
petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A
dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition
precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent,
the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that
no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. 6 Such
defect does not place the controversy beyond the court’s power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such
defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. 7 Such defect is curable by amendment as a
matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading.

Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the
paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child.
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. 12 This rule
has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, "No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." In
this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.

Hiyas Savings vs. Acuña, G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006
Fact: Alberto filed a case against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, and 3 more
defendants. Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. 
Issue:  May Hiyas invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code?

Held:  No. Since the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which
are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may
be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family. (Hiyas Savings and Loans Banks, Inc.
vs. Hon. Edmundo T. Acuña, G.R. No. 154132, August 31, 2006)

Heirs Of Favis, Sr. v Gonzales, et al., GR. No. 185922, Jan. 15 2014
Moreno v Kahn, GR 217744, July 30, 2018

XIII. FAMILY HOME, FC 152-162 [exclude FC 157, 161, 162]

Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the
property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely,
his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.
ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing
therein.
HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon
the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish
his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

Arriola v Arriola, GR 177703, January 28, 2008 G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008
Facts:
The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714
(84191) left by Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald
G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to sell it though public auction.
Vilma and Anthony Ronald Arriola initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be
allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CA
granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot including the house built on it.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the house built inside the land is considered part of partition.

Held:
No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. According to
Article 159 the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766

GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article
152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it
is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that
the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability
which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights
the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

Cabang vs Basay, GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009

A family Home cannot be established on property held in co ownership with third persons. The family
home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community or (b) the conjugal partnership ,
or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other

Ramos v Pangilinan, GR 185920, July 20, 2010

DOCTRINE:

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the exemption must be proved.

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned
by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and
the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive
leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy
Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in
Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the
judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that
it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the
business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Ramos and
the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was
substituted by herein petitioners.

The appellate court, in denying petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted
from execution, for while “Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it did not mean that the
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted
as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to
242..

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the
time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must
not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption
must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988,
or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’
family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the
Pandacan property valid.

Equitable v OJ Mark, G.R. No.  165950, August 11, 2010

TOPIC: FAMILY HOME, FC 152-162 [exclude FC 157, 161, 162]
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. in the aggregate
amount of Four Million Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P4,048,800.00). As security for the
said amount, a Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5,
Pasig City, Metro Manila
where the spouses are residing.
2. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the registered
owner and third-party
mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The REM was annotated on Condominium Certificate of
Title No. PT-21363 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. 2
3. The Spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation
4. In a letter, they offered to settle their indebtedness “with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial
lot of corresponding value”
and also requested for recomputation at a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties
5. While the Bank’s officers held a meeting with Mr. Martinez, he failed to submit the required
documents such as certificates of title
and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en
pago.
6. Consequently, the Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate Mortgage.
7. The Spouses filed a civil action for “Temporary Restraining Order (‘TRO’), Injunction and Annulment
of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale” in the RTC of Pasig City, which the RTC granted by issuing a TRO for 20 days.
8. In their Complaint With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, 7 respondents sought to enjoin
the impending foreclosure
sale alleging that the same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted, and also claiming
defects in the execution of the
REM. Respondents imputed bad faith on the part of petitioner who did not officially inform them of the
denial or disapproval of
their proposal to settle the loan obligation by "dacion via assignment of a commercial
property." Respondents maintained that
aside from the REM being illegally notarized, incomplete and unenforceable, the obligation subject
thereof had been extinguished
by the dacion proposal considering that the value of the property offered was more than sufficient to pay
for the mortgage debt. It
was further averred that the subject property is being used and occupied by respondent-spouses as a
family home.
9. The Spouses on the other hand claims that the said unit being a Family Home is exempt from
foreclosure as provided under Art. 153 of the Family Code
and that if the injunctive relief would not be granted, they will suffer an irreparable injury, as well as their
children.
10. It is alleged by the petitioner Equitable Bank that while the condominium unit is supposedly a family
home, it is admittedly owned by the corporation and
not by the conjugal partnership or absolute community of the Spouses and that even assuming that OJ-
Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, the
Spouses’ stance contravenes the established rule that properties registered in the name of the corporation
are owned by it as an entity separate and
distinct from its members or stockholders.
11. The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
12. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and
public auction of the third-party
mortgagor’s property (which is being used as family home) while the case for annulment of REM on said
property is being tried.

HELD: NO.
The claim of exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged
condominium unit being a family home and notcorporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear
contractual agreement of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unitconstitutes
respondents’ family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same
Code allows the execution or forced sale of afamily home “for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution.”
The Spouses failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ
is to be directed are violative of their rights under
Art. 153 of the Family Code
In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right
to foreclose the mortgage andto have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds
to the payment of the obligation
The Court notes that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on
the mortgaged condominiumunit being a family home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent
with the clear contractual agreement of the REM.
Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents’ family home, the
same will not exempt it fromforeclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or
forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution.” The Spouses thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of theinjunctive
writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial court’s orders granting the Spouses’
application forpreliminary injunction

De Mesa v Acero, Jan. 16, 2011

DOCTRINE:
Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:
First, family residences constructed before theeffectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988
must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the  Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be
set up and proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:
Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after,
Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a
mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan.
When Aceropresented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already
closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint
for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to
pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the
property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that
the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses
De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful
owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property
was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never
assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted
thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that
the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus,
could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed
the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.

HELD:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the family home is
exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was
levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
RATIO:
For the family home to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be
summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988
must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa
got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that
the subject property was a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from
execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subjectproperty being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are
stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.

Fortaleza v Lapitan, GR 178288, August 15, 2012

Eulogio v.  Bell, G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015

Facts:
(the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan-Bell... sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-
square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by
virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI
million plus 12% interest per annum.
CA... affirmed
Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners in the amount of
P1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed... their Petition for failure to show any reversible
error committed by the CA.
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property... was levied on execution.
Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31
August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family
home.
Petitioners filed a Motion... of the lifting of the writ of execution.
Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the property
exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial... area, and that
Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.
The RTC... set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family home... and directed the
commissioners to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot.
respondents filed a Petition... before the CA... the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents' Petition
for Certiorari... the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
execution sale of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit.
The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160,... according to the appellate court, is its
actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's
order was contrary to law.
Issues:
whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the
Family Code.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment.
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a
judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court... which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the
time of its constitution. If the increased actual value... exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the
amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or
such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by... law.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its
owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided
the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at... the time of its constitution has
been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result
in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.[45] Otherwise, the family home can be the subject
of a... forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles
155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to
establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting... the family home, its owners or any
of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by petitioners.
The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality
that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an... equitable mortgage.

XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC 163

B. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN, FC 164,

Angeles vs Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363
FACTS:
Petitioner Belen Angeles is the wife of the deceased while the respondent Aleli Maglaya is the child of
the deceased Francisco Angeles in his first wife. Francisco died intestate and the respondent seeks
administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the
respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification
of the appropriate offices, records of marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged 1938 Francisco-
Genoveva wedding took place were destroyed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the administrator of the deceased
Francisco Angeles’s Estate?

