ASSEMBLE AND PETITION: could in the view of the Court ignite the turbulence the

mayor wanted to prevent.

Historically, the right of petition is the primary right, the
right to peaceably to assemble a subordinate and
instrumental right as if the provision read: “The right of the
people peaceably to assemble” in order to “petition the
government.” In the cases decided by the SC, it is now
clear that the right of peaceable assembly is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press and is
equally fundamental. Hence, since the right of assemble
and petition is equally as fundamental as freedom of
expression, the standards for allowable impairment of
speech and press are also used for assembly and petition.
(BERNAS, 2011)
NAVARRO VS VILLEGAS (FEBRUARY 26 1970)
(I can’t find the rooted case originally docketed as L-31687 – I
also tried to find it in eScra but same results. However, good
news is, I found my old digest! Haha!)
DOCTRINE: Different application of the CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TEST.
Nelson Navarro, Petitioner vs. Mayor Antonio Villegas,
respondent
FACTS: On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in
behalf of the Movement of a Democratic Philippines, wrote
a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila,
applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26,
1970, from 4-11pm. On the same day, the respondent
wrote a reply, denying his request on the ground that
they have temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for
rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to the
events that happened from the past week. On the same
letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use
the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for the rally and it must
be held before it gets dark. The petitioner filed a
mandamus to compel the Mayor to issue the permit. Plus,
they also added that the Mayor’s action of not issuing such
permit violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s right
to the equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1).
The right of peaceable assemble is subject to
regulation under the police power of the state. The
right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly,
though granted by the Constitution, is not absolute for it
may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of
community and society. The Mayor possessed “
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used for the assembly in order to
secure convenient used thereof by others and provide
adequate and proper policing to minimized the risks of
disorder and maintain public safety and disorder.
Salymar’s Note: I have a creative way of defining the Clear and
Present Danger Test: According to constitutional law annotated
books by Bernas and Cruz, they said that PROXIMITY or PLACE
and TIME where the speech or assembly seeks to be performed
are an essential part in construing what would constitute a Clear
and Present Danger. Do you guys remember the “Boy who cried
Wolf” story? Well, if I remember it correctly, it’s a story of a boy
who lived in the farm at the time or era where wolves are
extremely common and dangerous to the society. Hence, every
time he cried (not to be construed as literally weep but to shout
an alarm) to the public that there are wolves on the village, the
public will panic and within seconds, public disorder will arise.
(Only to find out that the boy was just bluffing. Haha!) Therefore,
applying the above given scenario: the time and place where it
happened – these now became the controlling element why
there shall be a clear or present danger. If, however, the Boy
who cried wolf would do the same thing on today’s time and on a
metropolitan city (like for example, on a private building in
Makati?), it would not cater the same results because logically,
wolves do not exist on an urban places and on today’s time, do
people really say wolves as wolves? Haha!

Mayor Villegas refused claiming the same ground as his

predecessor, to wit, fear of public disorder as a result of
the speeches to be delivered at the intended meeting.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the

request of the petitioner violates the petitioners’ Right to
peaceable assembly

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court based its decision on

the difference in the FACTUAL CONDITION of Manila in
1947 (which is described as PEACEFUL) and 1970 (which
is on this time was at the height of student unrest and
activism). Manila was then in uproar, the people were
over-sensitive and the speeches planned to be delivered
at Plaza Miranda, the most sensitive place in the city,

