YOGIC PERCEPTION, MEDITATION AND ALTERED STATES

OF CONSCIOUSNESS
EDITED BY ELI FRANCO
In collaboration with Dagmar Eigner
ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 794. BAND

BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

NR. 65
 ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 794. BAND

Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered

States of Consciouness

Edited by Eli Franco

In collaboration with Dagmar Eigner
 Vorgelegt von w. M. ERNST STEINKELLNER
in der Sitzung am 13. März 2009

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 Contents

Eli Franco
Introduction ................................................................................ 1

Part I: Yogic Perception in the South Asian

and Tibetan Traditions
Larry McCrea
“Just Like Us, Just Like Now”: The Tactical Implications
of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception ...................... 55

John Taber
Yoga and our Epistemic Predicament ...................................... 71

Eli Franco
Meditation and Metaphysics: On their Mutual Relationship
in South Asian Buddhism ........................................................ 93

Anne MacDonald
Knowing Nothing: Candrakīrti and Yogic Perception .......... 133

Vincent Eltschinger
On the Career and the Cognition of Yogins ........................... 169

Dorji Wangchuk
A Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity
of Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism ............................... 215

Orna Almogi
The Materiality and Immanence of Gnosis
in Some rNying-ma Tantric Sources ..................................... 241

Philipp André Maas

The So-called Yoga of Suppression
in the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra ................................................... 263
vi CONTENTS

Marcus Schmücker
Yogic Perception According to the Later
Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta .................................. 283

Marion Rastelli
Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him:
Yogic Perception and Its Implications
in the Viṣṇuitic Tradition of Pāñcarātra ................................. 299

Part II: Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness

from an Interdisciplinary Perspective
Karl Baier
Meditation and Contemplation
in High to Late Medieval Europe .......................................... 321

Diana Riboli
Shamans and Transformation
in Nepal and Peninsular Malaysia ......................................... 347

Dagmar Eigner
Transformation of Consciousness
through Suffering, Devotion, and Meditation ........................ 369

John R. Baker
Psychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness:
Insights from the Biocultural Perspective .............................. 389

Shulamith Kreitler
Altered States of Consciousness
as Structural Variations of the Cognitive System .................. 407

Renaud van Quekelberghe

Mindfulness and Psychotherapy:
The Revival of Indian Meditative Traditions within
Modern Psychology, Psychotherapy, and Medicine .............. 435
 CONTENTS vii

Michael DelMonte
Empty Thy Mind and Come to Thy Senses:
A De-constructive Path to Inner Peace .................................. 449

Contributors ................................................................................... 481

 ELI FRANCO

Introduction1

The present volume has its origin in a research project funded by the
Austrian Science Fund (FWF) from 2002 to 2004 (Project Nr. P14861)
on the concept of para- and supra-normal perception in the Buddhist
epistemological tradition. The project was conceived as part of the vast
project “The epistemological-logical tradition in India and Tibet,” initi-
ated by Ernst Steinkellner and directed by him for more than twenty
years. The topic of para- and supra-normal perception, or extrasensory
perception, constitutes a hitherto neglected theme in the study of Bud-
dhist philosophy of religion, despite its considerable importance inas-
much as it concerns the very basis and foundation of the Buddhist reli-
gious tradition, namely, the core insights of the historical Buddha.2 In
the classical period of Buddhist philosophy, these insights were classi-
fied and interpreted by the Buddhist tradition as examples of yogic per-
ception. It is this notion of yogic perception, its theoretical conceptions
and presuppositions, the arguments for and against it, its cultural and
religious varieties, and its epistemological implications that form the
central topic of the ongoing project and, to a large extent, of this vol-
ume.

1
I would like to thank Prof. Dagmar Eigner for co-organizing the conference that was
the starting point for this volume, especially for helping shape its interdisciplinary
character, as seen in the chapters on psychology and shamanism in this volume's
second half. I am also indebted to Anne MacDonald and Philipp Maas, who kindly
read the introduction and made pertinent and very helpful remarks.
2
This statement is not meant to express a position in the ongoing debate about the
historicity of the Buddha and information about him found in the Buddhist texts.
Paradoxical as it may sound, the more we know about the Buddhist canons, the less
we know about the Buddha as a historical person. Rather the statement concerns the
way the Buddha was (and still is) perceived by the Buddhist tradition and how the
Buddhist tradition argued for the reliability of the teachings that are attributed to the
Buddha.
2 ELI FRANCO

The belief in meditation3 as a source for extrasensory percep-

tion seems to have always been present in South Asian civilization.
Some scholars trace the ideals of asceticism and the practice of yoga all
the way back to the Indus Valley Civilization. Needless to say, in view
of the absence of probative evidence, this must remain a matter of opin-
ion and speculation.4 However, clear references to meditation can al-
ready be found in the late Vedic literature, for instance, in the Muṇḍaka
Upaniṣad, which states that the Self, or soul, cannot be apprehended by
ordinary sensory means. Muṇḍaka 3.1.8 declares that the Self can be
perceived neither by means of the eye (or better, by the faculty of sight),
nor by speech, nor by other sense faculties (deva), nor by austerities
(tapas), nor by ritual action (karman). Rather, the partless Self is seen
by the meditating man5 when he (or his mind) has become pure through
the lucidity of his knowledge.6
While in the initial historical stages the practice of meditation
may have developed within the context of ritual and world-affirming
values, it increasingly came to be associated with the śramaṇa milieu.
The word śramaṇa is derived from the root śram, meaning “to strive, to
make an effort,” or more specifically “to perform austerities.” Accord-
ingly, the word śramaṇa refers to an ascetic or religious mendicant in
general. The expression “śramaṇa milieu” or “śramaṇa movement”

3
The term “meditation” is used in a wide variety of ways. I follow David Fontana,
who suggests that the common features among the various forms and traditions of
meditation may be reduced to three: concentration, tranquility and insight; see
David Fontana, “Meditation.” In: Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (eds.), The
Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford 2007: 154-162, at p. 154. Antoine
Lutz et al., however, explicitly reject any attempt to define meditation in general as
involving unverifiable hypotheses and trivializing diverse practices; see Antoine
Lutz et al., “Meditation and the Neuroscience of Consciousness: an Introduction.”
In: Philip David Zelazo et al. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness.
Cambridge 2007: 499-551, on p. 500.
4
It is notable that unlike the case of the practice of austerities (tapas and similar
terms) there are no clear correspondences to yoga and meditative practice in other
ancient Indo-European cultures. However, even if the practice of yoga and medita-
tion are genuine South Asian developments, it is not necessarily the case that they
are related to the Indus Valley Civilization.
5
The masculine form is used here; it is clear that the Upaniṣadic authors were not
thinking, as a rule, of women gaining access to this privileged knowledge.
6
See Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upaniṣads. New York 1998: 450: na cakṣuṣā gṛhya-
te, nāpi vācā, nānyair devais tapasā karmaṇā vā / jñānaprasādena viśuddhasattvaṃ
tatas tu taṃ paśyate niṣkalaṃ dhyāyamānaḥ //.
 INTRODUCTION 3

refers to ascetics living, mostly celibately, on the fringes of or com-

pletely outside society, some of them loosely associated in small
groups, others more tightly organized into religious orders. Many reli-
gious movements emerged from the śramaṇa milieu, not the least Bud-
dhism and Jainism, as well as innumerable religio-philosophical move-
ments and sects that did not survive to the present day or did not assume
a dominant role.
The śramaṇa milieu had a profound influence on South Asian
civilization as a whole, spreading its characteristic values of world ne-
gation, world renunciation and liberation from rebirth far beyond the
ascetic circles and into the mainstream of society, especially its brah-
manic elite. The most typical and fundamental concepts of Indian reli-
gious philosophy originated in this ascetic milieu or were propagated by
it: the view that the world is governed by a process of rebirth (saṃsāra)
and is fundamentally frustrating and painful; the tenet that moral actions
(karman) determine the form of rebirth; the idea that escape or libera-
tion (nirvāṇa, mokṣa and similar expressions) from rebirth is the ulti-
mate ideal and highest good for living beings; the tenet that liberation is
attainable by cognitive means, namely, by means of a special insight;
the belief that such insight is only possible when one renounces all
worldly ties (wealth or material possessions, family, etc.); the practice
of “non-violence” (ahiṃsā) and various forms of austerities (tapas) as
the means for gaining control over the sense faculties and desires (kāma
and similar expressions), to mention the most conspicuous notions. Of
course, these tenets and ideals are blended in various manners. Bud-
dhism, for instance, emphasizes the elimination of desires at the ex-
pense of the obliteration of karma.7 In Jainism it is the other way
around.8 With the notable exceptions of Mīmāṃsā orthodoxy9 and mate-
rialistic-skeptic heterodoxy,10 Indian religious philosophy has been writ-

7
Note that karma is not mentioned in the four noble truths of Buddhism; it is also not
included in the twelve members of dependent origination, although later Buddhist
interpreters claim that it is included in saṃskāra (“volitional impulses”).
8
Next to these two dominating models of liberation, namely through the eradication
of desires or of karma, one can add for the later period, with its spread of theistic
movements, the notion of liberation through devotion to God and by divine grace.
On yogic perception in the Vaiṣṇava tradition, see the papers by Marcus Schmücker
and Marion Rastelli in this volume.
9
See the contributions by Lawrence McCrea and John Taber in this volume.
10
See Eli Franco, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief. Repr. Delhi 1994.
4 ELI FRANCO

ten for the most part from the point of view of the renouncer or in ac-
ceptance of the values of the renouncer, even though the authors of phi-
losophical works themselves were not always renouncers. Religio-
philosophical works, such as the Bhagavadgītā, that repudiate renuncia-
tion and propagate the life of action within society are the exception
rather than the rule.
What is common to most of the ascetic movements is the be-
lief that liberation can be attained through knowledge, through a fun-
damental extrasensory insight into the ultimate nature of reality, which
is sometimes even equated with omniscience (sarvajñatva).11 Theoreti-
cally one can discern two models regarding the attainment of this in-
sight. Either the capacity for such extrasensory perception is innate to
the soul or the mind, and can be automatically attained by removal of
the obstacles (impurities, karma) that prevent the soul or the mind from
exercising its innate cognitive capacity, or this capacity for the liberat-
ing insight, or even omniscience, is not inherent in the soul or mind, but
can be attained by means of spiritual cultivation and refinement. In gen-
eral, the former model seems to be predominant in South Asian relig-
ions. A typical example is the Jaina theory that knowledge or cognition
(jñāna) is the innate nature (svabhāva) of the soul and that the soul will,
under the proper conditions, cognize everything that is knowable
(sarvaṃ jñeyam).12 As Jaini puts it, “[t]he amount of karma destroyed
correlates directly with the gain in purity of the soul and increase in the
range of knowledge. Therefore, a total destruction of the forces of
karma, together with the causes of their accumulation, must inevitably
result in perfect purity, which would automatically usher in the state of

11
The logical outcome of this belief is that the ultimate cause of bondage to this world
is ignorance or error. This is especially emphasized in Sāṃkhya–Yoga, Vedānta and
Buddhism.
12
Everything that is knowable means the infinite number of souls (jīva), the infinitely
infinite (anantānanta) amount of matter (pudgala), the principle of motion (dharma)
and rest (adharma), space (ākāśa), time (kāla) and the infinite number of transfor-
mations (paryāya) through which they all pass. See Padmanabh Jaini, “On Sarva-
jñatva (Omniscience) of Mahāvīra and the Buddha.” In: Collected Papers on Bud-
dhist Studies. Ed. Padmanabh Jaini. Repr. Delhi 2001: 97-123, on p. 101.
 INTRODUCTION 5

‘omniscience.’”13 Consequently, according to the Jainas every liberated

soul is omniscient.14
A similar belief can be encountered in Canonical Buddhism.
Here we find the simile of gold ore and the mind. Gold ore is defiled
with iron, copper, tin, lead, and silver, but when it is purified it shines
with its natural luster. Similarly, “when the mind is emancipated from
the five defilements, it becomes supple, pliant, lustrous, firm, and be-
comes rightly concentrated for the destruction of the defiling im-
pulses.”15 Another simile compares cognition to a pure crystal which
takes on the color of an object touching it; in the same manner cognition
is defiled by desire, etc. Thus, the defilements are considered to be only
adventitious to cognition, while its true nature is luminous.
However, this view was rejected by some of the major schools
of Conservative Buddhism, notably the Theravāda and the Sarvāsti-
vāda.16 According to them, cognition is not naturally or originally pure,
for it is defiled by passion and karma. If an originally pure and lumi-
nous cognition could be tainted by adventitious defilements, one might
also assume that defilements could become pure by the association with
pure cognition. Thus, in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda it is assumed that
when the connection with desires has been severed, an impure cognition
ceases and gives rise to a new cognition that is free from obstacles.17
Even if the mind is not luminous and pure by nature, it neverthe-
less has been considered to have a latent capacity for paranormal per-
ception. This capacity is cultivated in a negative way, not directly by
increasing the faculty of perceiving, but by eliminating the obstacles to

13
See Jaini, ibid., p. 102.
14
Buddhists, on the other hand, often distinguished between the perfect enlightenment
of the Buddha, which was also equated with omniscience, and the lesser enlighten-
ment of the Arhat, the disciple who differs from the Buddha inasmuch as he/she can
reach enlightenment only with the help of the Buddha or the Buddha’s teachings. Of
course, this lesser enlightenment also consists in an extrasensory perception.
15
Aṅguttara Nikāya III 16-17, quoted in K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge. London 1963: 423.
16
See Étienne Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti : Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. Louvain
1962: 53; André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule. Paris 1955: 67-
68, no. 44.
17
See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Paris/Louvain
1923-1931. Vol. 6: 288.
6 ELI FRANCO

paranormal perception.18 The five obstacles (pañca-nivaraṇa) are cov-

etousness (abhijjhā), ill-will (vyāpāda), sloth and torpor (thina-middha),
restlessness and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca), and skeptical doubt
(vicikicchā). A mind that has become free from these obstacles develops
further by means of practice of tranquility (śamatha-bhāvanā) and con-
centration.
The attainment of extrasensory perception is usually associated
with dhyāna (Pali: jhāna) meditation.19 While dwelling in the state of
the fourth dhyāna one attains what is usually termed abhiññā (Sanskrit:
abhijñā), an early and common Pali term that is the closest equivalent to
“extrasensory perception.” Abhiññā is usually said to have six compo-
nents:20 (1) the knowledge of magical powers (such as making the earth
shake, multiplying oneself, passing through walls, flying, diving into
the earth as if it were water, walking on water, touching the sun and the
moon with one’s hand, etc.), (2) clairaudience (“divine sense of hear-
ing”), (3) telepathy or the knowledge of other minds, (4) recollection of
previous lives, (5) clairvoyance (“divine sense of sight”), and (6)
knowledge of the destruction of the defilements.21
These six capacities have close equivalents in the Pātañjala
Yoga tradition.22 A substantial number of aphorisms in the Yogasūtra

18
An analogy to this type of indirect approach may be found in the Buddhist path; in
this context it is not required that one knows what the Self is, but rather that the em-
pirical constituents of a person are not the Self.
19
For a brief description, see my contribution to this volume.
20
For a classical study on this topic, based mainly on the Pali canon, see Sigurd
Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhiññā. Eine Studie über die klassischen Wunder des Yoga.
Uppsala 1935. For a useful general survey, see Étienne Lamotte, Le traité de la
grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra) avec une étude
sur la Vacuité. Vol. IV. Louvain 1976: 1813-1817. See also the first section of Anne
MacDonald’s paper in this volume.
21
To these six, Jayatilleke (ibid. 439-441) adds another four: another type of telepathic
knowledge and the threefold knowledge (tisso vijjā) attained in enlightenment. The
historical relation between the abhiññās and the threefold knowledge is not entirely
clear. It seems that the latter are included in or elaborated into the former. However,
the first five abhiññās are considered to be mundane, that is, attainable also by non-
Buddhist yogis.
22
I distinguish here between yoga and Yoga: yoga is a technique of gaining control
over the body, senses and mind in order to attain a liberating insight. It is a tech-
nique or a method and as such is not connected to any philosophy or religion in par-
ticular; thus we have Buddhist yoga, Jaina yoga, Vedānta yoga, and so on; Yoga
(capitalized), on the other hand, is used here as the name of a particular philosophi-
 INTRODUCTION 7

(hereafter YS) deal with the supranormal attainments or perfections

(siddhi) of the yogi who has reached an advanced state of meditation.
Among these attainments—which have been a cause of great embar-
rassment to Yoga scholars and practitioners alike23—one also finds spe-
cial forms of knowledge, such as the recollection of past lives, by con-
centrating on traces left by past experience in these lives (YS 3.18),
knowledge of other minds (YS 3.19), knowledge of the time of one’s
own death and that of others (YS 3.22), knowledge of subtle and con-
cealed objects (YS 3.25), knowledge of remote cosmic regions, such as
the world of Brahma and Prajāpati, by meditating on the sun, and
knowledge of the arrangement and movement of the stars by meditating
on the moon and the pole star, respectively (YS 3.26-27), knowledge of
one’s body by concentrating on the navel (YS 3.29), as well as super-
natural sight, hearing, smelling, etc. (YS 3.36). However, yogis do not
only attain such extraordinary forms of knowledge, but also miraculous
powers such as the ability to become invisible (YS 3.21) or strong like
an elephant (YS 3.24), to fly through the air (YS 3.42), to become as
small as an atom, to levitate, to become as large as a mountain or a city,
to stretch one’s body to the point of being able to touch the moon with
one’s finger tips, to dive into the earth as if it were water, to control
material things by causing them to be produced and destroyed, or by
rearranging their parts, and to fulfill one’s wishes (YS 3.45 and com-
mentaries thereon).
The similarity between the siddhis of Yoga and the iddhis and
abhiññās of Conservative Buddhism is not the only point of resem-

cal tradition, closely affiliated with Sāṃkhya, whose foundational text is the Yoga-
sūtra of Patañjali; thus one also refers to it as Pātañjala Yoga. On this tradition,
though not specifically on the siddhis, see Philipp Maas’ contribution to this vol-
ume.
23
On the embarrassed reactions to the descriptions of the siddhis by modern scholars,
see Yohanan Grinshpon, Silence Unheard: Deathly Otherness in Pātañjala-yoga.
Albany 2002: 32-35. It is indeed surprising how often the siddhis are only cursorily
mentioned and neither enumerated nor described (not even by Grinshpon himself or
by Mircea Eliade in his voluminous Yoga, Immortality and Freedom); for an excep-
tion, see Alain Danielou, Yoga. The Method of Re-Integration. Repr. London 1973:
149-157. Danielou lists and describes forty-six attainments: eight physical attain-
ments, thirty subsidiary attainments and eight spiritual attainments. Critical and
skeptical responses to claims of yogic attainments, especially to claims of extraordi-
nary knowledge, were also voiced from within the South Asian tradition. The two
contributions by McCrea and Taber in this volume reproduce these voices well.
8 ELI FRANCO

blance between the two traditions. It is probably not generally well

known to what extent Buddhist scholasticism, especially of the Sarvās-
tivāda School, had a decisive influence on the author(s) of the Yogasū-
tra. A long list of similarities between the sūtras and various Buddhist
doctrines was compiled by Louis de La Vallée Poussin.24 It suffices to
mention a few of them: the four types of concentration (samādhi),
which correspond to the four levels of dhyāna (see YS 1.17); the defini-
tion of God (īśvara) in YS 1.25 as the one in which the seed of omnis-
cience reaches the highest degree (niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam), a defini-
tion that can only be understood in light of Buddhist Mahāyāna teach-
ings (of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha); the four brahmavihāras in YS
1.33; the threefold division of knowledge/wisdom (prajñā) into knowl-
edge that “holds the truth” in contradistinction to knowledge which
arises from study (śruta) or reasoning (anumāna) in YS 1.48-49; the
interpretation of the doctrine of karma (YS 2.12-13, 31, 34, 4.7); the
division of suffering into three kinds in YS 2.15 (pariṇāma-tāpa-
saṃskāra-duḥkha), which is clearly of Buddhist origin; the theory of the
existence of three times (past, present and future) in YS 3.13 and 4.12,
which is a reflection of the corresponding Sarvāstivāda theory; the doc-
trine of knowledge of other minds (paracittajñāna) as knowing only
whether the cognition of another person is good or bad, but without
knowing the object of the cognition (YS 3.20-21); the four perfections
of the body (kāyasampad YS 3.46); and, of course, the five types of
siddhi (YS 4.1), which are either innate, produced by the use of herbs,
by uttering magical syllables (mantra), from the practice of austerities
(tapas), or through the practice of meditation/concentration (samādhi).
Such claims of extraordinary knowledge and supernatural bodily
capacities were presumably not made, at least for the most part, by the
persons to whom they are attributed, the Buddha,25 the Jina or other

24
See Louis de La Vallée Poussin, “Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali.” Mé-
langes chinois et bouddhiques 5 (1936–1937): 223-242. The direction of the influ-
ence is not always clear, but for the most part one can assume a Buddhist influence
on Yoga; Maas dates the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra, which includes the sūtras as well as
the earliest commentary, to a time span reaching from 325 to 425 CE (see p. 268 be-
low), a period in which Buddhism was philosophically dominant in South Asia. In-
dividual sūtras, however, may be of considerably earlier date.
25
In canonical Buddhism the stance towards omniscience is ambiguous. The Buddha
is reported to have said that actual omniscience, that is, knowing all things at once,
is impossible; thus other religions, notably Jainism, are criticized on this account.
 INTRODUCTION 9

accomplished yogis, but by their pious followers.26 They are primarily

due, I assume, to the natural propensity to aggrandize one’s teachers,
and even more so, the mythical founder of one’s tradition. Yet the cru-
cial question remains: Is meditation a suitable means for gaining knowl-
edge, especially knowledge that is not attainable otherwise? Some are
of the opinion that in India all philosophical theories arose directly or
indirectly from meditative experiences. Sweeping formulations such as
“In India philosophy is the rational interpretation of mystical experi-
ence” (Constantin Regamey) are plainly absurd, but even more careful
formulations are highly problematic, as I argue in my paper in the pre-
sent volume. One has to distinguish here between theory and practice:
In theory, the Buddha, the Jina and many others, although certainly not
all founders of traditions,27 gained their deep insights into the nature of
reality while absorbed in meditation, but in practice we see that also in
India metaphysical theories were conceived and developed—is this
really surprising?—by philosophers philosophizing. The same is true in
the case of the Tibetan tradition. As Dorji Wangchuk points out in his
paper in this volume, new philosophical theories in Tibet were mainly
created in an attempt to resolve contradictions and inconsistencies
found in the heterogeneous Buddhist scriptures.
For the traditional practicing yogis, such as the followers of the
Buddha and the Jina, the question of gaining new knowledge through
meditation usually does not arise, at least not theoretically. For them
there is nothing new to discover in the course of their meditation; the
objective of meditation is to gain deeper understanding of the truths
handed down by the tradition. The threefold sequence of study, reflec-
tion and meditation that is prescribed for Buddhist practitioners, briefly
described by Vincent Eltschinger in this volume, means that one studies

However, potential omniscience, i.e., that there is no part of reality that one cannot
grasp, is admitted. See Jayatilleke [as in n. 15]: 203-204. After the second century
CE, omniscience came to be regarded as an essential property of being a Buddha.
On the various terms used to designate the omniscience of the Buddha with special
reference to the Yogācāra tradition, see Paul Griffiths, Omniscience in the
Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and its Commentaries. Indo-Iranian Journal 33 (1990): 85-
120, especially pp. 88-89.
26
Grinshpon, ibid.: 60, however, suggests that the doctrine of siddhis may be based on
near-death experiences.
27
Notable exceptions are traditions like the Sāṃkhya, Yoga or Nyāya, which attribute
their beginnings to the original visions of certain Rishis.
10 ELI FRANCO

the teachings of the Buddha, reflects on them with rational means, and
then meditates on these same teachings. Similar procedures are well
known in the Hindu traditions and are closely associated with Yoga and
Vedānta. Although it is assumed that the knowledge attained in medita-
tion is deeper and more certain than the knowledge attained by rational
means, it is not really a different knowledge. Moreover, the teachings
provide the structure and/or the basis for the interpretation of experi-
ences in meditation. Accordingly, there is not much room for “new”
experiences. Indeed, it would have been presumptuous for a traditional
yogi to claim that s/he had attained new knowledge. And in addition, if
a yogi would have claimed that he had discovered something new that is
at odds with what was discovered by the founder of his tradition (the
Buddha, etc.), he would have risked being ostracized as a heretic by his
community.28
In other words, the traditional view about the results of medita-
tion can be summarized with the phrase: You should not get out what
you did not put in. What one gets out should conform, at least in its
broad outlines, to previously established teachings. And this conception
is hardly surprising in the context of a traditional society that believes
that perfect knowledge was already attained in the past and may only
have diminished in the present.
The perspective changes, of course, when one considers the
great founders of traditions like Buddhism. By definition, a Buddha is
someone who reaches enlightenment by himself; unlike the later Bud-
dhist disciples, a Buddha does not have another Buddha to guide him. In
his case, meditation must impart new knowledge, be it only newly dis-
covered long forgotten knowledge.29 Consequently, the Buddha’s claim
to knowledge cannot be grounded in any tradition. Therefore, the ques-
tion arises: Can the original insights of the meditating Buddha be veri-
fied by independent means? We may be caught here in the Mīmāṃsā
dilemma, ably represented by McCrea and Taber in their contributions
below: If these insights cannot be verified, why should they be ac-
28
Accordingly, when defining yogic perception, the Buddhist philosophers limit the
scope of such perception to the teachings of the Buddha; on this point, see my paper
below p. 122.
29
According to the Buddhist tradition, there were an infinite number of Buddhas in the
past, each discovering the Buddhist teachings anew. Similar notions are found in the
Hindu tradition, for knowledge disappears partly or completely during cosmic disso-
lution and has to be regained after each new creation.
 INTRODUCTION 11

cepted? If they can be verified, we do not need them; whatever they tell
us can be known from other sources.
From a modern perspective, most of us, I assume, would adopt
the position of the Mīmāṃsakas: Theories about the world gained from
meditative practice are either uncertain or superfluous. For most of us,
the external world is whatever the natural sciences say it is.30 And if a
theory realized in the course of meditation happens to agree with what
they say, this is interesting and all the better, and if it does not, all the
worse—for the theory, not for the natural sciences.
Incredulity towards the veracity of meditative visions was also
felt within the Buddhist tradition. To repeat an example given by
Wangchuk in his contribution, how is one to make sense of statements
that in just a single atom there exist Buddha fields corresponding in
number to the total number of atoms in the universe? The most elabo-
rate attempt to establish the validity of the teaching of the Buddha was
undertaken by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660?) and
his followers. According to them, the teachings of the Buddha can be
divided into a main part and secondary parts; the main part, which is
identified as the four noble truths and the doctrine of Non-Self (anāt-
man), is independently verifiable, in principle by anybody, by means of
perception and inference.31 Visions of the Buddha fields and other mira-
cles32 would presumably have to be relegated to the secondary and non-
essential parts of the Buddha’s teachings, be interpreted as only didacti-
cally useful, or not be accepted at all as being a genuine part of the
teaching. The fact that certain teachings are secondary does not imply
that they are false, but only that they need not be independently estab-
lished and defended against external criticism. Dharmakīrti did believe
in the possibility of extrasensory perception, but such perception, he

30
Or, in fact, after Popper and Kuhn not even that; physical theories are no longer
considered to be “true,” but only “approximations” (that lead periodically to para-
digmatic changes) to a reality, which can never be known.
31
There are an increasing number of studies on this topic; for a relatively recent dis-
cussion, see John Dunne, Foundation of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Somerville
2004: 223-252.
32
On the complex and ambivalent stance towards miracles in Buddhism, see Phyllis
Granoff, “The Ambiguity of Miracles. Buddhist Understandings of Supernatural
Power.” East and West 46 (1996): 79-96. For a remarkable study of miracles em-
ployed by the Buddha to convert various beings, which combines Buddhist philol-
ogy with art history, see Monika Zin, Mitleid und Wunderkraft. Wiesbaden 2006.
12 ELI FRANCO

thought, could only be utilized towards relatively minor aims such as

the neutralization of the poison of snakes, not towards soteriological
aims.33 Although Dharmakīrti was arguably the most important Bud-
dhist philosopher of South Asia, it is hard to say whether this opinion
was widely accepted in Buddhist circles. It was obviously formulated in
a period when Buddhism was under pressure from powerful philosophi-
cal criticism and suffering from dwindling political support.
Due to the encounter of Tibetan Buddhism with Western civili-
zation in the second half of the 20th century, this Buddhist tradition
seems to be slowly undergoing the process of coming to terms with
natural sciences that the Catholic Church has been going through during
the last centuries.34 Certain statements of the Dalai Lama, at least when
addressing a Western audience,35 indicate remarkable openness and
readiness to accept the world view of modern physics36 at the expense
of Buddhist cosmology.37 Similar processes are occurring in Theravāda
33
See Eltschinger, Dharmakīrti sur les mantra et la perception du supra-sensible.
Vienna 2001: 109-114.
34
That this process is far from being completed is clear from recent debates on intelli-
gent design.
35
See Thupten Jinpa, Science as an Ally or a Rival Philosophy? Tibetan Buddhist
Thinkers’ Engagement with Modern Science. In: B. Allan Wallace (ed.), Buddhism
and Science. New York 2003: 71-85, p. 79: “Unfortunately, so far no written work
in Tibetan from the Dalai Lama has been published that articulates his views on the
potential areas of engagement between Buddhist thought and science.”
36
One of the main purposes of the “Mind and Life” conferences is to provide a “high-
level tutorial for the Dalai Lama” in quantum mechanics. We are told, for instance,
that (http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/3186) the “Dalai Lama did not have
a problem with photons having both particle and wave-like properties, but was re-
luctant to accept that individual quantum events are random. For example, he re-
fused to accept that we cannot know which path a photon takes in a two-path quan-
tum interference experiment.” It is also remarkable that the Dalai Lama is now re-
portedly supporting the study of physics being part of the instruction at all Buddhist
monasteries. See also Arthur Zajonc (ed.), The New Physics and Cosmology. Dia-
logues with the Dalai Lama. Oxford 2004.
37
See http://www.dalailama.com/page.163.htm: “I [viz., the Dalai Lama] have often
remarked to my Buddhist colleagues that the empirically verified insights of modern
cosmology and astronomy must compel us now to modify, or in some cases reject,
many aspects of traditional cosmology as found in ancient Buddhist texts.” Further-
more (ibid): “[I]n the Buddhist investigation of reality, at least in principle, empiri-
cal evidence should triumph over scriptural authority, no matter how deeply vener-
ated a scripture may be.” See also The Dalai Lama, The Way to Freedom. San Fran-
cisco 1994: 73, quoted in Donald S. Lopez Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-La. Chicago
 INTRODUCTION 13

Buddhism and in Japanese Buddhism, though in a less conspicuous

manner, for other Buddhist traditions lack a central authoritative figure
like the Dalai Lama. It is not difficult to notice that Buddhism (espe-
cially, but not only Tibetan Buddhism) is repositioning itself as a ra-
tional and empirical cognitive science, a science of the mind based on
introspection and meditation, supplemented by altruistic ethics. Cos-
mology, if mentioned at all, is relegated to the background, and just as
in Dharmakīrti’s argument, presented as unessential. Typical for this
trend is Matthieu Ricard, who has become one of the most prominent
figures representing Tibetan Buddhism in intercultural and interdisci-
plinary dialogues. According to Ricard, Buddhism is different from all
other religions because it does not require an act of faith, and it could
better be designated a science of the mind than a religion.38
A most extreme, almost belligerent form of this discourse, pe-
culiar and displaying a surprising ignorance of the Buddhist tradition,

1999: 186: “The purpose of the Buddha coming to this world was not to measure the
circumference of the world and the distance between the earth and the moon, but
rather to teach the Dharma, to liberate sentient beings, to relieve sentient beings of
their sufferings.” Dharmakīrti’s statement (Pramāṇavārttika 2.33) that the Buddha’s
absolute knowledge of the number of insects on the earth is of no use to us has not
lost its relevance.
38
See Wolf Singer, Matthieu Ricard, and Susanne Wasmuth, Hirnforschung und
Meditation. Ein Dialog. Frankfurt am Main 2008:10: “[Buddhismus] … erfordert
keine Glaubensakte. Man könnte den Buddhismus vielmehr als eine Wissenschaft
des Geistes und einen Weg zur Transformation bezeichnen.” The rational and em-
pirical image of Buddhism is clearly belied by studies of traditional Buddhist socie-
ties; for just one example among many, see B.J. Terwiel, Monks and Magic. Bang-
kok 1994.
For a recent insightful and informative study (with an incongruously Maimonidian
subtitle) of the relationship between Buddhism and Western science in the last hun-
dred and fifty years, see Donald S. Lopez Jr., Buddhism and Science. A Guide for the
Perplexed. Chicago/London 2008. Lopez notes that in order to spread across Asia,
Buddhism assimilated the Vedic gods, the Tibetan “protectors of the snowy peaks,”
and the Japanese kami; he then raises the question: “In order for Buddhism to estab-
lish itself in Europe and America, must the God of the West, the God of Science,
also find its place in the Buddhist pantheon?” I believe that this is unlikely. Despite
the political correctness and mutual respect that accompany the numerous attempts
at rapprochement between Buddhism and science, defensive and apologetic under-
tones are clearly discernable throughout, even in the eloquent discourses of someone
like Ricard. A more appropriate metaphor than the assimilation of the God of Sci-
ence might be that of seamen caught in a shipwreck throwing overboard what is dis-
pensable in order to safeguard the essential.
14 ELI FRANCO

has been propounded by B. Allan Wallace. Wallace, who attempts to

apply the vocabulary of philosophy of science to Buddhism, claims that
Buddhism “posits testable hypotheses” about the nature of the mind and
its relation to the physical environment, and that Buddhist theories
“have allegedly been tested and experientially confirmed numerous
times over the past twenty-five hundred years, by means of duplicative
meditative techniques.”39 Further, “Buddhist insights into the nature of
the mind and consciousness are presented as genuine discoveries in the
scientific sense of the term: they can be replicated by any competent
researcher with sufficient prior training.”40
The distinctions and characterizations put forward by Ricard,
Wallace and others are historically doubtful, for Buddhism had neither a
scientific character—certainly not in the sense of “science” when ap-
plied to modern physics—nor was its scope limited to the mind. Bud-
dhism had its own theories of matter in order to account for all elements
of existence (dharmas). Nevertheless such new interpretations of Bud-

39
See Wallace 2003 [as in n. 35]: 7. The alleged experiential confirmation of Buddhist
theories would be, in my opinion, closer to the experiential confirmation of witch-
craft and divination (described in many ethnological studies such as of the Azande
by Edward Evans-Pritchard) than to a confirmation of an experiment in modern
physics or the cognitive sciences. In a similar vein, Wallace claims that “many Bud-
dhist theories are obviously the expression of rational public discourse” (p. 5), but
his idea of rationality remains a mystery to me. Wallace is hostile to the academic
study of Buddhism, whose scholars he describes as “scholars who spent their time
reading other people’s books and writing their own books about other people’s
books.” He considers their lack of contemplative experiences as introducing “a glar-
ing bias into modern academic Buddhist scholarship” (p. 7). Most scholars of Bud-
dhism, he says, take “an Orientalist approach” and the study of Buddhism in West-
ern academia is labeled “commonly unscientific” (p. 7). With such a cavalier ap-
proach, it is not entirely surprising that Wallace occasionally commits serious blun-
ders such as mistaking “the attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) for “a pri-
mary goal of Buddhist meditation” (p. 7). In fact, this meditation is not a part of the
Buddhist path to salvation and may be considered a meditative luxury.
Wallace quotes approvingly (p. 4) from Richard King’s Orientalism and Religion
and seems to subscribe to the tenet that “pure” and “authentic” Buddhism is located
in the experiences, lives and actions of living Buddhists in Asia and not in Buddhist
texts, or as King calls them, “the edited manuscripts and translations carried out un-
der the aegis of Western Orientalists.” Given that the vast majority of Buddhist tra-
ditions have not survived to the present day (Bareau discusses more than thirty
“sects” for Conservative Buddhism alone), this approach, if followed, would se-
verely limit and impoverish the scope of Buddhist studies.
40
See Wallace 2003 [as in n. 35]: 8-9.
 INTRODUCTION 15

dhism can be useful. Even though most scholars, myself included, are
not looking at meditation as a source of knowledge of the external
world, it may certainly be a source of knowledge in areas where the
enhancement of concentration and memory may tell us something new
and significant about ourselves. If rebirth is possible, and there is a con-
siderable body of evidence in favor of this hypothesis41—but then the
same can be said of miracles—meditation may perhaps be the means of
awakening recollections from past lives. The study of meditation itself
is not only crucial to the understanding of South Asian and Buddhist
culture, but can also be employed in areas where introspection is called
for, for instance in the study of the mind (as mind, and not as brain). It
is not surprising, therefore, that the academic fields where meditative
techniques have been studied and used best are psychology and psycho-
therapy. This is demonstrated by the papers in this volume by Michael
M. DelMonte, Renaud van Quekelberghe and Shulamith Kreitler.
It became clear already in early stages of the project that yogic
perception is an ideal topic for interdisciplinary study. The present vol-
ume is the outcome of an attempt to initiate such a study, a study that
centers on consciousness, body, mind and health, and that binds to-
gether such disparate disciplines as Buddhist and Tibetan studies, reli-
gious studies, philosophy and the history of philosophy, anthropology
and psychology.
One of the best available means of promoting cross-disciplinary
studies are interdisciplinary symposia. They offer the participants the
occasion to present the results of their research to a sympathetic and
interested audience of scholars who work on similar topics in other dis-
ciplines; it creates a general framework for dialogue, and not of lesser
importance, lets scholars and scientists experience their limitations.
After the initial difficulty of getting accustomed to new terminology,
new sets of questions, and new approaches, which initially makes com-
munication seem impossible, one slowly comes to the realization that
what other disciplines have to say is not only relevant, but greatly moti-

41
See Ian Stevenson, Cases of Reincarnation Type. 4 Vols. Charlottesville 1975-1983;
European Cases of Reincarnation Type. Jefferson 2003; Satwant Pasricha, Claims of
Reincarnation: An Empirical Study of Cases in India. Delhi 1990; Jim Tucker, Life
Before Life: A Scientific Investigation of Children's Memories of Previous Lives.
New York 2005.
16 ELI FRANCO

vating and inspiring. This, we hope, will also be the experience of the
reader.
In the following, we present the program of a conference of this
type that was organized by Dagmar Eigner, Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and
myself at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia
of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in June 2006, and summarize
those papers given at this conference that constitute the body of this
volume. Some of them are of course significantly longer, modified ver-
sions of the talks that were presented.

PROGRAM
Tuesday, 27 June 2006

9:00 Welcome
Ernst Steinkellner, Director, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual
History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences

Opening address
Eli Franco, Director, Institute for Indology and Central Asian Stud-
ies, University of Leipzig; Dagmar Eigner, Institute for the History of
Medicine, Medical University of Vienna

9:30 John Taber, University of New Mexico

Infinity in All Directions

10:15 Lawrence McCrea, Harvard University

“Just Like Us, Just Like Now”: The Tactical Implications of the
Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception

11:30 Orna Almogi, University of Hamburg

The Physicality and Immanence of Gnosis in rDzogs-chen

12:15 Dorji Wangchuk, University of Hamburg

A Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity of Perception in Indo-
Tibetan Buddhism
 INTRODUCTION 17

15:00 Vincent Eltschinger, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual

History of Asia
Dharmakīrti on the Career and Cognition of Yogins

15:45 Eli Franco, University of Leipzig

Meditation and Metaphysics: On Their Correspondence and Mutual
Interaction in South Asian Buddhism

17:00 Anne MacDonald, University of Vienna

Seeing in Not Seeing: The Madhyamaka Experience

Wednesday, 28 June 2006

9:30 Karl Baier, University of Vienna

Meditation and Contemplation: Late Medieval to Early Modern
Europe

10:15 Marion Rastelli, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual His-
tory of Asia
Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him: Yogic Perception and Its
Implications in the Tradition of Pāñcarātra

11:30 Yohanan Grinshpon, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The Serpent and the Void: Kundalini and Empty Consciousness in
Tantric Yoga

12:15 Elizabeth De Michelis, University of Cambridge

What do Haṭhayogins Perceive? Dhyāna (meditation), samādhi (en-
stasy) and the Manipulation of Mind, Senses and Sense-organs (manas,
citta, indriya) in Selected Classical and Modern haṭhayoga Texts

15:00 Philipp A. Maas, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual

History of Asia
Mental Processes, Direct Perception, and [Meditative] Concentration
(samādhi / māpatti) in Classical Sāṃkhya Yoga
18 ELI FRANCO

15:45 Marcus Schmücker, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual

History of Asia
Between God’s Cognition and Normal Perception: Yogic Perception
According to the Later Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

17:00 Oded Maimon, Tel Aviv University

Consciousness Phases According to Experience with Eastern Phi-
losophies

Thursday, 29 June 2006

9:30 Dietrich Ebert, University of Düsseldorf and University

of Leipzig
Physiological Correlatives of Dharana and Their Meaning

10:15 John Baker, Moorpark College, California

Psychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness: Some Biocultural Con-
siderations

11:30 Diana Riboli, Panteio University, Athens

Shamans and Transformation

14:00 Dagmar Eigner, Medical University of Vienna

Transformation of Consciousness through Suffering, Devotion, and
Meditation

14:45 Shulamith Kreitler, Tel Aviv University

Altered States of Consciousness as Structural and Functional Varia-
tions of the Cognitive System

Friday, 30 June, 2006

9:30 Renaud van Quekelberghe, University of Koblenz-Landau

Mindfulness and Psychotherapy: The Revival of Indian Meditative
Traditions within Modern Psychology, Psychotherapy and Medicine

10:15 Urs Rüegg, University of Vienna

 INTRODUCTION 19

Psychotherapy and Altered States of Consciousness: Which Scien-

tific Concept is Helpful?

11:00 Günther Fleck, University of Vienna

The Consciousness Disciplines and Knowledge Production: An Epis-
temological Account

12:15 Michael M. DelMonte, St. Patrick’s Hospital, Dublin

Empty Thy Mind and Come to Thy Senses: A De-constructive Path
to Inner Peace

15:00 Discussion

SUMMARIES

Part I: Yogic Perception in the South Asian and Tibetan Traditions

Of the above twenty-three lectures, seventeen could be collected in the

present volume. The following brief summaries of the papers accompa-
nied by short comments are designed to help the reader to navigate
through the presented terrain. In Indian philosophical texts, there are
often two protagonists, an opponent and a proponent, with the opponent
always speaking first (so that the proponent can have the last word). We
will follow this fine procedure here and begin with two papers that pre-
sent some of the most powerful objections to and criticism of yogic
perception that were articulated in the Indian tradition. The Mīmāṃsā
tradition is often labeled as the most orthodox of all Indian philosophi-
cal traditions. Yet this tradition rejects with vehemence some of the
most distinctive tenets that one associates with Hinduism, notably, the
existence of God,42 the cyclical dissolution and re-emergence of the

42
While the Mīmāṃsā does not reject the existence of deities who might play the role
of recipients in sacrifices, the existence of an omnipotent or omniscient God, like
Śiva or Viṣṇu, to whom the creation of the world, the composition of the Veda or a
decisive influence on the human lot may be attributed, is vigorously rejected.
20 ELI FRANCO

cosmos, the ideal of liberation (mokṣa, nirvāṇa and similar expres-

sions)43 and—what concerns us here—yogic perception.
In “‘Just Like Us, Just Like Now’: The Tactical Implications
of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception,” Larry McCrea shows
why the Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumārila (7th c. CE) considered the
very possibility of yogic perception a serious threat to the validity of the
Vedic tradition. He presents Kumārila’s arguments succinctly and
clearly and explains the context in which they were raised. The main
concern of the Mīmāṃsā is to demonstrate that the Vedas (“the oldest
sacred texts of Hinduism”) are the only source for knowing dharma.44
Thus, it is not yogic perception as such, but its potential as a source for
knowing the dharma that makes the Mīmāṃsakas fervently oppose it.
To begin with, even if a yogi such as the Buddha could indeed
perceive truths that are beyond the range of perception of ordinary peo-
ple, this would be useless for them. There is, as McCrea puts it, “an
unbridgeable epistemic divide” (p. 58) between yogis and ordinary peo-
ple. Thus an ordinary person can never know who is a genuine yogi and
who is a quack or a swindler. “It takes one to know one.” On the other
hand, if the statements of a yogi could be confirmed by ordinary means,
they would be superfluous.45
At any given time, people as a rule lie. One cannot trust them
today, and in the past they were equally unreliable. The constancy of
behavior between past and present individuals, past and present socie-
ties, is one of the most characteristic assumptions of Kumārila. The
same consistency or uniformity in the perceptual capacity of ordinary
people is assumed to have existed throughout the ages. It is clear that
people’s capacities can have quantitative differences: some people may
be able to see objects that are far away or very small, objects that an-

43
This human aim is absent in the early Mīmāṃsā texts, but was introduced in those
written after the 6th century CE.
44
Dharma is narrowly interpreted by the Mīmāṃsā as characterized by an injunction
to perform a sacrifice. It is a far cry from dharma referring to moral or meritorious
action; see Wilhelm Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection. Albany 1991, especially
chapter 4: Vedic Apologetics, Ritual Killing, and the Foundation of Ethics.
45
This criticism is reminiscent of a famous argument against the validity of infer-
ences: inferences are either not established or they prove what has already been
proved: sāmānye siddhasādhyatā, viśeṣe ‘nugamabhāvaḥ.
 INTRODUCTION 21

other person cannot see, but there is no radical or qualitative difference

between what all people see: colors are seen and not heard.46
A common move to substantiate the reliability of a person, be
it a yogi like the Buddha or a God like Śiva, relies on his self-identity. If
the Buddha’s statements about matters that can be examined by ordi-
nary people (say, about medicine and healing) are invariably confirmed
to be true, one may trust his statements about other matters as well (for
instance, about karma and past lives). If the mantras revealed by Śiva
that are applicable to everyday life function well (for instance, bring
wealth to their user), one may assume that his other mantras function
equally well.
As Kumārila makes clear, an argument in this form is patently
false. The fact that someone is reliable in area A does not imply that he
is reliable in area B, especially when area B is beyond the reach of ordi-
nary people. Would we accept metaphysical speculations about God
because they are put forth by a physicist who has been proven reliable
in physics?
Kumārila also emphasizes the plurality of yogic visions and
the ensuing contradictions. If the cognition of our yogis contradicts that
of your yogis, whom shall we trust? In fact, no yogi can be trusted.
Unless one possesses such knowledge oneself, one is unable to judge
whether another person knows things beyond the reach of the senses.
Any other standard opens the way to frauds or even honest but delu-
sional people claiming knowledge about extrasensory objects they do
not possess.47
Probably in response to Kumārila, later Buddhist and Hindu
writers who attempted to establish religious authority put a strong em-
phasis on the speaker’s motivation. It is not enough that one knows the
truth; one also has to have a positive motivation to communicate that
truth (this motivation is usually identified with compassion towards
living beings and the ensuing wish to help them) and a lack of motiva-

46
Actually there are people who do hear colors, as anyone with synaesthesia (appar-
ently one out of every thousand people) or anyone who has had a psychedelic ex-
perience would know.
47
In the last part of McCrea’s paper, which I do not summarize here, he briefly pre-
sents Kumārila’s positive arguments for the reliability and eternity of the Veda. It
would be an interesting exercise to check whether the arguments about the impossi-
bility of knowing whether a person is omniscient might not be applied to the impos-
sibility of knowing that the Veda is eternal.
22 ELI FRANCO

tion to lie. Unlike Kumārila, who states that people usually lie, the Bud-
dhist philosopher Dharmakīrti maintains that people tell the truth unless
they have a motive for lying, and he further argues that the Buddha has
no such motive because he has nothing to gain from lying to us.48 Al-
though the aspect of motivation and compassion of the speaker can be
found prior to Kumārila in discussions about religious authority and
reliability (e.g., in the Nyāyabhāṣya), this aspect does not seem to have
been emphasized before his time.
However, even if one can be sure that the Buddha had no mo-
tivation for lying to his disciples, it is possible that he was deluding
himself. Dharmakīrti counters this objection by maintaining that the
major part of the Buddha’s teaching is not about objects beyond the
reach of the ordinary perception and inference, but is about objects that
are independently verifiable. So even if the Buddha were wrong about
non-empirical matters such as karma,49 this would hardly matter as long
as he is verifiably right about the phenomenon of suffering, its cause,
and the way to remove this cause. Similarly, he may or may not be liter-
ally omniscient, but even if he isn’t, this hardly matters as long as he
knows everything there is to know about how to stop suffering. As
Dharmakīrti somewhat sarcastically puts it: we don’t care whether the
Buddha knows the number of worms in the world.
John Taber’s paper, “Yoga and our Epistemic Predicament,”
covers partly the same ground as McCrea’s, but it is wider in scope. It
begins with the question whether yogic experience is at all possible and
investigates the epistemic conditions that would allow one to answer the
question affirmatively. What matters to Taber is not whether such ex-
periences are subjectively possible, but whether they are true. In other
words, whether there can be a means for new knowledge, especially of

48
See Pramāṇavārttika 2.145b: vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam. “He [The Buddha] does not
tell a lie because [this would] be fruitless.” This verse is edited and translated in
Tilmann Vetter, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika. Vi-
enna 1990: 52.
49
Although karma is one of the causes of rebirth, Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects the
possibility of eradicating karma in order to stop rebirth. As long as one lives, one
continuously produces new karma and thus, the complete elimination of karma is
never possible. The only way to stop rebirth is to eliminate desire, as is stated in the
four noble truths.
 INTRODUCTION 23

objects that are traditionally associated with yogic perception, such as

past and future objects,50 or indeed of all objects.
Historians of Buddhism and Indian philosophy, as well as
scholars of religion, usually disregard the question of truth in many
facets of their studies, not only with regard to yogic perception.51 Yogic
perceptions, however, are important because the belief in them played
such an important role in various societies and cultures. It is for this
reason that Taber is not content with leaving the question of truth aside
(p. 72):
“Surely it is of the utmost significance if a particular society or
culture attributes value to, and invests considerable cultural energy and
resources in, something that is, at basis, an illusion—just as it would be
if a particular person were to build his life around a belief that is pat-
ently false, say, a belief in the existence of some imaginary being. We
would immediately suspect that some pathology is at work, distorting
that society’s collective perception of reality.”
Taber approaches the question of truth by examining a ques-
tion that was debated over centuries in Classical India, the famous de-
bate between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists (beginning in the 7th
century and lasting until Buddhism had practically disappeared from the
Subcontinent around the 12th century).52 Interestingly, for the most part
the debate was not whether a particular person (such as the Buddha or
the Jina) had acquired the right knowledge about what ultimately must
be done and avoided, but about the very possibility of a human being
acquiring such knowledge. A presupposition shared by all parties in the
debate was that if such knowledge is at all possible, it would be ac-
quired by yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa), for that is the only type of
perception whose scope can go beyond the present. So who won this
debate? Taber concentrates on the Proof of an Omniscient Person by the

50
Seeing past and future objects is counted by the Yogasūtra as one of the accom-
plishments (siddhi), i.e. the supernatural powers that the true yogi possesses; see
Yogasūtra 3.16.
51
The factoring out of the question of truth is not specific to Buddhist or Hindu stud-
ies, but is typical for religious studies in general. See Johann Figl, “Wahrheit der
Religionen. Ein Problem der neueren Religionswissenschaft und der Religionsphä-
nomenologie.” In: Gerhard Oberhammer and Marcus Schmücker (eds.), Glaubens-
gewissheit und Wahrheit in religiöser Tradition. Vienna 2008: 81-99.
52
The debate began in earnest with Kumārila in the 7th century and continued till the
11th century in the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.
24 ELI FRANCO

Buddhist philosopher Ratnakīrti (ca. 990-1050), who represents the last

phase of Buddhist philosophy in South Asia.
Taber compares the attribution of yogic perception to the Bud-
dha to the attribution of miracles to Jesus. In both cases the credibility
of the testimony must be weighed against that which speaks against it,
e.g., witnesses being few, of doubtful character or having a vested inter-
est in what they affirm. However, above all the credibility of the testi-
mony has to be weighed against the improbability of the fact to which it
testifies (p. 77-78).
Can one show that yogic perception is not a miracle, that it
does not violate the laws of nature? Yogic perception qua perception
has to have two qualities: it has to be free of conceptual construction (or
be vivid) and has to be non-erroneous. Concerning the first characteris-
tic, it seems impossible to transform conceptual teachings like the four
noble truths into a vivid visual image, no matter how long one meditates
on them. In establishing the first characteristic, Ratnakīrti explains that
one should not consider perception, as has been traditionally done, to be
an awareness that is somehow related to the senses. Rather perception is
nothing but an immediate awareness, and such awareness is not limited
to sense data.53
Yet even if we grant that long, intense and uninterrupted medi-
tation causes objects of cognition to appear with such clarity or vivid-
ness as if they stood before one’s eyes, the question of their veracity
remains open. However, as far as I can see, Ratnakīrti does not elabo-
rate on this issue, probably because he follows Dharmakīrti’s assump-
tion that the Buddha’s main teaching and his reliability are provable by
ordinary means of knowledge. Only towards the very end of his treatise
does he attempt to prove genuine omniscience, without, I suspect, being
entirely convinced of his own proof.
Taber concludes his investigation with the failure of the Bud-
dhists to prove the possibility of omniscience. Of course, the impossibil-
ity of omniscience remains equally improvable. This, however, is hardly
53
In this, Ratnakīrti follows his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra, who follows in turn an original
development by Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750-810). The latter identified perception with
immediate awareness (sākṣātkaraṇa) and consequently claimed that even inference
can be perception; see Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or
Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pra-
māṇavārtikam). Patna, 1953: 111.20: tasmād anumānam api sarvākārasākṣātkara-
ṇapravṛttaṃ pratyakṣam eva.
 INTRODUCTION 25

surprising, for practically no philosophical tenet can be proved. The

question Taber raises next is crucial, namely, how to deal with the fact
that yogic perceptions are widely, even cross-culturally, reported.
Should one simply investigate such phenomena and put aside the ques-
tion of their veracity? This is, in fact, the common practice in religious
studies (as an academic discipline), no matter which culture or which
religion forms the object of investigation. One may attempt to deter-
mine what is actually being said, what impact it has on a given culture,
what function it fulfils in society, and so on without asking whether it is
true, or even assuming it is untrue. But this is not the path Taber pro-
poses to take. If societies and traditions are inherently healthy and ra-
tional, they cannot be based on falsehoods or on the thin theoretical
possibility that that yogic perception is not impossible. Yet we must
continue to collect data and keep our minds open, and we must be will-
ing to consider yogic perception at its face value. For the time being,
however, as long as our theory of nature cannot accommodate yogic
perception, it will remain deeply problematic.
Eli Franco’s paper, “Meditation and Metaphysics,” has a dif-
ferent concern altogether, but it may still belong to the pūrvapakṣa of
this volume inasmuch as it challenges the role attributed to yogic per-
ception in shaping Buddhist philosophy. The notion that Buddhist phi-
losophy arose from meditation has been widespread among scholars of
Indian philosophy. Sweeping formulations of this idea, such as by Con-
stantin Regamey or Edward Conze, are clearly wrong and need not be
further examined. However, even more careful and qualified formula-
tions, such as that by Lambert Schmithausen, remain in the final analy-
sis improvable and questionable. Schmithausen is, to the best of our
knowledge, the only scholar who has not just pronounced this idea, but
who has seriously attempted to prove it on the basis of rigorous philol-
ogical analysis. Thus, his work deservedly forms the focus of the atten-
tion here. Franco examines this hypothesis in some detail and provides
thereby a bird’s-eye view of most if not all the important philosophical
theories in South Asian Buddhism. He argues that the relation between
meditation and metaphysics in Buddhism cannot be reduced to a single
model. In the final analysis, one cannot avoid the conclusion that certain
philosophical theories (which are described in the paper) arose from
meditative experiences and certain others did not, and that the origin of
still others cannot be determined, in which case it seems preferable to
26 ELI FRANCO

suspend judgment. This conclusion may seem trivial and obvious, but it
goes against the mainstream in Buddhist studies.
Anne MacDonald’s contribution, “Knowing Nothing: Can-
drakīrti and Yogic Perception,” deals with the topic of yogic perception
in the Madhyamaka tradition, one of the major schools of Mahāyāna
Buddhism that had a profound influence both on Indian and Chinese
Buddhism and is alive in the Tibetan tradition until the present day.
While focusing on the objectless meditation on emptiness (śūnyatā), she
also provides a succinct introduction to Madhyamaka philosophy in
general. Nāgārjuna (2nd-3rd c. CE), the founder of the Madhyamaka tra-
dition, said practically nothing on meditation or yogic perception in his
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās. His main concern there was to disprove the
existence of the elements of existence (dharma) as postulated in various
metaphysical theories of Conservative Buddhism. To understand the
Madhyamaka stance on yogic perception and related issues it is infor-
mative to turn to other works by Nāgārjuna and to his influential com-
mentator Candrakīrti (600-650 CE). MacDonald notes that the super-
natural capacities of knowledge (abhijñā)54 are barely mentioned in
Candrakīrti’s writings owing to their negligible soteriological role.
Candrakīrti’s interest in supramundane knowledge lies in an insight into
the nature of reality that facilitates the break out of the “jail of
saṃsāra.” This he equates not with an insight into the four noble truths,
but into the emptiness or unreality of all things.
Thus, the questions arise: How can one escape from something
that is not real? And is nirvāṇa as unreal and as non-existent as
saṃsāra? The Mādhyamikas reject the four possible views: that nirvāṇa
exists, that it does not exist, that it both exists and does not exist, or
neither. The thorough knowing (parijñā) of the non-existence of both
existence and non-existence is, according to the Mādhyamikas, power-
ful enough to release one from the bonds of saṃsāra. Candrakīrti
equates this knowing with non-perception of existence and non-
existence: When the yogi remains without an apprehension of any of the
things accepted by others as existing or non-existing, the object of his
thorough knowledge is different from and excludes all phenomenal enti-
ties. The true nature of dependently originated phenomena, MacDonald
contends (p. 145), should be understood as the “Mādhyamika’s onto-

54
See p. 6 above.
 INTRODUCTION 27

logical nirvāṇa.” The knowing of this nature, sometimes referred to as

knowing the “thusness” (tattva) of things, is the knowing without object
that the yogi cultivates in the meditative state. Later Mādhyamikas such
as Kamalaśīla (740-795), who was heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti
and the epistemological tradition (discussed in Eltschinger’s paper in
this volume), interpreted this knowledge as cognition apprehending
nothing but itself (svasaṃvedana). However, this interpretation would
not have been acceptable to Candrakīrti.
In the course of a debate with a Realist opponent who claims
that the object confers its form to consciousness, Candrakīrti points out
that consciousness of a non-existent object, such as the son of a barren
woman, would have to conform to the non-existent form and be itself
non-existent.55 When consciousness does not apprehend the image of an
object, it simply cannot arise. Equally impossible is the epistemologists’
account of liberating insight being the culmination of meditation on the
four noble truths. According to them, at the beginning of meditation its
object is conceptual, i.e., a universal, but in the course of meditation it
gains in vividness till it becomes a particular.56 This assumption, Can-
drakīrti maintains, is simply impossible, for a conceptual object can
never become a particular.57 Indeed, the epistemologists themselves
assume that the particular and the universal are mutually exclusive. Fur-
ther, even if such a process were possible, cessation (nirodha) could not
be perceived because consciousness cannot arise without an objective
support (ālambana).

55
Candrakīrti seems to play here on two meanings of the word “form” (ākāra), which
can be understood as an image or as the own nature of a thing. The same ambiguity
is present in other terms meaning “form,” notably the term rūpa.
56
This process is compared in later times to someone so besotted with his lover that he
perceives her in his mind with such vividness that it is as if she would be standing in
front of his eyes. See also Franco, “Perceptions of Yogis. Some Epistemological and
Metaphysical Considerations.” In: Proceedings of the 4th International Dharmakīrti
Conference (forthcoming).
57
It is indeed difficult to understand how an abstract and necessarily conceptual
statement such as “everything is impermanent” can become a particular object, no
matter how long and how intensely one meditates on it. This point was debated be-
tween Buddhists and Naiyāyikas for centuries (as long as Buddhism remained alive
on the Subcontinent); on the last phase of this debate, see Taber’s paper in this vol-
ume.
28 ELI FRANCO

But what are the implications of this stance? Does it mean that
ultimate reality is pure nothingness and the ultimate realization that one
cannot know anything? MacDonald contends that Candrakīrti’s view is
more sophisticated. For him the actual realization of the true nature of
all things is performed by an altogether different type of awareness
termed “gnosis” (jñāna).58 Unlike normal awareness (vijñāna), gnosis
does not have an object and perceives the inconceivable reality that was
always there; it has a form (or nature) that transcends all manifoldness
(sarvaprapañcātītarūpa). Candrakirti also states that the Buddhas abide
in this objectless gnosis. In advancing this interpretation, MacDonald
goes against the construal of Madhyamaka by North American scholars
such as C.W. Huntington and Dan Arnold.
Vincent Eltschinger’s paper, “On the Career and the Cogni-
tion of Yogins,” is a remarkable contribution towards the reconstruction
of the religious philosophy of Dharmakīrti. It consists of two parts. The
first part sketches a systematic development of the meditating Buddhist
monk from the stage in which he is still an ordinary person, beset by a
false view of Self and Mine giving rise to desire, to the moment of
enlightenment and the ensuing liberation. Dharmakīrti follows the tradi-
tional Buddhist scheme of three successive stages in understanding the
Buddha’s teaching as epitomized by the four noble truths, these three
stages being studying, reasoning and meditating.59 As soon as one at-
tains a meditative vision of the four noble truths for the first time (dar-
śanamārga), the yogi stops being “an ordinary person” and becomes a
noble person (ārya). However, this vision can only remove the concep-
tual error about the existence of a Self; the deeply-rooted, innate con-
ception of the Self (sahajasatkāyadṛṣṭi) is far more difficult to eradicate
and one has to repeat the meditative vision of the four noble truths in
various aspects again and again until this innate or instinctive concep-
tion of Self, which is present even in lower animals that are unable to
conceptualize, is uprooted.
According to the Yogācāra tradition, with which Dharmakīrti
is affiliated, living beings are divided into various “families” (gotra)

58
On various aspects of gnosis in the Tantric tradition, see Orna Almogi’s paper in
this volume.
59
A similar three-stage process of understanding can be found in Hinduism, and it is
still practiced, especially in the Vedānta tradition: studying (śravaṇa), reflecting
(manana), and meditating (nididhyāsana). See also YS 1.48-49 referred to above.
 INTRODUCTION 29

that determine the mode of liberation either as Hearers (i.e., disciples of

the Buddha who reach enlightenment with the help of the Buddha), or
as Buddhas-for-themselves (pratyeka-buddha, who reach enlightenment
by themselves, but do not help other living beings), or as Buddhas (who
reach enlightenment by themselves and help others to reach it). While
the path of the Hearers and the Pratyeka-Buddhas is relatively short, the
Bodhisattva, the person who has resolved to become a Buddha, has to
prolong his stay in saṃsāra in order to acquire additional skills that
enable him to become a “teacher” for all living beings; he must elimi-
nate imperfections of body, speech and mind, and become practically
omniscient. The practice of the path ends in the so-called transformation
of the basis (āśrayaparivṛtti), an expression that was first used for the
change of sex (from woman to man), but which came to designate the
irreversible elimination of all defilements and their latent causes
(“seeds”), this elimination characterizing the state of being Buddha.60
The second part of Eltschinger’s paper deals with the cognition
of a yogi in its epistemological dimension. Yoga is characterized as a
chariot pulled by two horses, tranquility of mind (śamatha) and dis-
cernment (vipaśyanā).61 It carries one to an insight (prajñā) of the true
nature of reality. Yogic perception, as every perception, must be reliable
and free of conceptualization. The first characteristic does not seem to
be problematic for Dharmakīrti; the reliability of yogic perception is
grounded in the Buddhist scriptures, which are also established by inde-
pendent means such as perception and inference. For instance, one
meditates on the four noble truths that are already known to be true be-
fore the meditation begins.62 One may also meditate of course on a non-
existent object such as an imaginary disintegrating corpse. In this case
the yogic cognition is simply not true (and therefore not perception—
pratyakṣa) for the simple reason that its object has no correspondence in

60
See also Hidenori Sakuma, Die Āśrayaparivṛtti-Theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi.
Stuttgart 1998.
61
See Louis de La Vallée Poussin: L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Vol. 8. Repr.
Brussels, 1980: 131, n. 2.
62
This perspective changes radically from the 8th century onwards, due to the debates
with the Mīmāṃsā. From this point in time it is not an ordinary yogi, but the Bud-
dha himself, the yogi par excellence, who is the focal point, and it is not the reliabil-
ity of the Buddhist yogi who follows the Buddha’s teachings which is at stake, but
that of the Buddha, who cannot rely on a further Buddha to establish the truthfulness
of the Buddhist teachings.
30 ELI FRANCO

reality. Dharmakīrti’s main concern, however, is how a conceptual cog-

nition can become non-conceptual. His criterion for the absence of con-
ceptualization is the vividness of a cognition—when one sees an object
as if it were standing before one’s eyes. Dharmakīrti’s solution to this
problem was not completely satisfactory, and later Buddhist philoso-
phers (Kamalaśīla, Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti) contin-
ued to deal with it and suggest still other solutions.63
However, if yogic perception apprehends an object that was al-
ready established by a means of knowledge (pramāṇa), how could it be
itself a means of knowledge, for a means of knowledge must apprehend
a new object, an object that was not perceived earlier? Dharmakīrti’s
answer would probably be that although the object was previously es-
tablished by scripture and reasoning, it was not established as a non-
conceptual object. Thus, the process of meditation is the reverse of the
process of perceiving in everyday life. In everyday life, the cognitive
process begins with a non-conceptual perception of an object which
gives rise to a conceptual cognition. In meditation one begins with a
conceptual object, and the meditation culminates in the conceptual con-
struction being cast away. This cognitive process consists in destroying
ignorance and other defilements of consciousness so that the cognition
may shine again in its intrinsic luminous nature, with which it can ap-
prehend reality as it truly is.64
Dorji Wangchuk’s contribution, “A Relativity Theory of the
Purity and Validity of Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism,” extends
our field of vision to Tibetan Buddhism, or better, Indo-Tibetan Bud-
dhism, for the philosophical developments of the Tibetan scholars can-
not be understood without their Indian background. Wangchuk notes
that one occasionally comes across philosophical theories and interpre-
tations that are of purely Tibetan origin and most of the purely Tibetan

63
See also Taber’s paper in this volume.
64
Or one could say that although the inferential cognition of the four noble truths
(attained at the second stage, between studying and meditation) is true, it does not
make one obtain its object, and thus it cannot be said to be non-belying (avisaṃ-
vādin) in the usual sense of the term. A similar case might take place with inference.
What happens when one infers fire and then goes to the place of the fire and sees it?
Both cognitions are valid, both are connected to the same object, yet each cognition
is said have a new object. In fact they only cognize the same object from different
aspects and cannot have different efficient actions (arthakriyā), which is character-
ized as attaining an object, for the same object cannot be obtained twice.
 INTRODUCTION 31

philosophical theories seem to be the product of an endeavor to resolve

and systematize conflicting ideas found in heterogeneous Indian Bud-
dhist systems. This thus tallies well with my observation that meditative
visions have not played a crucial role in the development of philosophi-
cal theories in South Asian Buddhism.
Wangchuk examines an intriguing tenet in the Buddhist theory
of knowledge, namely, that various types of living beings perceive one
and the same entity in different modes. For instance, what appears to
ordinary humans as clean water is perceived by so-called hungry ghosts
(preta) as dirty and disgusting (sullied with blood and pus, etc.),65 by the
gods as nectar, and by yogis as a goddess or a woman who is capable of
arousing samādhic ecstasy in them. The epistemological problem that
arises from this tenet is clear: If the same object is perceived differently
by different living beings, whose perception is true? How can one then
distinguish between valid and invalid cognitions? Further, how can one
substantiate yogic visions that seem downright impossible, as for in-
stance the perception of innumerable Buddha fields in a single atom?
Wouldn’t the acceptance of such visions lead to “ontological nihilism”?
The renowned rNying-ma scholar Mi-pham (1846–1912) sug-
gested making a distinction between various kinds of means of knowl-
edge, most importantly between pure and impure worldly means (kun tu
tha snyad pa’i tshad ma = sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa). The degree of the
purity of perception determines the degree of its correctness.66 The pu-
rity of perception can be enhanced by meditation, but there is also a
difference in the degree of purity of perception of those who do not
meditate at all. For instance, a human being perceives water as water,
which is regarded as purer than the preta’s perception of it as pus, re-
gardless of whether that human being and preta meditate or not. Mi-

65
This example first entered the philosophical discourse in Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā. It
is used by Vasubandhu to show that living beings (notably the pretas) can suffer
from what may be called collective illusions due to similar karmic fruition. Vasu-
bandhu, however, does not doubt the identity of water as an object in this example,
but only attempts to prove that it does not exist outside the mind. As far as I know,
the example is not further discussed in the Buddhist epistemological tradition from
the perspective it obtained in Tibetan Buddhism, namely, that the identity of the ob-
ject is doubtful.
66
According to this theory, the cognition of water by ordinary people would have to
be considered less true than the vision of the yogi who perceives the same substance
as a goddess.
32 ELI FRANCO

pham’s theory was inspired by Rong-zom-pa, a rNying-ma scholar of

the 11th century, who suggested that reality is “mere appearance” (snang
ba tsam), behind which there is nothing. He also adduced a distinction
in validity between human and non-human and between yogic and non-
yogic perceptions. Thus, the validity of perception depends on the pu-
rity of perception, i.e., the purer the perception is, the more it agrees
with ultimate reality, which is the absolute purity. Wangchuk also dis-
cusses briefly the Indian antecedents, especially in Madhyamaka
sources, of this theory, which he calls “the relativity theory of the purity
and validity of perception.”
Meditation and yogic perception culminate in gnosis (jñāna,
prajñā and similar expressions). The quasi-material aspects of this gno-
sis form the subject matter of Orna Almogi’s paper, “The Materiality
and Immanence of Gnosis in Some rNying-ma Tantric Sources.” Ac-
cording to these sources, gnosis is immanent in the human body, more
precisely, in the center of the heart. Before describing the “meta-
physiological” aspects of gnosis, Almogi looks into the conception of
the human body in Buddhism in general. As is well known, Buddhist
sources, including already the Pali Canon, consider the human body to
be a collection of impure and revolting substances such as hair, nails,
flesh, bones, bladder, liver, pus, blood, excrement, and the like. Yet the
body is also recognized as the basis for the human experience that en-
ables one to tread the path of salvation.
The Tantric attitude to the body is generally more positive.
The Tantric practitioners conceive the body as a microcosm, and it is
meditatively envisioned as the pure body of a deity; most importantly it
is the abode of gnosis, the ultimate aim for all Buddhists. Although gno-
sis is to be acquired by practice, it is often conceived of as inherent,
latent and changeless. It abides in the body like a lamp in a pot that can
shine only if the pot is broken. The Buddha-Embryo theory—the theory
that all living beings are potentially Buddhas and will eventually be-
come Buddhas—is used as a foundation to substantiate the immanence
of gnosis in one’s body. The resemblance of this notion of gnosis to the
Brahmanic concept of a permanent soul (ātman) is obvious,67 and the
rNying-ma scholars make a conscious effort to distinguish gnosis from
such a soul.

67
In fact, the Ratnagotravibhāga, the foundational text of the Tathāgatagarbha tradi-
tion uses the terms ātman and paramātman in the exposition of the Buddha nature.
 INTRODUCTION 33

The “meta-physiology” of gnosis involves channels, cakras,

vital winds and seminal drops. Their divergent descriptions have been
conveniently juxtaposed by Almogi in the form of tables. Each channel
has its own color, a type of pure essence, and an essence-syllable that
causes purification, phonic seeds that cause pollution, and birth caused
by the pertinent phonic seeds and type of mind. For instance, the chan-
nel of gnosis has a blue light, which is square in shape, the pure essence
of breath, the essence syllable hūṃ, and is inhabited by mental percep-
tion. It is clear that although gnosis is not a material entity, one does
find statements describing it in terms of light, color, shape and sound.
However, these are merely meant as aids to confused living beings, who
have not recognized the permanent immanent gnosis within themselves.
Nevertheless, it appears that these descriptions were sometimes taken
literally.
Almogi’s paper concludes the Buddhological section in this
volume. Three contributions deal with yogic perception in the Hindu
tradition. Philipp André Maas discusses the so-called Yoga of suppres-
sion as it appears in the first chapter of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, i.e., the
Yogasūtra of Patañjali with its oldest commentary, the so-called
Yogabhāṣya,68 a text that Maas has edited in an exemplary manner on
the basis of twenty-one printed editions and twenty-five manuscripts.
His starting point is Oberhammer’s pioneering yet largely ignored study
Strukturen yogischer Meditation (Vienna 1977), which shows beyond
doubt that the Pātañjalayoga teaches four different kinds of medita-
tions—not two, as is commonly assumed—which differ from each other
with regard to their objects, structure and content. Maas’ paper, how-
ever, limits itself to the first two of these meditation types, for which he
suggests a new terminology. The common term for these types of medi-
tations, which seems to have been coined by Frauwallner, is “Unter-
drückungsyoga” or “Yoga of suppression.” This term, however, can be
misleading inasmuch as it evokes the common psychological meaning
of “complete deletion of a reaction,” in contradistinction to “inhibition,”
which refers to an inner impediment to activity that can be removed.
“Suppression” is also used to refer to a voluntary suppression of an im-
pulse for action. Obviously, none of these meanings is applicable to
yogic meditation, nor is “suppression” as used by Indologists meant to

68
Yoga in this section is short for Pātañjala Yoga.
34 ELI FRANCO

convey these meanings, but rather to refer to the definition of yoga as

the elimination or stopping (“the shutdown” as Maas calls it) of all men-
tal processes. Further, it is often said that the purpose of yoga is to
eliminate cognition, but this statement has to be qualified insofar as
yoga does not eliminate the Self (puruṣa), which is defined as pure con-
sciousness. What yoga aims at is the elimination of all objects of con-
sciousness.
Maas also notes that the “Yoga of suppression” consists, in fact,
of two different types of meditation; he suggests calling the first type
“non-theistic yogic concentration” and the second “theistic yogic con-
centration.” In the former type, the path leading to the cessation of men-
tal activities is the practice of gradual withdrawal or detachment, in a
first stage from everyday material objects, in a second stage from matter
as such, and it culminates in self-perception of the Self, which leads to
liberation from the cycle of rebirths. The theistic concentration is simi-
lar to the non-theistic in many respects—most importantly it also cul-
minates in self-perception of the Self—but differs from it inasmuch as
in the initial stages it has God (īśvara) as its object.
It is remarkable that in Yoga the concept of God lacks any sec-
tarian or mythological elements. Moreover, there is no qualitative dif-
ference between God and any other liberated soul, except that the latter
became liberated at a certain point in time, whereas God has always
been liberated. Nor does God really intervene in the realm of matter,
and his effectiveness within the world is rather limited. At the begin-
ning of every re-creation of the world he “assumes” a mental capacity—
doesn’t this imply that he must leave his state of liberation?—in order to
teach a seer and thus start a succession of teachers and disciples. His
presumed motivation to do this, just as in the case of the Buddha, is
compassion.
The concept of God being intrinsically identical to all other
souls (or selves) can also be found in the tradition of Viśiṣṭādvaita Ve-
dānta, a Vedānta school that is strongly affiliated with the Vaiṣṇava
devotional movement, examined here by Marcus Schmücker in “Yogic
Perception According to the Later Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Ve-
dānta.” This tradition is particularly interesting in its contrast to the
Buddhist tradition. To begin with, yogic perception is hardly discussed
in the writings of Rāmānuja (traditionally dated 1017–1137), the found-
ing father of the Viśiṣṭādvaita. He accepts the possibility of its exis-
tence, but does not consider it capable of perceiving absolute reality
 INTRODUCTION 35

(brahman) (see n. 3 in the paper). However, Rāmānuja’s follower,

Meghanādārisūri (13th century), deals with this topic in a more extensive
manner. Unlike the Buddhists, who go to a great deal of trouble to
prove that yogic perception is free of any conceptual construction (see
the papers by Taber, Franco and Eltschinger in this volume),69 Megha-
nādārisūri assumes that all yogic perceptions are conceptual for the
simple reason that they do not depend on the senses. This aspect of
yogic perception puts it on par with the cognition of God (identified
with Viṣṇu), or the highest Self (paramātman), as well as of the liber-
ated souls—both those that have always been liberated (nityamukta) and
those that became liberated at a certain point in time. The difference
between the cognition of a yogi, who is still bound to saṃsāra, and the
cognition of the liberated souls (God included) is that the latter have
only conceptual cognitions. Of course the cognition of God is far larger
in scope—it includes everything—than that of the yogi, but inasmuch as
both are independent of the senses, both are conceptually constructed
(savikalpaka). Furthermore, while the Buddhists consider every concep-
tualization to be false and claim that only non-conceptual cognitions are
a true reflection of reality, Meghanādārisūri argues that an absolute cor-
respondence between perception and reality is only possible in a con-
ceptual perception. A non-conceptual perception, which depends on the
senses and has only a momentary existence, is unable to perceive all
properties of a given object. Especially the recurrent properties, the so-
called common properties or universals (jāti), which are identified with
the structure (saṃsthāna) of things, cannot be perceived as such when
an object is seen for the first time. It is only in the second and subse-
quent cognitions that the recurrence of a universal can be perceived. Yet
the common point between the Buddhist and the Viśiṣṭādvaita traditions
is that the highest cognition, be it the omniscience of God or of the
Buddha, is a subspecies of yogic perception.

69
An exception, however, should be noted for the Buddhist Tantric work Tattvasiddhi
attributed to Śāntarakṣita; see Ernst Steinkellner, “Is the Ultimate Cognition of the
Yogin Conceptual or Non-conceptual? Part 2: Introducing the Problem in the Final
Section of the Tantristic Tattvasiddhi with Analysis and Translation.” In: Esoteric
Buddhist Studies: Identity in Diversity. Proceedings of the International Conference
on Esoteric Buddhist Studies, Koyasan University, 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 2006. Ed. by the
Executive Committee, ICEBS. Koyasan 2008: 291-306. The possibility of Vedāntic
influence on the doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi still needs to be explored.
36 ELI FRANCO

The role of yogic perception in another Vaiṣṇava devotional

tradition, the Pañcarātra, is examined in Marion Rastelli’s contribution,
“Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him: Yogic Perception and Its
Implications in the Viṣṇuitic Tradition of Pāñcarātra.” The earliest evi-
dence of this tradition dates back to the pre-Christian era, and it is still
present today in the Vaiṣṇava tradition in South India. Unlike the other
Buddhist and Hindu traditions presented so far, the Pañcarātra offers its
followers not only a means of pursuing liberation from rebirth, but also
allows the pursuit of worldly pleasures such as wealth, offspring, the
fulfillment of sexual desires, death of enemies and a great number of
supernatural powers. For the most part, these aims are to be achieved by
ritual means into which yogic practices are integrated, but yoga is also
practiced independently. There are two kinds of yogic practices: the
Yoga of Eight Members (aṣṭāṅgayoga), which is practically identical to
the practice described in Pātañjala Yoga bearing the same name (briefly
referred to by Maas p. 6), and the Laya Yoga or the “Yoga of reabsorp-
tion.” Some elements are common to both practices, as for instance,
sitting in a particular posture, controlling one’s breathing, and the with-
drawal of the mind from the object of the senses. However, the two
practices differ in their object; while the object of the yoga of Eight
Members is static, the object of the Laya Yoga is dynamic. The term
laya evokes the cosmic dissolution of the material elements, these being
reabsorbed, each into the respectively preceding one, in the reverse or-
der that they were created or emanated until they are all absorbed into
the primordial matter, which is itself a manifestation of God.70 The Laya
Yoga imitates this process of destruction. The yogi visualizes object
after object in the order of their destruction until he reaches a particular
deity, this deity being an emanation of still another deity, and so on
until one reaches the Supreme God. The Lakṣmītantra describes several
deities that are to be meditated upon, and similar to the Buddhist Tantric
meditation described by Almogi, each is associated with a special state
of consciousness and with a specific sound (the various elements are
conveniently presented by Rastelli in a table on p. 306).