HELD:
No, respondent is not illegitimate.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006

FACTS:
Ø  Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died.
Ø  Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on
indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn
Ø  Her claim for monthly pension was settled.
Ø  SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for
death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than 6 years
before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.
Ø  The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary.
Ø  CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.

ISSUE:
W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo

HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Ø  It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Ø  Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on
October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and
the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was
born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
Ø  Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his
lifetime.
Ø  The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
Ø  For  Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying factors: (1) that she
is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.
Ø  A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for
support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is proved that the were   till living
together at the time of his death, it is presumed that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless
it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Ø  Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it.
Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other
siblings.

Basbas v Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014

 A. LEGITIMATE PROPER, FC 164

 
Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
YES, they are illegitimate.**
There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolario‟s
marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man
isalready conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other
generallyaccepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. Since they failed to
prove thefact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca
Malvas;hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it,is a relationship that must be judicially established.

Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998

In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died
in Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several
children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son,
petitioner Silvino Suntay.
Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While
the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have
been executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was
denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the pacific war,
Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January, 1931 and
probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will
executed in Amoy China on November, 1931.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the Philippines
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should
also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will
and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to
probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the
will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of
this country.

2. Proof of Filiation of legitimate children, FC 172-173

Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998
Facts:
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named
children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three equal
shares and to give him the (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendantsdenied that plaintiff was
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendantscontended that Inocentes was single when he died in
1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that
the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father
in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and
also identified pictures where the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial,
Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, LourdesTrinidad.) Another
witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the
father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents of
Arturio and that she was present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant
pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death
of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as
witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed
a certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned
during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocenteswas not married when
he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that his brother married anybody
and denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that
Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in
favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and his filation.

Ruling:
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner
or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born
during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative
father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent
evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born
during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all
records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
said municipality. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital
union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant
evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner:
Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the
child’s father and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondent’s self- serving
negations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499

Facts:

Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses Danilo and Carolina. However, they were
acknowledged as an illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized document. Juan died.

Issue:

Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.

Ruling:

No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate children of
Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.

Ong vs. Diaz, December 17, 2007

FACTS: A complaint for recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne
Rodgin, represented by her mother and guardian Jinky Diaz against Rogelio Ong before the RTC. As
alleged by Jinky in her complaint, She and Rogelio met at Tarlac City and their friendship developed into
love. At this time however, Jinky was married to a foreign national, Hasegawa Katsuo.

On 1994-1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together in Capitol Garden, Tarlac City which
produced Joanne Rodjin Diaz who was born on Feb 1998. Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and also
took the mother and child home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal
expenses and finally provided for all the minor’s needs- recognizing her as his.
However, on September 1998, Rogelio abandoned the mother and child, stopped supporting the minor
and falsely alleged that he is not the father of the child.

After summons were served against Rogelio, he failed to file any responsive pleadings despit repeated
motions for extensions prompting the court to declare him in default and allowed Joanne to present
evidence ex parte and granted the reliefs prayed for.
Rogelio then filed a motion to lift the order of default and was granted by the court. Rogelio then filed a
motion for new trial and was also granted.

The RTC then ruled that Joanne was the Illegitimate child of Rogelio in view of Joanne’s subsisting
marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo and ordered Rogelio to pay support in favor of Joanne.
Rogelio filed an appeal with the CA. however, during the pendency of the appeal, Rogelio died and was
substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. Subsequently, the CA GRANTED the petition and ordered the
case to be REMANDED to the RTC for the ISSUANCE of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis.

The estate now files this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case for DNA testing despite Rogelio’s death.

HELD: NO. Petition DENIED.

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. — The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As
defined above, the term “biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva,
and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997

Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora
Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The present action
for reconveyance involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment which was originally owned by the
spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5,
1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and
herein petitioners. Petitioners’ father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit
from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
 
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they
are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo
however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes
Held: NO. the private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is
the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none —
even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

Aguilar v Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, Jan. 28 2015

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead,
a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within
the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

Hilario v Miranda, GR 196499, Nov. 28, 2018

3. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174, NCC 364, 374, 376, NCC 888,
NCC 979

4. Grounds to impugn legitimacy, FC 166

(a) Physical impossibility of access

Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165

FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis
Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano.
The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to
work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed.
Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s father until
1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943,
Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is
presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the
initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be
shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit
intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation
between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.

Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner  Gerardo  Concepcion  and  private  respondent  Ma.  Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he
married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was
conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private respondent and
Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is strictly personal to
the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
b) Biological or other scientific grounds, FC 170, 171

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne

G.R. No. 171713, 17 December 2007

FACTS:
Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support against Rogelio Ong, she was represented by her mother Jinky. Before the case, Jinky married a
certain Hasegawa Katsuo, Japanese. That same year, Jinky met Rogelio, they fell in love. The next year,
Rogelio and Jinky cohabited. After four years, Joanna was born, Rogelio recognized Joanna as his,
however, that same year, Rogelio abandoned them and stopped giving support to Joanna, he alleged that
he is not the father of Joanna, hence this petition. RTC rendered a decision and declared the minor to be
the illegitimate child of Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the
age of majority. Ong opposed the CA’s order to directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA
analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne.
During the pendency of the case, Rogelion Died. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that “DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of
settling the present paternity dispute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done even if the person is whose DNA is the subject is dead.

RULING:
Yes.The court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA analysis
so long as there exist, suitable biological samples of his DNA. The New Rules on DNA Evidence permits
the manner of DNA testing by using biological samples–organic material originating from the person’s
body, for example, blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is
susceptible to DNA testing. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to adequately found
or would be hard to get, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes found from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical remains of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

Lucas v Lucas, GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties
to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother
Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which
include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from
the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the
case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the
basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in
Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional  paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only
the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other
factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not
mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirementof a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient  evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing  The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”

5. Action to impugn legitimacy

Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010

PEREZ, J. FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: During the pendency of a suit for ejectment instituted by Librada and her adopted daughter
Leonida against Eugenio, Librada died. Eugenio questioned the legal standing of Leonida as a party
averring that Leonida is a mere ward of Librada, thus not a legal heir.
ISSUE: Can Eugenio question the legitimacy of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute?
HELD: No, Eugenio cannot question the legitimacy of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute. The
legitimacy, filiation or the legality of the adoption by the testator can be assailed only in a separate action
brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack. Since the question regarding the
legitimacy, legality or the legality of adoption was not raised in a separate action brought for that purpose,
but rather in a case regarding land dispute, Eugenio cannot validly question the same

Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011

Facts: 

Respondent Julian Edward Emerson was born in Makati City to Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted
marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent
filed before RTC of Quezon City a petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim
Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the NSO stating that his
mother Anna Dominique does not appear in its National Indices of Marriage. Respondent
also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname
"Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. Respondent
ran and was elected as Quezon City’s Councilor using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." 