1 CASE DIGEST ASSEMBLY AND PETITION – FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ESTRADA V ESCRITOR)

PBM EMPLOYEES vs PBM
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners are officers and
members of the petitioner Union.
FACTS: Petitioners decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration. During the two
meetings held between the parties regarding the said
strike, the Company warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly, the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of
the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike which
would constitute unfair labor practice.
Despite the warning, the strike was pursued with. The said
employees were hereinafter charged with the violation of
the CBA. The lower court decided in favor of the company
and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied and declared in bad faith by the
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) for being filed two
days late. The CIR further ruled that the mass
demonstration conducted is a "concerted act and the
occurrence temporary stoppage of work.”
In summary, the Petitioner’s contentions were:
(1) The acts of the employers were in violation of the
exercise of laborers under the inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom
of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
(2) As to their late response on them matter: Property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by
the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be
an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs
— political, economic or otherwise.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of the Petitioners
are tenable
RULING: YES. The SC sustained the contentions of the
Petitioners. The primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained: “In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights
2 CASE DIGEST ASSEMBLY AND PETITION – FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ESTRADA V ESCRITOR)
of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions;   and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The
superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the
law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights.  On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent.” The freedoms of expression and of
assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the
ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the
liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe
unless the liberties of all are protected.
Moreover, the questioned mass demonstration was
against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen AND
CLEARLY NOT AGAINST THEIR EMPLOYER. The
respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice because the refusal of the respondent firm and
the dismissal of the employees constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition
for redress of grievances.
It is also important to note that the purpose of the Bill
of Rights is to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality
and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who
have no patience with general principles." The purpose of
the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
IMPORTANT: The rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but
also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW
AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE
AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA,
JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as
members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB,
JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M.
HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S.
YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in
their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB, respondents
FACTS: In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify
and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in
connection with certain utterances he made in his
television show, Ang Dating Daan.
That on August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner,
as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV
37, made the following remarks:
”Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae
o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o
di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.1 x x x”
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael
M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of
the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner
appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004,
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan
program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB,
in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule
VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5 The same order
also set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the
preventive suspension order, MTRCB imposed a penalty
of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang
Dating Daan".
Petitioner alleged that the following constitutional rights
were violated:
(1) Equal Protection
(2) Freedom of Religion
(3) Freedom of Speech and of expression
He relied on the following grounds:
(1) Section 3(c( of PD 1986 is unconstitutional since it
unduly infringes the constitutional guarantee of
3 CASE DIGEST ASSEMBLY AND PETITION – FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ESTRADA V ESCRITOR)
freedom of religion, speech and expression as it
partakes of the nature of not just a subsequent
punishment but also prior restraint curtailing the same
since his suspension also includes his future
speeches
ISSUE: Whether the statements uttered by Soriano during
the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
RULING: NO.
(1) As to the the powers of the MTRCB:
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which
may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-
legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute.12 They have in
fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in
determining whether an agency has certain powers, the
inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained
as existing, the authority given should be liberally
construed.
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB) may suspend a TV program but not its host.
—But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to
review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its
decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for
nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining
Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative
Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board
empowered to suspend the program host or even to
prevent certain people from appearing in television
programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the
broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits
for exhibition, but it may not suspend television
personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of
regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons,
offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the
letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within
the decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. And when it
exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of
the person charged with violating the statute and for whom
the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in
Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004
and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision
must be modified. The suspension should cover only the
television program on which petitioner appeared and
uttered the offensive and obscene language, which
sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for.
“vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good
name and reputation of any person, whether living or
dead;”
(2) As to Equal Protection: (Sinama ko lang just in case)
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the
equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the preventive
suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming
from the INC ministers.
Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection
clause demands that "all persons subject to legislation should be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed." It guards against
undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile
discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises,
place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for
one, are not facing administrative complaints before the
MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said
ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that
which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s
disciplinary action
(3) AS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom,
submitting that what he uttered was religious speech,
adding that words like "putang babae" were said in
exercise of his religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s
utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom.
There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The
fact that he came out with his statements in a televised
bible exposition program does not automatically accord
them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and
simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show
that he was moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity that some INC ministers distorted his
statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to
a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that
petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation
and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner
had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-
language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to
contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for
the low road.
all problems and does away with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to
free speech and which compels a court to release a
defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic
disaster. As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation vs. Dans, Jr., the clear and present
danger test “does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in
all forums.”
4.1 AS TO PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT
PUNISHMENT
The State has a compelling interest to protect minors,
against offensive language in TV programs. As such,
the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect
and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in
regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as
provided in PD 1986.
Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his
program during the period of suspension be plausibly
treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed
in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the
nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an
unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser
punishment than the permissible cancellation of
exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the
suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the
MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the
law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its
proper context, the suspension sought to penalize
past speech made on prime-time “G” rated TV
program; it does not bar future speech of petitioner in
other television programs; it is a permissible
subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be
confused with a prior restraint on speech.

(4) AS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION:

A TV program rated “G” or for general viewership
reaches adults and children alike. What may not be
obscene speech to adults may be considered obscene
for children. In this sense, we find petitioner’s utterances
obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella
of freedom of speech.

It was originally designed to determine the latitude which

should be given to speech that espouses anti-government
action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious
consequences on the security and public order of the
community. The clear and present danger rule has been
applied to this jurisdiction. As a standard of limitation on
free speech and press, however, the clear and present
danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out