70
These cycles of cosmic emanation and dissolution are well known from Classical
Sāṃkhya (see also Maas’ paper in this volume, pp. 269-270) and Purāṇic literature.
However, in the Pāñcarātra tradition the material elements are considered a manifes-
tation of the God Vāsudeva.
 INTRODUCTION 37

In the Laya Yoga, the meditating yogi visualizes a deity and

continuously recites a mantra until the deity appears to him; by concen-
trating on the deity the yogi becomes one with it and reaches a state
called “Consisting of Him/Her” (tanmayatā), depending upon whether
the object of meditation is a God or a Goddess. In other words, the sub-
ject and object of meditation become identical. What this identity means
exactly is not entirely clear, however. Rastelli suggests that the identity
cannot be complete or numerical; rather “consisting of Vishnu” is
analogous to saying “consisting of wood”: consisting of something
would thus mean having all the properties of that thing. Thus, the result
of meditation varies according to the object one meditates on. If one
meditates on brahman (absolute reality) one attains the state of brah-
man, which means liberation from rebirth; if one meditates on Sudar-
śana, one attains the supernatural powers of Sudarśana, and so on.
In the Pañcarātra tradition, it is also possible to become “con-
sisting of God” by ritual means, above all through a mental identifica-
tion with the deity. This identification can be induced verbally by
means of mantras, or by assuming the outward appearance of a deity,
for instance, by wearing garments that are usually associated with the
deity or certain adornments that are typical for it. A still easier way to
attain the same goals, provided one has the financial means, is to offer
fire oblations (homa) to the deity. It is interesting to note that all of
these rituals, if performed well over a period of time, leave the deity no
freedom of choice. It must appear before the yogi or the devotee.71

Part II: Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness from an

Interdisciplinary Perspective
The second part of this volume examines broader aspects of altered
states of consciousness beyond those occurring in yogic perception. In
the first four papers, Karl Baier deals with meditation and contempla-
tion in the Christian tradition, Dagmar Eigner and Diana Riboli focus on
shamanic trance in Nepal and Malaysia, while John Baker clearly shows
that drug-induced altered states of consciousness are an element present

71
In this respect the Pāñcarātra tradition follows an older Vedic and Mīmāṃsā tradi-
tion which claims that the gods who are the recipients of certain sacrifices are in fact
passive players inasmuch as they are obliged bring about the result for which a sac-
rifice is prescribed.
38 ELI FRANCO

in all traditional and modern societies. Thus, altered states of con-

sciousness are by no means limited to meditative traditions.
Karl Baier’s contribution, “Meditation and Contemplation in
High to Late Medieval Europe,” is a useful reminder that Europe had its
own rich tradition of meditation which has fallen into disuse, a tradition
that, in an odd twist of fate, shows signs of revival under the growing
influence of Indian meditative traditions.
Baier examines the period between the 12th and 15th century, a
period that differs significantly from the preceding and subsequent cen-
turies. He deals primarily with four trends that became prominent dur-
ing this period: the development of elaborate philosophical and theo-
logical theories dealing systematically with meditation and contempla-
tion; the democratization of meditation and contemplation; the emer-
gence of new imaginative forms of meditation; and a differentiation
between meditation and contemplation. Baier considers these trends and
related developments by examining three texts: Benjamin minor (also
called The Twelve Patriarchs) of Richard of St. Victor (?-1173), the
Scala Claustralium of Guigo II (1174-1180) and the anonymous Clowde
of Unknowyng.
In Benjamin minor, Richard of St. Victor develops a hierarchi-
cal system of different modes of cognition, correlating them to four
basic cognitive faculties: sensus, imaginatio, ratio and intelligentia
(sense-perception, imagination, discriminative rationality, intuitive in-
sight). The lowest mode of awareness is termed cogitatio. It is “the
careless looking around of the mind,” motivated by curiosity and other
passions. Meditation is a more focused way of thinking; it emerges
when the cogitatio becomes seriously interested in an object it has un-
covered. Its dominant mental faculty is ratio, discursive thinking, and it
investigates the cause (causa), mode (modus), effect (effectus), purpose
(utilitas) and inner structure (ratio) of its objects. Meditation culminates
in contemplation, the fulfilled insight. Cogitatio is like crawling on the
floor, meditatio like walking and sometimes running, but contemplatio
is comparable to free flight (liber volatus) and beholding from above,
this allowing the whole landscape be viewed at once.
Richard discriminates between different levels of ecstasy: a
state in which the activity of the corporeal senses is only suspended, one
in which imagination has come to a standstill, and a final absorption in
 INTRODUCTION 39

which even intelligentia is no longer active. All forms of ecstasy are

accompanied by exaltation and intense joy.72
Guigo’s Scala Claustralium (ladder for monastics), also known
as Scala paradisi (the ladder to paradise) and Epistola de vita contem-
plativa (letter on the contemplative life) contains one of the most con-
cise analyses of spirituale exercitium (spiritual exercise) written in the
High Middle Ages. His intent was to integrate meditation and contem-
plation into the reading and interpretation of the Bible. In the early me-
dieval period reading the Bible chiefly meant memorizing the text for
liturgical purposes. In the 11th century the tradition of the Desert Fathers
was revived, and the new order of the Carthusians integrated the life-
style of the hermit with monastic community life. This led to an interi-
orization of religious reading, as is reflected in Guigo’s text. The prac-
tice contained three stages, which, again, are strongly reminiscent of
Buddhist, Yoga and Vedānta practices: lectio, the monk reading the
Bible in his cell and following the literal sense of the text as attentively
as possible, which led to meditation and the monk beginning to repeat a
passage that touches his heart again and again;73 oratio, the monk ask-
ing God to open his soul to His presence; and contemplatio, the monk
gaining the deepest level of understanding of the biblical texts and ex-
periencing their mystical sense (anagogia, sensus mysticus), which, as a
direct encounter with God, can only be fully realized in contemplation.
The basic distinction between meditation and contemplation is that in
meditation the different faculties of the soul are still at work, whilst in
contemplation their activities have calmed down and the ineffable cen-
ter of the soul awakens.
In the centuries after Guigo, the link between reading the Bible
and meditation lost its importance. The imaginative techniques had the
effect of the Bible being replaced by manuals of meditation, such as
Vita Christi, which were better suited for visualization and easier to
grasp. Meditation and contemplation ceased to be a monastic privilege
that could be practiced only in the solitude of monasteries; they could

72
One is immediately reminded of the Buddhist descriptions of dhyāna and āyatana
meditations, briefly described in Franco’s paper, as well as of saṃprajñāta samādhi
as discussed in Maas’ contribution, but the differences are strong enough to rea-
sonably exclude the assumption of borrowing or influence of one tradition on the
other.
73
This practice is traditionally called ruminatio, rumination on the text.
40 ELI FRANCO

also be practiced in the flourishing towns. Book production developed

enough to create a market of religious texts; these were usually compi-
lations of monastic mystical theology, simplified schemes for the ascent
to God, edifying stories about saints and miracles, and prayers. These
books were not written in Latin, but in the vernacular languages. Thus,
from the Late Medieval Period onwards, meditative and contemplative
practices became increasingly popular among all strata of the literate
European Christian society. Older forms of mysticism, based on with-
drawal from the world and programs of asceticism and contemplative
prayer, did not die out, but they were challenged by new lifestyles en-
couraging more democratic types of mysticism that were open to all
(and therefore also communicated in the vernacular) and that did not
demand retreat from the world.74
The Clowde of Unknowyng, written between 1375 and 1400
and today one of the most famous of all late medieval mystical texts, is
a good example of the developments outlined above. The text follows
the traditional distinction between vita activa (actyve liif) and vita con-
templativa (contemplatyve liif). The first stage of active life consists of
works of mercy and charity, the second, which is concurrently the first
stage of contemplative life, is goostly meditacion, the third and final
stage is specyal preier. The latter is described as blynde thoucht or na-
kyd feeling and culminates in ecstasy (excesse of the mynde, overpas-
syng of thiself), in which one is to leave behind distinct considerations
of the self, sins, creation and God and enter a “cloude of forgetyng.”
In the 15th century, the methodical structuring of thought
within meditation became extremely elaborated. However, the more
meditation became formalized, the more its limitations and dangers
became obvious; the practice of contemplation began to decline. As
Baier concludes, “only with the growing influence of Eastern religions
and the revival of Western mysticism from the end of the 19th century
onwards did the popularization of contemplative practices start all over
again. The 20th century became the Age of the decline of the Baroque
form of European meditation and gave birth to a second contemplation
movement within Western Christianity.”
Diana Riboli’s contribution, “Shamans and Transformation in
Nepal and Peninsular Malaysia,” is an introduction to the different be-

74
Here, too, the emergence of the Mahāyāna bears striking if superficial similarities.
 INTRODUCTION 41

liefs related to shamanic transformation into animal and plant forms, in

particular in the ethnic groups of the Chepang in south-central Nepal
and the Jahai and Batek of peninsular Malaysia. Despite the necessary
adaptations of shamanic cultures to changes in social, economic and
political conditions, the figure of the shaman generally remains that of a
“hunter of souls,” even in societies no longer based on hunting and
gathering.
Riboli describes the rain forest as a closed universe from the
Batek and Jahai point of view, divine and perfect, a sort of maternal
uterus that satisfies all the basic requirements of its inhabitants and
which is the beginning and end of everything.75 In what is clearly an
implicit critique of Lévi-Strauss and his followers, she claims that for
the societies she has studied, a conceptual distinction between “nature”
and “culture” has little or no significance.
Quite often the shamans’ faculty of transforming themselves
into animal or vegetal forms, of communicating with animals and dei-
ties, or flying between cosmic zones is seen as a relic from a mythical
“Golden Age,” a time when all human beings had these abilities. How-
ever, in some shamanic societies ecstatic journeys and altered states of
consciousness are almost completely absent, although considered by
Eliade and others to be an essential and defining element of shamanism.
Riboli points out that what scholars call “altered states of con-
sciousness” or simply “trance” is a complex phenomenon, and that the
Chepang language has no single term corresponding to it.76 In spite of
trances often having a similar physical appearance—the shaman’s body
jerking, trembling and sweating profusely, as well as appearing to un-
dergo sensorial detachment—there are different types, and they are not
experienced as the same by shamans or their audience. Riboli distin-
guishes between “incorporatory trances,” in which shamans embody
supernatural beings, and “trances of movement,” in which shamans
travel to other cosmic zones. In her earlier studies she included the
category “initiatory trances,” and noted that there are certainly still
other types of altered states of consciousness, these being, however,

75
The most friendly inhabitants of the rainforest are the cenoi, poetic creatures some-
what like our fairies, described as perfect little men and women living inside flowers
who offer help to humans in distress.
76
The same is true, of course, of what one calls “meditation,” a rather vague term that
has no exact correspondence in any South Asian language (see also n. 3 above).
42 ELI FRANCO

difficult to document. Similarly, “shaman” itself is not a consistent

category; the Chepang distinguish between pande,77 who are allowed to
travel to all cosmic zones, and gurau, who can transform themselves
into animal forms.78 The Jahai use halak and jampi to refer respectively
to shamans of greater and lesser powers.
Though Riboli has noted a decline in many of the shamanic
practices described by Endicott in the 1970s, she nevertheless confirms,
contrary to observations by certain scholars, that despite the strong
pressures and tensions they are continually subjected to, both Batek and
Jahai forms of shamanism are still very much alive today. In fact, after
the recent passing away of one of the oldest and most venerable sha-
mans, many young men have been receiving dreams in which the old
shaman is teaching them about the shamanic vocation. A new genera-
tion of young shamans seems to be emerging.
Dagmar Eigner’s contribution, “Transformation of Conscious-
ness through Suffering, Devotion, and Meditation,” investigates the
spiritual and personal development of shamans and mediums in Central
Nepal. It is based on Eigner’s study of traditional healers in Central
Nepal undertaken for a total of thirty-six months between 1984 and
2005. Her research has focussed on Tamang shamans living in the mid-
dle hills east of Kathmandu Valley. The Tamang constitute the largest
ethnic minority in Nepal and there are many shamans among them.
These shamans mostly treat a multi-ethnic, socially disadvantaged cli-
entele, who seek cures for a wide variety of ailments. Some shamans
have moved away from traditional healing methods, partly because of
their lack of the needed knowledge and partly in order to accommodate
the multi-ethnic environment. In this context, Eigner has investigated
the similarities between the healing methods of different healers and the
role of ethnic-specific knowledge of myths in the shamanic procedures.
Contact with a deity is considered a basic component of a sha-
man’s power. Shamans and mediums usually experience a vocational
calling, in which they are chosen by a spiritual power to become a
healer. Often this is not immediately recognized and the unusual behav-

77
It seems that about ten percent of pande are women; Riboli investigated thirty
pande, three of whom were women.
78
This second category seems to be mythical or defunct; in eight years of extensive
field work, Riboli has not encountered a single shaman who claimed to possess this
ability.
 INTRODUCTION 43

iour of the chosen person is interpreted as a disturbance of her/his well

being. The period of crisis is attended by physical and psychic suffering
that is not alleviated by standard medical treatment. On the contrary, in
some cases attempts to force the so-called evil spirits to depart causes
the suffering to intensify. Sometimes several years pass before deities or
ancestor spirits reveal themselves through the persons they have chosen.
After the initial crisis, such a person forms a strong relationship
with the spiritual world. They then begin a process of granting the dei-
ties and tutelary spirits increasing space within their psyche, and of di-
minishing the desires and expression of their own ego. Devotional exer-
cises slowly alter the mind of a shaman so that with growing experi-
ence, the chosen person remains continuously in a state of transformed
consciousness. Having attained this altered level of consciousness, they
are able to carry out whatever is needed during healing sessions without
effort and without a conscious decision on their part. Their change in
personality is primarily realized during treatments, in which their pa-
tients experience the power of the deities, this being the core of the
healing process.
Eigner’s paper presents a number of narratives of shamans and
mediums from Central Nepal describing this process of transformation.
Briefly presented are various healers’ perceptions of the spiritual world,
their own connection to it, and their understanding of the cures they
achieve. These narratives show that the strong connection with the spiri-
tual world changes these healers for the rest of their lives; their status in
the community, their relationships with the people around them, and
their sense of identity have become irreversibly altered.
In “Psychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness: Insights from
the Biocultural Perspective,” John Baker suggests that the use of psy-
chedelic substances to alter consciousness is more ancient than all of the
other techniques discussed in this volume. He also argues that studies of
psychedelic experiences can be very useful for discerning the roles that
cultural expectations and individual characteristics play in shaping and
understanding altered states of consciousness. Baker’s interactionist
position assumes that consciousness is affected by both “top down” and
“bottom up” phenomena. Consequently, the study of consciousness
states requires a comprehensive framework that incorporates biological
and psychological insights into the study of socio-cultural phenomena.
The number of plants, fungi, minerals, and even animals capa-
ble of inducing altered states of consciousness is large, and the use of
44 ELI FRANCO

these substances has been documented throughout the world since an-
cient times. The use of such substances reflects both the basic human
predilection to enter altered states and the fact that almost any psy-
choactive substance can be utilized for personally integrative and cul-
turally constructive purposes when used appropriately.
In contrast to the traditional use of psychedelic substances in
non-Western cultures, many Westerners have a “hallucinophobic” atti-
tude about psychedelics. This attitude has its roots in the proscriptions
against pagan religions issued by the Emperor Theodosius in 380 CE,
when he adopted Christianity as the official religion of the empire and
suppressed the ancient mystery cults. During the next sixteen hundred
years, most European knowledge about the proper ways to use these
substances and exploit their effects for constructive purposes was lost.
Consequently, few were prepared for the renaissance in psychedelic use
that began in the 19th century and accelerated in the 20th, especially after
the discovery of LSD.
With the spread of LSD and other psychedelic substances, mil-
lions of individuals were able to experience and explore highly unusual
states of consciousness. Lacking traditional frameworks for using these
substances or understanding their effects, some people experienced
“bad trips” or suffered physical injury because they were temporarily
unable to react appropriately to external events. Laws were quickly
passed that prohibited the manufacturing, distribution, use, or posses-
sion of psychedelic substances. By the mid-1960s, all psychedelic re-
search on human subjects had been curtailed. As a result, many people
in the West continue to view psychedelics in a highly negative light.
Baker uses the terms “sacrament” and “sacramental” to distin-
guish between psychedelic use in societies that embrace such use and in
those that condemn it. In the former, a person’s first use of a psyche-
delic substance often has an initiatory quality and occurs after a period
of training in which the individual has been taught to anticipate and
“correctly” interpret such experiences. Here, psychedelics often serve
culturally integrative purposes. In the second type of society, psychedel-
ics are typically used clandestinely and without proper guidance. In
such contexts, psychedelic experiences may lead an individual to ques-
tion his or her society’s values and world view. In spite of this, such
experiences are often interpreted in near-mystical terms and can have
profoundly positive effects upon the user.
 INTRODUCTION 45

The “sacrament/sacramental” distinction recognizes that cul-

tural attitudes play a profound role in shaping states of consciousness.
At the same time, the biological underpinnings of modern anthropology
remind us that the uniqueness of each person begins at the genetic level,
and is expressed in differences in the make-up of our individual nervous
systems as well as our life histories. Consequently, every experience of
an altered state of consciousness is unique, and is open to multiple in-
terpretations.
Baker concludes that psychedelic agents do not only represent
important tools for studying consciousness, but also have the potential
to “democratize” consciousness by making it possible for large numbers
of people to explore domains previously accessible to only a few. He
suggests that the near-universal desire to experience an altered state of
consciousness can—and should—be channeled in a way that minimizes
the possibility of problems and maximizes the potential for personal and
social gain.
Shulamith Kreitler’s contribution, “Altered States of Con-
sciousness as Structural Variations of the Cognitive System,” presents a
new approach to defining consciousness in terms of an innovative the-
ory of meaning. Most approaches to consciousness have been based on
the assumption that differences in consciousness consist primarily in
degrees of awareness, so that it may seem superfluous to dwell on the
characterization of various so-called altered states of consciousness.
However, an analysis of different states of consciousness reveals several
major dimensions in which they indeed do differ, e.g., salience and the
status of the “I,” the sense of control and the ability to control, clarity of
thought, precision of perception with regard to external reality and envi-
ronment, emotional involvement, as well as the arousal, accessibility
and inhibition of certain kinds of information. These specified dimen-
sions allow the common states of consciousness to be characterized
according to their differences in terms of major cognitive, emotional
and behavioral features. The differences between the states of con-
sciousness imply that a new approach is necessary. The new suggested
approach is cognitive and based on a theory of meaning dealing with the
contents and processes underlying cognitive functioning. Meaning is
defined as a referent-centered pattern of meaning values. A referent is
the input, the carrier of meaning, whereas meaning values are cognitive
contents assigned to the referent in order to express or communicate its
meaning. Together, the referent and the meaning value form a meaning
46 ELI FRANCO

unit. Five sets of variables are used for characterizing the meaning unit:
meaning dimensions, which characterize the contents of the meaning
values; types of relation, which characterize the immediacy of the rela-
tion between the referent and the cognitive contents; forms of relation,
which characterize the formal regulation of the relation between the
referent and the cognitive contents; referent shifts, which characterize
the relation between the referent and the presented input; and forms of
expression, which characterize the forms of expression of the meaning
units. Each individual person functions cognitively in terms of a spe-
cific meaning profile (i.e., a set of meaning variables habitual for that
person) that determines his or her range of cognitive potentialities and
also affects manifestations at the level of emotions and personality.
Cognition is a function of the structure and activation of the meaning
system.
Kreitler’s main thesis is that states of consciousness are a func-
tion of comprehensive changes in the cognitive system brought about by
specific organizational transformations in the meaning system. One
major kind of reorganization consists in changing the dominant types of
relation that regulate the functioning of the cognitive system in ordinary
wakeful states, namely the attributive and comparative, to the exempli-
fying-illustrative and metaphoric-symbolic that regulate the functioning
of the cognitive system in certain states of consciousness. Structural
changes of this kind may be attained by either psychological or physio-
logical means. When they occur, cognitive functioning, personality
manifestations, mood and affect, as well as physiological processes may
be affected. Kreitler describes the changes in consciousness attained by
means of experimentally-induced changes in meaning, as well as the
resulting changes in cognitive and emotional functioning. The new ap-
proach may enable the matching of cognitive tasks to suitable states of
consciousness, the production of states of consciousness by self-
controlled cognitive means, and even the definition of new states of
consciousness.
The two final papers, by Michael M. DelMonte and Renaud
van Quekelberghe, consider the use and integration of meditation in
psychotherapy. Van Quekelberghe begins with a brief discussion of
“mindfulness” (Pali: sattipaṭṭhāna, Sanskrit: smṛtyupasthāna) in the
context of Theravāda Buddhism. The purpose of mindfulness is to in-
crease the powers of concentration as a preparatory stage to meditation
properly speaking (samādhi). It consists in the conscious awareness of
 INTRODUCTION 47

everyday activities such as breathing, thinking, feeling, moving, eating

and even defecating. In the last decade or so, cognitive behavior therapy
and psychoanalysis has begun to focus on mindfulness as a constructive
method for overcoming clinical symptoms and suffering. Quekelberghe
notes that the recent shift in cognitive therapy from symptoms as the
“content” to symptoms as the “context” offers an analogy to the tradi-
tional Eastern (Buddhist and other) distinction of consciousness directed
towards an object and consciousness without an object. “Context”
would correspond to emptiness, peace of mind, pure silence, crystal-like
transparency and an empty mirror; while “content” would correspond to
ego-related passions, mirages, thoughts and feelings. This dichotomy
indicates the need to step back from the many to the one, from the
changing to the changeless, from bondage to freedom.
In the second part of his paper Quekelberghe offers a very use-
ful survey of the relationship between psychotherapy and Buddhism
from the 1930s to the present day. He begins with the well-known study
“Buddhist training as an artificial catatonia” by Franz Alexander (also
summarized by DelMonte), which has inspired many leading psychia-
trists to focus on the parallels between schizophrenic regression and
meditation. However, there were also exceptions to this general trend
and some psychiatrists, such as Johannes Schulz and Arthur Deikman,
considered yogic traditions positively, fighting against the “naïve arro-
gance” of psychiatry and psychoanalysis towards the Eastern meditative
practice.
Jung rejected the psychoanalytic view of Asian or Buddhist
meditation as infantile regression, autistic defense formation or narcis-
sistic neurosis. Yet he too believed that an integration of Western psy-
chotherapy and Eastern meditation was—if at all possible—not desir-
able. On the other hand, the so-called Neo-Freudians, including Karen
Horney, Erich Fromm and Harold Kelman, involved themselves with
Zen-Buddhism in the 1950s and emphasized points of convergence of
their discipline with it. Kelman, for instance, considered psychoanalysis
to be a meditative training in mindfulness and the development of
therapist-client relationship as analogous to the guru-devotee relation-
ship. In the 1980s, Jeffrey Rubin tried to integrate Buddhist ideas into a
so-called contemplative psychoanalysis, although oddly enough he
somehow confused the Buddhist conception of egoless-ness (Pali:
anatta, Sanskrit: anātman) with the psychoanalytic narcissism theory.
The dialogue between Buddhism and psychotherapy has continued un-
48 ELI FRANCO

interruptedly until the present day, with Barry Magid currently its most
prominent proponent.
W.L. Mikulas was the first behavior therapist who integrated
Buddhist meditation into behavior therapy. He emphasized self-control
skills and few theoretical constructs, focused on the concrete content of
conscious experience, and made a clear distinction between observable
behavior and problematic concepts such as person, ego, identity and the
world. Quekelberghe summarizes the work of a number of behavior
psychotherapists who found correspondence between the Buddhist
teachings and techniques of behavior therapy, namely, stress reduction
programs based on mindlessness. These include Da Silva, Kabatt-Zinn,
Grossman, Linhan, Perls, Hayes, and last but not least, Quekelberghe
himself.
Another important area of dialogue between Asian meditative
traditions and psychotherapy is transpersonal psychology and ther-
apy79—a school of psychology that studies and encourages spiritual
self-development, peak experiences, mystical experiences, systemic
trance and other metaphysical experiences of living. In an earlier
work,80 Quekelberghe described the main fields of this spiritually ori-
ented psychotherapy. Quekelberghe ends his article with a plea to estab-
lish modern “wisdom research centers” after the model of the famous
Buddhist monastery Nālandā.
Michael DelMonte’s paper, “Empty Thy Mind and Come to
Thy Senses: A De-constructive Path to Inner Peace,” studies the benefi-
cial effects of Yoga practices, Qi-gong, and modern Gestalt therapy on
psychological growth (Eros). In an age when our minds and our senses
are over-stimulated and our emotions over-aroused, meditation may be
positively used as an antidote to mental over-drive. Paradoxically deep
“mindfulness,” when competently practiced, may lead to peaceful
“mindlessness,”81 a state of “no thought.”82 Such techniques are particu-

79
The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology describes transpersonal psychology as
“the study of humanity’s highest potential, and with the recognition, understanding,
and realization of unitive, spiritual, and transcendent states of consciousness.”
80
Transpersonale Psychologie und Psychotherapie, Ed. Dietmar Klotz. Eschborn bei
Frankfurt/M. 2005.
81
In this respect, meditative therapy is the opposite of the “talking cure” typically used
in Freudian and other therapies.
82
DelMonte’s view of the relationship between thought and consciousness strikes me
as being potentially anti-Darwinist (§4): “Although consciousness without thought
 INTRODUCTION 49

larly effective in cases of unhealthy attachments, be they attachment to

victimhood and self-righteous misery, obsessive attachment to people or
objects, or fear of loss as linked to separation anxiety. These attach-
ments lead to defensive detachment which DelMonte calls “schizoid
defense”; in extreme versions this defense is found in the affective non-
attachment of borderline personalities, defensive isolation, extreme ego-
tism, or solipsism.
However, DelMonte also warns us of the risks of using medita-
tive techniques inappropriately; their use may become detrimental to
social engagement and emotional attachment, foster “narcissistic empti-
ness,” pathological de-realization and de-personalization as well as
pathological regression—fixated on Thanatos, i.e, the wish to return to
an undemanding pre-incarnate state. Meditation is not suitable for eve-
rybody nor is everyone ready for it.
The challenge for all self-conscious and reflective beings is
how to build up an internal sense of self while being and living in an
impermanent world. We all have a quest for knowledge as well as two
typical orientations: introversion and extroversion, which need to be in
equilibrium. Successful meditation helps one find the right balance be-
tween, on one hand, introspection and self awareness and on the other,
social adaptation. Not surprisingly, introspection tends to become more
important as we age.
A final point is what DelMonte calls “the obsessive Western
focus on individualism” that leads to a strong individual identity being
forged at the risk of this over-valued “mask” or “false self” being taken
too seriously. The traditional Eastern society, says DelMonte, does not
overly focus on individualism83 and may facilitate attempts to dis-

is a possibility, its opposite, thought without some consciousness is not (excluding

the Freudian repressed unconscious). Consciousness thus appears to be primary, and
from it emerges thought as a secondary epi-phenomenon: An epi-phenomenon that
can become “parasitic,” in the sense that consciousness can play the role of a reluc-
tant host to our unbidden thinking.”
83
DelMonte touches here on a set of problems that are especially associated with the
work of Louis Dumont (see especially his Homo Hierarchicus. Le système des castes
et ses implications. Repr. Paris 1979). However, Dumont’s inspiring work also met
with strong criticism. The issues involved are too complex and multifaceted to be
dealt with here, but to risk a generalization about Indian civilization (for I have no
overall competence in “Eastern” civilization), I would say that the tensions and in-
ner conflict between “Homo Hierarchicus” and “Homo Equalis” are present also
within Indian society.
50 ELI FRANCO

identify from over-invested individualism. It is interesting that the aim

of yoga as a psychotherapy is not to become “atomized emotional is-
lands,” although this is precisely the purpose of traditional yoga (see for
instance Maas’ paper in this volume): Liberation consists in the aware-
ness that one is an isolated “island,” albeit not an emotional one.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above papers fall into two broad categories, those dealing with his-
torical-philological aspects of yogic perception and meditation, and
others broadly falling into the social sciences of anthropology and psy-
chology. The need for an interdisciplinary approach between textual and
sociological disciplines is so obvious that it hardly needs to be men-
tioned. But at the risk of stating the obvious: The benefits of an interdis-
ciplinary approach as practiced here should go in at least two directions.
On one hand, after taking a walk in the modern social sciences, the tex-
tual scholars should be able to go back to their sources and gain a better
understanding of them. The social scientists, on the other hand, who
study meditative experiences as a cultural phenomenon, would certainly
benefit from the historical depth that can be gained from the study of
texts. As Richard Gombrich once said—I paraphrase from memory—
Buddhism has been around for 2500 years: who in his right mind would
want to restrict one’s study of it to the last century? The same is true of
course for Hinduism and the European civilization.
To conclude, I should mention perhaps what was under-
represented at the conference and is completely lacking in the present
volume: the natural sciences. This reflects the approach and interests of
the organizers. Collingwood once chastised someone who thought the
mind is what proves recalcitrant to an explanation by the natural sci-
ences: “In the natural sciences, mind is not that which is left over when
explaining has broken down; it is what does the explaining. If an expla-
nation of mind is what you want, you have come to the wrong shop; you
ought to have gone to the sciences of the mind.”84
Our intention is not to question the relationship between the
mind and the brain, or their possible ontological identity. At present,
however, we do not yet seem to gain much when quantum physicists

84
R.G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan. Oxford 1942 (Repr. 1944), p. 11, § 2.48.
 INTRODUCTION 51

tell us that consciousness is related to the collapse of a wave function

which is used to describe the probability of distribution of all possible
states of an observed system. Nor do we wish to dwell on the concept of
relativity in Madhyamaka Buddhism as a precursor of modern physics
or on the resonance of emptiness and quantum mechanics. We also con-
sider of little relevance to our studies whether gamma or alpha rays
increase or decrease in deep meditation. It may be fascinating to ob-
serve the physical changes that occur in meditation, which include
metabolic, autonomic, endocrine, neurological, encephalographic and
digestive effects, galvanic skin responses, hormone levels in blood, as
well as limbic arousal in the brain. We deny neither the merit nor inter-
est nor importance of these studies, but have deemed them of peripheral
relevance to the studies undertaken in this volume.
 Part I
Yogic Perception in the South Asian
and Tibetan Traditions
 LAWRENCE MCCREA

“Just Like Us, Just Like Now”: The Tactical

Implications of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic
Perception

The practitioners of traditional Indian hermeneutics, or “Mīmāṃsā”, are

often described as the most “orthodox” upholders of the Vedic tradition,
but even a cursory survey of the central works of the Mīmāṃsā tradition
is sufficient to reveal that their positions were often quite radical,
placing them at odds with most or all rival philosophical systems, even
those within the “Hindu” fold. They were by and large skeptical about,
or outright deniers of, many of the stock elements of Hindu
cosmology—for example, the existence of gods, the cyclical dissolution
and reemergence of the cosmos, the possibility of liberation from the
cycle of death and rebirth. Similarly, the Mīmāṃsā position on yogic
perception is decidedly at odds with what we might describe as
“mainstream opinion” among Sanskrit philosophers. In opposition to
virtually all other schools of thought in pre-modern India, the
Mīmāṃsakas totally reject the possibility of yogic or supernatural
perception. The only other group of philosophers who made this
absolute denial were the materialist Cārvākas (with whom the
Mīmāṃsakas otherwise have very little in common). In this paper I
want to briefly consider some of the principal arguments the
Mīmāṃsakas raised against yogic perception, in the hope of shedding
some light on what made this skeptical stance so appealing to them or,
perhaps more to the point, what made the admission of supernormal
perception, even on the part of upholders of the Vedic tradition, seem so
threatening to them. I will focus primarily on the arguments of the
seventh century Mīmāṃsaka Kumārilabhaṭṭa, as he proved to be the
most articulate and influential critic of yogic perception.
In interpreting Kumārila’s arguments against yogic perception
and attempting to understand their motivation, it is crucial to attend to
the context in which they are made. Kumārila’s most important
discussions of yogic perception are found in the Codanāsūtra and
56 LAWRENCE MCCREA

Pratyakṣapariccheda sections of his Ślokavārttika.1 The central question

of the Ślokavārttika, and of the section of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra on which it
comments, is to demonstrate that it is only from scripture, specifically
from the Vedas, that people can gain knowledge of dharma and
adharma—that is to say, of the beneficial or adverse karmic results that
will follow from present actions, including but not limited to
otherworldly results such as the obtainment of heaven or spiritual
liberation. The primary purpose of raising the question of yogic
perception in both of the passages mentioned above is to rule it out as a
rival means of knowing dharma, leaving scripture as the only possible
means of acquiring such knowledge.
Now, the Mīmāṃsakas are not of course alone in wishing to
ground their beliefs about the nature of the soul or the afterlife in
purportedly reliable scriptural texts. Most of the rival philosophical/-
religious traditions they confronted accepted one or another set of
scriptures as a reliable guide to otherworldly matters. What sets the
Mīmāṃsakas apart from nearly all of their rivals is their understanding
of how it is that scriptures can contain reliable information on such
matters. Rival accounts of scriptural validity—both those of extra-Vedic
rivals such as the Buddhists and Jains, and of those who upheld the
validity of the Vedas, such as the Naiyāyikas—take the reliability of
their scriptures to derive from the knowledgeability of their authors.
Intuitively enough, they take the position that scriptures should be
understood to be reliable insofar as it can be determined that those who
composed them knew whereof they spoke. The remembered and
recorded words of “seers” such as the Buddha and the Jina are seen as
valuable insofar as they give us access to truths which they could
perceive, but we cannot. It is, above all, against such claims of personal
authority in matters of dharma that the Mīmāṃsakas direct their fire. It
is therefore not primarily the existence of yogic perception, but its
usefulness as a means for validating scriptural claims, that they wish to
deny. They do offer arguments against the very possibility that any
person could have the sort of extraordinary perceptual powers claimed
for the Buddha and the like; but, crucially, they argue further that even
if this were possible—even if certain individuals really did have the
power to perceive dharma, for instance—this would be of no help to

1
For a brief overview of Kumārila’s position, see Bhatt 1962, pp. 160-163.
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 57

ordinary people—to people like ourselves who are not yogis—in

gaining knowledge of dharma for themselves.
This concern to demonstrate the epistemic uselessness of yogic
perception can be clearly seen in Kumārila’s seminal discussion in the
Codanāsūtra section of the Ślokavārttika. The codanāsūtra itself (the
second of the aphorisms of Jaimini, which form the basis of the
Mīmāṃsā system) indicates that the commands of the Veda (codanā),
which the Mīmāṃsakas take to be eternal and authorless, are the only
means through which one can come to know dharma.2 In the course of
defending this claim, Kumārila’s predecessor Śabara remarks that the
statements of human beings cannot be considered reliable when they
concern matters “beyond the range of the senses” (anindriyaviṣayam),
for such things, as he says, “could not be known by a person, except
through a verbal statement”.3 Yet if this verbal statement is made by
another person, this only pushes back the epistemological problem one
more step: how could the speaker of this statement have any knowledge
of supersensory matters to impart? “In matters of this sort,” says Śabara,
“human statements have no authority, just like the statements of
congenitally blind people regarding particular colors.”4 Śabara’s brief
comments, without offering any detailed arguments to this effect,
presuppose a general uniformity of sensory capacities among people:
what is “beyond the range of the senses” for one person will be so for
another (barring sensory impairments such as blindness). Yet this is
precisely what the advocate of yogic perception denies. The yogi is
presumed to have sensory capacities that exceed those of ordinary
persons, such that his statements would have the capacity to impart to
those ordinary persons information about supernatural matters which
they could not acquire for themselves.
Obviously, if claims for this sort of extraordinary perception are
allowed to stand, Śabara’s argument, and the central Mīmāṃsā claim it
upholds, will collapse. Hence Kumārila, in commenting on and
defending this passage of Śabara’s work, seeks to rule out the possibili-
ty that the statements of yogis could serve as a reliable source of

2
See Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2 (MD, Vol. 1, p. 13): codanālakṣaṇo ‘rtho dharmaḥ.
3
Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.2 (MD, Vol. 1, p. 17): aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum r̥te
vacanāt.
4
MD Vol.1, p. 18: naivaṃjātīyakeṣv artheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyam upaiti, jāty-
andhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣu.
58 LAWRENCE MCCREA

knowledge for ordinary, non-yogically-endowed people such as us. Due

to this focus on the statements of yogis and their putative validity, the
issue he confronts is not so much an ontological question—Do yogis
actually exist?—but an epistemological one—How, if at all, could one
reliably determine whether the statements of any self-proclaimed yogi
are reliable or not? The upholders of yogic perception, and of the
authorial model of scriptural authority, need to argue that their yogis,
and specifically the authors of their scriptures, have direct and
privileged access to certain truths—about the nature of the universe, the
soul or its absence, our fate after death, and so on—that are totally
beyond the range of what ordinary people can know by their own
devices. The value of scriptures lies precisely in their capacity to
transmit to us the knowledge of those who can perceive what we
cannot. But, one of the key strategies of Kumārila’s argument in the
Codanāsūtra is to show that—even if we were to admit the existence of
yogis—the privileged access to truth that is claimed for them, far from
making their words a valuable source of knowledge for ordinary
persons, actually renders them entirely useless to us. He attempts to
show that the perceptually privileged status ascribed to yogis would
create an unbridgeable epistemic divide between us and them, such that
their own knowledge, however accurate it might be, would necessarily
remain inaccessible to us. I will examine his arguments in more detail
below, but briefly his position is that “it takes one to know one”—that
there is simply no way one can satisfactorily evaluate the knowledge-
claims of purported seers or yogis, unless one can confirm
independently that they really do know truly what they claim to. Yet
one cannot do this unless one has the same extraordinary perceptual
capacities that they do. Hence, the statements of those who claim
extraordinary perceptual powers can be held valid only insofar as they
are redundant—we can only know them to be true when they tell us
what we are able to find out for ourselves. So, even if it could be
established that such extraordinary perceptual powers exist in some
individuals, their epistemic value for ordinary people would be nil. One
could never tell the difference between a genuine yogi and a fraud
without being a yogi oneself.
Kumārila’s argument against the epistemic usefulness of yogic-
perception claims is grounded in a pervasive skepticism regarding the
reliability of human beings and their utterances, summed up in his
bracingly cynical dictum that:
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 59

At all times, people are, for the most part, liars.

Just as there can be no confidence in them now, in the same way there is no
confidence in statements of things past.5

We know—from abundant experience, alas—that people nowadays are

often less than entirely truthful in what they say. And just as people are
nowadays frequently seen to make unreliable statements, we may
reasonably suppose that people in the past were similarly undependable.
We have, then, strong prima facie reasons to doubt the veracity of
human statements past or present. In ordinary situations, this presents
only a minor practical problem; if one doubts the accuracy of statements
people make about everyday matters, it is easy enough to to confirm or
disconfirm them through direct observation. Yet, in the case of
statements made by the Buddha, the Jina, or others who claim to
possess extraordinary perceptual powers (and, in fact, claim to be
literally omniscient), we are asked to place our trust in claims we are
absolutely incapable of verifying for ourselves. We are asked,
moreover, to accept that those who made these claims gained their own
knowledge through a kind of “perception” wholly unlike any perception
we have ever experienced ourselves, or witnessed in others.
Here Kumārila resorts to one of his most characteristic moves:
what we might call an “inference from the ordinary.” He argues that, in
the absence of strong counterevidence, we may legitimately infer that
the perceptual capacities of other persons—past, present and future—
are basically similar to our own. Since people, in our own experience,
have no ability to perceive—for example—objects existing in the past
or future, we can legitimately extrapolate from this experience and
conclude that people in the past were similarly limited in their
perceptual capacities.6 As he says:
People can apprehend objects of a certain sort by certain means of knowledge
now. It was the same even in other times.
Even where a heightened ability [in some sense faculty] is seen, it occurs
without overstepping the natural object [of that sense faculty], as, for example,

5
ŚV, Codanā 144: sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānr̥tavādinaḥ | yathādyatve na vis-
rambhas tathātītārthakīrtane ||
6
For an argument that awareness of past or future objects must be excluded, by defi-
nition, from the scope of perception, see ŚV, Pratyakṣa 26-36, and (for a translation
and explanation of the passage) Taber 2005, pp. 54-57.
60 LAWRENCE MCCREA

when someone sees objects which are far away or very small. But one’s
hearing cannot apprehend color.
And one never sees, even in the smallest degree, a capacity to perceive a
future object ...7

In our own experience, we observe that there are variations in people’s

perceptual capacities. Some people are better than others at seeing
distant or minute objects, and, extrapolating from this experiential base,
we could plausibly enough imagine people who can see farther or
smaller objects than any we have known. But we could not plausibly
imagine people who could “see” sounds or smells; it seems to be
inextricably part of the nature of “seeing” that what we see are colors
and shapes, nothing else. As Kumārila sees it, supposing, in
contradiction our own present-day experience, that people such as the
Buddha could “see” the future involves a similar category error. To
suppose that anyone could perceive future objects would fly in the face
of our own experience in the same way as supposing that one could hear
colors.
This sort of argument—that, in general, things or people in the
past may legitimately inferred to be “like nowadays” (adyavat, idānīm
iva) or “like people nowadays” (adyatanavat), and that people outside
the range of our own experience may be inferred to be “like persons
such as ourselves” (asmadādivat)—is pervasive in Kumārila’s work,
and underlies many of the key arguments of the Ślokavārttika (not only
arguments against supernormal perception, but arguments in support of
the eternality of Sanskrit, and of the Vedas, and against the occurrence
of cosmic dissolution).8 It may seem a rather cheap argument—not
much more than a reflexively conservative attitude—but it does appear
to generate formally valid inferences, and is not without a certain basic
plausibility. If we do not base our understanding of the nature of

7
ŚV, Codanā 113-115: yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇais tu yajjātīyārthadarśanam | bhaved
idānīṃ lokasya tathā kālāntare ‘py abhūt || yatrāpy atiśayo dr̥ṣṭaḥ sa svārthānati-
laṅghanāt | dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syān na rūpe śrotravr̥ttitā || bhaviṣyati na dr̥ṣṭaṃ ca
pratyakṣasya manāg api | sāmārthyaṃ... || Similar statements from Kumārila’s (lost)
Br̥ḥāṭṭīkā are quoted in Ratnakīrti’s Sarvajñasiddhi (RNĀ, p. 8) and Śāntirakṣita’s
Tattvasaṃgraha (TS, vss. 3160-3163, 3170-3171).
8
See for example ŚV, Codanā 99, 117, 144, 151; ŚV.Pratyakṣa.35; ŚV, Nirālambana-
vāda.85, 127; ŚV, Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra 67, 77, 97, 113, 116; ŚV, Ātma-
vāda.137; Tantravārttika ad 1.3.1 (MD, Vol. 2, pp. 71, 75).
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 61

perception on our own experience of it, then what, after all, are we to
base it on?
The key question then is this: since neither we ourselves nor
anyone in our own experience possesses the kind of perceptual
capacities claimed for persons like the Buddha, what sort of evidence
might there be that would lead us to lay aside the evidence of
experience and accept these claims at face value? Ex hypothesi, we have
no perceptual evidence that would support such claims. On the other
hand, if one were to rely upon scripture itself to support the knowledge
claims, problems of regress would arise. To conclude that a purported
seer possesses extraordinary knowledge because he himself claims to do
so in a text he himself has authored is plainly circular. But if one relies
on a claim made in a text composed by another author, one simply
presses the problem back one level: How can one know that this second
author himself possesses the relevant knowledge to support his claim?9
It might seem that the most promising avenue to pursue in
attempting to validate omniscience claims in the eyes of non-omniscient
persons would be inference. If we see that a person such as the Buddha
invariably speaks accurately about matters that are confirmable through
perception or other ordinary means of knowledge, may we not infer that
his statements about supersensory matters are similarly accurate? To
this Kumārila responds as follows:
If, having seen that [an author] makes true statements in matters where a
connection between the object and the sense organ is [possible] (i.e. in matters
accessible to ordinary perception), one were to conclude that he also makes
true statements about matters that must be taken on faith, because they are his
statements [121]; then one will have demonstrated that the authority [of his

9
See ŚV, Codanā 117-118. Somewhat different problems would arise if one at-
tempted to support the knowledge claims of a human scripture-author with claims
made in a purportedly eternal scripture such as the Veda: an eternal text could not
contain information about a historically limited author (as it would have to have ex-
isted before he did). Eternal texts, the Mīmāṃsakas argue, cannot refer to particular
historical persons or events. Those passages in eternal texts which appear to refer to
such persons and events must be understood as figuratively praising or otherwise re-
ferring to elements of the (eternally recurrent) Vedic sacrifice—what the
Mîmāṃsakas call arthavāda. Hence, any apparent reference in a purportedly eternal
text to the omniscience of a particular scripture-author would either have to be an
arthavāda passage (and accordingly be interpreted figuratively), or, as a historical
reference, would show that the text is not in fact eternal—see ŚV, Codanā 119-120.
62 LAWRENCE MCCREA

statements] is dependent [on perceptual confirmation]. If they are authoritative

in and of themselves, then what dependence would there be on sense-organs
and the like? [122] Just as, in this case, the authority [of his statements] is due
to being determined by sense-organs and the like, it would be the same even in
matters which must be taken on faith. [Their] authority is not established
independently. [123]10

The inference does not establish what it is intended to establish. If the

only testably valid knowledge claims an author makes are those
concerning matters accessible to ordinary means of knowledge such as
sense perception, then this can establish the authority of the author's
claims only in so far as they depend on these ordinary means of
knowledge. It can in no way establish that this pattern of accuracy
extends to supersensory matters as well.
Kumārila does not himself offer any example of the sort of
testable knowledge claims which might be advanced as evidence for the
accuracy of their speakers, but his commentators all mention the
Buddhist doctrine of momentariness in this connection.11 If the
Buddha’s claim that all things are momentary could be shown to be true
on grounds other than his own assertion, would this not confirm his
reliability? But Kumārila’s argument is well-suited to get around this
sort of example. If the momentariness of all things really were
demonstrable on grounds other than the Buddha’s assertion, then it
would in fact be a truth accessible through ordinary means of
knowledge, and hence could not serve as evidence for his accuracy in
matters beyond the scope of these ordinary means of knowledge. The
same would be true of any claim of a purported yogi which could be
verified through ordinary means of knowledge.
In addition, Kumārila challenges the inferential argument for
yogic reliability with the following counterinference:
Furthermore, when [human statements] concern objects beyond the range of
the senses, they are false, because they are human statements. [In this

10
ŚV, Codanā 121-123 (=ŚV(U), pp. 75-76, ŚV(S), Vol. 1, p. 127): yo ‘pīndriyārtha-
saṃbandhaviṣaye satyavāditām | dr̥ṣṭvā tadvacanatvena śraddheyārthe ‘pi kalpayet ||
tenāpi pāratantryeṇa sādhitā syāt pramāṇatā | prāmāṇyaṃ cet svayaṃ tasya
kāpekṣānyendriyādiṣu || yathaivātrendriyādibhyaḥ paricchedāt pramāṇatā | śrad-
dheye ‘pi tathaiva syān na svātantryeṇa labhyate ||
11
See Umbeka, Sucaritamiśra, and Pārthasārathi ad ŚV, Codanā 121, ŚV(S), Vol. 1, p.
127, and ŚV, p. 83.
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 63

inference] each of the extra-Vedic schools will serve as an example (lit.:

similar case, sapakṣa) for the others.12

Because there are multiple and conflicting claims about what exactly
yogic perception reveals about the ultimate nature of things—the Jainas
saying one thing, and the Buddhists another, for instance—each of these
schools must argue that the others are wrong, and that their claims of
supersensory knowledge are false. But this allows the Mīmāṃsaka to
use each case as an example in constructing an inference to counter the
other. The Buddhists must admit that the Jainas claim accuracy for their
scriptures based on the demonstrable accuracy of the Jina’s testable
truth claims, and yet are wrong. And the Jainas must admit the same
regarding the Buddhists. Thus each can be used to demonstrate to the
other the insufficiency of the inference from accuracy about ordinary
matters to accuracy about supersensory ones.
This line of argument suggests another basic problem with
accepting the claims of yogic perception. The non-yogi attempting to
judge for himself whether yogic claims should be taken seriously or not
is confronted, not with one person’s claim to accuracy in supersensory
matters, but with a whole host of mutually conflicting claims—from
Buddhists, Jainas, Sāṃkhyas, and others. Even if one were to admit
yogic perception as a general possibility, how, lacking any means for
judging among this welter of conflicting claims, could one hope to
determine which claims one should believe? Once the door has been
opened to claims of extraordinary perception, a free-for-all ensues. It
seems that almost anyone can make any claim based on such privileged
perceptual knowledge with more or less equal plausibility. Yet, because
any number of these conflicting and untestable knowledge-claims can
be (and are) made, no one such claim can convince. Kumārila touches
briefly on this issue in the Nirālambanavāda section of the Ślokavārttika
(88-94). The (Buddhist-Idealist) opponent claims that all our
awarenesses exist without any extra-mental object, like dream-
awarenesses. Kumārila, challenging the parallel between waking and

12
ŚV, Codanā 126:
api cālaukikārthatve sati puṃvākyahetukam |
mithyātvaṃ vedabāhyānāṃ syād anyonyaṃ sapakṣatā ||
The printed edition of ŚV reads vedavākyānāṃ, as does ŚV(S), but it’s clear from
his comments (ŚV(S), Vol. 1, p. 129) that Sucaritamiśra read -bāhyānāṃ; ŚV(U)
prints the text correctly as vedabāhyānāṃ (p. 76).
64 LAWRENCE MCCREA

dream awareness, notes that in the case of dreams we conclude that our
awareness lacked an extramental object only after we wake up. Our
experience of waking serves as a blocking awareness (bādhikā buddhiḥ)
which invalidates the dream. But in the case of our waking awareness,
there is no such blocking awareness, and therefore no reason to
conclude that the objects that appear to us in waking life are unreal. The
Buddhist counters that the awareness of yogis does indeed reveal the
unreality of everyday objects, and therefore stands in contradiction to
our waking awareness. But, Kumārila retorts, “[the awareness] of our
yogis [yogināṃ cāsmadīyānām] stands in contradiction to what you
have said.”13 Kumārila’s reference to “our yogis” seems rather tongue in
cheek. Since the Mīmāṃsakas themselves absolutely deny yogic
perception, the “us” in question must demarcate some broader
affiliation of “āstikas” or “followers of the Vedas” (what we would now
call Hindus). The point, of course, is not to claim that “our” yogis are
better and more trustworthy than those of the Buddhists, but to show
that anyone can play the “yogi”-card in any debate, and that such claims
are consequently useless in settling philosophical disputes.
Along the same lines, and still more facetiously, Kumārila
mocks the opponent’s inference for the reliability of yogic perception
(in the Codanāsūtra section) as follows:
[I say:] “The Buddha and other such people are not omniscient.” This
statement of mine is true, because it is my statement, just as [when I say],
“Fire is hot and bright.”
And one can perceive that I have made this statement; you have to prove that
[those statements] were made by the that person [i.e. the Buddha or whoever].
Therefore, mine is a sound inferential reason; yours is open to the suspicion
that is not established [in the desired locus].14

If the ability to make true statements about ordinary things is all that is
required to speak with authority on supersensory matters, then anyone
can claim such authority—even Kumārila himself. Again, the real point
is not to reveal the untenability of the Buddhist claim in particular, or
even the general impossibility of yogic perception, but to expose the
indeterminacy and consequent irresolvability of arguments based on

13
ŚV, Nirālambana 94cd (=ŚV(S) 2.60): yogināṃ cāsmadīyānāṃ tvaduktapratiyoginī ||
14
ŚV, Codanā 130-131: buddhādīnām asārvajñyam iti satyaṃ vaco mama | madukta-
tvād yathaivāgnir uṣṇo bhāsvara ity api || pratyakṣaṃ ca maduktatvaṃ tvayā sādhyā
taduktatā | tena hetur madīyaḥ syāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā tava ||
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 65

claims of privileged perception. Since there is simply no way to test

such claims, or to sort out good ones from bad ones, there is nothing to
prevent anyone from claiming the authority of yogic perception for any
conclusion he wishes to advance.
All claims to privileged or supernormal perceptual knowledge
are suspect precisely because of their privileged status. Statements
based on such knowledge, if they are to be at all useful, must be
transmitted at some point from persons who have this privileged
perceptual knowledge to those who do not. Yet the recipients of this
knowledge, because they have no access to the perceptual awareness
from which it is derived, are in no position to evaluate its accuracy.
Thus the “revelatory moment”, when the yogi or the omniscient person
imparts his knowledge to those who lack his perceptual ability, is
doomed to fail epistemically. To quote Kumārila again: How could
people at that time who wish to know whether that person is omniscient
understand this, if they have no awareness of his knowledge and its
objects?
And you would need to postulate many omniscient persons—anyone who is
not himself omniscient cannot know an omniscient person.
And, if a person does not know him to be omniscient, then his statements
would have no authority for that person, since he would not know their source,
just as with the statements of any other person.15

Even actual omniscience is not sufficient to make one’s statements

trustworthy from the perspective of ordinary people. One’s omniscience
could underwrite the authority of one’s statements only if it were known
to one’s hearers that one is omniscient. But they cannot truly know this
unless they already know what you know—unless they too are
omniscient. It takes one to know one. Hence, even the utterances of a
genuinely omniscient person would be, for epistemic purposes,
absolutely worthless. One could be confident of their accuracy only if
one already had independent knowledge of the information they convey.
To adopt any less rigorous standard than this in judging the
validity of a person’s statements regarding supersensory matters is to
leave oneself no defense against charlatans or delusional people

15
ŚV, Codanā 135-136: kalpanīyāś ca sarvajñā bhaveyur bahavas tava | ya eva syād
asarvajñaḥ sa sarvajñaṃ na budhyate || sarvajño ‘navabuddhaś ca yenaiva syān na
taṃ prati | tadvākyānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ mūlājñāne ‘nyavākyavat ||
66 LAWRENCE MCCREA

claiming knowledge they do not possess, and opens one up to a

multitude of irresolvable and contradictory claims, as discussed above.
Kumārila’s hermeneutic of suspicion is absolute and uncompromising.
Even God himself (were such a being to exist) could not be seen as a
reliable informant in supersensory matters. In the Sambandhākṣepapari-
hāra section of the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila, having already set forth
arguments against the existence of a creator God, goes on to show that,
even if He did exist, no one could ever trust His claim that he created
the world. As he says:
He could not be known by anybody, at any time.
Even if he were perceived with his own form, the fact of his being the Creator
would not be known. How could even the first beings in creation know this?
They would not know how they were born here, or what the prior state of the
world was, or that Prajāpati is the creator.
Nor could they have certain knowledge of this due to His own statement; for,
even if he hadn’t created the world, He might say it, in order to promulgate
His own lordship.16

So no person, human or even divine, could be taken as a reliable

informant on matters beyond the scope of ordinary means of
knowledge. You can’t be too careful.
Yet, despite their thoroughgoing suspicion regarding the
reliability of any person’s utterances, the Mīmāṃsakas are not skeptics.
They believe in a soul, they believe in an afterlife, and they believe it is
possible for us to acquire reliable knowledge about such things. But
how, in the light of the preceding arguments, can they believe anything
of the kind? Famously (or infamously) they do so by pushing aside the
issue of personal authority altogether, by arguing that their own
scriptures are not they product of any authors at all—human or divine,
yogically perceptive or otherwise—but are instead eternal and uncreated
texts, passed down orally from teacher to student in a beginningless and
unbroken chain of transmission. As we have seen from Kumārila’s
arguments above, it is the “moment of revelation”, when the knowing
author transmits his knowledge verbally to his perceptually limited

16
ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 57cd-60: na ca kaiścid asau jñātuṃ kadācid api
śakyate || svarūpeṇopalabdhe ‘pi sraṣṭr̥tvaṃ nāvagamyate | sr̥ṣṭyādyāḥ prāṇino ye ca
budhyantām kiṃ nu te tadā || kuto vayam ihotpannā iti tāvan na jānate | prāgava-
sthāṃ ca jagataḥ sraṣṭr̥tvaṃ ca prajāpateḥ || na ca tadvacanenaiṣāṃ pratipattiḥ
suniścitā | asr̥ṣṭvāpi hy asau brūyād ātmaiśvaryaprakāśanāt ||
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 67

hearers, that lies at the heart of the epistemic problem he finds with
authored scriptures. But in the case of the Veda, at least for the
Mīmāṃsakas, there is no moment of revelation. The text, and the
knowledge it contains, are always already the property of many. And
one need postulate no extraordinary perceptual or cognitive abilities on
the part of the receivers and transmitters of the tradition in order to
account for its epistemic effectiveness. As Kumārila explains:
Because it exists in many people, and because it is learned and remembered
within a single lifetime, there is nothing to impair independent authority in the
case of the Veda. And, if there were any alteration [of the Vedic text], it would
be prevented by many people. Whereas if [the text] were revealed to one
person, it would be no different from one created [by that person].
So, in this tradition, no one person is required.
Many people can be dependent [on it]; for they are all men, just like
nowadays.17

Knowledge of the Veda is thus always embedded in a community.

There is no time, and has never been any time, when its hearers were
faced with the dilemma that confronted the Buddha’s first audience:
Faced with a person who claims to “see” the ultimate nature of reality,
how is one to judge his trustworthiness, or the accuracy of his
knowledge? Is one simply to accept his claims on faith? In the case of
the Veda, there is not, and never has been any one person in whom one
needs to place this kind of trust.
The key features of Kumārila's argument are thrown into relief
if we compare them with his discussion of the authority of smr̥ti texts in
his other major work, the Tantravārttika (TV), commenting on MS
1.3.1-2. These texts are held to be the work of human authors (such as
the Mānavadharmaśāstra, held to be the work of the human sage
Manu), but are nevertheless held to be authoritative in matters of
dharma, since they are thought to contain a restatement of matter
derived from lost or otherwise inaccessible Vedic texts (which are
therefore said to be “remembered” [smr̥ta], rather than “heard” [śruta]).
The hypothetical opponent (pūrvapakṣin) who presents the case against
the Mīmāṃsā position here employs arguments strikingly similar to

17
ŚV, Codanā 149-151: anekapuruṣasthatvād ekatraiva ca janmani | grahaṇasmara-
ṇād vede na svātantryaṃ vihanyate || anyathākaraṇe cāsya bahubhiḥ syān nivāraṇam
| ekasya pratibhānaṃ tu kr̥takān na viśiṣyate || ataś ca saṃpradāye ca naikaḥ puruṣa
iṣyate | bahavaḥ paratantrāḥ syuḥ sarve hy adyatvavan narāḥ ||
68 LAWRENCE MCCREA

those deployed by Kumārila himself in rejecting the authority of

scriptures composed by self-proclaimed “omniscient persons” such as
the Buddha or the Jina. We see the same invidious comparison with
deceptive “present day persons” (“Even nowadays some people are seen
to declaim things with no scriptural basis by passing them off as
scripture”18), and the same problem of indeterminacy (“And, as in a
legal proceeding in which the witness is dead, if one may postulate a
lost Vedic recension as the basis [for claims made in smr̥ti texts], one
can take as authoritative anything that one pleases” 19), leading to the
same difficulty that even the scriptural claims of rival traditions could
be validated on the same basis (“If [smr̥ti texts] are supposed to be
based on lost Vedic recensions, then, by this means, it would follow that
all smr̥tis—even those of Buddhists and the like—would be valid.” 20).
The key distinction, for Kumārila, between the Mīmāṃsā defense of
authored texts and that given by rival traditions such as Buddhism is
that the Mīmāṃsakas claim for smr̥ti-authors such as Manu no special
insight or sensory power beyond those observed in ordinary people
nowadays—people “just like us”. 21 As Manu's text is universally held to
be valid among those who uphold the Vedic tradition, one may
reasonably infer that the claims he makes are themselves grounded in
that tradition, even if the specific Vedic texts which serve as the source
of these claims are not presently accessible to us. There is nothing
contrary to our experience in supposing that Manu learned the truths
imparted in his work in the ordinary manner, by memorizing a Vedic
text taught to him by an ordinary human teacher.22 The process by

18
dr̥śyante hy anāgamikān apy arthān āgamikatvādhyāropeṇa kecid adyatve 'py
abhidadhānāḥ (MD, Vol. 2, p. 71).
19
mr̥tasākṣikavyavahāravac ca pralīnaśākhāmūlatvakalpanāyāṃ yasmai yad rocate sa
tat pramāṇīkuryāt (MD, Vol. 2, p. 71).
20
yadi tu pralīnaśākhāmūlatā kalpyeta tataḥ sarvāsāṃ buddhādismr̥tīnām api
taddvāraṃ prāmāṇyaṃ prasajyate (MD, Vol. 2, p. 74).
21
Kumārila specifically rejects the suggestion that Manu had any “capacity contrary to
those of the general class of all persons nowadays” (idānīṃtanasarvapuruṣajāti-
viparītasāmarthya) which would allow him to directly experience the truths con-
tained in his work; “this has been rejected,” he says, “in the discussion of omni-
science” (etat sarvajñavāde nirākr̥tam)—seemingly referring back to his own dis-
cussion in the Codanāsūtra section of his Ślokavārttika (MD, Vol. 2, p. 75).
22
As the scriptures of extra-Vedic traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism contradict,
and indeed directly attack, the Vedas, and explicitly seek to ground their authority
 JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 69

which these Vedic texts may have been lost is likewise a part of our
everyday experience: “For even nowadays one sees that texts are lost,
while their meanings are remembered.”23 Even when ascribing authority
to texts of human authorship, the Mīmāṃsakas retain the basic
principles of the textual epistemology developed above: that no faith
can or should be put in statements which depend on claims of
supernormal perception or insight, and that knowledge of otherworldly
matters, in order to be reliable, must always already belong to a
(beginningless) community of knowers—ordinary persons like
ourselves—and can never be made to depend on such claims of
epistemic privilege.
The Mīmāṃsakas’ attempt to ground the reliability of Vedic
scriptures on their eternality, and on the absence of any person who
either composed or revealed them, whatever one may make of its
intrinsic philosophical merits, is a brilliant tactical move in the
Mīmāṃsā polemic against the their principle rivals, the Buddhists and
the Jainas. Because both traditions look back to historical founders,
neither can claim, or would want to claim, authority for their scriptures
on the only basis Kumārila’s argument allows for. It is an inescapable
feature of both traditions that their emergence into our world (at least in
the present time) is due to the teachings of their founders, and that the
trustworthiness of their central claims rests on the personal authority of
these founders’ own words. By calling the whole notion of personal
authority into question, the Mīmāṃsaka is able to avoid the
interminable and rather sterile “Our sages are better than your sages”
sort of arguments that those (such as the Naiyāyikas) who defend the
reliability of the Vedas by claiming omniscience for their authors, seem
always to be drawn into. They capitalize on the one feature that plainly
sets the Vedic tradition apart from that of the Buddhists or the Jainas—
its immemoriality.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhatt 1962 Govardhan P. Bhatt, The Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies XVII, Varanasi
1962.

on the supernormal perceptual capacities of their founders, they cannot be plausibly

supposed to derive in this way from lost Vedic texts.
23
dr̥śyate hy adyatve 'py arthasmaraṇaṃ garnthanāśaś ca (MD, Vol. 2, p. 77).
70 LAWRENCE MCCREA

MD Mīmāṃsādarśana, ed. Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyaṅkar and Gaṇeśa-

śāstrī Jośī, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97 [7 vols.], 2nd ed.,
Poona 1970-1977.
RNĀ Ratnakīrti, Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali, ed. Anant Lal Thakur, Tibetan
Sanskrit Works Series 3, Patna 1957.
ŚV Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika, ed. Rāma Śāstrī Tailaṅ-
ga, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 11, Benares 1898.
ŚV(S) The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Su-
caritamiśra, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series
Nos. 23, 29, and 31, Trivandrum 1927-1943.
ŚV(U) Umbeka, Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā [2nd. ed.], ed. S.K. Rama-
natha Sastri, revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy,
University of Madras, Madras 1971.
Taber 2005 John Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology, Rout-
ledge Curzon, London/New York 2005.
TS Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha, ed. Embar Krishnamacharya,
Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 31 [2 vols.], Baroda 1926.
 JOHN TABER

Yoga and our Epistemic Predicament

In this paper I would like to consider the question, Is yogic ex-

perience possible? It may seem odd, even inappropriate, that such a
question would be asked at a conference on yogic perception, medita-
tion, and altered states of consciousness. Surely, one would think, one
ought to be able to assume the existence of the topic of the conference! I
raise this question, however, in order to draw attention to the somewhat
awkward methodological predicament in which the participants of this
conference must find themselves. I suspect that most of us set ourselves
apart from our colleagues in our respective disciplines – and a wide
range of fields are represented here – by our interest in yoga, yogic per-
ception, and altered states of consciousness. I know that philosophers, at
least, tend to steer clear of these topics, which they lump together with
paranormal phenomena, just as they avoid the topic of mysticism. The
reason is that the status of these states of consciousness, in the modern
world, is very much in doubt. By that I mean whether what people who
have such experiences report experiencing when they have them, really
occurs: whether a yogin or yoginī really sees past lives (where some-
one’s “seeing” a certain state of affairs implies the existence of that
state of affairs in same the way in which it visually appears to that per-
son); whether he or she really sees events that will take place in the fu-
ture, or really sees everything at once; and even whether he or she ever
really sinks into a completely thoughtless state, a state of “pure con-
sciousness” (i.e., samādhi or nirodhasamāpatti). In short, are these
states of consciousness more than mere hallucinations? If not, why
should they merit our attention?
Many, I believe, would respond that, regardless whether they
are hallucinations or not, they merit our attention because the belief in
them has played an important role in various societies and cultures. The
belief in the supernormal cognition, even omniscience of the Buddha,
for instance, played a central role in Buddhist apologetics in India in the
first millennium C.E., as the basis for maintaining the authority of the
Buddhist scriptures against the skepticism of outsiders. Altered states of
72 JOHN TABER

consciousness, whether they are authentic encounters with a transcen-

dent reality, a spirit world, or just hallucinatory experiences, are as-
signed a value and serve a variety of social functions in many other
societies. Perhaps in our research we can focus on these aspects of these
phenomena, which can be observed empirically or documented textu-
ally, and suspend judgement about their nature as experiences, i.e.,
whether they belong to the category of veracious cognitions or to some-
thing else?
This, however, will not do. Surely it is of the utmost signifi-
cance if a particular society or culture attributes value to, and invests
considerable cultural energy and resources in, something that is, at ba-
sis, an illusion – just as it would be if a particular person were to build
his life around a belief that is patently false, say, a belief in the exis-
tence of some imaginary being. We would immediately suspect that
some pathology is at work, distorting that society’s collective percep-
tion of reality; and that would be a notable characteristic of that society,
which a complete social-scientific or historical account of it could not
very well leave out. Indeed, this is precisely what Freud suggested is the
case for European society – a certain collective pathology supports our
belief in a Supreme Being and sustains all the practices of religion
which accompany it, which of course from a purely sociological or an-
thropological perspective serve many useful social and cultural func-
tions.1
Therefore, I raise at the outset of this conference the question
that no one really wants to answer, and that is whether it is possible for
us to accept reports of yogic experience and altered states of conscious-
ness at face value, as veracious supernormal cognitive acts, e.g., actual
perceptions of things which normally lie beyond the range of our sense
faculties (states of affairs in the past or the future, for instance), or, in
the case of samādhi in particular, as the removal of all objects altogether
from consciousness, without the extinguishing of consciousness itself.2
What conditions, specifically, would have to be met in order for us to
take such claims seriously? I shall approach the question by examining
a debate that actually took place in classical Indian philosophy, between
certain highly orthodox representatives of the Brahmanical tradition on
1
See Freud 1961.
2
Even in India in classical times doubts were raised about the possibility of samādhi.
See, e.g., Nyāyasūtra and Bhāṣya 4.2.38-40 (NBh 1090, 5 – 1092, 3).
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 73

the one hand, and defenders of the so-called heterodox traditions of

Buddhism and Jainism on the other, about the possibility of yogic per-
ception.3 In this way we will not only become aware that we are not the
first to consider this problem; we will also get a sense of how one
school of thinkers, at least, went about solving it – by presuming to be
able to prove that yogic perception is possible! An examination of their
proposed solution to this problem, I believe, will at least indicate, by its
strengths and weaknesses, the basic elements that any affirmative an-
swer to the question of whether yogic experience is possible should
possess.
Other scholars at this conference will also be referencing this
debate, but my purpose will be rather different. They, for the most part,
will be concerned with assessing it as historians, to determine the mean-
ing and importance of the doctrine of yogic perception in classical In-
dian thought. I, on the other hand, shall be assessing it as a philosopher,
to determine who wins. For since we ourselves are interested, or should
be interested, in the question of whether yogic experience is possible, it
is of particular interest to us to see whether a particular school of phi-
losophers who thought they could prove that it is possible actually suc-
ceeded in doing so.
In order to orient ourselves toward the problem of yogic percep-
tion in Indian philosophy I shall rely on Eli Franco’s important study,
Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth.4 One of Franco’s most sig-
nificant achievements in that book was to work out a convincing ac-
count of the “proof strategy” of the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s
Pramāṇavārttika, a much discussed problem in Dharmakīrti scholar-
ship. Dharmakīrti, who probably lived in the first half of the seventh
century, was, together with his predecessor Dignāga (early to mid-sixth
century), co-founder of the important logico-epistemological school of
Buddhist philosophy. One of the principal concerns of that school was
to place the authority of the Buddhist scriptures on a firm footing,
which in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s period was being increasingly
effectively challenged by Brahmanical thinkers. Franco shows that
Dharmakīrti attempts to do this by actually employing a strategy origi-
nally devised, perhaps, by one of the Brahmanical schools of philoso-
3
A remarkably similar debate took place in fourth-century China between Confucians
and Taoists about the existence of the Taoist immortal (hsien). See Ware 1967.
4
See Franco 1997.
74 JOHN TABER

phy, the Nyāya, in establishing the validity of their own scripture, the
Veda.5 Nyāya philosophers believed the Veda to be true because it is a
valid form of “testimony” (śabda), that is to say, it has an author or au-
thors who are āpta, “reliable witnesses.”6 This was in marked contrast
to the approach of another leading Brahmanical philosophical school of
the classical period, the Mīmāṃsā, which held that the Veda should be
considered true precisely because it is eternal and authorless – the
Mīmāṃsakas denied that the Veda was composed by human beings, or
even by God – for error in a statement or text can only derive from an
author. According to the Nyāyabhāṣya, the earliest commentary on the
Nyāyasūtra to have come down to us, someone is an āpta if he or she
possesses the qualities of having (1) direct knowledge of things, (2)
compassion toward living beings, and (3) a desire to teach things as
they are. Thus, one is able to determine that someone is an āpta, in gen-
eral, by confirming his or her statements in regard to things one is able
to verify for oneself. One is able to determine that the “seers and teach-
ers” of the Veda are āpta, in particular, by verifying the truth of the
prescriptions of the Āyur and Atharva Vedas, which contain medical
remedies and magical formulas for curing diseases and averting other
evils. One assumes that all portions of the Veda have the same seers and
teachers. By confirming the truth of certain parts of the Veda one can be
confident that the seers and teachers of the Veda are trustworthy in gen-
eral, i.e., have the qualities required of those who are āpta, therefore,
that all parts of the Veda are true.
Dharmakīrti appears to follow this strategy, Franco argues, by
attempting to demonstrate in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his magnum
opus, the Pramāṇavārttika, the validity of the Four Noble Truths, the
central part of the Buddha’s teaching! Having confirmed for ourselves,
through reasoning (with Dharmakīrti’s help), this, the most important
and profound doctrine expounded by the Buddha, we may be confident
that the Buddha is an āpta (for Dharmakīrti the term āptavacana is
equivalent for āgama, scripture), that he possesses all the qualities ex-
pressed by the epithets of the famous dedicatory verse of Dignāga’s
Pramāṇasamuccaya, which Franco convincingly shows parallel the

5
Franco 1997, chap. 1, pp. 28 ff.
6
The Nyāyabhāṣya refers to “the seers and teachers” (draṣṭāraḥ prayoktāraś ca) of
the Veda (NBh 568, 3-5), who were probably considered its composers. By the time
of Vācaspatimiśra the Veda is believed to have a single, divine author.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 75

qualities of an āpta as presented in the Nyāyabhāṣya. Thus, one may be

confident that all the Buddha’s teachings are true, including in particu-
lar his statements about the results of good and bad actions, which im-
ply recommendations about how one should live – what should be done
and not done. In other words, we may be confident that the way of life
the Buddha prescribed for his disciples – his “Dharma,” which deviates
in significant respects from the Dharma of the Brahmins as well as the
way of life of the Jainas – will indeed lead to salvation, liberation from
the cycle of rebirth, if not also well-being and prosperity on earth and in
heaven.
Criticisms of the Buddhist attempt to demonstrate the authority
of the Buddha by other schools, in particular, the Mīmāṃsā, indicate
that they understood the Buddhist argument along these same lines. The
Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila (also first half of the 7th c. C.E.) points
out that expertise in one area does not necessarily transfer to another;
just because someone is smart in grammar doesn’t means he knows
astronomy; and certainly, the fact that one knows a lot about the sorts of
things we can know through perception and reasoning hardly implies
that he is able to know anything about transcendent matters.7 Besides, if
we have to verify the Four Noble Truths in order to be confident of
them, it makes sense for us to verify other statements of the Buddha.
Why, indeed, accept anyone’s word about anything?8 But the debate
quickly came to focus on one particular implication of the claim that the
Buddha had knowledge of Dharma, and that is that he was possessed of
some kind of supernormal cognitive ability. Dharma pertains to the
good and bad results of actions. One ought to do X because doing X
will yield a good result – pleasure or happiness; one ought to avoid Y

7
See TS, 3163-66, which cites Kumārila’s lost work the Bṛhaṭṭīkā.
8
I am rather freely paraphrasing some of Kumārila’s points. See ŚV, Codanā 121 ff.;
for a more detailed account of Kumārila’s position see the contribution by Lawrence
McCrea in this volume. It should be kept in mind that in the first chapter of the
Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti indicates that the reliability of someone’s statements
in regard to things we are able to confirm does not strictly establish the truth of his
statements regarding other, supersensible things; for there is always the possibility
of a “deviation” (PVSV 167,23-168,3). Dignāga stated that the notion of the reliabil-
ity of the statements of an āpta is an “inference” only “because there is no other
way” of being guided in acting in regard to supersensible matters, according to
Dharmakīrti (PV 1.216; PVSV 108, 1-6; 109, 19-22). Strictly speaking, Dharmakīrti
says, scripture is not a pramāṇa (PVSV 168, 2-3)!
76 JOHN TABER

because doing Y will yield a bad result – pain or suffering. But one is
able to know such things only insofar as one is able to see that a certain
action committed in the past yielded a certain result and a certain action
committed in the present will yield a certain result. Knowledge of
Dharma entails the ability to perceive states of affairs in the past and the
future, which ability is beyond the scope of ordinary human beings – or
so, at least, the Mīmāṃsaka insists. Or else, Dharma is simply “that
which ought to be done and avoided.” But that, too, most Indian phi-
losophers believed, is something ordinary mortals are unable to know
independently of scripture.9 The truth of the Buddha’s recommendations
about how one should live, about what should and should not be done,
believed to have originated from him and not some other scriptural
source, are thus called into question. In short, his statements about such
matters cannot be trusted, because he had no way of knowing them.
Thus the debate about the possibility of supernormal cognition,
synonymous in most texts with yogic perception, yogipratyakṣa, begins
in earnest across a broad range of texts in Indian philosophy. I do not
intend to survey the history of this debate here. Rather, I will be con-
cerned with what came to be the main Buddhist argument for the possi-
bility of the Buddha’s omniscience, including especially his ability to
know the results of good and bad actions, which presupposes the power
to see the past and the future.10 I shall ask, what are we, in this day and
age, to make of this argument? Is it at all persuasive? Does it really es-
tablish that the perception of the past and the future, of things far away,
very small (atoms), or concealed (beneath the earth), is possible? I shall
consider this argument in its mature form, as presented by Ratnakīrti in
his Sarvajñasiddhi, “Proof of an Omniscient Person.” This text, which
represents the culmination of a long development, was translated into
German by Gudrun Bühnemann in her doctoral dissertation, written

9
See Taber 2005: 51-56.
10
The Buddhist argument under consideration here is actually presented as proving
only that the Buddha knew all things relevant to salvation, that is, as Dharmakīrti
puts it, “the reality of what is to be accepted and rejected and the means [thereto]“
(PV 2.34), not absolutely every thing in every way. See SS 1, 9-19. Dharmakīrti
suggests that proving omniscience in the latter sense would be otiose, though some
Buddhists clearly accepted it (see Jaini 1974); and it is not clear that the argument
for the omniscience of the Buddha just in regard to all things relevant to Dharma
doesn’t actually imply total omniscience.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 77

under the supervision of Prof. Ernst Steinkellner and published in

1980.11
Before I turn to Ratnakīrti’s argument, however, I would like to
draw attention to certain considerations that have shaped the attitude
toward the supernatural among philosophers in our culture and therefore
define the context in which we think about it today. The category of
supernatural or supernormal phenomena with which Western philoso-
phers have traditionally been concerned has been, not yogic experience,
of course, nor even extrasensory perception, but miracles, especially
biblical miracles, which have been frequently cited by Christians as
proof of the divinity of Jesus and of the authenticity of the Bible. The
classic statement on this matter is that of David Hume in his An Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. It has provoked an extensive litera-
ture, which continues to grow to this day.12
Hume’s concern was whether there can ever be a valid reason to
believe that a miracle has occurred. He assumes that few of us ever wit-
ness miracles ourselves, therefore the question becomes whether the
testimony of others can ever suffice to establish the occurrence of a
miracle. Now trust in testimony, Hume observes, is founded on experi-
ence. Normally, we notice, the statements of people conform to the
facts. Humans generally have decent memories, an inclination to tell the
truth, and a sense of probity accompanied by a sense of shame when
detected in a falsehood.13 Thus, we are inclined to believe what they
say. Yet, Hume says, “a wise man proportions his belief to the evi-
dence,” 14 and we should take all the evidence into account. What speaks
in favor of the credibility of testimony must be balanced against what
speaks against it. We become suspicious of testimony, for example,
when witnesses contradict each other; when they are few, or of doubtful
character; when they have an interest in what they affirm, and so on. In
particular, we become suspicious of testimony when it reports some-
thing highly unusual. The improbability of the event testified to can
indeed neutralize the authority of the person or persons testifying to it.
Here Hume cites the Roman saying, “I would not believe such a story

11
See Bühnemann 1980.
12
For a recent bibliography see Levine 1996. One of the most important recent contri-
butions is Coady 1992.
13
Hume 1955: 119.
14
Ibid., p. 118.
78 JOHN TABER

were it told to me by Cato.”15 Transposing this into Indian terms, the

āptatva of a witness, based on considerations about the witness’s char-
acter, his compassion and so forth, and even a solid track-record of cor-
rect statements in the past, is not sufficient by itself to guarantee the
truth of what he says. It must still be weighed against the improbability
of the fact to which he testifies.
From this Hume concludes that no testimony can ever be suffi-
cient to establish a miracle, which by definition is a violation of the
laws of nature, hence contrary to all experience. Or else,
no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony can be of
such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it
endeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of ar-
guments, so that the superior gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of
force which remains ... When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to
life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this
person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates,
should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and ac-
cording to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always
reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more mi-
raculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to
command my belief or opinion.16

One might think that while this analysis of testimony might pose a
problem for Christians, it doesn’t for Buddhists, since the Buddha was
not given to reporting miracles. But he did make statements about the
consequences of actions, which have implications about right and
wrong, about how one should conduct one’s life. For Indians in classi-
cal times, as discussed above, that suggests that he had an ability to
know things that ordinary mortals are unable to know, specifically, the
past and the future. Such an ability is prima facie miraculous by Hume’s
definition: it is contrary to common experience. Therefore, the Bud-
dha’s statements, despite his authority established on the basis of our
alleged confirmation of the most important and profound part of his
teachings, the Four Noble Truths, are called into question by the miracle
or miracles that would have had to occur in order for them to be expres-
sions of a valid state of knowledge on his part.

15
Ibid., p. 121.
16
Ibid., pp. 123-4.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 79

One can see from Hume’s discussion that the key to affirming
the Buddha’s authority is to show how yogic experience is possible, and
that would seem to entail showing how it is not a violation of the laws of
nature, i.e., not really a miracle at all. In other words, one must suggest
a plausible natural mechanism that can explain it. That is precisely what
Ratnakīrti tries to do in his Sarvajñasiddhi.
Ratnakīrti’s central argument – unfortunately I do not have
space to treat his views comprehensively – goes roughly like this. If one
thinks long enough and intensely enough about something, then the
object of one’s reflection will eventually present itself in propria per-
sona: one will have a vivid, intuitive experience of the object as if it
were actually present. A lovesick man, obsessed with a beautiful
maiden, for example, and constantly thinking of her, will eventually
experience a vivid apparition of her, as if she were bodily present. Now
the Buddha reflected on the Four Noble Truths uninterruptedly over a
long period of time; we may expect that this reflection eventually cul-
minated in a vivid intuitive experience of the Four Noble Truths. Since
the Four Noble Truths are universal in scope – they state that everything
is duḥkha, the cause of all duḥkha is desire, and so forth – his intuition
of those truths encompassed everything in the past, present, and future.
And so, when the Four Noble Truths became vividly evident to him, the
properties of all things past, present, and future became evident to him
as well.
I have of course taken liberties in paraphrasing the argument. Rat-
nakīrti’s own formulation is closer to the following.
Any property or quality of the mind (cetoguṇa) which is accompanied by atten-
tive, continuous, and sustained practice (abhyāsa) is capable of becoming vivid
(sphuṭībhāvayogya), like the mental representation (ākāra) of a maiden of a
lovesick man. The mental representations of the Four Noble Truths of the Bud-
dha are like that – they are mental qualities that were cultivated by attentive,
continuous, and sustained practice. Hence they were capable of becoming vivid
(SS 1, 20-25).

Ratnakīrti is aware of course that this does not directly prove the omnis-
cience of the Buddha but just the possibility of a mental state achieving,
through continuous repetition, a kind of intuitive quality (SS 4, 24 ff.).
Vividness is the hallmark of perception for Ratnakīrti, as we shall see;
hence, for any vivid, intuitive awareness there is a presumption in favor
of its truth. It is only by further implication that the person who has
achieved a vivid intuition of the Four Noble Truths through this kind of
80 JOHN TABER

practice can have a vivid intuition of all things in the past, present, and
future, which comprise the subject of the propositions which are the
Four Noble Truths (except perhaps the fourth) (SS 10, 18-21).17 It is
sufficient to establish merely this possibility, says Ratnakīrti, in order to
refute those who deny there could be any cause of omniscience (i.e., the
Mīmāṃsakas and Cārvākas [materialist philosophers]) (SS 5, 12-13). In
fact, if one maintained that a vivid intuition will arise from the constant
repetition of a particular mental state, then one would be inferring an
effect from its cause, which is illegitimate (SS 5, 4-5). That specifically
the Buddha had such a (veracious) intuition is then indicated by the
correctness of his teachings of the momentariness and selflessness of all
entities, which are established by other pramāṇas but which other sages
alleged to be omniscient reject (SS 6, 10-21) – that is to say, in effect,
by his āptatva, his compassion and wisdom as established by our own
confirmation of the truth of his main teachings. It would be impossible
to prove directly that a particular person such as the Buddha is omnis-
cient, because there is no class of omniscient persons with which to
compare him and in which he would be included if he possessed a cer-
tain characteristic mark.
Thus, the crux of Ratnakīrti’s proof is the attempt to establish
the possibility of bringing a cognition to complete vividness, in effect
raising it to the status of a perception, through constant and intense
repetition.
The first thing that strikes the modern reader about the proof is
the example, which is supposed to ground the generalization that mental
states that are practiced attentively, constantly, and over a long period
of time indeed yield vivid intuitions. What is Ratnakīrti talking about
when he says that the lovesick man, obsessed with the maiden, eventu-
ally sees her (as if) before his very eyes? This is not the sort of thing
that is often reported in our culture. Nor, for that matter, does it seem to

17
This, however, is from the Buddhist pūrvapakṣa of Vācaspatimiśra’s Nyāyakaṇikā
which Ratnakīrti quotes (see below) – and the point is made in regard to knowledge
of the selflessnessness of all entities, not the Four Noble Truths. Ratnakīrti does not
make the point explicitly himself. Cf., however, TS 3440-42. McClintock 2000 of-
fers an analysis of how Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla thought a cognition of all things
could follow from the cognition of one general object, such as emptiness or selfless-
ness. It should be noted, however, that the notion of omniscience as the ability to
know all objects at once is rejected in the Pali Canon. See Jaini 1974, 80-82.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 81

have been a staple of Indian literature. Kuntidevī in the Mahābhārata is

able to call into her presence the various gods, but she was given a man-
tra to do that. Visualization practices are known throughout Tantric and
sectarian Hindu literature, and of course bhāvanā has a lengthy history
in Buddhism prior to Ratnakīrti, but those are precisely the sorts of
techniques the efficacy of which is in question here. To cite them as
examples for establishing the connection of the logical reason of this
inference with the property-to-be-proved would be an obvious petitio
principii. I shall return to this point presently. Vācaspatimiśra, however,
the Brahmanical writer, in his discussion of this argument in his
Nyāyakaṇikā, has the Buddhist maintaining that this is something we
can actually observe, if only indirectly. We know from the speech and
gestures of a lovesick man that he finds himself in the presence of the
woman he is obsessed with, for he says, “Come, you enchanting crea-
ture with the jug-like breasts, eyes of a deer, and slender, golden body –
embrace me like the vine of the Kandalī plant. I fall down at your
feet!”18 But if this is what Ratnakīrti is talking about, his example, at the
same time that it establishes the possibility of a very vivid intuitive
cognition arising from constant and sustained reflection, also suggests
its falsehood. The lovesick man may indeed be seeing a beautiful
woman, but if we can’t see her, too, then she is not real!
Vācaspati raises essentially this objection in his discussion of an
earlier version of the Buddhist argument in his Nyāyakaṇikā, which
Ratnakīrti quotes at length in the Sarvajñasiddhi and attempts to refute
(SS 10, 15 – 11, 25).19 (Vācaspati, by the way, is a somewhat puzzling
figure in that he wrote, besides the Nyāyakaṇikā, in which he attacks the
very possibility of yogic perception, also a commentary on the
Yogasūtrabhāṣya, in which he takes all kinds of yogic experience very
seriously.) We will grant, Vācaspati says, that someone might produce a
vivid intuitive cognition of an object through constant reflection or con-
templation (bhāvanā) on it, but that cognition will not be a pramāṇa, a
valid means of knowledge; for, neither identical with nor arising from
that object, it can deviate from it, that is, it can turn out that the object is
quite different from how it is represented in the cognition. The Bud-

18
Adapted from Vidhivivekaḥ, 1218,10-1220,3. Dharmakīrti also suggests that the
fact that a person is experiencing the object as if it is bodily present can be inferred
from his behavior; see the contribution by Vincent Eltschinger in this volume.
19
In the Nyāyakaṇikā the discussion extends from 1214,8-1224,9.
82 JOHN TABER

dha’s vivid intuitive cognition of all entities as duḥkha and so forth, as a

result of his meditation on the Four Noble Truths, which are proposi-
tional in nature and which he arrived at presumably through some proc-
ess of reasoning, did not actually arise from all the entities in the uni-
verse, the ultimately real particulars themselves, but from his thought
about them. The Four Noble Truths refer to “everything” only in a gen-
eral way; they do not specifically mention that entity A is duḥkha, entity
B is duḥkha, and so forth. If one were to maintain that the Buddha’s
intuitive cognition of all entities nevertheless arose indirectly from all
ultimately real particulars (svalakṣaṇas), in the same way that an infer-
ential cognition of fire from the observation of smoke arises indirectly
from the svalakṣaṇa of fire that produces the svalakṣaṇa of smoke that
one observes, and in the same way that a vivid intuitive cognition of fire
resulting from continuous and sustained contemplation on that inferred
fire might be said to arise indirectly from the particular fire and thus be
caused by its object – if one were to take this view, one must still ac-
knowledge that the intuitive cognition of fire resulting from the medita-
tion on the fire we inferred to exist from the heavy smoke rising from,
say, the top of the ridge, is usually quite different from the searing blaze
we are confronted with when we finally get to the top of the ridge! In
general, says Vācaspati, the intuitive cognition resulting from bhāvanā
is produced not by its object but by the bhāvanā – as if to say, it is a
state of subjective effervescence or intensity engendered just by the
mental activity of contemplation. It can have an unreal object just as
easily as a real one, as we see indeed in the case of the lovesick man. If
we were ever to encounter such a person in our day we would tend to
dismiss him, saying something like, “He’s really worked himself into a
state!”20

20
Dharmakīrti tries to escape this problem by stipulating that yogic perception must be
reliable, saṃvādin (PV 3.286) – or else “consistent with a pramāṇa” (pramāṇa-
saṃvādin), if one reads the verse according to Franco’s recommendation (see
Franco forthcoming). He recognizes that some of the meditational exercises that
form part of the preliminary path for the Buddhist adept achieve vivid, non-
conceptual cognitions of unreal (abhūta), imagined objects, such as a corpse in vari-
ous stages of decay (PV 3.284). For a yogic cognition to count as an instance of the
pramāṇa perception its object must be established by other pramāṇas, in particular,
reasoning. Thus, the chief, if not indeed the sole, object of (valid) yogic perception
for Dharmakīrti is the Four Noble Truths, which he establishes by means of reason-
ing in the second chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika. See, again, the contribution by
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 83

Ratnakīrti’s response to this, which I take to be the main criti-

cism of his argument as I have reconstructed it, is not unsophisticated;
in the end, however, it does not seem completely satisfactory. He
stresses at the outset, partially in reply to objections raised by other au-
thors, that the essence of perception does not consist in its being pro-
duced by an external sense faculty, but in its involving the immediate
presentation of its object (sākṣātkāra) (SS 16, 32-33). The vivid intui-
tive cognition of all things produced by bhāvanā on the Four Noble
Truths is a mental cognition that immediately reveals its object and
therefore qualifies as a perception. “Just as the visual sense, without
violating its [normal] capacity, functions to produce its specific [visual]
cognition dependent on an object located in an appropriate place, so the
mind, which is also a sense faculty, joined with bhāvanā on an existing
object, which opposes all ignorance, and reaching (prāpya!) an object
located in an appropriate place, will function to produce its specific
cognition (svavijñānajanana)” (SS 17, 2-4). Just as visual perception is
possible without coming directly in contact with its object, so is mental
cognition – of objects in the past and the future – possible – but not for
everyone! The key here is the practice of a kind of bhāvanā that de-
stroys the defilements that normally restrict the capacity of perception
to objects proximate in time and space, in particular, bhāvanā on the
Four Noble Truths or on the momentariness and selflessness of all enti-
ties (SS 17, 4-14). Once one fully comprehends these things, ignorance
is destroyed, which uproots the other defilements (kleśas). This kind of
bhāvanā, which reveals the object as it truly is even though the mind is
not in immediate contact with it – in the same way, for the Buddhist, the
senses of vision and hearing apprehend their objects without being di-
rectly in contact with them – must be said to arise from the object itself,
and not just from the bhāvanā, and so it is a pramāṇa.
Vācaspati’s example of an intuitive cognition produced from
contemplation on an inferred fire, which is seen not always to corre-
spond to its object, is therefore a sheer fantasy and cannot be taken as
challenging the generalization the Buddhist really wants to establish,
namely, that bhāvanā on an object yields a veracious intuitive cogni-

Vincent Eltschinger in this volume. The unfortunate consequence of this kind of ap-
proach, as we shall see, is that it leaves no other example of yogic perception to
point to in proving the possibility of the Buddha’s perception of the Four Noble
Truths.
84 JOHN TABER

tion. No one would practice bhāvanā on a fire (SS 19, 21-25)!21 And it
would seem that the main point Ratnakīrti is emphasizing, that the kind
of bhāvanā he is talking about is the kind that destroys ignorance, de-
sire, and other defilements, thereby releasing perception from its usual
constraints (of proximity to its object in time and space, and so forth),
could be used to turn aside the objection Vācaspati (and I) raised earlier
against the example of the lovesick man, namely, that this is a case of
hallucination, not a valid cognition; for Ratnakīrti could say that in this
case, too, we are not dealing with the right kind of bhāvanā, the kind
that really destroys the defilements and has the power immediately to
present its object as it really is. In fact, if there ever were a case of the
wrong kind of bhāvanā, the type that would reinforce avidyā and the
other defilements, not remove them, surely this is it!
Now, however, Ratnakīrti – the Buddhist – is faced with a new
and equally serious problem, which in the end seems fatal to me. He
has, in effect, in responding to Vacaspati's objections, revised his infer-
ence so that it might be stated as follows:
The proper kind of bhāvanā focused on the right kind of object will yield a vera-
cious, intuitive experience of that object. The Buddha’s contemplation of the
Four Noble Truths was precisely that – the proper kind of bhāvanā focused on
the right kind of object. Therefore, the Buddha achieved a veracious, intuitive
experience of the Four Noble Truths.

His problem now is that he is still in need of an example for his infer-
ence, one that will support the generalization that the right kind of bhā-
vanā on the right kind of object will lead to a veracious, intuitive ex-
perience of the object. He needs an example, moreover, that is drawn
from everyday experience; for the positive example of an inference must
be siddha, not taken from the class of things to be proved but already
accepted by both opponent and proponent. Obviously, Ratnakīrti can-
not, in grounding the generalization on which his inference is based,
appeal to the alleged fact that yogis have veracious, intuitive experi-
ences as a result of the destruction of defilements by means of bhāvanā
all the time! No such example from everyday experience, however, ap-
pears to be forthcoming. This is hardly surprising; for it is of the es-
sence of ordinary perception that it is restricted to objects that exist here

21
Someone who is cold will simply move toward a fire he has inferred, not contem-
plate it.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 85

and now, are of a certain magnitude, and directly affect the sense facul-
ties. It’s beginning to look as if “you can’t get there from here,” you
can’t base an argument for the possibility of supernomal perception on
observations about everyday experience. Everyday experience speaks
against the possibility of supernormal experience at every turn.
Ratnakīrti is also faced with a problem concerning the vyatireka
of his inference. The logical reason or hetu of an inference has to satisfy
not only the requirement of anvaya, being found together with the prop-
erty-to-be-proved, which is documented by the positive example, but
also the requirement of vyatireka, not being found to occur in the ab-
sence of the property-to-be-proved, which is documented by a negative
example. Is it the case, however, that no mental state that is practiced
assiduously over a long period of time ever fails to yield a veracious,
vivid intuitive cognition? Well, we certainly hear plenty of reports from
disappointed meditators practicing all kinds of techniques, including
visualization techniques, to the effect that the promised result never
comes about: the object of meditation does not materialize even after
sustained and arduous practice. The only question is how long and hard
does one have to keep practicing without results before one deems that
the generalization that such practice will eventually yield a vivid, vera-
cious intuition is disconfirmed? In short, the relation between logical
reason and property-to-be-proved in this inference seems rather tenu-
ous.
I think we can begin to see from this very brief treatment of
Ratnakīrti’s main argument that, when it comes to the attempt to prove
the possibility of supernormal, yogic experience by means of some kind
of inference, anumāna, the skeptic – the Humean or the Mīmāṃsaka –
will always have the advantage. The Mīmāṃsakas understood this very
well. For every proof, sādhana, of the omniscience of the Buddha that
the Buddhist puts forward, they said, there will be a counterproof, a
pratisādhana. Whatever characteristics the Buddha might have that
speak in favor of his possession of supernormal abilities – his long
meditation on momentariness and selflessness, which would seem to
destroy ignorance along with all the other kleśas, his compassion and
accuracy concerning things we are able to verify for ourselves – will be
offset by all his other ordinary human characteristics, which indicate he
really wasn’t any different from the rest of us. (As a modern skeptic
might put it: he had to put his pants on one leg at a time, just like us!)
The Mīmāṃsaka lists among these mundane characteristics: his being
86 JOHN TABER

an object of cognition, being an object of a valid means of knowledge,

being a living being, a human being, a speaker, and possessed of sense
faculties.22
It seems, then, that the Buddhist cannot win at the anumāna (in-
ference) game when it comes to debating about the existence of super-
normal powers or beings with supernormal abilities. He cannot prove
the possibility of supernormal perception by means of some inference.
Inference, by its very nature, appeals to experience. It is therefore diffi-
cult to see how it can ever reveal to us anything, even the possibility of
anything, beyond experience. This is what two of the greatest Indian
thinkers outside the epistemological tradition, Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara,
pointed out. Reasoning cannot tell us about what lies beyond the senses,
only scripture can. But this is hardly a satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem of evidence for yoga and yogic experience that confronts the mod-
ern yoga researcher!
It would seem that the Buddhist failure to prove the possibility
of yogic perception has implications for the question of whether yogic
experience is possible in general. The Buddhist case suggests that any
attempt to prove that yogic experience is possible is bound to fail. For
any proof – unless of course it is an a priori proof, which seems hardly
to come into question here – must somehow extrapolate from common
experience; and our common experience of human cognition is that it is
opposite in nature to yogic experience: it is characterized by intentional-
ity (directedness toward objects) 23 and dependent on the stimulation of
the nervous system by internal and external stimuli. More specifically,
in order to show that yogic experience is possible, one must be able to
suggest a causal mechanism that could account for it. Any such mecha-
nism, however, would have to be consistent with our scientific under-
standing of nature, to which humans of course also belong – which un-
derstanding must ultimately be based on common experience, including
observations we make about normal human perception and other cogni-
tive processes. Thus, it seems one could never prove yogic experience
to be possible. Indeed, the whole enterprise of attempting to devise

22
See SS p. 23, 11-14: sugato ‘sarvajñaḥ jñeyatvāt prameyatvāt sattvāt puruṣatvād
vaktṛtvād indriyādimattvād ityādi rathyāpuruṣavat; cf. ŚV, Codanā 132; TS, 3156.
23
Samādhi, on the other hand, is depicted as a state of pure consciousness, awareness
without an object.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 87

some kind of proof of the possibility of yogic experience seems funda-

mentally misguided.
At the same time, however, it becomes apparent that one cannot
prove that yogic experience is impossible, either. The fact that some-
thing “violates the laws of nature” – i.e., the principles that underly our
scientific understanding of nature – does not establish its impossibility,
as Hume seems to think, unless we are confident that those “laws” cap-
ture the way things really are.24 We are sophisticated enough nowadays
– we have obtained sufficient distance from the great discoveries that
revolutionized Hume’s world – to know that that is unlikely. We know
that the foundations of our scientific picture of the world are periodi-
cally called into question and revised, and that we can, at any moment
in the history of science, only be confident that we are progressing
closer toward a correct, comprehensive understanding of nature, but
never that we have finally arrived there. Moreover, we have become
aware that science advances only by posing questions to which precise
and definite answers can be provided, which restricts its focus to a cer-
tain range of phenomena; we are painfully aware that, for all the amaz-
ing progress of the physical and social sciences, there is still much we
do not know. Under these circumstances, to consider compatibility with
“the laws of nature” as science currently understands them the criterion
of possibility would be rather arbitrary.
Nevertheless, this offers little if any succor to those who would
like to believe in yogic experiences. That something is not impossible of
course implies that it is possible, but mere theoretic possibility is hardly
the same as plausibility. The fact that something is incompatible with
our scientific understanding of nature makes it, if not impossible, then
certainly extremely unlikely. Indeed, that may have been all that Hume
meant when he referred to something as a “miracle.”
Let us now return to the situation of the yoga researcher and see
if these considerations somehow give us a new purchase on the problem
of whether yogic experience is possible. The yoga researcher is faced

24
See Hume 1955: 122: “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm
and unalterable experience has established those laws, the proof against a miracle,
from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can
possibly be imagined.” This passage suggests that “the laws of nature” Hume has in
mind are ones to which we have epistemic access, hence the laws of nature as de-
fined by contemporary science.
88 JOHN TABER

with the following predicament: Over against the “impossibility” of

yogic experiences and altered states of consciousness stands the fact
that they are widely, even cross-culturally, reported. Committed to a
scientific view of the world, convinced that everything will eventually
yield itself to a scientific – and that means a physical – explanation, one
may be inclined to adopt the position that there simply are no valid
clairvoyant or clairaudient experiences – no one ever really sees things
in the past or the future, let alone all things at once – or genuine states
of objectless trance, and that reports of such experiences and the preoc-
cupation with them in certain cultures or traditions have to be under-
stood in terms of the role the idea of such experiences plays in them.
Yet I believe that a yoga researcher may also reasonably resist this con-
clusion, because it just presents us with another disturbing incongruity,
namely, that certain cultures and traditions should attach so much im-
portance to experiences that are essentially erroneous or hallucinatory.
Yet the latter researcher must also have a response to the
Humean challenge: Shouldn’t reports of yogic experiences simply be
dismissed on the grounds that they are violations of the so-called laws
of nature and therefore ipso facto undermine the credibility of anyone
who would report them? For, otherwise, on what basis could one ever
believe that such experiences actually occur? Here it must be noted,
however, that Hume’s attitude – quite reminiscent, in fact, of the
Mīmāṃsā attitude that people and the world have always been, and
presumably will continue to be, more or less as they are today25 – when
taken to an extreme, becomes unreasonable and unscientific. If “the
laws of nature,” determined just by what we have experienced thus far,
rigidly dictated what counts as valid experience, we would never learn
anything really new. Columbus’s “discovery” of the New World would
never have been taken seriously – the “miracle of the fact” would have
cancelled out the credibility of the witnesses – nor any other major geo-
graphical, archaeological, and astronomical discovery of history. We
would have dismissed out of hand reports of magnetism produced by an
electric current, x-rays, black holes, static electricity, vacuums, cloud
chambers, and many, many other phenomena. In general, the Humean
principle that science immediately overrules reports of experiences in-
consistent with it is insensitive to the fact that science and experience

25
Cf. ŚV, Codanā 113; cf. also McCrea’s paper in this volume.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 89

exist in a kind of tension with each other. Our current scientific picture
of reality may tell us what is “possible,” but experience can call scien-
tific theory into question and sometimes even overrule it – indeed, if it
couldn’t, science would not be empirical. Of course, that happens only
in certain circumstances, which modern history of science has helped us
to understand; in particular, it happens when the resources are available
to construct a new theory that not only accounts for the problematic
phenomenon but also has greater overall predictive power and fecundity
than the old one. Moreover, the kind of experience to which science is
attuned is, ideally, repeatable and intersubjectively verifiable, and yogic
experience is typically not like that. Nevertheless, in light of our mod-
ern understanding of the dynamic relationship between scientific theory
and empirical observation, Hume’s attitude that an established scientific
theory should automatically overrule reports of experiences of phenom-
ena that are inconsistent with it (because the “miracle of the fact” will
always be greater than the “miracle” that the testimony is false) seems
too strong and even dogmatic.26

26
I have not attempted here to do justice to all of the subtleties of Hume’s position, let
alone consider all the interpretations, revisions, and refinements of it that have
emerged in two-and-a-half centuries of discussion of it. Suffice it here to point out
that while Hume may have thought that testimony about the occurrence of a miracle,
which by definition is a violation of the laws of nature, is a priori incredible, testi-
mony about other extraordinary events, which are “analogous” to other events
known from experience, may be acceptable under certain circumstances. He consid-
ers the case of “all authors, in all languages” agreeing that on January 1, 1600, the
entire earth was plunged into darkness for eight days. “... Suppose that the tradition
of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: that all travel-
ers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition,
without the least variation or contradiction: it is evident, that our present philoso-
phers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought search
for causes whence it might be derived” (Hume 1955: 137-8). One could argue that
yogic experience is more like this; it is less of a prodigy than an outright miracle –
think of Moses turning the Nile into blood (Exodus 7:14-24), for example – and
bears certain analogies to common experience. (Another Buddhist author,
Śāntarakṣita, suggested, in attempting to prove the possibility of yogic perception,
that it is analogous to the ability of certain animals to see in the dark or see great
distances [see TS, 3404-6]. Moreover, he argued, directly contradicting the
Mīmāṃsaka, that just as one might increase one’s capacity to jump through constant
practice, so one can increase, proportionately to one’s practice, one’s mental powers
[TS, 3424-30]. For that matter, the argument for the possibility of yogic perception
from the observation that one may bring about a vivid, “intuitive” experience of an
90 JOHN TABER

In summary, unable to prove either that yogic experience is pos-

sible or that it is impossible, it would seem that one ought to suspend
judgement about the matter. But of course that leaves open the possibil-
ity that yogic experience is possible, and that means, by application of a
well-known rule of modal logic, that it is possible. But the mere theo-
retic possibility of yogic experience is too thin a basis for taking reports
of yogic experience seriously, i.e., at face value. Those historians and
social scientists who are inclined to do so require an additional, fairly
powerful reason. Such a reason, I believe, would be the conviction that
the societies and traditions they study are inherently healthy and ra-
tional. That they would attribute great value and importance to certain
experiences – even to the point of considering them the most important
experiences one can have – that misrepresent reality and are rarely, if
ever, confirmed, simply does not make sense. The urge simply to over-
rule reports of experiences that are incompatible with our current scien-
tific picture of reality, to which Hume has forcefully given expression,
can reasonably be resisted by noting that, in the end – even taking into
account all the considerations brought to bear on this matter by propo-
nents of scientific holism – our scientific picture of reality is built up
from and justified by experience, not vice versa. Until we are confident
that we have worked out a complete theory of nature, including human
nature, we must continue to collect data with open minds, and that
means, we must willing to consider it at face value. Nevertheless, as
long as yogic experience remains incompatible with the picture of na-
ture presented to us by the physical and biological sciences, it will con-
tinue to be deeply problematic. The only thing that could eventually

object by constant meditation can be seen as pursuing this same strategy; it renders
it less incongruous by showing it to be continuous with other known phenomena.) In
light of this, one might well argue that testimony about yogic experience should be
accepted because it actually meets Hume’s standard for acceptability, namely, its
falsehood would be more improbable than the phenomenon it reports; for, as I have
suggested, given the importance vested in yogic experience and altered states of
consciousness in so many cultures, the imaginary or illusory status of these experi-
ences would be would be highly problematic. That, however, is ultimately a com-
plex methodological question in the social sciences which also cannot be adequately
dealt with here. For a trenchant presentation of the dominant attitude toward reli-
gious experience within the academic discipline of religious studies in North Amer-
ica – with which this paper is of course completely at odds – one may consult
McCutcheon 2001.
 YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 91

dispel the air of mystery around yoga and yogic experience would be a
(radically) revised theory of nature that can accommodate it – which,
however, at this time is not on the horizon.

ABBREVATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bühnemann 1980 Gudrun Bühnemann, Der Allwissende Buddha. Ein Beweis und
seine Probleme. Ratnakīrti’s Sarvajñasiddhi. Wiener Studien zur
Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 4. Wien 1980.
Coady 1992 C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: a Philosophical Study. Oxford 1992.
Franco 1997 Eli Franco, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Wiener
Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 38. Wien 1997.
Franco forthcoming Eli Franco, “Perceptions of Yogis - Some Epistemological and
Metaphysical Considerations.” Proceedings of the 4th Interna-
tional Dharmakīrti Conference. Wien, forthcoming
Freud 1961 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion. New York 1961.
Levine 1996 Michael Levine, “Miracles.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles 1996.
Hume 1955 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed.
Charles W. Hendel, Indianapolis 1955.
Jaini 1974 P. S. Jaini, “On the Sarvajñatva of Mahāvīra and the Buddha.” In:
Buddhist Studies in Honor of I. B. Horner. Dordrecht 1974
McClintock 2000 Sara McClintock, “Knowing All through Knowing One: Mystical
Communion or Logical Trick in the Tattvasaṃgraha and
Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.” Journal of the International Association
of Buddhist Studies 23/2 2000.
McCutcheon 2001 Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the
Public Study of Religion. Albany 2001.
Nyāyakaṇikā Vācaspatimiśra, Nyāyakaṇikā. In: Vidhiviveka.
NBh Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya. In: Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana’s
Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyaṭīkā
& Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti, ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and
Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1983
PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmkirtti with the
Commentary ‘Vrtti’ of Acharya Manorathanandin, ed. Swami
Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series 3. Varanasi 1968.
PVSV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. In: The Pramāṇavārttikam
of Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary, ed.
Raniero Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome 1960.
ŚV Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Ślokavārttika. In: Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila
Bhaṭṭa, with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasāra-
thimiśra, ed. Svāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī, Prāchyabhārati Series 10.
Varanasi 1978.
SS Ratnakīrti, Sarvajñasiddhi. In: Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī, ed. Anan-
talal Thakur, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 3. Patna 1975.
92 JOHN TABER

Taber 2005 John Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology. London

2005.
TS Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha. In: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya
Shāntarakṣita, with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Ka-
malashīla, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Se-
ries 1-2. Varanasi 1981.
Vidhiviveka Maṇḍanamiśra, Vidhivivekaḥ with Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of
Vācaspatimiśraḥ and Supercommentaries Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī and
Svaditaṅkaraṅī of Parameśvaraḥ: the Pūrvapakṣa, ed. Elliot M.
Stern, 4 vols., unpublished disser., University of Pennsylvania
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1989).
Ware 1967 James R. Ware (trans.), Alchemy, Medicine, and Religion in the
China of A.D. 320: The Nei pien of Ko Hung (Pao-p’u tzu). Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1967.
 ELI FRANCO

Meditation and Metaphysics

On their Mutual Relationship in South Asian
Buddhism1

It is well known that Buddhism developed and prescribed a large num-

ber of meditative exercises. It is equally well known that Buddhism
developed some highly original metaphysical doctrines, such as the
anātman-doctrine, i.e., the doctrine that there is no soul and no sub-
stance, the doctrine of momentariness, i.e., the doctrine that all things,
even those that seem permanent such as stones and mountains, last for
only a moment, the doctrine of Emptiness of the Madhyamaka accord-
ing to which nothing really exists and all things are but an illusion, or
the idealism of the Yogācāra which professes that the external world is
merely an image in our consciousness. However, it may be less well
known that all metaphysical doctrines of Buddhism have their corre-
spondence in meditative practice, and some of them may even have
arisen from such practice.
There are at least two main reasons for this state of affairs. First
the general tendency in Indian thought to presuppose a correspondence
theory of truth. In other words, if the objects visualized by the yogi dur-
ing meditation are to be considered true, they must have a correspon-
dence in reality. In this respect, the perception or awareness of yogis is
not different from any other perception. The second reason is that in the
majority of Buddhist traditions, Enlightenment, or liberating insight,

1
I would like to thank Lambert Schmithausen very warmly for personal and written
comments on a previous draft of this paper and I regret that he was unable to com-
ment on this final draft. I am also indebted to Karin Preisendanz who read several
versions of the paper and made highly perspicacious comments and suggestions at
all stages. Further thanks go to Nobuyoshi Yamabe who kindly shared his thoughts
with me about the nature of meditation and its relation to philosophical theories.
94 ELI FRANCO

consists in a right insight into the true nature of reality.2 And this pro-
found insight into the absolute truth, it is generally assumed, cannot be
achieved only by way of rational thinking which is connected to con-
cepts and language, but has to be deepened in meditation. One should
not only learn and think about the teachings of the Buddha, but also
meditate upon them repeatedly. Thus, because Enlightenment is usually
an insight into the true nature of the world, the metaphysical teachings
were being taught as subjects of meditation, and their content was pos-
tulated as part of liberating insight. It goes without saying that this con-
tent differs from tradition to tradition. In a realistic tradition the liberat-
ing insight is an insight into the true nature of the final elements of exis-
tence (dharma); in an illusionistic tradition it consists in the insight that
precisely these elements are unreal.3
It is undisputed that there are close relationships between medi-
tation and metaphysics in Buddhism. However, some scholars of Bud-
dhism go as far as to claim that all metaphysical doctrines in Buddhism
have arisen from meditative practice, and indeed this opinion seems to
be widely spread. I will mention here only three of its most influential
variants. Constantin Regamey claims that not only Buddhist philosophy,
but Indian philosophy in general is the rational interpretation of mysti-
cal experience (Regamey 1951: 251):
Notre philosophie est née de la curiosité et du besoin de savoir, d’expliquer le
monde d’une façon cohérente. En Inde la philosophie est l’interprétation ration-
nelle de l’expérience mystique.

This is the most sweeping generalisation on the subject that I have come
across so far. According to Regamey one would have to assume that
every Indian philosophical theory, from the atomism and ontological
categories of the Vaiśeṣika to the logical developments of Navya
Nyāya, is a rational interpretation of mystical experience. In a less

2
This in contradistinction to Jainism, where the means of liberation consists in the
elimination of karma, or certain theistic systems, where liberation depends on the
grace of God, etc.
3
In addition to these two reasons, one may mention the subjective feeling of the
meditating person, who sometimes feels transposed to another space (cf. for instance
the case of the dhyāna meditation below). The journey of the spirit is a phenomenon
well known from many cultures, even though the modalities of such journeys are not
often theorized.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 95

sweeping but similar manner Edward Conze, one of the most influential
Buddhist scholars in the second half of the twentieth century, states
(Conze 1967: 213):
The cornerstone of my interpretation of Buddhism is the conviction, shared by
nearly everyone, that it is essentially a doctrine of salvation, and that all its phi-
losophical statements are subordinate to its soteriological purpose. This implies,
not only that many philosophical problems are dismissed as idle speculations,
but that each and every [philosophical] proposition must be considered in refer-
ence to its spiritual intention and as a formulation of meditative experiences ... I
cannot imagine any scholar wishing to challenge this methodological postulate
…

However, the most influential formulation of this hypothesis was put

forward by Lambert Schmithausen in his renowned paper “Spirituelle
Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus” (Schmithausen
1973: 1854):
Es scheint sich somit bei dieser Entwicklung von philosophischen Theorien aus
spirituell-praktischen Ursprüngen um einen Vorgang zu handeln, der für die
buddhistische Geistesgeschichte geradezu t y p i s c h ist. ... Für die zentralen,
das Ganze bestimmenden philosophischen Theorien gilt, dass sie, zum minde-
sten zum größten Teil, unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis hervorgewachsen
sein dürften.5

4
A shorter English version of this paper was published as “On the Problem of the
Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism,” cf.
Schmithausen 1976a. This shorter version was reprinted in Williams 2005: 242-254.
5
“It seems, therefore, that philosophical theories developing out of meditative exer-
cises is a process that is really t y p i c a l for Buddhist intellectual history.
It is valid to say that the central philosophical theories, which define the whole, may
have directly arisen, at least for the most part, from spiritual practice (=meditative
practice).”
The expression “spirituelle Praxis” can be understood, of course, in a very broad
manner. Indeed, any mental activity can be so described. However, if this term is to
describe something that is typical for Buddhism and to stand in contradistinction to
philosophical theory, its scope has to be narrowed down. Schmithausen defines “spi-
rituelle Praxis” (p. 162) as “die geistige Seite religiöser Übungen, d.h. solcher Ü-
bungen oder Handlungen, die direkt oder indirekt auf das Heil ausgerichtet sind. Im
Falle des Buddhismus handelt es sich dabei vor allem um moralisch-ethische Übun-
gen sowie um Versenkungspraktiken.” Since moral-ethical exercises are not further
discussed in Schmithausen 1973 and 2005, and do not seem to be directly relevant to
the arising of metaphysical theories, I will confine my remarks to “Versenkungs-
96 ELI FRANCO

Unlike Regamey, Conze and others, Schmithausen does not only claim
that philosophical theories in Buddhism arose from meditative practice,
but actually attempts to prove that this is the case. I will, therefore, con-
fine my remarks to his paper.6
Schmithausen’s thesis is seductive because if it could be con-
firmed, it would capture an essential and special characteristic of Bud-
dhism that would distinguish it not only from Western philosophies and
religions, but also from other Indian traditions. However, the relation-
ship between meditation and metaphysics is in my opinion more com-
plex and heterogeneous, and I shall argue that its varieties cannot be
reduced to a single homogeneous model.
Let me begin with two cases that fit Schmithausen’s hypothesis
well. The close relationship between meditation and metaphysics can be
clearly seen in the case of dhyāna-meditation. This type of meditation is
generally considered to belong to the earliest strata of the Buddhist
canon (see, for instance, Vetter 1988: 3ff.), and it already appears
within the framework of the four noble truths. The fourth truth laconi-

praktiken” which I translate as “meditative practice,” “meditative state” or simply as

“meditation.” Regamey uses the term “expérience mystique” to refer, presumably,
to the same meditative experiences. Cf. also Schmithausen 1973: 165 where he re-
fers to Conze’s thesis (Conze 1962: 251ff. cf. also May 1971) that the roots of
Yogācāra are to be looked for above all (in erster Linie) in meditative practice, in
opposition to Masuda’s hypothesis that the Yogācāra developed as a reaction to the
absolute Negativism of the Madhyamaka. In Schmithausen 2005: 247, Schmit-
hausen also uses the expression “transphenomenal state” to refer to the Buddhist
spiritual practice.
6
As I understand it, Schmithausen’s thesis clearly implies that all the important or
central philosophical theories in Buddhism arose mainly from meditative practice.
However, in what follows I will examine a number of philosophical theories that are
not discussed in his paper. In this respect, I may be going beyond his original inten-
tion. Ideally, one would have to determine first what Schmithausen considers central
and what philosophy, but these are issues that I hope Schmithausen himself will
clarify on a different occasion. In my opinion, all the philosophical doctrines dis-
cussed below are central to Buddhism, but it goes without saying that others may be
of a different opinion. On the use of the term “philosophical” here, cf. n. 55 below.
I am however not the first to criticize Schmithausen’s thesis. An extensive criticism
was formulated in Robert Sharf’s impressive paper (Sharf 1995). A more limited
criticism that concerns only the Yogācāra portion of Schmithausen’s paper was
voiced in Bronkhorst 2000: 77-93. But my approach here is different and, I hope,
has not been made redundant by these previous criticisms.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 97

cally describes the path of a person from the moment he meets the Bud-
dha and comes to realize that life is fundamentally frustrating, painful
and hopeless till the moment he reaches Enlightenment through medita-
tion.
Right meditation, which is the culmination of the path, is di-
vided into four stages. The first stage is characterized by bodily well-
being (kāyasukha) and mental joy (prīti). This joy arises from the fact
that one has succeeded in ridding oneself of one’s desires. Conceptual
thinking, that is, thinking connected with language, continues at this
stage. When concentration further increases, one reaches the second
stage, at which conceptual thinking ceases. Bodily well-being and joy
continue, but they now arise directly from the power of meditation.
When concentration increases even further, one reaches the third stage,
at which joy is replaced by equanimity. Finally, at the fourth stage, even
bodily well-being disappears and absolute equanimity and lack of sen-
sation are reached. In this fourth dhyāna the mind becomes absolutely
clear. One can remember one’s own previous lives and see how certain
deeds lead to certain results—good deeds to pleasant births, bad deeds
to painful ones. Then, with the so-called divine eye one can observe the
same phenomena for countless other living beings. Finally, after one
perceives in this manner the entire saṃsāra both in time and in space,
one reaches the certainty that the present life is one’s final life, that one
will not be born again.
It is interesting to note that this dhyāna meditation has (or better,
has obtained in the late or post-canonical period) a cosmological corre-
spondence. According to the Ābhidharmikas of the Conservative Bud-
dhism, the world consists of three layers. The first, the layer of desire
(kāma-dhātu), is the one we live in. On the top of it there is a second
layer, the layer of desireless corporeality (rūpa-dhātu), and it corre-
sponds precisely to the four stages of the dhyāna meditation (cf. AKBh
3.2). The sixteen, seventeen or eighteen subdivisions of this cosmic
layer7 are divided into four groups that are also called dhyāna. More-
over, the first three dhyānas are further divided each into three layers
which correspond to weak (mṛdu), middle (madhya) and intense (adhi-

7
On the different opinions concerning the number of layers, cf. La Vallée Poussin,
chapter 3: 2-3.
98 ELI FRANCO

mātra) concentrations. The fourth cosmic layer contains further layers,

primarily those in which the Buddhist saints who no longer return to the
layer of desire (anāgāmin) stay till their definitive disappearance into
nirvāṇa.8
The highest cosmic layer, the ārūpya-dhātu, the layer that lacks
corporeality, corresponds in its fourfold division to a division of stages
of another type of meditation. In the ārūpya meditation, the yogi turns
his mind to a succession of objects, each subtler than the preceding one.
The starting point of this meditation is the so-called kasina exercise.
The yogi concentrates on an object, such as a piece of earth or a patch
of color, until he no longer observes a difference between the inner
mental image and the immediately perceived image. In other words, the
yogi sees the object just as clearly and vividly with closed as with open
eyes. The yogi can then stand up and go elsewhere taking the image
with him. Now he has to concentrate on this image until a second image
is produced; i.e., the first image functions as the immediate image of the
external object and it gives rise to a second mental reflex. When the
yogi observes this secondary image for a long time, it disintegrates and
fades away slowly, and in its place the incorporeal presentation of the
infinity of space appears. Herewith the first stage of the ārūpya medita-
tion is attained.
After meditating on the infinity of space (ākāśānantya), the yogi
naturally moves on to meditate on the infinity of the mind or conscious-

8
Unfortunately I was unable to find a visual description of the three layers in Indian
or Tibetan art. As a rule, only the lowest layer, the layer of desire, is depicted. This
is understandable, for the abstract content of the layer of desireless corporeality
(rūpa-dhātu) and of lack of corporeality (ārūpya-dhātu) cannot be easily illustrated.
Martin Brauen, in his book The Mandala: Sacred Circle in Tibetan Buddhism, has
generated a computer model according to the ancient descriptions. This model is ba-
sically the same as the one in the Abhidharmakośa, but differs in some detail be-
cause Brauen follows the Kālacakra cosmology. For instance, Mount Meru is round
and not quadrangular. A reproduction of a modern painting of the three dhātus can
be found in the catalogue of “The Tibet Exhibition in Japan 1983” (Tokyo: Mainichi
Communications, 1983) plate nr. Tsu 77. According to the catalogue it is often
placed at the entrance of Tibetan temples, paired with a saṃsāracakra. For sketches
illustrating Buddhist cosmology according to the Pāli tradition, cf. Adolf Bastian
1894.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 99

ness (vijñānānantya);9 next the stage of nothingness (ākiñcanya) is

reached, i.e., the meditation has no object whatsoever. Finally, without
an object consciousness becomes so weak that it hardly deserves its
name. Accordingly, this stage of meditation is called “neither con-
sciousness nor non-consciousness” (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā).10 When this
meditation is further intensified, consciousness disappears altogether.
The meditation now has neither subject nor object. This stage is called
saṃjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti, i.e., the meditation which consists in
the suppression of consciousness and feelings. Because at this stage all
consciousness and feelings disappear, this state of meditation has no
cosmological correspondence. At this stage the yogi is almost dead; his
body is unconscious and numb like a corpse. Only by his bodily heat
can one may know that he is still alive.11
We thus see that the psychological aspects of the dhyāna medi-
tation have a cosmological correspondence, whereas in the case of the
ārūpya meditation there is cosmological correspondence to the object of
meditation as well as to a special state of consciousness of the meditat-
ing person. What does this mean? In the first case, one could understand
that the yogi or the yogi’s mind is transposed to the corresponding cos-
mological region through the attainment of a special state of mind. Fur-
ther, all living beings inhabiting this region experience this state of
mind or are somehow connected to it. In the second case, the content of
the meditation in the first two stages corresponds to a cosmic realm and
to cosmic (material, but not corporeal) elements; in the next two stages,
by attaining a special state of consciousness, the yogi is transposed to a
specific cosmic realm in a manner comparable to the case of the dhyāna
meditation. The “suppression of consciousness and feeling,” where both
object and subject are eliminated, has no cosmic or ontological corre-
spondence because there is nothing left to be corresponded to.

9
Note that consciousness was considered to be a cosmic element which consists in
subtle incorporeal matter, obviously even more subtle than space (or ether – ākāśa)
which is also material but not corporeal. Cf. Langer 2001, esp. 43-50.
10
According to the Buddhist tradition, the Buddha practiced this meditation with his
teachers Ārāḍa Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra. It thus may be a pre-Buddhist form
of meditation.
11
One more factor distinguishes the yogi from a corpse, namely, the power of life
(āyus), but this factor is, of course, not observable.
100 ELI FRANCO

The case of dhyāna meditation and at least the last two stages of
the ārūpya meditation seem to confirm Schmithausen thesis. However,
these practices cannot be taken to represent all meditations in Bud-
dhism. There are other meditative exercises that have their metaphysical
correspondences in the sense that they reflect the ultimate reality ac-
cording to various ontological doctrines, for instance, the selflessness,
the substancelessness and the momentariness of all existing things. Yet
in the case of these exercises, Schmithausen’s thesis does not work
smoothly.
Schmithausen himself has retracted his thesis that the doctrine
of momentariness of all things has arisen from spiritual practice
(Schmithausen 1976b: 285f., and n. 5). But is this the exception that
confirms the rule or is it the clear case that refutes it? I will argue for the
latter alternative by pointing out that momentariness is not a single tree
in the savannah. There are indeed other conspicuous doctrines that cer-
tainly qualify as “central philosophical theories” and which are not
taken into consideration by Schmithausen in the above-mentioned pa-
per. Two such doctrines that immediately come to mind are the doctrine
of Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and the Sarvāstivāda
theory of existence of past and future objects. Concerning the former,
there is hardly any need to argue that it did not directly arise from medi-
tation or spiritual practice. Schmithausen himself has contributed a fun-
damental study of this doctrine, where he argues that the list of twelve
members as we know it today is the result of three different lists that
were put together in the course of a development that is reflected in the
heterogeneous materials of the Pāli canon (cf. Schmithausen 2000). In
this case, I assume, Schmithausen himself would argue for systematiza-
tions of earlier lists and redactional motives, rather than spiritual prac-
tice, as decisive for the origin of the doctrine. As for the doctrine of
rebirth as such that is reflected in most if not all these lists, it is pre-
Buddhist in origin and is presupposed and taken for granted in the earli-
est strata of the Pāli canon. Thus, it too cannot have arisen from medita-
tion, at least not from Buddhist meditation.12

12
Thus, it is excluded by Schmithausen from his investigation; cf. the beginning of his
paper (Schmithausen 2005: 243): “Thus, the philosophical theories whose relation to
spiritual practice I am going to discuss in this article are those which are exclusively
Buddhists and which are freshly developed by Buddhism.” Also uncertain would be
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 101

The Sarvāstivāda theory that all final elements of existence

(dharma) exist in all three times (past, present and future) also presents
a clear case of a central philosophical theory that was not developed
from meditative practice. The Abhidharmakośa provides four reasons
for this counterintuitive doctrine. The first reason is simply that the
Buddha himself said so. In a similar vein, the second reason is that this
doctrine is implied by certain statements of the Buddha. The third rea-
son has to do with the tenet that every moment of awareness is sup-
posed to have an objective support. Thus, recollection too requires such
support, and that support must be a past object; similarly, certain cogni-
tions have future objects and thus future objects must exist. Finally, past
objects must be assumed in order to account for the functioning of the
law of karma, more specifically, to account for the fact that a past act
can produce its result in the future, long after the act was committed.13
In connection with this tenet, four philosophical theories of time
were developed that aim to explain the difference between past, present
and future objects (cf. Stcherbatsky 1923: 78-80). None of these theo-
ries seems to have arisen from spiritual practice. On the contrary, they
seem to be theoretical reflections meant to reduce the difference be-
tween past, present and future objects to a bare minimum.
Similarly, the Sarvāstivāda theory that every element of exis-
tence is accompanied by four characteristic entities (lakṣaṇas) responsi-
ble for its arising, subsistence, decay and destruction and by four secon-
dary characteristic entities (anulakṣaṇas) that play a part in the causa-
tion of the first four entities is clearly due to theoretical reflections
about causality and the philosophical inclination to avoid infinite re-
gress. They also reflect the rejection of the idea of a substance and a
special hermeneutical approach towards the canonical writings, but
there is no evidence to connect their origin to meditative practice. 14
Furthermore, the postulation of the three eternal entities, space-
ether (ākāśa), “suppression through careful consideration” (pratisaṃ-

the assumption that the various lists found in the Pāli canon are “exclusively Bud-
dhist,” but even if they are, whether they are due to mystical experience, introspec-
tion, rational investigation or other sources is anybody’s guess.
13
Cf. AKBh 5.24, p. 295, translated by de La Vallée Poussin, chapter 5 : 50-51.
14
Cf. AKBh 2.45cd-46ab, p. 75.19ff., translated by de La Vallée Poussin, chapter 2:
222ff.
102 ELI FRANCO

khyānirodha) and “suppression without careful consideration” (aprati-

saṃkhyānirodha), as well the factors dissociated from thought (citta-
viprayuktasaṃskāra) could hardly be said to have arisen immediately
from meditative experience. It seems rather that the Sarvāstivāda, like
the Ābhidharmikas of other schools, were analytically striving to iden-
tify and systematize the final constituents of physical and mental reality
in dependence on canonical materials.
This concern is also apparent in the so-called abhisamayavāda
(“the doctrine of intuitive grasp”) of Dharmaśrī with its ten “propensi-
ties” (anuśaya) and sixteen aspects of the four noble truths. According
to Frauwallner, who made a detailed study of the historical development
of this theory,15 it did not arise from spiritual practice. In fact, it is ques-
tionable whether the entire Abhidharma enterprise, from the early lists
(mātṛkā)16 to the later developments by Vasubandhu and Saṅgha-
bhadra,17 can be said to have arisen from meditation or spiritual prac-
tice, rather than the collection, organization, systematization and theo-
retical development of canonical materials.
The Conservative Buddhists developed a considerable number
of philosophical theories about matter, causation, space and time, and
about epistemological, ethical and soteriological issues. Practically none
of them were taken into consideration by Schmithausen (who probably
did not consider them to be central) or by any of the other scholars who
generalized the origin of Buddhist philosophical theories. It is sufficient
to leaf through a work such as Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu)18 to
understand the extent of the disagreement among the various Buddhist
schools, and to see how difficult, not to say impossible, would be the

15
Cf. Frauwallner 1971a; English translation in Frauwallner 1995: 149-184.
16
On the mātṛkās and their relationship to meditation, cf. Gethin 1993. On the tradi-
tional account of the arising of mātṛkās, cf. DN 33, where the Buddha asks Śāriputra
to prepare lists summarizing his (the Buddha’s) teachings in order to prevent strife
among his disciples after his death, as was the case among the disciples of the Jina.
Thus, at least according to the traditional account, the mātṛkās have not arisen from
meditative experience, but from the practical necessity to determine, secure and
summarize the Buddha’s teaching.
17
On Saṅghabhadra, cf. Cox 1995.
18
Cf. Aung and Rhys Davids 1969. An extensive list of theses of controversy among
Conservative Buddhists was conveniently presented in Bareau 1955: 260-289. Note,
however, that many of these points of controversy are not philosophical in nature.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 103

task of anyone wishing to establish the origin of all philosophical theo-

ries in Buddhism, even if one were to limit oneself to the most impor-
tant ones. Interestingly, meditation does not seem to play a role in the
philosophical debates documented in the Kathāvatthu. (On the other
hand, it plays a decisive role in the doctrines that are rejected as harmful
in the Brahmajālasutta; cf. below.)
In what follows I shall mostly limit myself to those theories
taken into consideration by Schmithausen. Perhaps the most important
and typical theory of Conservative Buddhism is the anātman theory, the
theory that there is no Self or Soul. This theory was indeed considered
by Schmithausen, but the evidence he adduces for the hypothesis that it
has its origin in meditative experience is rather meager. Schmithausen is
one of the most learned scholars of Buddhism of our time, and yet for
the negation of the Soul (ātman) in meditation he could find no earlier
testimony than Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra,19 (sixth century CE),
which was composed many centuries after the establishment of this
doctrine. Furthermore, in recent times an alternative explanation of the
origin of the anātman doctrine has been proposed, namely, that it devel-
oped not from spiritual practice, but as a reaction to the pudgala theory
of the Vātsīputrīyas.20 This hypothesis, however, was suggested after
Schmithausen’s paper was written and thus he could not take it into
account while formulating his thesis. In any case, it is a reasonable al-
ternative hypothesis that casts serious doubts on Schmithausen’s as-
sumption that the anātman theory was developed from meditative prac-
tice.

19
Cf. Schmithausen 1973, note 55 which quotes Madhyamakāvatāra VI 120.
20
Cf. Steinkellner 2002: 183: “Die theoretische Lehre von ‘Nicht-Selbst’ (anātmavā-
da) als eines philosophischen Dogmas verdankt ihre Entstehung offenbar nicht dem
Bedürfnis, diese Praxis ontologisch abzustützen, sondern der Notwendigkeit, eine
einflussreiche Fehlentwicklung zurückzudrängen, nämlich die Lehre von der soge-
nannten ‚Person’ (pudgala), die ein Mönch Vātsīputra um 300 v.u.Z. vertreten hat.”
Possibly the same opinion, though formulated more vaguely and in a less committed
manner, is expressed by Vetter 1988: 42-44. An earlier formulation—or at least by
way of implication—of this opinion is to be found in Frauwallner 1971b: 121 (=[9]),
where Vātsīputra’s doctrine of pudgala is said to have broken the ice: “Damit war
gewissermaßen das Eis gebrochen. Nun begann man auch andere Probleme zu über-
denken und, wenn es nötig schien, die überkommenen Lehren weiterzubilden oder
umzuformen.” Cf. also the quotation in the next note.
104 ELI FRANCO

This inevitably leads us to the question about the origin of the

pudgala theory. Is there any evidence to connect its origin to meditative
experience or was it motivated, as Frauwallner and others assume, by
the need to fill a theoretical gap in the canonical materials?21 And while
we are at it, is there any evidence to connect the origin of the doctrine of
the five groups (pañcaskandha) of the empirical person to meditative
practice? This concept is ubiquitously present in the Pāli canon, but we
know nothing about its origin. For all we know, it may not even be
Buddhist in origin.
The doctrine of anātman as we know it from the post-canonical
literature must have meant at its first stage that human beings, or living
beings in general, lack a permanent Self or Soul. However, sooner or
later it was reinterpreted in a more general way to mean that all things
lack substance. Could one maintain that the development of this more
sweeping doctrine is due to meditation? Again, evidence is lacking and
one could make up various scenarios all equally speculative.
To conclude the discussion on Conservative Buddhism, let us
briefly consider the four noble truths. Surely, one may think, if any phi-
losophical theory originated from meditation in an immediate manner,
this so-called original message of the Buddha would be it. However,
such an assumption is highly unlikely. Bareau, who closely studied all
extant versions of the text, concluded that it is “not only apocryphal, but
rather late.”22 This in itself need not refute the thesis that the four noble
truths originated from meditation, but there are at least two reasons
against such an assumption and they both concern the fourth truth. First,
there is some evidence to suggest that this truth was added to the first
three at a later stage.23 But more importantly, the fourth truth presup-

21
Cf. Frauwallner1971b: 121: “Aber der Buddha ist ihr [der Frage nach dem Ich]
ausgewichen, weil er wußte, daß sie zu endlosen theoretischen Streitigkeiten führen
würde … Dieses Vermeiden einer klaren Aussage hat sich im allgemeinen behauptet
und auch bewährt. Aber es war nicht zu vermeiden, dass sich die Frage nach dem
Ich schließlich doch wieder vordrängte.”
22
Cf. Bareau 1963 : 180: “[L]e texte de ce premier sermon, tel que nous le trouvons
dans les trois Vinaya, est non seulement apocryphe, mais assez tardif.”
23
The fourth truth is sometimes transmitted without the first three, notably in the
Dharmacakrapravartana-sūtra, and it is also formulated in a different style. It is
possible that the third truth was originally the truth of the path (i.e., the way to avoid
suffering is to eliminate its cause, desire) and that the function of representing the
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 105

poses the saṅgha (monastic order), and its content has as much to do
with monastic rules and the way of life befitting a monk (or a nun) as
with meditative practice. Its eight members summarize the career of a
monk from the moment he meets the Buddha and arrives at the right
view that the Buddha’s way is the right way towards eliminating suffer-
ing till the moment he reaches enlightenment by the right meditation.
Thus, it seems that in Conservative Buddhism most philosophi-
cal doctrines did not originate directly from meditative practice. How-
ever, can it be said that they originated indirectly from such practice?
Before we can answer this question, we have to understand what could
be meant by “originating indirectly.” If we understand this phrase as
originating primarily from philosophical reflection on meditative prac-
tice,24 one could still maintain that most philosophical theories would
not fulfill this requirement, or more precisely, that we lack decisive
evidence that they do. If, on the other hand, we were satisfied to water
down the qualification of “indirectly originating” to “origination some-
how connected,” the qualification may be true, but trivial. Everything is
indirectly connected to everything, and nobody disputes that meditation
is a central phenomenon in Buddhism.
Let us turn now to the fundamental metaphysical doctrines of
the Mahāyāna. Shortly before or after the beginning of the Common Era
something extraordinary happened in the history of Buddhism. A large
number of apocrypha, the Mahāyānasūtras, were composed by Buddhist
monks, or perhaps even lay persons, in which radically new teachings
were attributed to the Buddha. These teachings stand in clear contradic-
tion to what was known of the Buddha’s teachings until then. The basic
fundamental teaching of the Mahāyāna is the so-called illusionism, the
doctrine that all elements of existence (dharma) are illusory, unreal, do
not really exist. Even the Buddha himself was an illusion. Furthermore,

path was taken over by the fourth truth when it was appended to the first three.
Needless to say, a thorough investigation would be required to prove such an as-
sumption.
24
In contradistinction to, say, being developed in a different context and later applied
to spiritual practice (as could be the case of the five skandhas), or being due to sys-
tematization of older materials (as could be the case of pratītyasamutpāda), or a
generalization of an already existing philosophical theory (as could be the case for
the doctrine of no-soul to the doctrine of no-substance).
106 ELI FRANCO

desire and suffering too are illusions, and this means that all living be-
ings, who do not really exist, are also not really tormented by unreal
suffering, which cannot arise from an unreal illusion. Nirvāṇa as the
lack of suffering has thus always been there. Therefore, one may say
that there is no difference between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.
Of course, these new apocrypha caused protests and opposition
from the Conservative Buddhists. However, it was apparently not so
easy to prove that the new Sūtras were falsifications of the original
teachings of the Buddha. The protests of the Conservative Buddhists (or
Mainstream Buddhists, to use Paul Harrison’s expression) could not
prevail; even worse: the Conservative Buddhists were presented as
fools. Their canonical sermons and other teachings ascribed to the Bud-
dha which they transmitted orally and later on in written form were
considered to be half-truths and thereby disparaged. Only the Mahā-
yānasūtras contain the absolute truth. The Hīnayānasūtras are merely
addressed at monks who are not mature enough to receive the ultimate
truth.
The Mahāyāna movement is undoubtedly one of the most suc-
cessful religious movements ever. Nowadays it is still alive in Tibet, in
Mongolia and East Asia (China, Korea, Japan). One of the reasons why
the Mahāyāna apocrypha could be so successful is that the composition
of Buddhist apocrypha had begun much earlier.25 Next to the canonical
collections, independent works (muktaka) were always circulating,
some of which were designated as apocrypha, lit., ‘superimposed’
(adhyāropita). This phenomenon is mentioned already in the Pāli canon.
Lamotte (1974: 180) refers to two passages, in Samyuttanikāya (II, 267)
and Aṅguttaranikāya (I, 72-73),26 in which the Buddha prophesizes that
the authentic sūtras will disappear and that people will believe in apoc-
rypha composed by poets (kavikata).
The oldest Mahāyānasūtra is considered to be the Aṣṭasāhasrikā
Prajñāpāramitā, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand verses.27

25
The authenticity of treatises and sermons ascribed to the Buddha was a problem that
all schools of Buddhism (including Madhyamaka and Yogācāra) had to face, and
several attempts were made to formulate criteria for the authenticity of Buddhist sū-
tras; cf. Lamotte 1988, Skilling 2000 and Mathes forthcoming.
26
Both references are to the editions of the Pali Text Society.
27
For an extensive summary, cf. Conze 1975.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 107

It is a relatively extensive work; an English translation would probably

run for more than a thousand pages. The Sūtra was translated into Chi-
nese already in 179 CE by Lokakṣema. Now, what is the perfection of
wisdom that is repeatedly praised in this Sūtra? It is the insight that all
final elements of existence (dharmas) are unreal, and this insight is real-
ized during a meditation that causes the suppression of all conscious-
ness and feelings. In other words, when the perfection of wisdom is
attained, the world disappears; all dharmas vanish and nothing remains:
neither objects, nor feelings, nor consciousness. This state is similar to
the one attained in the nirodhasamāpatti mentioned above, but there is
one important difference: the content of this meditation corresponds to
absolute reality. When the yogi emerges from the meditative state, he
generalizes his experience: Just as all final elements of existence do not
exist during meditative state, they not exist outside of it. The whole
world is but an illusion; it contains elements of existence that only ap-
pear to be real, but in fact are empty and unreal. The correspondence
between the content of the meditation and the metaphysical truth is
clear: The absence of the final elements of existence during meditation
reflects their inexistence in reality.
Can we conclude that this counterintuitive doctrine has arisen
from meditative practice? I fail to see that there is evidence for such a
conclusion. There are at least three possible hypotheses that may ac-
count for the development of the Perfection of Wisdom. One based on
philosophical reflection: One may claim that qualities can only exist as
something supported by a substance, and if substances do not exist,
qualities cannot exist either. And if there are neither substances nor
qualities, nothing exists. Alternatively, one may explain the origin of
the Mahāyāna Illusionism as a generalization of the meditative “experi-
ence” in the nirodhasamāpatti. A third hypothesis was proposed by
Frauwallner, who assumed that the Mahāyāna philosophy is due to the
mystical experience of the highest Being (höchstes Sein) and the ten-
dency to assume that only this Being is real (cf. Frauwallner 1994: 144).
As far as I can see, the question whether philosophical reasoning or
spiritual practice is responsible for the arising of the Mahāyāna illusion-
ism cannot be answered because the relevant materials are lacking. The
108 ELI FRANCO

doctrine is absent in the old canonical literature,28 and it is already pre-

supposed by the earliest Mahāyānasūtras. In other words, either the
evidence that may have let us determine the origin of this doctrine is no
longer available, or the doctrine came into the world like the aupapādu-
kas, or Athena from Zeus’ forehead, in a fully developed form and thus
provides no clues for determining the context of its arising. Therefore, it
seems preferable in this case to suspend judgment and refrain from put-
ting forward hypotheses about its origin.
On the basis of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, Nāgārjuna (fl. 2nd-3rd c.
CE) developed the Madhyamaka philosophy, especially in his Mūla-
madhyamakakārikā, which is considered the foundational text of this
school. Schmithausen is silent on the Madhyamaka philosophy. Prima
facie, however, it would be rather difficult to prove that the argumenta-
tive philosophy of Nāgārjuna is the result of meditative experience,
especially after a series of studies by Claus Oetke that bear on this sub-
ject (for instance, Oetke 1988).
However, Schmithausen’s pièce de résistance is no doubt the
Yogācāra system and the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā. It seems, in fact,
that Schmithausen first developed his thesis in the context of his inves-
tigations into the Yogācārabhūmi and then extended and generalized it
as being typical for Buddhism as a whole. Schmithausen’s hypothesis
about the origin of vijñaptimātratā has already been criticized in some
detail by Johannes Bronkhorst in his monograph Karma and Teleology.
A problem and its solution in Indian philosophy (cf. Bronkhorst 2000:
77-93). Bronkhorst argues in some detail that the materials presented by
Schmithausen can be better explained in relation to the karma theory. It
seems to me that Bronkhorst’s arguments are as inconclusive as
Schmithausen’s, but I will not attempt to discuss the matter here.29 In-
stead, I would like to take a closer look at the method employed by
Schmithausen and examine how it could be applied to the Yogācāra
texts.

28
The use of illusory terms in the Pāli canon (e.g., SN III 95 (3) Pheṇam, pp. 140ff.) in
respect to the final elements of existence cannot be taken by itself as pointing at the
origin of the Mahāyānistic notion of emptiness, for they are used there to express the
worthlessness of dharmas, not their inexistence.
29
For a more thorough criticism, though from a different perspective, cf. Robert
Sharf’s paper (Sharf 1995).
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 109

Schmithausen states that he wants to prove his thesis by means

of a rigorous historic-philological method (“nach streng historisch-
philologischer Methode” Schmithausen 1973: 163) and explains that
“[f]or this purpose, the oldest sources for a given philosophical theory
have to be made available and the context in which the theory appears
examined” (“Hierzu müßten für eine gegebene philosophische Theorie
die älteste Quellen ausfindig gemacht und der Zusammenhang, in dem
die Theorie dort erscheint, geprüft werden.”).
Similarly, in the English version of his paper (Schmithausen
2005: 243) he says: “[T]here is still much work to be done from the
point of view of a strictly historicophilological method. In order to ar-
rive at reliable results, one has to find the oldest sources for each phi-
losophical theory and to check the context in which the respective the-
ory appears there.”
However, “the oldest sources” is a relative term. What if the ear-
liest source for a given theory is centuries later than the theory itself? In
the main part of his paper Schmithausen examines the Sandhinirmoca-
nasūtra, which may be as late as the 4th century CE because it is later
than the Daśabhūmikasūtra, which was translated into Chinese in the
last decade of the third century (cf. Schmithausen 1973: 172, Schmit-
hausen 2005: 248). To what extant can one rely on this source, which is
not a historiographic source and which perhaps originated two centuries
after the theory of vijñaptimātratā, in order to draw a conclusion about
its origin? On the other hand, the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthi-
tasāmadhisūtra, which is the oldest source for the vijñaptimātratā doc-
trine, and was translated into Chinese as early as 179 C.E., receives less
attention from Schmithausen. In the following I will confine my re-
marks to this work, as it is indeed our earliest source for the vijñaptimā-
tratā doctrine. 30

30
In Schmithausen 1984: 438 (see also Schmithausen 2005: 245) it is stated that San-
dhinirmocanasūra VIII.7 is “in all probability, the oldest extant passage announcing,
by the very term, the doctrine of vijñaptimātra, i.e., the central doctrine of
Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.” It is actually quite possible that the Pratyutpannabuddha-
sammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra uses only the term cittamātra and not vijñaptimātra
(the original Sanskrit of both texts is now lost), but in any case both terms refer to
the idealistic doctrine and I fail to see why Schmithausen considers the later passage
of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra to be the oldest occurrence of the doctrine. I use “vi-
110 ELI FRANCO

Like the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, this Sūtra too was also

translated by Lokakṣema and counts as one of the earliest Mahāyānasū-
tras. While the Aṣṭasāhasrikā is considered to be a source for the
Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna, the Pratyutpannabuddha-
sammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra is assumed to be a foundation of the
idealism of the Yogācāra. In the type of meditation described and
praised in this Sūtra, the yogi visualizes one, or even several present
Buddhas, foremost Amitābha, the Buddha of Immeasurable Light/-
Luster. When he reaches the highest degree of concentration, he per-
ceives the Buddha(s) face to face. Only after he emerges from the state
of meditation does he understand that he did not go to the Buddha, nor
did the Buddha come to him. The whole encounter took place only in

jñaptimātratā doctrine” above to refer to the doctrine that the so-called external ob-
jects are in reality images in one’s consciousness, no matter whether this doctrine is
referred to by cittamātra, vijñaptimātra, or by another term. Schmithausen seems to
distinguish between Mahāyānasūtras and Yogācāra texts; thus, while recognizing
that the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra is considerably earlier
than the Sandhinirmocanasūtra, he still considers the latter to be the earliest
Yogācāra source. Even if the distinction is cogent, it raises difficulties for Schmit-
hausen’s analysis of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra. Either the authors of this Sūtra al-
ready knew the doctrine from the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhi-
sūtra or from another source and borrowed it, or the doctrine has originated twice,
each independently of the other. In the former case, the Sandhinirmocanasūtra
would hardly qualify as the earliest available source of the doctrine, and even if one
were to assume that in the Yogācāra texts/school the doctrine was borrowed in the
context of spiritual practice, that would hardly imply that it originated in this con-
text. If, on the other hand, the latter is assumed, one would have to face the charge
of kalpanāgaurva. Assuming, as Schmithausen seems to do (e.g., 1984: 455, 2005:
250) that cittamātra is an older term than vijñaptimātra, what does the introduction
or occurrence of a new term for an older doctrine tell us about origin of this doc-
trine? According to my understanding, even if we accept all of Schmithausen’s con-
jectures and assumptions, the change in terminology indicates an attempt to put an
idea that is not new (that is, it may be new only in Yogācāra context, not new as
such) into an old garb. In that case, the Sandhinirmocanasūtra could tell us at most
when/where the doctrine was borrowed, not when/where it originated. Yet
Schmithausen (1984: 454) does not seem to assume that the doctrine has been bor-
rowed, but that it has been newly incepted: “[The double entendre in Sandhinirmo-
canasūtra VIII.7] can be appreciated as purposeful only in the context of the intro-
duction of a new idea on which its discoverer wanted to confer as much of a tradi-
tional garb as was available.”
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 111

his mind. And again the yogi generalizes: Just as during the meditation
all objects were mere images in my mind or consciousness, so are all
external objects: they are nothing but images in one’s mind. The exter-
nal world, i.e., the world outside consciousness, does not exist.31
It is worthwhile noting that in this case there is no one-to-one
correspondence between the content of the meditation and a metaphysi-
cal doctrine. The yogi in meditation does not have an insight into the
true nature of reality. On the contrary, the objects of his meditation, the
Buddha(s) that he visualizes, are false. Epistemologically speaking, they
have the same status as an illusion. Only after the state of meditation,
from without, does the yogi reach the correct conclusion. As the text
states, he did not go to the Buddha, and the Buddha did not come to
him. (Nevertheless, the meditation is not entirely without foundation in
reality because the mind of the Buddha indeed operates from a distance
directly on the mind of the yogi.32)
Therefore, when Schmithausen states that the metaphysical doc-
trines in Buddhism arose in an immediate manner from spiritual praxis
(“unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis hervorgewachsen sein dür-
ften”), he uses the expression “arose in an immediate manner” in differ-
ent meanings. In one case, the expression refers to the molding of medi-
tative experience into a philosophical or religious doctrine, in the other
case to the molding of the experience into a doctrine that contradicts it
because the experience in the state of meditation is declared to be
false.33
Next, let us consider the meaning of “checking the context.”
According to the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra
the yogi attains an understanding of a metaphysical doctrine after and
on the basis of his experience during meditation. Can we rely on this

31
For an English translation, cf. Harrison 1990, esp. chapter 3.
32
Three factors are necessary for the obtaining of the vision of the Buddhas (Harrison
1990: 41): “[t]he might (Skt. anubhāva) of the Buddha, the application of the force
of their [the Bodhisattvas’] own wholesome potentialities, and the power [which is
the result] of attaining samādhi.” Cf. also ibid., pp. 49 and 51 where it is stated that
the Bodhisattvas are established in the samādhi while being supported by the Bud-
dha.
33
In a personal communication Schmithausen informs me that he would now with-
draw the adverb “unmittelbar” (“in an immediate manner”), but still maintains that
philosophical theories arise in a mediate manner from meditation.
112 ELI FRANCO

presentation of the context and draw historical conclusions about the

origination of this metaphysical teaching from it? The Mahāyānasūtras
are obviously not historical narratives or reports in the sense that they
provide information on the historical situation in which their teachings
came into being. In other words, if a Mahāyānasūtra narrates that a cer-
tain yogi reached the right view about vijñaptimātratā in meditation,
this would hardly allow us to infer that this was in fact the way the doc-
trine came into being, even if the contextual connection in the Sūtra
seems smooth. Besides, the Mahāyānasūtras in general and our Sūtra in
particular do not describe the meditating yogi as discovering anything
that was not already taught by the Buddha. The yogi does not enter
meditation as a tabula rasa, but only after studying (or “hearing”) what
has to be practiced during meditation. Thus, the Sūtra’s own account
does not leave any room for innovation. Rather, one could say that no
matter how a metaphysical doctrine arose, the Mahāyānasūtras present
it as the Buddha’s word and as an object of meditation. The mode of
presentation has more to do with religious topology and literary conven-
tions than with an actual historical situation. If we were to take the Ma-
hāyānasūtras as historical accounts, we may just as well start looking
for the origin of Mahāyāna theories on the Vulture Peak in Rājagṛha.
It would also not be advisable, as some scholars attempted only
a generation ago34 with respect to the Sūtras of Conservative Buddhism,
to discard those parts of the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthita-
sāmadhisūtra that are obviously mythical and assume that what remains
corresponds to a historical reality. Such a procedure was applied, for
instance, to the biography of the Buddha, with results that seem more
and more doubtful. Imagine subtracting the wolf from Little Red Riding
Hood and assuming that the rest of the story corresponds somehow to
historical reality.
Moreover, even if one were to accept that the presentation in this
particular Sūtra is a true and faithful mirror of its origin, this still does
not lead to conclusive results in this case, or better, it leads to more than
one result. The crucial passage adduced as evidence for the thesis that
the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā originated in meditative practice can also
be adduced as evidence that the same doctrine was developed as a result

34
Indeed, not only a generation ago; cf. Schumann 2004.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 113

of thoughts about the reflection of light in mirrors and similar shiny

objects. Let us have a look at the passage to understand how precarious
the textual material is (Harrison 1990: 41-42):
[3K] ‘For example, Bhadrapāla, there are certain women or men with a natural
bent for washing their hair and putting on jewelry, who might decide to look at
themselves in a vessel of clear oil, or a vessel of clear water, or a well-polished
round mirror, or a patch of ground smeared with azurite[?]. If they see therein
their own form, Bhadrapāla, what do you think? Does that appearance of the
form of the men or women in the vessel of clear oil, or the vessel of clear water,
or well-polished round mirror, or patch of ground smeared with azurite mean
that there are men or women who have gone inside those things or entered
them?’
Bhadrapāla said:
‘No Reverend Lord, it does not. Rather, Reverend Lord, because the oil and the
water are clear and undisturbed, or the mirror is highly polished, or the patch of
earth smeared with azurite is clean, the reflections stand forth; the bodies of the
men or women have not arisen from the water, oil, mirror, or patch of earth, they
have not come from anywhere nor gone anywhere, they have not been produced
from anywhere, nor have they disappeared anywhere.’
[3L] The Lord said:
‘Well done, well done, Bhadrapāla! You have done well, Bhadrapāla! So it is,
Bhadrapāla. As you have said, because the forms are good and clear the reflec-
tions appear. In the same manner, when those bodhisattvas have cultivated this
samādhi properly, those Tathāgatas are seen by the bodhisattvas with little diffi-
culty. Having seen them they ask questions, and are delighted by the answering
of those questions. In thinking: ‘Did these Tathāgatas come from anywhere?
Did I go anywhere? They understand that the Tathāgatas did not come from
anywhere. Having understood that their bodies did not go anywhere either, they
think: ‘Whatever belongs to this triple world is nothing but mind (~cittamātram
idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam). Why is that? Because however I imagine things,
that is how they appear.’

I’m afraid that nothing decisive can be concluded from this or similar
passages. Furthermore, in the same chapter of the same Sūtra (chapter
3) the doctrine that all final elements of existence are illusory is pre-
sented in connection with the phenomenon of dreams. After a dream,
one generalizes and comes to the conclusion that the experience in a
dream is the same as all everyday experience and the illusory character
of dreams is extended to the latter.35 This connection between dreams

35
Cf. Harrison 1990: 39: “‘Bhadrapāla, formerly in the past, a certain man travelled
into deserted wilderness, and having become hungry and thirsty was overcome by
114 ELI FRANCO

and vijñaptimātratā is also contextually smooth and given the signifi-

cance of dreams in Indian culture, apparent already in the Vedic period,
one could even argue for certain plausibility in its favor. 36
However, here Schmithausen would object, as he kindly did in a
personal communication, that his method consists in examining the
oldest source for a key term (“Schlüssel-Terminus”)37 in a specific
meaning (“in einer bestimmten Bedeutung”) and asking whether the
occurrence of the term in its context is plausible,38 i.e., whether the in-

torpor and lethargy; he fell asleep, and in a dream obtained a great quantity of food
and drink. On obtaining it he ate his fill, and his hunger and thirst vanished. When
he awoke, neither his body nor his belly had grown any larger, and so he thought:
‘There exist certain dharmas which are so, that is, like a dream;’ understanding that
to be so he obtained the patient acceptance of the fact that dharmas are not produced
(Skt. anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti); and he also became unable to regress from the su-
preme and perfect awakening.”
The text continues that in the same manner the Bodhisattvas who “concentrate their
thought on the Tathāgata in that quarter, they will obtain a vision of the Buddha.
They should not entertain the apperception of an existing thing, but should entertain
the apperception of an empty space.”
36
The connection between the vijñaptimātratā doctrine and dreams in the context of
this sūtra has already been pointed out by Sharf (Williams 2005:287-288, n. 10). He
quotes Schmithausen 1976: 246 who compares the Bodhisattva’s understanding that
he has not met the Buddha in his meditation to “a man, awaking from a dream,
comprehends that all phenomena are illusory like dream visions.” He then adds:
“Remarkably, Schmithausen cites this text in support of his claim that, ‘the thesis of
universal idealism originated from the generalisation of a situation observed in the
case of objects visualized in meditative concentration, i.e., in the context of spiritual
practice’ (ibid.: 247). Yet this scripture suggests quite the opposite, in so far as it
succeeds in explicating a doctrinal point by drawing an analogy to dreaming.”
37
This emphasis on a key term does not yet appear in Schmithausen’s 1973 paper and
in the English version of 1976, but is formulated in his Ālayavijñāna (Tokyo 1987) §
1.4, pp. 9-10; cf. note 39 below.
38
Plausibility is, of course, a rather vague criterion. What is plausible for one observer
is implausible for another. If one believes that philosophical theories in Buddhism
arise from meditative experiences, it seems plausible that this is also the case in the
Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra; if, on the other hand, some-
one, like Bronkhorst or Sharf, does not share this belief, this would seem implausi-
ble. What seems plausible to us is bound to become implausible to the next genera-
tion. Dumezil once gave a wonderful answer to the question whether he was right
about the tripartite ideology: J’ai raison, mais j’aurai tort! (“I am right, but I will be
wrong!”)
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 115

troduction of the term in the relevant meaning is reasonably motivated,

as he has done with regard to the term ālayavijñāna.39
The emphasis on a key term raises the question whether a given
theory and the term that designates it coincide. In the case of the terms
vijñaptimātra or cittamātra we know this not to be the case.
Schmithausen himself pointed out that the term cittamātra was first
used to negate emotional and volitional factors beside the mind, not the
existence of real objects.40 The expression prajñaptimātra was used in
the Bodhisattvabhūmi and Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya in the sense of
“mere denomination,” i.e., alluding to a nominalistic theory that denies
the correspondence between human concepts and things in reality, but
does not deny that things exist in reality. In another use of the same
term, it refers to a theory which maintains that false conception really
produces things (outside the mind).41 The statement that the whole
world is just mind (cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam) in the
Daśabhūmikasūtra can be understood as denying the Self (ātman), not
the existence of real objects.42 So what can be concluded from the fact
that vijñaptimātra or cittamātra occur in the Sūtra in a different (not
necessarily new) meaning? What can be inferred from the fact that they
denote here an idealistic doctrine? Do the terms tell us how this doctrine
arose? The terms are after all descriptive of a certain tenet; they do not
wear a tag saying how the tenet they refer to came about.43

39
“Aber ich gehe nicht von einer beliebigen Stelle aus, sondern vom ältesten erreich-
baren Beleg eines Schlüssel-Terminus in einer bestimmten Bedeutung, und frage
mich, ob dessen Auftreten dort im Kontext plausibel ist, d.h. die Einführung des
verwendeten Terminus in der relevanten Bedeutung einleuchtend motiviert (vgl.
Ālayavijñana § 1.4).” Does the word ‘Einführung’ imply that the term was used
there for the first time? Surely that would be an unlikely assumption. Considering
the state of available materials, the assumption that such a source did not survive is
more plausible. Schmithausen clearly says “erreichbaren Beleg.” Note the (unin-
tended?) switch from the neutral “Auftreten” to “Einführung,” which is not neutral.
40
Schmithausen 1976: 244.
41
Schmithausen 1976: 245.
42
Schmithausen 1976: 249.
43
In the case of the term ālayavijñāna one may argue that its literal meaning reflects
its first function because the term was coined with that function in mind. However,
such an inference is not possible in the case of cittamātra or vijñaptimātra; they do
not disclose the context of their origin.
116 ELI FRANCO

Furthermore, couldn’t one assume that a doctrine existed before

a specific term was adopted to refer to it? And couldn’t it be that a
source where a technical term does not yet appear indicates an earlier
stage of development before the theory was crystallized and obtained a
special designation? Consequently, is it not possible that a source where
a technical term does not yet appear gives us a better clue as to how the
theory in question originated? Imagining two passages proclaiming the
same idealistic theory, one using the key term vijñaptimātra, the other
not referring to it, do we have to conclude that the first passage gives us
the decisive clue as to how the theory arose and not the second?44
To conclude the examination of the issue of vijñaptimātratā, we
may say that although there is some evidence for the arising of this the-
ory from meditative experience, though certainly not in an immediate
manner, the evidence is inconclusive and the methodology used by
Schmithausen uncertain.
One should also recall that Schmithausen’s theory is not, so to
speak, the only one on the market. Following Paul Harrison, the idealis-
tic teachings of the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhi-
sūtra can be seen as an attempt to harmonize a certain meditative prac-
tice with the Mahāyāna teachings which stand in contradiction to it,
namely, the practice of the visualization of the Buddha with the doctrine
that everything, including the Buddha himself, is unreal. If this hy-
pothesis were confirmed, the doctrine did not arise from meditative
practice, but from the need to harmonize contradictory theories: a pre-
viously existing doctrine and/or practice of meditation being adjusted to

44
Consider for instance two passages that refer to the Sāṃkhyistic doctrine of the
three guṇas as constituent parts of all matter. I do not think that anyone would argue
that the passage where the technical term guṇa or the technical terms for the specific
guṇas appear for the first time in the available sources is necessarily older and gives
us a better clue about the origin of the doctrine. To take another example, the doc-
trine of the Tathāgatagarbha referred to below appears in rudimentary form, and
without association with a technical term, in the Lotus Sūtra in connection with the
eccentric monk Sadāparibhūta. Should one, therefore, conclude from a methodologi-
cal point of view that the passage where the key term occurs for the first time, rather
than the one where it does not occur, gives us the key about the origin of the doc-
trine?
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 117

a new philosophical theory.45 One may also speculate that the buddhā-
nusmṛti-Meditation was first harmonized with a previously existing
vijñaptimātratā doctrine, because the author of the Sūtra emphasizes
that the buddhānusmṛti functions within the frame of the vijñaptimātra-
tā doctrine by assuming a mutual influence between the mind of the
meditator and that of the Buddha. Then, in a second stage of develop-
ment, the vijñaptimātratā doctrine was integrated into Mahāyāna Illu-
sionism, according to which even the mind and its images are unreal.46
Furthermore, the vijñaptimātratā doctrine is the only Yogācāra
doctrine that is examined by Schmithausen. However, there are other
philosophical doctrines associated with this “school,”47 such as the doc-
trine of the three natures (trisvabhāva), the transformation of the basis
(āśrayaparivṛtti),48 a special theory of Buddhahood,49 Nirvāṇa (aprati-
ṣṭhitanirvāṇa) and tathatā, and indeed of the general Mahāyāna ideal of
Bodhisattva.50 It remains to be proved that all these theories—which do
not seem less central than the vijñaptimātratā—arose from meditative
experience or from spiritual practice. As far as I can see, it would even
be hard to prove that theories about meditation arise from meditative
practice (cf. below).
My skepticism about the role of meditation in the formation of
philosophical theories is not alleviated when I consider the most impor-

45
Cf. Harrison 1978. One could argue perhaps that even in this case the vijñaptimā-
tratā doctrine arose indirectly from meditation, namely, from thinking about the
compatibility of buddhānusmṛti-meditation with Mahāyāna Illusionism. However, I
do not think that Schmithausen would argue for this hypothesis because what is de-
cisive here is the philosophical desire for coherence, not the spiritual practice as
such.
46
As far as I know, the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā without connection to Mahāyāna
general illusionism or tathatā Monism appears only in later works such as the
Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu. This does not mean, of course, that this doctrine (i.e., that
the final elements of existence are mental dharmas that are not themselves illusory)
originated with Vasubandhu.
47
The notion of school is rather problematic in the Indian philosophical context; I use
this term here merely for the sake of convenience, cf. also Franco 1997: 89-92.
48
Cf. Sakuma 1998.
49
Cf. Griffiths 1995.
50
Cf. Dayal 2004. How much of the Bodhisattva doctrine can be said to have arisen
from spiritual (moral-ethical or meditative) practice?
118 ELI FRANCO

tant individual Yogācāra philosophers, Maitreya51 and Asaṅga. Frau-

wallner described Maitreya’s philosophy as follows (Frauwallner 1994:
297-298): “Im großen gesehen ist die Lehre Maitreyanāthas ein
kunstvolles Gebäude, in dem die verschiedenen älteren Lehren mit
wertvollen eigenen Gedanken zu einer Einheit verschmolzen sind.”
Among the older teachings, Frauwallner mentions the theory of the
highest Being of Sāramati, earlier Yogācāra ideas (“Anschauungen”)
and various elements from the Madhyamaka. These diverse elements
were systematized to form a philosophical system which may be termed
idealistic monism. What I fail to see, however, is that the conception of
this system is the result of meditative experience. To be sure, liberating
insight is said to be attained only in a state of meditation, but one cannot
show that the philosophical or mystical doctrine realized in this state
actually arose from it or was conceived on its basis. The systematization
of older materials into a coherent and new philosophical system hardly
requires or presupposes meditative experience. Similarly, when one
considers the writings attributed to Asaṅga, the assumption that they
arose from meditation becomes doubtful, for his basic work consists in
patient reorganization and reworking of older Hīnayāna Abhidharma
materials within the new framework of Yogācāra idealism.52
The next Mahāyāna tradition I would like to consider is the
Tathāgatagarbha, the so-called Buddha-embryo school. According to
this school all living beings are potential Buddhas and, even though it
will certainly take much time, will eventually become Buddhas. In other
words, all living beings are Buddha embryos that will grow to become
fully developed Buddhas or—according to another meaning of the word
garbha which may mean not only “embryo” but also “womb”—all
living beings represent wombs in which Buddhas will grow. The Tathā-
gatagarbhasūtra is presumably the earliest source in which the Tathāga-
tagarbha doctrine is expressed in association with this term itself.53 Mi-
chael Zimmermann, to whom we owe the most extensive study of this

51
The historicity of Maitreya is dubious, but there is no need to discuss this issue here
because it does not affect my argument.
52
Cf. Frauwallner 1994: 328: “Für sein System ist … vor allem die Übernahme der
Begriffswelt der Hīnayāna-Dogmatik kennzeichnend.”
53
The Ekayāna doctrine, however, which is presupposed or implied by the Tathāgata-
garbha philosophy, predates the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Cf. also note 44 above.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 119

Sūtra, also investigated its origin and I cannot but fully agree with his
conclusion (Zimmermann 2002: 75):
Of course, we cannot know whether the idea of the Buddha-nature in living be-
ings resulted from a novel meditative experience or because the authors felt the
need to assert its existence in order to improve an unsatisfactory worldly or phi-
losophical state of affairs, or whether it is based on other experiences. All this is
mere speculation.

The last philosophical tradition I would like to examine here is

the so-called Pramāṇa School. How much of the Buddhist philosophy
presented in the pramāṇa works can be said to have arisen from medita-
tive practice? We are relatively well informed about the origin of this
tradition and its philosophical theories, and it seems that they do not
have anything to do with meditation. Rather, in the first stage (as re-
flected in the *Tarkaśāstra, *Upāyahṛdaya, the final part of the Spitzer
Manuscript,54 and fragments from Vasubandhu’s lost works Vādavidhi
and Vādavidhāna), the Buddhists borrow very heavily from Brahmini-
cal manuals of debate, adding, modifying and developing here and
there. In the later period, from the sixth century onwards, Buddhist phi-
losophy, focusing mainly but not exclusively on epistemology, logic
and theory of language, is developed above all in response to and in
controversy with the Brahminical philosophers from the Nyāya and
Mīmāṃsā traditions. It is clear that when Schmithausen speaks about
philosophical theories, he thinks primarily of ontological theories and
leaves aside epistemology, logic, theory of language and to large extent
even ethics.55 Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta,
Śaṅkaranandana and Jñānaśrīmitra are generally considered the most
outstanding Buddhist philosophers, but one cannot point at anything in
their writings as having originated from meditation. For all we know,

54
Cf. Tucci 1929 and Franco 2004.
55
It is also clear that Schmithausen’s understanding of the term “philosophy” is not
restricted to philosophy in the technical sense, which is characterized by the use of
special reasons and arguments. It is only by following Schmithausen’s usage of the
term “philosophy” that I used here “philosophical theory,” “philosophical doctrine”
and similar expressions while referring to Buddhist Sūtras and Abhidharma litera-
ture.
120 ELI FRANCO

these Buddhist philosophers may not have practiced meditation at all,56

or if they did, perhaps only for short and insignificant periods of time.57
At this point it may be worthwhile to raise the question how the Bud-
dhist tradition itself considered the relationship between meditation and
metaphysics. I mentioned above that meditation plays a decisive role in
the doctrines that are rejected as harmful in the Brahmajālasutta. This
Sūtra, which is placed first in the collection of sūtras in the Pāli canon,
discusses some sixty-four58 erroneous views held by various ascetics
and Brahmins. A large number of these false views arise directly from
meditative experiences. I will mention only two such views, one claim-
ing that the world is finite, the other that it is infinite. It is clear that the

56
We have practically no biographical data about the Buddhist philosophers. Pra-
jñākaragupta was probably a lay person (upāsaka) (cf. Taranātha 1997: 296) and
Śaṅkaranandana was perhaps not even a Buddhist; cf. Krasser 2001 and Eltschinger
forthcoming. A pertinent observation by Eltschinger is worth quoting in this connec-
tion (2008: §16): “Le bouddhisme indien nous confronte donc à la situation
suivante. D’un côté, des sectes nombreuses dont les spécificités disciplinaires et
doctrinales nous sont plus ou moins bien documentées; de l’autre, des discours phi-
losophiques plus ou moins bien connus eux aussi, mais dont l’ancrage institutionnel
sectaire nous échappe. En d’autres termes, ces deux ordres de réalité, l’institutionnel
et le philosophique, ne coïncident ou ne se superposent qu’en de très rares cas en
l’état actuel de nos connaissances.” I would only want to add that even if we knew
more about the sectarian and institutional affiliation of the Buddhist philosophers,
we would still not know if, and to what extent, an individual philosopher followed
such disciplinary and doctrinal specifications in practice.
57
To these, one may add perhaps Vasubandhu, whose strength, so it seems, lies more
in his ability to systematise and expound various theories than in conceiving original
philosophical doctrines. There is a biography of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha, which
is, to be sure, partly legendary. Yet it is interesting that Paramārtha never depicts his
hero meditating. Rather, Vasubandhu studies the Buddhist writings, summarizes
them, refutes them, argues by means of logical reasoning and on points of grammar,
and engages in debates with teachers of rival schools, both Buddhists and non-
Buddhists, on the whole not unlike modern philosophers. Cf. Takakusu, 1904: 269-
296. One should add perhaps that Paramārtha also describes Asaṅga as encountering
Maitreya in Tuṣita-heaven. In any case, it is hardly possible to determine the origin
of philosophical doctrines from hagiographies.
58
Sixty-four is a number that designates a certain completeness (cf. the sixty-four arts
and crafts [kalā]). While there are certainly more than sixty-four wrong views in the
world, the author nevertheless seems to be striving for an exhaustive enumeration of
all views concerning the world (loka) and the self (atta).
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 121

author(s) of this Sūtra distrust(s) meditative visions and trances as a

source for philosophical theories (Anonymous 1987: 32):
He [a certain samaṇa or brāhmaṇa] says thus: “This world is finite. It is circum-
scribed. Why can it be said so? It can be said so because having achieved utmost
mental concentration by dint of ardent, steadfast, persevering exertion, mindful-
ness and right attentiveness, and having established my mind in highest concen-
tration, I abide in the view that the world is finite. Based on this, I know that the
world is finite and that it is circumscribed.”

Exactly the same formulation is used to substantiate the contradictory

view that the world is infinite:59
He [a certain samaṇa or brāhmaṇa] says thus: “This world is infinite, with no
limit. Those samaṇas and brāhmaṇas who assert that the world is finite and that
it is circumcised are wrong. In fact, this world is infinite, with no limit. Why can
it be said so? It can be said so because having achieved utmost mental concen-
tration by dint of ardent, steadfast, persevering exertion, mindfulness and right
attentiveness, and having established my mind in highest concentration, I abide
in the view that the world is infinite. Based on this, I know that the world is infi-
nite, with no limit.”

As mentioned above, both views are rejected by the Buddha (or more
precisely, by the author of the Sūtra), however, not because he rejects
that the meditating persons achieved “utmost mental concentration by
dint of ardent, steadfast, persevering exertion, mindfulness and right
attentiveness,” that is, not because he questions the quality of their
meditative practice, but because meditative visions, such as recollec-
tions of numerous past lives, are not in themselves a sound basis for the
formation of metaphysical doctrines.
The topic of the special perception of yogis is extensively dealt
with in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, where it is intimately
related to the fundamental issues of the Buddhist religion, such as the
reliability and omniscience of the Buddha. According to this tradition,
as well as most, if not all Buddhist traditions, the Buddha already dis-
covered everything one needs to know in order to achieve Enlighten-
ment. Therefore, theoretically the yogi cannot innovate anything on the
basis of his meditative experiences, at least not anything soteriologi-
cally true and useful, but has to meditate on the content of the Buddha’s

59
The same formula is adduced as a reason for the false claims that the world is per-
manent, impermanent, partly permanent, etc. Cf. ibid., pp. 19, 21, 22, etc.
122 ELI FRANCO

words.60 The characterization of the special perception of yogis in the

Pramāṇasamuccaya, the foundational work of the Pramāṇa tradition,
may seem surprising at first sight: “The yogin’s intuition which is not
associated (avyavakīrṇa) with any conceptual construction of the āgama
(the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only a
thing in itself is also perception.”61 Read as such, this statement may
create the impression that the perception of yogis has, by definition,
nothing to do with the Buddhist authoritative writings (āgama), but in
fact the contrary is the case. What Dignāga means, and this is also how
his followers understood him, is that the yogi studies the Buddhist
teachings, meditates on them and in the process of meditation casts
away all conceptual constructions, all cognitions related to language,
and arrives at an immediate, non-conceptual understanding of these
very teachings, perceiving them as vividly as one perceives an object in
front of one’s eyes. Therefore, the characterization of Dignāga in fact
limits the scope of perception of yogis to the content of the Buddhist
works which profess the Buddha’s word (or if Dignāga also had non-
Buddhist yogis in mind, to the scope of the authoritative teachings of
the respective traditions).62 In other words, it is theoretically impossible
that the yogi will discover anything new and true in his visions that is
not already included in his authoritative tradition.
The literature of the Buddhist epistemological tradition is par-
ticularly interesting because it also provides us with theories about
meditative trance. Here we can learn not only what the yogis perceive in
a trance, but also about the nature of trance, how it arises, what its dis-
tinctive qualities are and so on. Moreover, we possess the individual
writings of the most important philosophers of this tradition and can
thus see how their theories were developed. The topic of meditation or
perception of yogis (yogipratyakṣa), as it is usually called, became an

60
In this respect Robert Sharf is certainly right when he points out that the Buddhist
tradition distrusted any new meditative experiences.
61
Cf. PS on I.6cd: yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātradarśanaṃ
pratyakṣam. The translation is taken from Hattori 1968: 27.
62
At least according to Dharmakīrti and later commentators, only the Buddha’s teach-
ings, mainly the four noble truths, are an appropriate object of meditation. Non-
Buddhist meditations do not count as yogic perceptions, but as mere delusions; cf.
Franco forthcoming.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 123

important issue of controversy in the epistemological tradition to the

extent that Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980-1040), the last important Buddhist
philosopher in South Asia, devoted a special treatise to it.63 However,
yogic perception and related issues were hotly debated for hundreds of
years before that, especially with the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, who rec-
ognized the potential danger yogic perception posed to the authority of
the Veda.64 In addition, epistemological problems inherent in the notion
of yogic perception were independently raised. Already Dharmakīrti
(ca. 600-660) was faced with the problem how abstract statements, such
as those that constitute the four noble truths, could be perceived in an
immediate manner, that is, without involving concepts (cf. Franco forth-
coming). Later generations were particularly concerned with the prob-
lems related to omniscience. Is it really possible for a yogi, such as the
Buddha, to know everything? What is the object of an omniscient cog-
nition? Can one really know all individual things in a single act of
awareness? Or is it only possible to know the essence of one thing and
from that knowledge understand the essence of all things?65
Another problem concerns the veracity of yogic perception. If
yogic perception is to be considered true, its object must exist, just like
the object of any other perception. However, yogis in the Indian (not
just Buddhist) tradition are believed to have direct perceptions of past
and future objects.66 Accordingly, Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750-810) argues
that past and future objects must exist. This tenet, in its turn, leads to a
development in the theory of time, which must account for the differ-
ence in the mode of existence of past, present and future objects. Pra-
jñākaragupta maintains that time taken as an independent and perma-
nent entity does not exist. He seems to conceive of time as a relational
property. Speaking of time as a separate entity, for instance, when one
says: “the time of this thing,” is similar to saying “the body of this

63
For a general introduction to the topic of yogic perception in the Pramāṇa literature
and a summary of the Yoginirṇaya, cf. Steinkellner 1978.
64
Cf. McCrea’s and Taber’s papers in this volume.
65
Cf. McClintock 2000, Moriyama 2004, Moriyama forthcoming, Franco forthcom-
ing.
66
The perception of past and future objects is already mentioned in the Yogasūtra as
one of the “accomplishments” or supernatural powers (siddhis) of yogis. Cf. YS
3.16.
124 ELI FRANCO

torso.” Past or future objects are, therefore, objects that are not seen at
present. And to say that yogis perceive the past or the future means that
they perceive what is not being seen, that is, not being seen by other
ordinary people. Therefore, being a past or future entity depends on its
not seeing by ordinary people. The yogi himself perceives past and fu-
ture objects as present; only after emerging from the state of meditation
does he determine them as past or future.67
When one follows this discussion in detail, it is clear that the de-
liberations are purely philosophical. It is in fact quite certain that Pra-
jñākaragupta developed the theory of the existence of past and future
objects in the context of his proof of life after death and merely adapted
a ready-made theory to the context of yogic perception. It can also be
observed that the discussion of meditation in general in the Buddhist
epistemological tradition is not related to actual experience in medita-
tion.68 To what extant this was also the case in the earlier Abhidharma
tradition cannot be determined because the mode of presentation in the
Abhidharma texts is impersonal and does not provide a context for pos-
sible personal innovations by individual philosophers. It is doubtful
whether the authors of the Mahāyānasūtras, the Yogācārabhūmi or
manuals of meditation69 were themselves practicing yogis or whether

67
PVABh, 113,7–9: tasmād atītādi paśyatīti ko ’rthaḥ? anyenādṛśyamānaṃ paśyati
tad dṛśyamānatayā vartamānam eva tāvatā tad iti na doṣaḥ. anyāpekṣayā tasyātītā-
ditvam. tasmād yat sākṣātkṛtaṃ tad evāstīti nātītād<āv> akṣavyāpāras tasya sākṣāt-
kṛtatvenāst[h]itvāt.
68
It is symptomatic that the example of the infatuated lover who sees his beloved as if
she were standing right before his eyes is based on Dharmakīrti’s exposition and
that it is repeated for hundreds of years. However, the poverty of examples, i.e., the
fact that the same old examples are repeated again and again and hardly any new
ones are introduced into the philosophical discourse is typical for Indian philosophy
in general.
69
For an example of a Buddhist manual of meditation, cf. Schlingloff 2006. Schlin-
gloff points out that the purpose of the manual is not to teach the methods and tech-
niques of meditative practice (their knowledge is presupposed), but to present the
individual visions systematically, and classify and underpin them dogmatically
(Schlingloff 2006: 30): “Dieses [das Yogalehrbuch] hat die Aufgabe, die einzelne
Visionen als systematische Übungen darzustellen, zu gliedern und dogmatisch zu
untermauern.” “The practical part” (der praktischer Teil) too is anchored in the tra-
dition; just as Maudgalyāyana penetrates heaven and earth, the yogi too visualises
them, etc. (ibid.). On the whole, the meditation manual leaves little or no room for
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 125

they were not rather systematizing the experiences of others. The latter
state of affairs would hardly be typical for Buddhism alone. For as
Grinshpon repeatedly emphasizes, the author of the Yogasūtras was a
Sāṃkhya philosopher who certainly was not actively practicing yoga
(cf. Grinshpon 2002 passim).
To conclude, I would like come back to Schmithausen’s thesis.
In the above-mentioned paper, Schmithausen attributes the peculiarity
that all central theories in Buddhism arise immediately from spiritual
practice to the Buddha himself: „Der Grund für diesen Unterschied
[zwischen Buddhismus auf der einen Seite und europäischer und hindu-
istischer Philosophie auf der anderen Seite] liegt gewiss letztlich in der
Person des Buddha selbst, der mit einer wohl einmaligen Konsequenz
und Radikalität alle für das Heil irrelevanten theoretischen Spekulatio-
nen abgewiesen hatte.“ [“The reason for this difference [between Bud-
dhism on the one hand and European and Hindu philosophy on the
other] certainly lies, in the final analysis, in the personality of the Bud-
dha himself, who rejected once and for all, and with unique conse-
quence and radicalness, all theoretical speculations that are irrelevant to
salvation.”]70
Schmithausen’s thesis could be crucial for Buddhist studies. If it
could be shown to be true, he would have discovered an essential driv-
ing force that played a crucial role during the entire history of Bud-
dhism. One could almost see the Hegelian spirit entering Buddhist phi-
losophy and determining it in a decisive manner and to a surprising
degree. Not being a Hegelian myself, I find it difficult to accept that in
the long and complex history of Buddhism in South Asia the causal
relationship between meditation and metaphysics was in all central
cases one-directional, spiritual practice always being the cause and
metaphysics always the effect. As I have tried to show above, this as-

personal innovations. The language is both descriptive and prescriptive; it not only
describes what the yogi supposedly sees, but also what he should see. The individual
spontaneous visions are in fact modelled after the Buddha’s biography and other ca-
nonical materials. The same hold good for other manuals and descriptions of medi-
tations, cf. Yamabe 1999 and forthcoming, Bretfeld 2003.
70
The historicity of the Buddha and our ability to extract his original teachings from
the canonical writings are clearly presupposed in this passage and need not be
spelled out. Those were obviously more optimistic times.
126 ELI FRANCO

sumption involves a number of problems and there are considerations

clearly speaking against it. On the whole, it is simply not provable. In-
deed, it would be difficult to prove that spiritual practice is the cause of
something when the spiritual practice itself is all but unknown to us.71
As far as I can see, the relation between meditation and meta-
physics in Buddhism cannot be reduced to a single model. In the final
analysis, one cannot avoid the conclusion that certain philosophical
theories arose from meditative experiences and certain others did not,
and that the origin of still others cannot be determined, in which case it
seems preferable to suspend judgment. On the basis of the examples
mentioned above, I would say that the dhyāna meditation and the higher
levels of the ārūpya meditation (at least the last two levels), which inci-
dentally are not mentioned by Schmithausen,72 seem to fit his model
very well. The cosmic layers that bear the same name seem to have
been conceived as cosmological parallels to the content as well as the
psychological characteristics of the corresponding visions. This is clear
already from the terminology. On the other hand, the theory of momen-
tariness, as Schmithausen himself conceded, seems to have been devel-
oped out of philosophical considerations. The same can be maintained
for the doctrine of the pudgala and the anātman doctrine. The doctrine
of pratītyasamutpāda seems to have arisen as a systematization of older
canonical materials, and perhaps redactional reasons were the primary
driving force behind it. Reflection on the law of karma and the phe-
nomenon of memory, as well as textual considerations, seem to have led
to the Sarvāstivāda assumption of past and future objects. The question
whether meditation or philosophical reasoning caused the arising of the
Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness cannot be answered because relevant
unambiguous materials are lacking. The same holds true for the vijñap-

71
This difficulty is relevant not only for Schmithausen’s thesis, but also for recent
attempts to use Pierre Hadot’s interpretation of Greek philosophy as a model for
Buddhist philosophy; cf. McClintock 2002: 6-8 and Kapstein 2003: 3-16. The prob-
lems and shortcomings of this approach are discussed in Eltschinger 2008. Eltschin-
ger rightly concludes (§ 20): “… nos textes [i.e., les textes de la philosophie boudd-
hique] ne se laissent pratiquement jamais reconduire à leurs conditions historiques
de production, ne quittant jamais le terrain de l’argumentation et du raisonnement
purs.”
72
The reason for this is not clear to me; perhaps he does not consider them to be Bud-
dhist in origin.
 MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 127

timātratā doctrine. To be sure, there is some evidence that connects this

doctrine to the visualizations of the Buddha(s), but I fail to see how one
could determine whether this doctrine arose from reflections on such
visualizations or whether it originated independently and was applied to
the meditative context to show that visualizations of the Buddha(s) are
meaningful even within the Mahāyāna illusionistic context.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume for the sake of argu-
ment that all central philosophical theories in Buddhism were developed
indirectly by reflection on spiritual practice, one could still argue that
the dichotomy between spiritual practice and philosophical theory as
such is not always tenable. For what happens when a philosopher thinks
about spiritual practice—quite possibly without first-hand experience of
this practice—and develops a new theory? Could it be said that in this
case the doctrine arose from spiritual praxis in contradistinction to phi-
losophical and theoretical considerations?
Finally, it is worth repeating that the yogi, even if he were to ar-
rive at a new metaphysical doctrine on the basis of meditation, does not
enter meditative experience in the state of tabula rasa. It is highly
unlikely that a Buddhist yogi will meet God the Creator in his visions,
nor that a Jewish mystic or a Sufi will experience the anātman-doctrine.
Even the purest meditative experience is culturally and linguistically
bound, and is engrossed in a tradition.73

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73
In this connection one has to note especially the extensive work of Stephan Katz. He
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128 ELI FRANCO

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Schmithausen 2005 Lambert Schmithausen, Reprint of Schmithausen 1976a
in: Paul Williams (ed.), Buddhism. Critical Concepts in
Religious Studies. Vol. II: The Early Buddhist Schools and
Doctrinal History; Theravāda Doctrine. London and New
York 2005, 242-254.
Schumann 2004 Hans Wolfgang Schumann, The Historical Buddha. The
Times, the Life and the Teachings of the Founder of Bud-
dhism. Delhi 2004.
Sharf 1995 Robert Sharf, Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of
Meditative Experience. Numen 42 (1995): 228-83. Re-
printed in P. Williams (ed.), Buddhism. Critical Concepts
in Religious Studies. Vol. II: The Early Buddhist Schools
and Doctrinal History; Theravāda Buddhism. London and
New York 2005, 255-299.
Skilling 2000 Peter Skilling, Vasubandhu and the Vyākhyāyukti Litera-
ture. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies 23/2 (2000) 297-350.
SN Samyuttanikāya (Pāli Text Society)
Stcherbatsky 1923 Theodor Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Bud-
dhism and the Meaning of the Word “dharma”. London
1923.
Steinkellner 1978 Ernst Steinkellner, Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem im
Buddhismus. In: G. Oberhammer (ed.) Transzendenz-
erfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils. Wien 1978, 121-
134.
Steinkellner 2002 Ernst Steinkellner, Zur Lehre vom Nicht-Selbst (anātman)
im frühen Buddhismus. In: J. Figl and H.-D. Klein (eds.),
Der Begriff der Seele in der Religionswissenschaft. Würz-
burg 2002, 171-186.
Taranātha 1997 Taranātha, History of Buddhism in India. Transl. from
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Takakusu 1904 Junjirō Takakusu, The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha

(A.D. 499-569). T’oung pao, ser. 2: 5 (1904) 269-296
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 ANNE MACDONALD

Knowing Nothing: Candrakīrti and Yogic

Perception1

1. INTRODUCTION

Individuals who have reached advanced stages on the Buddhist path are
renowned for being able to apprehend things beyond the ken of ordinary
persons. A plethora of anecdotes, narratives and expository material in
Indian Buddhist works, beginning with the earliest suttas and extending
through the compositions of the Conservative (the so-called Hīnayāna)
schools to the Mahāyāna scriptures and śāstras, depict and describe
practitioners who have gained perceptual and cognitive access to remote
objects and otherwise inaccessible information, who know distant envi-
ronments, the hidden or invisible in their immediate surroundings,
and/or the fundamental nature of the world. The ability of these adepts
to experience distinct phenomena, states of affairs, dimensions and su-
preme realities concealed to others is often attributed to their mastery of
concentrative states and meditative techniques, and the acquisition of
refined levels of consciousness generated on their basis. Given the spe-
cifically Buddhist focus of these persons’ striving, their efforts tend to
be ultimately aimed at the direct cognition of or immediate insight into
their tradition’s conception of the final truth, this truth being presented
in early and Conservative Buddhism as, e.g., the four noble truths, and
in the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism as emptiness.
Nāgārjuna (2nd/3rd c. CE), the founder of the Madhyamaka
school, although without doubt convinced of an ultimate state of affairs,
has little specific to say about perception of the out-of-the-ordinary in

1
Research for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Foundation in the
context of the FWF-Project S9805-G08. I am most grateful to Prof. Eli Franco, Dr.
Dorji Wangchuk and Terry Chantler for carefully reading the present paper and for
offering insightful comments and suggestions. I also thank Dr. Mudagamuwe
Maithrimurthi for sharing with me his knowledge of the abhijñās.
134 ANNE MACDONALD

his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (henceforth MMK), and focuses its 447

verses primarily on refuting the existence of the phenomena known to
the world, or, more particularly, on disproving the entities, categories
and concepts accepted and taught by the Conservative Buddhist
schools.2 With the exception of the very general reference in MMK
24.24 to the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the path (mārga),3 Nāgārjuna also
does not mention or discuss in the MMK the means, such as meditation
techniques, for arriving at apprehension of the parokṣa, the impercepti-
ble, or, as described by later scholars, the atyāntaparokṣa, the radically
inaccessible. This dearth of references to methods and processes and his
limited delineation of the result leave his stance on exactly what those
who dare to appropriate and internalize his radical critique might in the
end perceive, achieve or experience open to interpretation, and contrib-
ute to it remaining a topic of debate among scholars. Although the com-
plementary scrutiny of other writings attributed to him contributes to the
illumination of his views, for more explicit and detailed statements
about yogic perception and the objects of yogic perception in Madhya-
maka it is necessary to examine the works of later authors and commen-
tators. The present paper will mainly concentrate on statements by Can-
drakīrti (600–650 CE) that address, and allude and relate to the topic of
yogic perception. These can be found scattered throughout his works; I
rely here on his commentary on the MMK, i.e., the Prasannapadā, his
commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s Yuktiṣaṣṭikā and Śūnyatāsaptati,4 and on
his independent work the Madhyamakāvatāra, together with its bhāṣya.