The RTC granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to: 

1. Delete the entry “date and place of marriage” (of parents) in respondent’s live birth certificate
2. Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
3. Delete entry of Coseteng from “Middle name”
4. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for "Father". 

Republic appealed contending that deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondents
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding. 

Issues: 
1. Was there a valid ground for changing respondent's name?

2. Did respondent file the proper remedy?

Held:

1. The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE
OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write orpronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desiredchange
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized
grounds, however. 

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the
surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that
she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. 

2. No. Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and
controversialalterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings. Since
respondents desired change affectshis civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies and not
Rule 103. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected, that of Makati in the present case,
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to
the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his
birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed
by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were
made parties thereto.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversialalterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated (Republic vs. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2007)
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed pRENTS is not
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child. And even amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate ,
which is a public document . Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements
made there by the interested parties.

6. Effect of a mother’s declaration, FC 167

7. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169

People v Quitoriano, January 20, 1997

8. Presumptions, FC 170, 171

4. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

1. Who are considered illegitimate, FC 165

Joanie Surposa Uy v Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition[1] for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan.
In his Answer[3] to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit
relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.[4] Hearings then ensued during which
petitioner testified that... respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until
she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also
presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
on27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence[5] on the ground that the Decision dated 21
February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res
judicata in Special Proceeding
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner
had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against
respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,... assigned to RTC-Branch 9.
Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000, praying that
judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent]
JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement... is concurred with
petitioner's brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this
pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.
As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brother's (Allan) civil, monetary and
similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself
to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and... another TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby
acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount.
Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of
action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or... against all corporations,
companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and
Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have
interest or participation.
[Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to the
subject matter of the present petition.
Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with
prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with
prejudice his counterclaim."... the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent's
Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that
petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition

Issues:
whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes
res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.

Ruling:
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.[18] In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[19] the
Court pronounced that a... judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with
the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object
certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of... the obligation that is established. And,
like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law
or public policy is null and... void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It
produces no legal effect at all.[
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner's status and filiation,... i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they
are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.
Although unmentioned, it was a... necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner
also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent.
Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is
covered by... the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.[22] Paternity
and filiation or the lack of the same, is... a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[23]
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative... even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173, 172, 175-176

Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009

De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009FACTS:

Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but
unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.
Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino.
When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
Certificate of Live Birth
AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother
Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.
Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per
IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states
that:
“Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express recognition of
paternity.

ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity

RULING: YES.
RATIONALE:
Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by
putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.
Special circumstances to the case:
Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to be affected by their
hereditary rights
The Court then adopted the ff. rules:
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence
Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the
Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the
name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth
and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of
Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the
primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the
persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother
over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and
the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their
respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to
deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected
"best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.

HELD: The petition is partially granted

CIVIL LAW Filation

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

Masbate v Relucio, GR 235498, July 30, 2018

3. Proof of filiation, FC 175

Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495

FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and
when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza
Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged
that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a
Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by
the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not
her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.
Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish
one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”. Hence,
Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.

Rivero v CA, G.R. NO. 141273, May 17, 2005

Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009

Facts:

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and
situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of
Juan Gabatan.

petitioners denied that respondent's mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that
Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue... and that Juan was survived by one brother and
two sisters,... petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was
any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent,... ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan

Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero
Pacana, free of any encumbrance;

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar,
Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan
Gabatan:... x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently
residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by
Teofilo and the latter's nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged
Hermogena's status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38,... Rule 130[6] of the Rules of
Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very
own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena's right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which
ultimately passed on to... respondent.

Issues:

CA ruled that petitioners' possession of the disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription
because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA
committed the following reversible errors:

Ruling:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for... recovery of possession and
ownership.

The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the
RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim
entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

The entry on the space for mother's maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent
attempt to thwart plaintiff's mother filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these
circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that

Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.[2

Thus, the trial court's finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly...
contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain
Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local C

The words "A certified true copy: July

6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same
typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information stated
therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga... was never presented
as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were
identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication
of her birth certificate.

Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their respective offices' copies of respondent's birth
certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that they were
motivated by ill will or... bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondent's Exhibit A and
petitioners' Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.

the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as
competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners' counsel for being a mere
photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it... inadmissible for the
purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondent's
own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan
Gabatan to recover the decedent's property... from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued
in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan,
did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to... recover
the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo
Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.[44] Again,
respondent waited until 1989... to refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she
waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old.
[46]

Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property
under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of... her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not
come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her
certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the
Court... cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

Dela Cruz vs.Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:

Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but
unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.
Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino.
When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
Certificate of Live Birth
AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother
Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.
Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per
IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states
that:
“Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express recognition of
paternity.
ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity

RULING: YES.

RATIONALE:

Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by
putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.

Special circumstances to the case:

Died 2 months prior to child’s birth

Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to be affected by their
hereditary rights
The Court then adopted the ff. rules:

Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence

Lucas v Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties
to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother
Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which
include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from
the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the
case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the
basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

RATIO:

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in
Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only
the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule
shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that
a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012

FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly
neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly
assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support
against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the
trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by
CA.

ISSUE: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

HELD: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient
certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.
An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The
Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

***

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However,
this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As this
case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower
courts. GRANTED.

Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R.191936, June 27, 2016

Facts:
Virginia co-owned a property with Silvestra under Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No.183088 and under
such title is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of
the said property. Anastacio Jr. and Alicia both surnamed Macapaz are children of Silvestra’s brother,
Anastacio Sr. and Fidela Vda de Macapaz. Anastacio Jr. filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner
for 2 counts of falsification of documents but was dismissed. On 2006, respondents, asserting that they
are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT
221466 with damages. Petitioner countered that respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil
action because they are illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr and Art. 992 of the Civil Code prohibits
illegitimate children from inheriting intestate.

Issue: W/N respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.

Held:
Court favors respondents. Petition is bereft of merit. Court finds that the respondents’ certificate
of live births were duly executed with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of
illegitimate child. The fact that only the signature of Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment
because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents’ fact of birth as legitimate
children. Also, Anastacio Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife (Trinidad v CA) for a
number of years as a result of which they had 2 children (respondents). Art 220 of the Civil Code is the
governing provision herein which states that “in case of doubt, all presumptions favor solidarity of the
family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of the children, the community property during marriage, the authority
of parents over their children, and the validity of the defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.”

San Agustin vs. Sales, G.R. N0. 189289, August 31, 2016
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to
a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land.
On February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Vda.
de Caiquep, TCT No. 436465 with the following encumbrance annotated at the back of
the title:

This Deed of Absolute Sale is subject to the conditions enumerated below which
shall be permanent encumbrances on the property, the violation of any of which shall
entitle the vendor to cancel x x x this Deed of Absolute Sale and reenter the property;

x x x the vendee shall not sell, convey, lease or sublease, or otherwise

encumber the property in favor of any other party within five (5) years from the date final and absolute
ownership thereof becomes vested in the vendee, except in cases of
hereditary succession or resale in favor of the vendor.