4 CASE DIGEST ASSEMBLY AND PETITION – FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ESTRADA V ESCRITOR)


ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD
S. ESCRITOR, respondent. [Estrada vs. Escritor, 408
SCRA 1(2003)]
Subject: Freedom of Religion (Free Exercise Clause. Non-
Establishment Clause), Strict Neutrality vs. Benevolent
Neutrality
FACTS: Alejandro Estrada wrote a letter to the judge of
RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City, complaining of immoral
acts committed by Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in
said court, who is allegedly living with a man not her
husband.
During the investigation, Escritor admitted that she has
been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of
marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as
a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together,
she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness." Quilapio executed a similar pledge. At the
time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. Insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about
the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio
and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation. Moreover, at the time Escritor joined the
judiciary, her husband has already died and there was no
longer any legal impediment to marry on her part, although
Quilapio was still married to another but separated.
Escritor, who is charged with committing "gross and
immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code,
invokes the moral standards of her religion, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement with
a man not her legal husband does not constitute
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be
held administratively liable.
RULING:
(1) Free exercise clause
1. The Free Exercise Clause embraces two concepts -
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
Evolution of Different Tests employed by the courts
under the Free Exercise Clause
(a) The belief-action test Under this test, regulation of
religiously dictated conduct would be upheld no matter
how central the conduct was to the exercise of religion and
no matter how insignificant was the government's non-
religious regulatory interest so long as the government is
proscribing action and not belief.
(b) The Court abandoned the simplistic belief-action
distinction and instead recognized the deliberate-
5 CASE DIGEST ASSEMBLY AND PETITION – FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ESTRADA V ESCRITOR)
inadvertent distinction, i.e., the distinction between
deliberate state interference of religious exercise for
religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and
government's inadvertent interference with religion in
pursuing some secular objective.
(c) The two-part balancing test of validity of the
infringing regulation where the first step was for plaintiff to
show that the regulation placed a real burden on his
religious exercise. Next, the burden would be upheld only
if the state showed that it was pursuing an overriding
secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden
on religious practices.
(d) Then came the stricter compelling state interest test,
this latter test stressed that the state interest was not
merely any colorable state interest, but must be paramount
and compelling to override the free exercise claim. A
‘compelling state interest’ is the highest level of
constitutional scrutiny short of a holding of a per se
violation. Thus, when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
'compelling state interest' intervenes.
(2) Non-Establishment Clause
2. U.S. Supreme Court adopted Jefferson's metaphor of
"a wall of separation between church and state" as
encapsulating the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
3. The Lemon v. Kurtzman test requires a challenged
policy to meet the following criteria to pass scrutiny under
the Establishment Clause.
(i) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose
(ii) its primary or principal effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion
(iii) the statute must not foster 'an excessive
entanglement with religion.'
(3) Strict Neutrality vs. Benevolent Neutrality
4. The two main standards used by the Court in deciding
religion clause cases: separation (strict neutrality) and
accommodation (benevolent neutrality).
(a) Under the strict neutrality approach, the government
should base public policy solely on secular considerations,
without regard to the religious consequences of its actions.
It adopts a policy of ‘religious blindness’. This approach
has been used in education cases where the court refused
to allow any form of prayer, spoken or silent, in public
schools. However, this separationist approach has
become problematic in contemporary times when both the
government and religion are growing and expanding their
spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the
intersection of government and religion at many points.
(b) The benevolent neutrality approach allows for
interaction between the church and state as called for by
necessity or practicality. Benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the
"government [may] take religion into account . . .to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish."
(4) Accommodation theory
5. A three-step process (also referred to as the "two-
step balancing process" when the second and third steps
are combined) is followed in weighing the state's interest
and religious freedom when these collide. Three questions
are answered in this process:
(a) Has the statute or government action created a
burden on the free exercise of religion? The courts often
look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth. The
sincerity of the claimant's belief is ascertained to avoid the
mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatory
regulation.
(b) Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to
justify this infringement of religious liberty? In this step, the
government has to establish that its purposes are
legitimate for the state and that they are compelling.
(c) Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state?
(5) Philippine jurisdiction adopts Benevolent Neutrality
approach
6. The Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe
not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible
within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
6 CASE DIGEST ASSEMBLY AND PETITION – FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ESTRADA V ESCRITOR)
7. In other words, in the absence of legislation granting
exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court
can carve out an exception when the religion clauses
justify it.
(6) Tests applied on exercise of religious freedom
8. The case at bar does not involve speech where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate.
9. The present case involves purely conduct arising from
religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved. Under this test, not any
interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right
to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights.
10. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide.
(7) Religious clauses and Morality
11. The morality referred to in the law is public and
secular morality, not religious morality. The distinction is
important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should
be understood only in this realm.
Application of ‘Benevolent Neutrality’ and the ‘Compelling
State Interest’ Test
12. In ruling on Escritor’s claim of religious freedom, the
court applied the ‘compelling state interest’ test from a
‘benevolent neutrality’ stance - i.e. the claim of religious
freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the
Civil Service Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest.
13. Applying the balancing process earlier discussed, the
court found that Escritor's right to religious freedom has
been burdened as she is made to choose between
keeping her employment and following her religious
precept. She appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality.
14. However, the case must be remanded to the Office of
the Court Administrator to properly settle the issue of the
existence of a compelling state interest. The government
should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold which can
override respondent's religious belief and practice. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General.