2
See Vetter 1982: 96, n. 21, where he considers MMK 7.4 to represent the view of a
Sarvāstivāda opponent; MMK 9.1-2 and 9.6 that of a Pudgalavādin, possibly a
Sāṃmitīya; MMK 17.1-11 to represent the view of an opponent who would at least
later be termed a Sautrāntika; and MMK 17.12-20 to possibly be that of a
Sāṃmitīya. See also Kragh 2006, Chapter 3 for more detailed discussion concerning
references to the opponents dealt with in MMK 17.1-20. Nāgārjuna’s approach in
the MMK is apophatic, but he does refer to and even characterize (primarily nega-
tively) the ultimate state (see, e.g., MMK 18.9); important references to the highest
truth and nirvāṇa in the MMK have been noted and discussed in Vetter 1982.
3
MMK 24.24: svābhāvye sati mārgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate | athāsau bhāvyate
mārgaḥ svābhāvyaṃ te na vidyate ||. The mārga is also referred to in MMK 24.25
and 40, bhāvanā in 24.27.
4
Candrakīrti’s authorship of the Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti is not completely beyond doubt.
The work is not mentioned in Indian literature, and only the colophon of the Tibetan
translation of the work (in all four Canonical editions of the Tanjur) and later Ti-
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 135

2. CANDRAKĪRTI ON EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION

Before proceeding to a presentation of the Madhyamaka understanding
of the ultimate and an investigation of Candrakīrti’s views on its per-
ception, it might be noted that Candrakīrti also makes allowance for
more general types of extrasensory knowledge. One interesting refer-
ence to the wonder of yogic perception in its wider sense is encountered
at Madhyamakāvatāra 3.11, where Candrakīrti recites some of the at-
tainments gained by the practitioner who has reached and dwells on the
third Bodhisattva level of awakening, the bhūmi called prabhākarī, the
“Illuminating.” 5 He states that the Bodhisattva who abides on this level,
in addition to completely destroying his craving and hatred and perfect-
ing the dhyānas,6 attains supernormal knowledge, or, as it is sometimes
interpreted, “direct knowledge” (mngon shes, *abhijñā). In the commen-
tary on his verse, it is made clear that with his mention of supernormal
knowledge he intends a traditional five-fold group of abhijñās, four of
which might broadly be seen as types of clairvoyance.7 These five types
of supranormal capability are generally said to be produced on the basis
of the practitioner having reached the fourth dhyāna, an intensified con-
centrative state characterized by one-pointedness of mind and emotional
equanimity. The first of the five abhijñās referred to in Candrakīrti’s
commentary consists in the ability to perform various types of paranor-

betan historians name him as its author. For internal criteria that nonetheless appear
to support attribution of the work to him, see Erb 1997: 1-10.
5
MA 3.11 (MABhed 53.17-20): sa der rgyal sras bsam gtan mngon shes dang || ’dod
chags zhe sdang yongs su zad par ’gyur || des kyang rtag tu ’jig rten pa yi ni || ’dod
pa’i ’dod chags ’joms par nus par ’gyur ||.
6
The word bsam gtan (*dhyāna) is explained in the bhāṣya as intending the four
dhyānas, the four samāpattis, and the four apramāṇas.
7
For references to the group of five abhijñās, cf. Lamotte 1976: 1814; on the six
abhijñās, cf. 1809ff. Lamotte notes (p. 1809) that the first five are usually given in
the order r̥ddhividhijñāna (Pāli: iddhividha) / r̥ddhiviṣayajñāna; divyaśrotra (Pāli:
dibbasota); cetaḥparyāyajñāna (Pāli: cetopariyañāṇa) / paracittajñāna; pūrvanirvā-
sānusmr̥tijñāna (Pāli: pubbe nivāsānussatiñāṇa); cyutyupapādajñāna (Pāli: sattānaṃ
cutūpapātañāṇa), also known as divyacakṣus (Pāli: dibbacakkhu). Cf. also de La
Vallée Poussin 1931; Lindquist 1935; Ñāṇamoli 1995: 37 (with references to
Majjhima Nikāya suttas 6, 73, 77 and 108); AK 7.42-56 and AKBh thereon; Dayal
1932: 106ff.; Gethin 1998: 185f.; Gethin 2001: 84. On methods for developing the
iddhis and the abhijñās, see Visuddhimagga chapters 12 and 13 (iddhividhāniddeso
and abhiññāniddeso) and AKBh on 7.43d; see also Gethin 2001: 101f.
136 ANNE MACDONALD

mal feats (r̥ddhi), such as being able to manifest mind-made bodies, to

pass through physical matter such as walls and mountains, to fly, to
walk on water and dive into the earth, to blaze like fire and shower
down rain from oneself, and to touch the sun and the moon. The second
abhijñā mentioned is the divine ear (divyaśrotra), by way of which the
yogin is able to hear any sounds, divine or human, that he wishes to
listen to. The third abhijñā enables him to know the state of mind of
other beings (paracittajñāna), the fourth, to recollect millions of his
previous lives in great detail (pūrvanivāsānusmr̥tijñāna). With the fifth
supranormal achievement, that of the divine eye (divyacakṣus), he is
able to see beings dying and being reborn, and knows the wholesome or
unwholesome karma that takes them to their respective good or difficult
destinations. As astounding and fascinating as these powers and super-
normal perceptions might be, Candrakīrti has nothing special to say
about them himself, choosing instead to elaborate on them in his bhāṣya
by citing verbatim the Daśabhūmikasūtra’s brief but detailed account of
the five abhijñās.8 His interest in them is exhausted in this account.
As is obvious from Candrakīrti’s reliance on a Mahāyāna sūtra
for their description, these five abhijñās are not unique to the Madhya-
maka school; we are, in fact, familiar with presentations of them in Ca-
nonical and Abhidharma works, and two of them, the recollection of
past lives and the divine eye, figure in a number of Canonical portrayals
of the Buddha’s own awakening.9 Individual abhijñās, explained as
resulting automatically upon attainment of the fourth dhyāna (as in the
case of the Buddha or persons who trained in them in previous lives) or
as needing to be developed through effort by the yogin on the basis of
this dhyāna,10 were viewed early on as extraordinary but mundane types
of knowledge because they did not on their own accomplish release
from saṃsāra for the practitioner, even though they might be conducive

8
De La Vallée Poussin presents the Sanskrit text of the Daśabhūmikasūtra citation in
an appendix to his translation of MA chapter 3; see MABhtr 1907: 305-307. For the
section cited, see also Rahder 1926: 34-36 (= section M).
9
For suttas in which these two abhijñās do not appear, see Schmithausen 1981: 221,
n. 75.
10
Cf. Gethin 2001: 102. Cp. AKBh on 7.44b. On the dissociation of liberation from
attainment of the dhyānas in some Canonical texts, see Schmithausen 1981: 219-
222.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 137

to it.11 Canonical descriptions of the abhijñās in the context of the lib-

eration process therefore usually included a further item, termed
“knowledge of the destruction of the taints” (Pāli: āsavakkhayañāṇa,
Sanskrit: āsravakṣayajñāna), the “taints” being [craving for] sensual
pleasures (kāma), [craving for] existence (bhava), and ignorance
(avidyā).12 This abhijñā came to be known as the supramundane abhi-
jñā, for it informed of one’s attainment of freedom from birth and death,
of one’s nirvāṇa, and in the stereotypical account of the attainment of
liberation has as a main component the insight that effects liberation.13
It is probable that two of the abhijñās included in the Canonical
liberation accounts, viz., the recalling of former lifetimes and the wit-
nessing of beings propelled by their earlier actions to new existences,
were considered to provide experiential confirmation of soteriologically
relevant truths, especially the truths of suffering and the origin of suffer-
ing, and in this way to contribute to the liberation process. Both Ca-
nonical and post-Canonical authors also acknowledged the usefulness of
other abhijñās, such as the ability to read others’ minds and the capacity
to perform miracles, for benefitting ordinary persons, especially for
converting them to Buddhism.14 Transferred to the Mahāyānist Bodhi-
sattva context, the first five abhijñās – the sixth either reserved for
Buddhahood or revised inasmuch as the end of the taints would deliver
the Bodhisattva to a premature nirvāṇa and thus abruptly end his ca-
reer15 – must have been interpreted as serving to deepen the adept’s

11
See Ñāṇamoli 1995: 37; cp. the discussion and classifications in AKBh chapter 7 ad
verse 42. See also Schmithausen 1981: 221f., where he suggests that the abhijñās
may have been considered especially necessary in the case of the Buddha’s original
discovery of the Four Noble Truths.
12
De La Vallée Poussin (1931: 338) remarks: “À ces cinq savoirs, fut ajouté un
sixième: la connaissance que prend le saint de sa sainteté. Le caractère scolastique
de cette invention n’est pas douteux.”
13
For the “stereotypical account,” see Schmithausen 1981: 203-205. On āsavakkhaya-
ñāṇa in the context of the stereotypical account, see Schmithausen 1981: 204, n. 16.
14
On Canonical views regarding the performance of miraculous feats, see, e.g., Gethin
2001: 97-101. Cf. AKBh on AK 7.47 regarding the value of miracles and mind-
reading for conversion; note also Granoff 1996 for problems connected with the per-
formance of miracles.
15
The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, for example, distinguishes between an incomplete
and complete āsravakṣayajñāna in order to explain statements in Prajñāpāramitā lit-
erature that connect Bodhisattvas with the sixth abhijñā. In the case of the incom-
plete form, the kleśas are stopped, but the vāsanās are not; see Lamotte 1976:
138 ANNE MACDONALD

experience and strengthen his dedication to reach the final goal of

Buddhahood, and as being of use in augmenting both his desire and
ability to inspire and aid others. It is difficult to know whether Can-
drakīrti’s single-word reference to the abhijñās in his Madhyamakāva-
tāra verse and his uncommented citing of the Daśabhūmikasūtra indi-
cate much more than a tipping of his hat to tradition; their mention may
demonstrate his acknowledgement of the view that the acquisition and
employment of miraculous powers serve the Bodhisattva’s programme
of helping other beings. However, his disinterest in further elaborating
the five abhijñās signals that regardless of their value as useful side-
effects of the Bodhisattva’s endeavour, for him they are of minor impor-
tance owing to their negligible soteriological value, both individually
and collectively having little, if anything, to contribute to the actual
achievement of liberation. Yet like the early authors whose inclusion of
a sixth abhijñā was inspired by a primary concern with knowledge with
soteriological function, Candrakīrti’s main interest is in a type of know-
ledge that can be classified as supramundane and that provides the in-
sight which breaks one out of, as the texts have it, the “jail of saṃsāra.”
Writing nearly a millennium after the Canonical authors composed their
accounts of the Buddha’s and his disciples’ liberation process, Can-
drakīrti, however, does not assert that the escape from repeated birth
and death is effected through meditative stabilization in the fourth dhy-
āna and subsequent profound insight into the four noble truths accom-
panied by vanquishment of the taints. He declares rather that it is
brought about by profound insight into the emptiness (śūnyatā) of
things.

3. THE MĀDHYAMIKA’S NIRVĀṆA: AN ILLUSION?

In brief, Candrakīrti propounds the view that the world, including the
subject perceiving and experiencing the world, is of an illusionary na-

1816ff. Candrakīrti explicitly refers to āsravakṣayajñāna when he recites and com-

ments on the ten powers (bala) of a buddha in MA 12.21 (cf. MABhed 369.13: zag
rnam zad pa mkhyen stobs); in MA 12.31 he declares that it informs the newly ac-
complished buddha of the destruction of the kleśas together with their vāsanās. In-
cluded in the stock list of the ten powers in MA 12.21 is the ability to recall past
lives (sngon gnas dran pa mkhyen pa, *pūrvanivāsānusmr̥tijñāna) and the knowl-
edge of the birth and death of beings (’chi ’pho skye blo, *cyutyupapādajñāna).
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 139

ture; it may be appropriate to refer to his view in this respect as one of

metaphysical illusionism.16 According to him, the phenomena of the
world, or universe, which appear and seem to be real, in actuality do not
exist. He and others of the Madhyamaka tradition do admit that the
things of the world appear to ordinary, unawakened persons, but they
deny that these things truly are as they appear to be, i.e., real as opposed
to unreal. The Mādhyamikas maintain that the things of the world are
empty of a real nature that would support or justify any claim to their
being ontologically existent. Phenomena must be empty of a real nature,
of an own-being (svabhāva), the Mādhyamika argues, because they
arise in dependence (pratītyasamutpāda) upon other things; whatever
arises in dependence, in being reliant on something else and thus not
capable of existing without the other’s support, obviously does not exist
of its own accord, by its own nature. Would things exist on their own,
i.e., be real, they could as a consequence neither arise nor perish, for a
real thing, a thing with its “own” being (sva-bhāva), would on account
of this not require causes for it to come into being or to pass out of be-
ing; it would not arise in dependence on something else nor decay or
vanish due to the influence of some other factor. Such an entity would
exist forever, and change would be impossible. That the phenomena
experienced by the unawakened are indeed apprehended to arise in de-
pendence, and to change, reveals that they are empty of an own-being,
and thus bereft of true existence. Their arising in dependence translates
into not truly existing, to not actually arising in dependence. The merely
apparent existence of the things of the world therefore inspires the
Mādhyamikas to compare them to, among other illusory phenomena,
the objects apprehended in dreams and mirages, or conjured by a magi-
cian. Even though such objects appear and seem to be real during the
dream, on a hot day in the desert, or, in the case of a magical illusion,
while one beholds the magic show, the elephants in the dream, the water
in the mirage and the beautiful damsel produced by the magician are
empty of real existence and do not actually exist. Upon awakening from
the dream, approaching the mirage for water, or seeing the magician
dissolve the damsel, one relinquishes − even though their reality had
been taken for granted until then − all ideas of the existence of these
objects. Like these illusory objects, the dependently-arisen phenomena

16
On Nāgārjuna as a propounder of metaphysical illusionism, see Oetke 2007: 16ff.
140 ANNE MACDONALD

of the world that are unquestioningly believed to be genuine by the un-

enlightened have only an apparent reality, a semblance of, a superficial,
“fake” realness. The teaching of the emptiness of things thus discloses
the deceptive nature of worldly phenomena: they are mere fictions, un-
real appearances masquerading, so to speak, as real things. As fictions
they are actually no things, ontologically nothing, and thus in the final
analysis, inexistent. According to the Mādhyamikas, no thing has ever
really existed and no thing will ever come into existence. The cycling
through repeated births and deaths that constitute the saṃsāric wander-
ing − this too has never really occurred.
Thus the question arises: If, according to the Mādhyamikas,
saṃsāra is actually a fiction, what, then, of nirvāṇa? Can one escape
from something that never was? Does nirvāṇa, unlike saṃsāra, exist?
Or is liberation also a fiction, and the counsel to strive for it, a Mahā-
yānist joke? Aid for answering these questions can be found in MMK
chapter 25, the “Examination of nirvāṇa,” and in Candrakīrti’s com-
mentary on its individual kārikās. It should be mentioned that large
circles within early Buddhism and some of the Conservative schools did
indeed maintain a positively characterized nirvāṇa. A number of pas-
sages in early Buddhist works present nirvāṇa as an unconditioned and
enduring state or sphere, and as such as similar to the higher spheres of
yogic concentration but radically transcending them; nirvāṇa appears in
these specific cases to have been conceived as a metaphysical, or rather,
meta-physical, world-transcending dimension into which the liberated
mind/self would enter.17 The Theravādins, in spite of their dogmatic

17
For references, see Frauwallner 1953: 226f. [= Frauwallner 1984: 178f.]; Schmit-
hausen 1969: 158f. Schmithausen (1969: 159) remarks that the occurrence of a far
greater number of passages negatively characterizing nirvāṇa as the process or state
of the termination of suffering derives from the fact that the positive nature of nir-
vāṇa, as it is in itself, was beyond the reach of thought and speech and experience-
able only in a meditative state; positive statements might indicate its not being noth-
ing, but detailed speculation, given the nature of language, was dubious. He adds
that such speculation on the nature of nirvāṇa was superfluous for the goal of Bud-
dhism: inasmuch as all of worldly existence, on account of its impermanence, was
considered to be suffering, liberation from this suffering sufficed as the goal, regard-
less of whether it might be characterized as a positive state or as pure annihilation.
The tradition thus recognized the existence of a positive though indescribable di-
mension as the “place” of liberation, but particularly emphasized its negative func-
tion as the ending of suffering.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 141

denial of the existence of a self that might enter or experience nirvāṇa,

postulated it as a positive, unconditioned, and enduring − and to that
extent joyful − entity. Nirvāṇa in the Sarvāstivāda school has the unique
characteristic of being a hypostatized elimination or stopping of the
defilements and suffering, an existing “non-being,” and was thus con-
sidered a real, unconditioned and permanent entity.18 Nāgārjuna ad-
dresses the issue of an existent nirvāṇa in the fourth, fifth and sixth
kārikās of MMK 25,19 commencing by unhesitatingly rejecting the pos-
sibility. He argues that if nirvāṇa would be an existent thing, it a) would
have to be characterized by aging and death (jarāmaraṇa), b) would
have to be conditioned (saṃskr̥ta) and c) would have to be reliant on
something else (upādāya), since all existent things have the characteris-
tics of aging and death, are conditioned and are reliant. No Buddhist
would accept a nirvāṇa so characterized. Nāgārjuna likewise rejects the
view that nirvāṇa is non-existence (abhāva).20 The equating of nirvāṇa
and non-existence was, however, not completely foreign to Buddhism,
for the Sautrāntika school did assert a nirvāṇa − at least an ontological
nirvāṇa − that is mere non-existence. The Sautrāntika nirvāṇa is ex-
hausted in its designation: it is solely the name for the fact that the emo-
tional and intellectual defilements, and suffering, no longer arise, onto-

18
Even though the Sarvāstivādins’ presuppositions that individual existence ends with
the death of the liberated person and that an ātman (which might continue) does not
exist relegated the spiritual experience of nirvāṇa without remainder to mere annihi-
lation, the school did make room for the liberative effects of nirvāṇa prior to death.
These occurred in the form of a consecutive separation from the defilements brought
about by religious praxis and by pratisaṃkhyānirodha (cessation resulting from con-
sideration/insight, equated by the Sarvāstivādins with nirvāṇa), which of necessity
was viewed as a succession of real, existent pratisaṃkhyānirodhas, or “nirvāṇas,”
equivalent in number to the number of defilements removed. See, e.g., Schmit-
hausen 1969: 161f.; Cox 1994; Cox 1995: 87f., 90f., 323 n. 72.
19
MMK 25.4: bhāvas tāvan na nirvāṇaṃ jarāmaraṇalakṣaṇam | prasajyetāsti bhāvo hi
na jarāmaraṇaṃ vinā ||. MMK 25.5: bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ saṃskr̥taṃ
bhavet | nāsaṃskr̥to vidyate hi bhāvaḥ kvacana kaścana || (pāda c emended follow-
ing MacDonald 2007: 40f.). MMK 25.6: bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇam anupādāya tat
katham | nirvāṇaṃ nānupādāya kaścid bhāvo hi vidyate ||.
20
He rejects this possibility in MMK 25.7-8. 25.7: bhāvo yadi na nirvāṇam abhāvaḥ
kiṃ bhaviṣyati | nirvāṇaṃ yatra bhāvo na nābhāvas tatra vidyate ||. 25.8: yady abhā-
vaś ca nirvāṇam anupādāya tat katham | nirvāṇaṃ na hy abhāvo ’sti yo ’nupādāya
vidyate ||.
142 ANNE MACDONALD

logically nothing at all.21 Explicating Nāgārjuna’s rejection of nirvāṇa

conceived as non-existence, Candrakīrti states that in the world a thing
is termed non-existent when it gives up its own-being and becomes
otherwise, i.e., becomes other than existent.22 But since nirvāṇa was
never established as something that exists, it cannot relinquish its exis-
tence and become otherwise; that is, not having obtained the necessary
prerequisite of having the state of a thing, it is not in a position to aban-
don this state and become inexistent. Speaking to the Sautrāntika view
of nirvāṇa as the cessation and thus end of the defilements, as their
“having become otherwise,” Candrakīrti declares that if the non-
existence of the defilements23 is nirvāṇa, then the impermanence of the
defilements (to be understood as their momentary perishing in the
saṃsāric continuum) will have to be accepted as nirvāṇa. This is defi-
nitely not accepted by the Sautrāntikas, asserts Candrakīrti, because it
would entail that liberation is automatically achieved, without any effort
on the part of the practitioner.24
Yet even though the Mādhyamikas reject a nirvāṇa conceived and
classified either as an existent or as non-existence (as well as one char-
acterized by both existence and non-existence, and by neither existence
nor non-existence),25 they continue to speak of nirvāṇa. This is con-
firmed, for instance, by Candrakīrti’s commentary on MMK 25.10. In

21
The Sautrāntika nirvāṇa as a spiritual event consists in liberation from the defile-
ments and suffering existence; nirvāṇa without remainder thus expresses itself as
the complete destruction, i.e., the end, of the body-mind continuum.
22
Candrakīrti’s statement here relates to MMK 25.7. See de Jong 1978: 245, entry for
p. 527.6 (the sentences are missing from PsPed 527): iha hi bhāvaḥ svabhāvaparityā-
gād anyathā bhavann abhāva iti vyapadiśyate | yatra ca pakṣe nirvāṇaṃ bhāvo na
bhavati vihitadoṣatvāt tatra pakṣe ’bhāvo ’pi nirvāṇaṃ na bhavati bhāvasvarūpeṇā-
siddharūpasyābhāvarūpatānupapatter iti abhiprāyaḥ |.
23
Candrakīrti mentions birth (janman) along with the defilements (kleśa).
24
In his commentary on Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 4cd, Candrakīrti informs an opponent who holds
that saṃsāra, specified as the skandhas, i.e., the body-mind continuum, exists and
that its cessation is nirvāṇa understood as non-existence (abhāva), that such is in-
deed taught, but it is merely a strategy. The teaching is necessary because the un-
enlightened have been habituated since beginningless time to the belief that things
really exist, and are not able to turn away from attachment to them without being
told, as an antidote, that nirvāṇa is the cessation of saṃsāra. In coming to believe
that the attainment of nirvāṇa involves great happiness, they are able to turn away
from the pleasant things of saṃsāra, not to mention the disagreeable.
25
Cf. MMK 25.11-15 and 25.16-17 and Candrakīrti’s commentary thereon.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 143

the kārikā, Nāgārjuna makes reference to a statement of the Buddha’s in

which he has proclaimed that being (bhava) and non-being (vibhava)
have to be abandoned, and from this Nāgārjuna concludes that nirvāṇa
is appropriate neither as existence (bhāva) nor as non-existence (abhā-
va).26 Citing a sentence from a Canonical work which negates that re-
lease from existence can be found by way of being or non-being,27 Can-
drakīrti declares that even though existence and non-existence are to be
abandoned, the Buddha did not state that nirvāṇa is to be abandoned; he
rather asserted that it is not to be abandoned.28 Following Candrakīrti’s
interpretation of the MMK on nirvāṇa thus far, this would mean that the
practitioner who has come to understand that the world and even what
was thought to be the escape from it are neither existing nor not existing
(nor both nor neither) – this practitioner is nevertheless to continue to
strive for liberation, for nirvāṇa.
One might be inclined to interpret this call to continued effort
from a subjective point of view, as meaning that even though the
Mādhyamikas reject an ontologically existent nirvāṇa, and even though
they equally reject nirvāṇa as the cessation of an ontologically existent
saṃsāra, they do accept nirvāṇa as a spiritual event. As an event it will
belong to the conventional level, but as the paramount and decisive
spiritual event it will effect the practitioner’s release from repeated birth
and death, which are ultimately unreal but experienced as real until the
event occurs. It is, as stated earlier, a profound insight, sharpened, deep-
ened and solidified by meditative concentration, which is said to effect
the release. In Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 4cd, Nāgārjuna declares that the thorough
knowledge (parijñā) of existence and non-existence is the liberating
factor.29 In his commentary on this half-verse, Candrakīrti explains that
because existence and non-existence are mutually dependent, they are
not established by own-nature, i.e., they cannot exist in reality (for

26
MMK 25.10: prahāṇaṃ cābravīc chāstā bhavasya vibhavasya ca | tasmān na bhāvo
nābhāvo nirvāṇam iti yujyate ||.
27
PsPed 530.7: tatra sūtra uktam | ye kecid bhikṣavo bhavena bhavasya niḥsaraṇaṃ
paryeṣante vibhavena vā ’parijñānaṃ tat teṣām iti |. De La Vallée Poussin (PsPed
530, n. 4) determines the text closest to the sūtra cited by Candrakīrti to be attested
in the Udāna (p. 33, iii.10).
28
PsPed 530.8-9: na caitan nirvāṇaṃ prahātavyam uktaṃ bhagavatā kiṃ tarhy apra-
hātavyam |.
29
YṢ 4cd: dngos dang dngos med yongs shes pas || bdag nyid chen po rnam par grol ||.
I rely in this paper on Scherrer-Schaub’s edition of the YṢ as contained in the YṢV.
144 ANNE MACDONALD

whatever is dependent cannot really exist), but the spiritually immature

do not know this and, conceiving existence and non-existence and
therewith engendering desire and other defilements in regard to the two,
they are bound and doomed to wander in saṃsāra.30 Awareness of the
lack of real existence and non-existence, on the other hand, has the
power to ultimately terminate the continuum of desire and other defile-
ments because it jettisons the objective basis onto which desire is pro-
jected. Thorough knowledge of the non-existence of both existence and
non-existence is on account of this potent enough to break the bonds of
the cycle of birth and death and deliver one from saṃsāra; it is thus
suitable as a means of liberation.
That thought and conceptual activity have no part to play in this
thorough knowing is indicated in Candrakīrti’s commentary to Yukti-
ṣaṣṭikā 4cd, where he describes it as having the nature of the non-
imagining of an own-being of existence and non-existence. More epis-
temologically, he equates it with the non-perception of existence and
non-existence.31 It thus appears that for him thorough knowledge is the
result of cultivation of the understanding that nothing exists, and in-
volves, conceptually, the ceasing of all conceptualizing of and in regard
to existence and its contingent opposite, and perceptually, the non-
apprehension of these two, i.e., of any thing or any lack of existence
predicated upon a thing. When the yogin as “knower” is without the
concept of, or apprehension of any of the things accepted as existing or
not existing by the world or by the other Buddhist schools, the “object”
of the thorough knowing must exclude all possible phenomenal entities
and non-entities. The object, conventionally speaking, is the truth be-
hind the veil; the yogin’s thorough knowing characterized as the non-
apprehension of existence or non-existence bespeaks a penetration of
the world of fictions to its true nature, a nature which is untouched by
conceptuality and stripped of the manifoldness of the illusion. It is a

30
Related text and French translation in Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 32.9-23 and 132-134
(I rely on Scherrer-Schaub’s edition of the YṢV in this paper). See alternatively Lo-
izzo 2007: 259.6-260.6 and 140f. (Loizzo’s YṢ and YṢV translation is often unreli-
able).
31
… yongs su shes pa dngos po dang dngos po med pa’i rang gi ngo bo la sogs pa
yongs su mi rtog pa’i rang bzhin … (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 32.12-14; Loizzo 2007:
259.7-9); dngos po dang dngos po med pa mi dmigs pa ni ... (Scherrer-Schaub 1991:
32.23-24; Loizzo 2007: 260.6-7).
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 145

nature described in Madhyamaka works as peaceful (śānta) and the

pacification of all objective manifoldness and all manifold conceptual
and verbal activity (praprañcopaśama),32 and is such because nothing
has ever arisen to disturb its calm: nothing has ever come into being,
and nothing has ever ceased. Thus even though it is neither a “thing”
nor a dependently conceived “non-thing,” the object of the thorough
knowledge, viz., the true nature of the dependently originated and the
dependently designated, is appropriate to be understood as the Mādhya-
mika’s ontological nirvāṇa. This true nature of the world coincides with
nirvāṇa conceived as the removal of the defilements and the abandon-
ing of all suffering existence because like all other things, the defile-
ments and suffering, in never having arisen, have always been “aban-
doned.” Similar to the traditionally described nirvāṇa,33 the Madhya-
maka nirvāṇa is set forth as the pacification of all manifoldness, but in
contradistinction to the previously mentioned interpretations of nirvāṇa,
which envisioned it as an existent and enduring dimension or entity
removed from the world, as an existent non-existent, or as the stopping
of real defilements and a real personal continuum, the Madhyamaka
nirvāṇa is the world itself – in its innate and eternal state of peaceful
non-arising. As the true nature of the world and the phenomena consti-
tuting it, it is not even, as the other schools’ nirvāṇa is, something to be
attained through escape from the world, for it is already ontologically
anticipated in things themselves and merely requires insight into this
fact.34 The old opposition between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is replaced in

32
Cf. MMK 7.16, 18.9, 25.24.
33
Cf. Aṅguttara Nikāya II.163 where nirvāṇa is characterized as papañcavūpasama.
34
Cf. Vetter 1982: 92f.: “Ich weise hier nur darauf hin, dass das von Nāgārjuna als
Ziel genannte Nirvāṇa kein jenseitiger Ort ist, auch kein isolierter Zustand in der
Welt, auch kein Nichtmehrsein von etwas Besonderem, sondern die Welt selbst, in-
sofern sie ihrer Bestimmtheiten und damit Bedingtheiten entkleidet und darum nicht
mehr als solche wahrnehmbar ist.” (“I will here only point out that the nirvāṇa
named by Nāgārjuna as the goal is not a place beyond, not an isolated state in the
world, also not the being no more of something particular; [it is] rather the world it-
self insofar as it is stripped of its determinacies and with that its conditionalities and
therefore no longer perceptible as such.”). Cf. MMK 25.9: ya ājavaṃjavībhāva
upādāya pratītya vā | so ’pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate ||. See also Vetter
1982: 93, where he asserts that the Madhyamaka interpretation of nirvāṇa assures its
definiteness: “... diese Endgültigkeit kann nur dadurch garantiert werden, dass es
schon immer nur das Nirvāṇa gibt und dass die Welt nur eine falsche Vorstellung
146 ANNE MACDONALD

Madhyamaka with an identification of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, or rather

with an identification of nirvāṇa and the true nature of saṃsāra. nirvāṇa
as a spiritual event involves seeing through the world, the manifoldness
of existence, such that its true nature is experienced.
It is against this larger background that the seemingly paradoxi-
cal statements found in Madhyamaka texts as well as in Prajñāpāramitā
and Mahāyāna literature in general which state that the yogin sees the
ultimate by not-seeing, or that “non-seeing is seeing” are to be under-
stood.35 The knowing of the true nature of things, of the ultimate peace-
fulness of existence that has always been at its heart, or as the texts
sometimes refer to it, of “thusness” (tattva), is a knowing that is without
objects or appearances, one in which the yogin does not apprehend any
thing. To dwell in a meditative state in which nothing appears is to see
reality. In his commentary on Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 6cd,36 Candrakīrti also de-
fines nirvāṇa via the seeming paradox: he asserts that the thorough
knowing of the non-arising of a real nature of existence which occurs by
way of non thorough-knowing, is said to be nirvāṇa.37

4. PERCEPTION OF EMPTINESS ACCORDING TO A POST-CANDRAKĪRTI

MĀDHYAMIKA
As realization of the ultimate was deemed to be direct and unmediated,
with the rise of the Buddhist epistemological-logical tradition Mādhya-

ist.” (“This definitiveness can only be guaranteed when there was always solely
nirvāṇa and the world is only a wrong idea.”).
35
See, e.g., MABhed 229.18-20 (MABhtr 1911: 279): rnal ’byor pa ’phags pa’i lam
mngon du mdzad par gyur pas ma gzigs pa’i tshul gyis de kho na nyid gzigs pa dag
gis … . Cf. also PsPed 265.3-5. The author of the Tarkajvālā quotes the sentence
mthong ba med pa ni de nyid mthong ba’o (similar to the oft-cited adarśanaṃ bha-
gavan sarvadharmāṇāṃ darśanaṃ saṃyagdarśanam); see Heitmann 2004: 98f. and
99, n. 3. On interpretations of such statements, see Keira 2004: 99, n. 151.
36
YṢ 6cd: parijñānaṃ bhavasyaiva nirvāṇam iti kathyate || (Sanskrit cited in Scherrer-
Schaub 1991: 144, n. 125). Tibetan text and translation in Scherrer-Schaub 1991:
37.21-22 and 146; Loizzo 2007: 268.1-2 and 147.
37
Text of the entire relevant passage and translation in Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 37.23-
38.2 and 146-147; Loizzo 2007: 268.3-6 and 147. See also Scherrer-Schaub p. 146,
n. 129, where she remarks that the aparijñāna defined as nirvāṇa may be best inter-
preted as a state of consciousness without subject or object. Note that Candrakīrti
has defined existence (bhava, srid pa) as the five appropriated skandhas in his
commentary to Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 6ab.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 147

mikas felt increasingly behooved to explain how the soteriologically

critical non-seeing occurred, and in doing so to situate it in an epistemo-
logically suitable context.38 Candrakīrti’s presentation of the direct per-
ception of the non-existence of phenomena was, as we shall see, in part
a response to the influence of the epistemologists. In order to highlight
the distinctiveness of his presentation, it may be instructive to briefly
describe, as a point of contrast, the theory of ultimate perception set
forth by Kamalaśīla (740–795), a later Mādhyamika who dealt with the
issue by appropriating and revamping the ideas of the epistemologists.
Heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660), Kamalaśīla relied on
his theory of non-perception (anupalabdhi) for the theoretical elucida-
tion and traditional grounding of the vision of emptiness. Slightly modi-
fying Dharmakīrti’s theory, which determines that the non-perception of
a specific thing X implies a perception other than that of thing X (an-
yopalabdhi) and indeed a perception of something other than X, viz., Y,
(anyabhāva), Kamalaśīla maintains that the non-perception consisting
in the non-seeing of any and all things is a perception other than that of
X (anyopalabdhi) because it is a perception that is different from the
seeing of things, but rejects that the perception of something other than
X (anyabhāva), that is, of some other thing, plays a role because no
other thing truly exists which might serve as the object of perception.39

38
R. Keira (2004: 47-49) explains: “Now, since ordinary beings cannot perceive the
ultimate nature of entities, it is also impossible that they would perceive the void-
ness (śūnyatā) of entities, since that is what entities ultimately are. Here, however,
the following problem arises: if nobody could understand the Mādhyamika thesis of
the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of direct perception, the Mādhyamikas
would not have a method for obtaining the nonconceptual wisdom of thusness. In
that case the religious project of Mādhyamika philosophy would not be fulfilled:
bodhisattvas would not be able to progress spiritually on the path to buddhahood by
directly realizing the ultimate thusness, i.e., the absence of real intrinsic nature. The
Mādhyamika theory of meditation upon all dharmas as being without real intrinsic
nature thus could not be established. Furthermore, if the Mādhyamikas could not
prove the possibility of a direct perception which understands the absence of real in-
trinsic nature, they also could not prove the existence of the Buddha’s wisdom di-
rectly understanding selflessness (nairātmya). Therefore, since the Buddha would
not be established to be someone who can directly realize thusness, his authority
would accordingly be lost, as it is an essential facet of the Buddha’s wisdom that it
be nonconceptual and direct.”
39
On Dharmakīrti’s theory of non-perception, see Keira 2004: 52-64; on Kamalaśīla’s
revision of this theory for Mādhyamika consumption, see pp. 64-86.
148 ANNE MACDONALD

Put simply, knowing the ultimate involves a cognition which does not
take any thing as its support. Kamalaśīla admits that like all other
things, this cognition does not ultimately exist, but he unambiguously
declares that it, like the yogin in possession of it, does exist convention-
ally.40 Even though the conventionally existing cognition which knows
the true nature of things is a cognition devoid of content, it is proper to
confer on it the status of valid direct perception because it is clear
(spaṣṭa), that is, non-conceptual (kalpanāpoḍha), and non-belying
(avisaṃvāda). Opponents who, in consideration of the fact that cogni-
tion by definition requires an object, would argue that non-existing
things are incapable of generating cognition are countered by Kamal-
aśīla’s assertion that the gnosis (ye shes) which arises from meditation
clearly realizes the thusness (de kho na nyid) of the selflessness of
things; by no means, he states, on occasions where this gnosis is said,
e.g., in the Dharmasaṅgītisūtra,41 to involve “non-seeing” is a non-
implicative negation, i.e., no cognition at all, intended.42 Even so, it is
challenging to imagine how yogic cognition, as a clear perception in
which nothing appears, might have as its “object” the state without ap-
pearances; as R. Keira has noted, Kamalaśīla could be criticized for
assuming an anyopalabdhi which has non-existence (abhāva) as its ob-
ject.43 Kamalaśīla deals with the problem by turning to reflexive cogni-
tion (svasaṃvedana) − the aspect of cognition which knows the content
of cognition and makes memory possible. According to him, when the
yogin reaches the stage in his meditation on the selflessness of phenom-
ena in which nothing appears, the reflexive aspect of his cognition, here
in the role of anyopalabdhi, takes the clear perception without appear-
ances as its object, first recognizing that it lacks any appearances and
subsequently recognizing that the cognition itself does not truly exist.
On the basis of this experience, the yogin is afterwards, upon emerging
from the non-conceptual state, able to understand by way of a concep-
tual subsequent [judging] cognition (phyis rjes su thob pa’i shes pa) that

40
See Keira 2004: 105-110. For the Madhyamakāloka text containing Kamalaśīla’s
affirmation of the conventional existence of yogic cognition, see ibid., pp. 226-228.
41
Dharmasaṅgītisūtra (as cited in the Śīkṣāsamuccaya): adarśanaṃ bhagavan sarva-
dharmāṇām darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam iti; see Keira 2004: 69-71 and 99.
42
See Keira 2004: 98-104; for the Madhyamakāloka Tibetan text, see ibid., p. 225f.
43
See ibid., p. 83f.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 149

the cognition lacked appearances and that it also lacks true existence,
and, as the upshot of this, that all things are without a real nature.44

5. CANDRAKĪRTI ON PERCEIVING NOTHING

Candrakīrti, who is estimated to have been active approximately a cen-
tury and a half before Kamalaśīla and who seems not to have known
Dharmakīrti’s views on non-perception, would concur with Kamalaśīla
that the yogin’s perception of reality occurs in the form of a direct per-
ception. In a section of his Yuktiṣaṣṭikā commentary, to which I shall
return shortly, Candrakīrti explicitly asserts that there is direct percep-
tion of reality. His understanding of the nature of the cognition that
directly perceives the final nature of things is, however, quite different
from Kamalaśīla’s.
A passage relevant to Candrakīrti’s views on cognition of the ul-
timate, albeit occurring in another context, can be found in his commen-
tary on the second kārikā of Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatāsaptati.45 The discus-
sion there, sparked by the kārikā’s reference to the self (bdag, *ātman),
commences with Candrakīrti’s rebuttal of an opponent view that the
words “I” and “mine,” although without an objective support for the
Buddhas who have relinquished the belief in a self (ngar ’dzin pa,
*ahaṃkāra) and the belief in “mine” (nga yir ’dzin pa, *mamakāra), do
have an objective support when it comes to ordinary, unenlightened
people because they still maintain the belief in a self; Candrakīrti argues
that this is not the case because the self simply does not exist. The op-
ponent responds that even if the self does not exist, the belief in a self
nevertheless exists as a mind associate (sems las byung ba, *caitta) and
therefore cannot be just a word. Candrakīrti inquires what the objective
support (dmigs pa, *ālambana) for this mind associate might be, and
when the opponent states that it is the self, Candrakīrti reiterates that the
self does not exist, and points out that in the absence of an objective
support, consciousness and its associates cannot arise. He then moves
on to address the Yogācāra objection that consciousness and its associ-

44
I rely on Keira for this explanation. Kamalaśīla’s assertions on this point from the
Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā, etc., and R. Keira’s elucidation of them may be found
in Keira 2004: 77-81.
45
For the text and a German translation of the entire relevant passage, see Erb 1997:
218.33-223.32 and 46-53.
150 ANNE MACDONALD

ates arise and exist without an external object, as they do in dreams,

etc.,46 and chides the Yogācāra opponent for not adhering to the well-
established worldly convention that consciousness occurs together with
an object, arguing that consciousness and its associates, which are in
fact produced by an object, cannot exist when the object is missing. An
extended discussion with another opponent follows in which a favourite
non-existent of Indian philosophy is made topical, with the opponent
contending that not all consciousnesses have an (existent) object be-
cause otherwise the consciousness which apprehends the son of a barren
woman (mo gsham gyi bu, *vandyāputra) could not occur. Candrakīrti
asserts that the designation (ming, *nāman/*abhidhāna) “son of a barren
woman” serves as the consciousness’s object, and asks the opponent
why he would then say that this consciousness is objectless. The oppo-
nent retorts that if the mere name would be the object when one hears
“son of a barren woman,” then with the utterance of the sentence “The
son of a barren woman does not exist,” the designation should also not
exist, but since this is not the case, the name cannot be the object of
consciousness. The opponent goes on to argue that non-existence
(dngos po med pa, *abhāva) would constitute the object-support (dmigs
pa, *ālambana), positioning himself in the well-known ākāra theory of
perception attributed to the Sautrāntika school and recognized by epis-
temologists like Dignāga, according to which the object bestows its
image to consciousness and is cognized by means of this image;47 for
those admitting external things consciousness knows the outer object
exclusively via the image of the object reflected in it. Consciousness
thus appears with an image that conforms to its object; for example,
consciousness of the colour blue arises assuming the aspect of its object,
namely, blue. Consciousness of a barren woman’s son, in the view of
Candrakīrti’s opponent, would therefore arise with non-existence as its
image. Candrakīrti attacks this idea, likewise in reliance on the Sautrān-
tika theory that consciousness assumes the image of the object, focusing
first on the idea that the image is not in its nature different from con-
sciousness. Given that the opponent presumes that the son of a barren

46
Cf. also Candrakīrti’s rebuttal of the dream example for the Yogācāra argument that
consciousness arises without an object in MABhed on MA 6.48-53; see MABhed
140.5-145.9 and MABhtr 1910: 328-333.
47
Cf. AKBh 62.6, 473.25-474.1; Cox 1988: 38-40; Hattori 1968: 98, 102; Erb 1997:
142, n. 400.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 151

woman as object transfers its image of non-existence onto conscious-

ness, the consciousness, Candrakīrti points out, in conforming to the
sheer non-existence of the image, will not be able to be existent. It is not
logically possible, he asserts, for an existent consciousness to take on
the image of that which is bereft of existence, because existence and
non-existence are mutually exclusive and cannot occur simultaneously
in a single phenomenon. If it would nevertheless be supposed that the
consciousness would become both existent (to accommodate its own
existence) and non-existent (to accommodate the image of the son of a
barren woman), then the opponent will be forced to accept a double
consciousness. When the opponent shifts the focus to the object and
argues that the case of the apprehension of non-existence will exactly
parallel the case of the apprehension of blue, i.e., the appearing image
will reflect the object, he is informed that the image concerned (and the
consciousness by implication), in conforming to the inexistence of the
son of a barren woman, can only be non-existent, because otherwise the
object and its image, the former non-existent, the latter existent, would
contradict each other. In the same vein, Candrakīrti stresses a few lines
later that inasmuch as consciousness does not have a nature different
from the image, a consciousness that is produced through conforming to
non-existence will have to be non-existent, since non-existence and an
(existent) image are incompatible. He adds that consciousness lacks any
nature prior to its arising, and not apprehending the image of an object,
it simply does not arise.48 The debate does not stop here, but the main
point has been made: for Candrakīrti, a consciousness of which the ob-
jective support is non-existence is a non-existent one. The lack of an
object for consciousness precludes the arising of consciousness.
While the above discussion from the Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti deals
with the Sautrāntika ākāra theory in the context of a response to oppo-
nents who rely on it to defend their own doctrinal theories, in other of
his works Candrakīrti independently introduces it and adopts it for the
sake of underpinning his own views; he appears to have accepted this
doctrine on the conventional level.49 Perhaps his most interesting use of
the ākāra theory occurs in the passages in which he describes and de-
fends his interpretation of consciousness’s apprehension of ultimate

48
Cf. Erb 1997: 221.14-15 and 49.
49
For references, see Erb 1997: 142, n. 400.
152 ANNE MACDONALD

reality, ontological nirvāṇa. An epistemologically focused discussion on

this topic can be found in his comments on Yuktiṣaṣṭikā kārikā 8,50
where he attacks fellow Buddhists for the sake of demonstrating that his
view regarding consciousness and the ultimate is the sole logically and
epistemologically viable one. Proceeding from the kārikā’s characteri-
zation of the Buddhist opponents’ nirvāṇa as (a real) cessation (’gog,
*nirodha),51 Candrakīrti commences by exposing the inadequacy of the
Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika nirvāṇa conceived as the ceasing of the
defilements and the psycho-physical continuum (in the case of the
Vaibhāṣikas the conclusion of a series of hypostatized “stops,” and in
the case of the Sautrāntikas nothing but the utter end of the continuum)
when it comes to realization, i.e., direct perception, of this cessation.52
Among other arguments, he denies that cessation, and thus perception
of it, could occur as long as the aggregates still exist and adverts to the
fact that, as the kārikā has indicated, once the psycho-physical contin-
uum has come to an end there is no subject left to apprehend the cessa-
tion.53 Candrakīrti then turns to the views of the logical-epistemological
school on direct perception of the ultimate. Quoting from and para-
phrasing Pramāṇasamuccaya I.6cd and its auto-commentary, he sets
forth Dignāga’s definition of yogic perception, presenting it as the yog-
ins’ seeing of the mere thing (don tsam, *arthamātra), a seeing that is

50
YṢ 8: rnam par ’jig pas ’gog ’gyur gyi || ’dus byas shes pas ma yin na || de ni su la
mngon sum ’gyur || zhig ces pa de ji lta bu ||.
51
See also YṢ 7: dngos po skyes pa zhig pa la || ji ltar ’gog pa brtag pa bzhin || de
bzhin sgyu ma byas pa ltar || mkhas pa dag gis ’gog par dgongs ||.
52
As Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 149f. [n. 141]) has already indicated, Candrakīrti ex-
ploits the traditional notion that nirvāṇa/nirodha must be “realized’ (sākṣātkr̥) to
bring the discussion onto epistemological terrain. “La discussion qui s’ouvre avec la
kār 8 et se poursuit jusqu’à la kār 12 et son commentaire … porte sur la nature de
l’arrêt (nirodha) et de la connaissance de l’arrêt (nirodha-jñāna). Les sources scrip-
turaires et les traités parlent de cette dernière comme d’une connaissance directe, un
‘vue devant les yeux’: ainsi de l’opération sur la troisième vérité, où l’arrêt doit être
perçu directement (nirodha-sākṣātkāra). … La synonymie des expressions sākṣāt-
KR̥- et pratyakṣī-KR̥-, de leur dérivés et expressions apparentées, autorise Candra-
kīrti à déplacer le centre de la discussion sur le terrain de l’épistémologie.” Cf., e.g.,
Saṃyutta Nikāya V, 422.19-22: Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhanirodham ariyasaccaṃ
sacchikātabban ti me bhikkhave … āloko udapādi ||; further references in Scherrer-
Schaub 1991: 150 (n. 141).
53
For text and translation of these and other arguments, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991:
39.3-40.11 and 151-155; Loizzo 2007: 270.3-272.7 and 148-150.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 153

without the superimposition of a unitary object and not mixed with con-
ceptuality deriving from the guru’s teaching;54 he declares that such a
view of yogic perception is not suitable when it is a question of direct
perception of cessation. The opponent epistemologist responds by
specifying that it is generally established (grags, *prasiddha) that when
a real particular (rang gi mtshan nyid, *svalakṣaṇa) is meditated upon
by way of its general characteristics (spyi’i mtshan nyid, *sāmānya-
lakṣaṇa), the gnosis arisen from meditation (bsgoms pa las byung ba’i
ye shes, *bhāvanāmayam jñānam) gradually arises. That which is ap-
prehended by this non-conceptual gnosis (rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes,
*avikalpajñāna), he adds, being free of any conceptual superimposition,
is nothing but the particular. Thus, when one realizes, e.g., imperma-
nence, one knows the mere thing (dngos po tsam).55 The opponent con-
cludes his argument by stating that since the object apprehended by
gnosis is the particular, this object, like the object in the case of con-
sciousness perceiving mere blue, etc., is directly perceived. The non-
conceptual gnosis is thereby situated at the culmination of the episte-
mologist yogin’s meditation on, we may assume, the four Noble Truths,
with the “mere thing” the real aspects such as impermanence, suffering,
emptiness, selflessness, etc., connected with these Truths. The yogin
envisaged by the opponent would thus initially meditate on a conceptual
image or conceptual ascertainment of his object, such as impermanence
or emptiness, and his intense concentration and repeated effort would
effect a gradual refinement of the conceptualized object, with the end
result that the meditation would issue in a direct, i.e., exclusively non-
conceptual, perception of the object.56 In the view of certain later

54
YṢV: rnal ’byor pa rnams kyi bla mas bstan pa las skyes pa rnam par rtog pa dang
ma ’dres pa gcig tu yul sgro btags pa med pa don tsam mthong ba gang yin pa de
yang ’gog pa la mi srid do || (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40.12-14; Loizzo 2007: 272.7-
9. Translation in Scherrer-Schaub p. 155f.; Loizzo p. 150). Pramāṇasamuccaya
I.6cd: yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyavakīrṇārthamātradr̥k; (see Steinkellner 2005: 3; the
fragments presented in Hattori 1968: 94 read °āvyatibhinnā° for °āvyavakīrṇā°).
Pramāṇasamuccayavr̥tti to I.6cd: yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam
arthamātradarśanaṃ pratyakṣam (Steinkellner 2005: 3; see also Vincent
Eltschinger’s article in the present volume, n. 93, as well as Eli Franco’s article in
the present volume p. 122).
55
Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40.12-21; Loizzo 2007: 272.10-273.2.
56
For a concise summary of the basic structure of the yogic path according to Dhar-
makīrti, see section 3.1 (under “The Path to Salvation”) of Vincent Eltschinger’s ar-
154 ANNE MACDONALD

Mādhyamikas like Kamalaśīla, who is known for having appropriated a

number of the logical-epistemological school’s doctrines, the yogin
involved in conceptual meditation on the emptiness of things would be
able to evolve the meditation to the point that upon reaching the “ulti-
mate limit of [conceptual] meditation” (bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta), a
non-conceptual perception of emptiness would arise,57 which, as previ-
ously explained, would take the form of a cognition without content and
would be recognized and registered by the self-knowing aspect of cog-
nition.
The postulation of Dignāga’s,58 later elaborated by Dharmakīrti
and his commentators, and tailored to fit Madhyamaka requirements by
Kamalaśīla, that extended conceptual cultivation of an object would
issue in direct perception of the object, is dismissed by Candrakīrti as
preposterous. He asserts that when the idea being maintained is exam-
ined more closely, the epistemologists, given that they strictly maintain
the distinctiveness, i.e., the mutual exclusivity, of the particular and of
the general characteristic, respectively the object of direct perception
and conceptual cognition, will have to admit that it is logically unac-
ceptable to hold that the object used for meditation on the general char-
acteristic could be the particular, since this would involve over-
extension (ha cang thal bar ’gyur ba, *atiprasaṅga) – I assume because
the scope of the particular is thereby extended to include general char-

ticle in the present volume. For Dharmakīrti’s description of the cognitions and the
meditative process the yogic path involves, see section 4 (“Yogijñāna as an Episte-
mological Topic”) of the same article.
57
Cf. Keira 2004: 50, 69ff.
58
Though I here attribute to Dignāga the idea that extended conceptual cultivation of
an object issues in its direct perception, it should be noted that this theory is not re-
corded in any of his works available to us and is usually associated with Dhar-
makīrti. While it is of course possible that Dignāga set forth this view in one or
more of his non-extant works and our YṢV passage provides documentation for this,
its absence in the extant materials brings up the question of whether Candrakīrti
might have known Dharmakīrti. Christian Lindtner, solely on the basis of text in the
Catuḥśatakaṭīkā which appears to refer to the Pramāṇavārttika assertion pramāṇam
avisaṃvādi jñānam, maintains that it “seems probable” that Candrakīrti did know
Dharmakīrti (see Lindtner 1992: 57; the Catuḥśatakaṭīkā clause Lindtner cites, viz.,
mi bslu ba’i shes pa ni ’jig rten na tshad ma nyid du mthong na, can be found in Til-
lemans 1990: 67.11-12 [vol. 2]). The evidence is still too slim for definitive conclu-
sions. I am grateful to Dr. Helmut Krasser for discussions on the matter and for pro-
viding me with valuable references.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 155

acteristics. Candrakīrti’s rejection of the epistemologists’ theory thus

focuses on the fact that if the particular free of all conceptual overlay is
the actual object of meditation and, on account of this, the final object
of yogic direct perception, then during the long and repeated course of
the meditation, this particular cannot also be its opposite, the general
characteristic constituted purely by conceptuality. The epistemologists,
in maintaining that a yet unrealized particular can be conceptually con-
templated to the point that it finally escapes the superimposition of gen-
eral characteristics, contradict their fundamental differentiation of the
objects of cognition with this, in his view, fogging of the distinction
between the two and overlapping of their definitions. The mutually ex-
clusive nature of the two objects and their respective cognitions other-
wise posited by the epistemologists automatically prohibits any coincid-
ing, intersection or reconciliation.
As stated, Candrakīrti obviously intends to expose the faults of
the views of his Buddhist colleagues in order to clear the way for his
own position on perception of the ultimate. In the discussion on kārikā 8
preceding the altercation with the epistemologists, he is asked if direct
perception takes place at the moment of seeing, and responds that be-
cause there is the making known (rnam par rig pa, *vijñapti) of the ob-
ject by consciousness (rnam par shes pa, *vijñāna) even after seeing has
ceased, this may be designated “direct perception.”59 He uses this as a
lead-in to reference to the Sautrāntika theory of direct perception, ac-
cording to which it is the image in consciousness, which conforms to
the actual object, that is actually perceived, invoking here the theory’s
stock example of the consciousness of blue. The discussion is taken in
another direction by a Vaibhāṣika objection, but subsequent to his refu-
tation of the epistemologists’ theory of yogic direct perception, there is
another allusion to the Sautrāntika theory. Candrakīrti initiates the pres-
entation of his Madhyamaka view by rhetorically asking how, even if
the meditative process posited by the epistemologists would be correct,
there could be the direct perception of the consciousness of cessation
(’gog pa, *nirodha) when in cessation there does not exist even a trace
of an entity having the form of the cessation of suffering. Next, in reli-
ance on scriptural testimony which states that awareness of the non-
arising of suffering is direct perception, he argues that it would, in fact,

59
Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 39.19-22; Loizzo 2007: 271.3-5.
156 ANNE MACDONALD

be impossible for consciousness to arise when its objective support

(dmigs pa; *ālambana) has the form of non-arising; in such a case con-
sciousness would definitely assume the mode of non-arising,60 that is, it
would not arise at all.
With this last brief statement Candrakīrti’s initially seemingly
unusual take on direct perception of the ultimate is disclosed. For him,
at the time of perception of the ultimate, of the emptiness of things that
were never really there in the first place, inasmuch as there is nothing
whatsoever to be perceived, that is, since an object for consciousness
does not exist, consciousness will simply not come into being; Candra-
kīrti’s assertion that consciousness assumes the mode of non-arising
translates into no consciousness at all. Yet in this way consciousness
still fulfills the Sautrāntika demand that the consciousness resemble,
conform to, its object: like its object, the non-arisen true nature of
things, consciousness “takes,” so to speak, a non-arisen and non-
existent form. In Candrakīrti’s words: If consciousness, like its object,
has the form of non-arising, it is proper to maintain that it has proceeded
by way of the object just as it is.61 And given its proceeding by way of
its object, its conforming to its object, it is proper to designate it direct
perception. In the everyday world, too, he avers, situations occur in
which one speaks of “direct perception” in regard to non-existent
things. He provides the following example: A traveller sees an area off
in the distance that appears to be abounding in clear water. He intends
to cross the water but feels incompetent and nervous to do so, and there-
fore inquires of a local farmer just how much water might actually be
out there. In response, the local, apparently taken aback by the question,
asks where the water might be that the traveller claims to see, and then
explains that what indeed looks like water off in the distance is actually
only a mirage. He adds that if the traveller doesn’t believe him, he
should go and look for himself; then he will directly perceive what he
has just been told. It is the same in regular life, Candrakīrti points out,
where things that do not exist and are not perceived are conventionally
designated as directly perceived; therefore, from the point of view of
worldly concealing truth, it is not contradictory to call a consciousness
of non-perception (mi dmigs pa’i shes pa) − which for Candrakīrti is no

60
Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40.28-41.3; Loizzo 2007: 273.7-11.
61
Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 41.3-5; Loizzo 2007: 273.11-12.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 157

consciousness at all – “direct perception.” He bolsters his position by

referring to a scriptural statement which asserts that the determination
(yongs su gcod pa, *pariccheda) of an object, corresponding to the way
it is, by that which makes it known (shes pa byed pa, *jñāpaka) is direct
perception. Candrakīrti considers this statement applicable to the pre-
sent case because the consciousness which does not arise on account of
the fact that its object is non-arisen accurately reflects, makes known,
the fact that the object is non-arisen, i.e., that the object does not exist;
therefore, inasmuch as the exact state of the object is accurately re-
flected through consciousness’s own inexistence, it is appropriate to
term it direct perception.
Candrakīrti had earlier presented basically the same view, al-
though in another context, in the fourth verse and its commentary in the
chapter on the level of a Buddha in the Madhyamakāvatāra.62 There he
is replying to an opponent who contends that if the peaceful (zhi ba,
*śānta), viz., the eternal calmedness of all non-arisen things, is reality
(de nyid, *tattva), the mind will not proceed in regard to this, and when
the mind does not proceed, it cannot thoroughly know its object; as a
consequence, statements to the effect that precisely the non-existence of
thorough knowledge (yong su shes pa med pa) constitutes thorough
knowledge of reality, or complete non-knowing is knowing, are inap-
propriate. In his verse response, Candrakīrti admits that in this specific
case of the mind relying on the aspect (rnam pa, *ākāra) of reality, it is
only “as if” (lta bu, *iva) consciousness knows the ultimate, clarifying
in his commentary, after reciting the Sautrāntika main requisite for per-
ception, namely, that the consciousness be in conformity with the aspect
of the object, and illustrating this with the example of blue, that it is
metaphorically stated that the consciousness “arising” in conformity
with the aspect of reality knows reality. It is owing to conceptuality that
one establishes that this consciousness knows reality; in actuality there
is not any consciousness of anything because neither consciousness nor
its object come into being. Yet even with the qualification, Candrakīrti
intends for the idea of a merely metaphorical apprehension of the ulti-
mate to be taken seriously, indicating in the course of his explanation

62
Cf. the discussion in MABhed 356.18-358.20. See also the analysis of MA 12.3-4 in
Dunne 1996: 546-548.
158 ANNE MACDONALD

that his reference to the Sautrāntika model of perception supplies a gen-

erally established example for the argument.63

6. KNOWING THE ULTIMATE

So what exactly, we might ask, is the point of all this, besides the fact
that Candrakīrti has displayed his agility in the performance of a very
nice little pirouette with the Sautrāntika theory of perception? And why
does he insist on describing the Mādhyamika yogin’s lack of conscious-
ness as direct perception? One might initially conjecture that Nāgār-
juna’s explicit mention of the realization of cessation, i.e., of nirvāṇa, in
kārikā 8 of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā inspired Candrakīrti, whose criticism of the
other Buddhist schools demonstrates his awareness of the prevailing
theories regarding nirvāṇa and the perception of it, to come up with his
own specifically Madhyamaka view on the topic as he composed his
commentary on the kārikā. But this is too simplistic, and we have just
seen that he had already given a less developed explanation of the
knowing of the ultimate in his earliest composition, the Madhya-
makāvatāra. It is more probable that Candrakīrti took Nāgārjuna’s refer-
ence to realization of cessation primarily as an opportunity to confront
Dignāga’s school, with its developed epistemological theories his main
rival on the issue of direct perception of the ultimate, in order to both
discredit its explanation of it and to set forth, in an argumentative and
scripturally backed form, his own ingenious but typically pragmatic
version. His intent, one assumes, would have been to enter the arena of
Buddhist theories of perception of the ultimate and defeat the episte-
mologist on turf that was quite possibly already monopolized by him. It
was certainly necessary that Candrakīrti find a way to acknowledge
direct perception of nirvāṇa, for not to have done so would have left
him open to attack regarding the Mādhyamika’s and even the Buddha’s
direct realization of nirvāṇa, and as a consequence, easy prey when it
came to questions of the value of Madhyamaka doctrines and to the
issue of the Buddha’s establishment as an authority. At the very least,
by securing his own rather unusual portrayal of the consciousness that
“directly perceives” nirvāṇa as the ultimate state of things by means of
scripture and a widely accepted theory of perception, Candrakīrti was

63
Cf. MABhed 358.13-14.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 159

able to retain his faction’s standing within the general Buddhist tradi-
tion on these issues of fundamental importance. His specifically unique
presentation of the consciousness of the ultimate, on the other hand,
spared him from having to compromise his integrity as a Mādhyamika.
But what are the implications of the stance that when the final
state of things is realized there is no object to be known, and no con-
sciousness to know this? Would it mean that the ultimate is a sheer
void, or a pure abstract nothing, and that the ultimate realization of this
is in the end impossible since one can’t know nothing? I would contend
that our author’s view is more sophisticated and suggestive than this.
One of the main points, if not precisely the point that Candrakīrti in-
tends to make in the above discussions is that consciousness (vijñāna)
as conceived by his fellow philosophers and accepted by himself on the
conventional level is fundamentally incapable of knowing the ultimate,
because its functioning is restricted to occurring in relation to objects,
and the ultimate is no object and has no objects in it. One can be quite
certain that Candrakīrti would have rejected Kamalaśīla’s version of the
highest awareness as clear perception not only because it is based on the
epistemologist’s model but also because in this version the clear percep-
tion does not escape being described in terms that relate it to and there-
fore bind it to the conventional level; Kamalaśīla in fact allows this
consciousness conventional existence. Candrakīrti’s non-acceptance of
reflexive awareness would further have led him to repudiate the idea
that non-existence is not the object of the consciousness and to charge
that the positing of consciousness devoid of content, i.e., bereft of an
object, would contradict the general Buddhist doctrine that conscious-
ness occurs in tandem with an object. Candrakīrti’s underscoring that
consciousness does not arise when the object is the ultimate is secondar-
ily intended to point to the fact that for him all perceptual activity as we
know it − as well as all conceptual and linguistic activity − ceases in the
experience of the true nature of things, of ontological nirvāṇa.64 Toward
the end of the Śūnyatāsaptati’s earlier referenced discussion of the per-
ception of the son of a barren woman, Candrakīrti declares that the

64
Cf., e.g., Candrakīrti’s commentary on MMK 5.8, where he states that the pacifica-
tion of all visibles (draṣṭavyopaśama) that is free of the net of all conceptuality (sar-
vakalpanājālarahita) has the nature of the ceasing of consciousness (here intended
in the sense of conventional consciousness) and the object of consciousness (jñāna-
jñeyanivr̥ttisvabhāva).
160 ANNE MACDONALD

Mādhyamikas accomplish the clearing away, the elimination, of the

factors of existence (chos, *dharma) in the sense that with the non-
perception of any of these factors, all of which are of the nature of non-
existence, consciousness stops.65 This statement is followed by two
supporting scriptural citations, one of which is Āryadeva’s famous verse
that states that consciousness (rnam shes, *vijñāna) is the “seed of exis-
tence.”66
For Candrakīrti, the actual realization of the true nature of things
is performed by a completely different category of awareness, if I may
call it that, namely, by jñāna, “gnosis,” which does not belong or relate
to the everyday level. I am aware that a number of Madhyamaka schol-
ars construe the situation regarding ultimate knowledge and its object
quite differently, in large part because they interpret the fundamental
Madhyamaka stance on the possibility of existence – in my interpreta-
tion that it is impossible – as espousing it. I digress with this, but let it
be noted that C.W. Huntington in his book “The Emptiness of Empti-
ness” describes the consciousness which knows the ultimate, i.e., jñāna,
as a non-dualistic knowledge that is coterminous with the bodhisattva’s
everyday experience “in both its conceptual and perceptual aspects.” He
writes, “The Mādhyamika does not advocate any radically unconven-
tional category of epistemic act, but rather a radically unconventional
form of life, in which one is constantly and profoundly in touch with the
holistic, contextual nature of all experience—with ‘the suchness of de-
pendent origination.’”67 Huntington’s jñāna, albeit acknowledged to be
65
See Erb 1997: 221.40-222.2 and 50-51. It is to be noted that antecedent to this text
passage, in the extended debate concerning perception of the non-existent Can-
drakīrti adverts to the absurd consequence entailed by acceptance of objectless con-
sciousness in regard to nirvāṇa, namely, that (ordinary) consciousness would per-
manently continue, taking nirvāṇa as its objective support. He also briefly weaves in
his view of the status of consciousness at the time of perception of the ultimate; see
ibid., 221.31-222.12 and 50-51. Cf. also 223.7-16 and 52.
66
Cf. Catuḥśataka XIV.25 (Suzuki 1994: 360): srid pa’i sa bon rnam śes te || yul rnams
de yi spyod yul lo || yul la bdag med mthong na ni || srid pa’i sa bon ’gag par ’gyur ||.
The verse as cited in the ŚSV reads: srid pa’i sa bon rnam par śes || yul ni de yi
spyod yul la || mthong ba’i yul rnams bdag med phyir || srid pa’i sa bon ’gag par
’gyur ||; see Erb 1997: 222.9-12 and p. 144, n. 421.
67
Huntington 1989: 119f. One notes also other comments in reference to jñāna:
“Jñāna is the essential clarity and unerring sensibility of a mind that no longer
clings to reified concepts of any kind. It is a direct and sustained awareness of the
truth, for a bodhisattva, that meaning and existence are found only in the interface
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 161

meditatively cultivated, is essentially a rational insight into a profound

interconnectedness inherent in the truly existing world, and thus merely
a worldly, lived awareness of a state of affairs, and one that is involved
not only with perception but with conceptual thought. Dan Arnold does
not refer to jñāna per se in his book “Buddhists, Brahmins and Belief,”
but he does speak of a realization, which he qualifies, at least paren-
thetically, as “radically transformative.”68 He clarifies that the subject of
such a realization would be “a Buddha.” Arnold states that the object of
the realization would be ultimate truth, but rejecting Madhyamaka ar-
gumentation as world-denying, he contends “that, for Candrakīrti, the
only ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth—that the ‘ultimate
truth,’ in other words, is the abstract state of affairs of there being no set
of ‘ultimately existent’ (paramārthasat) ontological primitives like the
dharmas of Abhidharma.”69 “‘[U]ltimate truth’ (nirvāṇa),” he writes,
attempting to explain MMK 25.19ab, “does not consist in something
fundamentally different in kind from ‘conventional’ reality (saṃsāra);
rather, what is ‘ultimately true’ is simply the fact that there is nothing
fundamentally different from the world as conventionally described.”70
According to him, the content of a Buddha’s realization would therefore
consist in knowing that there is not something more real than the
dependently arisen, but truly existing, world;71 similar to Huntington’s,
Arnold’s ultimate insight is a real rational insight into the way the de-

between the components of an unstable and constantly shifting web of relationships,

which is everyday life” (ibid., p. 104), and in reference to prajñā (Huntington states
that it is “difficult to draw a distinction” between prajñā and jñāna): “Perfect wis-
dom graphically reveals the holistic, contextual nature of all forms of existence and
knowledge and allows the bodhisattva to adjust his attitude so that it accords with
the ‘suchness’ of all experience, with the self, and with the world, as they are in the
context of the moment. In this way, he is invested with the ability to act effectively
and in harmony with the demands of every situation as it presents itself in the web
of interrelated events (ibid., p. 88).”
68
Arnold 2005: 204.
69
Ibid., p. 184.
70
Ibid., p. 172. Two sentences before the one quoted, he states, “Thus, the point of
insisting on the ‘emptiness of emptiness’ is to throw us back into the world and to
compel the recognition that, although events are dependent, contingent, and conven-
tional, they are, for all that, real.”
71
Arnold (2005: 204) writes, “That claim [= Candrakīrti’s] is that the ‘ultimate’ con-
sists not in some radically ‘other’ state of affairs but in the realization (radically
transformative, to be sure) that there is nothing more real than this.”
162 ANNE MACDONALD

pendent but real world, inclusive of its concepts, exists. Taking up John
Dunne’s claim (a claim based on the previously mentioned Madhya-
makāvatāra verse which states that suchness is only metaphorically
known by the non-arisen consciousness) that a buddha would know
neither ultimate reality nor the ordinary world because nothing occurs in
his mind, Arnold contests that such a being would indeed perceive
something, though certainly not an ultimate reality: “It seems that the
ordinary world is all that such a Buddha would see.”72 On my reading of
Candrakīrti’s works, however, neither Huntington nor Arnold come
near to capturing what our author intends to convey with his references
and allusions to the knowing of reality or his more general pronounce-
ments on the nature of things.
To return to my understanding of Candrakīrti’s perspective on
the ultimate and its awareness: The cessation of all consciousness in the
face of no objects is pivotal for the realization of emptiness, the true
nature of things; it does not, however, fully define it. The coming to rest
of consciousness merely serves as the necessary condition for the ex-
perience of the ultimate. As stated, it is a completely different type of
awareness, viz., “gnosis” (jñāna), that knows it. Unlike ordinary con-
sciousness, gnosis does not take a thing, or as Candrakīrti sometimes
terms it, a mark (nimitta), as its object.73 The fact that its object-support
is conventionally described by Candrakīrti to be emptiness74 does not,
however, necessarily mean that the ultimate realization is a realization
of nothing, or that it involves acquiescing to absolute nothingness, to a
sheer, abstract void. Emptiness elucidated as the pacification of all
manifoldness (prapañcopaśama) implies that no concept or linguistic
designation applies to the true nature of the world; nothing can be
predicated of it, not even “non-existence.” The notion of emptiness has
in this context a spiritual function; as Lambert Schmithausen has stated,

72
Arnold 2005: 204. Arnold is referring to Dunne 1996: 548.
73
Cf. Candrakīrti’s commentary on MMK 25.16 (PsPed 533.11-15), where he argues
that nirvāṇa, in this case conceived by the opponent as both “existent and non-
existent,” cannot be ascertained by vijñāna because there is no nimitta in nirvāṇa:
kenaitad itthaṃvidhaṃ nirvāṇam astīti paricchidyate | saṃsārāvasthitaḥ paricchin-
attīti cet | yadi saṃsārāvasthitaḥ paricchinatti sa kiṃ vijñānena paricchinatti uta
jñānena | yadi vijñāneneti parikalpyate tan na yujyate | kiṃ kāraṇam | yasmān
nimittālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ na ca nirvāṇe kiṃcin nimittam asti |.
74
See PsPed 533.16: yasmāj jñānena hi śūnyatālambanena bhavitavyam |.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 163

“The concept ‘emptiness’ is also not intended to make a positive state-

ment about this reality; it is rather merely a call to thought to deliver
itself to its negation, to think itself away, to shake off all manifold con-
ceptuality and thereby enable the manifestation of the inconceivable
reality that was always there.”75 The ceasing of all conceptual and per-
ceptual activity in the Madhyamaka yogin would thus act as a catalyst
for experience of the concept-, designation- and percept-transcending
ultimate that is neither an existent entity nor pure nothingness. Con-
sciousness’ coming to rest would create, so to speak, a vacuum in which
emptiness as thusness (tattva), the true nature of the world free of any
appearances or conceptual content, could reveal itself. Inasmuch as the
pacification of manifoldness coincides in meaning with the cessation of
all things worldly, to which belong karma and the defilements, empti-
ness as the true nature of the world is equivalent to nirvāṇa;76 the ex-
perience of emptiness, then, would translate into an experience of
nirvāṇa, and the gnosis that has, conventionally speaking, emptiness as
its object-support (ālambana) would convey this experience of nirvāṇa.
But if gnosis is not a real consciousness that takes the non-
existent as its object or a conventionally existing clear, contentless con-
sciousness, just how does Candrakīrti envision it? Given the general
Madhyamaka focus on demonstrating the ontological impossibility of
known or postulated phenomena, and Candrakīrti’s hesitancy to attempt
to describe an ultimate that could mistakenly be construed as existent or
non-existent, details regarding the nature of gnosis are extremely rare in
his works. There is, however, one interesting passage in which he does
dare to sketch its features; it occurs in his commentary on MMK 25.16,

75
Schmithausen 1969: 166: “Auch der Begriff ‘Leerheit’ soll keine positive Aussage
über diese Wirklichkeit machen; es ist vielmehr lediglich eine Aufforderung an das
Denken, sich zur Negation seiner selbst zu vermitteln, sich zu zerdenken, alle viel-
fältige Vorstellung abzuschütteln und dadurch die Manifestation der immer schon
vorhandenen unbegreiflichen Wirklichkeit zu ermöglichen.”
76
Schmithausen (1969: 166) describes the intersection of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra: “Das
Nirvāṇa (als metaphysische Größe) ist also im Madhyamaka kein Jenseits; es ist
nicht außerhalb der Welt, es ist vielmehr in ihr; ja, Nirvāṇa und Welt sind überhaupt
nicht verschieden, sofern man nur die Welt nicht in ihrer unwahren Endlichkeit,
sondern in ihrem wahren Wesen nimmt.” (“Nirvāṇa (as a metaphysical dimension)
is therefore in Madhyamaka not a ‘beyond’; it is not outside the world, it is rather in
it; indeed, nirvāṇa and the world are not at all different, as long as one takes the
world not in its unreal finitude, but in its true nature.”)
164 ANNE MACDONALD

in which he contrasts consciousness (vijñāna) and gnosis (jñāna) and, as

already noted, asserts that gnosis’ object-support is emptiness. Immedi-
ately after this reference to its object-support he qualifies gnosis by way
of two adjectives, namely, “having the form of non-arising” (anutpāda-
rūpa) and “having a non-existing own-form” (avidyamānasvarūpa),
both of which could be applied to the consciousness which in Can-
drakīrti’s pirouette “directly perceives” the ultimate, and both of which
could also be taken to support the idea that there is no experience of
reality, or that its non-experience is experience of it. It is the third adjec-
tive given − although at first glance seemingly insignificant − that pro-
vides perhaps one of the most telling references to his take on it. The
modifier is “having a form that transcends all manifoldness” (sarvapra-
pañcātītarūpa), and in contrast to the previous two, it clearly does not
intend a purely negative characterization. With it, there is allusion to an
awareness that surmounts all manifold conceptualization and designa-
tion, one which neither exists nor does not exist, and is as unfathomable
as its so-called object, the thusness that is true reality, ontological
nirvāṇa. Of course as an awareness that is diametrically opposed to
ordinary consciousness, it will not be configured in a subject-object
relationship with emptiness, expressed as its focus for conventional
convenience; its functioning would rather be non-dual. Intimated by this
and the third adjective is the idea that gnosis consists in a radical mysti-
cal experience. Elsewhere, Candrakīrti states that the Buddhas abide in
the objectless gnosis, far beyond the spiritually immature.77 It will not
be irrelevant to mention, in this connection, that Nāgārjuna, in his chap-
ter on the Tathāgata in the MMK, describes the Buddha, here under-
stood not as a distinct person but as the true reality that is his nature, in
the same way that Candrakīrti describes gnosis, namely, as “transcend-
ing all manifoldness” (prapañcātīta).78 Just as striking is Candrakīrti’s
comment in the same chapter where he declares that the Mādhyamikas
do not teach that the Tathāgatas are inexistent inasmuch as they are

77
Cf. YṢV on YṢ 4cd: de’i phyir de dag skye bo byis pa rnams las shin tu ’das pa
dmigs pa med pa’i ye shes la gnas pas de dag nyid che ba’i phyir bdag nyid chen po
zhes bya ste | (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 32.16-18; Loizzo 2006: 260. 1-3).
78
MMK 22.15: prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam | te prapañcahatāḥ
sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam ||. Cf. also PsPed 446.5: sarvās tv etāḥ kalpanā
niṣprapañce tathāgate na saṃbhavanti |.
 KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAKĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 165

“completely outside [the domain of] manifoldness.”79 These descrip-

tions of the awakened beings and their gnosis, limited to being made by
way of modifiers indicating indescribability and inconceivability,
merely point to the unfathomable state beyond the nothingness of
worldly phenomena. It is probably not inappropriate to state that for the
Mādhyamika as yogin the final goal, and the final state, is not nothing-
ness, but transcendence. Although he is more often occupied with and
thus associated with rigorously arguing an uncompromising denial of
the world, it is in passages such as the ones examined here that we en-
counter Candrakīrti, as he moves on from this to allude to the outcome
and purpose of that denial, as a conveyer of spiritual, mystical experi-
ence.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AK Abhidharmakośa. See AKBh.

AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. P. Pradhan, ed.
Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. 2nd ed. Patna, 1975.
Arnold 2005 Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemol-
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Cox 1988 Collett Cox, “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of
Consciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika Theories.” In
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
11 (1988): 63-105.
Cox 1994 Collett Cox, “Attainment through Abandonment: The Sar-
vāstivāda Path of Removing Defilements.” In Paths to Lib-
eration. The Mārga and its Transformations in Buddhist
Thought. R.E. Buswell, Jr. & R.M. Gimello, ed. Delhi
1994: 31-87.
Cox 1995 Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories
on Existence. Studia Philologica Buddhica: Monograph Se-
ries, 11. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist
Studies, 1995.

79
PsPed 443.11: na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃ
brūmaḥ… |.
166 ANNE MACDONALD

Dayal 1932 Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit

Literature. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul Ltd., 1932.
Reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.
Dunne 1996 John Dunne, “Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha.” In
Journal of the American Academy of Religion LXIV/3
(1996): 525-556.
Erb 1997 Felix Erb, Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti: Candrakīrtis Kommentar zu
den „Siebzig Versen über die Leerheit“ des Nāgārjuna
[Kārikās 1-14]. Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 6, Insti-
tute for the Culture and History of Indian and Tibet at the
University of Hamburg. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag,
1997.
Frauwallner 1953 Erich Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I.
Band. Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1953.
Frauwallner 1984 Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1.
Bedekar, V.M., tr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
Gethin 1998 Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998.
Gethin 2001 Rupert Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening. Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1992; 2nd edition Oxford: Oneworld, 2001.
Granoff 1996 Phyllis Granoff, “The Ambiguity of Miracles. Buddhist
Understandings of Supernatural Power.” In East and West
46 (1996): 79-96.
Hattori 1968 Masaaki Hattori. Dignāga, On Perception. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1968.
Heitmann 2004 Annette L. Heitmann, Nektar der Erkenntnis. Buddhistische
Philosophie des 6. Jh.: Bhavyas Tarkajvālā I-III.26.
Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 2004.
Huntington 1989 C.W. Huntington, Jr., The Emptiness of Emptiness. An
Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika. Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawaii Press, 1989.
de Jong 1978 J.W. de Jong, “Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā.” In
Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978): 25-59; 217-252.
Keira 2004 Ryusei Keira, Mādhyamika and Epistemology. A Study of
Kamalaśīla's Method for Proving the Voidness of all
Dharmas. Introduction, Annotated Translations and Tibetan
Texts of Selected Sections of the Second Chapter of the
Madhyamakāloka. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und
Buddhismuskunde 59. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische
und Buddhistische Studien, 2004.
Kragh 2006 Ulrich Timme Kragh, Early Buddhist Theories of Action
and Result: A Study of Karmaphalasambandha. Candra-
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kīrti's Prasannapadā, Verses 17.1–20. Wiener Studien zur

Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 64. Vienna: Arbeits-
kreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 2006.
Lamotte, 1976 Étienne Lamotte, Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de
Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra) avec une étude sur
la Vacuité. Tome IV. Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste
de Louvain, 12. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, Université
de Louvain, 1976.
La Vallée Poussin 1931 Louis de La Vallée Poussin, “Le Bouddha et les Abhijñā.”
In Le Muséon (1931): 335-342.
Lindquist 1935 Sigurd Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhiññā. Eine Studie über die
Klassischen Wunder des Yoga. Uppsala 1935.
Lindtner 1992 Christian Lindtner, “On the Date of Dharmakīrti etc.” In
The Adyar Library Bulletin (1992): 56-62.
Loizzo 2007 Joseph Loizzo and the AIBS Translation Team, Nāgārju-
na’s Reason Sixty with Candrakīrti’s Reason Sixty Com-
mentary. New York: The American Institute of Buddhist
Studies at Columbia University, 2007.
MA Madhyamakāvatāra. See MABhed.
MABhed Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibétain.
Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. Bibliotheca Buddhica IX.
St. Petersburg, 1907-1912. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-
dass, 1992.
MABhtr “Madhyamakāvatāra, Introduction au Traité du Milieu de
l’Ācārya Candrakīrti, avec le commentaire de l’auteur, tra-
duit d’aprés la version tibétaine.” Louis de La Vallée Pous-
sin, tr. In Le Muséon VIII (1907): 249-317; XI (1910): 271-
358; XII (1911): 235-328.
MacDonald 2007 Anne MacDonald, “Revisiting the Mūlamadhya-
makakārikā: Text-Critical Proposals and Problems.” In
Studies in Indian Philosophy and Buddhism 14 (2007): 25-
55.
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. See PsPed and de Jong 1978.
Ñāṇamoli 1995 Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, tr., The Middle
Length Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of the
Majjhima Nikāya. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995.
Oetke 2007 Claus Oetke, “On MMK 24.18.” In Journal of Indian Phi-
losophy 35 (2007): 1-32.
PsPed Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgār-
juna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti.
Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St.
168 ANNE MACDONALD

Petersburg 1903-1913. Reprint Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag,

1970.
Rahder 1926 Johannes Rahder, Daśabhūmikasūtra. Leuven, 1926.
Saṃyutta Nikāya M. Leon Feer, ed. London: Pali Text Society, 1898. Reprint
1960.
Scherrer-Schaub 1991 Christina Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvr̥tti. Commentaire
à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseigne-
ment de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti.
Bruxelles: Institut Belge Des Hautes Études Chinoises,
1991.
Schmithausen 1969 Lambert Schmithausen, “Ich und Erlösung im Buddhis-
mus.” In Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religi-
onswissenschaft 53 (1969): 157-170.
Schmithausen 1973 Lambert Schmithausen, “Spirituelle Praxis und philosophi-
sche Theorie im Buddhismus.” In Zeitschrift für Missions-
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186.
Schmithausen 1981 Lambert Schmithausen, “On some Aspects of Descriptions
or Theories of ‘Liberating Insight’ and ‘Enlightenment’ in
Early Buddhism.” In Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhis-
mus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf. Klaus Bruhn and
Albrecht Wezler, ed. Wiesbaden 1981: 199-250.
ŚSV Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti. See Erb 1997.
Steinkellner 2005 Ernst Steinkellner, Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter
I. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text. Online
publication (http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf),
2005.
Suzuki 1994 Kōshin Suzuki, ed., Sanskrit Fragments and Tibetan Trans-
lation of Candrakīrti's Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśataka-
ṭīkā. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1994.
Tillemans 1990 Tom J.F. Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Āryadeva,
Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti. Wiener Studien zur Tibeto-
logie und Buddhismuskunde 24. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für
Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1990.
Vetter 1982 Tilmann Vetter, “Die Lehre Nāgārjunas in den Mūla-
Madhyamaka-kārikās.” In Epiphanie des Heils. Zur Heils-
gegenwart in indischer und christlicher Religion. Arbeits-
dokumentation eines Symposiums. Gerhard Oberhammer,
ed. Publications of the de Nobili Research Library, Vol IX.
Vienna 1982: 87-108.
YṢ, YṢV Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvr̥tti. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991.
 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

On the Career and the Cognition of Yogins1

In the present paper, I shall first attempt to reconstruct Dharmakīrti’s

notion of a yogin’s career on the basis of the statements one can find
scattered throughout his very influential Pramāṇavārttika. I shall try to
draw a coherent picture of both yoga and yogins, from the first insights
(prajñā) that take place when still in the stage of an “ordinary person”
(pṛthagjana), who is beset by a false view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), to the
culmination of the yogic endeavour at emancipation (mukti) and/or enli-

1
The present paper is the fifth in a series of studies of Dharmakīrti’s religious phi-
losophy, see Eltschinger 2005a and b, 2007 and forthcoming. Most sincere thanks
are due to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Prof. John Taber and Dr. Helmut Krasser, who
carefully read through the present paper, and to Mrs Cynthia Peck-Kubacek, who
very kindly improved my English. Though I could not do justice to all his sugges-
tions and remarks, I am much indebted to Prof. Eli Franco’s very insightful com-
ments on this paper. Since the present study was written in 2005, it did not take into
consideration John Dunne’s 2006 essay on the yogins’ cognition. Dunne’s exegeti-
cal hypothesis is, however, diametrically opposed to mine. To put it in a nutshell,
Dunne argues that “Dharmakīrti does not choose to present yogic perception as a
mystical gnosis that encounters or uncovers real things in the world” (Dunne 2006:
500), or, to put it in other words, that “Dharmakīrti deliberately chooses to down-
play the notion that, through spiritual exercises, an adept gains extraordinary sen-
sory abilities” (Dunne 2006: 504). As I shall try to argue in the second part of this
paper, I think that Dharmakīrti actually did hold the opinion that, at the completion
of the path, the yogin has a direct perceptual encounter with reality itself. In my
opinion, Dharmakīrti inherits from ideas that can be found, e.g., in the Śrāvaka-
bhūmi, and which have been summarized recently by Lambert Schmithausen. Ac-
cording to the latter (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79), “the contemplation process cul-
minates in a non-conceptualizing (nirvikalpa) perceptual cognition or insight
(pratyakṣaṃ jñānadarśanam) that transcends the mental image and directly appre-
hends the respective object itself.” To be more precise, the path described in the
Śrāvakabhūmi “culminates in a non-conceptualizing (nirvikalpa) perceptual cogni-
tion (pratyakṣajñāna) of the four Noble Truths” (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79). Re-
search for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Fund in the context of
the FWF-Project P19862 (“Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhis-
mus”).
170 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

ghtenment (bodhi). The description aims at presenting the religious

conceptions that form the background of Dharmakīrti’s epistemological
account of a yogin’s perception (yogipratyakṣa). In the second part of
this paper, I shall adduce a new and somewhat provocative hypothesis
concerning the still rather unclear subject of the nature of the yogin’s
cognition. I shall try to show that the properties Dharmakīrti ascribes to
a mystic’s perception (pratyakṣa), viz., vividness (spaṣṭābhatā), non-
conceptuality (nirvikalpatā) and reliability (avisaṃvāditā), should be
taken at face value. To put it in other words, I shall attempt to demon-
strate why, though of an admittedly much higher type, the yogins’ per-
ception of the (Buddhist) truths does not differ from ordinary percep-
tion.