A day after the issuance of TCT No. 436465, Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject
lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. For being suspected as a subversive, Menez was detained for two years and he
hid for another 4 years after his release.

In December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was missing. Menez
filed a petition to replace the lost one and the same was granted by the Court.

On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of
the abovecited decision. He claimed this was the first time he became aware of the
case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime in
1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property and the heir of
Macaria

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Menez which was
executed during the five-year prohibitory period was binding upon Agustin.

YES. The Court held that the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment of
the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, nor for the forfeiture of the lot in question. Thus, the
contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until annulled in the
proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. The said contract of sale is binding upon
the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be one of her
heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest.

Barcelota v Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017

GR No. 222095      August 7, 2017
TOPIC: birth certificate of illegitimate child without signature of mother
PONENTE: Carpio
FACTS:
On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky 0. Tinitigan in her
relative’s residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of their
child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital.
To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived
with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore another
child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to
avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and
she returned to Davao City.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally decided
to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their
births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace
Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335, respectively, after
submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.
However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was
informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name of the
mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.
The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the names “Avee
Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan”. Ricky Tinitigan was
the listed Informant in both birth certificates.
Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth
certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing
erroneous entries.
RTC granted the cancellation of birth certificates. CA, however, reversed and set aside the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by their father
Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were void.
HELD: YES
The Court held that since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage
after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the
illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother,
Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore
incorrect; their surname should have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”
The Court did not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates were the express recognition of the
children’s filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly registeredin accordance with law i.e. the
subject birth certificates of the illegitimate children were not signed by their mother.
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, 16 states:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
(first paragraph)
xxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. (fourth paragraph)
The first paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is legitimate since our
law accords a strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of children. On the other hand, the
fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate child, the
birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the
father refuses. The fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an illegitimate child and likewise
underscores its mandatory character with the use of the word “shall.”
Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child; otherwise, the same is void
Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificateof her child in all
cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent
of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.  The
mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental
authority and custody of the illegitimate child.
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the documents, the
local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject
birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the mother,
the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.
Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for
being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s
surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her
children’s birth certificates.

Calma v Turla, GR 221684, July 30, 2018

Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017

Tabuada v Tabuada, GR 196510, Sept. 12, 2018

3. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345

People vs. Magtibay, G.R. No. 142985. Aug. 6, 2002

People v Abella, G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010

MARTIRES, J.:

Facts: Accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section (Sec.) 5, Article (Art.) II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 in an Information which alleges that the said accused, conspiring together and
mutually aiding one another not being then authorized by law, feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-
buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing an approximate weight of 0.01 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly called "shabu," a dangerous drug.

The prosecution alleged that both accused-appellants transacted with the poseur-buyer; appellant Abella
received the money from the poseur-buyer and handed it to appellant Sendiong; and Sendiong handed the
heat-sealed transparent sachet to Abella who in turn gave it to poseur-buyer.

Abella averred that the police officers may have conducted a buy-bust operation but which revealed an
instance of instigation. She claimed that the poseur-buyer convinced the accused-appellants of his intent
to buy shabu.

Issue: Whether or not the buy-bust team validly implemented the entrapment.

Ruling: Yes, the buy-bust team merely facilitated the apprehension of the criminals by employing ploys
and schemes.

In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the
accused; the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing
ruses and schemes. In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation leads to the
acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction.

In this case, the poseur-buyer merely convinced the accused-appellants that he would be buying shabu but
never told them that he would be buying it from them. Apparently, the criminal intent or design to sell
shabu originated in the mind of the accused-appellants because they voluntarily and knowingly transacted
with the poseur-buyer to sell him a sachet of shabu at the price of P300.00.

Ratio Decidendi: Entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a
lawbreaker.

Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the Judgment of the RTC finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of 0.01 gram of shabu in violation
of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

People v. Gersamio, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015TOPIC: Paternity and Filiation-
Compulsory Recognition

DOCTRINE: The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering Gersamio to
acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidenc. In this case, AAA was
already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically examined in September 2002.
Obviously, the rape that happened on August 28, 2002 was not the cause of that pregnancy. With these,
Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.

FACTS: August 28, 2002: In the afternoon, Gersamio, with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation and having carnal knowledge
with the complainant [AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of the incident against her will. Evidence
was established that: AAA’s first sexual ordeal at the hands of Gersamio happened sometime in 1999,
when she was only 13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986. It was repeated for several times.
The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said date, AAA was about to enter their
house, Gersamio, who was then hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her towards
the back of their house – a banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as he pointed a knife at
her neck. He commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted, prompting the former to kick the latter in her
thigh. When AAA was already lying on the ground, he removed her t-shirt, short pants and underwear. He
also threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply cried. He inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina.
He warned AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them.
On 2 September 2002, AAA’s grandmother, BBB, discovered her pregnancy because of the changes in
her physical appearance. When asked about the father of her child, it was then that AAA disclosed to
BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of Gersamio, which began in 1999 when she was only 13
years old, the last of which was on 28 August 2002. Such sexual advances by him resulted in her
pregnancy. At once, BBB went to his house and confronted him regarding what he did to AAA.
Nonetheless, in order to save AAA and their whole family from shame as he is AAA’s uncle, being the
first cousin of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep the matter among themselves and merely
asked him to acknowledge and support the child of AAA. He, however, denied the accusation and he
even got mad at BBB. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB, sought the assistance
of their Barangay Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The Barangay Captain then
advised them to have a medical examination, which they did.
The Trial Court held him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, ordering him to pay AAA
for moral damages; and acknowledge or recognize AAA’s offspring resulting from the rape; and support
AAA’s child in the event his means improves after serving his sentence.
The CA deleted, however, the portion ordering him to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s
child, as the issue of whether the child is Gersamio’s is yet to be resolved in a full-blown trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not AAA’s child should be recognized and supported by Gersamio.

HELD: NO. A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the findings of
both lower courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, Gersamio raped her and his guilt
was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002 showed that she
was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant
could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape against her. Contrary to Gersamio’s view, AAA’s
pregnancy is immaterial to the issue since pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. So,
whether the child whom the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a
truthful manner.
The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering the appellant to
acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence thereof. In this case, AAA
was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically examined in September 2002.
Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002 was not the cause of that pregnancy. Though there
were allegations of repeated rape from 1999 up to 28 August 2002, only two Informations for rape was
filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the appellant was acquitted for the rape
committed in 1999 for prosecution’s failure to specify with certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense
was committed. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.
Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt of the
appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is the impregnation of
the rape victim not an element of rape; it must also be stressed that AAA stated that the appellant
repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002. Although the appellant cannot be held liable for
such alleged rapes, as this case does not cover other incidents of rape prior to 28 August 2002, AAA’s
testimony on this point provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5 January 2003 as her child
turned one on 5 January 2004.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
the appellant is further ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of
P50,000.00 and P30,000.00.

5. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

1. Who may be legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858

Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447

Facts:
An administrative case was filed by Abadilla (a clerk of court) alleging that Judge Tabiliran
had scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan (with whom he begot 3 children) during
the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela-Tabiliran. The respondent and Baybayan
were married on May 23, 1986. It was further alleged that Judge Tabiliran falsely represented himself as
“single” in the marriage contract and that Mrs. Tabiliran also filed a complaint against the respondent for
abandoning the family home and living with Leonora Pillarion, with whom he begot a son. the judge was
also alleged to have committed corruption and bribery.
In his defense, Judge Tabiliran claimed that he was not liable for bigamy because he cohabited and
married Baybayan after Mrs. Tabiliran left and abandoned him and their family in 1966. Since then, he
had not heard any news about his wife. He also alleged that Abadilla was filing this case in retribution
and resentment. The RTC said that the marriage between Tabiliran and Baybayan is valid until the
reappearance of his first wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in recognizing the second marriage valid.
Ruling:
The Court found that Judge Tabiliran started cohabiting with Baybayan as early as 1970, prove by the
birth of their children in 1970, 1971 and 1975 respectively. Hence, the cohabitation occurred while
the first marriage was valid and subsisting and contrary to Sec 3 of the Rules of Court and Art 390 of the
Civil Code which states that a spouse is presumed to be dead after 7 years of absence. In this case, Mrs.
Tabiliran was absent only for 4 years when respondent and Baybayan cohabited. Therefore, Judge
Tabiliran was found guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption.

2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178, FC 180

3. Retroactivity and effects, FC 180-181

4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182

5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179

6. ADOPTED CHILDREN

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Facts:
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.  Respondents offered the
child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was
barely two (2) weeks old.  An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was
also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April

The appropriate petition for adoption... was filed by herein petitioners over the child before the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67... granting the... petition.
The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from
the legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and...
purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their
estate.

while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the
petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother.
She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid
the amount of P150,000.00.
Issues:
The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes
Ruling:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount.  The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule... otherwise. [5] In all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending...
parents.  Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.
His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the... minor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.  Besides, respon-
dent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she
lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually... left her and vanished.  For a minor (like Angelie
Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the
moral outlook and values of said minor.  Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear
to be... morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a
future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but
also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give... her.
the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents.  A
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over
the adopted child, except where the adopting... parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in
which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.[7] The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child[8] and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.

Bartolome vs. SSS, G.R. No. 19253, November 12, 2014

Oribello v CA, G.R. No. 163504, Aug. 5 2015

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014
 
 
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary
 
FACTS:
                John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while
on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits.
                SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
                According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the  restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
 
HELD:
 
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
                The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in
the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of
the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for
the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
                The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
                The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee,
while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
                From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from
the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled,
include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s
adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
                The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of
the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.
Oribello v CA
DOCTRINE: When a CFI issues a decree of adoption , the same cannot be annulled by the RTC because
they are courts of equal rank. THE petition to annul the decree should have been filed before the court
with a higher jurisdiction than that which issued the decree sought to be annulled. Indeed, no court has the
authority to nullify the judgements or processes of another court equal rank and category, having the
equal power to grant reliefs sought. Such power devolves exclusively upon the proper appellate court.
The raison d’etre for the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of equal or coordinate
jurisdiction which would surely lead a confusion and seriously hinder the proper administration of justice.

1. Who may adopt – Sec. 7, 8552

Michelle Lim, GR 168992, May 21, 2009
FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately,
in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and
seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are
certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9

Facts:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of Evelyn
who has been under their care and custody for quite a time.
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter became a naturalized
citizen of the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a widow, due to poverty
and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption and decreeing that
said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights
and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Also, it dissolves parental authority bestowed upon
his natural parents and vests parental authority to the spouses and makes him their legal heir.
Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a Petition for review on certiorari of the decision  of
the lower court, contending that it erred in granting the petition for adoption because spouses Clouse are
not qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the filing of petition for adoption.
Issues:
Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is mandatory.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family Code of the Philippines”,
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen .
Secondly, Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Lastly,
when spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino citizen.
She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a US citizen.
Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209.
She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.
Today, this case is applicable only insofar as the mandatory nature of a joint adoption by husband and
wife is concerned. As to the qualification or non-qualification of an alien adopter,  RA 8552 (enacted on
February 25, 1998) is applicable.

2. Who may be adopted – Sec. 8

3. Need for consent – Sec. 9

Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her
petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal
grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and
gave their written consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that
Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to
prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological
mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child,
if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner
failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption

4. Effects of a decree of adoption, Secs. 13, 16, 17 and 18, FC

Arts. 189-190

Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint
for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic
incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was
granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody
was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the
shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows
that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for
the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over
the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial
custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.
Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minorAngelie Anne
Cervantes.Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo andGina Carreon,
who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child foradoption to Gina Carreon's sister and
brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantesand Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of
the child when shewas barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
wasexecuted by respondent Gina Carreon.

The petition for adoption was filed bypetitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which

granted the petition.Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,received a
letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get
back their child. Petitioners refused. As aresult, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon took
the child from her"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do soby her
mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners demandedthe return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire togive up her child for adoption and that the affidavit
of consent to the adoption shehad executed was not fully explained to her.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custodyover Angelie Ann Cervantes.
Held:
The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted topetitioners, Zenaida and Nelson
Cervantes, to whom they properly belong.
Ratio:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separatedfrom a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court findscompelling reasons to rule otherwise.

In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of thechild concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
socialstanding of the contending parents.Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a
common-lawhusband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord theminor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an uprightand moral-minded person. Gina
Carreon had also previously given birth to anotherchild by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three (3) years butwho eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister
whose"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of saidminor. Upon
the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to bemorally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the minor andgiving her a future better than what the natural mother, who
is not only jobless butalso maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.Minor
has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge andconsent of respondents. A decree of
adoption has the effect of dissolving theauthority vested in natural parents over the adopted child.

The adopting parentshave the right to the care and custody of the adopted childand exercise
parentalauthority and responsibility over him.

Stephanie Garcia, 454 SCRA 541

FACTS:

Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

ISSUE:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?

RULING:

YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.

Bagayas vs Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308, Sept. 18, 2013

FACTS:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint5 for annulment of sale and partition before the RTC
claiming that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas (respondents)
intended to exclude her from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents, Maximino
Bagayas and Eligia Clemente , by falsifying a deed of absolute sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly
executed by the deceased spouses transferring two parcels of land registered in their names to their
biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando Bagayas. Said deed, which was supposedly executed
on October 7, 1974, bore the signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her signature thereon as she
had long been dead since August 21, 1971. By virtue of the same instrument, however, the Bagayas
brothers were able to secure in their favor TCT over the subject lands.
Rogelio claimed that after their parents had died, he and Orlando executed a document denominated as
Deed of Extra judicial Succession over the subject lands to effect the transfer of titles thereof to their
names. Before the deed of extra judicial succession could be registered, however, a deed of absolute sale
transferring the subject lands to them was discovered from the old files of Maximino, which they used by
"reason of convenience" to acquire title to the said lands.
The RTC further held that, even though petitioner is an adopted child, she could not ask for partition of
the subject lands as she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of
absolute sale. Moreover, the action for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a collateral attack
on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.
Insisting that the subject lands were conjugal properties of Maximino and Eligia, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration from the aforesaid Decision, which was denied by the RTC holding that while it may
have committed a mistake in declaring the subject lands as exclusive properties of Maximino.
No appeal was taken from the RTC’s Decision dated March 24, 2008or the Resolution dated June 17,
2008, thereby allowing the same to lapse into finality.
Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, on August 1, 2008, twin petitions26 before the same RTC,
docketed as LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35, for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 to include
her name and those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent of one-third
of the lands covered therein.
The petitions were dismissed by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is co-ownership on subject properties so that the action for partition
will prosper

HELD:

NO. Petitioner could not ask for the partition of the subject lands, even though she is an adopted
child, because she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute
sale purportedly executed by Maximino and Eligia. This conclusion came about as a consequence of the
RTC’s finding that, since the subject lands belonged exclusively to Maximino, there was no need to
secure the consent of his wife who was long dead before the sale took place. For this reason, the forgery
of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed was held to be inconsequential.

However, on reconsideration, the RTC declared that it committed a mistake in holding the subject lands
as exclusive properties of Maximino since there was already an admission [by] the defendants during the
pre-trial conference that the subject properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses Maximino
Bagayas and Eligia Clemente. Nonetheless, the RTC sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 on
the ground that it constituted a collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the
issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack.
It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself.

As pronounced in Lacbayan: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register
of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more
often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of
title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.42 (Emphases supplied)

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment of sale on the ground that it
constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject
lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.

5. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19, 20

Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization
could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care
Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed,
for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
 decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that
made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with
the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin
Lahom.”

The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A.
No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate
status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole
right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the
adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the
Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.

The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.

XV. SUPPORT

A. What comprises support, FC 194

B. Who are obliged to provide support, FC 195, 196, 199

Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453

FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of the
daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00
which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that
the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-in-law
had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance
rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the
Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code.
Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the defendant’s
daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.

In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services
of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the compliance therewith
is unavoidable.

Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil 110

De Asis vs. CA, G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance
and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance
despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel
denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They
mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue
his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time
as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the
case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between
the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original
agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise
regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of
filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim,
the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter
which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to
claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack
thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the
same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was
untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

Rondina v People, GR 179059, June 13, 2012

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

Facts: Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of January 1993. They
started intimate sexual relations sometime in September 1993. By August 1994 Divina found out she was
pregnant. The couple made plans to marry but later on Charles backed out of the wedding plan. Divina
filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. This was later on
amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and support the child. Divina sent
him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding recognition and support. When Charles did not answer, she
filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. Charles denied the imputed
paternity.

“RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the
respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the
petitioner, i.e., “September 1993” in her direct testimony while “last week of January 1993” during her
cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s
initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite
erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.”

“CA departed from the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter
merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted
that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the
respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the
petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize
his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.”

Issue: WON CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC appreciation of the respondent’s
testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.

Decision: SC affirmed CA.

The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina established prima facie case
against Charles through her testimony, corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm owner), that she’s only been
involved with one man at the time of conception. Charles did not deny his sexual relations with her, only
that it occurred at a later date.

“One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We
have held that such other proof of one’s filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission
by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.””

“In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that a prima facie case
exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the
putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained further that
the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with
the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with
other men at the time of conception.”

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012

FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly
neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly
assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support
against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the
trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by
CA.

ISSUE: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

HELD: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient
certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.
An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The
Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

***

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However,
this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As this
case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower
courts. GRANTED.

Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013

Lim-Lua v Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 05, 2013
FACTS:

Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer
for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. Citing
respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and
abroad.
After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the
time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also
granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.

The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and
respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being in accordance with
family’s social and financial standing.

The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive support is
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the
respondent

MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00 which
ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.

The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision
indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16,
representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances are given
to the petitioner and his children.

CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered advances
which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children.

Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of
Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children.

ISSUE:

Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.

RULING.

The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly support of
PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him. Second, that
only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite
for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the CA).

C. Source of support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122

Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440

Husband Teodoro Lerma sued his wife and a certain Teddy Ramirez for adultery. Sometime later, the
wife sued Lerma for legal separation with an urgent motion for support pendente lite. Lerma opposed the
motion setting up the wfie’s alleged adultery as a defense.

Issue: is the adultery a valid defense?

Held:
Yes, the alleged adultery adultery of the wife is a valid defense if there is a good chance that this adultery
can be proved. And this is true, whether what is asked is support from the husband’s capital or from the
conjugal partnership property, because even in the latter case where conjugal partnership assets are
involved, the right to a separate maintenance is granted only if there is justifiable cause for it, not when
the person asking is, to all apperance, guilty of adultery.

Reyes vs Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803

Petitioner:
Manuel J.C. Reyes
Respondent:
Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano (Judge of the Juvenile & DomesticRelations Court, QC), the Court of
Appeals, Celia Ilustre-Reyes
DOCTRINE Art. 61, FC.
After the filing of the petition for legal separation, thespouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other.The Court, in absence of a written agreement between the spouses,shall designate either of
them or a third person to administer theabsolute community or conjugal partnership property.
Theadministrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers andduties as those of a guardian
under the Rules of Court.
Art. 62, FC. During the pendency of the action for legal separation,the provisions of Article 49
1
shall likewise apply to the support ofthe spouses and the custody and support of the common children
.
FACTS
1.
Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ofQuezon City a complaint against
her husband Manuel J.C. Reyes for legalseparation on the ground that he had attempted to kill her:a.
he punched her, held her head, and bumped itseveral times against the cement floor. He also pushed her
atthe stairway of 13 flights, and swung at her abdomen which gother half-unconscious. It was her father
who saved her.b.
He doused her with grape juice, kicked her several times, andwas saved this time by her driver.
1
The Court shall provide for the support of the spouses, the support andcustody of the common children.
Paramount considerations = moral andmaterial welfare of the children, their choice of parent
2.
She
filed for support
pendente lite
2
for her and her 3 children
.Manuel opposed this by saying thathis wife committed adultery withher physician.

RTC
Granted, P5000 per month (from June 1976)

P4000
CA
Dismissed Manuel’s petition for the annulment of the RTC order
Manuel appears to be financially capable of giving the support
ISSUE:
WON adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support
–
YES,QUALIFIED (not in this case)RATIO
1.
The alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence.
Adultery is a good defense if properly proved.2.
Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation.
3.
He still has the opportunity to adduce evidence on this alleged adulterywhen the action for legal
separation is heard on the merits before theJuvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC.4.