THE CAREER OF A YOGIN

1. On Ordinary Persons (pṛthagjana) and Nescience (avidyā)

1.1. Pṛthagjanatva. The intrinsically painful and unsatisfactory condi-
tion from which a yogin wishes to free himself is traditionally described
as the state of an ordinary/worldly person (pṛthagjanatva). Buddhist
definitions of this state are of a mainly negative character: the ordinary
person is one in whose psychic stream the path of seeing (darśana-
mārga), the four noble truths (āryasatya) or, to be more precise, the
supramundane (lokottara) noble factors (āryadharma), have not yet
arisen (see below §3.2). According to the Sautrāntikas, the state of an
ordinary person – which is denied any reality as a separate entity2 – is to

2
The Vaibhāṣikas, some of whom at least classify pṛthagjanatva as a factor dissoci-
ated from the mind (cittaviprayuktadharma), define pṛthagjanatva as follows
(AKBh 66,9–12 together with AK 2.40bc1): mārgasyāprāptir iṣyate | pṛthag-
janatvam | pṛthagjanatvaṃ katamat | āryadharmāṇām alābha iti śāstrapāṭhaḥ | alā-
bhaś ca nāma aprāptiḥ |. “[T]he non-possession of the noble path is held to be the
nature of an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva). As the śāstra states: ‘What is the na-
ture of an ordinary person? It is the non-acquisition of the noble factors.’ Non-
acquisition is a synonym for non-possession.” Translation (of Saṅghabhadra’s
Nyāyānusāra 399a) in Cox 1995: 202. According to Cox (1995: 223n. 102), śāstra
here refers to Jñānaprasthāna 2, 298c5ff, and Mahāvibhāṣā 45, 232b9ff: “What is
the nature of an ordinary person? The nature of an ordinary person is the present,
past, and future non-possession of noble factors, noble heat, noble views, noble pa-
tience, noble inclination, and noble insight.” Translation in Cox 1995: 223n. 102.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 171

be defined as follows3: “The state of an ordinary person is the stream in

which the noble factors have not arisen.” Not surprisingly,
Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika definition coincides with the one put forth by
Yogācāras, who hold the state (gnas skabs = avasthā?) of an ordinary
person to be one in which the supramundane (lokottara) noble dharmas
have not arisen (ma bskyed pa = anutpanna?).4 Idealist sources more-
over regard the state of an ordinary person, which they also consider
being besieged with erroneous clinging to (the notion of) person(s) and
dharmas (pudgaladharmābhiniveśasaṃmoha), as the obstacle (āvaraṇa)
that prevents one from entering the first Bodhisattva stage (bhūmi).5
Provided the yogin has not, still as an ordinary person, gone through
(parts of) the so-called mundane path of cultivation (laukika-
bhāvanāmārga), his condition is characterized by entanglement in ne-
science (avidyā, or ignorance, ajñāna, delusion, moha) and the depravi-
ties, moral faults and defilements (āsrava, doṣa, [upa]kleśa, etc.) ne-
science is responsible for, all of which make one subject to rebirth

See also Siddhi I.57–58. Note that, at least for the epistemologists, the category of
arvāgdarśin (“jemand, dessen Erkenntnis von unserer Art ist,” Steinkellner 1979:
79n. 258) is wider than the category of pthagjana: whereas the second refers to
those who have not yet entered the path of vision/first Bodhisattva stage, the first is
often though not systematically used as an equivalent of asarvadarśin (“non-
omniscient”), i.e., seems to refer to all persons who are not Buddhas.
3
AKBh 66,20: anutpannāryadharmasantatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam |. The Mahāvibhāṣā
(45, 231b26–29) ascribes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the conception according to which
pṛthagjanatva is no real entity (Cox 1995: 224n. 109). See also AKVy 154,28–31 on
AKBh 66,20: anutpannāryadharmā santatir iti. anutpannā āryadharmā asyām ity
anutpannāryadharmā santatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam. anutpannāryamārgā skandhasantatir
ity arthaḥ. arthād utpannāryadharmā santatir āryatvam ity uktaṃ bhavaty āśraya-
parāvṛtteḥ.
4
VinSg P77a8, as quoted by Kritzer (2005: 63): so so‘i skye bo gnas skabs gaṅ la
gdags | rnam pa du yod ce na | smras pa | ‘jig rten las ‘das pa ‘phags pa‘i chos ma
bskyed pa‘i gnas skabs la‘o ||.
5
According to SNS 9.5.1 (see Lamotte 1935: 240), each stage or bhūmi opposes a
specific type of error (saṃmoha), the first opposing pudgaladharmābhiniveśa-
saṃmoha (SNS 127,12–13: sa daṅ po la ni gaṅ zag daṅ chos la mṅon par źen pa kun
tu rmoṅs pa). According to Vasubandhu’s commentary on MS 5.1 (see Lamotte
1973: II.196 as well as II.39*, which contains numerous bibliographical references
to pṛthagjanas), pṛthagjanatva opposes the first stage. Siddhi II.642 explicitly iden-
tifies the SNS’s saṃmoha to Vasubandhu’s pṛthagjanatā, the latter being defined as
the (bījas of the) kleśa° and jñeyāvaraṇa of the speculative type (see Siddhi II.639–
640 as well as II.590).
172 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

(punarjanman) and re-existence (punarbhava), i.e., to the intrinsically

painful (duḥkha) cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra).6

1.2. Satkāyadṛṣṭi. Dharmakīrti identifies the traditional Buddhist con-

cept of nescience with the equally traditional concept of false view of
self (satkāyadṛṣṭi, or °darśana),7 the latter being in turn equivalent to
the belief in a self (ātmagraha) or in a (personal) being (sattvagraha).8
What does the false view of self consist of? According to Śākyabuddhi
and Karṇakagomin, satkāyadṛṣṭi is to be explained as clinging or adher-
ence to the self and one’s own (ātmātmīyābhiniveśa),9 which is close to
the definitions of pṛthagjanatva provided earlier by the Sautrāntikas as
well as the Yogācāras. According to (the Sautrāntika) Vasubandhu,
satkāyadṛṣṭi consists in the false view of the self and one’s own (ātmā-
tmīyadṛṣṭi),10 and is to be explained as an “aberration relative to the
things which constitute the pseudoperson.”11 According to the Yogācāra
VinSg, which Vasubandhu most likely relied upon,12 satkāyadṛṣṭi it to

6
On pthagjanas in epistemological literature, see PVP D195a2–3/P227b6, PVṬ Ñe
D205b2/P253b2–3 (ad PV 3.217b; for the context, see Eltschinger 2005b: 168–
171); PVP D58a6/P66b1–2 (ad PV 2.140–141a; for the context, see Eltschinger
2005a: 415–416).
7
See Vetter 1990: 22–26 and Schmithausen 1987: II.517–519 (= n. 1421). On
satkāyadṛṣṭi in general, see Rahder 1932, Kośa 5.15–17 + nn. 2–3 (AKBh 281,17–
282,3 on AK 5.7), TṛBh 23,12 and 29,21, Traité II.737n. 3. On the reasons for such
an identification (rejected by Vasubandhu, see AK 3.29c), see Eltschinger (2007a,
Appendix D, §1).
8
According to PV 2.211 and PV 2.196. For a more complete list of conceptual
equivalents, see Vetter 1990: 22–23.
9
PVṬ Je D252a6/P299b8–300a1 = PVSVṬ 401,23: satkāyadarśanād ātmātmīyā-
bhiniveśāt |.
10
AKBh 281,20: ātmadṛṣṭir ātmīyadṛṣṭir vā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ |, and AKBh 281,24:
ātmātmīyadṛṣṭir eva satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ |.
11
See AKBh 290,19–21: api cānayor dṛṣṭyoḥ svadravyasaṃmūḍhatvād aparapīḍā-
pravṛttatvāc ca | svargatṛṣṇāsmimānayor apy evaṃ prasaṅgaḥ | sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭir
avyākṛtā | yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate | vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ |. Eng-
lish translation of Kośa 5.41 in Pruden 1991: III.798. See also AKVy 463,8–10:
svadravyasaṃmūḍhatvād iti. svasantatipatitānām upādānaskandhānām ātmātmīya-
tvena grahaṇāt svadravyasaṃmūḍhā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ |.
12
See Kritzer 2005: 292–293 (“Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the
sūtra-master [T. 1562: 618a17–19] and refutes it”). The first of the two passages
quoted by Kritzer (2005: 293) runs as follows (VinSg P112b6–113a1): de la ‘jig
tshogs la lta ba gaṅ źe na | ñe bar len pa‘i phuṅ po lṅa po dag la bdag gam bdag gir
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 173

be defined as “the false view of self and one’s own (ātmātmīyadṛṣṭi),

clinging (abhiniveśa) and ‘mentalization’ (sems la ‘jog pa) with regard
to the five constituents-of-personality being clung to (upādāna-
skandha).” According to all the schools mentioned – the Yogācāras, the
Sautrāntikas, and epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti – this false view
of self is twofold, viz. speculative (parikalpita VinSg, ASBh, LAV,
PVP, PVṬ, vikalpita AKBh) and innate/spontaneous (sahaja).13 The
speculative false view of self characterizes heretics (anyatīrthya,
VinSg), i.e., substantialist philosophers such as Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣi-
kas (AKVy),14 and arises out of the meditation on (heterodox) treatises
(śāstracint[an]ādi, PVṬ).15 The innate view of self is common to puerile
worldly people (bālapṛthagjana, VinSg) as well as to animals like ante-
lopes and birds (mṛgapakṣin, VinSg, AKBh)16 and arises out of begin-
ningless latent tendencies (anādivāsanā, PVṬ).17 According to Dhar-
makīrti, both the speculative and the innate false views of self charac-
terize the type of living beings traditional Buddhist scholasticism classi-
fies as ordinary persons.

1.3. Pratītyasamutpāda. Nescience traditionally forms the first link in

the Buddhist twelve-membered chain of dependent origination (pratī-
tyasamutpāda) and as such at least indirectly conditions thirst or crav-
ing (tṛṣṇā, or love, sneha, or desire, rāga). This craving is in turn re-
garded as the cause of suffering (duḥkhahetu), i.e., the factor that
prompts deluded people to act in order to quench their thirst, hence to

ba lta ba daṅ | mṅon par źen pa daṅ sems la ‘jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni ‘jig tshogs la lta
ba źes bya‘o || de‘aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste | lhan cig skyes pa daṅ kun
brtags pa‘o || de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so‘i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha na
ri dags daṅ bya rnams kyi yaṅ yin no || kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi
yin par blta bar bya‘o ||.
13
LAV 117,17–118,13, AKBh 290,19–21 (see n. 11 above), VinSg (see n. 12 above),
PV 2.199 (see n. 47 below). Note that Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin call
the first of these two kinds of satkāyadṛṣṭi “ābhisaṃskārikā;” Manorathanandin de-
fines it as skandhavyatiriktātmādhyavasāyinī (see PVA 139,27–28 and PVV 79,20–
23).
14
AKVy 463,17–18: yā ātmavādibhiḥ kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā |.
15
PVṬ Ñe D131b6–7/P162a7–8: kun tu brtags pa ni bstan bcos sems pa la sogs pa‘i
sgo nas byuṅ ba‘o || lhan cig skyes pa ni thog ma med pa‘i bag chags las byuṅ ba‘o ||.
16
See nn. 11 and 12 above.
17
See n. 15 above.
174 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

be bound to saṃsāric existence.18 Dharmakīrti devotes many pratītya-

samutpāda-like passages to account for the rise of craving and the other
defilements out of the belief in the person. One of the clearest runs as
follows19: “The one who sees a self has a constant love for this [self,
thinking of it as] ‘I’. Because of [this] love [for the self] he craves for
the delights [for that self, and this] thirst conceals [from him] the draw-
backs [of the things he deems conducive to these delights]. Seeing [but]
qualities [to these things], he craves [for them thinking of them as hav-
ing to become] ‘mine’, and appropriates (upā√dā) the means [that are
conducive] to them. Therefore he [remains] in saṃsāra as long as he
clings to [that] self.” These texts exhibit the traditional chain that links
nescience, craving, appropriation (upādāna) and (re-)existence
(bhava[/jāti]), but fail to inform us further about the rise of passions or
defilements other than craving. The PVSV provides us with the most
exhaustive picture of Dharmakīrti’s account of the genealogy of defile-
ments20: “The birth of all kinds of [moral] faults is due to the [false]
view of self [i.e., to the clinging to self and one’s own, and] this [false

18
See PV 2.146a (duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ) and PV 2.185d (tasmāt tṛṣṇā
bhavāśrayaḥ) in Vetter 1990: 53 and 88.
19
PV 2.217–218: yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ | snehāt
sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute || guṇadarśī paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādha-
nāny upādatte | tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre ||.
20
“Genealogy” as a free rendering of Karṇakagomin’s krama (lit. sequence, succes-
sion; PVSVṬ 401,25–26: kena punaḥ krameṇa doṣāṇāṃ satkāyadarśanād utpattiḥ |).
Satkāyadarśana is the prabhava (PVSV 111,11, gl. utpattikāraṇa PVSVṬ 401,20),
the mūla (PV 2.196), the ekayoni (PV 2.211) of the defilements. PVSV 111,13–20
(together with PV 1.222): sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt | sāvidyā ta-
tra tatsnehas tasmād dveṣādisambhavaḥ || na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyataḥ parigra-
ham antareṇa kvacit snehaḥ | na cānanurāgiṇaḥ kvacid dveṣaḥ | ātmātmīyānu-
parodhiny uparodhapratighātini ca tadabhāvāt | tasmāt samānajātīyābhyāsajam āt-
madarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte | tau ca tatsnehaṃ sa ca dveṣādīn iti satkāya-
darśanajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ | tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate |. See also PV 2.196ac: mohaś
ca mūlaṃ doṣāṇāṃ sa ca sattvagraho vinā | tenāghahetau na dveṣaḥ … “Delusion is
the root[-cause] of [moral] faults, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [per-
sonal] being. In the absence (vinā) of this [belief, there can be] no aversion for a
cause of evil (agha) [since the error of an injury to the self does not occur for one
who does not see any self].” PV 2.211: ātmagrahaikayonitvāt … rāgapratighayoḥ
… “Because both desire and hostility have the belief in a self as their only source.”
PV 2.212cd: tanmūlāś ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam ||. “All the defilements
have this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the [false] view of
the self.” On this point, see Franco 2001: 295–296.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 175

view of self] is nescience [itself]; with regard to the [object which is

clung to as being self and one’s own arises] love for those [i.e., for self
and one’s own, and] from this [love] are born such [evil defilements] as
aversion. Indeed, the one who, without grasping (parigraha), sees that
there is neither I nor mine, does not love anything and, [being so] unat-
tached, does not hate anything [either], for there is no [aversion] for that
which does not hinder the self or one’s own, nor of that which opposes
the [said] hindrance.21 Therefore the [false] view of self, which is born
from the repeated habit (abhyāsa) of the [previous very] same [false
view of self], generates the [false] view of one’s own. Both of them
then [produce] love for those [two things, self and one’s own], and this
[love in turn generates] such [evil passions] as aversion. Therefore all
[moral] faults are born from the [false] view of self, and it is this [false
view of self] that is called ‘ignorance’ (ajñāna) [in our doctrinal sys-
tem].” Provided, once again, that he has not yet gotten rid of those de-
filements that an ordinary person can eliminate by means of the mun-
dane path of cultivation, the pṛthagjana is first and foremost typified by
his erroneous superimposition of ego-related aspects onto the selfless
constituents of reality, and by the correlative defilements that make him
slave to saṃsāra and suffering.

2. The Idea of a Way Out

2.1. Gotra, kalyāṇamitra and the śrutamayī prajñā. There are some
reasons to believe that at least some of Dharmakīrti’s commentators and
epigones assented to the (mainly) Mahāyānist doctrinal complex that
entails such key notions as gotra (“family”), kalyāṇamitra (“spiritual
friend”), bodhicitta (“thought of enlightenment”) and praṇidhāna
(“vow”).22 Asked to account for the cause(s) of a Bodhisattva’s first im-

21
See PV 2.219: ātmani sati parasaṃjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau | anayoḥ
sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante || “When there is [a notion of] a self, [there
is] a notion of the other; from [this very] distinction between a self and another,
both grasping (parigraha) and aversion [are generated and], bound to these two, all
the [moral] faults arise.”
22
On gotra, see PVP D16a5/P18a3–4, PVṬ Ñe D88b5/P108a3–4, TSP K872,1–
7/Ś1055,14–20 and PVV 20,12–17 (on this passage, see Franco 1997: 24); on bo-
dhicitta and praṇidhāna, see PVP D85a5/P98a1 (byaṅ chub kyi sems sṅon du soṅ ba
can gyi brtse ba) and PVV 79,9 (praṇidhāna). See Eltschinger (2008, §§3.2–3 and
5.4).
176 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

pulse toward the practice of compassion (karuṇā), Devendrabuddhi,

Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla mention a particular type of living being
(sattvaviśeṣa, PVP), i.e., a (specific) family (gotra PVṬ, gotraviśeṣa
TSP) that we must understand as consisting of the bodhisattvagotra
(“family of Bodhisattvas,” in contrast to the families of the Hearers
[śrāvakagotra] or Buddhas-for-themselves [pratyekabuddhagotra]).
Indeed, the bodhisattvagotra is intrinsically linked to compassion.23 His
belonging to this family causes the Bodhisattva, still as an ordinary
person, to generate the (conventional) thought of enlightenment and to
make the vow of striving for awakening in order to alleviate the suffer-
ing of living beings.24 Elsewhere I have argued that Dharmakīrti’s PV
2.131cd–132ab can be interpreted as providing us with a functional
equivalent to the arising of the thought of enlightenment25: “[Wishing to
calm other people’s suffering,] the compassionate [Bodhisattva] en-
gages in [the cultivation of] means to [calm suffering] in order to eradi-
cate [his own] suffering: for whom the goal (upeya) and [its] cause re-
main imperceptible (parokṣa), it is indeed a difficult task to [correctly]
teach [others about them].” True to a well-documented Yogācāra tradi-
tion, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Ravigupta also consider com-
panionship with and service (sevā) to a “spiritual friend” to be instru-
mental (< pratyaya) in the the rising of the first impulse of a (novice)
Bodhisattva toward the practice of compassion.26 In addition to his ex-
hortation to engage in compassion, this kalyāṇamitra’s main function is
to teach Dharma or the path toward awakening (bodhimārga). From
such a Buddha or skilled Bodhisattva, the yogin hears or learns (√śru)
the Good Law (saddharma) or Word (pravacana) of the Buddha27: this
is the so-called wisdom born of listening (śrutamayī prajñā), which, just

23
See MSA 3.5 together with MSABh 11,18, Maithrimurthi 1999: 268 and nn. 153–
154.
24
See BoBh D10,12–13/W15,11–12 and MSABh 15,2.
25
PV 2.131cd–132ab: dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate || parokṣopeya-
taddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram |. See Eltschinger (2008, §§5.3–5).
26
See Eltschinger (2008, §3.4).
27
See Eltschinger (2008, n. 75). Interestingly, the Buddha’s Word seems to be nine-
membered (navāṅga) rather than twelve-membered (dvādaśāṅga) in the few places
it is mentioned by the epistemologists. See PVP D120b4–5/P139b3 (together with
PVṬ Ñe D150b3–4/P186a2–3) and TSP K877,4–6/Ś1062,7–9. On this distinction,
see Lamotte 1976: 157–159.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 177

like the following “wisdom born of (rational) reflection,” the (novice)

Bodhisattva obtains still as an ordinary person.28

2.2. Cintāmayī prajñā.29 The wisdom born of (rational) reflection mir-

rors the concerns of a human “type” who is ideally possessed of two
properties: first, his desire to engage (pravṛttikāma) in a religious path
and second, his practical rationality (prekṣāvattva, prekṣāpūrvakāritva).
At this stage, the (novice) Bodhisattva submits the scriptural contents
he has previously heard/learnt to a rational inquiry (yukti) or examina-
tion (parīkṣā, vicāra, etc.) that mainly proceeds by means of inference
(anumāna, sādhana). Wisdom born of (rational) reflection consists in
an ascertainment (niścaya, nirṇaya) of scriptural contents through the
so-called means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), and results in (a) cogni-
tion(s) that is/are termed “agreeing with the means of valid cognition”
(pramāṇasaṃvādin), i.e., whose objects (artha) have proved to stand
critical analysis by means of pramāṇas (pramāṇa[pari]śuddhārtha,
pramāṇa[pari]dṛṣṭārtha) and hence are deemed to be worthy of (reli-
gious) exertion/endeavour (abhiyogārha). Typical of this kind of object
are the four Noble Truths, which form the core or principal point
(pradhānārtha) of the Buddhist teaching and which a rational person
subjects to inferential investigation in order to assess the reliability
(avisaṃvāditva) of scriptures (āgama). In a philosophical narrative,30

28
See MSAVBh D142b5–6 on MSA 9.76a1 (dhāraṇāt): daṅ po so so‘i skye bo‘i dus
na dge ba‘i bśes gñen la brten nas | dam pa‘i chos mñan pa daṅ | mñan nas tshig daṅ
don gzuṅ ba daṅ gzuṅ ba rnams bsam źiṅ … “First when [still] an ordinary person
(pṛthagjanakāle), [the Bodhisattva] learns (√śru) the Good Law (saddharma) rely-
ing on a spiritual friend (kalyāṇamitram āśritya), grasps (√grah) the word
(vyañjana?) and the meaning (artha) after he has learnt (śrutvā) [them] and reflects
(√cint) upon the [things thus] grasped (gṛhīta) … ”
29
On the cintāmayī prajñā, see Eltschinger (forthcoming 1). The present section is but
a summary of (parts of) the second part of this study.
30
PV 2.132cd–135: yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate || tasyānityādi-
rūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ | yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati ||
phalasya hetor hānārthaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ parīkṣate | sādhyate tadvipakṣo ’pi heto
rūpāvabodhataḥ || ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ | hetur virodhi
nairātmyadarśanaṃ tasya bādhakam ||. “Reflecting on [the means and the goal]
through reasoning (yukti) and the Scriptures (āgama), [the compassionate Bodhi-
sattva] inquires into the cause of the suffering [that is to be eradicated] and, through
the particularities of suffering itself, [he inquires also] into the impermanent nature,
etc., of the [cause in question]. Since in this way [he who wishes to eradicate suffer-
178 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

Dharmakīrti relates how the compassionate Buddha-to-be, rationally

and scripturally (yuktyāgamābhyām), reflects upon the cause of suffer-
ing and the antidote (vipakṣa, pratipakṣa) to that cause. The Bodhisattva
first determines love (sneha, i.e., craving), itself generated by the belief
in self and one’s own (ātmātmīyagrahakṛta), to be the (destructible)
cause of suffering. He then identifies the means (upāya) or factor
(dharma) that is able to oppose, contradict (vi√rudh, √bādh) and de-
stroy the cause of suffering: this antidote or antagonistic factor consists
in the view or perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness (nairātmya-
darśana or °dṛṣṭi, śūnyatādṛṣṭi). In the stage of rational reflection,
pramāṇas (i.e., inference) ascertain or determine the real aspects (bhū-
tākāra, impermanence, painfulness, emptiness in the sense of the lack
of one’s own [AKBh 400,2–3], selflessness, etc.) of entities and hence
provide the reflecting yogin’s cognition with aspects (ākāra) and
objects (ālambana) that contradict, oppose or counteract the
superimpositions (samāropa, etc., namely, permanence, delight, one’s
own, self, etc.) that ignorance, as a generalized erroneous perception
(mithyopalabdhi), is responsible for. What the yogin is intent upon here
is nothing other than following a path that will enable him to counteract
(pratipakṣamārga) the adventitious (āgantuka) filth of passions and

ing] sees that there is no end to the effect so long as the cause remains, he inquires
into the antidote of the [cause of suffering] in order to eliminate it. [As for the
dharma forming] the antidote of that [cause, it] is also ascertained by the [Bodhi-
sattva’s] knowledge of the nature of the cause [itself]. [That] cause [is] attachment
bearing on dispositions, [an attachment which] is due to the belief in self and one’s
own; [as for] the antidote to that [cause, it is] the perception of selfnessness which
opposes it.” On this important passage, see inter alia Franco 1989: 84–90, Vetter
1990: 11–12, Eltschinger 2005: 397–408, Eltschinger (forthcoming 1, §2.4) and
Dunne 2006: 505–507. It is easy to show that this passage narrates the Bodhisattva’s
rational determination of the Noble Truths. PV 2.131cd–132ab present us with a
mahāyānist account of the Bodhisattva’s being struck by his own as well as the
other living beings’ suffering (duḥkhasatya). This of course needs not be further in-
vestigated since duḥkha is but an empirical fact. PV 2.132c–133ab and 135ac1 ac-
count for the Bodhisattva’s inquiry into the origin of suffering (samudayasatya),
whereas PV 2.134bd and 135c2d describe his determination of the path leading to
the destruction of suffering (mārgasatya). As to the destruction of suffering (nirod-
hasatya) itself, it cannot be made the object of an analysis, but merely be hinted at,
which we can observe in PV 2.133cd–134a, with its characteristic allusion to nivṛtti.
On that passage, see in general Eltschinger 2005a: 397–408 and Eltschinger (forth-
coming 1, §2.4).
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 179

hence establish his mind (citta = vijñāna) in its naturally radiant (pra-
bhāsvara) and flawless (nirāsrava) condition.

3. The Path to Salvation

3.1. Pratipakṣamārga.31 According to Dharmakīrti, nescience consists in
an erroneous perception (PV 2.213) that he identifies with the innate
false view of self. This false view gives rise to thirst or craving, which
is regarded as the cause of suffering. The yogin who is eager to rid him-
self of suffering will thus have to eliminate craving and other defile-
ments by eradicating their cause. In other words, he will have to de-
velop and cultivate the perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness,
which acts as an antidote or antagonistic factor to the false view of self,
in order to free himself from craving and suffering. This antagonism
between avidyā = satkāyadṛṣṭi and nairātmyadarśana is based on the
fact that these mutually opposing factors display contrary aspects of the
object (viparītālambanākāra).32 Two stanzas of PV 2 account well for
this mutual incompatibility and for Dharmakīrti’s general conception of
the yogic path33: “Having[, due to nescience,] superimposed sixteen
unreal aspects, viz. ‘lasting’, ‘pleasant’, ‘mine’, ‘I’,34 etc., on the four
[Noble] Truths, one experiences craving [for such a superimposed ob-
ject as delight, etc.]. 35The correct view, well cultivated,36 destroys the
thirst together with its suite [of defilements such as selfishness, envy,
etc.,37 insofar as this correct view], with regard to these [four Noble
31
Pratipakṣamārga in PVṬ Je D252a1–2/P299a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 401,12–13.
32
PVP D115b3/P134a4: ‘gal ba de yaṅ* dmigs pa’i rnam pa phyin ci log pa’i sgo nas
yin no ||. * = ma rig pa daṅ bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba ‘gal ba according to PVṬ Ñe
D147a3/P181b5–6.
33
PV 2.270–271: sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye | abhūtān ṣoḍa-
śākārān āropya paritṛṣyati || tatraiva tadviruddhārthatattvākārānurodhinī | hanti
sānucarāṃ tṛṣṇāṃ samyagdṛṣṭiḥ subhāvitā ||. On anurodhin, see Vetter 1990: 27n.
14.
34
See PVP D115b4–6/P134a5–8 and PVṬ Ñe D147b1–3/P182a5–8.
35
According to PVP D116a2–3/P134b4–5, Dharmakīrti shows now that the path is the
counteracting factor because it is possessed with aspects that are contrary to the
ones superimposed by nescience.
36
According to PVP D116a6/P135a1, once the perception of unsubstantiality has
become coessential (sātmībhūta) with the mind through cultivation; on PVV
103,8 (subhāvitā sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsaprāptavaiśadyā), see below §3.5.
37
Mātsarya and īrṣyā according to PVP D116a6/P135a1–2 and PVV 103,8–9 .
180 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

Truths], conforms to (anurodhin) the real aspects of the thing38 which

are contradictory to the [ones falsely ascribed by ignorance].”39 Nes-
cience has one superimpose or grasp such unreal aspects as perma-
nence.40 Once craving and all kinds of defilements arise, they bear upon
objects whose aspects have been superimposed.41 Now the perception of
unsubstantiality entails or goes along with the sixteen real aspects of the
Noble Truths,42 i.e., is provided with aspects that are contradictory to
those superimposed by nescience. Cultivating this perception to its ma-
ximum degree of intensity, i.e., up to the point where it becomes essen-
tial to the mind or the psychic stream, will annul not only the innate
false view of self, but also all the defilements that it gives rise to by
providing them with (pseudo-)objects. Such is the basic structure and
goal of Dharmakīrti’s path (mārga). Though this structure remains ba-
sically the same for all types of Buddhist yogins (Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-
buddhas and Bodhisattvas), differences are mainly concerned with the
initial motivation (nimitta, prayojana) guiding the yogin, and hence with

38
Literally: “aspects which constitute the true reality of the thing.” See Devendrabud-
dhi’s and Manorathanandin’s explanations in PVP D116a3/P134b5 and PVV 103,6–
8 respectively.
39
PVP D116a1–2/P134b3–4: lam ma rig pa daṅ ‘gal bar gyur pa na sred pa daṅ yaṅ
don gyis ‘gal ba yin no źes bstan to ||. “[Dharmakīrti] teaches [here] that if the path is
contradictory to nescience, it is [then] indirectly (arthāt) contradictory to craving
too.”
40
PVP D115b6–7/P134a8–b2 presents us with the following unreal aspects with re-
gard to tṛṣṇālakṣaṇo duḥkhahetuḥ: erroneous superimposition of asamudaya°, ahe-
tu°, apratyaya° and aprabhavākāra. PVṬ Ñe D147b3–5/P182a8–b2 supplies for
Dharmakīrti’s and Devendrabuddhi’s °ādis in the following way: superimposition
of anirodha°, aśānta°, apraṇīta° and aniḥsaraṇākāra with regard to nirodhasatya;
superimposition of amārga°, anyāya°, apratipatti° and anairyāṇikākāra with regard
to mārgasatya.
41
Note PVṬ Ñe D147b5–7/P182b2–4: sgro btags nas ni yoṅs su sred ces bya ba‘i tshig
gis log par sgro ‘dogs pa sṅon du soṅ ba can gyi sred pa ñid gsal bar bstan pa yin no
|| sgro ‘dogs pa‘i yul la ‘jug pa‘i sred pa de yaṅ sgro ‘dogs pa‘i rnam pa ñid yin la |
sgro ‘dogs pa‘i rnam pa can gyi yul can gyi ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñe ba‘i ñon moṅs pa
thams cad ñid ma rig pa ñid yin pa de ltar na de‘i raṅ bźin can ñid kyaṅ bstan pa ñid
yin no ||.
42
See AKBh 343,16–19 together with Kośa 6.163 (Pruden 1991: III.930) and, for
definitions, AKBh 400,1–401,17 together with Kośa 7.30–39 (Pruden 1991:
IV.1110–1116).
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 181

the length of the cultivation as well as with the quality or scope of the
salvational result.43

3.2. Darśanamārga. When he practiced rational reflection on scriptural

contents, the yogin was still an ordinary person, and the compassion he
was endowed with still bore upon a hypostasised notion of living beings
(sattvālambana).44 To put it in a more traditional way, we could say that
at this stage, the yogin was a Bodhisattva who has formed the initial
resolution (prathamacittotpādika), abiding in the so-called adhimukti-
caryābhūmi (“stage of zealous conduct”). The supramundane noble
factors that an ordinary person is per definitionem bereft of are those
that arise on the so-called path of vision/seeing (darśanamārga), which
(normally) opens up the Buddhist religious path properly speaking and
coincides, in a Mahāyānist perspective, with the Bodhisattva’s entrance
into the first stage (most commonly known as the “joyful stage,” pra-
muditā bhūmiḥ).45 The state of an ordinary person ceases as soon as the
yogin has entered the path of vision46: at this time, the yogin becomes a
noble person (ārya[pudgala]) and enters the path of those who are un-
dergoing religious training (śaikṣamārga). Like all the path structures
that have been inherited from the Vaibhāṣika abhisamayavāda, Dhar-
makīrti’s path is basically twofold, divided into a path of vision and a
path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga, though both are here included in the
broader category of bhāvanā). Dharmakīrti spells it out as follows47:
“[Objection:] Inexistence (abhava) [i.e., liberation from saṃsāra,]
43
For differences between the darśanamārgas of the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas,
see MS 3.15.
44
PVṬ Je D24b6/P29b2–3 = PVSVṬ 53,9: sattvālambanā pṛthagjanānām |. “sattvā-
lambanā” refers itself to karuṇā and more generally, to the four “immeasurables”
(apramāṇa).
45
See e.g. BoBh D223,22–25/W326,22–327,1.
46
There are at least two interpretations with regard to the nature of the noble factors
referred to in the Vaibhāṣika definition of the state of an ordinary being: “To the
non-acquisition of which factors does the nature of an ordinary person refer? [Ac-
cording to two interpretations, it is maintained that the nature of an ordinary person]
is either the general non-acquisition of all (sarva) noble factors or the [specific]
non-acquisition only of the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with re-
gard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti).” Nyāyānusāra 399b as translated in
Cox 1995: 203. See also Kośa 6.182–183n. 1 (Pruden 1991: III.1056–1057n. 165).
47
PV 2.199ac: satkāyadṛṣṭer vigamād ādya evābhavo bhavet | mārge cet sahajāhāner
na …
182 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

should occur [already] on the initial path [i.e., during the path of vi-
sion],48 for the [false] view of self[, which is the cause of the connection
to a new birth,] ceases [at that time].49 [Answer:] No, because [at that
time] one does not rid oneself of the innate [false view of self].” We see
thus that Dharmakīrti also accepted the two above-mentioned
satkāyadṛṣṭis: whereas the speculative one is to be eliminated by the
path of vision, the innate one, which arises from beginningless latent
tendencies, can only be eliminated by the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-
mārgaheya, PVṬ, PVV). Since one does not rid oneself of the innate
satkāyadṛṣṭi, i.e., the cause of rebirth (punarbhavahetu, PVP), by the
path of vision,50 love for the self (ātmasneha PVP, tṛṣṇā PVV) contin-
ues beyond the path of vision and results in re-existence (punarbhava
PVP, janmaprabandha PVV).51 This amounts to saying that such Bud-
48
PVP D85a7/P98a4: lam daṅ po ste | mthoṅ ba‘i lam; PVV 79,19: ādya eva mārge
darśanamārge. According to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ Ñe D131b5/P162a6), Dharmakīrti
calls the darśanamārga the “initial path” because darśanamārga occurs before the
path of cultivation, the path of those who are undergoing religious training (śaikṣa-
mārga) and the path of those who no longer need religious training (aśaikṣamārga).
On śaikṣas and aśaikṣa = arhat, see AKBh 365,16–366,7 and Kośa 6.230–233. The
category of Śaikṣa covers seven types of saints or noble persons (āryapudgala) ac-
cording to AKBh 365,18–19 (sapta pūrvoktāḥ pudgalāḥ śaikṣā iti |), viz., four “can-
didates” (pratipannakāḥ) and three “abiders” (phale sthitāḥ, AKBh 366,1–2): the
ones who are in the progress of realizing the four states of Srotaāpanna, Sakṛd-
āgāmin, Anāgāmin and Arhat, and those who in fact are Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmin
and Anāgāmin (AKBh 366,2–3). On the Srotaāpanna, see AK 6.29cd together with
AKBh 353,20–22 (Kośa 6.194, Pruden 1991: III.953); on the Sakṛdāgāmin (devān
gatvā sakṛn manuṣyalokāgamanāt sakṛdāgāmī, AKBh 358,1–2), see AK 6.35 to-
gether with AKBh 358,1–3 (Kośa 6.208–209, Pruden 1991: III.964–965); on the
Anāgāmin (kāmadhātvanāgamanāt, AKBh 358,16–17), see AK 6.36d together with
AKBh 358,16–17 (Kośa 6.209–210, Pruden 1991: III.965–966).
49
Conclusion, PVP D85a7/P98a4–5: de yaṅ mi ‘gyur ba de‘i phyir bdag tu chags pa
skye ba‘i mtshams sbyor ba‘i rgyu ma yin no źe na |. “But it does not occur [at that
time]; therefore, love for the self (ātmasneha) is not the cause of the connection to a
[new] birth.”
50
Note also PVP D121a1/P139b7–8 (about abāhyaśaikṣas, i.e., Buddhist śaikṣas):
lhan cig skyes pa‘i ‘jig tshogs su lta ba ma spaṅs pa‘i phyir ro ||.
51
See PVP D85b1–2/P98a5–7: bdag tu lta ba‘i rnam pa gñis te | kun brtags pa daṅ
lhan cig skyes pa‘o || kun tu brtags pa de ni de dag gis śin tu kun tu spyod pa‘i chos
ma yin pas na spaṅs pas de ni skye ba‘i kun nas ‘chiṅ ba‘i rgyur mi ‘gyur ro || ‘jig
tshogs su lta ba lhan cig skyes pa yaṅ srid pa‘i rgyu gaṅ yin pa de ni de dag ñid kyis
spaṅs pa ma yin no || de ma spaṅs pa‘i rgyu‘i phyir bdag tu chags pa ma log pa ñid
yin pa de ltar na yaṅ srid pa yod pa yin no ||. PVV 79,20–23: dvidhā hi satkāyadṛṣṭir
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 183

dhist saints as the stream-enterer (srotaāpanna), the once-returner

(sakṛdāgāmin) and the non-returner (anāgāmin) are still possessed of an
innate erroneous nescience (*sahajāvidyā viparītā?) that they will have
to eradicate by the path of cultivation.52

3.3. Bhāvanāmārga. At the end of the path of vision, the śaikṣas of the
śrāvaka type obtain the religious fruit or result (phala) they were a can-
didate for (pratipannaka) before entering the path. Depending on the
extent to which they have, still as ordinary persons, eliminated the bhā-
vanāheya defilements by means of a mundane path of cultivation,53 they
obtain the results of stream-enterer, once-returner and non-returner.54
As such they are reborn, respectively, seven times in the realm of desire
(kāmadhātu), or only once, or no more, before they reach emancipation
from saṃsāra, i.e., nirvāṇa. The supramundane path of cultivation they

ābhis[a]ṃskārikī yā skandhavyatiriktātmādhyavasāyinī sahajā ca | tatra prathamā

darśanamārge hīyate | na dvitīyā bhāvanāmārgaheyā | sā ca mohas tṛṣṇāyāś ca hetur
iti bhavati janmaprabandhaḥ |. PVṬ Ñe D131b7/P162a8–b1: de dag ñid kyis spaṅs
pa ma yin no źes bya ba ni thog ma med pa‘i bag chags las byuṅ ba de ni bsgom pa‘i
lam ñid kyis spaṅ bar bya ba ñid yin pa‘i phyir ro ||. For a similar distinction be-
tween speculative-darśanaheya and innate-bhāvanāheya āvaraṇas, see Siddhi II.572
and Siddhi II.639–640.
52
PVṬ Ñe D131b7/P162b1–2: bdag tu chags pa khas len pa ñid kyi phyir | rgyun du
źugs pa la lhan cig skyes pa‘i mi śes pa phyin ci log yod pa yin no źes bstan pa‘i
phyir |. See also ASBh 62,3–4, as quoted by Schmithausen (1987: II.440n. 931): sa-
hajā satkāyadṛṣṭir bhāvanāprahātavyā: yām adhiṣṭhāya utpannadarśanamārgasyāpy
āryaśrāvakasyāsmimānaḥ samudācarati |. “Innate [false] view of self is to be elimi-
nated through cultivation: based on this (yām adhiṣṭhāya) [innate false view of self],
egotism (asmimāna) occurs even in a Noble Hearer (āryaśrāvaka) in whom the path
of vision has arisen.” ASBh 62,9–11, as (partly) quoted by Schmithausen (1987:
II.440–441n. 932): darśanamārgeṇa prahīṇaparikalpitasatkāyadṛṣṭimalasyāpy ārya-
śrāvakasya pūrvābhiniveśābhyāsakṛtam … ātmadarśanam anuvartate yat tat punar
mārgabhāvanayā prahātavyaṃ bhavati |. “Even in a Noble Hearer in whom the im-
purity consisting in the speculative [false] view of self has been eliminated by the
path of vision, the [false] view of self, caused by the repeated habit of former clin-
ging, goes on existing, which is still to be eliminated by the cultivation of the path.”
53
Laukikabhāvanāmārga at PVV 107,5–6; see also TS 3496–3497, and Kośa 6.iv–xi
(Pruden 1991: III.xiv–xxii).
54
PVP D85a7/P98a4: rgyun du źugs pa la sogs pa; PVV 79,19: srotaāpannasya. PVṬ
Ñe D131b5–6/P162a6–7: rgyun du źugs pa la sogs pa źes bya ba la sogs pa‘i sgras
ni lan cig phyir ‘oṅ ba daṅ phyir mi ‘oṅ ba gzuṅ ṅo || sdug bsṅal gyi bden pa mthoṅ
ba ñid kyis de dag gis ‘jig tshogs su lta ba spaṅs pa yin no ||.
184 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

still need in order to get rid of the remaining defilements is then ex-
tremely short. Highly different is the situation of the śaikṣa who is des-
tined for Buddhahood and not for Arhatship, and who, still as an ordi-
nary person, had made the vow to reach enlightenment in order to alle-
viate living beings’ suffering by teaching them the path to liberation. As
far as I can see, this Buddha-to-be still must rid himself of three major
elements as he exits the path of vision. (1) Like Hearers and Buddhas-
for-themselves, he will have to uproot the innate false view of self to-
gether with its attendant defilements, but (2) unlike Hearers and
Buddhas-for-themselves, he will have to eliminate these defilements
together with their traces or after-effects (vāsanā), which regularly
manifest themselves in Arhats through corporeal, vocal or mental defi-
ciencies (kāyavākcittavaiguṇya). (3) The Buddha-to-be still must uproot
the so-called undefiled nescience or ignorance (akliṣṭāvidyā, or
°ajñāna, or °saṃmoha). To put it technically, the Bodhisattva must
eradicate two kinds of obstacles (āvaraṇa) in addition to the innate false
view of self: the obstacle that consists in the defilements together with
their after-effect (savāsanakleśāvaraṇa), and the obstacle that conceals
the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa).55 Needless to say, this threefold uprooting
demands an incomparably longer path of cultivation than that taken by
Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves.56 Whoever the yogin may be, the
cultivation or repeated practice (abhyāsa) consists in the yogin’s prac-
ticing (prayoga) or generating (utpādana, utpatti) repeatedly, “again
and again” (punaḥ punaḥ, paunaḥpunyena),57 the salvational means,
viz., the perception of unsubstantiality, in order to finally reach a direct
perceptual realization58 (sākṣātkaraṇa) of it.

3.4. Anābhogatā and svarasavāhitva. Dharmakīrti’s conception of a

Bodhisattva’s cultivation is based on a Mahāyānist path structure that

55
On all this, see Eltschinger 2005a: 408–436, and below §3.5.
56
On the duration of the various religious careers (and especially the one of Bodhi-
sattvas), see Traité IV.1842, and n. 5 (pp. 1842–1843), and Siddhi II.731–733.
57
Abhyāsa is defined as punaḥ punar nairantaryeṇotpādanam (PVSVṬ 398,9), as pau-
naḥpunyenānādikālam utpattiḥ (PVṬ Je D252b7–253a1/P300b6 = PVSVṬ 402,19),
or else as punaḥ punaḥ prayogaḥ (AKVy 649,26), or as punaḥ punaś cetasi vinive-
śanam (NBṬ S11,18–19/M67,5).
58
See PVP D54b7/P62a8, PVA 108,20 and 26, PVV 57,4, TS 3339–3340ab, TSP
K16,1–3/Ś20,12–13, K876,17–19/Ś1061,14–16, passim.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 185

entails various stages (bhūmi) as well as the parallel development of

insight (prajñā, vipaśyanā) and compassion (karuṇā, kṛpā, dayā).59 In
the most authoritative traditional accounts of a Bodhisattva’s career
(caryā), the entrance into the eighth (or seventh) stage (acalā DBhS,
niyatā BoBh, or the tenth abode, vihāra BoBh) stands out as a decisive
turning point. The Bodhisattva is now possessed of the “presentiment
that dharmas (ultimately) have no arising” (anutpattikadharmakṣānti);
from now on his progression is irreversible (avaivartika). Especially
noteworthy is the fact that all the factors and operations characterizing
him have now become spontaneous (< svarasena eva) on account of the
intensity of the cultivation (bhāvanābāhulyāt),60 and develop without
any intentional effort (anābhogena).61 This pertains to the Bodhisattva’s
wisdom as well as to his compassion, which from now on can properly
be termed “great compassion” (mahākaruṇā), and which no longer
bears upon anything (anālambanā, because the Bodhisattva no longer
sees sattvas or dharmas).62 Note should also be made that the entrance
into the eighth (or seventh) stage coincides with the acquisition of “un-
fixed” nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa).63
The epistemologists’ assent to this complex of ideas can be eas-
ily documented. Dharmakīrti himself accepts the notion of an objectless
compassion (anālambanā karuṇā),64 which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇaka-
gomin declare to be proper to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, in con-
tradistinction to ordinary persons and noble beings (ārya), have rid
themselves of the clinging to the object-subject dichotomy.65 Moreover,

59
Note Devendrabuddhi’s explanation of hetusampad in PVP D57b2/P65b2: bcom
ldan ‘das kyi thugs rje daṅ thabs goms pa rgyu yin no źes rgyu phun sum tshogs pa
gsuṅs pa yin no ||. Upāyābhyāsa = nairātmyadarśanābhyāsa = prajñābhyāsa. De-
vendrabuddhi’s prayoga at PVP D57a1–3/P64b7–65a2 (see Eltschinger 2005a:
405n. 45) makes it perfectly clear that nairātmyadarśana is prajñā.
60
See BoBh D219,17–220,2/W320,24–321,2 and Eltschinger (2008, §4.3 and n. 103).
61
See DBhS (VII F) 58,6–9, (VIII C) 64,15–16 and 25–26, (VIII K) 67,10–19, and
(VIII C) 64,26–27. This is also termed the anābhogacaryā at LAV 43,9 (see Suzuki
1999: 221–230).
62
See Eltschinger (2008, §4).
63
On the apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, see the bibliographical references in Lamotte 1973:
II.47*–48*; see also Siddhi II.671–672 and Nagao 2000: 2–4.
64
See PVSV 9,14–15.
65
PVṬ Je D24b6–7/P29b3–4 = PVSVṬ 53,9–10: anālambanā grāhyagrāhakābhini-
veśavigatānāṃ buddhabodhisattvānām |.
186 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

Dharmakīrti associates “great compassion” (mahatī kṛpā) with Bodhisa-

ttvas who are possessed of a durable substratum (sthirāśraya) and re-
main in saṃsāra (in contradistinction to Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-
buddhas).66 Last but not least, Dharmakīrti argues at length that com-
passion proceeds spontaneously (svarasena) as it becomes the very na-
ture (svabhāva) of the psychic stream and no longer requires any effort
(yatna) in order to increase.67 The same doctrinal pattern also seems to
obtain in the case of discernment (vipaśyanā), which, defined as “wis-
dom bearing upon unsubstantiality” (nairātmyālambanā prajñā),68 is
equivalent to the already mentioned perception of unsubstantiality and
the counteracting path it defines. The yogin’s nearly endless cultivation
of nairātymadarśana gradually results in the latter’s becoming “co-
essential” or “conatural” to the mind (citta), a process (or rather its re-
sult) the epistemologists usually describe in terms of sātmya or sātmī-
bhāva: after a certain point, the mind or the psychic stream (santāna)
acquires discernment as its own nature,69 which amounts to saying that
it is coessential with the perception or cultivation of unsubstantiality,
also referred to as the path or the antidote of the defilements (doṣaprati-
pakṣa/°vipakṣa).70 Devendrabuddhi uses the expression *anābho-

66
See PV 2.197–198, below n. 73.
67
See PV 2.120–131ab, and Eltschinger (2008, §2) for an English translation and
explanations.
68
PVṬ Ñe D134b3/P166a1: lhag mthoṅ yin la źes bya ba bdag med pa la dmigs pa‘i
śes rab bo ||. Note also BhK 1.219,23–220,4, where vipaśyanā bears upon the unsub-
stantiality of all dharmas (sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvatālambana), and Kamalaśīla’s
definition of vipaśyanā at BhK 3.5,17–20: bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate |
bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyam | tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā skandhā-
nām ātmātmīyarahitatā | dharmanairātmyaṃ yā teṣām eva māyopamatā |. “La vi-
paśyanā est une analyse correcte. Elle est correcte parce [qu’elle porte] sur
l’inexistence de l’individu et sur l’inexistence des dharma. L’inexistence de la per-
sonne consiste en ce que les agrégats sont privés de Moi; l’inexistence des dharma
est le fait qu’ils sont pareils à une magie.” Translation in Lamotte 1987b: 340.
69
PVSVṬ 400,13: vipaśayanāsvabhāvasya; PVP D90a1/P103b8: raṅ bźin yaṅ lhag
mthoṅ ba yin; PVSVṬ 401,14: vipaśyanāsātmani sthitasya (= PVṬ Je D252a2, as
against P299b1).
70
PVSV 110,18 (sātmībhāvāt – see PVṬ Je D249a6/P295b1 = PVSVṬ 398,11, where
the santāna is said to be sātmībhūtadoṣapratipakṣa, to be treated as a bahuvrīhi
compound), PVSV 110,24 (doṣavipakṣasātmatve, where the doṣavipakṣa is
nairātmyadarśana according to PVṬ Je D250b1/P297a5–6 = PVSVṬ 399,17),
PVSV 111,3 (vipakṣasātmanaḥ puruṣasya), PVSV 111,8 (pratipakṣasātmya°); PVV
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 187

ganairātmyadarśanaḥ puruṣaḥ to refer to this state,71 while Śākyabud-

dhi regards nairātmyadarśana as proceeding spontaneously (svarasavā-
hitva, or *svarasapravartakatva).72 As for “unfixed” nirvāṇa, an allu-
sion (at least according to Śākyabuddhi) is found in a passage in which
Dharmakīrti contrasts Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas on the one hand,
and Bodhisattvas on the other73: “It is not true (na) that there [can be]
no liberation [from saṃsāra], because once the previous saṃskāra [=
karman] has been exhausted, there is no connection to another [painful
birth. However,] those whose saṃskāra is of unexhausted force do re-
main [in saṃsāra out of compassion, after having meditated upon the
benefit of the other living beings,74 and are] immaculate. And because
compassion is weak [since it has not been cultivated intensively before],
the effort in order to remain [in saṃsāra] is not great [and hence the
abode in saṃsāra does not last]; on the contrary (tu), [those] whose
commiseration (kṛpā) is great do remain [in saṃsāra, being entirely]
devoted to the other [living beings].” It is commonplace in Mahāyāna
literature for Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas75 to hasten to reach nirvāṇa
because they are terrified of saṃsāra, whereas Bodhisattvas76 remain in

59,24: nairātmyabhāvanāsātmye; PVṬ Je D251a1–2/P298a2 ≈ PVSVṬ 399,25:

sātmībhūtaṃ mārgam; PVP D89b1/P103a5: lam de‘i bdag ñid can gyi sems; PVV
83,14–15: sātmībhūtamārge. Note Devendrabuddhi’s definition of mārga at PVP
D89b3/P103a8: bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba‘i mtshan ñid can gyi lam (cf. PVV 83,11:
nairātmyadarśanasya mārgas[ya]). Note also PVṬ Ñe D133a6–7/P164a7–8: dṅos po
ji ltar gnas pa bźin du ‘dzin pas źugs pa‘i bdag med pa‘i lam ni sems kyi raṅ bźin ñid
yin pa‘i phyir ro ||.
71
PVP D58a7–b2/P66b3–6 and D58a2–4/P66a4–6: bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba lhun
gyis grub pa‘i skyes bu.
72
PVṬ Ñe D118b1–2/P144b8: raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis ‘jug pa ñid kyis raṅ bźin ñid yin pa‘i
phyir ro ||. Note also TSP K895,8–9/Ś1082,22–23: … iti svabhāvatvena prajñādī-
nāṃ sakṛdāhitānāṃ svarasata eva pravṛttir bhavatīti siddham |.
73
PV 2.197–198: nāmuktiḥ pūrvasaṃskārakṣaye ’nyāpratisandhitaḥ | akṣīṇaśaktiḥ
saṃskāro yeṣāṃ tiṣṭhanti te ’naghāḥ || mandatvāt karuṇāyāś ca na yatnaḥ sthāpane
mahān | tiṣṭhanty eva parādhīnā yeṣāṃ tu mahatī kṛpā ||.
74
According to PVP D85a1/P97b3–4: gal te chags pa med pa dag sñiṅ rjes gnas pa
de‘i tshe sñiṅ rje[s] gnas nas sems can gyi don yid la byas nas de dag yun riṅ por ci‘i
phyir mi gnas |. See also the prayoga that follows (PVP D85a1–3/P97b4–6).
75
PVP D85a3/P97b7: dper na ñan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas dag lta bu‘o ||. PVV 79,11:
śrāvakāṇāṃ tu karmaṇo niyatakālasthitikadehākṣepakatvāt.
76
PVP D84b7/P97b3: dper na byaṅ chub sems dpa‘ rnams kyi lta bu‘o ||. Note, how-
ever, Manorathanandin’s (PVV 79,10) explanation of anaghāḥ as samyaksam-
buddhāḥ.
188 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

saṃsāra in order to honour their commitment to alleviate living beings’

suffering.77 Though these Bodhisattvas are dispassionate (vītarāga?)
and “endowed” with an undefiled (nirdoṣa?) series of aggregates
(skandhasantati?),78 the force of their karmic impulses is unexhausted,79
“because all [their] provisions [of merit and knowledge] result in un-
fixed nirvāṇa (*sarvasambhārasya apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇaphalatvāt).” Be-
cause of his great compassion, a Bodhisattva does not remain in nirvāṇa
(unlike Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), and because of his insight or
wisdom, he does not remain in saṃsāra either (unlike ordinary peo-
ple).80 As Devendrabuddhi puts it,81 “the reason why these great beings
(mahāsattva) who are extremely affectionate without any [selfish] mo-
tive (akāraṇaparamavatsala) remain uninterruptedly [in saṃsāra] is
[their] great compassion (mahatī kṛpā), which proceeds spontaneously
(svarasavāhin), because its practice (kṛpābhyāsa) is preceded by the
thought of enlightenment (bodhicittapūrvaka).”

3.5. Āśrayaparivṛtti and Buddhahood. The practice of the path ends

with the so-called transmutation of the basis [of personal existence]82
(āśrayaparivṛtti), which, like Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra), Dharmakīrti
interprets (only in PV 2!) from a Sautrāntika perspective as the final
and irreversible elimination (niranvayavināśa) of defilements together

77
See BoBh D27,9–28,6/W40,3–41,12, TSP K872,1–7/Ś1055,14–10, and Eltschinger
(forthcoming 1, §2.6).
78
See PVṬ Ñe D131b2/P162a1–2: gaṅ ‘du byed nus zad med can źes bya ba ni phuṅ
po‘i rgyun skyon med pa skyed pa la | ‘dod chags daṅ bral ba gaṅ dag la las kyi nus
pa zad pa med pa yod pa źes bya ba‘i don to ||.
79
According to PVṬ Ñe D131b2–3/P162a2–3: [dper na byaṅ chub sems dpa‘ rnams
kyi lta bu‘o źes bya ba ni byaṅ chub sems dpa‘ rnams ni las kyi nus pa zad pa can ma
yin te |] tshogs thams cad mi gnas pa‘i mya ṅan las ‘das pa‘i ‘bras bu can ñid yin
pa‘i phyir ro ||.
80
See MSAVBh D63b5–64a4, and Eltschinger (2008, n. 51).
81
According to PVP D85a4–6/P98a1–2: gaṅ dag sems can chen po rgyu med par
mchog tu mñes gśin pa byaṅ chub kyi sems sṅon du soṅ ba can gyi brtse ba goms
pa‘i stobs kyis raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis ‘jug pa‘i brtse ba chen po rgyun mi ‘chad par gnas pa‘i
rgyu mṅa‘ ba [de dag gźan gyi ṅor ni bźugs pa yin | sems can gyi don gyi phyir | dus
thams cad du bźugs pa … ] Note PVV 79,15: yeṣām akāraṇavatsalānāṃ mahatī
kṛpā, as well as PVV 79,9: yeṣāṃ punar mahākṛpāṇāṃ praṇidhānaparipuṣṭasya …
82
PV 2.205ab: ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate |.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 189

with their (productive) latent tendencies or germs (bīja).83 Whereas this

(minimal) definition seems to be true of all the Buddhist liberated
minds whatsoever, it must be considerably enlarged when regarding the
transmutated basis of the Bodhisattva who has just (i.e., ipso facto) be-
come a Buddha/Sugata. Dharmakīrti first spells this out in PV 2.135–
136ab84: “The qualities and drawbacks of the [perception of unsubstan-
tiality and its opposite] become [perfectly] clear to the [Bodhisattva]
who practices the means [i.e., insight/discernment] repeatedly, in vari-
ous ways and for a very long time. And because of the intensity the
cognition [of unsubstantiality has reached] due to this [extremely long
repetition of practice], the after-effect of the cause [of suffering] is
abandoned.” Because he sees in all clarity the qualities of the salvific
means and the drawbacks of its opposite, the Buddha is able to instruct
living beings in the path or the four noble truths,85 i.e., is possessed with
śāstṛtvasampad and conversion through the teaching (anuśāsanīprāti-
hārya).86 But no less important here is the fact that, due to this nearly
endless cultivation, the Bodhisattva has rid himself of the (non-
productive) trace or after-effect of defilements. This after-effect of de-
filements consists in a corporeal (kāya°), verbal (vāc°) and mental
(buddhi°) defectiveness (vaiguṇya) or unwieldiness (akarmaṇyatā).87
This still affects liberated saints like the Arhat Maudgalyāyana, who
kept hopping around because he had been born as a monkey 500 life-
times earlier, or the Arhat Pilindavatsa who, because he had been a
brāhmaṇa before, continued to say harsh and belittling words to his

83
On the āśrayaparivṛtti in Dharmakīrti’s works, see Eltschinger 2005b. Niranvayavi-
nāśadharman in PVSV 110,22, TSP K875,20/Ś1060,13, is explained by Śākyabud-
dhi and Karṇakagomin (PVṬ Je D250a3–4/P296b5–7 = PVSVṬ 399,7–9) as fol-
lows: anvayaḥ kleśabījam | anvety utpadyate ’smād doṣa iti kṛtvā | nirgato ’nvayo
yasmin vināśe sa niranvayavināśaḥ | sa dharmo yeṣāṃ doṣāṇāṃ te niranvayavināśa-
dharmāṇaḥ | vāsanayā saha vināśadharmāṇa ity arthaḥ |. On Vasubandhu’s views as
regards āśrayaparivṛtti, see Eltschinger 2005b: 181–182.
84
PV 2.135–136ab: bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāsya ca | gacchanty abhya-
syatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām || buddheś ca pāṭavād dhetor vāsanātaḥ prahī-
yate |.
85
As a tāyin or “protector” of the living beings (see PV 2.145–146ab).
86
PVP D61a2–3/P69b5–7 (Eltschinger 2005a: 424). See Kośa 7.110–112 (Pruden
1991: IV.1166-1167).
87
See PV 2.141c.
190 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

fellow monks.88 In other words, the (Bodhisattva/)Buddha has elimi-

nated the obstacle consisting of defilements together with their after-
effects (savāsanakleśāvaraṇa). But yet another type of abandonment
distinguishes him from Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas: contrary to
them (or to Arhats), a Buddha has rid himself of unskilfulness in teach-
ing the path (mārgoktyapaṭutā),89 which I interpret as Dharmakīrti’s
allusion to undefiled ignorance (akliṣṭāvidyā, °ajñāna, °saṃmoha).90 If
this hypothesis holds good, we can safely consider our Bodhisattva’s
transmutation of the basis also to entail the elimination of the obstacle
that conceals the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa, and hence an omniscience of
the sarvasarvajñatā-type), for the equation akliṣṭāvidyā = jñeyāvaraṇa
is easy to document in Buddhist Mahāyāna literature.91 Moreover, most
of the definitions of āśrayaparivṛtti include the elimination of both ob-
stacles, the epistemologists being no exception.92

THE COGNITION OF A YOGIN

4. Yogijñāna as an Epistemological Topic

Let us now turn to the epistemological dimension of yoga proper.93
Dharmakīrti devotes two main passages to the so-called perception of
88
On the vāsanāsamudghāta, see Lamotte 1974, Traité IV.1755–1758, and
Eltschinger 2005a: 419–422. On the story of Maudgalyāyana, see PVṬ Ñe D118b4–
5/P145a4–5, Lamotte 1973: II.300, Traité I.117n. 4 and Lamotte 1974: 92. On the
story of Pilindavatsa, see PVṬ Ñe D118b5–6/P145a5–7.
89
See PV 2.141d.
90
See AKBh 1,13–15 (Kośa 1.2, Pruden 1991: I.1–2), Jaini 2001: 167–179,
Eltschinger 2005a: 423–424.
91
See Eltschinger 2005a: 429–434.
92
See PVṬ Je D115a1/P135b6 ≈ PVSVṬ 211,8–9.
93
Among Buddhist philosophers, Dignāga (480–540?) is likely to have been the first
one to discuss the perception of mystics within the general framework of perception
(pratyakṣa) as a means of valid cognition. However, the following statement seems
to exhaust Dignāga’s opinion on the subject: “[T]he yogin’s intuition of a thing in it-
self unassociated (avyatibhinna) with the teacher’s instruction [is also a type of per-
ception]. The yogin’s perception which is not associated (avyavakīrṇa) with any
conceptual construction of āgama (the authoritative words of the teachers) and
which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception.” Hattori’s (1968: 27)
translation of PS 1.6cd and PSV thereon. Sanskrit texts (< Vibh. 191n. 3 and 203n.
1) in Hattori 1968: 94 nn. 1.48 (yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk) and
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 191

yogins (yogipratyakṣa),94 both of which refer their reader back to the

religious ideas we have considered so far, i.e., to the religious philoso-
phy as expounded in PV 2. What do yoga and yogins consist of? Dhar-
mottara (740–800) is one of the few authors to supply any substantial
definitions of these two terms. According to ordinary understanding
(loka), yoga consists of (psychic) concentration (samādhi), but accord-
ing to (Buddhist) authoritative treatises (śāstra), it consists of tranquil-
lity (of mind, śamatha) and discernment (vipaśyanā), which have (psy-
chic) concentration and insight (prajñā) for their nature (°ātman), re-
spectively. A yogin is one who is possessed of tranquillity of mind and
discernment into the nature of things, one who strives for constant con-
centration (< nityasamāhita) and discrimination of true reality (tattva-
pravicaya?).95

1.49 (yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātradarśanaṃ pratyakṣam).

Steinkellner’s reconstruction of PS(V) 1.6ab reads as follows: yogināṃ gurunirde-
śāvyavakīrṇārthamātradṛk |. Note that PSV is also quoted in PVP D210b3/P246b56.
Interestingly enough, Dignāga’s presentation is based on two notions the subsequent
tradition will seemingly disregard. First, the perception of yogins grasps a “thing in
itself” (arthamātra); this expression I do not dare interpret further than Jinen-
drabuddhi’s comment to the effect that °mātra (“only,” “in itself” in Hattori’s trans-
lation) aims at excluding superimposed objects (PSṬ 56,15–57,1: mātraśabdo
’dhyāropitārthavyavacchedārthaḥ |). Second, this perception is totally free from, or
unmixed with scriptural concepts (āgamavikalpa), which on the one side matches
the definitory non-conceptuality of perception well, but on the other side seems to
conflict with the subsequent tradition’s insistence upon the four Noble Truths (on
this point, see Franco in present volume).
94
PV 3.281–286, PVin 1.27,7–28,8; see also NB 1.11. On yogipratyakṣa, see Vetter
1964: 41, Steinkellner 1978, McDermott 1991, Pemwieser 1991: 21–50, Dreyfus
1997: 413–414.
95
According to the following passages: PVinṬ D117b2–3/P135b1–2: ’jig rten na ni
mñam par gźag pa la rnal ’byor (em. ’byor: DP ’byor ba) yin la | bstan bcos las ni
tiṅ ṅe ’dzin daṅ śes rab kyi bdag ñid źi gnas daṅ lhag mthoṅ la yin te | rnal ’byor ba
de dag la yod pa de dag ni rnal ’byor bas te | rtag tu mñam par gźag pa daṅ | de kho
na rnam par ’byed pa la brtson pa’o ||. NBṬ S12,8–9/M70,2: yogaḥ samādhiḥ | sa
yasyāsti sa yogī | (≈ PSṬ 56,12: yogaḥ samādhiḥ | sa yeṣām asti, te yoginaḥ |), and
DhPr 70,19–22 thereon: yogaśabdasya vyutpattim āha | yoga iti | samādhiś cittaikā-
gratā | iha dharmottareṇa lokaprasiddhir āśritā | viniścayaṭīkāyāṃ tu śāstrasthitis
tenāvirodhaḥ | yad vā samādhigrahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatvāt prajñā ca vivekakaraṇa-
śaktir draṣṭavyā | sa yasyāsti sa nityasamāhito vivekakaraṇatatparaś ca yogī |. PVA
327,17–18: tathā ca śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo yoga iti vacanam |.
192 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

Let us start with Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception in his

PVin and NB, and disregard the possible evolution of his ideas on this
topic (cf. Franco, forthcoming). In PVin 1.4ab1, Dharmakīrti defines
perception as cognition that is free from conceptual thought (kalpanā-
poḍha) and is non-erroneous (abhrānta),96 conceptual thought being in
turn characterized as a cognition whose appearance or image may be
expressed verbally.97 We may thus offer two defining conditions that
the cognition of a yogin must meet in order to be termed a “perception”:
first, it must be non-conceptual (and hence its content cannot be ade-
quately expressed by words); second, it must be non-erroneous and
reliable/non-belying (avisaṃvādin). The criterion of a given cognition’s
non-conceptual character lies in its presenting a clear or vivid (spaṣṭa,
sphuṭa) appearance or image. The vividness and hence the non-concep-
tuality of a yogin’s cognition comes from the fact that this cognition is
born of cultivation (bhāvanāmaya, etc.) and arises out of this virtually
endless process characterized as punaḥ punar utpādanam, as we have
seen above.98 Dharmakīrti spells this out as follows99: “[We have al-
ready] presented the cognition of the yogins above [in the second chap-
ter]. This [cognition] of the [yogins] is born of cultivation [and therefore
is] free from the [deceptive] net of conceptual thought (kalpanā)[; be-
cause it is of a non-conceptual character, this cognition] presents a vivid
image.” This depiction is indeed the forerunner of Dharmakīrti’s open-
ing statement on the subject in PVin 1, where the second definitory
criterion has been duly integrated100: “That cognition which, as in the
case of fear, etc., vividly appears by force of cultivation, [and which is]

96
PVin 1.4ab1 = NB 1.4: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. Note also Dharmot-
tara’s (PVinṬ D117a4/P135a2–3) definition of pratyakṣa in this context: gsal bar
snaṅ ba don byed par bzod pa’i dṅos po’i raṅ bźin la ma ’khrul pa daṅ | rtogs pa
med pa’i śes pa ni mṅon sum yin no ||.
97
PVin 1.7,7 ≈ NB 1.5: abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā |.
98
See n. 57 above.
99
PV 3.281: prāg uktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam | vidhūtakalpa-
nājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate ||. To be connected with PV 3.285 = PVin 1.31: tas-
mād bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evātibhāvyate | bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphu-
ṭākalpadhīphalam ||. “Therefore, [be it] real or unreal, whatever is intensively medi-
tated upon (atibhāvyate) results in a clear and non-conceptual cognition when the
cultivation is perfected.”
100
PVin 1.28: bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭaṃ bhayādāv iva bhāsate | yaj jñānam avisaṃvādi
tat pratyakṣam akalpakam ||.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 193

reliable [as well as] non-conceptual (akalpa), this is a [direct] percep-

tion [too].” As Dharmottara has it,101 “due to cultivation, [this cogni-
tion] appears vividly; because it appears vividly, [this cognition] is es-
tablished (siddha) as non-conceptual; since it bears upon an entity that
has been ‘purified’ by the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa-
pariśuddhavastuviṣaya), [this cognition] is non-erroneous; therefore,
why should it not be a perception, [if all] the other perceptions also
appear vividly, are non-conceptual and non-erroneous?”
A cognition’s being the outcome of the intense cultivation of an
object by no means implies that the said cognition bears upon a real
(bhūta) object (artha, viṣaya). Dharmakīrti adduces several examples in
order to show that the cultivation of unreal (abhūta) objects may also
result in a vivid and hence non-conceptual cognition. He says102: “[Peo-
ple who are] deluded by confusion due to love, sorrow or fear, and by
dreams about thieves, etc.,103 see [the respective objects] as if [these
would] stand before [them,] though [these objects are] unreal.” But, one
may ask, how do we know that these deluded persons see, because of
their cultivation of it, the object as if it would stand before them?104 This
is to be inferred on the basis of these persons’ outward behaviour, as
Dharmakīrti says105: “Since we see that, in accord with the delusion

101
PVinṬ D117a7–b1/P135a7–b1: bsgoms pas gsal bar snaṅ źiṅ | gsal bar snaṅ ba’i
phyir rnam par rtog pa med par grub pa yin la | tshad mas yoṅs su dag pa’i dṅos po’i
yul can yin pa’i phyir ma ’khrul pa yin pas ci’i phyir mṅon sum ñid du mi ’gyur |
mṅon sum gźan yaṅ gsal bar snaṅ ba daṅ rtog pa daṅ bral źiṅ ma ’khrul pa yin no ||.
102
PV 3.282 = PVin 1.29: kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ | abhūtān
api paśyanti purato ’vasthitān iva ||. According to PVP D210b5/P247a1, this stanza
answers the following question: gaṅ daṅ gaṅ śin tu bsgoms pa de daṅ de las gsal bar
snaṅ bar ’gyur ro źes bya ba de ñid gaṅ las yin źe na |.
103
PVP D210b7/P247a4 explains “etc.” as: myur du bskor ba daṅ ’chi ltas la sogs pa
gzuṅ ṅo ||. See also PVṬ Ñe D215b6–7/P266b1–2 thereon: sogs pa smos pas ni myur
du bskor ba daṅ ’chi ltas la sogs pa gzuṅ ṅo źes bya ba la | ’di ltar ’khor lo bźin du
lus myur du bskor ba las dṅos po g.yo ba med pa yaṅ g.yo ba bźin du gsal bar dmigs
par ’gyur ba ’aṅ ’chi ba’i dus na lus daṅ sems kyi gnas skabs ’ga’ źig ’chi ltas kyi
miṅ can dṅos po yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa mthoṅ bar ’gyur ro ||.
104
PVinṬ D119a1/P137a4: yaṅ de dag gis de mdun na gnas pa bźin du mthoṅ ba źes
bya ba ’di gaṅ las śe na |.
105
PVin 1.30ab: yathāviplavam āvegapratipattipradarśanāt |. “To be inferred” accord-
ing to Vibh. 203n. 3 (anumeya). Eli Franco kindly suggests to me that one can inter-
pret this statement in a slightly different manner: … since they show (their delu-
sional) cognition by their agitation.
194 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

[they are the victims of], they act with agitation.” Some explanations
may not be out of place. By “agitation” (āvega), we should understand
physical states such as trembling with joy, or being thrilled (roma-
harṣa). By “behaviour” is meant a physical action (anuṣṭhāna) that con-
forms to the specific vision of a deluded person: the first will stretch his
arms out in order to embrace his beloved, the second mourns or sighs,
and the third boastfully seizes a sword.106 But one may also wonder why
the cognition at stake should be of an immediate (pratyakṣa) rather than
of a mediate (parokṣa) character.107 This Dharmakīrti answers as fol-
lows108: “Because we do not see any behaviour of that kind when
[someone] is conscious that his/her cognition is a mediate one
(parokṣa).”
However, cultivating unreal objects is by no means limited to
deluded or passionate people. The Buddhist meditation exercises that
build up, among other things, the (remote) preparatory path (prayoga-
mārga) are also endowed with utterly unreal objects, as Dharmakīrti
tells us in both his PV and PVin109: “We hold that, though [they are]
unreal, the loathsome, the totality of earth, etc., which are created by
force of cultivation, are vivid and [hence] non-conceptual.” This in-
cludes meditation such as cognizing a corpse turning blue (vinīlaka) or
rotting (vipūyaka), or of a corpse that has become a skeleton (asthi-

106
See PVinṬ D119a1–3/P137a4–6: gus pas ni grims pa ste | spro ba’i dbaṅ gis ’dar
ba’i mtshan ñid can nam ba spu laṅs mtshan ñid kyi lus kyi gnas skabs so || bsgrub
pa ni mthoṅ ba daṅ rjes su mthun par nan tan du byed pa ste | sdug pa la sogs ’dren
pa daṅ | ’di na su su źes smra ba daṅ | ṅa rgyal daṅ bcas pa ral gri la sogs pa la ’ju
ba ste |. PVP D210b7–211a1/P247a5–6: de ltar na de ltar mthoṅ bas don mṅon du
gyur pa bźin du | de daṅ rjes su mthun par bsgrubs pa la dmigs par ’gyur na | gaṅ gis
na de dag ’dir lkog tu gyur pa’i miṅ can du yaṅ ’gyur ba ma yin no źes bya ba de ṅes
par gzuṅ bar mi ’gyur |. PVV 203,9: yasmāt tadanurūpāṃ pravṛttiṃ ceṣṭante |.
107
According to PVinṬ D119a3/P137a6–7: ’di sñam du gus pas bsgrub pa mthoṅ du
zin kyaṅ | mṅon sum bźin du de dag gsal bar snaṅ ba yin par ji ltar ṅes śe na |.
108
PVin 1.30cd: parokṣagatisaṃjñāyāṃ tathāvṛtter adarśanāt ||.
109
PV 3.284: aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādy abhūtam api varṇyate | spaṣṭābhaṃ nirvikalpaṃ ca
bhāvanābalanirmitam ||. PVin 1.28,7–8: tathā hy aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādikam abhūta-
viṣayam api spaṣṭapratibhāsaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ ca bhāvanābalaniṣpannam iṣyate ||.
“It is indeed accepted [by us Buddhists] that [meditative exercises] like [the con-
templation of] the loathsome and the totality of earth, which arise by force of culti-
vation, present a vivid image and are non-conceptual despite [their] having an un-
real object.”
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 195

saṅkalā),110 or meditation that has all entities (vastu) appearing as the

earth, or as water, as they have unreal objects despite the fact that the
image they display is perfectly clear once the cultivation process has
been completed.111 The reason why these meditations have unreal ob-
jects is, according to Vaibhāṣikas and to Dharmottara, that they consist
in acts of attention that are directed towards imaginary or, better, voli-
tional objects (adhimuktimanas[i]kāra).112
Since they arise from intensive cultivation of their objects, the
aforementioned direct or immediate cognitions display a vivid image
and hence are non-conceptual. In this respect, they all meet the first
defining condition of a perception. But since they bear upon imaginary
or volitional objects such as a beloved, an enemy or a putrefying
corpse, they fail to meet the second. As belying/unreliable (visaṃvādin,
asaṃvādin) cognitions, they do not lay claim to the “validity” that is
inherent in a true perception. As Dharmakīrti himself says,113 “among
these [vivid and non-conceptual cognitions that result from cultiva-
tion,114 we] accept as a means of valid cognition [only] that perception
which, born of cultivation, is reliable,115 just like [the one that is related

110
See PVinṬ D119b2/P137b7: mi sdug pa źes bya ba ni rus pa ’brel pa’i rnam pa can
gyi tiṅ ṅe ’dzin to ||, PVV 203,22: aśubhā vinīlakavipūyakāsthisaṅkalādikā. On
aśubhā, see Kośa 6.148–153 (Pruden 1991: III.916–921).
111
PVinṬ D119b2–3/P137b7–8: zad par sa ni dṅos po mtha’ dag sar snaṅ ba’i tiṅ ṅe
’dzin to || sogs pa smos pas ni zad par chu la sogs pa’o ||, PVV 203,22: pṛthivī-
kṛtsnādi bhūmayatvādi. On kṛtsnāyatanas, see Kośa 8.213–215 (Pruden 1991:
IV.1277–1278).
112
PVinṬ D119b4/P138a1–2: mos pas byas pa rnal ’byor ba’i spyod yul du ’gyur ba
rus pa la sogs pa rnams … On adhimuktimanas[i]kāra in the case of aśubhā, see
Kośa 6.150 and 152 (Pruden 1991: III.918–919 and 920); on adhimuktimanas[i]kāra
in the case of the kṛtsnāyatana, see Kośa 8.214n. 1 (Pruden 1991: IV.1306n. 203).
About this meaning of adhimukti, see Bhsd 14b–15a s.v. adhimucyate (2). Note also
Devendrabuddhi’s (PVP D211b2–3/P248a1) explanation: raṅ gi rnam par rtog pa
tsam gyis kun nas bslaṅ ba yin no || (*svavikalpamātreṇa samutthitāḥ), as well as
Prajñākaragupta’s (PVA 327,14): atattvamanaskāratvād aśubhādīnām.
113
PV 3.286: tatra pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi yat prāṅnirṇītavastuvat | tad bhāvanājaṃ
pratyakṣam iṣṭaṃ śeṣā upaplavāḥ ||.
114
According to PVV 204,9: tatra bhāvanābalabhāviṣu spaṣṭ[a]nirvikalpeṣu; PVP
D211b4/P248a4: de sgom pa’i ’bras bu’i śes pa de dag la.
115
See PVV 204,9: saṃvādy upadarśitārthaprāpakam.
196 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

to] the matter (vastu) [we] determined above [in chapter two]. All the
remaining [cognitions] are [mere] delusions.116”
The condition of a yogic cognition’s reliability lies in its bearing
on an object that has proved to stand critical analysis by means of
pramāṇas. In other words, this object must have been submitted to ra-
tional inquiry (yukti), “purified” ([pari]śuddha) or ascertained as agree-
ing (saṃvādin) with the means of valid cognition. This is tantamount to
saying that the object of a yogin’s cognition is one that has been re-
flected upon (< √cint), examined (< vi√car) or ascertained (< niś√ci,
vyava√sthācaus, nir√nī) by means of the above-mentioned cintāmayī
prajñā. It is obvious that, as Dharmakīrti himself makes clear, this ob-
ject only consists of the four Noble Truths117 that he submitted to infer-
ential evaluation in the second chapter of his PV.118 When commenting
on Dharmakīrti’s statement to the effect that yogic cognition has al-
ready been treated, all commentators add that it has been explained “as
bearing upon the (four Noble) Truths” ([caturārya]satyaviṣaya), and
this in the satyavicāracintā of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter.119 In other

116
PVP D211b5/P248a5: dper na zad par sa la sogs pa lta bu’o ||; PVV 204,13–14:
śeṣā ayathārthā upaplavā bhramā yathā aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādipratyayāḥ |.
117
See PVinṬ D118a2–3/P136a2–4 for a short summary on the four Truths: ‘bras bur
gyur pa ñe bar len pa‘i phuṅ po lṅa ni sdug bsṅal lo || de dag ñid sred pa daṅ lhan
cig pas rgyur gyur pa ni kun ‘byuṅ ṅo || ṅes par legs pa‘i raṅ bźin du gyur pa‘i sems
ni ‘gog pa‘o || raṅ bźin de ñid thob pa‘i rgyur gyur pa bdag med pa la sogs pa‘i rnam
pa can gyi sems kyi khyad par ni lam mo ||. “Suffering (duḥkha) consists of the resul-
tant (phalabhūta) five constituents[-of-a-person] which one clings to (pañca upādā-
naskandhāḥ). The origin (samudaya) [of suffering] consists of the same [five con-
stituents] with the status of a cause (hetubhūta) because [they are] accompanied by
craving (tṛṣṇāsahita?). The destruction (nirodha) [of suffering, i.e., nirvāṇa,] con-
sists of the mind (citta) having turned into a blissful condition (niḥśreyasasva-
bhāvabhūta?). The path (mārga) [that leads to the destruction of suffering] consists
of a particular mind (cittaviśeṣa?) which, endowed with such [real] aspects as un-
substantiality (nairātmyādyākāra[vat]?), is the cause of obtaining this very condition
(tasya eva svabhāvasya prāptihetubhūtaḥ?) [that defines nirvāṇa].”
118
PV 3.286b: prāṅnirṇītavastuvat; PVin 1.27,11–12: āryasatyadarśanavad yathā
nirṇītam asmābhiḥ pramāṇavārttike; note also PV 3.281a: prāg uktaṃ yogināṃ
jñānam.
119
On PV 3.281a: PVV 203,1: prāk prathamaparicchede (= Pramāṇasiddhi) yogināṃ
jñānaṃ satyaviṣayam uktam; PVA 326,23: caturāryasatyaviṣayaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ
prāg uktam; PVP D210b3–4/P246b6–7: sṅar bśad rnal ’byor śes pa ni sṅar ‘phags
pa’i bden pa bźi’i yul can du bśad pa na | bden pa dpyod pa gaṅ yin pa de źes bya
ba’i don to ||. On PV 3.286b: PVV 204,12–13: prāk prathamaparicchede nirṇītaṃ
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 197

words, as Devendrabuddhi has it,120 “not all cognitions of yogins are

perception (pratyakṣa), but (kiṃ tarhi) [only] the one that has been
stated before, i.e., the one that has been stated before as bearing upon
the four Noble Truths.” According to Dharmottara,121 “the cognition
that perceives (darśana) these [four Noble Truths], i.e., is aware of
them in immediate manner (sākṣāt°/pratyakṣīkaraṇa), is perception
(pratyakṣa).” And according to the same author,122 Dharmakīrti in his
PV has explained “how the four Noble Truths are ‘purified’ by
pramāṇas, and how they are to be cultivated (bhāvanīya) under such
aspects as impermanence (anityādi).” Now provided a yogin’s cultiva-
tional and hence non-conceptual cognition has the four Noble Truths for
its object, it meets the second defining condition of a perception.

vastu satyacatuṣṭayaṃ tasminn eva; PVA 327,32–33: prāṅnirṇītavastu paralokaca-

turāryasatyādikaṃ tadviṣayam eva pratyakṣam | na tu kāmādiviṣayam |; PVP
D211b5/P248a5: sṅar bden pa dpyad pa’i skabs su tshad ma’i dṅos po yaṅ dag par
bstan pa bźin no. Note also NBṬ S11,18/M67,3–4: bhūtaḥ sadbhūto ’rthaḥ | pra-
māṇena dṛṣṭaś ca sadbhūtaḥ | yathā catvāry āryasatyāni |, and PVV 203,2 (satyasva-
rūpaviṣaya) or 204,3 (āryasatyādi as a gloss on bhūtam). Prajñākaragupta’s para-
loka is the only exception I am aware of in this particular context. The presence of
an “etc.” (°adi) is no argument since most if not all °ādis are explicable or even ex-
plained as nairātmya or anitya[tā], which of course amounts to the four Noble
Truths (note also that Dharmakīrti does not introduce an °ādi in this particular con-
text).
120
PVP D210b3–4/P246b6–7: rnal ’byor ba’i śes pa thams cad mṅon sum ma yin no ||
’o na ci yin źe na | sṅar bśad rnal ’byor śes pa ni [= PV 3.281a] | sṅar ’phags pa’i
bden pa bźi’i yul can du bśad pa na |.
121
PVinṬ D118a3–4/P136a4–5: ’di [= bden pa] dag mthoṅ bar mṅon sum du byed pa’i
śes pa gaṅ yin pa de mṅon sum yin pa |.
122
PVinṬ D118a4/P136a5: ’phags pa’i bden pa bźi po rnams ji ltar tshad mas rnam par
dag pa daṅ | mi rtag pa la sogs pa de dag rnam pa ji lta bu bsgom par bya ba. Note
the whole of Dharmottara’s account of Dharmakīrti’s PV 2 (PVinṬ D118a4–
6/P136a5–8): ‘phags pa‘i bden pa bźi po rnams ji ltar tshad mas rnam par dag pa
daṅ | mi (D:P bi) rtag pa la sogs pa de dag rnam pa ji lta bu źig (D:P om. źig) bsgom
par bya ba daṅ | skye ba brgyud pa du mas dus ji srid kyi mthar thug par goms par
bya ba daṅ | rgyu gaṅ la goms par byed pa byaṅ chub sems dpa‘ rnams kyi ni sñiṅ rje
las yin la | de las gźan rnams ni ‘khor ba las yid byuṅ ba źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de
thams cad ni | ji ltar Tshad ma rnam ‘grel du gtan (D:P bstan) la phab pa‘i rnam pa
de ñid kyis ‘phags pa‘i bden pa mthoṅ ba thabs daṅ bcas | yul daṅ bcas | rnam pa
daṅ bcas par khoṅ du chud par byas te | ‘dir ni yaṅ dag pa‘i yul can gyi rnam par
rtog pa goms pa las de‘i don la dmigs pa‘i mṅon sum skye ba ñid do źes bya ba de
tsam źig bsgrub (P:D bsgrubs) par ‘dod pa ‘ba‘ źig tu zad do ||.
198 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

In a most interesting statement of the PVin, Dharmakīrti relates

the topic of yogijñāna back to the basic path-structure of Buddhism.
The traditional threefold sequence or gradual progression (bhāvanā-
krama) of insights is deemed to be the cause of a yogic cognition’s viv-
idness and reliability123: “Having first grasped objects through a cogni-
tion born of listening [to treatises that are favourable to cultivation124],
and [then] ascertained [them] through a [cognition] born of reflecting
[upon them] by means of rational inquiry (yukti) [i.e., by means of
pramāṇas],125 yogins cultivate [those objects]. The [cognition] which, at
the completion of this [cultivation], appears as vividly as in such cases
as fear [or sorrow, and hence is] non-conceptual [but which also] has a
true object [because it bears upon an object that has been formerly as-
certained by pramāṇas], this is [also] the pramāṇa perception.”
Note should be made in this connection that the cognition at
stake is said to be “born of cultivation” (bhāvanāmaya), which the
commentators explain as “caused by cultivation” (bhāvanāhetu[niṣ-
patti]ka),126 an expression that matches Dharmakīrti’s own formulations
well (bhāvanāja, bhāvanābalanirmita, bhāvanābalaniṣpanna, bhāvanā-
balataḥ127). In other words, this cognition does not consist in cultiva-
tion, but arises at the very end of cultivation, once the cultivation proc-

123
PVin 1.27,7–8: yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā yukticintāmayena
vyavasthāpya bhāvayatāṃ tanniṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv iva, tad avikal-
pakam avitathaviṣayaṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣam. Dharmottara’s introduction (PVinṬ
D117b1–2/P135b1) runs as follows: ’di ñid rnam par ’grel pa na gsal bar snaṅ ba
ñid kyi rgyu bsgom pa’i go rim ston par byed do ||.
124
See PVinṬ D117b3–4/P135b3–4: thos pa las byuṅ bas bsgoms pa daṅ rjes su mthun
pa’i bstan bcos mñan pa’i rgyu can gyis bzuṅ ba ṅes pa’i don bsgom par bya ba |.
125
See PVinṬ D117b4/P135b4: rigs pas te tshad mas sems śiṅ ṅes par rtog pa ni rigs
pas (em. pas: DP pa) sems pa’o ||.
126
PVA 326,23–24: bhāvanāhetukam; PVV 203,1–2: bhāvanāhetuniṣpattikam.
127
Respectively, PV 3.286c (bhāvanāja also PVV 203,10, PVV 204,10); PV 3.284d;
PVin 1.28,8; PVin 1.28a (see also PVinṬ D117a5/P135a4 and D119b3/P138a1,
where stobs is explained as mthu; PVP D211b4/P248a3; bhāvanābalāt PVV 327,8
and PVA 328,1). The commentators provide us with plenty of expressions: bsgoms
pa’i stobs las skyes pa (PVP D211b1/P247b7–8), bhāvanābalaja (PVV 203,18 and
204,13), bhāvanābalabhāvin (PVA 327,32), bsgoms pa‘i ’bras bu’i śes pa (PVP
D211b4/P248a4, PVinṬ D119a7/P137b4 and D119b1/P137b6), bsgoms pa‘i mthu
las (PVinṬ D119b5/P138a3).
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 199

ess has been completed (bhāvanāpariniṣpattau, tanniṣpattau128). This is

indeed the way Dharmakīrti accounts for yogijñāna in the definition he
supplies in his NB129: “Arisen from the ultimate degree [reached by] the
cultivation of a real object, the cognition of yogins, too[, is a direct per-
ception].”

5. Yogijñāna in a Soteriological Perspective

5.1. Dharmakīrti repeatedly reminds his readers of the fact that he has
already accounted for yogināṃ jñānam in the second chapter of his PV.
This remark is a little puzzling insofar as this chapter does not provide
any explicit treatment of the topic. Nevertheless, I think it supplies
enough materials for us to proceed further in our interpretation of the
yogin’s cognition.
It is my contention that Dharmakīrti’s account of the yogin’s
cognition as vivid, non-conceptual and non-belying refers to the mind’s
gnoseological condition at the end of the “cleansing” path, i.e., at the
moment when all superimpositions and their concomitant defilements,
even those of an extremely subtle nature, have been thoroughly and
absolutely eliminated. In other words, Dharmakīrti’s presentation con-
cerns the mind or cognition of the mystic whose basis-of-existence has
just been transmuted. The coincidence between Dharmakīrti’s bhāvanā-
pariniṣpattau in the context of yogijñāna and his remark to the effect
that the basis-of-existence is transmuted due to the repeated practice of
the path (tadabhyāsāt), is striking. It is brought out with particular clar-

128
PV 3.285c = PVin 1.31c (note PVV 204,4–5: bhāvanāyāḥ sādaranirantaradīrgha-
kālapravartitāyāḥ pariniṣpattau); PVin 1.27,10 (sgom pa rdzogs śiṅ PVinṬ
D117b5/P135b5). Note also Devendrabuddhi’s explanation of bhāvanāmaya as bden
pa sgom pa rdzogs pa las (PVP D210b4/P246b7–8), as well as Dharmottara’s
bsgoms pa mthar phyin pa (PVinṬ D119a6/P137b3). The process traditionally ends
up with or culminates in the so-called “absorption similar to a diamond” (vajro-
pamasamādhi, see AKBh 364,13–365,10 [Kośa 6.227–229, Pruden 1991: III.981–
983]). This final moment in the path of cultivation marks the end of the “cleansing”
process. I hold it to coincide with Dharmakīrti’s bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta (NB
1.11), or with his bhāvanāpariniṣpatti (PV 3.285c).
129
NB 1.11: bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti ||. Dharmottara
interprets °paryanta° as ablative case (NBṬ S11,23/M68,2: tasmāt paryantāt yaj
jātam), contrary to Jñānaśrīmitra’s locative (bhāvanāprakarṣaparyante, in
Steinkellner 1978: 130n. 42).
200 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

ity in Devendrabuddhi’s commentary130: “Due to the [repeated] practice

(abhyāsa) of the [aforementioned] path (mārga), i.e., once the cultiva-
tion (bhāvanā) of the path defined as the perception of unsubstantiality
(nairātmyadarśanalakṣaṇa) has been completed (niṣpatti), the basis[-of-
existence] is transmuted (āśrayaḥ parivartate, = PV 2.205b): the defiled
(doṣavat?) mind (citta) [now] has the property (dharma) absolutely
[never] to [re]arise (atyantānutpatti?). The meaning (artha) [intended
by Dharmakīrti is the following]: the mind is [now] coessential with the
path (mārgasātmani sthitam).” Highly interesting in this connection is
an allegedly Vaibhāṣika objection occurring in Prajñākaragupta’s PVA.
Just before he turns to his criticism, the Vaibhāṣika opponent concedes
the following point:131 “It is true that [the cognition in question] pre-
sents, due to [intense] cultivation, a vivid image of an object (vastu) that
has been [previously] established by the means of valid cognition, be-
cause [in it] the object (artha) appears in its own [particular] form
(svena rūpeṇa) when the opacity of nescience (avidyākāluṣya) has been
[entirely] wiped away through cultivation.” I conjecture that the doc-
trine that provokes the Vaibhāṣika’s assent encapsulates Dharmakīrti’s
position with regard to the cognition of yogins. As we shall see, this
hypothesis accounts both for the vividness and for the truth that are
deemed inherent in a yogin’s cognition.

5.2. In the second chapter of his PV, Dharmakīrti presents us with the
following “realist” account of the nature (prakṛti) of cognition (vi-
jñāna)132: “[Provided one accepts, unlike the idealist,133 that] the prop-
erty of [all] cognition is to grasp an object, [one must also admit that]

130
PVP D87a4–5/P100a7–b1: lam de goms pa las bdag med pa mthoṅ ba’i mtshan ñid
can gyi lam de’i sgom pa rdzogs pa na rten ni yoṅs su gyur par ’gyur | ñes pa daṅ
bcas pa’i sems śin tu skye ba med pa’i chos can yod na lam de’i bdag ñid la sems
gnas par ’gyur ro źes bya ba’i don to ||.
131
PVA 327,8–9: (vaibhāṣikā āhuḥ | nanu) vastuni pramāṇaprasiddhe bhāvanābalāt
spaṣṭābhateti yuktam | bhāvanayāvidyākāluṣyāpagame svena rūpeṇārthasya prati-
bhāsanāt |.
132
PV 2.206–207a1: viṣayagrahaṇaṃ dharmo vijñānasya yathāsti saḥ | gṛhyate so ’sya
janako vidyamānātmaneti ca || eṣā prakṛtiḥ …
133
On the epistemological presuppositions of that passage, see PVP D87b5–
88a4/P101a3–b3 (Eltschinger 2005b: 185–186), and TSP K872,27–
873,7/Ś1056,21–25 (McClintock 2002: 213–214).
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 201

this [object] is grasped as it [really] is [i.e., as impermanent, etc.134].