However, it is doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimonypendente liteshe is asking for
support to be taken from theirconjugal property, not Manuel’s personal funds.
ISSUE:
WON in determining the amount of support it is enough that the Courtascertain via affidavits or other
documentary evidence
YESRATIO
1.Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application forsupport
pendent lite
; it is enough that the facts be established byaffidavits/other documentary evidence.2.
Celia submitted documents that the corporations controlled byManuel have entered into multi-million
contracts in projects of theMinistry of Public Highways
Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016
Facts:Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were married in June16, 1978.
They had 5 children. Due to the alleged Francisco’s infidelity they decided toseparate and their children
were all in the custody of their mother.Edna, then, filed a complaint against Colonel Francisco before the
Provost MarshallDivision of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She demanded that they be entitled
to75% of the retirement benefits of Col. Otamias as their monthly support since thechildren were all
living with her. Issue: Wherther or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for
thefinancial support of his legitimate familyRuling:The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the
law between the parties, and itsprovisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel
Otamias wascoerced or defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the lawbetween
parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are notcontrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not
contrary to law; it was inaccordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was
noreason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC
granted the request for support of thewives of other retired military personnel in a similar situation as that
of petitioner in thiscase. Attached to the Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members of
themilitary, who have received a portion of their husbands' pensions.Section 31 of Presidential Decree
No. 1638 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree,
except as provided herein, shallnot be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax
whatsoever;neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That ifa
retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under thisDecree has unsettled
money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the activeservice, not more than fifty per centum
of the pension gratuity or other payment duesuch officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and beapplied to settle such accountabilities.cralawred

Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016

D. Order of support, FC 199, 200, 204

Mangonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a
Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the
RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico
Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that
time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage
was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11
August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within
seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin
daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition,
Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted
to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and
Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

ISSUE:
Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.

HELD:
As to the amount of support pendente lite, the court takes its bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the
amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by
petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business
endeavors. Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education
by the time of the promulgation of this decision, the court deems it proper to award support pendente lite
in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective
studies. The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters
raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be
resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return
of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment.

Spouses Lim v Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009

FACTS: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with
Edwards. Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors),
after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother
in what the trial court described a very compromising situation. Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued
petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000
pendente lite.
In 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000
monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000
subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their
liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held
jointly liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents.
Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by
providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the family under Article
194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).

In 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim
(petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD: YES.

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow
question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX
of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the
childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring
ends with them.

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is
able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability
of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the
ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the
anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to
give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial court
awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial
court for this limited purpose.

E. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-208

F. Renunciation and Termination, NCC 2035; FC 194

G. Support pendente lite, FC 198

XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

Concept of parental authority, FC 209, 211

Medina vs. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969

Unson vs. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus Of Minor Shang Ko

CASE: In the matter of the petition for habeas corpus of minor Shang Ko Vingson Yu, Shirly Vingson @
Shirly Vingson Demaisip VS. Jovy Cabcaban [UDK No. 14817, January 13, 2014]

PONENTE: Associate Justice Roberto Abad

SUBJECT:

Remedial Law:
i. Habeas Corpus – Purpose
“The writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor.”

FACTS:

Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko), her 14-year-old daughter, ran
away from home. Two months thereafter, Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt
of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of Jovy Cabcaban (Cabcaban), a police officer in that
station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura (Pura), informed Shirly that
Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids.
Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been attending school.

This prompted Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of
Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City
citing as reason several threats against her life in that city.

The CA resolved to deny the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko.
According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the
whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the
disappearance of such person [See CASE BrieF No. 2006-925 Estrella Martinez vs. Dir. Gen. Leandro
Mendoza et. al.] The CA denied Shirly’s motion for reconsideration, hence, she filed a petition for review
in the Supreme Court.

In her Comment, Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko was found crying outside a church by police officers.
When queried, the latter refused to give any information about herself. Thus, they indorsed her case to
the Bacolod City Police Women and Children Protection Desk that Cabcaban headed. After the initial
interview, Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay Pasilungan, a temporary shelter for abused women and
children.
Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with the minor who said that her
mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. She narrated that Shirly instructed another daughter to
give Shang Ko P280.00 and take her to the pier to board a boat going to Iloilo City. Shang Ko was told to
look for a job there and to never come back to Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she
arrived in Iloilo City, Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City with the money given her. She went to
her best friend’s house but was turned away for fear of Shirly. She called her sister so that she and her
boyfriend could get her but they, too, turned her down.

Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not to return her to
her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City Police filed a complaintagainst Shirly for violation of Republic
Act 7610 The police sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a conference but she refused to receive such
notice.

Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the child back to use
her as leverage for getting financial support from him.

RULING:

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases
involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over
their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such
children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them
emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
properly counseled.

Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be
best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering the presumption
that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids, the Court
believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides, she
herself has expressed preference to stay in that place.

Vingson v Cabcaban, UDK No. 14817, January 13, 2014

Caram v Segui, GR 193652, Aug. 5, 2014 [en banc

FACTS:

Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her
pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13,
2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the
DSWD.
 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally
Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her
family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for
adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward
of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no
enforced disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 9851 to wit:

That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers
never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed
her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD
officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced
disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her
parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered
a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614, January 12,
2016

Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234

 
Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317
FACTS:

When Reynaldo Eslao died,Maria Paz’s husband, she entrusted care and custody of her youngest child
Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law stating that she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. She then returned to her mother’s house with her another
daughter, Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a Japanese-American and lives with him in the US.
She then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She then
informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new husband’s willingness to adopt
her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica when she was 10 days
old. Teresita added that she would be deserving to take care of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12
children of her own herself; that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that she
maintains a store which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the
death of her husband, she rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a total of
P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the
maintenance of her house.

Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to her. After the trial
on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the full decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child.

RULING:

No, Sagala-Eslao cannot be given the custody of the child. Article 210 of the Family Code states that
“Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized
by law.”

In Santos, Sr. v Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407we stated, viz:

[Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of
the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law [Article 210]. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
childrens home or an orphan institution.[Art.222-224] when a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the
law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company [Article 209 and 211].

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

Who exercises PA, FC 211-213 cf. FC 49, 102(6). 129 (9) and 63(2), Art. 176

Unson v. Navarro 101 SCRA 183

Unson vs. Navarro (Miguel R. Unson III, petitioner vs. Hon Pedro C. Navarro and Edita N.
Araneta,respondents)GR No. L-52242 (101 SCRA 183)November 17, 1980Article 209.Article
211.Article 212.Article 213.Facts:Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 and
out of that marriage the child inquestion, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. However, on July 13,
1974, they executed an agreementfor the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have
in fact been living separatelysince June 1972. Said agreement was approved by the Court.The parties have
agreed that no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody ofthe child because
the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.In the early part of 1978,
the petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife: (1) shewas in a relation with her
brother-in-law and godfather of their child (a former seminarian at that), MariaTeresa; (2) that the
brother-in-law was being treated for manic depressive disorder; (3) the illicit affairproduced 2 children;
and (4) that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant faith.On 28 December 1979, the
respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria TeresaUnson and return her to the
custody of the mother, herein private respondent, further obliging him to
“continue his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs”.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has the right over the custody of the
child, Maria Teresa UnsonRuling:Yes. The Court held that in all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the sole and foremostconsideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the
child concerned, taking intoaccount the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents.

Espiritu & Layug v. CA, G.R. No. 115640 (1995)

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband
while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel
Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a
year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently,
they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second
chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in
the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his
sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount
concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for
compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years
of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over
7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in
the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show
that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and
care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for
the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.

Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

Santos Sr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 113054 (1995)

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before
a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s
parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel
Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of
Julia’s parents into their family affairs.

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under
AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.

David vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995

Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

Gualberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994.  June 28, 2005

Salientes vs Salientes, 500 SCRA 128

fACTS:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the
parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents,
petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent
suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left
the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla
in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Custody which the trial court granted. However, petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article
213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein
respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima
facie proof thereof, and even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus
is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Respondent
on the other hand, asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the
minors’ right to see his father and vice versa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is available and should be granted to the petitioner.

RULING:

Yes. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present
case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the
child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provide
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any
of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private
respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-
04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file
answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor
before the court. This was exactly what the court did. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals
with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the
court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents’ petition for custody. But it is
not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father
from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of
time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone
else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the
name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth
and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of
Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the
primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the
persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother
over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and
the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their
respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to
deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected
"best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE:

Has the father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition
of their filiation?
HELD: Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: "Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force."

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as
Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

***

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his
recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255.

An administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation, G.R No 170633, October 17, 2007 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a
mere administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which
they will be known.

BBB -versus -AAA, G.R. No. 193225 , February 9, 2015

Bucal v Bucal, G.R. No. 206957, June 17, 2015, 

Substitute PA, FC 212-214, 216, FC 233

Vancil vs Belmes, 358 SCRA 70

Facts: Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America
who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named
Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Petitioner commences before the RTC a
guardianship proceeding over the persons and properties of minors Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2
years old. She was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of said children. The
natural mother of the minors, herein respondent, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship. The trial court
rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian. The
subsequent attempt for reconsideration was likewise dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

Ruling: Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Indeed, being the natural mother of
minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. The ruling in
Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals is reiterated in this case that of considerable importance is the rule long
accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent
one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.

Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental
authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code which states that in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals is reiterated herein that the law vests on the father and
mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of
either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.

Hence, actual custody of and exercising parental authority over minor Vincent is vested on the natural
mother.

E. Special PA, FC 218-219, FC 233, cf. FC 221 in rel. to NCC 2180

St. Mary’s vs. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002

Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part
of the campaigning group.

Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a
case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.

Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The
Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have causal
connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.

Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.

Child Learning Centre vs. Tagario, GR 150920, Nov. 25, 2005

Holy Spirit vs. Taguiam, GR 165565, July 14, 2008

Facts:
Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner school. After obtaining
permission from the principal, they were allowed to use the school swimming poolfor their year-end
activity. With this, respondent Taguiam distributed the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the
students.
The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother personally brought
her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that the mother allowed
her to join. Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim
to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out.
Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was
away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent
rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
The petitioner school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent attended and submitted
her Affidavit of Explanation. A month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on the ground of
gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss oftrust
and confidence was valid
Held:
Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an
employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to
perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
The SC concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara
Mae’s permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae’s mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school
with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as Class Adviser to
supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with
the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel,
were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of
pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable
resultant damage, however, the SC agreed that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.Indeed,
the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered
in the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.

Aquinas School v Inton, GR 184202, January 26, 2011

FACTS:
This case is about the private school’s liability for the
outside
catechist’s act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs
when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and notmove around the classroom.In 1998, Jose
Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three studentat Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister
MargaritaYamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching
at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade
three religion class.Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke ofsurprising him.
Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat.After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over
to the sameclassmate.Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legsseveral times. She
also pulled and shoved his head on the
classmate’s seat.
She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard whileseating on the floor.Respondents Jose and
Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an actionfor damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin
andAquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in CivilCase 67427.The Intons also filed
a criminal action against Yamyamin for violationof Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and
wassentenced accordingly.

F. Effects of PA over the child’s person, FC 220-222, FC 223-224

Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were schoolmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
School in Bacolod City. On July 9. 1962 their instructor assigned them. together with three other
schoolmates. to weed the grass in the school premises. While therefore engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a fictile headband. an cosmetic object normally worn by immature misss over their hair. Jokingly
she said aloud that she had found an angleworm and. obviously to scare the Cuadra miss. tossed the
object at her. At that precise minute the latter turned around to confront her friend. and the object hit her
right oculus. Aching from the hurting. she rubbed the injured portion and treated it with some
pulverization. The following twenty-four hours. July 10. the oculus became conceited and it was so that
the miss related the incident to her parents. who thereupon took her to a physician for intervention. She
underwent surgical operation twice. on July 20 and August 4. 1962 severally. and stayed in the infirmary
for a sum of 23 yearss. for all of which the parents spent the amount of P1. 703. 75. Despite the medical
attempts. nevertheless. Maria Teresa Cuadra wholly lost the sight of her right oculus. Maria Teresa
Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort ( Maria Teresa Monfort’s male parent ) based on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.

Issues:

Whether or non Alfonso Monfort should be held apt under Article 2180.

Business Law
Opinion of the tribunal:

The suspect is non apt and hence can non be sued under Article 2180. This article provides that the male
parent and. in instance of his decease or incapacity. the female parent. are responsible for the amendss
caused by the minor kids who live in their company. The footing of this vicarious. although primary.
liability is. as in Article 2176. mistake or carelessness. which is presumed from that which accompanied
the causative act or skip. The given is simply based on the ?rst feeling ( leading facie ) and may hence be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical illation that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180.
which provinces “that the duty treated of in this Article shall discontinue when the individuals herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good male parent of a household to forestall
harm. ”

In this instance. there is nil from which it may be inferred that the suspect. Alfonso Monfort. could hold
prevented the harm by the observation of due attention. or that he was in any manner remiss in the
exercising of his parental authorization in neglecting to anticipate such harm. or the act which caused it.
On the contrary. his kid was at school. where it was his responsibility to direct her and where she was. as
he had the right to anticipate her to be. under the attention and supervising of the instructor. And every bit
far as the act which caused the hurt was concerned. it was an guiltless buffoonery non unusual among
kids at drama and which no parent. nevertheless careful. would hold any particular ground to expect much
less guard against. Nor did it uncover any arch leaning. or so any trait in the child’s character which
would re?ect unfavourably on her upbringing and for which the incrimination could be attributed to her
parents.

Rosales vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014

G. Filial privilege, FC 215

 H. Effects of PA over the child’s property, FC 225-227
RA 9231, Secs. 12-B and 12-C

Hebron vs. Loyola, G.R. No. 168960, July 5, 2010

Neri v Heirs, GR 194366, October 10, 2012

I. Suspension or termination of PA, FC 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, cf

193 cf. RA 6809

XV. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS, FC 356 – 363

XVI. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, FC 238-252