This [object] generates this [cognition of itself] by [its] existing nature
(vidyamānātmanā). And this is [the object’s and the cognition’s origi-
nal] nature [i.e., that the object generates a cognition that grasps it as it
really is, and that the cognition grasps a real aspect of the object].”
Dharmakīrti’s presentation relies on a Sautrāntika doctrine, according
to which direct perception is explained by the fact that the object casts
or “projects” (arpaṇa) its own aspect (ākāra) and hence generates the
cognition itself. Dharmakīrti spells this out in the third chapter of the
same work135: “Experts on rational inquiry consider that to be an ob-
ject/be perceptible consists in being a cause [which is] capable of pro-
jecting a [true] aspect [of itself] onto the cognition.” I believe we are
left with no other possibility than to accept the alleged reality of the
aspects the entity casts onto consciousness. As Devendrabuddhi makes
clear,136 these real aspects are those we already met in Dharmakīrti’s
description of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths, imperma-
nence, painfulness, emptiness, selflessness, etc. The conclusion is then
easily drawn, as Kamalaśīla has it137: “It has been settled that the origi-
nal nature of the [mind/cognition] is to grasp the real aspects of the ob-
ject. It has also been explained that the real nature of the object consists
in momentariness, selflessness, etc. Therefore, [the mind] has but the
grasping of unsubstantiality for its nature.” In order to present us with
the nature of cognition, the epistemologists resort to, and reinterpret ac-
cordingly, two highly valued traditional topoi, i.e., the alleged natural
“luminosity” (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of the mind or cognition,138 and the
perception of true reality (tattvadarśana). Dharmakīrti describes the
first in PV 2.208ab139: “[Therefore,] the mind is radiant by [its very]
nature [i.e., grasps an object as it really is,140 whereas] impurities (mala)

134
Anityādyākāra in PVP D87b6/P101a4, D88b3–4/P102a4–5.
135
PV 3.247b2d: grāhyatāṃ viduḥ | hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam ||.
136
See PVP D88a4–5/P101b3–4.
137
TSP K873,5–7/Ś1057,2–4: bhūtaviṣayākāragrāhitā asya svabhāvo nija iti sthitam |
bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣaṇikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat | tena nair-
ātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva.
138
See Eltschinger 2005b: 180 and 190–192. On the mind’s natural luminosity, see
Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 410–454 and Lamotte 1987a: 51–60.
139
PV 2.208ab: prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ |.
140
According to PVP D89a5/P103a1: ‘di‘i raṅ bźin ‘od gsal te | yaṅ dag pa ji lta ba
bźin du ‘dzin pa‘i raṅ bźin no ||.
202 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

[such as the view of self or craving] are [purely] adventitious [i.e., are
not its nature,141 and hence are removable].” According to the second
topos, which, as far as I can see, Dharmakīrti does not explicitly allude
to in this particular context, to see the real aspects of things amounts to
perceiving true reality. Thus, Devendrabuddhi142: “By its [very] nature,
the mind thus consists of the perception of true reality, [whereas] impu-
rities are [merely] adventitious.” Or, as Śāntarakṣita has it,143 “the mind,
which consists of the perception of true reality, is radiant [by its very
nature].”
Now how are we to account for the indisputable fact that we ac-
tually do not perceive true reality, i.e., do not perceive real entities as
impermanent, painful, empty or selfless? In other words, how is it that
we ordinary persons can at best infer these real aspects of things, and
hence have but conceptual and nonvivid notions of them? Dharmakīrti’s
answer is as follows144: “On account of a certain cause (nimitta) [i.e., on
account of an adventitious cause of error], the [mind] shifts (skhalat)
from this [inherently veracious nature, superimposing such erroneous
aspects as permanence on the object,145] and becomes uncertain (adṛ-
ḍha), requiring a condition146 (pratyaya) for the removal [of this state],
like the cognition of a piece of rope [as a snake].” In order to under-
stand the first part of Dharmakīrti’s explanation, we should remember
what the state of an ordinary person consists of. The innate false view

141
According to PVP D89a6/P103a2: glo bur ba yin gyi de‘i raṅ bźin ni ma yin no ||.
142
PVP D89b1/P103a5–6: ’di ltar sems ni ṅo bo ñid kyis de kho na ñid mthoṅ ba’i bdag
ñid can yin la | dri ma rnams ni glo bur ba yin pa. See also PVP D89b2/P103a7:
sems kyi de kho na ñid mthoṅ ba de’i bdag ñid can; PVP D87b4/P101a1: sems kyi
raṅ bźin ñid kyi de kho na ñid mthoṅ ba de’i bdag ñid can; TSP K895,10/Ś1083,11:
tattvadarśanātmakam eva vijñānasya (sic); TSP K895,7/Ś1082,21: prakṛtyā tattva-
darśanātmakatayā cittasya; TSP K895,19/Ś1083,15–16: tattvadarśanātmakam eva
cittaṃ siddham iti bhāvaḥ; TSP K896,4 (with no equivalent in Ś!): tattvadarśin;
PVV 107,6: tattvadarśitvāt (said of the Blessed One); PVV 107,5–6: atattva-
darśinaḥ (said of the vītarāgā bāhyāḥ).
143
TS 3435K/3434Ś: prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ tattvadarśanasātmakam |.
144
PV 2.207a2d: asyās tan nimittāntarataḥ skhalat | vyāvṛttau pratyayāpekṣam adṛḍhaṃ
sarpabuddhivat ||.
145
According to PVP D89a2/P102b4–5: rtag pa la sogs pa‘i rnam par sgro ‘dogs pas
‘jug pa ni gźan du gyur pa‘o || (where gźan du gyur pa is the Tibetan rendering of
Sanskrit skhalat[/skhalana]).
146
PVP D89a2–3/P102b5–6: rkyen la ltos pa yin te | de ltar skyes bu‘i ‘khrul pa gnod
pa can gyi tshad ma la ltos pa daṅ bcas pa yin no ||.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 203

of self, i.e., nescience, causes pṛthagjanas to superimpose sixteen unreal

aspects onto the four Noble Truths, e.g., permanence, pleasantness,
mine and I. Because they are attached to I and mine, or to self and one’s
own, ordinary beings crave for objects that delight the (pseudo-)self,
and act accordingly in order to grasp them; they also develop aversion
of whatever is deemed a threat to the self or its alleged property. Thus
defilements and depravities arise out of the false view of self.147 This is
the situation that Dharmakīrti alludes to when he says that the mind or
the cognition shifts from its own true nature.148 But, as Dharmakīrti has
it, this superimposing cognition is as uncertain or unsteady as the mis-
taken cognition of a piece of rope as snake at night in a place where one
may suspect the presence of snakes.149 In the same way, nescience and
the superimpositions it is responsible for, no matter how deeply rooted
in the mind, are removable because they are adventitious or unnatural to
the mind. Now what is needed to get rid of this shift? The epistemolo-
gists’ answer is unambiguous: an ordinary person who is deluded by the
false view of self must resort to the means of valid cognition and es-
pecially to inference. Here again we should remember that, still as an
ordinary person, one may, on account of belonging to a specific “fam-
ily” and/or having met a “spiritual friend” like a Buddha or an advanced
Bodhisattva, listen to the Buddhist scriptures and hence develop faith or
conviction (adhimukti), but one may also set about rationally reflecting
upon scriptural contents by means of pramāṇas. This rational inquiry,
mainly consisting of the ascertainment of the true aspects of the Noble

147
See §§1.1–3 above.
148
We should, however, be cautious not to ascribe to him the mythological notion of a
“fall” or decay of the mind that would in turn imply the path to consist in the grad-
ual recovery of a lost condition. Nescience is a beginningless (anādi) erroneous per-
ception (mithyopalabdhi) that arises out of its own seeds (bīja) or latent tendencies
(vāsanā) and that has been nourished by, and nourishes in turn, the so-called incor-
rect judgement (ayoniśomanaskāra). On this last doctrinal point, see PVSV 8,20–21
(ātmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvakā hi rāgādayo ’yoniśomanaskārapūrvakatvāt sarvadoṣot-
patteḥ |), PVṬ Je D249b6–7/P296a6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 398,25–26, PVṬ Je D253a4–
5/P301a4 = PVSVṬ 403,8–9, PVV 101,10 and 367,10–11. On ayoniśomanaskāra as
the root of satkāyadṛṣṭi, see MS 2.20.9 in Lamotte 1973: II.115, Paramārthagāthā
20 in Wayman 1961: 170, BhK 1.215,8–15.
149
See PVP D87b7/P101a6: dper na sbrul du ’dris pa’i phyogs mi gsal bar thag pa la
sbrul gyi śes pa lta bu’o ||. Cf. Vibh. 82n. 4: (mandamandaprakāśe) sarpopacite
pradeśe. See also Lamotte 1973: II.109–110, and MS 3.8.2 in Lamotte 1973: II.163.
204 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

Truths, aims at shaping the salvational means (upāya), i.e., the percep-
tion of unsubstantiality as an antagonistic or opposing factor of
satkāyadṛṣṭi. There can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti’s vyāvṛttau pra-
tyayāpekṣam (PV 2.207c) refers in the first place to the inferential
analysis that is typical for the cintāmayī prajñā.150
As we have seen above, the cultivation of the salvational means
that the yogin carries out is simultaneously of a cognitive and cleansing
character. The more our yogin sharpens his realization of the Truths and
their corresponding aspects, the more he succeeds in uprooting the op-
posite false views as well as the superimpositions and defilements they
are responsible for. But eradicating the adventitious impurities amounts
to gradually freeing the mind of those malignant obstacles that pre-
vented it from grasping the object as it really is, i.e., with its real as-
pects of impermanence, emptiness, etc. During the path of vision, the
yogin gets rid of gross superimpositions such as those the speculative
false view of self gives rise to. Much more difficult to eliminate how-
ever, is the innate false view of self, along with the remaining defile-
ments (i.e., the bhāvanāheyakleśas) and their productive and non-
productive vāsanās, the uprooting of which, in many Mahāyānist ac-
counts, necessitates no less than eight complete stages or bhūmis (bhū-
mis 2-9). During the first six of these bhūmis (2–7), the yogin must de-
vote constant effort and “intentionality” (vikalpa) to his cultivation of
the cleansing means; during the last two bhūmis (8–9), insight becomes
spontaneous, effortless, and unintentional. The removal of the most
subtle categories of bad dispositions now proceeds as “automatically”
or “naturally” as the perception of unsubstantiality itself. At the end of
the path of cultivation, the entire filth of impurities has been irrever-
sibly destroyed, a psychological and existential situation described as a
transmutation of the basis-of-existence. Now the mind only consists of
the path; it has the perception of unsubstantiality or discernment for its
unique and indestructible nature. Dharmakīrti describes this as fol-
lows151: “Of [these impurities] that were incapable [of annulling the
mind] before [the perceptual realization of unsubstantiality152], what
(kva) [could] therefore be the capacity afterwards, with regard to a
[mind] that [once the practice of nairātmyadarśana has been completed,
150
See §§2.1–2 above.
151
PV 2.208cd: tat prāg apy asamarthānāṃ paścāc chaktiḥ kva tanmaye ||.
152
According to PVP D89a6/P103a3: bdag med pa mthoṅ ba‘i mṅon sum du byas pa.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 205

entirely] consists (maya) of the [path]153?” The following excerpt of

Devendrabuddhi will provide a useful summary as well as transition to
the concluding part of my hypothesis154: “[Moral] faults [i.e., defile-
ments,] lack the capacity to re-occur in the mind of the one who is of
one essence with the path (mārgasātmye sthitasya), for the nature
(svabhāva) of the mind (citta) consists in the perception of true reality
(tattvadarśanātmaka);155 it does not have for its essence the [moral]
faults that are bound to [i.e., derive from] aspects that are contrary (vi-
parītākāra) [to the ones which are ascertained by the means of valid
cognition]. Now its (= the mind’s) depravities (upakleśa) [arise] by for-
ce of a [purely] adventitious condition (āgantu[ka]pratyayavaśāt?).156 If
something opposes (√bādh) them,157 the mind that rests in its own
[original] nature (svasvabhāva) provides the [moral] faults with no sup-
port/resting-place (āśraya) anymore (na punar), because its nature ex-
ists by force of [real] entities (vastubalapravṛtta).”158 As Devendra-
buddhi has it, the mind or cognition now abides in its own proper and
undefiled nature, which is nothing other than the grasping of the real
aspects of the object projected onto it. The practice of the path, i.e.,

153
According to PVP D89a7–b1/P103a5: bdag med pa mthoṅ ba goms pa grub pa na
de‘i raṅ bźin lam de’i bdag ñid can gyi sems la (*nairātmyadarśanābhyāsaniṣpattau
tanmaye mārgasātmani citte).
154
PVP D87a7–87b2/P100b2–5: lam goms pa la gnas pa’i sems la ñes pa rnams yaṅ
’byuṅ ba’i nus pa yod pa ma yin no* || de ltar na sems kyi raṅ bźin ni de kho na ñid
mthoṅ ba’i bdag ñid can yin gyi | phyin ci log gi rnam pa daṅ rjes su ’brel pa’i ñes
pa de’i bdag ñid can ni ma yin no || ’di’i ñe ba’i ñon moṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ glo
bur ba’i rkyen gyi dbaṅ gis yin no || de la gnod pa yod na raṅ gi raṅ bźin la gnas pa’i
sems ni yaṅ ñes pa’i rten byed pa ma yin te | dṅos po’i stobs kyis źugs pa’i raṅ bźin
ñid yin pa’i phyir ro ||. *Cf. PVV 82,1–2: mārgasātmye ’pi sthitasya cetasi na doṣā-
ṇām utpattuṃ sāmarthyam asti |.
155
PVṬ Ñe D133a3–4/P164a2–3 explains tattvadarśanātmaka as follows: dṅos po ji lta
ba bźin du gnas pa‘i ‘dzin pa‘i bdag ñid can (*yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇātmaka <
PVV 82,14–15).
156
PVṬ Ñe D133a5/P164a4–5 explains āgantu(ka)pratyaya as follows: rgyu mtshan
’ga’ źig las bdag la sogs par sgro btags pas ’jug pa’i ’khrul pa’i śes pa.
157
PVṬ Ñe D133a5–6/P164a5–6: de la gnod pa yod na źes bya ba glo bur ba‘i rnam
pas | de‘i rgyu can gyi ñe ba‘i ñon moṅs pa bdag med pa‘i lam gyis bsal ba yod na
źes bya ba‘i don to ||.
158
PVṬ Ñe D133a6–7/P164a7–8: dṅos po stobs kyis źugs pa‘i raṅ bźin ñid yin pa‘i
phyir ro źes bya ba ni dṅos po ji ltar gnas pa bźin du ‘dzin pas źugs pa‘i bdag med
pa‘i lam ni sems kyi raṅ bźin ñid yin pa‘i phyir ro || (*yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇa-
pravṛttasya nairātmyamārgasya cittasvabhāvatvāt).
206 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

cultivation, has freed the cognition of the obstacles that avidyā was ul-
timately responsible for; in other words the mind is now free from the
obstacle that concealed the knowable. Of the real and pramāṇa-ascertai-
ned aspects the object imposes upon it, which are the real aspects of the
four Noble Truths, the mind can have but a vivid and hence non-
conceptual image. In other words: whereas the cintāmayī prajñā, i.e.,
the (initially purely conceptual) ascertainment of true reality by means
of pramāṇas, is responsible for the reliability of the yogin’s cognition,
the bhāvanāmayī prajñā gradually frees the mind of the defilements in
such a way that the aspects objects cast upon it appear vividly. Irrespec-
tive of all subsequent interpretations of the yogināṃ jñānam, this in my
opinion is what Dharmakīrti has in mind when he rather cryptically
describes the cognition of yogins.
I would like to add a final remark. As far as I know, Dhar-
makīrti does not describe the nature of discernment during the path
itself, i.e., before the āśrayaparivṛtti takes place. Now it is clear that,
before entering the path of vision, the yogin has but an inferential and
hence conceptual notion of such real aspects as impermanence, empti-
ness and the like. I would incline towards considering that his cognition
of them remains a conceptual one, albeit extremely refined and hence
vivid, throughout the path. But we ought not to forget that the mind is a
purely momentary entity: the cognition that the path or the cultivation
generates again and again may well be nothing like the cognition of the
liberated one. This is exactly what the following stanzas of the Pa-
ramārthagāthās account for159: “39. Defiled mind, of course (hi), is
[something] that arises and ceases each time together with the Defile-
ments. For it, liberation from the Defilements has [therefore] neither
[already] happened nor will it [ever] happen. 40. [For it is] not that this
[very same defiled mind] arises afterwards as a pure one, but [rather
what] arises [afterwards is] another [mind which is pure]. And [it is]

159
Paramārthagāthā 39–41: sahotpannaniruddhaṃ hi kleśaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ sadā |
kleśebhyas tasya nirmokṣo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati || na tad utpadyate paścāc
chuddham anyat tu jāyate | tac ca pūrvam asaṃkliṣṭaṃ kleśebhyo muktam ucyate ||
yat kliṣṭaṃ tad ihātyantāc chuddhaṃ prakṛtibhāsvaram | na ceha śudhyate kaścit ku-
taścid vāpi śudhyate ||. Text and translation in Schmithausen 1987: I.232–233 (see
also the commentary on the stanzas in Schmithausen 1987: I.161–162). See also the
Vaibhāṣika’s account of liberation (vimukti) in AKBh 388,19–389,4, and
Eltschinger 2005b: 190–192.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 207

this [other mind that, although it had] not [been] defiled before, is called
‘liberated’ from Defilements. 42. That which is defiled is, in this [sys-
tem], absolutely [defiled]; [what is] pure is radiant by nature. And [thus
(?) there is], in this [system], no [person or even dharma which] is puri-
fied, nor is [he/it, a fortiori,] purified from anything.”

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ceedings of the Fourth Dharmakīrti Conference (Vienna, August
2005). Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaften.
Eltschinger (forthcoming 1) = Vincent Eltschinger: “Studies in Dharmakīrti’s Religious
Philosophy: 4. The Cintāmayī Prajñā.” To be published in Piotr
Balcerowicz: Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy. Delhi, 2008:
Motilal Banarsidass (Warsaw Indological Studies, 3).
Franco 1989 Eli Franco: “Was the Buddha a Buddha?” Journal of Indian Phi-
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Franco 1997 Eli Franco: Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Vienna:
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38).
Franco 2001 Eli Franco: “Dharmakīrti’s Reductionism in Religion and Logic.”
Pp. 285–308 of Raffaele Torella: Le parole e i marmi. Studi in
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92.1).
Franco forthcoming Eli Franco: “Perception of Yogis–Some epistemological and me-
taphysical considerations.” To be published in Eli Franco/Helmut
Krasser/Horst Lasic/Birgit Kellner: Proceedings of the Fourth
Dharmakīrti Conference (Vienna, August 2005). Vienna: Verlag
der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 209

Hattori 1968 Masaaki Hattori: Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣa-

pariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press (Harvard Oriental Series, 47).
Jaini 2001 Padmanabh S. Jaini: Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies. Delhi,
2001: Motilal Banarsidass.
Jñānaprasthāna T26 (1544).
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Lamotte 1935 Étienne Lamotte: Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, l’explication des mys-
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Lamotte 1976 Étienne Lamotte: Histoire du bouddhisme indien. Des origines à
l’ère Śaka. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1976: Université de Louvain, Ins-
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Lamotte 1987a Étienne Lamotte: L’enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinir-
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Lamotte 1987b Étienne Lamotte: “Le troisième Bhāvanā-krama de Kamalaśīla.
Traduction de la version tibétaine.” Pp. 336–353 of Paul Demié-
ville: Le Concile de Lhasa, une controverse sur le quiétisme entre
bouddhistes de l’Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l’ère chré-
tienne. Paris, 1987: Collège de France, Institut des Hautes Études
Chinoises (Publication de l’Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises,
7).
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University Press (Bibliotheca Otaniensis, 1).
Mahāvibhāṣā T27 (1545).
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Gleichmut. Eine ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung der vier
apramāṇas in der buddhistischen Ethik und Spiritualität von den
Anfängen bis hin zum frühen Yogācāra. Stuttgart, 1999: Franz
Steiner Verlag (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien herausgegeben
vom Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets an der
Universität Hamburg, 50).
210 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

McClintock 2002 Sara McClintock: Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason in the
Tattvasaṃgraha and the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. Unpublished
PhD Thesis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.
McDermott 1991 Charlene McDermott: “Yogic Direct Awareness as Means of
Valid Cognition in Dharmakīrti and Rgyal-tshab.” Pp. 144–166
of Minoru Kiyota: Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation. Theory and
Practice. Dehli, 1991: Motilal Banarsidass.
MS See Lamotte 1973: I.
MSA(Bh) Sylvain Lévi: Asaṅga. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra, Exposé de la
doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra. Tome 1:
texte. Paris, 1907: Librairie Honoré Champion.
MSAVBh Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya (Sthiramati). D n°4034, Mi
1b1–Tsi 266a7.
Nagao 2000 Gadjin M. Nagao: “The Bodhisattva’s Compassion Described in
the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra.” Pp. 1–38 of Jonathan A. Silk: Wis-
dom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding. The Bud-
dhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao. Honolulu, 2000: Uni-
versity of Hawai’i Press (Studies in the Buddhist Traditions).
NB(Ṭ) S = Th. I. Ščerbatskoj: Nyāyabindu. Buddijskij učebnik’’ logiki
sočinenie Dharmakirti I tolkovanie na nego Nyāyabinduṭīkā so-
činenie Darmottary. Osnabrück, 1970 (Petrograd, 19181): Biblio
Verlag (Bibliotheca Buddhica, 7).
M Paṇḍita Dalsukhbhai Malvania: Paṇḍita Durveka Miśras’s Dhar-
mottarapradīpa (Being a sub–commentary on Dharmottara’s
Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu.
Patna, 1971: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit
Works Series, 2).
Nyāyānusāra T29 (1562).
P Daisetz T. Suzuki: The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in
the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tokyo/Kyoto, 1957:
Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.
Pemwieser 1991 Monika Pemwieser: Materialien zur Theorie der yogischen Er-
kenntnis im Buddhismus. Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des magi-
stergrades an der Universität Wien. Wien, 1991 (unpublished).
Pruden 1991 Leo M. Pruden: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam by Louis de La Vallée
Poussin. English Translation by Leo M. Pruden. 4 vol. Berkeley,
1991: Asian Humanities Press.
PS(V) Ernst Steinkellner: Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti). Chapter I.
www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf. See also Hattori
1968.
PSṬ Ernst Steinkellner/Helmut Krasser/Horst Lasic: Jinendrabuddhi’s
Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1. Part I: Cri-
tical Edition. Beijing/Vienna, 2005: China Tibetology Research
Center/Austrian Academy of Sciences.
PV 1–4 Yūsho Miyasaka: “Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Ti-
betan).” Acta Indologica II (1971–1972), pp. 1–206. See also
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 211

PVV; for PV 2–3, see also PVA; for PV 1, see also PVSV; for
PV 2.131cd–285, see also Vetter 1990. My numerotation of the
verses in PV 2 follows the one of Vetter.
PVA Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅ-
kāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharma-
kīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam). Patna, 1953: K.P. Jayaswal Research
Institute.
PVin 1 Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1
and 2. Beijing/Vienna, 2007: China Tibetology Publishing
House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts from
the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 2).
PVinṬ Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara). D n°4229, Dze 1b1–Tshe
178a3/P n°5727, Dze 1b1–We 209b8.
PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi). D n°4217, Che 1–
326b4/P n°5717, Che 1–390a8.
PVSV Raniero Gnoli: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First
Chapter with the Auto-Commentary. Roma, 1960: Istituto Italiano
per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, 23).
PVSVṬ Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Karṇakagomin’s Commentary on the Pra-
māṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti. Kyoto, 1982: Rinsen Books Co.
(Allahabad, 1943: Kitab Mahal).
PVṬ Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi). D n°4220, Je 1b1–Ñe
282a7/P n°5718, Je 1b1–Ñe 348a8.
PVV Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: “Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with
Commentary by Manorathanandin.” Published as an appendix of
the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24–26
(1938–1940).
Rahder 1932 Johannes Rahder: “La Satkāyadṛṣṭi d’après Vibhāṣā, 8.” Mé-
langes Chinois et Bouddhiques 1 (1931–1932), pp. 227–239.
Schmithausen 1987 Lambert Schmithausen: Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and the
Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy.
2 volumes. Tokyo, 1987: The International Institute for Buddhist
Studies (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series, IVa/b).
Schmithausen 2007 Lambert Schmithausen: “Aspects of Spiritual Practice in Early
Yogācāra.” Journal of the International College for Postgraduate
Buddhist Studies 11, pp. 213(/98)–244(/67).
Seyfort Ruegg 1969 David Seyfort Ruegg: La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Go-
tra. Paris, 1969: École Française d’Extrême-Orient (Publications
de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, Université de Paris, Fa-
culté des Lettres et Sciences humaines).
Siddhi Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de
Hiuan-Tsang. 2 volumes. Paris, 1929: Librairie Orientaliste Paul
Geuthner (Buddhica, Documents et travaux pour l’étude du bou-
ddhisme publiés sous la direction de Jean Przyluski, Première sé-
rie: Mémoires, 5).
SNS Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. See Lamotte 1935.
212 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

Steinkellner 1978 Ernst Steinkellner: “Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem im Budd-

hismus. Pp. 121–134 of Gerhard Oberhammer: Transzen-
denzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils. Das Problem in in-
discher und christlicher Tradition. Arbeitsdokumentation eines
Symposiums.” Wien, 1978: Publications of the de Nobili Re-
search Library, 5.
Steinkellner 1979 Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. Zweites
Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmer-
kungen. Wien, 1979: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Spra-
chen und Kulturen Südasiens, 15).
Suzuki 1999 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Delhi,
1999 (London, 19301): Motilal Banarsidass (Buddhist Tradition
Series, 41).
T Junjirō Takakusu/Kaikyoku Watanabe: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō.
Tōkyō, 1924–1932: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai.
Traité Étienne Lamotte: Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de
Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra). 5 volumes. Louvain-la-
Neuve, 19812, 19812, 1970, 1976, 1980): Université de Louvain,
Institut Orientaliste (Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste, 25, 26,
2, 12, 24).
TṛBh Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya (Sthiramati). Sylvain Lévi: Vijñaptimā-
tratāsiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā.
Paris, 1925: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion (Bibliothèque
de l’École des Hautes Études, Sciences historiques et philolo-
giques, 245).
TS(P) K = Embar Krishnamacharya: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita
With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. 2 vol. Baroda, 1984: Orien-
tal Institute.
Ś = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shān-
tarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalshīla. 2
vol. Varanasi, 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series,
1).
Vetter 1964 Tilmann Vetter: Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti. Wien,
1964: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., Kommissionsverlag der Öster-
reichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Österreichische Aka-
demie der Wissenschaften, philologisch-historische Klasse, Sit-
zungsberichte, 245).
Vetter 1990 Tilmann Vetter: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis
Pramāṇavārttika. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier ed-
len Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel. Wien, 1990: Arbeits-
kreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien
(Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 12).
Vibh. Vibhūticandra’s notes to PVV. See PVV.
VinSg Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi. P n°5539, Zi 1b1 –
‘i 142b8.
 CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YOGINS 213

Wayman 1961 Alex Wayman: Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript. Berke-

ley/Los Angeles, 1961: University of California Press.
 DORJI WANGCHUK

A Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity of

Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*

The mind is its own place, and in itself

Can make a heav’n of hell, a hell of heav’n.
John Milton (1608–1674), Paradise Lost

One devoid of self-cognitive mind that cognises true [reality],

Would perceive even [pure] Buddha fields to be domains of bad
destinations (e.g. hells).
[For] one who realises the [true] reality of equality [taught by] the
Supreme Vehicle,
The very domains of bad destinations are domains of the Akaniṣṭha
[and] Tuṣita [heavens].
sGyu ’phrul le lhag and rDo rje gsang rgyud1

1. INTRODUCTION
On the whole, Tibetan Buddhist scholars have honestly striven to
adhere to the doctrines of Indian Buddhism. But we do encounter from
time to time philosophical theories and interpretations that are of purely
Tibetan provenance. Most of them seem to be the product of an attempt
to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies found in the heterogeneous
Indian Buddhist scriptures and systems, which, as I have already tried to
illustrate on the basis of the Buddha Nature theory, were dealt with in
different ways.2 No doubt differences in interpretations provoked heated
debates, but it is precisely these and similar doctrinal disputes that gave

*
I owe my thanks to Philip Pierce for kindly proofreading this article.
1
sGyu ’phrul le lhag (p. 425.6–7) and rDo rje gsang rgyud (p. 332.3–4):
yang dag shes pa’i rang rig blo med na ||
bde gshegs zhing yang ngan song gnas su mthong ||
theg mchog mnyam pa’i don nyid rtogs pa ni ||
ngan song gnas nyid ’og min dga’ ldan gnas ||.
Note that the rDo rje gsang rgyud erroneously reads bla instead of blo in pāda a.
This verse is cited by Mi-pham in his ’Od gsal snying po (pp. 94.6–95.2), with the
sGyu ’phrul rgyas pa named as his source. Instead of ni in pāda c, he has na.
2
Wangchuk 2004.
216 DORJI WANGCHUK

rise to fascinating philosophical ideas that are uniquely Tibetan. One of

the most intriguing examples is the debate surrounding an Indo-Tibetan
Buddhist theory of knowledge, namely, on how beings of various
realms and spiritual levels are said to perceive a common entity, for
instance, what is known to us humans as water. Some of the questions
that Tibetan scholars have asked were whether what we call water exists
at all as water, whether our perception of water is a valid cognition, or
whether it may be that water is not simply water after all but in fact pus
(pūya: rnag), as it is perceived by hungry ghosts (preta: yi dwags);
nectar, as it is perceived by gods; a goddess, as it is perceived by
yogins; or still something else. They also pondered upon such questions
as whether there is a common and shared object of perception, and if so,
what it is, and which of the perceptions—if every sentient being of the
six realms perceives it differently—is valid, and what the criteria of
perceptual validity are. Scholars from the four major schools of Tibetan
Buddhism (dGe-lugs, Sa-skya, bKa’-brgyud, and rNying-ma) who
reflected upon these questions came to varying conclusions, which will
be discussed elsewhere. This paper seeks to introduce a relativity theory
of the purity and validity of perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, one
essentially the result of attempts made by some scholars of the rNying-
ma (or the Ancient) School of Tibetan Buddhism to answer the above
queries, having apparently drawn their inspiration from Indian Buddhist
sources.
The theory that I intend to present has revealed itself, as is often
the case, as more complex than initially assumed. Firstly, this theory of
perception does not concern an anthropocentric view of perception, and
is not limited to human knowledge, but embraces the entire spectrum of
karmically conditioned perceptions experienced by the six classes of
sentient beings, namely, gods, demigods, humans, animals, hungry
ghosts, and beings in hell. Secondly, human beings for one may have
access to various dimensions of perception. For instance, based on
karmic influences, a man may perceive an entity “x” as water—as
something that can quench his thirst—but he may also be able to
meditatively enhance his perception and perceive “x” as a female being
capable of arousing samādhic ecstasy in him. Thirdly, this theory
presupposes varying understandings of ontology, logic and
epistemology (pramāṇa), gnoseology (i.e. the theory of jñāna, which in
the Buddhist context can be understood as higher epistemology), and
soteriology—in the varying Buddhist philosophical systems—and this
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 217

makes the matter all the more complicated. Fourthly, there is a certain
terminological constriction in having to express eastern thought in
western languages, and one cannot always adopt or else try to get
around using western scientific or philosophical terms such as
“relativity” and “relativism”3 without running risks of being misunder-
stood.

2. THE HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL SETTING

Of the four periods of the history of Buddhist logic and epistemology
(pramāṇa) in Tibet as proposed by Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp,4
namely, Ancient (i.e. pre-Glang-dar-ma Period, that is, pre-9th century),
Pre-Classical (beginning with Klu-mes Tshul-khrims-shes-rab in the
10th century), Classical (beginning with Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’-
rgyal-mtshan in the 12th century), and Post-Classical (beginning in the
15th century), the Ancient Period witnessed the translation of only a
few Indian works on Buddhist logic and epistemology.5 One is likely to
assume that beyond these few translations Tibetan scholars of the
Ancient Period have really nothing to say or offer on matters pertaining
to Buddhist logic and epistemology. Such an assumption would
certainly be justified if we were to think exclusively in terms of
commentaries on pure Pramāṇa treatises belonging to the Dignāga-
Dharmakīrti school of Buddhist logic and epistemology, but not
necessarily if we were to consider Buddhist theories of knowledge and
their application in more general terms. For example, the theory of four
kinds of yukti (“logical reasoning”), namely, reasoning [based on the
principle] of dependence (apekṣāyukti: ltos pa’i rigs pa), reasoning
[based on the principle of the ability of things to] cause effects
(kāryakaraṇayukti: bya ba byed pa’i rigs pa), reasoning that establishes

3
I would like to thank John Taber for kindly acquainting me with Maria
Baghramian’s monograph on relativism (Baghramian 2004). Unfortunately, it has
not been possible to go into a discussion of whether my own employment of the
terms “relativity” and “relativism” conforms to one or more of the numerous
semantic nuances and usages presented therein. I shall have to leave it up to readers
for themselves to judge if and to what extent the theory presented in this paper can
be described in those terms.
4
van der Kuijp 1989: 8–9.
5
For the Pramāṇa texts translated during the Ancient Period in Tibet, see Frauwallner
1957.
218 DORJI WANGCHUK

the tenability [of the other three types of reasoning] (upapattisādhana-

yukti: ’thad pa sgrub pa’i rigs pa), and reasoning [based on the rule-
boundedness] of reality [itself] (dharmatāyukti: chos nyid kyi rigs pa), is
particularly interesting, for it existed in India prior to Dignāga and
Dharmakīrti, for the most part within the Maitreya-Asaṅga or Yogācāra
textual milieu. Some of the earliest sources of the four yuktis may well
be the Śrāvakabhūmi6 and Bodhisattvabhūmi7 (and not the Saṃdhinir-
mocanasūtra,8 in spite of its sūtra status). The four yuktis are either
merely alluded to or discussed in greater detail in these and other Indian
works. In Tibet, the topic seems to have been quite popular from early
on, as the commentaries on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the bKa’
yang dag pa’i tshad ma ascribed to the Tibetan King Khri-srong-lde-
btsan9 adequately demonstrate. One of the most detailed and systematic
explanations and applications of the four yuktis I have seen thus far,
however, is that of the eleventh-century rNying-ma scholar Rong-zom
Chos-kyi-bzang-po (henceforth Rong-zom-pa),10 who evidently relied
on Candragomin’s Nyāyasiddhyāloka.11 Rong-zom-pa’s explanations
and applications of these four yuktis are very useful, containing as they
do intriguing deliberations on a number of ontological, epistemological,
soteriological, and gnoseological issues.12 Although the four yuktis will
not be discussed in this article, it should be pointed out that early
Tibetan deliberations on theory of knowledge, including what I call the
relativity theory of the purity and validity of perception, can best be
understood at the backdrop of these four yuktis.

6
Śrāvakabhūmi (pp. 236.10–240.15).
7
Bodhisattvabhūmi (p. 293.17–18).
8
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra X.7 (pp. 155–158).
9
See Steinkellner 1989 and Powers 2004: 20, n. 43.
10
dKon mchog ’grel (pp. 102.9–103.15); mDo rgyas (pp. 308.22–314.10); Theg tshul
(pp. 487.20–491.20); sNang ba lhar sgrub (pp. 560.6–563.1). Mi-pham also
discussed the four yuktis on a number of occasions; see, for example, his mKhas ’jug
(pp. 296.3–300.4), his commentary on Madhyamakālaṃkāra 65 (dBu ma rgyan
’grel, pp. 241.3–249.2), mDo sde rgyan ’grel (pp. 667.2–668.4), Shes rab ral gri and
Shes rab ral gri’i mchan (pp. 790.1–792.4), and sKad gnyis shan sbyar (pp. 235.6–
236.1). For the role Mi-pham envisioned for the four yuktis within the general
Mahāyāna context, see his Legs bshad snang ba’i gter (p. 897.1–4). See also
Kapstein 2001: 317–343.
11
For a discussion of the authorship of the Nyāyasiddhyāloka, see Steinkellner 1984.
12
Rang byung ye shes (pp. 124.21–125.22); dKon mchog ’grel (pp. 103.15–109.9);
sNang ba lhar sgrub (pp. 563.1–567.6).
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 219

It was, however, only in the nineteenth century that the rNying-

ma school managed to “colonise” the field of classical Buddhist logic
and epistemology, primarily thanks to the efforts of Mi-pham rNam-
rgyal-rgya-mtsho (1846–1912),13 who became an authority in the field
in his tradition. One of Mi-pham’s most significant contributions to
theories of knowledge is his systematisation of the theory of two kinds
of means of conventional valid cognition (i.e. cognition that has the
conventional as its object) (kun tu tha snyad pa’i tshad ma: sāṃvyava-
hārikapramāṇa),14 namely, one based on ordinary (lit. “of this-side,”
i.e., this-worldly) perception (tshu rol mthong ba: arvāgdarśana/apara-
darśana)15 and the other based on pure perception (dag pa’i gzigs pa:
*śuddhadarśana).16 Mi-pham himself thought his theory to be a matter
of great profundity (shin tu zab pa’i gnad) crucially relevant for both
tantric and non-tantric Buddhist systems. What can his motive for
introducing such a theory have been? Mi-pham was, like Tsong-kha-pa
Blo-bzang-grags-pa (1357–1419), a champion of the Pramāṇa and
Madhyamaka systems, and he strongly believed in an intimate and
natural relationship between Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa and Nāgārjuna’s

13
The few Pramāṇa works by Mi-pham are: (a) Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi gzhung gsal
por bshad pa legs bshad snang ba’i gter (MS, vol. 20, pp. 1–901); (b) Tshad ma kun
las btus pa’i mchan ’grel rig [= rigs?] lam rab gsal snang ba (MS, vol. 8/hūṃ, pp.
473–619); (c) Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter mchan gyis ’grel pa phyogs las rnam par
rgyal ba’i ru mtshon (MS, vol. 11/kha, pp. 549–751); and (d) bsDus tshan rtsod rigs
smra ba’i sgo ’byed (MS, vol. 27, pp. 285–353). See the bsTan pa’i mdzes rgyan (pp.
676.5–677.2)—a work of mKhan-po Kun-bzang-dpal-ldan, or in short Kun-dpal
(1872–1943), which includes some additional Pramāṇa writings of Mi-pham, of
which the Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi bsdus don nyi zla’i phreng ba seems particularly
noteworthy. For a discussion of Mi-pham’s theory of interpretation (as presented in
his Shes rab ral gri), see Kapstein 2001.
14
The term sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa is attested in Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryā-
vatārapañjikā (p. 180.25) and in Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (e.g.
pp. 3.14, 5.23, 226.8). Cf. Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (p. 487.28): sāṃvyavahārikaṃ
pramāṇam. Prajñākaragupta also employs terms such as vyāvahārikapramāṇa (ibid.,
p. 226.8) and sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa (ibid., p. 13.4). (I would like to thank Eli
Franco for drawing my attention to Prajñākaragupta’s work.) Note that Tibetan
sources also employ the expressions tha snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma and tha snyad
(pa’i/kyi) tshad ma.
15
Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 182.9, 13); Jackson 1987: 401, n. 103. Cf. Negi 1993–
2005: s.v. tshu rol mthong ba.
16
Mi-pham, ’Od gsal snying po (pp. 82.1–84.5) and Shes rab ral gri (pp. 800.3–
801.4).
220 DORJI WANGCHUK

Madhyamaka,17 or between the systems of the “Two Kīrtis,” namely,

Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti.18 Harmony between the doctrines of
Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti also meant for him harmony between
Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, and so too between the Nāgārjuna and
Maitreya-Asaṅga traditions. The means of absolute valid cognition (i.e.
cognition that has the absolute as its object) (don dam pa’i tshad ma:
pāramārthikapramāṇa)19 emphasised by Nāgārjuna and the sāṃvyava-
hārikapramāṇa emphasised by Dharmakīrti are often referred to as the
two means of valid cognition of the two kinds of reality (bden pa gnyis
kyi tshad ma gnyis).20 The explicit or implicit argument—analogous to
Dharmakīrti’s argument for the number of pramāṇas—is that because
there are two kinds of prameya, namely, conventional and absolute
realities, there must be two kinds of pramāṇa, namely, sāṃvyavahārika-
pramāṇa and pāramārthikapramāṇa.21 If something such as fire exists
on the conventional level, it must be attestable through sāṃvyavahāri-
kapramāṇa for if it is not attestable through such a cognition, it cannot
exist on the conventional level. Similarly, if there is an absolute reality
such as emptiness, it must be attestable through pāramārthikapramāṇa,

17
Mi-pham, dBu ma rgyan ’grel (p. 46.5–6): khyad par don dam pa’i tshad ma dpal
ldan klu yis ji ltar bzhed pa dang | tha snyad kyi tshad ma dpal chos kyi grags pas ji
ltar bzhed pa gnyis rags [= rigs] pa’i rgya mtsho chen por ro gcig tu bskyil zhing |.
See also ibid. (p. 47.3): dbu tshad seng ge mjing bsnol.
18
See the intermediate verses (bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa) in the dBu ma rgyan
’grel (pp. 13.6–15.2).
19
The term pāramārthikapramāṇa is attested, for example, in Prajñākaragupta’s
Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (p. 30.22; cited in Franco 1997: 50, n. 12). Cf. Pramāṇa-
vārttikālaṃkāra (p. 67.12–13): pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇam. Prajñākaragupta also
employs the term pāramārthikaprameya (ibid., p. 215.13). Note that Tibetan sources
also use the term don dam dpyod pa’i tshad ma.
20
The terms tha snyad pa'i tshad ma and don dam pa'i tshad ma seem to go back to
the Pramāṇaviniścaya (p. 44.2–5): sāṃvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam
uktam | atrāpi pare mūḍhā visaṃvādayanti lokam iti | cintāmayīm eva tu prajñām
anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhī-
kurvanti |; Tibetan translation (Vetter 1966: 100.20–24): ’di ni kun tu tha snyad pa’i
tshad ma’i rang bzhin brjod pa yin te | ’di la yang pha rol rmongs pas ’jig rten slu
bar byed pa’i phyir ro || bsam pa las byung ba nyid kyi shes rab goms par byas pas
rnam par ’khrul pas dben zhing dri ma med la log pa med pa don dam pa’i tshad ma
mngon sum du byed do ||. See also Mi-pham, Legs bshad snang ba’i gter (p. 553.14–
17).
21
Such an argument is clearly inspired by Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.2
(Steinkellner 2005: 1) and Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika 3.1 (see the Pramāṇa-
vārttikālaṃkāra, p. 169.10–11).
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 221

for reality that is not attestable through pāramārthikapramāṇa is not an

absolute reality. However, Mi-pham also belongs to a tradition that
postulates the indivisibility of the two truths. Accordingly, he posits that
ultimately there is only one single prameya,22 and hence only one single
pramāṇa, which he equates with self-occurring gnosis or with the
gnosis of the Self-occurring One (i.e. the Buddha) (svayaṃbhūjñāna:
rang byung gi ye shes). Tsong-kha-pa, when discussing, for example,
Madhyamakāvatāra 6.71b, points out the consequence of denying the
established Pramāṇa theories.23 He, for his part, apparently feared that a
denial of the Pramāṇa theories would lead to logical, ontological,
epistemological, and ethical-moral indeterminism (or arbitrariness), or
as Thubten Jinpa in his study of Tsong-kha-pa’s Madhyamaka
philosophy correctly points out, to “epistemological scepticism,”
“ontological nihilism,” and “moral relativism,” all of which were for
Tsong-kha-pa different aspects of the same problem and equally
objectionable.24 Mi-pham, too, could not imagine a world where there
are no reliable criteria to differentiate between valid and invalid
cognition. If a cognition were to be arbitrarily regarded as valid or
invalid, how could one determine what is correct and incorrect, and
what is right and wrong? He could thus in principle share Tsong-kha-
pa’s concern.
Mi-pham, however, had a concern of another kind, which was
obviously not shared or addressed by his fellow Tibetan scholars from
the gSar-ma (“New”) schools. The established epistemological
paradigm, which is perhaps common to most Tibetan Buddhist schools,
must have appeared too narrow and inadequate to him, for it did not and
could not address or explain Buddhist doctrines which he thought were
of greater significance. Buddhist scriptures are full of allusions to the
ideas of supernatural or supramundane phenomena or perceptions that
make no sense to the ordinary human understanding. For instance, in
just a single atom there are said to exist Buddha fields numbering as

22
For a similar idea, see Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika 3.53d (as cited in the
Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, p. 212.28): meyaṃ tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam.
23
Tsong-kha-pa, dGongs pa rab gsal (fol. 178b2–3): de ltar go ba de’i don yin par
bzung nas tshad mas grub pa la yid brtan med do zhes smra na ni | don ’di kho bos
’di ltar rtogs so zhes pa gcig kyang gzhag tu med cing | tshad ma thams cad la skur
pa ’debs pas na shin tu mi ’thad pa’o ||.
24
Jinpa 2002: 34, 175.
222 DORJI WANGCHUK

many as the total number of atoms. It is even explicitly stated that

neither has the size of the Buddha fields been contracted nor the size of
the atom expanded. How is one to deal with such an idea? One
alternative would be to dismiss it as mere rhetoric. Most Buddhist
scholars would not go for this alternative. Another alternative would be
to explain it as a miracle demonstrated by the supernatural power of a
buddha, which de facto means that such a phenomenon or event is not
attestable through any means of valid cognition. Some Tibetan scholars
might accept this explanation. The problem with it, though, is the
absurd implications that it involves, particularly in a context where the
same entity “x” that appears to ordinary humans as water appears to
yogins—who have fewer or no defilements or obscurations, who
undergo fewer or no sufferings, and are partially or totally released from
saṃsāric bondage—as something else. At least from a Buddhist point of
view, the supposition that our ordinary perceptions, obscured by
intellectual-emotional defilements, pain, sufferings, and bondage, are
valid or true, whereas yogic perceptions free from intellectual-
emotional defilements, pain, sufferings, and bondage, are invalid or
false sounds quite absurd and supercilious. Mi-pham’s motive thus
seems to have been to propose an upgraded and updated theory that
could explain otherwise logically unexplainable phenomena,
particularly the idea of pure appearances and pure perceptions
(thematised in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna scriptures).

3. MI-PHAM’S THEORY OF THE TWO KINDS OF

SĀṂVYAVAHĀRIKAPRAMĀṆA
Mi-pham argues that there must be two types of sāṃvyavahārikapramā-
ṇa, for any phenomenon on the conventional level has two modes,
namely, the mode of appearance (snang tshul) and the mode of
existence (gnas tshul). A conventional entity “x” such as water may
appear to be impure, but it always exists in a pure state; in its absolute
mode of existence, however, it is always characterised by emptiness
(śūnyatā: stong pa nyid).25 He thus classifies means of valid cognition
into two types: sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa and pāramārthikapramāṇa.
Sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa is further divided into one based on ordinary

25
Cf. the tables in Pettit 1999: 431–434.
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 223

perception (tshu rol mthong ba la brten pa kun tu tha snyad pa’i tshad
ma) and one based on pure perception (dag pa’i gzigs pa la brten pa kun
tu tha snyad pa’i tshad ma). He distinguishes them on the basis of their
cause (rgyu), nature (ngo bo), function (byed las), result (’bras bu), and
example (dpe), as follows:

Distinctions between the Two Types of Sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa

Basis of Sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa
Distinction Based on Ordinary Perception
(tshu rol mthong ba la brten
pa kun tu tha snyad pa’i tshad
ma)
1. Cause Given rise to by dint of a
(rgyu) correct assessment of its lim-
ited object, the [perceptible]
phenomenon (rang yul chos
can nyi tshe ba la tshul bzhin
brtags pa’i stobs las skyes pa)
2. Nature Cognition that is provisionally
(ngo bo) non-deceptive in regard to its
mere object (rang yul tsam la
gnas skabs mi bslu ba’i rig
pa)
3. Function Elimination of superimposi-
(byed las) tion [and depreciation] in re-
gard to the objects of ordinary
perception (tshul [= tshu rol]
mthong gi yul la sgro ’dogs
sel ba)
4. Result Proceeding on after the
(’bras bu) pertinent object has been
exactly determined (skabs don
yongs su bcad nas ’jug pa)
5. Analogy Human sight (mi’i mig)
(dpe)26
Sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa
Based on Pure Perception (dag
pa’i gzigs pa la brten pa kun tu
tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)
Acquired as an outcome of the
correct appropriation of true
reality [during meditative ab-
sorption] (chos nyid ji lta ba
tshul bzhin dmigs pa’i rjes las
’thob pa)
Discriminating insight of great
range possessed by a subject
[surveying] the full gamut [of
phenomena] (ji snyed pa’i yul
can rgya che ba’i shes rab)
Elimination of superimposition
[and depreciation] in regard to
the [normally] inconceivable do-
main (bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i
spyod yul la sgro ’dogs sel ba)
Gnosis that cognises [phenom-
ena] to the full extent (ji snyed
mkhyen pa’i ye shes)
Celestial sight (lha’i mig)

Mi-pham presented these two types of sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa on at

least two occasions, namely, in his general commentary on the
*Guhyagarbhatantra (a fundamental tantric scripture of the rNying-ma
school) called ’Od gsal snying po, and in his work on hermeneutics

26
Not counted separately by Mi-pham.
224 DORJI WANGCHUK

called Shes rab ral gri, on which he also wrote an annotated

commentary.27 One important question is how original Mi-pham was
and how much he owed to his Indian and Tibetan predecessors. As far
as I can see, no one before him had proposed and explained two kinds
of sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa. On the other hand, although the Sanskrit
term for dag pa gzigs pa’i tshad ma (*śuddhadarśanapramāṇa) has yet
to be traced in Indian sources,28 the idea of pure perception
(śuddhapratyakṣa: dag pa’i mngon sum) is attested in the Hetuvidyā
section of the Yogācārabhūmi29 as shown by Hōjun Nagasaki in his
article “Perception in Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts,”30 where it is listed
and explained as one of the four kinds of pratyakṣa, the other three
being perception by means of corporeal sense faculties (rūpīndriya-
pratyakṣa: dbang po gzugs can gyi mgnon sum), perception [in the
form] of mental experience (manonubhavapratyakṣa: yid kyis myong
ba’i mngon sum), and mundane perception (lokapratyakṣa: ’jig rten gyi
mngon sum). Nagasaki interprets śuddhapratyakṣa in two ways: (a) as
manonubhavapratyakṣa and (b) as lokottarajñāna. One wonders
whether śuddhapratyakṣa could have meant both pure mundane gnosis
(śuddhalaukikajñāna: dag pa ’jig rten pa’i ye shes) and non-conceptual
gnosis (nirvikalpajñāna: rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes). In Tibetan
sources, the idea of means of pure valid cognition occurs primarily in
the context of what is called “establishing the divinity of appearance”
(snang ba lhar sgrub pa), that is, establishing the supramundaneness of
the very mundane, the divinity of the very earthly—according to Mi-
pham, a uniquely rNying-ma concern, which stems from the eleventh-
century rNying-ma scholar Rong-zom-pa, and is described by him as
the “Lion’s Roar” (seng ge’i nga ro) of this scholar.31 Indeed Mi-pham’s
theory of pure sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa is clearly largely inspired by

27
’Od gsal snying po (pp. 82.1–84.5); Shes rab ral gri (pp. 800.3–801.4).
28
Compare the expression pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajña in the Pramāṇavārtti-
kālaṃkāra (p. 51.22).
29
Hetuvidyā (p. 340.2–13).
30
Nagasaki 1991: 223–225.
31
Mi-pham, Nges shes sgron me (p. 103.4–5):
snang kun rang bzhin lhar sgrub pa ||
snga ’gyur ring lugs kho na ste ||
kun mkhyen rong zom paṇḍi ta’i ||
legs bshad seng ge’i nga ro yin ||.
For an English translation, see Pettit 1999: 222.
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 225

Rong-zom-pa’s writings, particularly those passages attempting to

establish the divinity of appearance.32

4. RONG-ZOM-PA ON ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, SOTERIOLOGY,

GNOSEOLOGY, AND THE INDIVIDUALITY OF PERSONS
Undoubtedly Rong-zom-pa’s work on establishing the divinity of
appearances is unprecedented in the world of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.
He is said to have composed a set of seven works of varying size, what
one might call his “heptalogy,” on the establishment of the divinity of
appearances, of which only one is extant.33 The fundamental idea
behind the establishment of the divinity of appearances is that
phenomena, which appear to us in manifold ways, are in reality
primordially pure regardless of whether we perceive them as such or
not. One of Rong-zom-pa’s main arguments is that a dharma (“phenol-
menon”) can hardly be impure if its dharmatā (“true reality”) is pure,
for there is an essential connection between dharma and dharmatā.
Both dharma and dharmatā are thus pure, and hence also divine. For
him, then, divinity means purity. Where could Rong-zom-pa have got
this idea from? The proposition that all phenomena are completely pure
is widespread in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna literature. In
particular, it plays a dominant role in the *Guhyagarbhatantra, a
tradition to which Rong-zom-pa belonged, and wherein the so-called (a)
external world or habitat (snod), comprising five elements, (b) its
inhabitants (bcud), made up of five psycho-physiological aggregates
(phung po), and (c) mental continua (rgyud), a set of eight kinds of
“mind” (rnam par shes pa tshogs brgyad), are all said to be pure, the
purities of the external habitat (snod dag pa), its inhabitants (bcud dag
pa), and the mental continua (rgyud dag pa) being referred to as “three
kinds of purity” (dag pa rnam pa gsum).34 The central philosophy of the
*Guhyagarbhatantra is that all phenomena are in their conventionality
characterised by great purity (dag pa chen po) and in their absoluteness

32
For Mi-pham’s own efforts to establish the divinity of appearance, see his ’Od gsal
snying po (pp. 77.2–97.1).
33
See Rong-pa Me-dpung’s list of Rong-zom-pa’s writings (Tho yig, p. 239.5–6):
snang ba lha sgrub che phra bdun du grags pa la sogs pa dag yin te |. See also
Almogi 1997: 248–249; 170–171.
34
Rong-zom-pa, dKon mchog ’grel (p. 184.1–6).
226 DORJI WANGCHUK

by great equality (mnyam pa chen po), and that the two modes are
characterised by great indivisibility (dbyer med pa chen po). One of the
main devices employed to establish such propositions is the four kinds
of reasoning referred to above.
We may now set the theory proposed by Rong-zom-pa in the
wider context of his assessment of the Mahāyāna doctrine. Broadly
speaking, Mahāyāna Buddhism can be classified into tantric and non-
tantric, although the borderline tends to be quite fluid or permeable.
One generally assumes that non-tantric Mahāyāna is doctrinally more
conservative than tantric Mahāyāna. This is, however, not always the
case, inasmuch as some sūtras contain ideas that are more developed
than those found in certain tantras. This may help to explain why Rong-
zom-pa occasionally—for example, in his dKon mchog ’grel—speaks of
common (thun mong) and uncommon or special (thun mong ma yin pa)
Mahāyāna. A distinction between the two is clearly made in accordance
with the degree of doctrinal conservatism. By “special Mahāyāna,” he
means a school of Buddhist thought which postulates the idea of the
indivisibility of the two kinds of truth (bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyer
med pa), that is, the idea that there is in reality one single truth, and that
its division into conventional and absolute is merely a device for
enabling access to that single truth. This “special Mahāyāna” of Rong-
zom-pa includes both tantric and non-tantric forms. To the group of
scriptures of the “special Mahāyāna” belong both sūtras, such as the
Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra and Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā, and tantras, such
as the *Guhyagarbhatantra. According to him, the “special Mahāyāna”
is special for five reasons, which may be explicated as follows:35
(a) It is special because it proposes a special kind of ontology.
Specifically, the only viable ontological reality is what the author calls
“mere appearance” (snang ba tsam), behind the facade of which there is
nothing. Even this “mere appearance” may or may not endure
depending upon the presence or absence of necessary and sufficient
causes and conditions.
(b) It is special because it proposes a special kind of soteriology.
According to this special soteriological model, one sees and seeks a
solution in the problem itself, nirvāṇa in saṃsāra itself; release in

35
dKon mchog ’grel (pp. 42.2–43.13). For a critical edition of the pertinent text and an
English translation, see Almogi 2006: 468–470 (text), 319–322 (translation).
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 227

bondage itself. In other words, the very duḥkhasatya is seen as a

nirodhasatya; the very samudayasatya as a mārgasatya.
(c) It is special because it proposes a special kind of gnoseology. Seeing
(or, knowing) the gnosis through which release is attained (vimukti-
jñānadarśana: rnam par grol ba’i ye shes mthong ba)36 is special,
because this gnosis is not conceived as something that can be attained or
generated at a certain stage, place, and time but as being immanent here
and now, for our ordinary minds and mental associates are by nature
self-occurring gnosis (svayaṃbhūjñāna: rang byung gi ye shes).
(d) It is special because it proposes a special kind of epistemology. It
offers, that is, a unique theory of perception in regard to the scope and
validity of the various human and non-human, yogic and non-yogic
perceptions. This is one of the sources feeding into the relativity theory
of the purity and validity of perception. We shall return to it later.
(e) I am not sure how best the fifth aspect of the special Mahāyāna can
be expressed. The author apparently alludes to a special spiritual
proclivity or disposition within the person, namely, the uniqueness of
his or her cognitive, conative, and emotive faculty which allows access
to the so-called “non-dual mode” (gnyis su med pa’i tshul), clearly
meaning the indivisibility of the two kinds of truth referred to above.

5. THE PHILOSOPHICAL-DOCTRINAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE THEORY

The theory of the purity and validity of perception proposed by Rong-
zom-pa can perhaps be best understood against the backdrop of three
kinds of presuppositions, namely, his concept of ontology, soteriology,
and epistemology. I employ the term “perception” in the sense of the
Tibetan terms mthong ba (or gzigs pa) and snang ba. Tibetan mthong ba
seems to mean primarily the “perception of an appearance” and
secondarily the “perceived or perceptible appearance” whereas snang
ba seems to mean primarily “perceived or perceptible appearance,” and
secondarily “perception of an appearance.” A direct ontic-epistemic
correspondence between appearance and perception is presupposed by
most Tibetan scholars, since only that which is ontologically possible is
epistemically cognisable; and only that which appears is perceived or
perceptible.

36
Negi 1993–2005: s.v.
228 DORJI WANGCHUK

(a) The Ontological Presuppositions of the Theory

One cannot talk about the theory of perception or knowledge if no
knowable or perceptible is presupposed. Various Buddhist systems may
argue about the ontological status of the knowable, but I would assert
that within the Buddhist systems one tacitly assumes that there is a kind
of reality, or nature to phenomena (whatever it may be) that is
cognisable, timeless, and independent of being cognised and the person
who cognises it.37 It is said that buddhas may come and go, but the truth
remains as it is (yathābhūtam), unaffected by its occasional rediscovery
or oblivion. This idea can be found in non-Mahāyāna sources (such as
the Saṃyuttanikāya and Aṅguttaranikāya), in non-tantric Mahāyāna
literature (such as the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra,
and Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra), and tantric sources (such as the
Vairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra).38 As we have just seen, for Rong-zom-
pa, the only ontological reality is what he calls “mere appearance”
(snang ba tsam). It is conceived of as being totally hollow, without any
defining characteristics whatsoever, rootless, bottomless, invariable, and
soteriologically neutral, and yet it is (i) the only viable basis for
bondage and release, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa;39 (ii) the basis of defining
characteristics (mtshan gzhi), that is, the basis for assigning various
defining characteristics (mtshan nyid sna tshogs),40 (iii) the only viable
premise allowing for a dialogue between sentient beings of the six
realms; yogins and non-yogins; experts and non-experts; (iv) the only
viable shared object of independent perceptions.

37
See Vetter’s remark in Bsteh 2000: 48.
38
For the universality of reality and its being independent of the appearance of a
tathāgata in both non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna sources, see Wangchuk 2007: 41–
42, 78, n. 24.
39
Rong-zom-pa, Theg tshul (p. 513.4–6): mdor na gzhi gcig la rnam par dag pa’i ’jig
rten du snang ba dang | ma dag pa’i ’jig rten du snang ba ste | de la ma dag par
snang ba ni | bslad pas bsgribs pa yin no zhe’o ||; ibid. (p. 513.20–22): snang ba de
nyid kyang byang grol dang ’ching ba gnyis ga’i rkyen du ’gyur bar mnyam pas |
tshul gnyi’ ga ltar yang bsgrub du [= tu] rung bar snang ngo ||; ibid. (p. 522.4–5):
snang ba la skyon med na sems can gang gis bslus te ’khor zhe na |.
40
Rong-zom-pa, Theg tshul (p. 465.20–24): snang ba tsam ni mkhas pa paṇ ṭi [= ḍi] ta
nas blun mo [= po] ba glang rdzi yan chad gang yang rung ste | las kyi bsgo skal la
spyod pa mthun par snang ba dang | yongs su dag pa dang ma dag pa la stsogs pa
snang ba bye brag mthun pa rnams la snang ngo zhes bsgrub mi dgos te | mtshan
nyid sna tshogs rnam par ’jog pa’i mtshan [= mtshon?] gzhi yin no || mtshan nyid ni
ji ltar snang ba de ltar bsgrub pa rdul ’phra’ mo tsam yang myed do ||.
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 229

Why can a nondescript appearance appear as various specific

appearances, such as pus, water, nectar, and so forth? Mi-pham’s main
argument is that where there is appearance-and-emptiness, everything is
possible, and where there is no appearance-and-emptiness, nothing is
possible.41 Except for a slight modification in the wording, this is a clear
reference to Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.14, according to which
everything is possible for anything that exists in harmony with
emptiness.42 According to Rong-zom-pa,43 appearances (snang ba)
appear (snang) on account of (a) the power of delusion (’khrul pa’i
dbang), (b) the power of self-cognition (rang rig pa’i dbang), and (c)
the power of the non-origination of true reality (chos nyid skye ba med
pa’i dbang). These three causes or factors of appearances (snang ba’i
rgyu/rkyen gsum) have been explained as follows: First, the power of
delusion is for all practical purposes the diverse latent tendencies
implanted in the ālayavijñāna (“fundamental mind”) by the deluded
mind (’khrul pa’i shes pa). Second, the power of self-cognition is
explained as the ability of the mind to cognise itself; that is, mind, being
always self-cognitive, is not an inanimate entity (bem po) and offers no
physical resistance (rdos can). If the mind were not self-cognitive or
devoid of any cognitive characteristics (shes rig gyi mtshan nyid dang

41
Mi-pham, Nges shes sgron me (p. 101.4–5):
des na rang gi lugs la ni ||
snang stong ris su ma chad pa’i ||
gzhi nyid cir yang ma grub pa ||
gang snang kun la mnyam pa’i phyir ||
dngos gcig sna tshogs par yang snang ||
gang la snang stong rung ba na ||
de la thams cad rung bar ’gyur ||
gang la snang stong mi rung ba ||
de la thams cad rung mi ’gyur ||.
For an English translation, see Pettit 1999: 220–221.
42
Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.14 (cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī 70). See, for
example, the Tshig don mdzod (pp. 7.3–29.2), where Klong-chen-pa discusses seven
positions on the universal basis (gzhi), alluding thereby to several rDzogs-chen
tantras. It is explained that the universal basis is neither (1) spontaneously present
(lhun grub), (2) indeterminate (ma nges pa), (3) determinate (nges pa), (4) malleable
(cir yang bsgyur du btub pa), (5) arbitrary (cir yang khas blang du btub pa), nor (6)
manifold (sna tshogs), but (7) primordially pure (ka dag). The primordially pure
universal basis is said to consist of the three inseparable qualities of emptiness,
luminosity, and all-embracing compassion.
43
Rang byung ye shes (pp. 120.16–123.21).
230 DORJI WANGCHUK

bral ba zhig), nothing would appear. Third, the power of the non-
origination of true reality is also explained as the natural and intrinsic
purity (rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa / ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par dag
pa) of all phenomena. Phenomena, not being anything (cir yang ma yin
pa), can appear in any way (cir yang snang du rung ba), for they are
devoid of resistance (gegs med pa).
Of the three factors of appearances, purity and the ability of the
mind to cognise itself are the dominant conditions for appearances of
both “pollution” (saṃkleśa: kun nas nyon mongs pa) and “purification”
(vyavadāna: rnam par byang ba). The latent tendencies form the
general conditions for the appearance of both pollution and purification.
Nonetheless, those appearances that are caused by negative latent
tendencies (nag po’i bag chags) are called deceptive (slu ba), untrue (mi
bden pa), fallacious (’khrul pa), and unreliable (yid brtan du mi rung
ba), whereas those appearances that are caused by positive latent
tendencies (dkar po’i bag chags) are called non-deceptive (mi slu ba),
true (bden pa), non-fallacious (ma ’khrul pa), and reliable (yid brtan du
rung ba). Although none of the appearances is ultimately true (yang dag
par bden pa), the less deceptive ones are provisionally regarded as non-
deceptive by the wise, for they are non-deceiving to the extent that they
bring about salvation.

(b) The Soteriological Presuppositions of the Theory

The main soteriological presupposition of the theory is that at least in
principle anybody, at any given point in time and space, can gain full
access to true reality by means of meditative insight, and the correct
cognition or insightful penetration of the truth has a soteriological or
salvific effect on the person who cognises or penetrates it. In other
words, a person is liberated by gaining meditative insight into the truth.
For most Buddhist scholars and mystics, it is the correct cognition of
true reality, regardless of how it is defined by the various Buddhist
systems, that makes the spiritual or soteriological breakthrough
possible, and that the gnosis (jñāna: ye shes) of a buddha is by defini-
tion direct valid cognition (pramāṇa: tshad ma). This notion of release
upon seeing true reality is found in tantric sources such as the Caryā-
melāpakapradīpa, and also in non-tantric Mahāyāna sources such as the
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 231

Abhisamayālaṃkāra and Ratnagotravibhāga.44 According to Rong-zom-

pa, release upon seeing true reality is an idea common to all Buddhist
systems,45 which implies that the actual spiritual breakthrough in
Buddhism is intellectual and not emotional.46

(c) The Epistemological Presuppositions of the Theory

The basic epistemological assumption is that a variety of perceptions of
one and the same entity “x” is possible. If all sentient beings of the six
realms (or yogins and non-yogins) were to perceive an entity or reality
“x” in an identical way, there would be no need for a dialogue. The
main point of divergence among sentient beings of the six realms (or
yogins and non-yogins) is the characteristics of a so-called “mere
appearance” as it appears to various beings in various degrees of
impurity and purity. Rong-zom-pa explains that (1) hungry ghosts
perceive water as extremely impure (shin tu ma dag par snang); (2)
human beings as somewhat impure (cung zad ma dag par snang), (3)
individuals of the pure realms as pure (dag par snang), (4) yogins or
vidyādharas (“knowledge bearers”), who have command over
phenomena, as extremely pure (shin tu dag par snang), and that (5)
those who have exhausted all latent tendencies, clearly meaning
buddhas, are free from all appearances (snang ba thams cad dang bral),
since for them all manifoldness has undergone complete cessation
(spros pa thams cad yongs su zhi bar gyur). If all these perceptions were
equally valid or invalid, it would mean that there would be nothing that
one could call reality. If there were no such standard as the validity or
invalidity of perception, there would be no incentive for a dialogue.
Rong-zom-pa thus rejects the arbitrariness of perceptual validity.

6. THE THEORY
Rong-zom-pa’s position is that in general no perception is
independently valid or invalid. Depending on the varying degree of

44
For several primary sources, see Wangchuk 2007: 199–200, n. 11.
45
bDen gnyis ’jog tshul (p. 32.6–8): ’di ltar nyan thos kyi theg pa nas gzhi bzung nas |
rdzogs pa chen po’i mthar thug gi bar du | gang zhig yang dag pa’i don mthong na
rnam par grol lo zhes thun mong du grags pa yin la |.
46
See also Wangchuk 2007: 43–45, 199–200.
232 DORJI WANGCHUK

purity and impurity of perception, there is only a relative validity of

perception; that is, the human perception of appearance “x” as water is
pure, and thus valid, when compared to the preta’s perception of it as
pus, but is impure when compared to the god’s perception of it as
nectar, and thus invalid. The most maculate and thus the most invalid
perception of all is that of a hell-being, whereas the most immaculate
and thus the most valid perception of all is that of one who is subject to
no obscuration whatsoever. It is this theory that I call the relativity
theory of the purity and validity of perception, and it can be formulated
as: “The validity of perception is directly proportional to the purity of
perception.”47

7. THE INDIAN BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY

While Rong-zom-pa certainly deserves credit for suggesting that the
degree of purity of perception determines the degree of its validity, it is
clear that he drew his inspiration from Indian sources, particularly
regarding the validity of yogic versus non-yogic perceptions. The idea
that the perception of a person who has attained salvific release can
invalidate the perception of a person who is still bound can also be
found in several Indian sources. For example, Candrakīrti argued that a
non-yogin who has no gnosis and is not released is not an authority, and
that if this were not the case, it would imply that such a person has
perceived true reality and eliminated ignorance, and this in turn would

47
Rong-zom-pa, dKon mchog ’grel (p. 43.6–7): “It should be known that if one
evaluates objectively, the purer these perceptions (snang ba), the truer (bden pa)
[they are]” (gzu bo’i blos gzhal na snang ba de dag kyang ji lta ji ltar dag pa de lta
de ltar bden par shes par bya’o ||). Ibid. (p. 104.4–7): “If these are evaluated with an
objective mind, the purer the perceptions (mthong ba), the truer (bden pa) [they are],
inasmuch as [the objects of valid perceptions] are objects [perceived by] the lords
among those who have purified the obscurations (āvaraṇa: sgrib pa), and because
[perceptions] are relatively (ltos te rnam par bzhag na) enduring and non-deceiving
(brtan zhing mi bslu ba)” (de rnams la gzu bo’i blos gzhal bar byas na | ji ltar ji ltar
mthong ba dag pa de ltar de ltar bden pa yin te | sgrib pa’i dri ma dag pa rnams kyi
dbang po rnams kyi yul yin pa’i phyir dang | ltos te rnam par bzhag na brtan zhing
mi bslu ba’i phyir ro ||). Ibid. (p. 105.2–3): “… if an objective assessment is made, as
[stated] above, the [degree of] correctness corresponds to the [degree of] purity” (…
gzu bo’i blos rnam par gzhag na | ji ltar dag pa ltar rig [= rigs] pa che ba ni snga ma
bzhin no ||).
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 233

imply the redundancy of the spiritual paths of the noble ones (ārya-
mārga: ’phags pa’i lam).48 That an undefiled cognition of a yogin can
invalidate the defiled cognition of a non-yogin and not vice versa has
been clearly stated by him in his Madhyamakāvatāra:49
The perception of eyes with a timira [disorder]
Does not invalidate the perception [of eyes] without a timira [disorder].
Similarly, a cognition that is devoid of immaculate gnosis
Does not invalidate an immaculate cognition.

He also states that only the gnosis of a buddha, and not other types of
gnosis, given their limitation (ekadeśatva: nyi tshe ba nyid), can be
pratyakṣa.50 Veridical relativism is also suggested by Śāntideva in his
Bodhicaryāvatāra 9.3–4ab. According to him, people (loka: ’jig rten)
are of two kinds: ordinary people (prākṛtako lokaḥ: ’jig rten phal pa)
and people who are yogins (yogiloka: rnal ’byor ’jig rten). The
perception or knowledge (dhī: blo) of the ordinary world can be
invalidated by that of the yogiloka, but not vice versa, as made explicit
by Prajñākaramati.51 A qualitative distinction is also made among the
perceptions of the various yogins, with the perceptions of the more
advanced yogins successively able to invalidate the perceptions of the
less advanced yogins. Following this logic, buddhajñāna, or the
yogipratyakṣa of a buddha, will certainly be assumed to be the supreme
cognition that can invalidate the perceptions of all yogins who have not
yet attained Buddhahood.52 In particular, Mañjuśrīmitra’s Bodhicitta-
bhāvanā and Bodhicittabhāvanānirdeśa (also attributed to him) seem to
have directly inspired Rong-zom-pa.53

48
Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra 6.30.
49
Madhyamakāvatāra 6.27:
mig ni rab rib can gyi dmigs pa yis ||
rab rib med shes la gnod min ji ltar ||
de bzhin dri med ye shes spangs pa’i blos ||
dri med blo la gnod pa yod ma yin||.
50
Madhyamakāvatāra 6.214.
51
Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 158.11).
52
Cf. Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī 4.91.
53
Bodhicittabhāvanā (P, fols. 2b7–3a2; D, fol. 2b1–3; S, vol. 33, pp. 810.18–811.5);
Bodhicittabhāvanānirdeśa (P, fol. 59a5–b5; D, fol. 48a1–7; S, vol. 33, pp. 188.20–
189.20). See particularly the latter (P, fol. 59a8; D, fol. 48a3; S, vol. 33, p. 189.6–7):
sems can gyis mthong ba rnams ni ’khrul pa yin par mngon no ||; ibid. (P, fol. 59b5;
D, fol. 48a7; S, vol. 33, p. 189.18–20): de ltar sems can gyis mthong ba rnams ni rig
234 DORJI WANGCHUK

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have seen that the only feasible ontology for Rong-zom-pa is mere
appearance, which is rootless, unrestricted, invariable, soteriologically
neutral, and yet the only viable basis for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.
Strikingly, for him, mere appearance, like a mirage, operates in
accordance with the principle of dependent origination (rten cing ’brel
bar ’byung ba: pratītyasamutpāda). Depending on the presence or
absence of causes and conditions, it may appear or disappear. What he
does seem to posit is the sphere in which the mere appearance operates,
namely, the dharmadhātu, the sphere of reality itself, just as he posits
the space in which mirages appear or disappear. According to his
epistemology, a mere appearance may be perceived as extremely
impure, somewhat impure, pure, extremely pure, or not perceived at all,
and the degree of the purity of perception determines the degree of its
validity. Here the person by whom mere appearance is not perceived at
all is a buddha, whose gnosis (if it exists at all)54 represents the upper
limit of the perceptual scale. Just as a mirage is an optical illusion and
the perception of it a perceptual delusion, a mere appearance is an
illusion, and the perception of it, no matter how pure or impure,
ultimately a mere delusion. A buddha, being free from all delusions,
perceives no illusions. Not perceiving an optical illusion such as a
mirage in the open air may be designated as seeing space. Similarly, not
perceiving any mere appearance in the dharmadhātu, the sphere of
reality, is clearly designated as perceiving the dharmadhātu.

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Edition], vol. 22/za, pp. 322–480. Thimphu: National
Library of Bhutan, 1982.
Rong zom chos bzang gi gsung ’bum. 2 vols. Chengdu: Si-
khron-mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1999.
kyi-shes-rig-dpe-skrun-khang, 1994–2005.
Étienne Lamotte, ed. & tr., Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: L’
Explication des mystères. Texte tibétain édité et traduit.
Louvain / Paris: Bureau du Recueil, 1935.
238 DORJI WANGCHUK

sGyu ’phrul le lhag sGyu ’phrul le lhag. In rNying ma rgyud ’bum [mTshams-
brag Edition], vol. 20/wa, pp. 417–580. Thimphu:
National Library of Bhutan, 1982.
Shes rab ral gri Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, Don rnam par nges pa
shes rab ral gri. See Shes rab ral gri’i mchan.
Shes rab ral gri’i mchan Id., Don rnam par nges pa shes rab ral gri mchan bcas. In
MS, vol. 4/pa, pp. 787–820.
sKad gnyis shan sbyar Id., sKad gnyis shan sbyar rab gsal nor bu’i me long. In
MS, vol. 26, pp. 1–598.
sNang ba lhar sgrub Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po, gSang sngags rdo rje theg
pa’i tshul las snang ba lhar bsgrub pa rong zom chos
bzang gis mdzad pa. In RS, vol. 1, pp. 559–568.
Śrāvakabhūmi Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group, ed., Śrāvakabhūmi: Revised
Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation. The First
Chapter. Taishō University Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūjo
Series 4. The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of
Buddhism, Taishō University. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press,
1998.
Steinkellner 1984 Ernst Steinkellner, “Miszellen zur Erkenntnis-
theoretischen-logischen Schule des Buddhismus: IV.
Candragomin, der Autor des Nyāyasiddhyāloka.” WZKS
28, 1984, pp. 177–178.
Steinkellner 1989 Id., “Who is Byaṅ chub rdzu ’phrul? Tibetan and non-
Tibetan Commentaries on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra - A
Survey of the literature.” Berliner Indologische Studien
4/5, ed. Institut für Indische Philologie und Kunst-
geschichte der Freien Universität Berlin. Reinbek: Dr.
Inge Wezler Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublika-
tionen, 1989, pp. 229–251.
Steinkellner 2005 Ernst Steinkellner, Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya,
Chapter 1: A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit
text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the
basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the
linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā.
www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (April 2005).
Steinkellner 2007 Ernst Steinkellner, ed., Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya.
Chapters 1 and 2. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences
Press, 2007.
Theg tshul Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po, Theg pa chen po’i tshul la
’jug pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos. In RS, vol. 2, pp. 415–
555.
Tho yig Rong-pa Me-dpung, rJe dharma bha dras mdzad pa’i
chos kyi rnam grangs kyi tho yig. In RS, vol. 2, pp. 233–
239.
Tshig don mdzod Klong-chen-rab-’byams-pa Dri-med-’od-zer, gSang ba
bla na med pa ’od gsal rdo rje snying po’i gnas gsum gsal
 PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 239

bar byed pa’i tshig don rin po che’i mdzod. In mDzod

bdun. Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, n.d. Reprint:
Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan, n.d., vol. nya.
Vetter 1966 Tilmann Vetter, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1.
Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen
Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung.
Vienna: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., Kommissionsverlag
der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966.
Vigrahavyāvartanī Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, E.H. Johnson, and Arnold
Kunst, ed. & tr., The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna:
Vigrahavyāvartanī. Fourth Edition (Revised and
Enlarged): Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998.
Wangchuk 2004 Dorji Wangchuk, “The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the
Tathāgatagarbha Theory.” WZKS 48, 2004 [appeared in
2005], pp. 171–213.
Wangchuk 2007 Id., The Resolve to Become a Buddha: A Study of the
Bodhicitta Concept in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Studia
Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series 23. Tokyo: The
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2007.
WSTB Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens
 ORNA ALMOGI

The Materiality and Immanence of Gnosis in

Some rNying-ma Tantric Sources*

1. INTRODUCTION
In certain rNying-ma (“Ancient”) tantric sources one finds the notion
that gnosis is immanent in the human body, or more precisely, in the
centre of the heart. From the description of gnosis found in these
sources (i.e. as having, for example, colours and shapes), one gets the
impression that the gnosis abiding in the body is in a way understood as
a material entity. In this paper I shall attempt to present what may be
called the meta-physiology of this gnosis and its abode as conceived in
these sources. First of all I shall briefly look into the perception and role
of the human body in Buddhism in general, and then discuss shortly the
concept of the inherence and immanence of gnosis and the
soteriological goal and models relevant to the discussion. This will be
followed by a discussion of gnosis itself, which is conceived of as a
focal point of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa that is laid bare at some critical
moments such as death, and if recognised could trigger the collapse of
the entire saṃsāric machinery.

2. THE PERCEPTION AND ROLE OF THE HUMAN BODY IN BUDDHISM

In non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, the psycho-physiological complex of a
person comprising five aggregates (phung po lnga: pañcaskandha) is
considered impure, impermanent, painful, and non-substantial. In
particular, the human body is perceived as consisting of thirty-six
impure substances1 and is often meditated upon on the basis of nine

*
I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Eli Franco for his useful comments and to
Philip Pierce for proofreading this paper.
1
These impure substances (mi gtsang ba’i rdzas) are various bodily parts and fluids—
hair, nails, flesh, bones, bladder, liver, pus, blood, excrement, and the like. The list
of thirty-six, however, varies slightly from one source to another. See, for example,
the lists found in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 209.3–11 (a translation is found in Bendall
242 ORNA ALMOGI

notions of repulsive [objects], that is, by imagining the various stages of

the decomposition of the body.2 Such meditation is clearly intended to
combat one of the numerous intellectual-emotional defilements (nyon
mongs pa: kleśa)—the greatest challenge for the seekers of salvation in
Buddhism—namely, attachment, particularly to one’s body and the
bodies of others. In Mahāyāna, the human body is also conceived of as
illusory and empty. Nonetheless, despite an apparent negative attitude
towards the human body, the usefulness of the body has been
recognised as being the basis for human existence, which latter enables
one to tread the path to salvation. The Buddha’s teachings are
considered as mere aids with the help of which one is to cross the river
of saṃsāra and are thus often compared to a boat that one leaves behind
after crossing the river.3 This analogy is occasionally also employed in
the case of the human body—for example, in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryā-
vatāra, where it is stated that a bodhisattva should view his body as
being like a boat and use it to fulfill the needs of living beings.4 In the
tantric context, the human body, which plays now a greater role,
particularly in the so-called higher tantric systems, is often compared to

& Rouse 1922: 202); Arthaviniścayasūtra, pp. 23.5–24.4 (reference to further

sources and a short discussion of the development of the list and differences
between existing lists are provided by the editor in n. 9), and p. 41, where a slightly
different list is given. Note that most of these substances are included in the list of
bodily parts found in the Mahāvyutpatti, nos. 3929–4065.
2
The nine kinds of meditation on repulsive [objects] (mi sdug pa sgom pa: aśubha-
bhāvanā), also referred to as nine notions of repulsive [objects] (mi sdug pa’i ’du
shes dgu), are listed in the Mahāvyutpatti (nos. 1155–1164) as follows: (1) the
notion of a bluish [corpse] (rnam par (b)sngos pa’i ’du shes: vinīlakasaṃjñā), (2)
the notion of a putrefying [corpse] (rnam par rnags pa’i ’du shes: vidhūtika/
vipūyaka-saṃjñā), (3) the notion of a maggot-infested [corpse] (rnam par ’bus
gzhig/ bzhigs pa’i ’du shes: vipaḍumakasaṃjñā), (4) the notion of a decomposing
[corpse] (rnam par bam pa’i/’ber ba’i ’du shes: vyādhmātakasaṃjñā), (5) the notion
of a reddish [corpse] (rnam par dmar ba’i ’du shes: vilohitakasaṃjñā), (6) the notion
of a devoured [corpse] (rnam par zos ba’i ’du shes: vikhāditakasaṃjñā), (7) the
notion of a lacerated [corpse] (rnam par mthor ba’i ’du shes: vikṣiptakasaṃjñā), (8)
the notion of a burned [corpse] (rnam par tshig pa’i ’du shes: vidagdhakasaṃjñā),
and (9) the notion of a skeleton (rus gong gi ’du shes: asthisaṃjñā). See also BHSD,
s.v. aśubhabhāvanā, where several sources are provided.
3
For references, see Almogi 2009: 272, n. 98.
4
Bodhicaryāvatāra 5.70. See Steinkellner 1981: 57 (for a German translation of the
pertinent verse) and Crosby & Skilton 1995: 40 (for an English translation). See also
Catuḥśataka 2.1 (Lang 1986: 32 (Tibetan text) and 33 (English translation)).
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 243

a boat, here, however, in a somewhat different sense; that is, the body
itself is now to be steered to reach the shore of salvation.5 One of the
arguments offered by some Tibetan Buddhist authors for the essentiality
of a human body for tantric practices is the indispensability of a body
endowed with the six elements (khams drug gi bdag nyid can: ṣaḍdhātv-
ātmaka),6 which only a human body is said to possess.7 This is
apparently because the so-called “white” and “red” bodhicitta, that is,
the male “semen” and female “blood,” which are substances which only
a body endowed with the six elements can possess are necessary for the
“secret empowerment” (gsang ba’i dbang: guhyābhiṣeka) and “insight-
gnosis empowerment” (shes rab ye shes kyi dbang: prajñājñānābhiṣe-
ka).8 One finds different lists of these six elements. The most common
is that of the six (cosmic) elements found already in Pāli sources which
include earth, water, fire, wind, space, and the mental element.9 In the
tantric context, one occasionally finds a slightly different list in which
the mental element (rnam par shes pa’i khams: vijñānadhātu) is
replaced with “gnostic element” (ye shes kyi khams: jñānadhātu).10
5
For examples of the analogy of a boat with the human body in the tantric context,
see Dasgupta 1962: 44–45 & 90, where several songs by tantric adepts are translated
and discussed.
6
See Negi 1993–2005, s.v. khams drug gi bdag nyid can, where the Vimalaprabhā is
given as a source. See also Vajragarbha’s Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā 6.73d (Shendge
2004: 44; Tibetan: 123.13), where the expression ṣaḍdhātukaṃ kulam (khams drug
rig can) is employed.
7
See Mi-pham’s bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 65.4–66.2), where the necessity of a
physical body endowed with six elements for the practice of Vajrayāna is discussed.
8
For a discussion of “white” and “red” bodhicitta, see the section on what has been
designated by Dorji Wangchuk “psycho-physiological bodhicitta” in Wangchuk
2007: 217–225.
9
See, for example, Majjhima Nikāya iii 63 (an English translation is found in Horner
1959: 105; Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995: 926, §5), where also other lists of six elements
are provided. For a discussion of these six (cosmic) elements, see Langer 2001,
chap. 6, which however focuses on the mental element (viññāṇa).
10
Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v. khams drug ldan: nam mkha’| rlung| me| chu| sa| ye shes
kyi khams rnams ldan pa’i mi’i lus rten gsang sngags rdo rje theg pa sgrub pa’i snod
du rung ba|. See also Negi 1993–2005, s.v. ye shes kyi khams, where references to
the Vimalaprabhā are given. Cf. Vajragarbha’s Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā 6.73–74
(Shendge 2004: 44; Tibetan, 123.12–15), where the six elements mentioned consist
of the four great elements—earth, water, fire and wind—and in addition semen
(śukra: khu ba) and (menstrual) blood (rajas: rdul), and where jñānadhātu is also
mentioned, but not as one of the six. This source is cited by Mi-pham in his Dus
’khor ’grel pa (p. 710.3–4). Semen and (menstrual) blood are commonly considered
244 ORNA ALMOGI

The tantric attitude towards the human body is generally more positive
than the one found in non-tantric Buddhism. The body is now conceived
of as a microcosm containing the entire universe, is meditatively
envisioned as the pure (though illusory) body of a deity, and is not to be
abused in any way.11 Most important of all, the body is considered the
abode of gnosis, the attainment of which is the soteriological goal of all
Buddhist vehicles and the unfolding of which is often referred to in the
tantric context as great bliss.12

3. THE INHERENCE AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS

Normally, gnosis is conceived of as a liberating insight that is acquired
by a yogin by sheer dint of sustained and correct meditative practices on
the path, which culminates with the gnosis of a buddha.13 Yet one
encounters not only the concept of acquired (or transcendental) gnosis,
but also the concept of inherent (or immanent) gnosis, which is
changeless. This idea is greatly underscored by the rNying-ma tantric
traditions, and such rDzogs-chen expressions as “gnosis that abides on

in Indian works, including Buddhist ones, procreatory elements stemming from the
father and mother, respectively (Das 2003: 3–5, §1.5 and 14–29, where the problem
of identifying the female fluid is discussed). This reminds one of yet another list of
six elements, that is, bone, marrow, and semen, inherited from one’s father, and
flesh, skin, and blood, inherited from one’s mother recorded in the Tshig mdzod
chen mo (s.v. mngal skyes khams drug: ’dzam bu gling pa’i mi mngal skyes rnams
ma’i mngal du tshang bar ldan pa’i khams drug ste pha las thob pa’i rus pa dang|
rkang| khu ba bcas gsum dang| ma las thob pa’i sha dang| pags pa| khrag bcas drug|).
This list more or less corresponds to the list of seven elements commonly listed in
Indian (medical) works which has in addition the “nutrient fluid” or “chyle” (rasa-
dhātu), and “fat” instead of “skin” (Das 2003: 19–20, § 2.4); “skin,” however, is
occasionally included as one of the seven elements, commonly replacing rasadhātu
(ibid. pp. 273ff., §§10.7ff.). It is also reported that there is some confusion between
two lists found in tantric literature: one of seven, beginning with skin instead of
rasa, and of six, again having skin but lacking semen (ibid. p. 276, §10.8).
11
On the importance of the body in tantric practices, see Dasgupta 1962: 88–92;
Snellgrove 1987: 288–294.
12
bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 43.6–44.3). On the notion of great bliss, see Almogi
2009: 134–137.
13
It may be noted that although teachings on the gnosis of the Buddha or a buddha
pervade the diverse Buddhist scriptures, the true existence of such a gnosis has been
a subject of debate among Buddhist scholars, particularly in Mādhyamika circles.
For more on this issue, see Almogi 2009.
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 245

the [universal] ground” (gzhi gnas kyi ye shes) and “gnosis that
illumines from within” (nang gsal gyi ye shes) are quite popular. But the
idea that gnosis abides and pervades the body can be found in a number
of Indian sources as well. For example, the Dharmadhātustava
attributed to one Nāgārjuna compares the gnosis which abides in the
body wrapped in kleśas to milk in a container that is mixed with water,
and states that just as a goose is able to extract the milk from the water,
so is a yogin able to mine the gnosis abiding in the body from within the
kleśas. Similarly, the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa, apparently roughly citing
from the Dharmadhātustava, compares the gnosis abiding in the body to
a lamp inside a pot that can shine without only if the pot is broken, and
so the gnosis can manifest only when the body is “broken” with the help
of a master.14 Other sources, too, such as the Hevajratantra,15
Vajraghaṇṭa’s (or Ghaṇtāpāda’s) Cakrasaṃvarapañcakrama,16 the rDo
rje me long gi rgyud,17 and dPe chung rang gnas,18 a small work

14
See Wangchuk 2007: 202–203, where sources in which this idea is found, including
the Dharmadhātustava, Hevajratantra, and Caryāmelāpakapradīpa, are provided.
15
The Hevajratantra is often cited in this connection by rNying-ma authors. See, for
example, the gSang bdag dgongs rgyan (p. 23.2–3), gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p.
278.1–3), and bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (p. 61.3–4).
16
Cakrasaṃvarapañcakrama (p. 152.13–14):
hṛdaye vartate nityaṃ bindur eko nirakṣaraḥ |
tañ ca bhāvayatāṃ puṃsāṃ jñānam utpadyate dhruvam ||.
I thank Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for drawing my attention to the Sanskrit version of
this text. The Tibetan text reads (p. 160.8–11; P, fol. 261a5–6; D, fol. 225a5; S, vol.
11, p. 569.15–17):
rtag tu snying la gnas pa yi||
thig le gcig la ’gyur med de||
de sgom byed pa’i skye bo la||
nges par ye shes skye bar ’gyur||.
This verse is cited in the bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (p. 61.4).
17
rDo rje me long gi rgyud (p. 536.5–6):
lus can snying la gang gnas pa’i||
rang ’byung zag med ye shes gzugs||
mi shigs thig le bde chen po||
nam mkha’ lta bur kun khyab pa||
mi gnas chos sku’i rang bzhin te||.
Cf. the citations in the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 429.1–2) and bKa’ brgyad
rnam bshad (p. 61.3–6).
18
dPe chung rang gnas (P, fol. 594a1; S, vol. 43, p. 1234.18–19):
mi shigs ye shes thig le ni||
sku gsung thugs kyi rdo rje’i bdag||
246 ORNA ALMOGI

attributed to Vilāsavajra, are often cited as scriptural support for the

idea that this gnosis pervades the body and is changeless. The rDo rje
me long gi rgyud, for example, describes this inherent and immanent
gnosis as self-occurring (rang byung), undefiled (zag med), an
indestructible seminal drop (mi shigs thig le), great bliss (bde ba chen
po), pervasive in the same way as space (nam mkha’ lta bur kun khyab),
unfixed (mi gnas), and as having the nature of the dharmakāya (chos
sku’i rang bzhin). Likewise, the dPe chung rang gnas describes it as an
indestructible gnostic seminal drop (mi shigs ye shes thig le), the nature
of a buddha’s Body, Speech, and Mind, free from singularity and
plurality, and as appearing in manifold ways, and so indeterminable.
The Buddha Nature (tathāgatagarbha) theory is employed to
doctrinally legitimatize the inherence and immanence of gnosis within
one’s body,19 and indeed this gnosis is identified with the Buddha
Nature itself.20 Such an idea, however, is not without its doctrinal
problems, particularly given its similarity to the non-Buddhist idea of an
eternal “soul” (ātman). The problem becomes even more acute when the
inherent and immanent gnosis, as we shall see later, is described in
terms of colours and shapes. One thus sees efforts on the part of rNying-
ma scholars to distance the Buddhist idea of inherent and immanent
gnosis from the non-Buddhist idea of an eternal soul.21

4. THE SOTERIOLOGICAL GOAL AND MODELS

The fact that gnosis is inherently and immanently present and pervasive
in the body is in itself regarded as soteriologically irrelevant; that is,
unless one explores and exploits this gnosis, one remains bound in
saṃsāra and will continue to suffer. Gnosis should be elicited from the
body primarily by manipulating the physiological bases skilfully. If
gnosis were not found within one’s body, it could not be elicited by
such techniques, just as oil cannot be gained from sand or butter from
water.

gcig dang du ma rnam spangs pa||

sna tshogs snang ba mtshon du med||.
Cf. the citation in the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 429.2).
19
See, for instance, the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 278.3–6).
20
See, for example, Klong-chen-pa, Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fol. 13b1): de bzhin
gshegs pa’i snying po chen po’ang de yin te|.
21
See the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, pp. 278.6–280.4).
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 247

Different tantric traditions may have one or more models for

gaining access to the gnosis inherent and immanent in one’s body. Here,
I should like to allude to the two tantric soteriological models found in
the rNying-ma tantric tradition, namely, the models of (1) “Way of
Efficient Strategy” (thabs lam) and (2) “Way of Release” (grol lam),
primarily as presented by Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (1846–
1912) and rDo-grub ’Jigs-med-bstan-pa’i-nyi-ma (1865–1926).22 In the
rNying-ma tradition, the sGyu ’phrul rgya mtsho’i rgyud, regarded as
the explanatory tantra of the *Guhyagarbhatantra, is often quoted as a
scriptural authority for the division into these two models.23 Thabs lam
uses special yogic techniques called “striking at the core” (gnad du
bsnun pa: marmaprahāra) of the physical bases (rten: ādhāra), namely,
the channels (rtsa: nāḍī), vital winds (rlung: vāyu), and seminal drops
(thig le: bindu), and as a result the gnosis emerges inevitably (btsan
thabs su: haṭhena). This model is subdivided into two types, involving
(a) the upper aperture (steng gi sgo: ūrdhvadvāra) and (b) the lower
aperture (’og gi sgo: adhodvāra). Grol lam, on the other hand, uses
special yogic techniques to strike directly at the core of the gnosis, so
that it emerges without having to depend on the body.24
Since thabs lam concerns the manipulation of the physiological
bases (channels, vital winds, and seminal drops), it is particularly
relevant to the present discussion. The idea behind these yogic practices
involving the exploitation of one’s physiological bases and resources
for soteriological purposes is that the various degrees of spiritual
realisation and qualities that a bodhisattva following the non-tantric

22
For a description of the thabs lam and grol lam, see Mi-pham’s ’Od gsal snying po
(pp. 47.6–51.6) and rDo-grub’s mDzod lde (pp. 424.2–440.1). See also Klong-chen-
pa’s Yid kyi mun sel (pp. 143.2–146.2); Lo-chen Dharma-shrī’s gSang bdag dgongs
rgyan (pp. 20.1–23.3); Kong-sprul’s Shes bya mdzod (pp. 810.2–811.23).
23
gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 301.4); mDzod lde (p. 424.2–3); Shes bya mdzod (p.
810.4): bshad rgyud rgya mtsho las| grol lam thabs su rnam par bstan|| zhes so||. The
text in the sGyu ’phrul rgya mtsho’i rgyud itself reads (p. 10.2): grol thar [= thabs?]
lam du rnam par bshad||.
24
The alchemic procedure of transforming iron into gold instantly by the efficient
manipulation of a mineral called mākṣika (MW, s.v.) is given as an analogy of the
thabs lam technique, while the alchemic procedure of transforming iron into gold
gradually by efficiently manipulating a jewel called kaustubha (MW, s.v.) is given
as an analogy of the grol lam technique (gSang bdag zhal lung, pp. 303.1–304.2;
’Od gsal snying po, pp. 48.1–49.5; mDzod lde, p. 426.2–3). For more on these
models, see Wangchuk 2007: 224–225.
248 ORNA ALMOGI

Mahāyāna is said to accrue at the various stages (sa: bhūmi) and on the
various paths (lam: mārga), and the two kinds of accumulation, namely,
the accumulation of beneficial resources (bsod nams kyi tshogs: pūṇya-
saṃbhāra) and the accumulation of gnosis (ye shes kyi tshogs: jñāna-
saṃbhāra), can be accrued by a yogin by making his normally dysfunc-
tional channels, vital winds, and seminal drops functional (las su rung
ba).25

5. THE META-PHYSIOLOGY ACCORDING TO THE GSANG THIGS AND

RELATED WORKS
We shall now delve briefly into “meta-physiology,” particularly its
relation to immanent gnosis and its abode. It is not possible to provide a
comprehensive picture of the divergent descriptions of the channels,
vital winds, and seminal drops found in the various old and new tantric
sources. Even within the rNying-ma tradition alone there seems to be no
one shared understanding of the matter. I shall, therefore, limit myself
to a few works of the tradition of the *Guhyagarbhatantra, the most
fundamental tantra of the rNying-ma school, and primarily to a short
work entitled gSang thigs/thig (i.e. Secret Seminal Drop) and a
commentary on it, both attributed to the Indian master Vimalamitra.26
Notably enough, although these two works are classified as Mahāyoga
texts, their content seems to be also found in texts belonging to the
Anuyoga and Atiyoga systems.
I shall begin with the main channels and the six points of psycho-
physiological energy called cakras. Commonly there are said to be three
axes (srog shing: akṣa)27 and four or six cakras. The three axes are:28

25
Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fol. 106a1–b4). The sGyu ’phrul rdo rje is cited to bolster
this idea.
26
The gSangs thigs (spelt there gSang tig) is listed in the lDe’u chos ’byung (p.
318.15) as one of the thirty-one minor pieces of literature on the Māyājāla cycle.
27
See, for example, the sGyu ’phrul rgya mtsho’i rgyud (p. 11.1–2):
’khor lo bzhi dang srog shing gsum||
me rlung ’gro bas nam mkha’i ba||
bzho ba steng du rnam par grags||.
This verse is cited in the Yid kyi mun sel (p. 145.5–6), mDzod lde (p. 427.6), and
Shes bya mdzod (p. 810.14–16). Elsewhere the three axes are also called the “three
chiefs” (gtso mo gsum). See, for instance, the bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 58.5,
63.5) and Negi 1993–2005, s.v. gtso mo, where the Hevajratantra is indicated as a
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 249

1. the central main channel, called dbu ma or dbu ma’i rtsa

(madhyanāḍī),29 and referred to elsewhere as kun ’dar ma (avadhūtī)
2. the right main channel, called ro ma (rasanā)
3. the left main channel, called rkyang ma (lalanā)

The six cakras are identified as:30

1. the “cakra of great bliss in the forehead” (spyi bo bde chen gyi ’khor
lo)
2. the “cakra of the Saṃbhoga[kāya] at the throat” (mgrin pa longs
spyod kyi ’khor lo)
3. the “cakra of the Dharma[kāya] at the heart” (snying ga chos kyi
’khor lo)
4. the “cakra of the Nirmāṇa[kāya] at the navel” (lte ba sprul pa’i
’khor lo)
5. the “cakra of fire” (me dkyil), also called the “fire of Brahmā”
(tshangs pa’i me), situated four fingers below the navel
6. the “cakra of conditions” (rkyen gyi ’khor lo), situated below the
“cakra of fire”

The *Guhyagarbhatantra tradition emphasises the cakra of the

Dharma[kāya] at the heart,31 which is therefore described in the

source. These three channels are also said to stand like three pillars (ka ba’i tshul du
gnas). See the Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fols. 9a3, 10a3).
28
mDzod lde (p. 428.2): srog shing gsum ni| dbu rkyang ro gsum mo||.
29
Negi 1993–2005, s.v. rtsa referring to the Vimalaprabhā.
30
mDzod lde (pp. 427.6–428.2): ’khor lo gsum phrag gnyis ni| spyi bo bde chen gyi|
mgrin pa longs spyod kyi| snying ga chos kyi| lte ba sprul pa’i ’khor lo ste rtsa ba’i
’khor lo bzhi dang| de ’og sor bzhi gzhal bar lte ba’i gtum mo las yar ’bar ba rgyud
gzhan du tshangs pa’i me zhes grags pa’i me dkyil dang| de’i ’og na me de sbor byed
thur sel gyi rlung ste rkyen gyi ’khor lo gnyis so||. See also the Shing rta chen po
(vol. 2, fols. 9a5–10a3), where varying numbers of cakras are discussed.
31
mDzod lde (p. 429.6): lugs ’dir snying ga’i gnad gtso bor byed de|. See also the Shes
bya mdzod (p. 810.16–24), where it is stated that the meditative practices involving
the manipulation of the cakras at the heart, navel, throat, and forehead are taught in
the thirteenth chapter of the *Guhyagarbhatantra, and that the meditative techniques
of striking at the core (gnad du bsnun pa) of these four cakras are called the
“quintessential instruction (or rather, here, meditative technique) of Samantabhadra”
(kun tu bzang po’i man ngag), the “quintessential instruction of Samantabhadrā”
(kun tu bzang mo’i man ngag), the “quintessential instruction of accurate procedure”
250 ORNA ALMOGI

associated literature in greater detail, and with which I shall be mainly

concerned in this paper, since it is the location where gnosis is said to
abide.

(a) Eight Pure Essence Channels (rtsa’i dwangs ma brgyad) or Eight

Petals of Channels (rtsa’i ’dab ma brgyad) in the Centre of the Heart
The gSang thigs and its commentary, which seem to be the main
sources for this particular meta-physiology, are not without textual
problems.32 Nonetheless the main points can be more or less extracted,
occasionally with the help of other works dealing with the same topic,
such as Klong-chen-pa’s Shing rta chen po.33 According to these works,
there are eight pure essence channels (rtsa’i dwangs/dangs/dwang ma),
commonly referred to in the literature as petals of channels (rtsa’i ’dab
ma), in the cakra of the Dharma[kāya] in the heart. Three of them,
described as great, are said to be outer ones, and five of them inner
ones. In the centre of the five inner ones there is the seminal drop (thig
le: bindu) of bodhicitta (i.e. bodhicitta in its gnoseo-physiological
sense). It is located in an empty space within the heart, where the eight
pure essence channels form a network with secondary channels (rtsa
bran) said to resemble a curved rope (thag pa gug pa). Of these eight
pure essence channels, three are said to be of true reality (chos nyid kyi
rtsa), one of gnosis (ye shes kyi rtsa), three of one’s continuum (rang
rgyud kyi rtsa), and one of qualities (yon tan gyi rtsa).34

(sbyor ba dag pa’i man ngag), and the “quintessential instruction of great pervasion”
(khyab rdal chen po’i man ngag), respectively.
32
Most particularly, the commentary does not seem to be a coherent text. It appears
that it is the result of the merging of two different commentaries, possibly by two
different authors, since each point is explained twice and often slightly differently,
not so much, that is, in a contradictory as in either a repetitive or supplementary
manner. Moreover, the reading of both the basic text and its commentary is often
uncertain. The fact that the extracanonical versions found in the NyK often offer
readings different from the ones found in the canon only adds to the ambiguity of
the reading. To resolve these problems a careful edition of these texts and the
consultation of related works will be necessary, a task that cannot be undertaken in
the present paper.
33
Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fols. 8b5–17a3, 50b4–55a2).
34
Note that according to the bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad, three channels are of true
reality, three of gnosis, one of the continuum, and one of qualities (pp. 58.6–59.1):
snying ga’i rtsa ’dab brgyad kyi gsum ni chos nyid kyi rtsa zhes bya| gsum ni ye shes
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 251

These essence channels are described as follows: Inside the

channels of true reality there is a yellow light (’od ser po), circular in
shape (dbyibs zlum po) and resembling a mixture of mercury (dngul
chu) and melted butter (zhun mar). Its essence-syllable (snying po:
hṛdaya) is OṂ; its phonic seeds (sa bon: bīja) are SU, situated on top of
the essence-syllable, and TRI, situated beneath it. The colour of these
three syllables is said to be like the colour of a pitched tent made of silk
brocade (za ’og gi gur phub pa).
Inside the channel of gnosis there is a blue (mthing ga) light that
is square in shape, and like a raised rope (zhags pa bsdogs/thogs pa).35 It
resembles a mirage on the surface of a river in springtime, or a dewdrop
(zil pa) on the tip of an ash-coloured leaf of grass (rtsa skya’i kha na).36
The essence-syllable is HŪṂ, and the phonic seeds are A, situated on
top of the essence-syllable, and NRI, situated beneath it. Inside the
channels of one’s continuum there is a red light (’od dmar po) in the
shape of a crescent (zla gam). It resembles a red silk pennon (le brgan
lce) running through a crystal ball (shel sgong). The colour is also said
to resemble liquid copper tinged with brass. The essence-syllable is
ĀḤ,37 and the phonic seeds are PRE, situated on top of the essence-
syllable, and DU, situated beneath it. The channel of qualities is
described only briefly in the gSang thigs and its commentary, and in the
other works consulted by me. It can be merely stated at this stage that
the light found in it is dark-red (’od dmar nag),38 and that the qualities
situated in it are said to be both good and bad.

kyi rtsa zhes bya| gcig ni rang rgyud kyi rtsa zhes bya| gcig ni yon tan gyi rtsa zhes
bya ste de ltar brgyad do||.
35
The precise meaning of zhags pa bsdogs pa and its connection with a square shape
is not quite clear. Cf. the Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fol. 12a5–6): zhags pa thogs
pa’am sbrul ’khyil ba dang ’dra’o||. See also the bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (p. 59.3),
where the shape is also compared to a “coiled snake” (sbrul dkyus pa).
36
The text names here as an alternative the colour red in the shape of a crescent (zla
gam) and compares it to a red silk pennon (le brgan lce) running through a crystal
ball (shel sgong) and compares the light of the following channel to a mirage, and so
forth. It seems, however, that the description of these two channels was mistakenly
reversed.
37
The forms A and Ā are also found, but they seem to be faulty.
38
This detail is missing in the gSang thigs and is supplemented from the bKa’ brgyad
rnam bshad (p. 59.4–5). Note, however, that some paragraphs later there is a
reference to the dark-red colour which runs through the channel’s pure essence of
252 ORNA ALMOGI

The syllables A and NRI are said to run through the breath’s
impure essences (snyigs ma: kaṣāya); SU and TRI, through the
channel’s impure essences; and PRE and DU, through the blood’s
impure essences. The channel’s pure essence (rtsa’i dwangs ma) runs
through the yellow light; the breath’s pure essence (dbugs kyi dwangs
ma), through the blue; and the blood’s pure essence (khrag gi dwangs
ma), through the red. The phonic seeds are the causes of saṃsāra, and
the essence-syllables are the causes of gnosis and thus nirvāṇa. These
two, namely, the causes of purification and pollution, are said to be
commonly mixed with one another, and they in turn to be mixed with
the seminal drop of bodhicitta.
The yellow light of the channels of true reality houses the
fundamental mind (kun gzhi’i rnam par shes pa: ālayavijñāna); the blue
light of the channel of gnosis, the mental perception (yid kyi rnam par
shes pa: manovijñāna); the red light of the channels of one’s continuum,
the defiled mind (nyon mongs pa’i yid: kliṣṭamanas); and the dark-red
light of the channel of qualities, the five types of sense perception (sgo
lnga’i rnam shes). Taking birth as a god or a human is said to be
facilitated by the mental perception, and the seeds of such births are
found in the syllables A and NRI; taking birth as a semi-god (lha ma
yin: asura) or an animal is facilitated by the fundamental mind, and the
seeds of such births are found in the syllables SU and TRI; and taking
birth as a hungry ghost (yi dwags: preta) or hell-being is facilitated by
the perceptions of the senses and the defiled [mind], and the seeds of
such births are found in the syllables PRE and DU.39 This arrangement
is said to be found in the continuum of each of the sentient beings of the
six realms. The above description of the eight essence channels in the
heart can thus be summarised in the form of a table as follows:

the five doors, that is, the five sense organs—with no mention, though, of the
channel of qualities.
39
The correlation of the phonic seeds TRI and PRE with animals and hungry ghosts,
respectively, is according to rDo-grub’s mDzod lde (p. 431.1–6). The gSang thigs
’grel pa has it the other way around, which is obviously an error, evidently due to
confusion between these two phonic seeds (TRI being often spelt TRE).
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 253

Type of 3 channels of true 1 channel of 3 channels of 1 channel

channel reality (chos nyid gnosis (ye shes one’s continu- of qualities
kyi rtsa) kyi rtsa) um (rang rgyud (yon tan gyi
kyi rtsa) rtsa)
Colour yellow blue red dark-red
Shape circle square crescent
Type of pure channel’s pure breath’s pure blood’s pure
essence (dwangs essence (rtsa’i essence (dbugs essence (khrag
ma) dwangs ma) kyi dwangs gi dwangs ma)
ma)
Essence-
syllable (snying OṂ HŪṂ ĀḤ
po: hṛdaya) =
cause of purify-
cation/ gnosis /
nirvāṇa
Phonic seeds SU and TRI run A and NRI run PRE and DU
(sa bon: bīja) = through the through the run through the
causes of pollu- channel’s impure breath’s im- blood’s impure
tion /ignorance essence (rtsa’i pure essence essence (khrag
/saṃsāra snyigs ma) (dbugs kyi gi snyigs ma)
snyigs ma)
Type of mind Fundamental mental defiled mind five types
residing in the mind (ālaya- perception (kliṣṭamanas) of sense
channel vijñāna) (manovijñāna) perception
Birth caused by semi-gods & gods & hungry ghosts & hell-beings
the pertinent animals humans
phonic seeds
and type of
mind

(b) The Five Pure Essences (dwangs ma lnga)

The gnosis immanent in the body is closely related to the pure essences
just mentioned, which are described as follows:
1. The channel’s pure essence (rtsa’i dwangs ma), located in the centre
of the heart, resembles a white silk thread (dar dkar gyi skud pa) and is
said to be as thin as 1/50th of the diameter of a strand of a horsetail (rta
rnga) and to have the form of a cobweb (ba thag), serves from
beginningless time as the support of the psycho-physiological complex
(phung po’i rten byed), and therefore is a pure essence of the elements.
254 ORNA ALMOGI

On the saṃsāric level it appears as the element of earth, while on the

nirvāṇic level it appears as the female deity Locanā; it is in fact the
gnosis of great emptiness (stong pa chen po’i ye shes), for it serves as
the base from which everything assumes the nature of the purified
dharmadhātu (rnam par dag pa’i ngang du ma gyur pa med pa’i rten
byed).
2. Within the channel’s pure essence is the blood’s pure essence (khrag
gi dwangs ma), which resembles cinnabar (mtshal cog la ma). This, too,
is a pure essence of the elements, for it purifies the psycho-
physiological complex (phung po dag par byed) from beginningless
time. It appears as water, while in reality it is the female deity Māmakī.
It is in fact the gnosis of equality (mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes:
samatājñāna), whose nature it is to collect or gather everything into the
sphere apart from anybody’s bidding (bkol ba med par dbyings gcig tu
sdud pa’i bdag nyid).
3. The breath’s pure essence (dbugs kyi dwangs ma), said to steam like a
vapour (rlangs pa: bāṣpa) of fine grains of gold (sa le sbram) that have
been found beneath the earth, functions from beginningless time as a
basis for the lightness and mobility of the psycho-physiological
complex (phung po yang zhing g.yo ba’i rten byed), and so it, too, is a
pure essence of the elements. It appears as wind, but in reality it is the
female deity Samayatārā (dam tshig sgrol ma). It is the gnosis of
performing (beneficial) activities (bya ba sgrub pa’i ye shes: kṛtyānu-
ṣṭhānajñāna), whose nature it is to move in the sphere of great bliss
(bde ba chen po’i dbyings su bskyod pa’i rang bzhin).
4. The warmth’s pure essence (drod kyi dwangs ma) is said to resemble
the glittering (’od kyi ngad) or mere shimmer (ngad tsam zhig) of a
mirror in the sun. Its nature is to ripen (smin par byed pa’i rang bzhin)
the psycho-physiological complex from beginningless time, and thus it,
too, is a pure essence of the elements. It appears as fire, while it is in
reality the female deity Pāṇḍaravāsinī (gos dkar mo). It is the discerning
gnosis (so sor rtog pa’i ye shes: pratyavekṣaṇajñāna), that is, gnosis
that realises everything as the sphere of great bliss (thams cad bde ba
chen po’i dbyings su rtogs pa’i ye shes).
5. Within this multi-coloured light exists the great seminal drop of
bodhicitta. It is the great pure essence (dwangs ma chen po). It serves as
a support for the illumination of the psycho-physiological complex
(phung po gsal bar byed pa’i rten byed), and thus it, too, is a pure
essence of the elements. It appears like space, but it is in fact the all-
pervading gnosis, the female deity Samantabhadrā (kun tu bzang mo). It
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 255

provides space for all that both appears and is empty to be illuminated
in the absolute sphere of reality (snang stong thams cad yang dag pa’i
dbyings su gsal ba’i go skabs ’byed). This seminal drop, which
resembles liquid gold or the disk of the rising sun, is insight, the essence
of all female deities. That which looks like a precious stone called ze’u
ka/kha40 placed in the cavity of this liquid gold is the essence of the
male deities including Samantabhadra, the king of method, and that
which looks like the quartz karketana41 hanging from a rail (gdang) is
the mirror-like gnosis (me long lta bu’i ye shes: ādarśajñāna). This is
the essence of the sphere of reality (dharmadhātugarbha), the cause of
all ultimate goals (don dam).
The above description of the five pure essences is summarised
in the next page. In brief, the gnosis (or “awareness,” as it is often
referred to in the rDzogs-chen literature) inherent and immanent in the
body, whose essence is said to be primordially pure (ngo bo ka dag gi
rig pa), abides in the centre of the heart of all sentient beings as the
great pure essence in what Klong-chen-pa calls the “precious secret
womb” (rin po che’i sbubs), or the “naturally luminous palace,” which
is a residence consisting of light, whose radiance flows through the
eight petals in the form of the remaining pure essences, corresponding
to the various kinds of gnosis.
Mi-pham,42 however, equates the first four pure essences with the pure
essences of the earth element (sa’i dwangs ma), water element (chu
khams kyi dwangs ma), fire element (me’i sa bon dwangs ma), and wind
element (rlung gi dwangs ma), respectively, while also designating the
brilliant inner space (bar snang sang sang po), which provides the
needed room (go ’byed), as the pure essence of the space element (nam
mkha’i dwangs ma). Within the concentrate of these five pure essences
(dwangs ma lnga ’dus) is said to reside the mind’s pure essence (sems
kyi dwangs ma), which is referred to above as the great pure essence
(dwangs ma chen po) and described as bodhicitta, the great seminal
drop that has gnosis as its essence (ye shes snying po’i thig le chen po).
Thus the expression “six great pure essences” (dwangs ma chen po
drug) is employed by him.43

40
It is not clear what precious stone ze’u ka/kha might be.
41
See Mahāvyutpatti no. 5949; MW, s.v. karkeṇata; karketana.
42
bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 59.6–61.1).
43
See ibid. (p. 62.2).
256 ORNA ALMOGI

Type of Resem- Function Appear- Actual na- Type of

Pure blance ance (saṃ- ture (nirvā- gnosis
Essence sāra) = ṇa) = one
one of the of the five
elements female
deities
1. channel’s white serves as a earth Locanā gnosis of great
pure silk support for emptiness (stong
essence thread the psycho- pa chen po’i ye
physiological shes)
complex
2. blood’s cinnabar purifies the water Māmakī gnosis of equali-
pure psycho- ty (mnyam pa
essence physiological nyid kyi ye shes:
complex samatājñāna)
3. breath’s “vapour” serves as the wind Samayatārā gnosis of per-
pure of gold basis for the forming (benefi-
essence lightness and cial) activities
mobility of (bya ba sgrub
the psycho- pa’i ye shes:
physiological kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-
complex jñāna)
4.warmth’s glittering ripens the fire Pāṇḍara- discerning gno-
pure of a mir- psycho- vāsinī sis (so sor rtog
essence ror in the physiological pa’i ye shes:
sun complex pratyavekṣaṇa-
jñāna)
5. great liquid imparts space Samanta- all-pervading
pure es- gold or glow/radi- bhadrā gnosis = mirror-
sence = the disk ance to the like gnosis (me
seminal of the psycho- long lta bu’i ye
drop of rising physiological shes: ādarśa-
bodhicitta sun complex jñāna)

6. NATURAL EXPOSURE TO THE INHERENT AND IMMANENT GNOSIS

According to the rNying-ma tantric tradition, a qualified master
introduces the disciple to the inherent and immanent gnosis within him,
and the disciple is supposed to recognise it and finally experience it as a
soteriological event by practising one or more of the prescribed yogic
practices. If a yogin succeeds in achieving the desired soteriological
goal during his life, so much the better, but even if he does not, a
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 257

number of options have been put at his disposal. We have seen that the
meta-physiological bases and the inherent and immanent gnosis have
been conceived of as having a “support-supported relationship” (rten
dang brten pa’i ’brel pa), which is, strictly speaking, a very weak
relationship.
The question is what happens when the psycho-physiological
bases of a person give in and cease to function as substrata for the
inherent and immanent gnosis. Such moments, such as upon the
occasion of dying, are opportunities that a yogin is supposed to seize
and turn to soteriological advantage. Dying in Buddhism may be
defined as a process during which the physiological constituents of a
person gradually withdraw and cease to function as substrata for the
psychical constituents (i.e. mind and the mental factors), and during
which the entire psycho-physiological apparatus of an individual totally
collapses. It is said that the intellectual-emotional defilements (nyon
mongs pa: kleśa) described as the eighty inherent conceptual entities
(rang bzhin gyi rtog pa brgyad bcu), namely, thirty-three associated
with desire (’dod chags: rāga), forty associated with aversion (zhe
sdang: dveṣa), and seven associated with disorientation (gti mug:
moha), succumb at the end of the dissolution process. The process of
dissolution is vividly described by Klong-chen-pa in his Shing rta chen
po.44 The white pure essence of the right main channel (inherited from
one’s father) dissolves into the upper end (yar sna) of the central
channel, marked with the syllable HAṂ. The red pure essence of the
left main channel (inherited from one’s mother) dissolves into the lower
end (mar sna) of the central channel, marked with the syllable A. The
white and red pure essences dissolve finally into the “great pure essence
of the luminous gnosis in the heart” (snying ga’i ye shes ’od gsal gyi
dangs ma chen po). All gross and subtle conceptual entities cease, and
the inherent and immanent gnosis is laid bare. This is a unique moment
in saṃsāric existence—when the inherent and immanent gnosis is rid of
all its obscurations (sgrib pa: āvaraṇa) and is in all respects identical
with a buddha’s gnosis. In the event of recognition at this juncture, this
gnosis would remain naked forever and not be defiled ever again. In
other words, a sentient being would become a buddha then and there.
According to Klong-chen-pa, this is what makes the idea of the so-

44
Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fols. 106b5–109a6).
258 ORNA ALMOGI

called “release on the primordial ground” (ye thog tu grol ba) found in
the rDzogs-chen literature so rational.45
An ordinary person would simply pass by this critical moment
without even having realised it. For a yogin who has still not been able
to make the final breakthrough, the amount of time in which the
inherent gnosis remains in its immaculate state would depend on the
length of what is called a “meditation day” (bsam gtan gyi zhag), which
varies according to the quality of the yogin’s meditative training. A
meditation day is the period of meditative absorption that is completely
free from conceptual thoughts. In other words, it is the gap between the
preceding and the following conceptual thought, and is thus
characterised by luminosity and lucidity. The longer one manages to
abide in such a meditation day during the meditative practice, the
greater is the chance that one becomes completely awakened during
such moments of a total collapse of the psycho-physiological apparatus,
and one is thus commonly advised to stabilize one’s meditative
concentration while still alive.46

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the present paper an attempt has been made to provide a general idea
of the meta-physiology of the gnosis said to be inherent and immanent
in the centre of the heart of all sentient beings; its abode; and how one’s
physiological constituents can be exploited to induce this gnosis to
manifest. It has also been shown that although this gnosis can be caused
to emerge by means of meditative techniques, it can also become
manifest in the course of a natural process of dissolution, and that then
even an ordinary being can come very close to a state normally
accessible only to a fully awakened being. I should like to conclude by
stating that, while one does occasionally find statements that
descriptions of this gnosis in terms of light, colours, shapes, and the like
are merely meant as aids for confused sentient beings who have not yet
recognised this gnosis within themselves,47 the physicality and

45
Ibid. (vol. 2, fol. 109b3): bzhi pa’i dus su phra ba thim pas sgrib pa mtha’ dag bral
ba’i skabs shig der ’byung bas ye thog tu grol ba’i ’thad pa ste| sangs rgyas mngon
du byed dus bzhin no||.
46
Ibid. (vol. 2, fols. 109b3–110a4).
47
Prajñāpraveśa (P, fol. 413b5–6; S, vol. 43, pp. 837.19–838.2):
sems can ma lus thams cad la||
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 259

materiality ascribed to gnosis in such descriptions is too vivid to be

ignored, and it appears that such descriptions have been often taken
literally.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Almogi 2009 Orna Almogi, Rong-zom-pa’s Discourses on Buddhology:

A Study of Various Conceptions of Buddhahood in Indian
Sources with Special Reference to the Controversy
Surrounding the Existence of Gnosis (ye shes: jñāna) as
Presented by the Eleventh-Century Tibetan Scholar Rong-
zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po. Studia Philologica Buddhica
Monograph Series 24. Tokyo: International Institute for
Buddhist Studies.
Arthaviniścayasūtra N. H. Samtani, The Arthaviniścayasūtra & Its Commen-
tary (Nibandh[a]na) (Written by Bhikṣu Vīryaśrīdatta of
Śrī-Nālandāvihāra). Critically edited and annotated for
the first time with introduction and several indices. Patna:
K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971. Reprint: 2005.
Bendall & Rouse 1922 Cecil Bendall & W. D. Rouse, trs., Śikṣā Samuccaya: A
Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine Compiled by Śāntideva
Chiefly from Early Mahāyāna Sūtras. 1922. Reprint:
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
BHSD Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar
and Dictionary, Volume 2: Dictionary. 1953. Reprint:
Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1985.
bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, dPal sgrub pa chen
po’i bka’ brgyad kyi spyi don rnam par bshad pa dngos
grub snying po. In MS, vol. 21, pp. 1–207.
Bodhicaryāvatāra Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, ed., Bodhicaryāvatāra.
Bibliotheca Indica 280. Calcutta 1960.
Cakrasaṃvarapañcakrama Vajraghaṇṭa alias Ghaṇṭāpāda, “Śrīcakrasaṃvara-pañca-
krama of Ghaṇṭāpāda. dPal ’khor lo sdom pa’i rim pa
lnga pa| mdzad pa po| rDo rje dril bu pa.” Dhīḥ 39, 2005,
pp. 149–168; P 2150; D 1433; S 0331, vol. 11.
Catuḥśataka Āryadeva, Catuḥśataka. See Lang 1986.

ye shes lnga yis kun khyab kyang||

rang gi rnam rtog bsgribs byas te||
ye shes lnga yi don ma mthong||
ma mthong rmongs pa thams cad la||
ye shes mtshan nyid bstan pa’i phyir||
dkar dang dmar dang ser ba dang||
ljang gu la sogs nag por bstan||.
260 ORNA ALMOGI

Crosby & Skilton 1995 Kate Crosby & Andrew Skilton, trs., Śāntideva. The
Bodhicaryāvatāra. With a general introduction by Paul
Williams. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
D The sDe-dge Edition of the bsTan-’gyur. Nos. according
to: Hakuju Ui et al., eds., A Complete Catalogue of the
Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥgyur).
Sendai: Tōhoku Imperial University, 1934.
Das 2003 Rahul Peter Das. The Origin of the Life of a Human Being:
Conception and the Female According to Ancient Indian
Medical and Sexological Literature. Indian Medical
Tradition 6. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2003.
Dasgupta 1962 Shashi Bhusan Dasgupta, Obscure Religious Cults.
Second and revised edition of 1946. Calcutta: Firma K. L.
Mukhopadhyay, 1962.
dPe chung rang gnas Vilāsavajra (attributed), sGyu ’phrul dpe chung rang gnas
kyi rim pa. P 4748; not found in D; S 2624, vol. 43.
Dus ’khor ’grel pa Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, Dus ’khor nang gi
le’u’i ’grel pa. In MS, vol. 17, pp. 601–927.
gSang bdag dgongs rgyan Lo-chen Dharma-shrī, dPal gsang ba’i snying po de kho
na nyid nges pa’i rgyud kyi ’grel pa gsang bdag dgongs
rgyan. In NyK, vol. 32 (khi), pp. 5–458.
gSang bdag zhal lung Id., dPal gsang ba’i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa’i
rgyud kyi rgyal po sgyu ’phrul drwa ba spyi don gyi sgo
nas gtan la ’bebs par byed pa’i legs bshad gsang bdag
zhal lung. 2 vols (e & waṃ). In NyK, vols. 33–34 (gi–ngi).
gSang thigs Vimalamitra (attributed), gSang ba’i thigs pa’i man ngag.
P 4738; not found in D; S 2600, vol. 43; KShG, vol. 81
(zhu), pp. 45–47.
gSang thigs ’grel pa Id. (attributed), gSang ba’i thigs pa’i man ngag gi ’grel
pa. P 4765; not found in D; S 2641, vol. 44; KShG, vol. 81
(zhu), pp. 49–67.
Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā Vajragarbha, Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā. See Shendge 2004.
Horner 1959 I. B. Horner, tr., The Collection of the Middle Length
Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya). Vol. 3: The Final Fifty
Discourses (Uparipaṇṇāsa). 1959. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 2004.
KShG bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa. Compiled and edited by
mKhan-po ’Jam-dbyangs. 120 vols. Chengdu, 1999.
Lang 1986 Karen Lang, Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka: On the
Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge.
Indiske Studier 7. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986.
Langer 2001 Rita Langer, Das Bewusstsein als Träger des Lebens:
Einige weniger beachtete Aspekte des viññāṇa im
Pālikanon. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und
Buddhismuskunde 52. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische
und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2001.
 MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 261

lDe’u chos ’byung mKhas-pa lDe’u, rGya bod kyi chos ’byung rgyas pa.
Chief ed. Chab-spel-tshe-brtan-phun-tshogs. Gangs can
rig mdzod 3. Lhasa: Bod-ljongs-mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang,
1987.
Mahāvyutpatti Sakaki Ryōzaburō, ed., Honyaku myōgi taishū (Mahā-
vyutpatti). 2 vols. 1916. Reprint: Tokyo: Kokusho
Kankōkai, 1987.
mDzod lde rDo-grub ’Jigs-med-bstan-pa’i-nyi-ma, dPal gsang ba’i
snying po’i rgyud kyi spyi don nyung ngu’i ngag gis rnam
par ’byed pa rin chen mdzod kyi lde mig. In NyK, vol. 35
(ci), pp. 367–588.
MS ’Jam mgon ’ju mi pham rgya mtsho’i gsung ’bum rgyas pa
sde dge dgon chen par ma. The Expanded Redaction of the
Complete Works of ’Ju Mi-pham. Reconstructed and
reproduced from the surviving prints at the order of H. H.
Dilgo Chhentse Rimpoche. Paro: Lama Ngodrup &
Sherab Drimey, 1984–1993.
MW Sir Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Diction-
ary. 1899. Reprint: Tokyo: Meicho Fukyukai Co., 1986.
Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995 Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi, trs., The Middle
Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the
Majjhima Nikāya. 1995. Second Edition: Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 2001.
Negi 1993–2005 J. S. Negi et al., Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary. 16 vols.
Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies,
Dictionary Unit, 1993–2005.
NyG rNying ma rgyud ’bum [mTshams-brag Edition].
Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan, 1982.
NyK rÑiṅ ma Bka’ ma rgyas pa. A Collection of Teachings and
Initiations of the Rñiṅ-ma-pa Tradition Passed through
Continuous and Unbroken Oral Lineages from the Ancient
Masters. Completely edited and restructured by H. H.
Bdud-’joms Rin-po-che on the basis of the successive
Smin-grol-gliṅ and Rdzogs-chen Rgyal-sras redactions.
Kalimpong: Dupjung Lama, 1982–1987.
’Od gsal snying po Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, gSang ’grel phyogs bcu
mun sel gyi spyi don ’od gsal snying po. In MS, vol. 19,
pp. 1–271.
P The Peking Edition of the bsTan-’gyur. Nos. according to:
Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed., The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking
Edition: Catalogue & Index. Reduced-size Edition. Kyoto:
Rinsen Book Co., 1985.
Prajñāpraveśa Vimalamitra (attributed), Mahāyogaprajñāpraveśa-
cakṣurupadeśa. P 4725; not found in D; S 2601, vol. 43.
rDo rje me long gi rgyud rDo rje sems dpa’i sgyu ’phrul dra ba gsang ba thams cad
kyi me long zhes bya ba’i rgyud. In NyG, vol. 22 (za), pp.
481–692.
S bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma). Sichuan: Krung-go’i-bod-
kyi-shes-rig-dpe-skrun-khang, 1994–2005.
262 ORNA ALMOGI

sGyu ’phrul rgya mtsho’i sGyu ’phrul rgya mtsho zhes bya ba’i rgyud. In NyG, vol.
rgyud 22 (za), pp. 1–103.
Shendge 2004 Malati J. Shendge, ed., Ṣaṭsāhasrikāhevajraṭīkā: A
Critical Edition. Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 2004.
Shes bya mdzod Kong-sprul Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho, Theg pa’i sgo kun las
btus pa gsung rab rin po che’i mdzod bslab pa gsum legs
par ston pa’i bstan bcos shes bya kun khyab [rtsa ’grel]
(on cover: Shes bya kun khyab). Eds. rDo-rje-rgyal-po &
Thub-bstan-nyi-ma. Beijing: Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang,
2002.
Shing rta chen po Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-’od-zer, rDzogs pa chen po sems
nyid ngal gso’i ’grel pa shing rta chen po. 2 vols. In Ngal
gso skor gsum, vols. nya & ta. Gangtok: Dodrup Chen
Rinpoche. Reprint: Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan,
n.d.
Śikṣāsamuccaya Cecil Bendall, ed., Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium of
Buddhist Teaching Compiled by Çāntideva Chiefly from
Earlier Mahāyāna-sūtras. 1897–1902. Bibliotheca
Buddhica 1. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992.
Snellgrove 1987 David Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian
Buddhists and Their Tibetan Successors. 1987. Reprint:
Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2002.
Steinkellner 1981 Ernst Steinkellner, tr., Eintritt in das Leben zur
Erleuchtung (Bodhicaryāvatāra): Lehrgedicht des
Mahāyāna aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt. Śāntideva. Diede-
richs Gelbe Reihe. Munich: Eugen Diederichs Verlag,
1981. Reprint: 1989.
Tshig mdzod chen mo Krang-dbyi-sun et al., Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo.
Beijing: Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1993.
Wangchuk 2007 Dorji Wangchuk, The Resolve to Become a Buddha: A
Study of the Bodhicitta Concept in Indo-Tibetan
Buddhism. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph
Series 23. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist
Studies, 2007.
Yid kyi mun sel Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-’od-zer, dPal gsang ba’i snying
po’i spyi don legs par bshad pa’i snang bas yid kyi mun pa
thams cad sel ba. In NyK, vol. 27 (sha), pp. 5–182.
 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

The So-called Yoga of Suppression in the

Pātañjala Yogaśāstra∗

In his outstanding pioneering study “Strukturen yogischer Meditation”

Oberhammer1 shows beyond doubt that the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra (PYŚ)
teaches four kinds of yogic meditations which differ from each other
with regard to their respective objects of meditation as well as with re-
gard to their structure, i.e. in the treatment (or development) of content
of consciousness within meditation.2 The present paper takes up Ober-
hammer’s line of thought with regard to the first two kinds of medita-
tion which are the subject of larger parts of the PYŚ’s first chapter, the
Samādhipāda. A fresh look at these meditations has become possible
(and indeed necessary), as there has been a good deal of scientific pro-
gress within the last thirty years.
First of all, there has been a considerable advancement in yoga
philology. Oberhammer had to rely on the first edition of the Pātañjala-
yogaśāstravivaraṇa (Madras 1952), which is based on one single manu-
script. The version of the basic text (i.e. the YS together with the YBh)
published together with the Vivaraṇa is not, as the title of the edition
might suggest, a critically edited text. Very probably the editors simply
copied it from the edition published by Kāśīnātha Śāstrī Āgāśe as No.
47 of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series in 1904.3 Every now and then
the editors of the Vivaraṇa modified the text of their exemplar with

∗
Sincere thanks to Professor Eli Franco for his thought provoking comments on an
earlier version of this paper. I would also like to thank Susanne Kammüller, M.A.
and Dr. Elizabeth De Michelis for taking a close look at my English.
1
Cf. the review of Oberhammer’s work by Alper 1980.
2
Oberhammer 1977: 134–230. Since the publication of Oberhammer’s study, Frau-
wallner’s interpretation of the PYŚ as dealing with only two different kinds of me-
ditation (1953: 427–443) is clearly outdated. Bronkhorst 1993: 68–75, who ap-
parently is not aware of Oberhammer 1977, distinguishes two kinds of meditation in
the YS leading to saṃprajñāta samādhi and to asaṃprajñāta (samādhi) respectively.
3
Cf. Maas 2006: xiii–xxv.
264 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

readings they derived from a reconstruction of the Vivaraṇa’s basic

text.4
In the meantime, we have not only come into possession of a
new critical edition of the Vivaraṇa’s first chapter (YVi), but also of a
critical edition of the first chapter of the YS together with the YBh,
based on 21 printed editions and 25 manuscripts (Maas 2006).5 Accord-
ing to manuscript colophons and secondary evidence, both texts taken
collectively bear the common title Pātañjala Yogaśāstra and, as I argue
in the introduction to my edition, probably have one single, common
“author” named Patañjali.6 This author would have collected the sūtras
from different sources and furnished them with explanations, which in
later times came to be regarded as the YBh.7 The date of the work is
still uncertain, but a time span reaching from 325 to 425 A.D. seems to
be most likely.8
In accordance with Frauwallner (1953), Oberhammer calls the
first two types of yoga as discussed in the PYŚ “yoga of suppression”
(Unterdrückungsyoga). This, however, is an unfortunate designation, as
it evokes misleading associations. “Unterdrückung,” according to Fröh-
lich’s Wörterbuch der Psychologie has a double meaning. In psychology
the word designates “the complete deletion of a reaction; in contrast to
‘inhibition’ (Hemmung) which can be removed ….” In psychoanalysis,
on the other hand, ‘suppression’ means a “voluntary suppression of cer-
tain impulses for action (Handlungsimpulse); in contrast to repression
(Verdrängung)”.9 In the course of this paper it should become obvious

4
Cf. Maas 2006: xiix.
5
Critically edited texts, of course, facilitate the correct understanding of passages
which have been corrupted in the course of the transmission. The critical edition of
PYŚ I.29 provides two striking examples for an improved text. The vulgate reads
the corrupt svarūpadarśanam instead of the correct svapuruṣadarśanam in I.29,3,
and instead of the correct madīya puruṣaḥ, it reads yaḥ puruṣaḥ (or simply puruṣaḥ)
in the next line. For a more detailed discussion of these variants cf. Maas 2006:
lxviii f., 104 f., and 168 f.
6
Bronkhorst 1985: 191–203 comes to the same conclusion, albeit for different rea-
sons.
7
The identification of Patañjali’s “source books” is of course impossible as no syste-
matic expositions of pre-classical Yoga have come down to us. For the considerable
influence of Buddhist terminology on Patañjali see La Valée Poussin 1936–1937.
8
Maas 2006: xii–xix.
9
Fröhlich 1993: 413, col. 2, s.v.: “Unterdrückung (suppression). [1] Bezeichnung für
die vollständige Löschung einer Reaktion; im Unterschied zur Hemmung, die durch
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 265

that neither of these meanings is applicable in yoga psychology. In us-

ing the designation “yoga of suppression” Frauwallner has neither a
psychological nor a psychoanalytical connotation in mind. In his view,
the use of “suppression” is justified by the type of meditation which Pa-
tañjali teaches in the first chapter of his work, starting with YS I.2 yo-
gaś cittavttinirodhaḥ “yoga is the shutdown of the mental capacity’s
processes.”10 The aim of this type of yoga, according to Frauwallner is
to “suppress all mental activity, and to eliminate cognition”11. The sec-
ond part of this statement is not fully consonant with the text from
which it is derived. If deletion of cognition as a whole were the aim of
yoga, this would imply not only a deletion of mental processes, but also
a deletion of the self, which is per definitionem pure consciousness. Pa-
radoxical as this might seem, the aim of yoga is not the elimination of
consciousness but the deletion of consciousness content.12 Moreover,
the term “suppression” should be avoided because of its use as technical
term in psychology and psychoanalysis. In replacing the term, I would
suggest the expression “non-theistic yogic concentration,” which would
do justice to its theistic variant, as well as to samāpatti and to saṃyama,
which are under discussion in later parts of the PYŚ.13
Before discussing “non-theistic yogic concentration,” I would
like to briefly brush up our knowledge of the metaphysical and onto-
logical foundations of Sāṅkhya Yoga, as far as they are indispensable
for the following discussion of yogic states of consciousness and forms
of meditation.14
Classical Sāṅkhya Yoga is known to be an ontologically dualis-
tic philosophy. It upholds that the world is divided into two fundamen-
tally different kinds of entities. On the one hand there exists an infinite

spontane Erholung u.ä. wieder aufgehoben werden kann. … [2] Allgemeine psycho-
analytische Bezeichnung für das willkürliche Unterdrücken bestimmter Handlungs-
impluse bzw. Handlungsweisen; im Unterschied zur Verdrängung, die durch unbe-
wußt wirksam Abwehrmechanismen erfolgen soll.”
10
Oberhammer 1977 argues convincingly that the first chapter of the PYŚ does not
deal with one single kind of meditation, but with three different types.
11
Frauwallner (1953: 438): “… sucht man durch den Yoga jede geistige Tätigkeit zu
unterdrücken und damit auch jede Erkenntnis auszuschalten.”
12
Cf. the immediately following summary of “the metaphysical and ontological foun-
dations of Sāṅkhya Yoga.”
13
For which see Oberhammer 1977: 177–209, and 209–230.
14
Cf. Schmithausen 1968: 331.
266 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

number of transcendental “selves,” or “spirits” (puruṣa). The selves are

pure consciousness, bare of any content. They are infinite—not only in
number but also with regard to time and space—inactive, and un-
changeable. Besides the selves, the world consists of the products of
primordial matter (prakti) which is completely unconscious, active and
changeable. The products of matter not only make up all things of the
outside world, but in human beings they also fashion the sense-capaci-
ties (buddhīndriya) as well as the mental capacity which is most fre-
quently called citta.15 These metaphysical assumptions are crucial for
the view of classical Sāṅkhya Yoga on epistemological issues, as men-
tal processes are thought to depend upon the existence—and as it were
“interaction”—of both kinds of entities. The mental capacity supplies
the content of a mental process to the self, which by “seeing” it “pro-
vides” the mental content with consciousness. Everyday experience, of
course, does not conform to this analysis. We neither experience con-
sciousness without content, nor do we experience content without con-
sciousness. According to Sāṅkhya Yoga, however, the analysis of men-
tal processes in every day experience as being of a uniform nature is
wrong. It is caused by nescience (avidyā), which deludes the self about
its own true ontological status. The self—pure consciousness—is at-
tracted by the mental capacity like iron is attracted by a lodestone. This
“attraction” is possible because of the mutual compatibility or fitness
(yogyatā) of the self and the citta. The mental capacity, which consists
mainly of the luminous substance sattva, one of three constituents of
primordial matter, is often called “the visible” (dṣya). It displays its
content to the self, which frequently is designated as “the seer” (draṣṭ).
Their compatibility is determined by their nature and cannot—in terms
of Sāṅkhya Yoga—be meaningfully questioned.
Being under attraction of the mental capacity, the self identifies
with it. The self is erroneously convinced to be affected by the content
of experience. It feels happiness and suffers pain, although these, as
well as all other kinds of mental events, exclusively take place within
the mental capacity. In reality, the self, due to its transcendental onto-
logical status, is incapable of being anything else than it is, viz. pure,
contentless, and unchanging consciousness.

15
The terms manas or buddhi are also in frequent use without any apparent difference
in meaning. Cf. Frauwallner 1953: 411.
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 267

The aim of Sāṅkhya Yoga in its soteriological dimension is to

end the wrong identification of the self with its mental capacity once
and for all, which amounts to the final liberation from the cycle of re-
births and its innate suffering. The means to this end is the realization of
the ontological difference between the self and matter in meditative
concentration, which is therefore called “knowledge of the difference”
(vivekakhyāti). This knowledge is the final content of consciousness, the
last involvement of the self with its mental capacity. When the citta is
no longer interested in such “knowledge of the difference,” even this
content ceases to exist and gives room for the un-eclipsed self percep-
tion of the self. The mental capacity continues to exist as long as the
liberated yogi lives, due to mental impressions (saṃskāras) which it has
stored. Finally, after the physical death of the yogi, the mental capacity
dissolves in matter (prakti). The self, on the other hand, continues to
exist in isolation (kaivalya), freed from the bonds of the cycle of re-
births.
Right at the beginning of his work, Patañjali (PYŚ I.1,2 f.) de-
fines yoga in a very general way:
yogaḥ samādhiḥ; sa ca sārvabhaumaś cittasya dharmaḥ. kṣiptaṃ mūḍhaṃ vi-
kṣiptam ekāgraṃ niruddham iti cittabhūmayaḥ. tatra vikṣipte cetasi vikṣepopa-
sarjanībhūtaḥ samādhir na yogapakṣe vartate. yas tv ekāgre cetasi sadbhūtam
arthaṃ dyotayati, kṣiṇoti kleśān, karmabandhanāni ślathayati, nirodham āmu-
khīkaroti, sa saṃprajñāto yoga ity ākhyāyate. sarvavttinirodhe tv
asaṃprajñātaḥ. tasya lakṣaṇābhidhitsayedaṃ sūtraṃ pravavte—yogaś
cittavttinirodhaḥ (YS I.2).
Yoga is awareness / concentration; and this is the quality of the mental
capacity in all its states (literally: levels). Fixed, dull, distracted, one-pointed,
and shut down [these] are the states of the mental capacity. Of these,
awareness / concentration which exists in [the first three states including] the
distracted one, as they are under the influence of distractive factors (like
disease, lethargy etc.16), do not belong to the part of [the enumeration which
makes up] yoga [proper]. On the other hand (tu), [concentration being]
conscious [of an object] (saṃprajñāta) is called yoga, which [occurring] in a
one-pointed mental capacity, makes the really true object appear,17 destroys
the defilements, loosens the bonds of karman, [and] brings about the shutdown
[of mental processes]. When all mental processes are shut down, however,
[concentration] is not conscious [of any object]. With the intention to give a
definition of this [concentration not conscious of an object], the [following]

16
The whole group of distractive factors is listed in YS I.30.
17
I take the expression sadbhūtaṃ artham to refer to the self (puruṣa).
268 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

sūtra (YS I.2) has been composed: Yoga is the shutdown of the processes of
the mental capacity.

Patañjali uses the word “yoga” in a number of related meanings. In its

broadest sense “yoga” designates awareness as a characteristic of men-
tal processes in general. There are, however, different kinds of aware-
ness, which qualify five states of the mental capacity. Three states are
not specifically yogic, and this is the reason why Patañjali excludes
them from his exposition. Nevertheless, as Wezler convincingly shows
on the backdrop of information provided by the Vivaraṇa, the arrange-
ment not only of those states specific to yoga, but also of the first three
ones is “quite consistent[ly] … determined by the final goal” of yoga,
viz. stopping the mental processes in general.18 The first state, called
“fixed,” is characterised by a strong and involuntary connection be-
tween the mental capacity and its object.19 The mental capacity, com-
pletely attached to its object, is incapable of becoming aware of any
different object. It is quite obvious that an involuntary fixation to a sin-
gle object completely rules out the possibility of mental training, and
this is the reason why Patañjali places this state at the beginning of his
enumeration.
The second place is held by the “dull” mental capacity, which is
equally involuntarily connected to a single object. Its connection to the
object, however, is very weak. Although the explanations of the YVi are
not comprehensive, one can quite safely regard the dull mental capacity
as having a very basic and limited awareness of its object only.20 The
mental capacity is not able to perceive the object distinctly. This
weakness is the reason why the dull state in terms of yoga psychology is
superior to the state called “fixed.” The lack of firmness seems to
provide the condition for an awareness of different objects, which leads
to a possible transition of the mental capacity to the next higher state,
called distracted.
18
Wezler 1983: 23. Wezler is not aware of Oberhammer 1977 and clings to Frau-
wallner’s differentiation of nirodha- and aṣṭāṅgayoga.
19
YVi 150,2 f.: kṣiptam aniṣṭaviṣayāsañjanena stimitam. “The attached [mental capa-
city] is paralysed by clinging to a not deliberately chosen object.” Cf. Wezler 1983:
20. Oberhammer (1977: 136, n. 6) translates as “... das durch die Färbung durch
nicht angestrebte Gegenstände gebannte [psychische Organ].” I do not see any ne-
cessity to emend °sañjanena to °rañjanena. Moreover, the grammatical number of
°viṣaya° is singular; cf. the following interpretation of this passage.
20
The only explanation is mūḍhaṃ nirvivekam (YVi 150,3).
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 269

For this state, too, the explanations of the YVi are quite scarce.
It simply paraphrases vikṣiptam as nānākṣiptam “being fixed to several
[objects].” Wezler takes this to mean that the mental capacity is bound
to several objects simultaneously.21 I doubt that this interpretation is
correct. The distracted mind is rather bound to several objects in a short
succession of time. It corresponds to our everyday awareness, which
usually lacks permanent concentration on a single object. The content of
consciousness changes according to the different sense data which come
to the mind by means of the sense capacities. The mental capacity is
attached to one object for a more or less short period of time, and be-
comes attached to the next when it has lost interest in the preceding one.
Presumably because the mind in its distracted state is connected to
several objects, it develops a certain distance, or—as the author of YVi
has it—impartiality to its objects. This impartiality provides the mental
capacity with the freedom to deliberately choose a desired object,
which, of course, not only is the precondition for acting as an autono-
mous subject, but also for entering upon the path of mental training and
spiritual progress.
A voluntary connection of sufficient strength between the men-
tal capacity and a deliberately chosen object, which comes about every
now and then in the distracted state, is the characteristic of the state
called one-pointed (ekāgara), the first of the specifically yogic states.
Patañjali’s discussion of yoga proper starts with PYŚ I.12. This
passage deals with two methods conducive to the shutdown of mental
processes, viz. practice (abhyāsa) and detachment (vairāgya). Their ef-
ficiency is elucidated by a comparison of the mental capacity with a
river being capable of flowing in two directions. The mind-river either
flows, when guided by practice and detachment, in the direction of
well-being (kalyāṇa) or, when uncontrolled, in the contrary direction of
a bad condition (pāpa). Detachment in this context is said to obstruct
the stream towards objects, in other words, it prevents the mind from
entering into an involuntary connection with objects.
Patañjali elaborates on the concept of detachment in PYŚ I.15–
16. He teaches that detachment is of two kinds, a lower and a higher
one. Lower detachment refers to all things which are subject to percep-
tion, like women, food, drinks and the execution of power. Moreover, it
21
Wezler 1983: 22:“[The] citta clearly … [does] not [have] one object only, but
several at a time.”
270 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

also applies to objects which are known from authoritative tradition,

like heavenly objects. The detached mental capacity, even when in con-
tact with these objects, keeps a neutral attitude. It neither wants to avoid
nor does it want to possess them, because it sees their defect, which ob-
viously lies in their transient nature. This sovereignty of the mind in
dealing with objects is called “consciousness of the controllability [of
all objects]” (vaśīkārasaṃjñā).22
The second kind of detachment is called “detachment from the
constituents of matter” (guṇavaitṣṇya) and refers to the entities be-
longing to the realm of matter (prakti) in Sāṅkhya Yoga ontology. The
mind, because of practice of “perception of the Self” (puruṣadarśanā-
bhyāsāt), is satisfied with the self’s difference from the realm of matter,
and therefore becomes detached from all potential objects. The highest
degree of detachment, according to Patañjali, is “only clearness of
knowledge” (jñānaprasādamātra). This is knowledge without content,
in other words, an unrestricted self-perception of the self, which is—or
leads to—the liberation of the self from the cycle of rebirths. In order to
achieve this self-perception, the yogi has to cultivate detachment as an
all-embracing and unrestricted attitude towards the content of his con-
sciousness. Even the liminal content which exists in the mental capacity
at the border with liberation has to be given up in a final step. When un-
restricted perception of the self has been achieved, this experience ter-
minates attachment once and for all. Patañjali, in a remarkable passage,
lets the liberated yogi describe the degree of his detachment. He says:
“prāptaṃ prāpaṇīyam, kṣīṇāḥ kṣetavyāḥ kleśāḥ, chinnaḥ śliṣṭaparvā bhavasaṃ-
kramaḥ, yasyāvicchedāj janitvā mriyate, mtvā ca jāyate“, iti (PYŚ I.16,5 f.).
“I have attained all that is attainable, I have destroyed all defilements being
subject to destruction, I have cut the succession of existences with its [tightly]
connected joints, due to the continuation of which after having been born, one
dies, and after having died, one is born [again].”

22
Cf. the YVi’s gloss in 218,8 ff.: vaśīkartuṃ śakyante ’syām avasthāyāṃ sarve gau-
ṇāḥ padārthāḥ, vaśīkartavyatvena saṃjñāyante. vaśīktāni ca tasyām avasthāyām
indriyāṇi saṃjñāyante. vaśīkaraṇam vā saṃjñāyate ’syām iti.
In this state [of mind] all things (padārtha) consisting of the constituents of matter
(gauṇa) can be controlled [so that] one is aware of their being controllable. And one
is aware of the sense-capacities as being controlled. Or one is aware of their control
in this [state of mind].
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 271

As mentioned before, PYŚ I.12 names a second concept besides “de-

tachment” which is conducive to the shutdown of mental processes, i.e.
“practice” (abhyāsa). Within a comparison of the mental capacity to a
river “practice of perception of the difference [between the self and
matter]” (vivekadarśanābhyāsa) is said to open the stream to well-
being.23
In the passage immediately following Patañjali gives a more
detailed definition: “… practice is the effort for steadiness (YS I.13).”24
He explains: “The mental capacity’s state of flowing calmly, when its
processes are reduced, is steadiness. … Practice [means] complying to
the methods with the desire to produce this [steadiness].”25
This quotation confirms the analysis of the specifically yogic
form of concentration (samādhi) outlined above. In order to belong to
yoga proper, concentration has to fulfil two requirements: (1) It must
consist of a stable connection between the mental capacity and an ob-
ject, and (2) the object has to be a deliberately chosen one. The second
requirement corresponds to “detachment” from all objects being poten-
tially subject to an involuntary connection caused by attachment. The
first requirement, i.e. stability of the connection, is the aim of practice.
The structure of the “non-theistic yogic concentration” as being
conscious of its object is briefly described in PYŚ I.17:
vitarkavicārānandāsmitārūpānugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ (YS I.17).
vitarkaś cittasyālambane sthūla ābhogaḥ. sūkṣmo vicāraḥ. ānando hlādaḥ.
ekarūpātmikā saṃvid asmitā. tatra prathamaś catuṣṭayānugataḥ samādhiḥ
savitarkaḥ. dvitīyo vitarkavikalaḥ savicāraḥ. ttīyo vicāravikalaḥ sānandaḥ.
caturthas tadvikalo ’smitāmātraḥ. sarva ete sālambanāḥ samādhayaḥ (PYŚ
I.17,2–6).26
[Concentration is] conscious [of an object], because it is accompanied by
thinking, by evaluation,27 by joy, and by the form [?] (rūpa) of individuality
(YS I.17).

23
PYŚ I.12,6 f.: vivekadarśanābhyāsena kalyāṇasrota udghāṭyate.
24
… sthitau yatno ’bhyāsaḥ (YS I.13).
25
cittasyāvttikasya praśāntavāhitā sthitiḥ. […] tatsaṃpipādayiṣayā sādhanānuṣṭhā-
nam abhyāsaḥ (PYŚ I.13,2 f.).
26
The parallels to the Buddhist dhyāna meditation (for which see Eimer 2006: 25)
have been noted by Bronkhorst 1993: 71; cf. also Cousins 1992: 148 and 151 ff.
27
The meanings of vitarka (Pāli vitakka) and vicāra as stages of samādhi in Buddhism
and Yoga are the subject of Cousins 1992. He concludes that “[f]or the canonical
abhidhamma, vitakka … is the ability to apply the mind to something and to fix it
272 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

“Thinking” is the mental capacity’s gross investigation28 of an object29. The

subtle investigation is “evaluation.” “Joy” is pleasure. Consciousness having a
single form is “individuality.” Of these [four kinds], the first concentration,
which is accompanied by all four [kinds of consciousness content], is
accompanied by thought. The second, which is devoid of thought, is
accompanied by evaluation. The third, which is devoid of evaluation, is
accompanied by joy. The fourth, which is devoid of this [joy], is individuality
only. All these concentrations have an object.

Four key words sketch the development of the mental capacity towards
conscious concentration: Thinking (vitarka), evaluation (vicāra), joy
(ānanda), and individuality (asmitā). Each keyword is characteristic of
one phase in the development of concentration. In the first phase, all
four forms of mental activity exist in succession. Nevertheless, it is
“thinking” which establishes the connection between the mental capa-
city and its deliberately chosen object, the self.30 “Thinking” obviously
has to be understood as the comprehension of the teachings concerning
the “self” in Sāṅkhya Yoga philosophy, which provides a basis for the
practice of the perception of the self (puruṣadarśanābhyāsa). In the se-
cond stage, the connection between the mental capacity and its object is

upon a (meditative) object. Vicāra … is the ability to explore and examine an

object” (153). Oberhammer (1977: 149 f.), whose work seems to be unknown to
Cousins, draws upon Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Yaśomitra’s com-
mentary thereon. He concludes his discussion stating that “… Vitarka und Vicāra
ein von Sprache … begleitetes diskursiv-begriffliches Erfassen des Gegenstandes
ist. Der Unterschied der beiden scheint … darin zu liegen, daß der Vitarka ein prü-
fendes Überlegen (ūhaḥ, paryeṣaṇam) ist, während der Vicāra jene erwägende Ein-
sicht am Ende ist, in der das prüfende Überlegen auf das Ergebnis hin überstiegen
wird, und die daher subtiler als jenes genannt werden kann” (150).
28
ābhoga according to BHSD (99, col. 2, s.v), means “effort,” “endeavour.” Ober-
hammer (1977: 148) takes it as “tasting (Verkosten)”; Cousins (1992: 148) pre-
sumably in accordance with the meanings “ideation, idea, thought” which are re-
corded in PTSD (103, col. 2, s.v.) translates more appropriately as “directing (the
mind) towards.” With some hesitation I decide to translate as “investigation,” which
should be taken as “directing the mind towards an object in order to grasp it con-
ceptually.”
29
The meaning “object” for ālambana is recorded in pw (187, col.1, s.v.) for Buddhist
texts. It was not properly included in MW (“also dharma or law belonging to manas”
153, col. 2, s.v.), but it found entry into BHSD (105, col. 2, s.v.). Oberhammer
(1977: 148) in translating “Objektstütze” apparently follows Woods’ (1914: 40)
“supporting [object].” The correct translation was already known to Ganganatha Jha
(1934: 30).
30
Cf. Oberhammer 1977: 156.
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 273

fixed to a degree which makes a rethinking of yoga philosophy dispen-

sable. The yogi can draw upon the insights he has gained from his oc-
cupation with yoga teachings concerning the self, and does not need to
investigate the subject again. This presumably is the reason why “eva-
luation” is termed a “refined” investigation of the object in comparison
to “thinking” which is seen as gross. In the third phase, which is charac-
terised by joy, the connection between the mental capacity and its object
is deprived of its conceptual and linguistic dimension. The self, which
in the previous phase was the object of conceptualisation, now turns
into the content of a direct, joyful experience. The passage cited
unambiguously states that the penultimate concentration has two
aspects, the characteristic aspect of joy, and a secondary aspect of indi-
viduality. The last mentioned aspect is not only a constituent of con-
sciousness in this phase of concentration, but of experience in general.
Experience by its very nature belongs to an individual, who is able to
refer to the subject of experience with the pronoun “I.” Usually, how-
ever, individuality is eclipsed by the content of consciousness, and does
not turn into an object of perception. In the final stage of conscious con-
centration the situation is different. As joy, the content of consciousness
characteristic in the previous phase has been given up, it is now the
form of consciousness that turns into a content of consciousness, ex-
perienced as individuality, or—according to the author of YVi—as the
state of being experience only (pratyayamātratā).31 Nevertheless, con-
sciousness here still is a consciousness of something. It is being con-
scious of belonging to an individual. The self, therefore, does not ex-
perience itself as being ontologically different from matter. It still per-
ceives as the subject of perception in association with its mental capa-
city. And the existence of a content within the mental capacity justifies
the designation “concentration being conscious of an object” (saṃpra-
jñātasamādhi) even in its ultimate phase.
The transition from concentration having a content to content-
less concentration is the subject of PYŚ I.18:
athāsaṃprajñātaḥ kimupāyaḥ, kiṃsvabhāva iti?
virāmapratyayābhyāsapūrvakaḥ saṃskāraśeṣo ’nyaḥ (YS I.18).
… tasya paraṃ vairāgyam upāyaḥ. sālambano ’bhyāsas tatsādhanāya na kalp-
yate, iti virāmapratyayo nirvastuka ālambanīkriyate. tadabhyāsapūrvakaṃ cit-

31
YVi 223,8: asmitā pratyayamātratā.
274 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

taṃ nirālambanam abhāvaprāptam iva bhavati. sa eṣa nirbījaḥ samādhir

asaṃprajñātaḥ (PYŚ I.18,1–7).
What means is there for [concentration being] not conscious of an object, and
what is its nature?
The other [concentration], which has a remainder of impressions, is preceded
by practicing the cessation experience (YS I.18).
… The means to this [concentration] is higher detachment. Practice having an
object is not capable to bring about this [concentration]. Therefore, the
cessation experience, which does not refer to a thing (nirvastuka), is used as its
object. The mental capacity, preceded by the practice of this [cessation
experience], having no object [at all], seemingly becomes non-existent. This
seedless (= having special impressions [?])32 concentration is not conscious of
an object.

Higher detachment is the means to bring about concentration that is not

conscious of an object. This supports the role of detachment as outlined
above. In order to finish the interaction between the mental capacity and
the self, the remaining content of consciousness, viz. the experience of
individuality, has to be given up. The consequence is severe. The yogi,
in order to let the transcendental self appear within the mental capa-
city—clear and un-eclipsed by any content of consciousness—even has
to detach himself from the coherence of his own existence as an indi-
vidual. The yogi, as it were, gives up his empirical personality in order
to win his true self.
How can this goal be achieved? The very nature of “individuali-
ty,” the content of consciousness in the ultimate phase of conscious con-
centration, rules out the possibility of any act of will. The only reason
for a transition from concentration with content to concentration with-
out content therefore is the self-perception of the self (puruṣa), which
by itself leads the mental capacity away from the realm of matter. It
seems that it is this dynamism that found its way into the definition of
higher detachment in the following statement:

32
YVi 226,15 glosses nirbījaḥ with saṃskāraviśeṣasvabhāva[ḥ] but this does not con-
tribute much to my understanding of the term. Maybe Patañjali alludes to a concept
discussed in PYŚ II.4. There we learn that defilements may exist in the mental
capacity in a latent (prasupta) form. These defilements exercise their effect as soon
as the mental capacity comes into contact with an object which serves as a trigger.
This, however, does not happen in the case of yogis who have “burned” the de-
filement-seeds with the fire of prasaṃkhyāna meditation.
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 275

puruṣadarśanābhyāsāt tacchuddhipravivekāpyāyitabuddhir guṇebhyo

vyaktāvyaktadharmakebhyo viraktaḥ (PYŚ I.16,2 f.).
Because of practising sight of the self (puruṣadarśanābhyāsāt) the [yogi]
having his mental capacity satisfied with distinguishing the pureness of the
[sight] (or: of the self) [from the sight itself]33 is detached from all constituents
of matter, whether their characteristics are manifest or not manifest.

The starting point for the development to concentration without content

is individuality. This content decreases in proportion to the increasing
clearness of the perception of the self. When almost no content is left,
the very insignificant remainder serving as “support” of the mental ca-
pacity is called “cessation-experience” (virāmapratyaya). The YVi ex-
plains the compound “cessation-experience” as a descriptive determina-
tive (karmadhāraya) compound.34 Accordingly, the expression does not
denote an experience having the content of cessation, but an experience
being characterised by cessation. In other words, it is the final experi-
ence of the mental capacity immediately before its complete loss of
content. The YVi gives an illustrative example. It compares the liminal
experience with the final flame of a fire that has consumed its fuel.35
In the state of being free from content, the mental capacity
makes room for the unlimited consciousness of the self. In dealing with
this state of consciousness Oberhammer correctly refers to PYŚ I.3

33
YVi 219.10 ff.: tad iti puruṣadarśanam parāmśyate. tasya śuddhis tacchuddhiḥ.
nirṇiktakleśādimalatvam. athavā tasya puruṣasya śuddhis tacchuddhiḥ. tacchuddes
tadālambanadarśanam pravivicyate. tatpravivekenāpyāyitā buddhir asya yoginaḥ.
[The word] “its” (tad) refers to the sight of the self. The compound tacchuddhiḥ is a
dependent determinative compound with a genitive case relation. [“Pureness of the
sight of the self” is] the sate of having the defilements of taints (kleśa) etc. cleansed.
Or otherwise, “its pureness” [means] the pureness of the self. [The yogi] disting-
uishes the pureness [of the self] from the sight, which has the [self] as its object. The
yogi’s mental capacity is satisfied with distinguishing it.
34
YVi 225,10: virāmaś cāsau pratyayaś ca virāmapratyayaḥ.
35
YVi 225,11-13: sarvaviṣayebho vinirvartamānasya vinirvartanakāle prāg apratya-
yā-{read apratyayatā-}patteḥ pratyayarūpatvam etat{instead of etat read etasya
[?]}. yathā pāvakasya jvalataḥ prakṣīyamāṇendhanasya śanaiḥ śanir upaśāmyataḥ
prāg aṅgāratāpatter jvalātmatā.
At the time of turning away, [immediately] before the state of non-experience
occurs, [the mental capacity] which is turning away from all objects [still] has
[some] experience, like a flaming fire, when its fuel is being consumed, little by
little becomes diminished, immediately before it assumes the state of being embers,
[still] consists of a flame.
276 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

which gives a very short description of the cessation of all mental

processes:36
tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe ’vasthānam (YS I.3).
svarūpapratiṣṭhā tadānīṃ cicchaktir, yathā kaivalye (PYŚ I.3,2 f.).
Then the seer (i.e. the self) abides in his own form (YS I.3). At that time the
capacity of consciousness (i.e. the self) is grounded in its own form, just as in
isolation.

The second yogic concentration, which I am going to discuss briefly, is

a variant of yoga as outlined so far. It shares, however, the general aim
of meditation, i.e. the realization of unrestricted self perception of the
self, and therefore also culminates in concentration which is not con-
scious of an object (asaṃprajñāta samādhi).37 In its initial stages it has
the supreme lord (īśvara) as its object. I would therefore like to name
this kind of yoga “theistic yogic concentration.” The “theistic yogic
concentration” is based on a special concept of God which lacks any
sectarian or mythological element.38
The summary of Sāṅkhya Yoga ontology given above did not
even once refer to the supreme lord. This exclusion was justified, as the
ontological dualism of Sāṅkhya Yoga includes the concept of a supreme
lord alongside of the transcendental selves (puruṣa), but only as in prin-
ciple identical with liberated selves, the only difference between the
supreme lord and “ordinary” liberated selves being that the latter, before
becoming liberated, were subject to bondage. The supreme lord, on the
other hand, was never bound to the realm of matter in the past, nor will
ever be bound in future. Apart from this, God and the selves are
identical.39 They are pure, unchanging, contentless consciousness. The
question arises of course about how the transcendental nature of God
can be brought in harmony with the concept of God’s activity within the
world according to Sāṅkhya Yoga? In other words: How can a transcen-

36
Oberhammer 1977: 161.
37
Cf. Oberhammer 1977: 177.
38
Cf. for the following exposition Oberhammer 1977: 162–177.
39
PYŚ I.24,1–10: atha pradhānapuruṣavyatiriktaḥ ko ’yam īśvara iti?
kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ (YS I.24). …
kaivalyaṃ prāptās tarhi santi bahavaḥ kevalinaḥ. te hi trīṇi bandhanāni cchittvā kai-
valyaṃ prāptāḥ. īśvarasya tatsaṃbandho na bhūto, na bhāvī. yathā muktasya pūrvā
bandhakoṭir jñāyate, yathā vā praktilīnasyottarā bandhakoṭiḥ saṃbhāvyate, naivam
īśvarasya. sa tu sadaiva muktaḥ sadaiveśvara iti.
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 277

dental self, pure consciousness, which per definitionem is totally free

from any kind of activity, intervene in the world which is the realm of
matter? The texts points out that God’s effectiveness within the world is
quite limited. At the beginning of each of the cyclically reoccurring cre-
ations of the world, he assumes a perfect (prakṣṭa) mental capacity,
made out of the luminous substance sattva, in order to provide instruc-
tion to a seer, and to start a lineage of teachers and pupils.40 This pro-
cess, according to Sāṅkhya Yoga, is not an activity in the full sense of
the word. It is an event that takes place in accordance with His com-
passionate nature. Besides this, the concept of God in Sāṅkhya Yoga
leaves no room for a this-worldly activity. The soteriological efficiency
of devotion to the supreme lord is therefore not a result of God’s action.
It is brought about by “theistic yogic concentration.”
Patañjali provides a basis for his discussion of “theistic yogic
concentration” by way of philosophical reflections on the relationship
between verbal denotations (vācaka), i.e. words, and the objects of de-
notations (vācya), i.e. the referents of words. God, according to PYŚ
I.27, is denoted by the praṇava, the sacred syllable om, which is his de-
notation.41 Patañjali holds a theory of language, which claims a perma-
nent connection (saṃbandha) between the objects of denotations (vāc-
ya), and verbal designations (vācaka).42 This permanence apparently can
be put down to an identical structure of language and its referent.
Although the relationship between language and its meaning is constant
and non-accidental, the shape of phonetic entities—viz. the form of
words—is non-constant and accidental, because it is established and
maintained by convention (saṃketa). The form of phonetic entities can
be subject to change, the logical structure of language cannot.
The author of YVi adds an empirical argument. The connection
between the syllable om and God is fixed, because the employment of
the mantra inevitably brings about its effect. It is therefore comparable
to the connection between food, which is the object of cooking, and fire,
which is the agent of cooking. If there was no fixed connection between

40
PYŚ I.25,8–11: “jñānadharmopadeśena kalpapralayamahāpralayeṣu saṃsāriṇaḥ
puruṣān uddhariṣyāmi“, iti. tathā coktam: “ādividvān nirmāṇacittam adhiṣṭhāya
kāruṇyād bhagavān parama ṣir āsuraye jijñāsamānāya provāca“ (Pañcaśikha,
according to TVś and YVā), iti.
41
PYŚ I.27,1: tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ (YS I.27); vācya īśvaraḥ.
42
PYŚ I.27,3: sthito ’sya vācyasya vācakena saṃbandhaḥ.
278 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

these two entities, fire would not be a suitable means for cooking. In the
same way, if there was no fixed connection between the syllable om and
God, muttering of the mantra would not bring about a direct experience
of the supreme lord.43 The means to this direct experience is described
in the opening passage of PYŚ I.28:
vijñātavācyavācakatvasya yoginaḥ—tajjapas tadarthabhāvanam (YS I.28).
The yogi, who has thoroughly understood that [God] is the object of
denotation and [the syllable om] is its denotation, mutters the [syllable om] and
makes its referent visible.

The interdependence of mantra-muttering and yogic concentration is

the subject of a stanza from the Viṣṇupurāṇa, which Patañjali cites as
authority for his outline of the theistic yogic meditation.
svādhyāyād yogam āsīta yogāt svādhyāyam āmanet |
svādhyāyayogasaṃpattyā para ātmā prakāśate || (PYŚ I.28,5 f. = VPurāṇa
6.6.2)
One should practice yogic meditation after mantra-repetition, after yogic
meditation, one should perform mantra-repetition. By means of the
accomplishment of mantra-repetition and of yogic meditation, the highest self
becomes visible.

The author of YVi explains the process leading to an experience of God

as follows: Initially mantra-repetition establishes an orientation of the
mind towards the supreme lord. Once this orientation is secured, the yo-
gi practices a meditative vision (dhyāna) of God. When his mind is un-
distracted and the vision has become solid, he takes up an internalised
form of mantra-repetition, which apparently increases the clearness of
the vision, until finally the supreme lord is the only content of con-
sciousness.44 Then the mental capacity of the yogi attains one-pointed-
ness.45

43
YVi 278,1–3: vācyavācakayor asthitasambandhatve tu praṇavarūpeṇābhimukhībha-
vatīśvara iti nāvakalpate. na hi pācyapācakasambandhe ’navasthite pācakāgnyu-
pādānam pākārthaṃ kalpate. If the denotation and the object of denotation did not
have a settled connection, the direct appearence of the supreme lord in the form of
the praṇava would not be possible. As [for example], if the connection between
[food which is] the thing to be cooked and the thing that cooks were not settled, the
utilization of fire as the agent of cooking would not be fit for the purpose of
cooking.
44
YVi 279,14–280,2: … “svādhyāyāt” praṇavajapād īśvaram praty avanatacittaḥ san
“yogam āsīta” tadartham īśvaran dhyāyet. tadarthadhyānāc ca pra{ instead of ca
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 279

The similarity between the non-theistic yogic concentration hav-

ing a consciousness content (saṃprajñāta samādhi) and its theistic vari-
ant is obvious. The states of the mental capacity are identical in both
cases in that they both have a single content, which at first sight, how-
ever, seems to differ. In the first case it was the individual self, in the
theistic variant the content is the supreme lord. If we remember the con-
cept of God as outlined above, the difference is practically reduced to
nothing, as both are identical in nature.
Patañjali provides an account of the experience of identity of the
self and God in PYŚ I.29, which sums up the result of the theistic yogic
concentration:
kiṃcāsya bhavati tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigam[aḥ] … (YS I.29). … svapuruṣa-
darśanam apy asya bhavati: “yathaiveśvaraḥ śuddhaḥ, prasannaḥ, kevalo, ’nu-
pasargas, tathāyam api buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī madīyaḥ puruṣaḥ,” ity adhigac-
chatīti. (PYŚ I.29,1-5)
Moreover, from this (mantra-repetition and yogic meditation) [t]he [yogi] ac-
quires the realization of his inner consciousness (YS I.29). [This means,] he
even acquires sight of his own self (puruṣa). He realizes: “As God is pure,
clear, alone and free from trouble, so also is my self here that experiences its
mental capacity.”

The yogi’s realization that his own self is identical in nature with the
supreme lord must not be understood as knowledge gained by concep-
tual thinking. This would, of course, not be compatible with the one-
pointedness of the mental capacity. The realization rather has to be seen
in analogy with the non theistic yogic concentration with content as de-
scribed above. In non-theistic meditation the content of consciousness is

pra read cāpra with manuscript L}calitamanāḥ “svādhyāyam” praṇavam “āmanet”

manasābhijapet. … tathā ca praṇavajapaparameśvaradhyānasampatyā “para ātmā”
parameṣṭhī “prakāśate” yogina iti.
… “after mantra-repetition”—after muttering the syllable om—[the yogi] inasmuch
as he has a mental capacity which is directed to God should “practice yogic medi-
tation”—should visualise God, the referent of the [syllable om]. And after the visu-
alisation of the referent [of the syllable om], [the yogi] having a mind which is not
wandering [around] should practice mantra-repetition—[he] should [silently] mutter
the syllable om in his mind. … And this way, by means of the accomplishment of
muttering the syllable om and of visualising the supreme lord, the highest self—the
one who is standing at the highest position— “becomes visible” to the yogi.
45
PYŚ I.28,2–4: tad asya yoginaḥ, praṇavaṃ japataḥ, praṇavārthaṃ bhāvayataś, cit-
tam ekāgratāṃ saṃpadyate.
280 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

the individual self which experiences itself as the subject of individuali-

ty. The self-realization in this state is imperfect, since the self as the
subject of an experience is still bound to its own mental capacity. In the
course of development, the remaining content of the mental capacity is
reduced, and finally the self perceives itself as pure consciousness. In
the theistic variant the starting point is similar. Here too the self experi-
ences a self, viz. God. This experience is not a direct one. The self can
only perceive the content of its own mental capacity, and therefore just
has an image of God. In the course of the meditation, this content of
consciousness gradually decreases. The image of God as a self becomes
weaker and weaker, and the eclipse of pure consciousness by a content
of consciousness vanishes. Finally, when all mental processes are shut
down, the mental capacity allows for an unrestricted self-perception of
the self, a concentration which is not conscious of any object (asaṃpra-
jñāta samādhi).

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Āgāśe 1904 K. Ś. Āgāśe (ed.), Vācaspatimiśraviracitaṭīkāsaṃvalita Vyāsa-
bhāṣyasametāni Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi. Tathā Bhojadevaviracita-
Rājamārtaṇḍābhidhavttisametāni Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi <Sūtra-
pāṭhasūtravarṇānukramasūcībhyāṃ ca sanāthīktāni.> … Tac ca
H. N. Āpaṭe ity anena … prakāśitam. Puṇyākhyapattana [= Pune]
1904 (Ānandāśramasaṃsktagranthāvaliḥ, 47).
Alper 1980 H. P. Alper, Review of Strukturen Yogischer Meditation: Unter-
suchungen zur Spiritualität des Yoga by Gerhard Oberhammer.
Philosophy East and West 30,2. (April 1980), 273–277.
BHSD F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary.
Vol. 2: Dictionary. New Haven 1953 (William Dwight Whitney
Linguistic Series).
Bronkhorst 1985 J. Bronkhorst, Patañjali and the Yoga Sūtras. Studien zur Indo-
logie und Iranistik 10 (1985), 191–212.
Bronkhorst 1993 J. Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India.
Reprint of the 1st Indian edition [1st ed. Stuttgart 1986]. Delhi
2000.
Cousins 1992 L. S. Cousins, Vitakka/Vitarka and Vicāra: The Stages of Samā-
dhi in Buddhism and Yoga. Indo Iranian Journal 35 (1992), 137–
157.
Eimer 2006 H. Eimer, Buddhistische Begriffsreihen als Skizzen des Erlö-
sungsweges. Wien 2006 (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und
Buddhismuskunde, 65).
Frauwallner 1953 E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Bd. 1. Die
Philosophie des Veda und des Epos. Der Buddha und der Jina.
 THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 281

Das Samkhya und das klassische Yoga-System. Salzburg 1953

(Wort und Antwort, 6).
Fröhlich 1993 W. D. Fröhlich, dtv-Wörtebuch zur Psychologie. 19. bearbeitete
und erweiterte Auflage (1st ed. 1968). München 1993.
Ganganatha Jha 1934 Ganganatha Jha (transl. of PYŚ, engl.), The Yoga-Darshana.
Comprising the Sūtras of Patañjali. With the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa.
Transl. into English with Notes. 2nd ed. thoroughly revised.
Madras 1934.
La Vallée Poussin 1936–1937 = L. de La Vallée Poussin, Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de
Patañjali. Melange chinois et bouddhiques 5 (1936–1937), 223–
242.
Maas 2006 Ph. A. Maas (ed.), Samādhipāda. Das erste Kapitel des Pātañjala-
yogaśāstra zum ersten Mal kritisch ediert. = The First Chapter of
the Pātañjalayogaśāstra for the First Time Critically Edited. Aa-
chen 2006 (Studia Indologica Universitatis Halensis) (Geistes-
kultur Indiens. Texte und Studien, 9).
MW M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Etymolo-
gically and Philologically Arranged with Special Reference to
Cognate Indo-European Languages. New Ed. Greatly Enlarged
and Improved with the Collaboration of E. Leumann … C.
Cappeler … [et. al.]. Oxford 1899.
Oberhammer 1977 G. Oberhammer, Strukturen yogischer Meditation. Untersuchun-
gen zur Spiritualität des Yoga. Wien 1977 (Österreichische Aka-
demie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse,
Sitzungsberichte, 322) (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für
Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, 132).
PTSD T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, Pali-English Dictionary (Re-
print of the 1st ed.: The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictio-
nary. London 1921–1925). Delhi 1989.
pw O. Böhtlingk, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung. (Reprint
of the ed. in 7 vols. St. Petersburg 1879–1889) Delhi 1991.
PYŚ Pātañjala Yogaśāstra ed. Maas 2006.
Schmithausen 1968 L. Schmithausen, Zur advaitischen Theorie der Objekterkenntnis.
In: Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für Erich
Frauwallner. Aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstages herausgegeben
von G. Oberhammer. Wien 1968 (WZKSO 12).
TVŚ Tattvavaiśaradī by Vācapatimiśra ed. Āgāśe 1904.
Vivaraṇa Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇa of Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpā-
da. Critically ed. with Introduction by … P. Sri Rama Sastri …
and S. R. Krishnamurthi Sastri … Madras 1952 (Madras Govern-
ment Oriental Series, 94).
VPurāṇa Viṣṇupurāṇa: The Critical Edition of the Viṣṇupurāṇam. Vol. 1–2.
… by M. M. Pathak. Vadodara. Vol.1: 1 to 3 Aṃśas. 1997. Vol.
2: Aṃśas 4–6 & Pāda-Index prepared by … P. Schreiner. 1999.
Wezler 1983 A. Wezler, Philological Observations on the So-Called Pātañjala-
yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa (Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstraviva-
raṇa I). Indo-Iranian Journal 25 (1983), 17–40.
282 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

Woods 1914 J. H. Woods (transl. of PYŚ and TVś, engl.), The Yoga-System of
Patañjali. Or the Ancient Hindu Doctrine of Concentration of
Mind, Embracing the Mnemonic Rules, Called Yoga-Sūtras, of
Patañjali and the Comment, Called Yoga-Bhāshya, Attributed to
Veda-Vyāsa, and the Explanation, Called Tattva-Vaiçāradī, of
Vāchaspati-Miçra. (Reprint. 1st ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1914)
Delhi 1992 (Harvard Oriental Series, 17).
YBh Yogabhāṣya, traditionally ascribed to Vyāsa.
YS Patañjali’s Yogasūtra.
YVā Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu. Text with English Translation and
Critical Notes along with the Text and English Translation of the
Pātañjala Yogasūtras and Vyāsabhāṣya. (Ed. and transl. by) T. S.
Rukmani. Vol. 1: Samādhipāda. Delhi 1981.
YVi A Critical Edition of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa. First Part.
Samādhipāda with an Introduction ed. by K. Harimoto. 1999. (A
Dissertation in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania).
 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

Yogic Perception According to the Later

Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta∗

Normally knowledge depends on a corresponding object. In the case of

perception the correspondence is even stronger; the object has usually to
exist at the same time and place as the perception that gives rise to it.
But can perception as a means of valid knowledge bring something into
consciousness, at least in some special cases, if the object is absent?
Must the validity of perception be confirmed by empirical evidence, or
can it be valid even if its object is not presented to consciousness
through a contact between sense and object?
These questions deal with general problems in a theory of
knowledge. They are also crucial to the Rāmānuja School’s division of
perception (pratyakṣa) into sense perception (indriyapratyakṣa) and
other types of perception such as perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa).
Rāmānuja himself discusses in his Śrībhāṣya the difference between
sense perception and other types of cognition whose object was either
perceived earlier or is in no way perceptible (Śrībh 27,15-20). In this
context he considers recollection (smaraṇa) and means of valid knowl-
edge, such as inference (anumāna), authoritative tradition (āgama) and
the perception of yogins. Although these kinds of means of valid knowl-
edge have no directly perceived object, they are nevertheless considered
to be valid. He admits that means of valid knowledge like perception
born from a sense faculty (indriyajanman), requires a simultaneous ob-
ject, i.e. its nature is restricted (svabhāvaniyama) to an object being
present at the moment it is perceived (svasamakālavartin). However,
Rāmānuja argues, this is not the case for the above-mentioned means of
valid knowledge and differentiates between them in the following way:

∗
I would like to express my gratitude to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and Will Rasmussen
for improving the English of this article. I am also indebted to Vincent Eltschinger
and to Eli Franco for valuable suggestions with regard to my Sanskrit translations
and the clarity of my thoughts.
284 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

“For such indeed is the natural restriction of a perception born

from a sense faculty that it grasps an object which exists at the same
time [as its perception]. [But] this is not the case for all cognitions and
means of valid cognition, because one observes that recollection,1 in-

1
Although recollection is listed here together with inference, etc., it is not considered
by Rāmānuja to be a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). For this reason he states “cog-
nitions and means of valid cognitions”; recollection is to be subsumed under the
former, but not under the latter. Cf. also n. 3 below, where Rāmānuja rejects the va-
lidity of yogic cognition on the ground that it is mere recollection. However, the sta-
tus of recollection in the Rāmānuja School is somewhat ambiguous, for recollection
plays a significant role in the process of gaining valid knowledge, as frequently
pointed out by later exponents of the viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition. Their views, however,
diverge. For Meghanādārisūri the view that recollection lacks validity is not accept-
able (NDy 183,17: … smṛtitvam aprāmāṇyam ity anaṅgīkārāt). He distinguishes be-
tween two aspects of recollection. Recollection relies on an object that was previ-
ously perceived by some other means of cognition, and by which a mnemonic trace
(saṃskāra) is left on the soul. In this respect recollection lacks validity. However,
recollection does not amount only to an image of an object, but by the mere fact of
its own independent existence (svasattayā) or by the fact of being a recollection
(smṛtitvam) it distinguishes itself from its own basis/support (svāśraya), i.e. the pre-
ceding perception, and is in this respect independent and valid. Cf. NDy 183,18-19:
sāpekṣatvam evāprāmāṇyam. sāpekṣatā ca viṣayaparicchede smṛter iti tatraivāprā-
māṇyam. svasattayaiva svāśrayaṃ prati svaparicchedān na tatra sāpekṣateti na prā-
māṇyahānis tatra. “The invalidity [of recollection consists] only in its dependency
[on a means of valid cognition like a previous perception]. And the dependency con-
sists in the recollection’s determination of the object. Therefore only in this respect
recollection lacks validity. [But] because it determines itself, by its mere existence,
as different from its own basis/support (lit. it discriminates itself in respect to its ba-
sis), it does not depend on that [support]. Thus, it does not lack validity in respect to
that [self-determination].”
For Parāśarabhaṭṭa, another important exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition, see
Oberhammer 1979: 115; Oberhammer comments on the passage smṛtiḥ pratyakṣaṃ
aitihyam anumānaṃ catuṣṭayam iti pratyakṣādyaviśeṣeṇa vedānuvādāc ca quoted in
Veṅkaṭanātha’s NP 67,15 (in Oberhammer 1979: 44-45 (Fragment 8): “Fest steht,
daß er [Parāśarabhaṭṭa] die Erinnerung, die auf einer durch Erkenntnismittel hervor-
gerufenen gültigen Erkenntnis beruht, ebenfalls als gültige Erkenntnis betrachtet hat.
[...]. Es sieht so aus, als sei der von ihm erwähnte vedānuvādaḥ im Anschluß an ei-
nen oder mehrere Gründe (vgl. vedānuvādāc ca) vorgebracht worden, um die
Gleichwertigkeit der Erinnerung mit den anderen durch Erkenntnismittel entstande-
nen Arten gültiger Erkenntnis durch ein autoritatives Zeugnis zu belegen.”
For Veṅkaṭanātha’s discussion of smṛti see for example NP 45,1: smṛtimātrāpra-
māṇatvaṃ na yuktam iti vakṣyate, abādhitasmṛter loke pramāṇatvaparigrahāt. For
more detailed explanation to relationship between perception and recollection cf. NP
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 285

ference, authoritative tradition, the perception of yogins, etc., grasp an

[object] even if it exists in another time. And this is precisely the reason
why the means of valid cognition are invariably connected to their ob-
jects. For a means of valid cognition’s relation with [its] object does not
consist in [its] invariable connection with a contemporaneous (svasama-
kālavartin) [object], but rather in its opposing the falsehood of the as-
pect [of the object] such as it appears [in the cognition] as related with
this [i.e. the means of valid cognition’s] space, time, etc.”2
Although in this passage Rāmānuja presents a clear distinction
between means of valid knowledges whose object is absent (kālāntara-
vartin) and means of valid knowledge whose object is present at the
same time as the means itself (svasamakālavartin) and admits the valid-
ity of a means of knowledge, even if the contact between sense faculty
(indriya) and object (viṣaya) is not simultaneously given, in his Śrī-
bhāṣya he does not elaborate much on yogipratyakṣa and its difference
from a means of valid knowledge like sense perception.3
Perception (pratyakṣa), according to Rāmānuja, presupposes an
object (viṣaya) which usually has to exist at the same time (svasamakā-
lavartin) as the cognition it gives rise to. This requirement becomes
clear in his concepts of non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) and conceptual
(savikalpaka) perception. Both perceptual forms of cognition – which
are enabled by the differentiating features of the object (saviśeṣaviṣaya)
and which rely on sense faculties (indriyāpekṣa) – are dependent on

289-293. For Veṅkaṭanātha’s commentary on the quoted passage of the Śrībhāṣya,

especially to the word smaraṇa, see TṬ 144,27.
2
Śrībh 27,15-20: indriyajanmanaḥ pratyakṣasya hy eṣa svabhāvaniyamaḥ, yat
svasamakālavartinaḥ padārthasya grāhakatvam. na sarveṣāṃ jñānānāṃ pramāṇā-
nāṃ ca, smaraṇānumānāgamayogipratyakṣādiṣu kālāntaravartino ‘pi grahaṇadar-
śanāt. ata eva ca pramāṇasya prameyāvinābhāvaḥ. na hi pramāṇasya svasamakāla-
vartināvinābhāvo ‘rthasaṃbandhaḥ, api tu yaddeśakālādisaṃbandhitayā yo ‘rtho
‘vabhāsate, tasya tathāvidhākāramithyātvapratyanīkatā.
3
The context of the other passage where Rāmānuja deals with yogic perception is the
following: Having refuted that Brahman cannot be proved by normal perception, he
goes on to refute that perception produced by yoga is a pramāṇa for Brahman, even
if yogic perception as mentioned in the quotation above is accepted as means of va-
lid cognition. He states Śrībh 97,16-18: “[…] Neither [can perception] produced by
yoga [prove Brahman]. Even if this [cognition], which is born at the end of intense
meditation, presents [its content] vividly, it has no validity as a means of knowl-
edge, because it consists only in the memory of what has been experienced before.”
(nāpi yogajanyam. bhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajanmanas tasya viśadāvabhāsatve ‘pi
pūrvānubhūtaviṣayasmtimātratvān na prāmāṇyam.)
286 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

each other and are necessary for reaching a complete knowledge of an

entity (vastu).
Thus, although the first perception apprehends the object to-
gether with its differentiating features (saviśeṣaviṣaya) and could be
verbalised in words such as “this [object] is of such and such [quality]”
(ittham ittham), it is nevertheless incomplete4 in determining the object,
because the generic structure (saṃsthāna) is cognised by the nirvikalpa-
kapratyakṣa in only one perceived individual/object. Therefore, for Rā-
mānuja, the two perceptions deviate from each other by the fact that the
recurrence (anuvṛtti) of the generic structure which is common to dif-
ferent objects or beings like cows cannot be grasped in the first percep-
tion, but is indeed recognised in the second and subsequent perceptions,
the savikalpakapratyakṣa. The required succession of the two percep-
tions and their dependency on an object which is present at the same
time it is perceived, is summarized by Rāmānuja in the following
words:
“When grasping the object the first time, it is not known that [the uni-
versal] cowness, etc., has a form that recurs. [But] in the [following]
second and subsequent cognitions of the thing, there is the knowledge
of recurrence. [The fact] that cowness etc., which has the form of the
generic structure of the object that is connected to the first cognition, is
qualified by the property of recurrence, is to be ascertained by the sec-
ond and subsequent cognitions of the object; therefore the second and
subsequent cognitions are conceptual. The recurrence of cowness, etc.,
which has the nature of the generic structure of the object such as the
dewlap is not grasped during the first cognition of an object; therefore
the first cognition of an object is non-conceptual.”5
However, the manner in which Rāmānuja describes this process
of the two perceptions is quite closely connected with the knowledge’s

4
Śrībh 23,5-6: “A cognition [of an object] with some qualities is called non-concep-
tual, It is not devoid of all distinguishing qualities, because such a kind of cognition
is never observed and is impossible.” (nirvikalpakaṃ nāma kena cid viśeṣeṇa viyuk-
tasya grahaṇam, na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśa-
nād anupapatteś ca.)
5
Śrībh 23,9-14: prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe gotvāder anuvttākāratā na pratīyate. dvitī-
yādipiṇḍagrahaṇeṣv evānuvttipratītiḥ. prathamapratītyanusaṃhitavastusaṃsthāna-
rūpagotvāder anuvttidharmaviśiṣṭatvaṃ dvitīyādipiṇḍagrahaṇāvaseyam iti dvitīyā-
digrahaṇasya savikalpakatvam. sāsnādivastusaṃsthānarūpagotvāder anuvttir na
prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe ghyata iti prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇasya nirvikalpakatvam.
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 287

dependency on sense faculty. But it seems that Rāmānuja does not pur-
sue the matter further, for example he does not raise the question how
yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) could proceed even if the object is
absent (kālāntaravartin) and can be known independent of sense facul-
ties (indriyānapekṣa).
His follower Meghanādārisūri, an important 13th century expo-
6
nent of the Rāmānuja tradition, provides more details about yogiprat-
yakṣa. In his Nayadyumaṇi, in the chapter defining the means of valid
cognition (pramāṇanirūpaṇa), especially in the section defining percep-
tion (cf. pratyakṣanirūpaṇa, NDy 187-194), Meghanādārisūri describes
not only the conditions under which an object (viṣaya) can be known by
means of valid knowledge, but also refers to yogic perception (yogiprat-
yakṣa) and its taking place independently of a sense faculty (indriyāna-
pekṣa), whereas perception (pratyakṣa) directed towards sense-objects
is normally defined as arising through the contact between an object and
the senses (indriyārthasaṃnikarṣaja). After explaining non-conceptual
(nirvikalpaka) and conceptual perception (savikalpaka) he equates the
first to sense dependent and the second to sense independent perception
and identifies yogic perception with savikalpakapratyakṣa (NDy
191,20-24).
However, the definition of yogic perception as independent of
senses – also defined as extrasensory perception (atīndriya) – requires
some further explanation, because, for Meghanādārisūri, other beings
like the highest Self, i.e. the paramātman, the released souls (mukta)
and the eternal souls that have always been free from saṃsāra (nitya-
mukta), are also characterized as having this kind of perception. But are
they therefore to be classified as yogins and is their type of extrasensory
perception to be characterized as conceptual perception (savikalpaka-
pratyakṣa)?
To provide the background that clarifies where Meghanādārisūri
places yogic perception between normal perception and perception of
other transcendent beings, the following account will be guided by two
questions: (1) What conditions define normal perception? (2) How does
normal perception differ from yogic perception?

6
Meghanādārisūri’s lifetime cannot be dated exactly. Because he does not mention
Veṅkaṭanātha (1268-1369), but quotes Śrīharṣa (1125-1180) he can be dated to the
beginning of the 13th century.
288 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

(1) DEFINITION OF NORMAL PERCEPTION

In comparison to Rāmānuja’s view of objective reality and the indi-
vidual being’s process of cognition Meghanādārisūri’s explanations
seem to elaborate and do not deviate from the authoritative statements
of the Śrībhāṣya. Nevertheless his exposition of the perceptions process
are more detailed and facilitates its description.
Also for Meghanādārisūri empirical evidence is achieved by dif-
ferent qualifying properties (dharma) such as being not separately (ap-
thak) connected to an underlying substrate. Thus an object (viṣaya) can
be analysed as qualificand (viśeṣya) and qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), i.e. a sub-
strate together with its qualifying property (dharma). It is important to
note that this definition of an object’s constitution is essential for speak-
ing about perceptible objects which are qualified entities (viśiṣṭavastu).
Thus, it cannot be argued that properties (dharma) alone can exist if
they are not based on an underlying substrate, nor can the substrate
alone (vastumātra) exist if it is not qualified by properties.7
What kind of cognition of an individual being corresponds to
such a defined objective reality and in which way is its cognition de-
scribed? Even according to Meghanādārisūri already the first moment
of perception, defined as non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapraty-
akṣa) enables the distinct identification of an object. Here again, one
can point to the general thesis of the togetherness of qualificand (viśeṣ-
ya) and qualifier (viśeṣaṇa): Just as no entity, i.e. an object, exists with-
out qualifier, so is no cognition without an object.8

7
The relation (saṃbandha) between a substrate and its qualifying properties is not
defined as being a third, connecting entity; rather the substrate and its qualifying en-
tity are defined as innately connected to each other. In general, it can be said that the
Rāmānuja school’s concept of a self-relating qualifier and qualificand differs from
other views of the relationship between the two, as for instance the monistic Advai-
tic position, which argues that the mere substrate (vastumātra) is perceived, denying
its relation to something else by rejecting the cognition of manifold qualifiers (viśe-
ṣaṇa). In this respect, the tradition of Rāmānuja school also argues against defining
the relation (saṃbandha) between qualifier and qualificant as inherence (samavāya).
A discussion against inherence (samavāya) can be found in Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya
to Brahmasūtra 2.2.12; for Meghanādārisūri’s refutation of the relation (saṃbandha)
as inherence (samavāya) compare NDy 193,3-14.
8
Strictly speaking, the term ‘non-conceptual’ (nirvikalpa) is possibly misleading
against this background of such a fundamental thesis of the Rāmānuja school, be-
cause one is already aware of qualifying (viśeṣaṇa) properties (dharma) in the first
moment of perception.
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 289

The requirements for non-conceptual perception are illustrated by Me-

ghanādārisūri in the following passage: “And a non-conceptual [per-
ception] does not reveal a bare entity [i.e. without any qualifiers], be-
cause the appearance of such a bare entity is not possible without pro-
perties like universal, etc. […]. Therefore, the knowledge of all [people]
[arises] as indeed being qualified by some qualifiers.”9 Again in this
context one can point out that perception of reality is enabled by an
object as being qualified. If one argues that the substrate alone (vastu-
mātra) is the object of perception, a second perception that brings about
full knowledge of the object would be impossible, because what has
been perceived in the first instant must be recollected in the second per-
ception. Neither the substrate alone nor only properties ungrounded in
an underlying substrate can be recollected, but only something which is
qualified by properties. Thus, Meghanādārisūri goes on to describe the
process of knowledge in the following words: “Otherwise, in the second
and subsequent cognitions [of the same object], no recognition of the
object that is connected to the first [cognition] would be possible. And
if there is no [recognition of the object that was initially perceived],
there would be no cognition of [an object] being qualified by many qua-
lifiers.”10
A person is unable to be entirely aware of an object in the first
moment, because of the swiftness (śaigrya) of the first moment it is
seen (NDy 188,13). Therefore the initial perception of an object does
not enable a person to grasp it completely; this requires a second level
of knowledge, i.e. the conceptual perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa).
Nonetheless, in Meghanādārisūri’s view, what enables the transition to
the second level, the knowledge of the object being qualified by many
qualifiers (anekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatvadhī)? And what differentiates the two
cognitions, i.e conceptual and non-conceptual perception?
Even if an object is completely known, only a few qualities are
perceived in the first moment. The difference between non-conceptual
perception and conceptual perception lies in the fact that a normal per-
son cannot cognize the particular generic structure (saṃsthānaviśeṣa) at

9
NDy 188,8-9: na ca vastumātrāvabhāsakaṃ nirvikalpakam, jātyādidharmavidhura-
tayā vastumātrasya pratibhāsānupapatteḥ. […] ataḥ kenacid viśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭatayaiva
sarveṣāṃ jñānam.
10
NDy 188,11-12: anyathā dvitīyādipratyayeṣu prathamābhisaṃhitārthapratyabhijñā-
naṃ na syāt. tadabhāve ca tasyānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatvadhīr na syāt.
290 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

the initial non-conceptual stage. For the perceiving person, such a par-
ticular generic structure appears through its recurrence (anuvtti) which
is itself explained as a property (dharma) and of which one does not
become conscious (ullekhita) during the first moment of perception.11
Thus the process of knowledge can be described in the follow-
ing way: initially one is aware of just a few qualifiers (katipaya-
viśeṣaṇa). This is followed by the knowledge of the object as qualified
by many qualifiers (anekaviśeṣaṇa). The second perception, therefore,
is a conceptual perception entailing the knowledge that an object is
qualified by many different qualifiers and that the object’s many quali-
fiers correspond to the manifold concepts (vividhavikalpa) of the per-
ception.12 Only at this point is the full correspondence between a per-
ception based on a sense faculty and an object completed. It is due to
the recurrent nature of the universal that qualifies the substrate, qua
qualifying property,13 that the object that was initially incompletely per-
ceived becomes completely known in the subsequent step of know-
ledge.14
Also in the next passage, Meghanādārisūri clearly states that an
object is known as being qualified, and it is recognized through the
qualifying property, i.e. recurrence, in a second perception: “In this
manner, when one grasps [an object] as qualified by [a universal] such
as cowness, which is called the generic structure of the entity, this

11
Cf. also NDy 188,5-7: nirvikalpakaṃ ca ghaṭāder anullekhitānuvttidharmagha-
ṭatvādikatipayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayārthāvacchedakaṃ jñānam. “Non-conceptual [per-
ception] is a cognition which determines an object such as a pot to be qualified by
[just] a few qualifiers such as potness, whose properties [such as] recurrence have
not [yet] been consciously figured out.”
12
Cf. NDy 188,15: vividhatvaṃ ca dharmabhedaktam ity anekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatvadhīr
eva savikalpakam.
13
It is perhaps quite important to point out in this context that the recurrence (anuvtti)
is to be understood as a property (dharma) of the generic character (saṃsthāna), i.e.
the universal (jāti) qualifying a certain individual; this is clear from compounds like
anuvttyādidharma- (NDy 188,16), anullekhitānuvttyādidharma- (NDy 188,18),
anullekhitānuvttidharmaghaṭatva- (NDy 188,5), ullekhitānuvttyādidharma- (NDy
191,20); and from the following quotation (Śrībh 23,9-14): gotvāder anuvttidhar-
maviśiṣṭatvam. Especially a compound like anullekhitānuvttidharmaghaṭatva-
(NDy 188,5) (for the translation, see fn. 7) makes clear that recurrence (anuvtti) is a
dharma of the universal (jāti), i.e. the generic character (saṃsthāna) of the particular
object.
14
That Meghanādārisūri follows closely Rāmānuja’s concept of perception is obvious
from Śrībh 23,9-14.
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 291

[grasping] is conceptual, because in the second and subsequent cogniti-

ons, the concepts of properties such as recurrence [gradually] arise.”15
The last key-term which is necessary for demonstrating the
process of cognizing briefly according to Meghanādārisūri is saṃsthā-
na, i.e. generic structure, which in turn he—following closely Rā-
mānuja—equates with a universal (jāti) (NDy 188,27 saṃsthānarūpa-
jātiº, NDy 189,2 gotvādisaṃsthānaº). In the first perception one grasps
only the object as qualified by the generic structure (NDy 189,4 saṃ-
sthānādiviśiṣṭavastumātragraha); it is not known as the particular ge-
neric structure of an object; but in the second cognition, i.e. the concep-
tual perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa), a particular structure (saṃsthā-
naviśeṣa) is consciously figured out (ullekha). And for recognizing the
particular saṃsthāna of the particular object it must become conscious
by the cognition of its recurrence (anuvttidhī) in many individuals;
such a cognition arises from the recurrence of the first perceived generic
character not associated with the particular object (NDy 189,2 gotvādi-
saṃsthānādimātrānuvttiº).
The following list summarizes the key terms Meghanādārisūri
uses to differentiate the two forms of perception:

nirvikalpakapratyakṣa savikalpakapratyakṣa
katipayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭa anekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭa
anullekhitānuvttidharma ullekhitānuvttidharma
anuvttyullekhābhāva saṃsthānaviśeṣollekha
saṃsthānādiviśiṣṭavastumātragraha

Thus both forms of knowledge, i.e. non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) and

conceptual (savikalpaka), are necessary for someone who depends on
the first cognition, i.e. on the use of sense faculty.
This presentation of Meghanādārisūri’s definitions of perception
was necessary to understand the context in which he deals with per-
ception of a yogin (yogipratyakṣa).

15
NDy 188, 15-19: tathā vastusaṃsthānākhyagotvādiviśiṣṭatayā grahe dvitīyādipratīti-
ṣv anuvttyādidharmavikalpodayāt savika[l]patā tasya.
292 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

(2) HOW DOES PERCEPTION OF A YOGIN (YOGIPRATYAKṢA) DIFFER FROM

NORMAL PERCEPTION?

For explaining the way in which Meghanādārisūri deals with yogic per-
ception two important issues must be taken into consideration. One is
the sense-independency; the other is the difference between the yogin
and other beings like the mukta, i.e. ‘liberated,’ the nityamukta, i.e ‘eter-
nal souls that have always been free from saṃsāra,’ and the highest Be-
ing, i.e. the paramātman, whose perception is also said to be indepen-
dent of sense faculties. Because Meghanādārisūri understands the yogin
as a being still existing in the saṃsāra (saṃsārin), perception is still
affected by the influence of karman;16 thus, the perception of the yogin
is not to be equated with the cognition of these mentioned transcendent
beings, which are liberated from bondage.
Apropos the first point: for Meghanādārisūri, the distinction be-
tween normal perception and yogic perception concerns exactly the
necessity of a first, sense-relying immediate perception. Yogic percep-
tion, on the other hand, is immediate knowledge that nevertheless deter-
mines an object (arthāvacchedaka) independently of the sense faculties.
Meghanādārisūri distinguishes between the two forms of cognition, i.e.
normal perception and yogic perception, by stating: “The knowledge
which determines an entity in an immediate manner is a conceptual
[perception], because it is qualified by many qualifiers whose properties
such as recurrence etc., are consciously figured out. And the exclusion
from non-conceptual perception is [pointed out] through the words
‘consciously figured out’ (ullekhita) etc. And [such a conceptual knowl-
edge] is twofold: yogic perception and non-yogic perception. Of these,
the perception of a yogin is an immediate cognition determining the

16
According to Meghanādārisūri, the knowledge (jñāna) of the souls still bound in the
saṃsāra (baddhāḥ) as ‘contracted by the connection with the body which is caused
by karman’ (NDy 249,1 karmanimittadehasaṃbandhasaṃkucitajñānāḥ). Compare
also Veṅkaṭanātha’s passage in NP 70, 2-4, where he establishes his division of
pratyakṣa in yogipratyakṣa and ayogipratyakṣa also by reason of karman: asmadādi-
pratyakṣaṃ dvividhā – yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣaṃ ceti. tatra yogipratyakṣaṃ
prakṛṣṭādṛṣṭaviśeṣajam. tat yuktāvasthāyāṃ manomātrajanyam. viyuktāvasthāyāṃ tu
bāhyendriyajanyam api.
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 293

object independently of the senses etc. The demarcation from non-yogic

perception [is seen in the expression] ‘independent of the senses’.”17
For the yogin every relevant factor for the progress of cognizing
beginning with the non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa)
like the swiftness (śaigrya) of the first moment of the object’s percep-
tion or the crossover to the knowledge of the recurrence (anuvttidhī) of
many properties (anekadharma) can be omitted, because he is able to
determine the object (artha) without a simultaneous and sense depen-
dent perception.
So far it is clear from this passage that yogic perception is a
means of explaining how knowledge can have an object independent of
the time and place in which it is perceived.18 Meghanādārisūri charac-
terizes such a knowledge later on by the expression deśādiviprakṣṭār-
thāvacchedaka, i.e. ‘[a knowledge, which] determines an object that is
remote from the place, etc., [where it is perceived]’ (NDy 192,11). Nev-
ertheless for such an object it is necessary to have been cognised in an
earlier time through an earlier cognition, being then evoked again in a
conceptual cognition.
To the second point: both, the yogin and the highest Self (para-
mātman) together with the other kinds of souls (mukta, nityamukta)
mentioned above are characterized as having perception that is indepen-
dent of the senses. Meghanādārisūri’s discussion about the meaning of
‘independent of senses’ should be presented in the following. The pas-
sage in which he explains the difference between the perception of the
yogin and that of the highest Self starts with an objection in which the
opponent denies that the Śrībhāṣya teaches yogipratyakṣa. By showing
17
NDy 191,20: ullekhitānuvttyādidharmakānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayā sākṣādvastuvya-
vacchedakaṃ jñānam savikalpakaṃ. ullekhitetyādipadān nirvikalpakavyāvttiḥ tac
ca dvividham – yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣaṃ ceti. tatra yogipratyakṣam indri-
yādyanapekṣam arthāvacchedakaṃ sākṣājjñānam. indriyādyanapekṣam ity ayogi-
pratyakṣavyavacchedaḥ.
18
Again it can be pointed out in this context that what is defined by Meghanādārisūri
as non-yogic perception presupposes an object known by sense faculties and be-
longs to the above mentioned process of nirvikalpika- and savikalpikapratyakṣa of a
normal person; he states NDy 192,27-28: purodeśādisaṃbaddhapadārthānām indri-
yāṇāṃ ca saṃnikarṣaviśeṣasāpekṣaṃ sāksādavacchedakaṃ jñānam ayogipraty-
akṣam. “A non-yogic [conceptual] perception is a cognition which determines [its
object] in immediate manner [and] which depends on a special connection between
things that are connected to place, etc., [being located] before [the perceiver] and the
senses/sense faculties.”
294 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

that even the highest Self can be called a yogin (cf. NDy 192,20-21) and
can be connected with extraordinary qualities such as supernatural
knowledge (jñāna) and power (śakti), Meghanādārisūri argues that Rā-
mānuja, too, considers yogic perception to be acceptable. And since
other beings such as the above mentioned nityamuktas, ‘souls that have
always been free from saṃsāra,’ muktas, ‘liberated souls,’ and even
saṃsārins, ‘souls still bound in the saṃsāra,’ can be connected to such
extraordinary qualities, they can, according to Meghanādārisūri, also be
classified as yogins. But this does not imply that every being which is
definable as a yogin cognizes by a conceptual perception (savikalpaka-
pratyakṣa) and it does not imply that the sense-independent cognition of
the yogin and of the other beings can be equated. For instance, the yogin
remains still in contrast to the highest Being and other beings, because
such a yogin is focused in the conceptual perception on particular ob-
jects (artha), albeit remote in time or space, whereas the highest Self’s
cognition is turned to everything (sarvatra).
These distinctions become clear in the following passage, by
which Meghanādārisūri tries to demonstrate that yogic perception is ac-
cepted in Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya. He refutes the opinion of an opponent
that Rāmānuja does not teach yogipratyakṣa by the following argument:
“Even the perception of the highest Self and the liberated souls is in-
cluded in yogic perception, because it is the same [as yogic perception]
inasmuch as it is independent of senses etc. Precisely for this reason one
can read in the section about the antaryāmin [=Śrībh 175,16-18]: ‘And
for the highest Self, its being a seer, etc., does not rely on the senses’.”19
But the opponent raises the objection against the equivalence, because it
is the case that the paramātman is able to have immediate awareness of
everything (sarvasākṣātkārasāmarthya), but for a soul still remaining in
the saṃsāra, even if it is a yogin, immediate perception of everything is
impossible. A second time Meghanādārisūri points out that also the
perception of the highest Self (paramātman) is contained in the yogin’s
form of perception; he argues: “Also for the highest Self, etc., their way
of perceiving is contained in the way the yogin perceives, because of

19
NDy 191,28: paramātmamuktapratyakṣasyāpi yogipratyakṣa evāntarbhāvaḥ, tasyā-
pīndriyādyanapekṣatvasāmyāt. ata eva hy antaryāmyadhikaraṇe na ca parasyātma-
naḥ karaṇāyattaṃ draṣṭtvādikam ity uktiḥ.
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 295

their [i.e. the paramātmans and the yogin’s] identity by an added con-
dition (upādhi) consisting in the independency from the senses, etc.”20
In the following passage he differentiates step by step the mean-
ing of ‘independent of senses’ (indriyānapekṣa). The yogin’s way of
knowing as conceptual cognition (savikalpaka) is still connected to a li-
mited area of objective reality, while ‘being independent of senses’ as-
cribed to the highest Self means that such a being has a cognition of the
reality on the whole; another aspect of their difference in perception
consists of the meaning of the body (śarīra). The yogin like every other
being in the saṃsāra has a body, which he can transcend in state of me-
ditation, but, in contrast, for the highest Self never any dependency on a
body and sense faculty is necessary. According to the School’s tradition
for the highest Self the cognition by senses connected with the body is
only a play (līlā). It is further noticeable that Meghanādārisūri uses the
expression atīndriyārthajñāna, i.e. ‘knowledge of extrasensory objects,’
for qualifying the cognition of every transcendent soul. But the yogin’s
knowledge can be only qualified in this manner during the state of me-
ditation (yuktāvastha), whereas Meghanādārisūri applies the independ-
ency of senses (indriyānapekṣa), when he discusses either the identity
(sāmya/aikya) of perception between the yogin and the highest Self, or
when he considers the conceptual perception of the yogin alone. The
implication might be that independency of sense faculty does not entail
cognition of extrasensory objects (atīndriyārtha), because it can be ap-
plied for the savikalpakapratyakṣa just as well. Nevertheless every
knowledge of extrasensory objects (atīndriyārtha) is independent of
senses. Meghanādārisūri continues his defence of yogic perception in
the following words:
“If [perception] depends on the senses, etc., the fact that it (i.e.,
perception) determines objects that are spatially, etc., remote is not es-
tablished. But the perception of a yogin is only a conceptual perception,
because it does not depend on the grasping of the object. For, if the
process of knowledge depends exclusively on the means of the senses,
the recurrence, etc., of the generic structure, etc., is not known. […] The
cognition of yogins, however, determines all objects, together with their
qualities, which are found in a place that extends only as far as the place
connected [to the yogins]. In contrast, the support of the highest Self

20
NDy 192,11: indriyādyanapekṣatvarūpopādhyaikyāt paramātmādipratyakṣasyāpi
yogipratyakṣāntarbhāva eva.
296 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

etc., is not only referring to yogic perception, but it is referring to every-

thing. However, for souls still bound in saṃsāra, an object that is be-
yond the senses is only determined in the state of meditation; at any
other time, there is [still] dependency on the senses.”21
Again Meghanādārisūri differentiates between the knowledge of
these souls still bound in the saṃsāra and of the highest Self together
with the liberated souls:
“The highest Self and the liberated souls always have knowl-
edge whose objects are beyond the senses. For them, appropriating
themselves a body, senses and so on, is only a play. At that time (i.e.,
when they play), [their] knowledge determines an object also by the
way of sense faculty etc.”22
It is clear from this passage that the meaning of sense independ-
ent perception which determines an object varies and is not the same,
when it is ascribed to the yogin and to the highest Self. But to establish
why in fact even the highest Self could be called a yogin Meghanādā-
risūri refers to another meaning of the word yogin: the Self’s being a
yogin is based on the meaning of ‘being connected with’ (ºyogitvam)
supernormal qualities.
The same kind of knowledge he applies for the souls ‘that have
always been free from saṃsāra’ (nityamukta) and for the liberated
(mukta) souls after the time of their release. But for the yogin still bound
in the saṃsāra becoming qualities equal to the highest Self, i.e. to be
connected with extraordinary qualities, is according to their merit (puṇ-
ya). Meghanādārisūri concludes the passage in the following words:
“And here and there it is observed that the highest Self, etc., is
referred to by the word yogin, etc. The reason for the use of the word
yogin to the highest Self is because it is also endowed with qualities like
knowledge, power, etc. And it is only due to the innate natures of [the
souls] that have always been free from saṃsāra that they are endowed

21
NDy 192,11-17: indriyādyapekṣatve deśādiviprakṣṭārthāvacchedakatvam asid-
dham. yogipratyakṣaṃ tu savikalpakam eva, viṣayagrahaṇe vilambābhāvāt. jñāna-
prasarāpekṣāyāṃ hi saṃsthānāder anuvttatvādyapratītiḥ. […] yogināṃ tu jñānasya
yāvaddeśasaṃbandhaḥ taddeśasthasarvapadārthānāṃ saguṇānām evāvacchedaka-
tvam. paramātmyādyanugrahas tu na yogipratyakṣa eva, kiṃ tu sarvatra. saṃsāri-
ṇāṃ tu yuktāvasthāyām evātīndriyārthāvacchedakatvam. anyadendriyādisāpekṣam
eva.
22
NDy 192,17-19: paramātmā muktāś ca sarvadātīndriyārthajñānāḥ. teṣāṃ śarīren-
driyādigrahaṇaṃ tu līlāmātram. tadendriyādidvārāpy arthāvacchedakatā jñānasya.
 YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 297

with these qualities [i.e. jñāna, śakti, etc.]. But for [souls that have be-
come] released, they manifest [these qualities] after their release. By
contrast, for yogins still bound in saṃsāra, the degree of their mani-
festation [of these qualities] is due to the degree of their merit.”23
To sum up: By referring to passages in Meghanādārisūri’s sec-
tion defining perception (pratyakṣanirūpaṇa) it could be pointed out
that for different souls various forms of perception are required; their
form of cognition alters according to the distance or the soul’s being
bound to the saṃsāra. Non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpaka-
pratyakṣa) is connected only to perception relying on sense faculty. The
normal soul, whose body is still affected by karman depends on such
kind of first perception, but it is also able to cognize objects by yogic
perception, i.e. a conceptual perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa). Even if
the latter itself does not rely on sense faculty it is in line with empiri-
cally perceived objects. Already for transcendent souls, i.e. the li-
berated, the eternally liberated and the highest Self, complete independ-
ency from sense faculty (atīndriyārtha) can be established. Sense inde-
pendent (indriyānapekṣa) means here a cognition which has an object,
but which in no manner is experienced by normal sense faculty.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

NDy Nayadyumaṇi by Meghanādārisūri. Critical edition with introduction
and notes by Krishnamacharya and T. Viraraghavacharya. [Madras
Government Oriental Series 141] Madras 1956.
NP Nyāyapariśuddhi: Nyāyapariśuddhiḥ by Sri Venkatanatha Sri Vedān-
tāchārya with a Commentary called Nyayasar by Sri Nīwāsāchārya
ed. with Notes by Vidyābhusan Laksmanāchārya of Brindāban.
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 251. Benrares 1918-1923.
Oberhammer Gerhard Oberhammer, Materialien zur Geschichte der Rāmānuja-
1979 Schule I. Parāśarabhaṭṭas Tattvaratnākaraḥ. [Sitzungsberichte der
phil.-hist. Klasse = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Spra-
chen und Kulturen Südasiens Heft 14]. Wien 1979.
Śrībh Śrībhāṣya by Rāmānuja. Publishers: Academy of Sanskrit Research.

23
NDy 192,20-24: paramātmādeś ca yogiśabdādivācyatā tatra tatra dśyate. jñāna-
śaktyādiyogitvam api yogiśabdapravttinimittaṃ paramātmanaḥ. nityamuktānāṃ ca
svabhāvād eva tadyogitvam. muktānāṃ tu muktyuttarakālaṃ tadāviṣkāraḥ. saṃsāri-
yogināṃ tu puṇyatāratamyāt tadāviṣkāratāratamyam.
298 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

Melkote 1995.
TṬ Tattvaṭīkā: Śrīmadvedāntadeśikagranthamālāyāṃ vyākhyānavibhāge
ttīyasaṃpuṭam.Tattvaṭīkā-Nikṣeparakṣā-Saccaritrarakṣā-Śrīpañca-
rātrarakṣā-savyākhyāna-Bhugalonirṇayādika. Śrīkāñcī Prativādi-
bhayaṅkaraḥ Aṇṇaṅgarācāryaḥ. Kanjīvaram 1941.
 MARION RASTELLI

Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him:

Yogic Perception and Its Implications in the
Viṣṇuitic Tradition of Pāñcarātra1

Yogic perception, even if not always understood in the same manner as

in Buddhism, also holds its own position in the theistic traditions of
India. This paper will examine yogic perception and its implications in
the tradition of Pāñcarātra. The Pāñcarātra is a Hindu tradition that wor-
ships Viṣṇu as Supreme God. The earliest evidence of this tradition
dates back to the pre-Christian era,2 and the tradition is still present in
certain aspects of the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition in South India today. This
paper is mainly based on texts from about the ninth to the thirteenth or
fourteenth centuries.3
A follower of the Pāñcarātra has two religious goals, liberation
(mukti, mokṣa) from transmigration on the one hand and worldly pleas-
ure (bhukti, bhoga; literally: enjoyment) on the other. The Pāñcarātra
teachings concerning liberation from transmigration describe, as in
many other Indian religions, a continuous cycle of rebirths that are
characterised by suffering. This suffering can only be stopped by the
termination of transmigration. Worldly enjoyment is the fulfilment of
all wishes one can imagine, as for example wealth, offspring, the fulfil-
ment of sexual wishes, the death of an enemy, or the attainment of su-
pernatural powers.
For the most part these two goals are striven for through the per-
formance of rituals in which Viṣṇu or his spouse Lakṣmī, or still an-
other subordinate deity, is worshipped. In these rituals, yogic practices

1
I am grateful to Eli Franco for his helpful comments as well as to Cynthia Peck-
Kubaczek for suggesting various stylistic corrections of the English manuscript.
2
Cf. Härtel 1987.
3
For the dates of the JS, SS, AS and PārS, see Rastelli 2006: 49-54, on the date of the
PādS ibid. 58f., on the date of the LT ibid. 274, n. 832.
300 MARION RASTELLI

are very often used. However, Yoga can also be independently practised
as means for reaching these goals outside of the rituals.
First I will deal with Yoga as an autonomous practice. Here we
can basically differentiate between two kinds of practices. One is a
practice that usually consists of eight elements, which for the most part
are to be practised one after the other. This practice is called aṣṭāṅga-
yoga, Yoga with eight constituents, and is similar to Classical Yoga.4
The other practice is called layayoga, “reabsorption Yoga”. In this
yogic practice, several objects are meditated on in a particular order,
each object being reabsorbed into the next. In the following, I will look
at these practices in more detail.
The first two elements of the aṣṭāṅgayoga,5 restraint (yama) and
observance (niyama), are prerequisites for this Yoga practice. They in-
clude ideal mental attitudes of the yogin, such as abstinence from caus-
ing injury, veracity, compassion and patience, and practical precepts for
his daily life, such as moderate eating habits, ascetic exercises, worship
of God and the study of holy texts.6 The third constituent is the correct
posture (āsana) that the yogin is to assume during his Yoga practice.
The fourth component is breath-control (prāṇāyāma), which helps the
yogin to control his mind. The fifth element is called “withdrawal”
(pratyāhāra). This means that the mind is withdrawn from the objects

4
Cf. Phillip Maas’ paper in this volume.
5
The following description of the aṣṭāṅgayoga is based on the yogapāda of the PādS
and AS 31-32. The practice of the aṣṭāṅgayoga is also mentioned in LT 16.31a and
28.39d-48b. In this paper, I will not deal with all the Yoga descriptions in Pāñcarātra
texts available to me, but primarily with those that explicitly speak about perception
in the state of Yoga.
6
The full list of yamas and niyamas in the AS (31.18-30b) is as follows: yamas: truth
(satya), compassion (dayā), steadiness (dhṛti), purity (śauca), celibacy (brah-
macarya), patience (kṣamā), straightforwardness (ārjava), moderate food (mi-
tāhāra), abstinence from theft (asteya) and from causing injury (ahiṃsā). niyamas:
hearing (i.e., the study) of the settled doctrines (siddhāntaśravaṇa), munificence
(dāna), resolution (mati), worship of God (īśvarapūjana), contentment (saṃtoṣa),
mortification (tapas), faith (āstikya), shame (hrī), recitation (japa) of mantras and
other texts, following observances (vrata). A similar list can be found in PādS yp
1.7-10b. For further lists of yamas and niyamas in Pāñcarātra texts as well as other
texts, cf. Rastelli 1999: 179-182.
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 301

of the senses and is focussed on the object of meditation.7 The next,

sixth, step is the fixation (dhāraṇā) of the mind on the object of medita-
tion. The seventh element is the visualisation (dhyāna) of the object of
meditation in a manner that is exactly prescribed. The eighth and final
constituent is absorption (samādhi), the immersion in meditation. I will
deal with its nature a bit later.
Some of the aṣṭāṅgayoga elements are also practised in the
framework of the layayoga8. The yogin here also has, of course, to sit in
a particular posture, control his breath and withdraw his mind from the
objects of the senses.9 And he is to visualise an object of meditation. In
this visualisation, however, one finds a difference between the aṣṭāṅga-
yoga and the layayoga. While in the former a single, static object is
meditated on, the object of the layayoga is dynamic.
In the layayoga, several objects are visualised in a particular or-
der, namely in the “order of destruction.” What does this mean? Ac-
cording to the Pāñcarātra’s concept of creation there is a fixed sequence
in which the various constituents of the world arise. The material con-
stituents, which are considered to be manifestations of God,10 arise out
of the primary matter, which also is considered to be a manifestation of
God. The various divine manifestations of God arise out of the Supreme
God Vāsudeva. In some texts the two series of creation are combined
with one another.11 At the time of the destruction of the world, its con-
stituents are dissolved into each other in the reverse order of their crea-
tion, until only its ultimate source, primary matter and, finally, God,
remains. The layayoga imitates this process of destruction. The yogin
visualises object after object in their order of destruction until he finally
reaches the Supreme God.

7
AS 32.56-57, PādS yp 4.8c-9b. PādS yp 4.9c-13b also gives an alternative definition
of pratyāhāra: the drawing of the mind from one point of the body to another and in
each case the subsequent fixation of the mind on these altogether eighteen points.
8
The following description of the layayoga is based on SS 6.194c-214, PārS 7.484-
494, and LT 24.23c-32. For translations into German of the first two passages, see
Rastelli 2006: 508-509 and 491-493.
9
These elements are explicitly mentioned in SS 6.198c-203b. They are also probably
implied in the other descriptions.
10
Cf. Rastelli 1999: 98f.
11
For the creation of the divine manifestations and of the material constituents of the
world cf., e.g., Rastelli 1999: 45-60; for the combination of the two creations, see
ParS 2.29ff. and Rastelli 2006: 354.
302 MARION RASTELLI

To illustrate such a process I will give a similar example from

the Lakṣmītantra. In this meditation, three immaterial aspects of crea-
tion are traced back from their most immanent form to their most tran-
scendent, namely, the states of consciousness, the Vyūhas, which are
the most important divine manifestations of Viṣṇu, and the constituents
of the mantra om. In doing so, the elements of the various levels are
equated with each other.

state of con-
deity constituents of om
sciousness

waking (jāgrat) Aniruddha a

dreaming
Pradyumna u
(svapna)

deep sleep
Saṃkarṣaṇa m
(suṣupti)

fourth state
Vāsudeva ṃ
(turya)

state beyond the

Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa
fourth (turyātīta)

The yogin begins with the visualisation of the deity Aniruddha, who is
equated with the waking state. He then mentally dissolves Aniruddha
into the first constituent of the mantra om, the letter a. a is then dis-
solved into the deity Pradyumna, equated with dreaming, and Pra-
dyumna is again resorbed into the letter u. u is dissolved into the deity
Saṃkarṣaṇa, who is equated with deep sleep. The text then says that
Saṃkarṣaṇa is to be resorbed into the deity Vāsudeva without mention-
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 303

ing the intermediate step of the letter m.12 Vāsudeva, who is equated
with the “fourth state”13 and with the last constituent of the mantra om,
the anusvāra (ṃ),14 is reabsorbed into the brahman, the most transcen-
dent form of God, which is represented by the couple Lakṣmī and
Nārāyaṇa in this context15 and which is equated with the state beyond
the fourth (turyātīta) state.16 Through steps such as these, in the layayo-
ga the yogin moves gradually from more immanent levels to the most
transcendent.
Common to both kinds of Yoga is the mental visualisation of an
object, be it a single object or a final object in a series of visualised ob-
jects. The object of meditation can be of various types and depends on
the yogin’s aim. As mentioned above, very often the object is Viṣṇu or

12
Saṃkarṣaṇa is equated with the letter m of the mantra om; cf. LT 24.8. There are
two possible reasons why this intermediate step of Saṃkarṣaṇa’s dissolution into m
is not mentioned. One possibility is that beginning from the level of Saṃkarṣaṇa
upwards, deities and letters are no longer differentiated; cf. LT 24.30-31b, which
says that Vāsudeva is the “half measure-unit” (ardhamātraka, i.e. the letter ṃ, the
last constituent of the mantra om; cf. also LT 24.19-20) without differentiating be-
tween deity and letter. The other possibility is that from this point the intermediate
steps with regard to the letters are implied but not explicitly mentioned.
13
The fourth state is a state of the soul that is beyond the three states of consciousness
normally experienced in life. The concept of these four states of consciousness
originally derives from the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad. For the given context, cf. the LT’s
definition of the four states of consciousness: “Waking is the manner of proceeding
of the external senses. The activity of the internal organ, in which impressions
(saṃskāra) remain, when the power of the external senses is overcome by darkness
is to be known as dreaming. When this [activity] is not existent, [this] is deep sleep.
When the activity of the external and internal senses of a wise one who is not over-
come by darkness [and] adheres to sattva stops, the continuous flow of tranquillity
of pure sattva, is called fourth state.” (LT 22.23b-26b: jāgrad bāhyendriyakramaḥ |
bāhyendriyāṇāṃ tamasābhibhūte vibhave sati || 23 antaḥkaraṇavṛttir yā saṃskāra-
pariśeṣiṇī | sā svapna iti vijñeyā tadabhāve suṣuptikā || 24 tamasānabhibhūtasya satt-
vasthasya vipaścitaḥ | bāhyāntaḥkaraṇasthāyā vṛtter uparame sati || 25 śuddhasatt-
vaprasādasya saṃtatis turyasaṃjñitā | Cf. also LT 7.19c-24b for another passage de-
fining the four states of consciousness).
14
There are several concepts of how the mantra om is broken into elements. The num-
ber of units is often dependent on the number of entities that are equated with it (cf.
Padoux 1990: 19ff.). Here, four constituents are needed in order to equate them with
the four states of consciousness and the four Vyūhas. Thus, the mantra om is con-
sidered to be made up of the four units a, u, m, and ṃ.
15
Cf. LT 2.15c-16b.
16
LT 24.25c-32a.
304 MARION RASTELLI

Lakṣmī or a deity subordinate to Viṣṇu. How this object is visualised is

prescribed by the texts exactly. Often the alternative is offered of visual-
ising the God or the Goddess with or without a form; see again an ex-
ample from the Lakṣmītantra: “Being well concentrated17, he is to visu-
alise me18 as the unparalleled, inexplicable, unconceptualizable, spotless
Lakṣmī, who is easily attainable everywhere, who is present in every
cognition. Alternatively, the yogin [is to visualise me] with a form, as
the Supreme Padmā, with hands [showing] the vara[da-] and the ab-
haya[mudrā]19, resembling the calyx of a lotus, with a lotus in the hand,
endowed with auspicious marks. Or else [he is to visualise me as] the
Goddess sitting on Nārāyaṇa’s lap, attaining the same essence [as He],
consisting in consciousness and bliss, as well as Śrī’s husband who has
the same nature [as I have].”20
Prolonged visualisation in this or a similar manner leads to ab-
sorption (samādhi). It is usually in this state that the object of medita-
tion is perceived, moreover, only this object and nothing else; cf. again
the Lakṣmītantra: “Having effected the visualisation in the right man-
ner, he is to resort to absorption, in which [all] three, [i.e.,] the visualis-
ing [person], the visualisation and the visualised [object] are dissolved.
Then I alone appear, the eternal, complete I-ness. When I, the great
ocean of consciousness, have reached singleness, then nothing else ap-
pears, I alone, the Supreme One.”21

17
Although derived from the same root (samā √dhā) as the term samādhi, here
susamāhita probably does not mean that the yogin is in the state of samādhi as he at-
tains this state only later (cf. LT 28.46ab; see below). Rather it probably expresses
the fact that the yogin needs more “power of concentration” to visualise the formless
Goddess than for visualising her in a particular form.
18
I.e., Lakṣmi, who is giving this prescription.
19
The mudrā granting wishes (varada) consists in the right hand being raised with its
palm turned away from the body; the mudrā for fearlessness (abhaya) consists in the
left hand hanging down with its palm turned towards the body; cf., e.g., JS 8.104-
105b.
20
LT 28.41d-44: māṃ dhyāyet susamāhitaḥ || 41 anaupamyām anirdeśyām avikalpāṃ
nirañjanām | sarvatra sulabhāṃ lakṣmīṃ sarvapratyayatāṃ gatām || 42 sākārām
athavā yogī varābhayakarāṃ parām | padmagarbhopamāṃ padmāṃ padmahastāṃ
sulakṣaṇām || 43 yad vā nārāyaṇāṅkasthāṃ sāmarasyam upāgatām | cidānanda-
mayīṃ devīṃ tādṛśaṃ ca śriyaḥ patim || 44.
21
LT 28.46-48b: samyaṅ nidhyānam utpādya samādhiṃ samupāśrayet | dhyātā
dhyānaṃ tathā dhyeyaṃ trayaṃ yatra vilīyate || 46 ekaivāhaṃ tadā bhāse
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 305

For a better understanding of this description of achieving the

perception of the object of meditation, I would also like to quote a few
definitions of the state of absorption: “Absorption is produced by the
constituents [of Yoga] such as restraint, etc. [It is] persistence in the
Supreme brahman, which is called ‘abode of Śrī’. [It is] indeed devoid
of any activity. Indeed it consists in direct perception. [It is] the state of
those who know the true brahman. [It] abides in the non-distinction of
the visualising [person] and the visualised [object and] is produced by
my grace.”22 “The third [method for attaining the ultimate goal], how-
ever, is the undeviating, steady perception that has the nature of absorp-
tion. It is an excess of grace indeed that is produced by excellent
sattva.”23 “The yogins know this [visualisation] that in this manner is
gradually increased by a continuous flow of remembrance and that is
the appearance of only the object as absorption.”24
What do these passages tell us about the nature of samādhi?
First of all, it is a continuous, persistent, steady state that is devoid of
any activity. In this state, which starts with visualising an object, the
visualising person and the visualised object become one. This is empha-
sized very often.25 We will see that there are different ways to under-

pūrṇāhaṃtā sanātanī | aikadhyam anusaṃprāpte mayi saṃvinmahodadhau || 47 nān-

yat prakāśate kiṃcid aham eva tadā parā |.
22
LT 16.31-32: yamādyaṅgasamudbhūtā samādhiḥ saṃsthitiḥ pare | brahmaṇi śrīnivā-
sākhye hy utthānaparivarjitā || 31 sākṣātkāramayī sā hi sthitiḥ sadbrahmavedinām |
dhyātṛdhyeyāvibhāgasthā matprasādasamudbhavā || 32.
23
LT 16.39: tṛtīyas tu samādhyātmā pratyakṣo ’viplavo dṛḍhaḥ | prakṛṣṭasattvasaṃ-
bhūtaḥ prasādātiśayo hi saḥ ||.
24
AS 32.70c-71b: tad evaṃ smṛtisaṃtānajanitotkarṣaṇaṃ kramāt || 70 arthamātrāva-
bhāsaṃ tu samādhiṃ yogino viduḥ | This definition could be influenced partly by
Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya, which describes meditation (dhyāna) as “having the form of
a continuous flow of uninterrupted remembrance, like a stream of sesame oil” (Śrībh
I 55,1-56,1: dhyānaṃ ca tailadhārāvad avicchinnasmṛtisantānarūpam.), and partly
by the Yogasūtra’s definition of absorption (“Just this [visualisation] that is the ap-
pearance of only the object [and] that is, as it were, void of its own form is absorp-
tion.”; YSū 3.3: tad evārthamātranirbhāsaṃ svarūpaśūnyam iva samādhiḥ.)
25
See also SS 6.213c, PārS 7.493c, PādS yp 5.17 (see p. 309). Not all Pāñcarātrins,
however, agree that the yogin achieves a complete non-difference with his object, as
this is against the doctrine of the Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta. Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta is influ-
ential in the Pāñcarātra and teaches a “differentiated” (viśiṣṭa) and not a complete
non-difference between the soul and the Supreme God; for a discussion of this, cf.
Rastelli 2006: 511-516.
306 MARION RASTELLI

stand this statement. Here, we have to relate it to the statements that

absorption consists in “direct perception”, that it is “undeviating, steady
perception”, that “only the object” appears and nothing else. This means
that the yogin perceives only the object and loses his awareness of self.
Finally, two of the quoted passages state that the state of absorp-
tion is produced by grace. This means that the yogin must make an ef-
fort to achieve this state, but if the Goddess appears to him is still her
own step. However, I would like to emphasize that both passages men-
tioning grace are from the Lakṣmītantra, and that I could not find simi-
lar passages in any other Pāñcarātra text to date. Thus, the necessity of
grace to achieve the state of absorption is not a general Pāñcarātra view.
The yogin is now in the state of absorption and perceives his
chosen object, for example, Viṣṇu or Lakṣmī. This perception is, how-
ever, not the end of the Yoga practice and not the ultimate goal of the
yogin. Rather it brings about a state that is literally called the “state of
consisting-in-Him/Her/it” (tanmayatā), depending on which object was
chosen for meditation.26
Let us look at a passage from the Sātvatasaṃhitā that describes
this process. In this particular case, the process is preceded by mental
visualisations of mantras of the four Vyūhas of Viṣṇu, which were al-
ready mentioned above, namely, Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṃkarṣaṇa
and Vāsudeva. These visualisations are accompanied by recitations of
the respective mantras, and both the mental visualisation and the recita-
tion aim at the yogin’s identification with the mantra.27 After describing
26
The attainment of tanmayatā is also described in Śaiva texts; cf. Vasudeva 2004:
433-435.
27
Cf. SS 6.206-210b: “And then, having mentally repeated the mantra-king Anirud-
dha, who is in the waking state (cf. p. 302 for the equation of Aniruddha with the
waking state), a hundred [times] with an ātman that is not different from him, his
(i.e., Aniruddha’s) majesty and knowledge arise for him (i.e., for the yogin) on ac-
count of the efficacy of the recitation of his mantra, which (efficacy) is connected
with the persistence in the identity [with Aniruddha]. At the end of a year [the
yogin] possesses non-duality with him on account of [this] repeated exercise. Hav-
ing, however, then repeated the Pradyumnamantra two hundred [times], also con-
tinually with the [thought] characterised by non-duality: ‘I am he’ in exactly the
same manner, he becomes wise [and] one whose doubts are dispelled by [this] exer-
cise on account of its (the Pradyumnamantra’s) power in the course of this same
time.” (tato jāgratpadasthaṃ cāpy aniruddhaṃ ca mantrarāṭ (mantrarāṭ can be used
in the sense of an accusative in “tantric Sanskrit”. I am grateful to Harunaga
Isaacson for this information.) | parāvartya śataṃ buddhyā tadabhinnena cātmanā ||
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 307

this meditation, the Sātvatasaṃhitā states: “By means of this method,

which is accompanied by an increase [in the number] of recitations, he
also is to make the whole group of mantras mentioned before the sub-
ject [of his meditation] till the Venerable One, whose manifestation is
dissolved, who is spotless, infinite, a treasure of glowing splendour,
compact consciousness and bliss, transcendent, unparalleled, [and]
calm, appears at the place with the characteristics mentioned (?), till he
(the yogin), concentrating his self on Him and giving up the perform-
ance of recitation, through the non-difference of the visualising [person]
and the visualised [object] attains the state of consisting in Him. When
he who is joined with the Venerable One attains stability in absorption
that is free of a cognizable [entity] on account of repeated exercise, he
then becomes28 the brahman.”29
The procedure here is described quite clearly. The yogin visual-
ises and recites the mantra until Vāsudeva, i.e. Viṣṇu, appears to him.
Then he, ending his recitation, concentrates on Vāsudeva until the dif-
ference between himself, the visualising person, and Vāsudeva, the
visualised object, disappears and the yogin becomes “consisting in
Vāsudeva”.30

206 tanmantrajapasāmarthyāt tādātmyasthitibandhanāt | mahimā tu savijñānas tadī-

yas tasya jāyate || 207 abhyāsād vatsarānte tu tadadvaitasamanvitaḥ (v.l.) | atha
pradyumnamantraṃ tu parāvartya śatadvayam || 208 yo ’yaṃ so ’ham anenaivāpy
advaitena sadaiva hi | evam eva samabhyāsād matimāṃś chinnasaṃśayaḥ || 209 tat-
prabhāvāc ca tenaiva tathā kālena jāyate |).
28
sampadyate can mean “he becomes” or “he attains”. Following Alaśiṅga Bhaṭṭa,
who quotes MuṇḍU 3.2.9: brahmaiva bhavati to explain this expression (SSBh
120,12), I choose the first meaning. Cf. Rastelli 2006, nn. 1630 and 1640 for differ-
ent possibilities of understanding the word sampadyate in this context .
29
SS 6.210c-214: anena kramayogena japavṛddhyānvitena tu || 210 nikhilaṃ cāpy
adhīkuryād mantravṛndaṃ puroditam | yāvad ābhāti bhagavān sthāne pūrvokta-
lakṣaṇe || 211 pralīnamūrtir amalo hy anantas tejasāṃ nidhiḥ | cidānandaghanaḥ
śānto hy anaupamyo hy anākulaḥ || 212 samādhāyātmanātmānaṃ tatra tyaktvā ja-
pakriyām | dhyātṛdhyeyāvibhāgena yāvat tanmayatāṃ vrajet || 213 yadā saṃvedya-
nirmukte samādhau labhate sthitim | abhyāsād bhagavadyogī brahma sampadyate
tadā || 214.
30
Cf. also the much shorter description of the AS: “Having then resorted to absorp-
tion, the one having attained the state of consisting in Him obtains the complete
power of the one abounding in śakti.” (AS 32.71c-72b: tataḥ samādhim āsthāya
tanmayatvam upāgataḥ || tasya prabhāvam akhilam aśnute śaktiśālinaḥ |).
308 MARION RASTELLI

What “consisting in God” means can be seen more clearly in

other passages in the Saṃhitās.31 The following passage gives us an idea
about the nature of the state of “consisting in God”, although it is not
from a yogic context but that of a ritual: “By means of the visualisation
that was taught before, he is then to visualise himself and [his] body in
the form of Viṣṇu, which is abounding with the aggregate of the six
[divine] qualities, in [his] own form, in all forms or in a form as desired.
‘I am the Venerable One; I am Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, Hari. I am Vāsudeva
indeed, the Pervader, the abode of beings, the Spotless One.’ Having
effected a very firm self-awareness of such a form, O Sage, the best of
the sādhakas soon becomes consisting in Him.”32 As in the SS (cf. n.
27), but here more clearly expressed, the devotee attains the state of
consisting in God by means of a meditative reflection in which he forms
his self-awareness in such a way that he conceives his I as being Viṣṇu,
feeling himself as Viṣṇu in the sense of “I am Viṣṇu”. Consequently he
“consists in Viṣṇu”.
We also find similar descriptions in other Saṃhitās. The LT
says at the end of the prescriptions for the layayoga described above:
“And having dissolved this fourth state into the state beyond the fourth
state, which has the nature of [the couple] Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa, he
himself is to assume the divine ‘I-ness’ of Viṣṇu. Having attained such
a state of dissolution, the one consisting in this [I-ness] then gradually
[is to ...]”33. In a description of a yogic exercise for attaining the brah-

Becoming “consisting in Viṣṇu” in the context of yogic meditation is, however, not
always connected to a visual perception. There are several descriptions of this proc-
ess in which visual perception is not mentioned. Although in these cases tanmayatā
is also a result of mental visualisation, immediate perception does not occur. It
arises immediately after the visualisation (see SS 17.451c-452c ≈ PādS yp 5.24c-
25c, PārS 7.493, LT 24.32, 38cd, 44.12.).
31
The following part of this paper, which discusses tanmayatā, is based on Rastelli
2006: 503-507.
32
JS 11.39c-42: tatas savigrahaṃ dhyāyed ātmānaṃ viṣṇurūpiṇam || 39 pūrvoktadhy-
ānayogena ṣāḍguṇyamahimāvṛtam | svarūpaṃ viśvarūpaṃ vā yathābhimatarūpakam
|| 40 ahaṃ sa bhagavān viṣṇur ahaṃ nārāyaṇo hariḥ | vāsudevo hy ahaṃ vyāpī bhū-
tāvāso nirañjanaḥ || 41 evaṃrūpam ahaṅkāram āsādya sudṛḍhaṃ mune | tanmayaś
cācireṇaiva jāyate sādhakottamaḥ || 42.
33
LT 24.31c-32: turyātīte ca tat turyaṃ lakṣmīnārāyaṇātmani || 31 pravilāpya svayaṃ
divyām ahaṃtāṃ vaiṣṇavīṃ śrayet | tanmayas tādṛśaṃ prāpya layasthānaṃ tataḥ
kramāt || 32.
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 309

man, the PādS gives: “... and, thinking of the eternal brahman that looks
like a thousand lightning bolts [and] resembles the fire at the end of the
yuga in the centre of the heart-lotus, having made his consciousness to
consist in it ...”34 In these two passages, the “I-ness of Viṣṇu” is as-
sumed, or the individual consciousness is made to “consist in the brah-
man”. Thus these passages also indicate that the devotee feels himself to
be Viṣṇu or the brahman.
As I mentioned above, the state of absorption, which is a pre-
condition for attaining tanmayatā, in which the visualising person and
the visualised object become one, can be understood in different ways,
namely, the subject becoming one with the object or the object becom-
ing one with the subject. If we look again at the end of the passage from
the SS quoted above: “... till he, concentrating his self on Him and giv-
ing up the performance of recitation, through the non-difference of the
visualising [person] and the visualised [object] becomes ‘consisting in
Him’. When he who is joined with the Venerable One attains stability in
absorption that is free of a cognizable [entity] on account of repeated
exercise, he then becomes the brahman.”35, it is rather the object that
merges into the subject than vice versa. The devotee is in a state in
which he identifies his I with Viṣṇu, i.e., his self-awareness is that of
being Viṣṇu, and in a state that is “free of a cognizable entity”.
We also find other passages that describe the disappearance of
the object of meditation in the state of absorption: “And he is to con-
template the object so long until he does not contemplate the object
[anymore]. For if the existence [of the object] has become non-existent,
his nature is declared as the Supreme One.”36 “The oneness of both the
personal soul and the Supreme One is to be known as [the state of] ab-
sorption, which accomplishes the goals of virtuous people. Performing
the visualisation ‘I indeed am the Supreme brahman’, being constantly
firm like a pillar, he does not perceive objects. Just as external water
that enters the motionless ocean abandons [its] moving nature, in the
same manner the personal soul of the yogin who is in absorption be-

34
PādS yp 5.24c-25: hṛtpuṇḍarīkamadhyasthaṃ smaran brahma sanātanam || 24
vidyutsahasrasaṃkāśaṃ yugāntānilasannibham | tanmayaṃ ca svacaitanyaṃ kṛtvā
(…) || 25. PādS yp 5.24c-28 is based on SS 17.451c-456.
35
SS 6.213c-214 (for the Sanskrit text see n. 29).
36
JS 33.34c-35b: tāvac ca bhāvayel lakṣyaṃ yāval lakṣyaṃ na bhāvayet || 34 bhāve hy
abhāvam āpanne svasvabhāvaḥ paraḥ smṛtaḥ |.
310 MARION RASTELLI

comes dissolved into the Supreme ātman (paramātman) in Vai-

kuṇṭha.”37
However, we have seen that there is also another perspective on
this state. Let us look again at the passage from the AS quoted above:
“The yogins know this [visualisation] that in this manner is gradually
increased by a continuous flow of remembrance and that is the appear-
ance of only the object as absorption. Having then resorted to absorp-
tion, the one having become consisting in Him obtains the complete
power of the one abounding in śakti.”38 In this description of becoming
consisting in God, self-awareness is not mentioned. And the definition
of absorption does not say that it is free of objects. On the contrary, this
state consists in the appearance of an object. Subjectivity and thus self-
awareness disappear.
This difference is, however, indeed only one of perspective,
since the final result is the same, namely, the yogin becomes “consisting
in God”. According to the one viewpoint, the subject, i.e., the yogin, and
the object, e.g. Viṣṇu, become one. The subject becomes the object and
the object disappears. This means the yogin becomes Viṣṇu; he is, in his
self-awareness, Viṣṇu. According to the other perspective, the subjec-
tivity of the yogin disappears and the object alone appears. This does
not mean, however, that the yogin ceases to exist. He continues to exist,
but in his self-perception he has become the object that he has meditated
upon.
In the context of the AS, the object of meditation is Sudarśana,39
Viṣṇu’s manifestation as a discus (cakra), a weapon used in battle. This
means that in the state of absorption only Sudarśana appears for the
yogin and the yogin becomes “consisting in Sudarśana”. Concretely this
means that the yogin possesses all of Sudarśana’s abilities.40 These abili-
ties include, for example, superhuman powers such as becoming as

37
PādS yp 5.17-20b: jīvātmanaḥ parasyāpi yad aikyam ubhayor api | samādhiḥ sa tu
vijñeyaḥ sādhvarthānāṃ prasādhakaḥ || 17 aham eva paraṃ brahma tad iti dhyānam
āsthitaḥ | sthāṇubhūto dṛḍhaḥ śaśvad viṣayān nāvabudhyate || 18 yathā bāhyajalaṃ
vārāṃ praviṣṭaṃ niścalaṃ nidhim | calasvabhāvaṃ tyajati tathā jīvaḥ pralīyate || 19
paramātmani vaikuṇṭhe samādhisthasya yoginaḥ |.
38
AS 32.70c-72b (for the Sanskrit text see nn. 24 and 30).
39
Cf. AS 32.59.
40
Cf. AS 32.72ab: “He obtains the complete power of the one abounding in śakti.” (for
the Sanskrit text see n. 30).
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 311

small as an atom, the ability to destroy many enemy armies single-

handedly, the attainment of whatever one desires, the subjugation of all
beings, and even omniscience and omnipotence.41 The possession of
these abilities clearly shows that the yogin has subjectively become Su-
darśana.
Thus, the final result is ultimately the same, independent of
whether the subject has become the object, or whether only the object
exists in the end. A passage from LT 44 even describes these two possi-
bilities side by side: “Constantly thinking [of Tārikā’s saṃjñāmantra42],
the yogin, whose body has been made to consist in Her (i.e., Tārikā) by
repeated exercise, having become consisting in myself, attains my state.
Or I, being known by him, having come to [his] direct perception, fulfil
every wish, whatever the yogin desires.”43 This passage describes first a
procedure by which the yogin becomes consisting in Tārikā by means of
the meditation on her saṃjñāmantra. By this he becomes consisting in
the Goddess of which Tārikā is a manifestation, and he reaches the state
of being the Goddess. Alternatively, the passage describes a process in
which the Goddess enters the yogin’s perception. The yogin is faced
with the Goddess as an object, probably as the only object. This means
that the yogin either becomes the object of meditation – he becomes
consisting in it – or he faces the object, perceiving it exclusively.44
“Consisting in him” (tanmayatva, tanmayatā) probably does not
mean that the yogin and God are completely identical. One could ex-
plain the state of tanmayatva perhaps by the following analogy: An ob-
ject made of wood “consists in wood”. It has all properties that wood
has. Nevertheless the object is not identical with wood. In the same way
the yogin “consists in Viṣṇu” and has all his properties, but he is not
identical with Viṣṇu insofar as Viṣṇu cannot be reduced to the person of
the yogin.

41
AS 32.72c-76.
42
śrīṃ svāhā; see LT 44.7ab, 9, and 11ab.
43
LT 44.12-13: smaran satatam abhyāsāt tanmayīkṛtavigrahaḥ | yogī manmayatāṃ
prāpya madbhāvaṃ pratipadyate || 12 ahaṃ vā bodhitā tena sākṣātkāram upeyuṣī |
vidadhe sakalaṃ kāmaṃ sa yogī yaṃ yam icchati || 13.
44
The actual difference here could be that in the first alternative, the yogin attains
liberation (mokṣa; indicated by the expression “he attains my state” [madbhāvaṃ
pratipadyate]?) and in the second, enjoyment (bhoga).
312 MARION RASTELLI

The concrete consequences of tanmayatva are not the same in

every case, but they are determined by the object of meditation, which
in turn has been chosen according to the goal being striven for. If the
goal is liberation from transmigration, an adequate object of meditation
is the Supreme brahman. By means of the meditation on the brahman,
the yogin becomes “consisting in brahman,” he achieves the state of
brahman, which means liberation. If the goal of the yogin is supernatu-
ral powers, he is to meditate on a manifestation of Viṣṇu that is able to
bestow them, such as his discus manifestation Sudarśana, as we have
seen in the example from the AS. Through the meditation on Sudarśana,
the yogin becomes “consisting in Sudarśana” and thereby attains the
same powers as this divine manifestation.
Up to now I have described the achievement of the state of
“consisting in God” by yogic means, i.e., by mental visualisation and
absorption, which in some cases are accompanied by the perception of
the object of meditation and in other cases are not. However, the per-
ception of God and the state of “consisting in Him” can also be attained
by other means.
I mentioned at the beginning that the religious goals of Pāñcarā-
trins are mainly reached by rituals. In some of these rituals, God can
also be perceived and/or the state of tanmayatā can be attained. Such
rituals are mainly for the purpose of the achievement of worldly pleas-
ure (bhukti, bhoga).45
These rituals are usually performed in an isolated place, where
the devotee, following several observances, lives for a certain period.
His main duty is to worship a particular manifestation of God, which he
has chosen according to the aims he wants to achieve.46
A general principle in Tantric ritual worship, to which Pāñcarā-
tra worship also belongs, is that everything involved in the ritual, that is,
the devotee, the implements and substances used in the ritual, the ritual
place, etc., must be suitable for the deity being worshipped. What is

45
tanmayatā can, however, also be attained in rituals for the purpose of liberation from
transmigration and is actually a precondition for them; cf. the quotation from JS
11.39c-42 above (p. 308) or JS 13.8c-10b.
46
In the following, I only give a very condensed description of this kind of ritual wor-
ship, including only the elements most important for understanding the achievement
of tanmayatā and the perception of deities. For a detailed description, cf. Rastelli
2000.
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 313

adequate for a deity is only that which is like the deity. Nothing that is
inferior to the deity is suitable for it. Thus the devotee must make every-
thing involved in the ritual like the deity, including himself. There are
several methods for making something like the deity. One is placing
(nyāsa) mantras onto an object. Placing mantras means, for example,
that the devotee places several mantras that represent various aspects of
the deity onto his body.47 Doing this, he makes these aspects of the deity
present on his body and thus his body becomes “like the deity”. This
effect is intensified by another method, namely, the devotee’s mental
identification with the deity, as given in the passage quoted from the JS
(p. 308).48 A further method is assuming the outward appearance of the
deity being worshipped. If the deity, for example, is usually considered
to wear red garments and certain types of adornments, the devotee is to
wear similar garments and adornments in order to have the same out-
ward appearance as the deity. This method is also usually supported by
the mental identification with the deity.49 We see that the devotee has to
become like the deity, “consisting in it” (tanmaya), already before its
worship. However, “consisting in the deity” can also be the result of
ritual worship.
There are two main means for worshipping a deity for the pur-
pose of the fulfilment of worldly wishes. One is the repeated recitation
(japa) of a mantra a huge number of times. A mantra is a manifestation
of the deity. It has two forms, a language form, e.g., the words oṃ namo
bhagavate vāsudevāya, and a visual form, e.g., an anthropomorphic
body.50 By reciting the language form of the mantra, which is accompa-
nied by the visualisation of the mantra’s visual form, the deity is made
present in both aspects.

47
For a detailed description of placing mantras on the devotee’s hands and body, cf.
Rastelli 1999: 239-246.
48
Cf. also JS 6.185c-187b: “Listen well, Divine ṛṣi. I tell you [the upāṅgamantras]
along with their secret doctrine. On account of their placing, the mantra manifesta-
tion is mastered by the sādhaka wherever it be and it soon gives fruits to the one
consisting in it. On account of their placing [and] on account of the meditation on
[their] pervasion, the one who has mastered the mantras is equal to the Lord of the
gods.” (samyak śṛṇuṣva devarṣe sarahasyaṃ vadāmi te || 185 yadvinyāsāt sādhakasya
siddho vai yatra kutracit | phalado mantramūrtis syād acirāt tanmayasya ca || 186 syād
deveśasamo mantrī tannyāsād vyāptibhāvanāt |).
49
Cf. Rastelli 2000: 329-331.
50
For more details on the mantra, see Rastelli 1999: 119-140.
314 MARION RASTELLI

The other means is offering huge numbers of oblations (homa)

to the fire in which the deity has been made present previously, al-
though this is generally done fewer times than the recitations. These aim
at satisfying the deity.51
By these two methods, making the deity present by reciting and
visualising its mantra and satisfying it by fire oblations over a long pe-
riod, the deity is forced to appear to the devotee. It then appears face to
face with him and comes into his perception. It admits that it has been
mastered by the devotee and will be at his disposal from that time on:
“Then, Brahmin, the Venerable Jayā herself comes. ‘You have mastered
me well, Son. Free of fear and affliction, perform the action that is de-
sired with my mantra.’ Having so spoken, the Goddess, who has the
nature of Nārāyaṇa, disappears.”52
The devotee has now attained his goal. By means of the mantra
he has mastered he can fulfil every wish that comes to his mind. Some
passages mention that this ability is accompanied by tanmayatā: “He
who has mastered the mantra, having attained the state of consisting in
him, obtains all wishes.”; “Making Vāsudeva evident to his senses by
means of many hundred recitations53 [and] by the same number of offer-
ings to the fire, he firmly becomes consisting in Him. What is the use of
these many words? By means of worship rituals, a man attains whatever
state is desired [by him].”54
Obviously, the state of tanmayatā described as the result of wor-
ship has another quality than the tanmayatā that must be attained as a
51
For the mantra recitation and the oblations to the fire, see Rastelli 2000: 332-334
(referring to the JS). References from other Saṃhitās are, e.g., NārS 5.7 and PādS cp
24.83 (see below).
52
JS 27.118c-120b: tato bhagavatī vipra samāyāti jayā svayam || 118 susiddhāsmi ca te
putra manmantreṇa samācara | yad abhīṣṭaṃ tu vai kāryaṃ niśśaṅko vigatajvaraḥ ||
119 uktvety adarśanaṃ yāti devī nārāyaṇātmikā | Cf. also Rastelli 2000: 334-336
(referring to the JS). For references from other Saṃhitās see, e.g., AS 44.21-22b,
PādS cp 24.83 (see below), 169c-170, 25.266c-267, 28.77c-78b, 33.140c-141b.
53
Literally: by a hundred recitations in very large numbers (mahaughaiḥ).
54
NārS 5.35cd: sarvān kāmān avāpnoti mantrī tanmayatāṃ gataḥ || PādS cp 24.83-84:
mahaughaiś śatajāpena tāvadāhutisaṃkhyayā | sākṣātkurvan vāsudevaṃ tanmayo
bhavati dhruvam || 83 kim ebhir bahubhiḥ proktaiḥ padaṃ yad yad abhīpsitam | tat
tad āpnoti puruṣaḥ samārādhanakarmabhiḥ || 84. Cf. also NārS 3.119-120b (see here
especially the v.l. advayatāṃ [“non-duality-ness] in the place of tanmayatāṃ). NārS
3.55cd gives tanmayatā as the particular achievement after the vāsudevamantra has
been recited 600,000 times.
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 315

precondition of ritual worship. By becoming “consisting in God” as a

precondition of worship, the devotee becomes like God in order to be
adequate for worshipping him. This state is, however, neither permanent
nor does it mean that the devotee is able to fulfil all his wishes through
it. tanmayatā as the result of successful worship, on the other hand, has
these qualities: it is permanent and the devotee can obtain all his wishes.
We have seen that perception of God and the state of “consisting
in Him” can be attained by different means: by yogic meditation on the
one hand and by ritual worship on the other. At first view, these means
seem to be very different, but in fact they have a lot in common. They
use similar methods that, despite their different emphasis, aim at the
same two goals, namely, making an object present and thus perceptible
on the one hand, and identification with this object on the other.
Let us compare yogic meditation and ritual worship as described
above. Yogic meditation starts with the visualisation (dhyāna) of an
object, for example, Viṣṇu. This visualisation can be connected with the
yogin’s conscious mental identification with his object and/or with the
recitation of the mantra that represents the object.55 Sometimes it is
even preceded by placing mantras on the devotee’s body, as I have de-
scribed in the ritual context.56 Prolonged visualisation leads to absorp-
tion (samādhi). Here the visualisation is perfected to such a degree that
the object of meditation appears to the yogin so realistically that he ac-
tually perceives it. He perceives it exclusively, leaving behind even his
perception of himself. Or, from another point of view, the yogin’s iden-
tification with his object is perfected to such a degree that he actually
feels he is this object. In both cases he may achieve tanmayatā, that is,
become like the object.
Ritual worship done in order to master a mantra and thereby to
achieve worldly pleasure is preceded by placing mantras on the devo-
tee’s body and sometimes by assuming the outward appearance of the
deity worshipped. These are the first steps of identification with the
deity being worshipped. In this ritual practice, the repeated recitation
(japa) of the mantra, many times and over a long period, is central. It is

55
Cf. the example from the SS described above (p. 306), in which both identifying
visualisation and recitation are applied. In the JS, recitation is also explicitly taught
as an element of Yoga practice (JS 33.10d-12b; cf. also Rastelli 1999: 339f.).
56
This is the case in the yogic meditation of the SS described above (p. 306); cf. SS
6.195-197b.
316 MARION RASTELLI

connected with the visualisation of the mantra, thus making both as-
pects of the mantra present, the linguistic and the visual. Fire offerings
seem to be a purely physical activity. However, this physical activity,
done with the purpose of satisfying the deity, makes the devotee aware
of the presence of this deity and enables him to enter the right frame of
mind for its presence. Through these methods that make the deity pre-
sent and allow the devotee to identify himself with it, the presence of
the deity becomes so real that on one hand it appears to the devotee in
manifest perception, and on the other, he feels himself to be the deity
and thus to possess all its powers.
To sum up, we have considered yogic perception and the per-
ception of supernatural objects effected by other means, both of which
are followed by the yogin’s becoming like the object. The methods used
to reach these states are different. Despite that, the various methods are
similar in that they all make their object mentally present and let the
adept identify with it.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AS Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā: Ahirbudhnya-Saṃhitā of the Pāñcarātrā-
gama, ed. M.D. Ramanujacharya under the Supervision of F. O.
Schrader. Revised by V. Krishnamacharya. 2 vols. Adyar 2nd ed.
1966 (repr. 1986).
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Härtel 1987 H. Härtel, Archaeological Evidence on the Early Vāsudeva Wor-
ship. In: Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae Dicata, ed. G. Gnoli
et L. Lanciotti. Roma 1987, 573-587.
JS Jayākhyasaṃhitā: Jayākhyasaṁhitā, ed. E. Krishnamacharya.
Baroda 1931.
LT Lakṣmītantra: Lakṣmī-Tantra. A Pāñcarātra Āgama, ed. V. Krish-
namacharya. Madras 1959 (repr. 1975).
MuṇḍU Muṇḍakopaniṣad: In: Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads. Vol. I.
(Upaniṣadic Text with Parallels from extant Vedic Literature,
Exegetical and Grammatical Notes), ed. V.P. Limaye and R.D.
Vadekar. Poona 1958, 38-47.
NārS Nāradīyasaṃhitā: Nāradīya Saṁhitā, ed. R.P. Chaudhary. Tiru-
pati 1971.
Padoux 1990 A. Padoux, Vāc. The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu
Tantras. Translated by J. Gontier. Albany 1990.
PādS Pādmasaṃhitā: Padma Samhita, crit. ed. S. Padmanabhan and R.N.
Sampath (part I), S. Padmanabhan and V. Varadachari (part II). Ma-
dras 1974, 1982.
 PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 317

ParS Paramasaṃhitā: Paramasaṁhitā [of the Pāñcharātra], ed. and

translated into English by S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar. Baroda
1940.
PārS Pārameśvarasaṃhitā: Pārameśvarasaṃhitā, ed. Govindācārya.
Śrīraṅgam 1953.
Rastelli 1999 M. Rastelli, Philosophisch-theologische Grundanschauungen der
Jayākhyasaṃhitā. Mit einer Darstellung des täglichen Rituals.
Wien 1999.
Rastelli 2000 id., The Religious Practice of the Sādhaka According to the
Jayākhyasaṃhitā. Indo-Iranian Journal 43/4 (2000) 319-395.
Rastelli 2006 id., Die Tradition des Pāñcarātra im Spiegel der Pārameśvara-
saṃhitā. Wien 2006.
Śrībh Śrībhāṣya: Śrībhāṣya, ed. T. Vīrarāghavācārya. 2 vols. Madras
1967.
SS Sātvatasaṃhitā: Sātvata-Saṁhitā. With Commentary by Alaśiṅga
Bhaṭṭa, ed. V.V. Dwivedi. Varanasi 1982.
SSBh Sātvatasaṃhitābhāṣya: see SS.
Vasudeva 2004 Somadeva Vasudeva, The Yoga of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra.
Chapters 1-4, 7, 11-17. Critical Edition, Translation & Notes.
Pondichéry 2004.
yp yogapāda.
YSū Yogasūtra: Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-
Bhagavatpāda, crit. ed. P.S.R. Sastri and S.R. Krishnamurthi Sas-
tri. Madras 1952.
 Part II
Meditation and Altered States of
Consciousness from an Interdisciplinary
Perspective
 KARL BAIER

Meditation and Contemplation in High to Late

Medieval Europe

In the Western European history of meditation and contemplation the

period from the 12th to the 15th century differs significantly from the
times both before and after. Earlier forms undergo important changes
and the foundations are laid for spiritual practices of which several
dominated until the 20th century. Four trends are of special importance:
• The development of elaborate philosophical and theological theories
which treat meditation and contemplation systematically.
• The democratization of meditation and contemplation.
• The emergence of new methods, especially imaginative forms of
meditation.
• The differentiation between meditation and contemplation and their
establishment as methods in their own right accompanied by discus-
sions about their relation and the transition from one to the other.
The following article will treat these trends and other related develop-
ments concentrating on Richard of St. Victor, the Scala Claustralium of
Guigo II and the Clowde of Unknowyng.

A. RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH

The Regular Canons of St. Victor, an abbey outside the city walls of
Paris, ran one of the most famous schools for higher education in the
12th century. They developed a new form of philosophy and theology,
unifying the monastic mystical tradition and spiritual practice with a
spirit of critical reflection and systematical thinking typical of the rising
scholasticism. In a practical and theoretical sense the Victorines con-
nected science with a specific form of life.1

1
Cf. S. Jaeger, Humanism and ethics at the School of St. Victor in the early twelfth
Century, in: Mediaeval Studies 55 (1993) 51-79.
322 KARL BAIER

Richard of St. Victor (?-1173) “must be counted as the most significant

of the Victorine mystics, both for the profundity of his thought and his
subsequent influence on the later Western tradition.“2 He affected Tho-
mas Gallus and Bonaventura, the English mystics Richard Rolle, Walter
Hilton and the anonymous author of the Cloud-texts, as well as German
and Flemish mysticism. It is probable that his influence extended (indi-
rectly) as far as the Spanish Carmelites of the 15th century, Teresa of
Avila and John of the Cross.3 Richard wrote two works concerning
meditation and contemplation which are of special importance. Benja-
min minor, also called The twelve Patriarchs, interprets Jacob, his
wives, concubines and twelve sons as stages of preparation for the state
of ecstasy which is symbolized in Benjamin, the last of the patriarchs.
Emphasis is given to self-knowledge and the development of certain
virtues.4 Benjamin major or De gratia contemplationis, also known as
The Mystical Ark, is a comprehensive manual on contemplation.5
In Benjamin major I, 3-4 Richard develops a hierarchical system
of different modes of cognition and correlates it to four basic cognitive
faculties which he took from Boethius: sensus, imaginatio, ratio and

2
McGinn 2004: 398.
3
See S. Chase, Contemplation and Compassion. The Victorine Tradition, Maryknoll
2003, 141.
4
The symbolical meaning of Benjamin is based on the Latin version of Psalm 68:27:
Ibi Benjamin adulescentulus in mentis excessu (“There is Benjamin the youngest, in
ecstasy of mind.“) On Richard’s concept of self-knowledge see H. Nakamura,
“Cognitio sui“ bei Richard von Sankt Viktor, in: R. Berndt and others (ed.), „Scien-
tia“ et „Disciplina“. Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahr-
hundert, Berlin 2002, 127-156.
5
The Latin texts of most of Richard’s works are found in: Richardi a Sancto Victore
Opera Omnia, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, Paris 1855 (Patrologia Latina 196). I quote
the Latin text of Benjamin maior from the edition by Aris. Translation of main
works into English: Richard of St. Victor, The twelve patriarchs. The mystical arc.
Book three of the Trinity. Transl. and introd. by G. A. Zinn, Mahwah 1979. For in-
terpretations of his theory of meditation and contemplation see J. Ebner, Die Er-
kenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen. Bd. XIX, Heft 4, Münster i. W. 1919; Ruh
1990: 397-406; S. Chase, Angelic Wisdom. The Cherubim and the Grace of Con-
templation in Richard of St. Victor, Notre Dame, London 1995; Aris 1996; Spijker
2004: 127-184; McGinn 2004: 395-418.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 323

intelligentia (sense-perception, imagination, discriminative rationality,

intuitive insight).6
The lowest mode of awareness is termed cogitatio which is
dominated by the first two of the Boethian faculties of the mind. It is
“the careless looking around of the mind tending to deviate.”7 This kind
of thinking is essentially driven by curiosity and other passions. It is a
restless movement, lost in the multiplicity of things and does not lead to
any valid results. “The senses [with the help of imagination, KB] offer
images to reason (ratio) where they become the objects of all kind of
thoughts. These wander around purposelessly. When the mind comes
upon one of these free-floating thoughts and wants to know more about
it, it has to concentrate and cogitation turns into meditation.”8
Meditation is a much more focused way of thinking. It emerges
when cogitatio starts to become seriously interested in something which
it has uncovered. Meditatio and the following ways of cognition are
subsequent steps on a progressive path towards truth.9 Richard defines it
as “the eager exertion of the mind which affectionately tries to investi-
gate something.“10 The dominant mental faculty is ratio, discursive
thinking, which investigates the cause (causa), mode (modus), effect
(effectus), purpose (utilitas) and inner structure (ratio) of its objects.
Meditation finally merges into contemplation, the fulfilled act of insight
that meditation is in search of:
“If the mind after a long time of searching finally finds the truth, then it
usually happens that it receives the new insight with appetite, gazes at it

6
See Boethius, Philosophiae Consolatio, ed. Ludwig Bieler, Turnhout 1957 (Corpus
Christianorum Series Latina 94) V, 27-30.
7
Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 9, 31-32): Cogitatio autem est improvidus animi respec-
tus ad evagationem pronus. If not mentioned otherwise the translations of the Latin
texts are mine.
8
Spijker 2004: 145.
9
See Benjamin maior V, 12 (Aris, 137, 19-21): Ecce quibus promotionum gradibus
sublevatur animus humanus. Meditatione profecto assurgitur in contemplationem,
contemplatione in admirationem, admiratione in mentis alienationem. (“Look,
through which stages of advancement the human mind is elevated. Through perfect
meditation it is raised into contemplation, through contemplation into admira-
tion/astonishment, through admiration/astonishment into the alienation of the
mind.“)
10
Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 9, 28-30): Meditatio vero est studiosa mentis intentio
circa aliquid investigandum diligenter insistens [...].
324 KARL BAIER

with wonder and jubilation and stays in this amazement for a longer
time. This means to exceed meditation within meditation and to proceed
from meditation to contemplation. Because the characteristic of con-
templation is to dedicate itself to that which it sees full of joy and with
astonishment/admiration.”11
Contemplation is a free gaze of the mind into the visible mani-
festations of (divine) wisdom accompanied by astonishment/admiration,
a gaze which – as already Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141) said, whom
Richard quotes in this respect – is poured out everywhere over the
things to be known.12 Whereas cogitatio is like crawling on the floor
and meditatio like walking and sometimes running, contemplatio is
comparable to a free flight (liber volatus) and a view from above, which
sees the whole landscape at once whereas the meditating person has to
wander on the surface of the earth from one point to the other discrimi-
nating and collecting the different parts and dimensions of the meditated
object.
The disclosure of truth in contemplation is intrinsically con-
nected with the mood of astonishment/admiration (the meaning of the
Latin “admiratio“ as Richard uses it is somehow located between “as-
tonishment“ and “admiration“). That is because what is revealed to the
contemplative mind expands the established horizon of understanding
(it is supra aestimationem as Richard says) and opens the human cogni-
tion in an unexpected way (praeter spem) towards an insight which ex-
ceeds its former capacity of understanding.13 We feel astonish-
ment/admiration, whenever we realize a new perspective or discover
something new (novitas visionis et rei), which changes our way of look-

11
Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 10,13-17): Nam veritatem quidem diu quaesitam tan-
demque inventam mens solet cum aviditate suscipere, mirari cum consultatione, eiu-
sque admirationi diutius inhaerere. Et hoc est iam meditationem meditando excedere
et meditationem in contemplationem transire. Proprium itaque est contemplationi
iucunditatis suae spectaculo cum admiratione inhaerere.
12
Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 9,25-28): Contemplatio est libera mentis perspicacia in
sapientiae spectacula cum admiratione suspensa vel certe sicut praecipuo illi nostri
temporis theologo placuit, qui eam in haec verba definivit: Contemplatio est perspi-
cax et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas usquequaque diffusus.
13
Cf. Benjamin maior V, 9 (Aris, 133,15-134,18).
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 325

ing at things. In contemplation the leading faculty of the mind is pura

intelligentia, pure intuitive insight into sublime and divine things.14
Contemplation is followed by the highest level of cognition, ex-
cessus or alienatio mentis, which is treated primarily in the fifth book of
Benjamin Major.15 “The alienation of the mind happens when the mind
looses the remembrance of things present and, transformed by divine
action, acquires a state of the soul, that is alien and inaccessible to hu-
man effort.“16 The soul is then outside itself in that sense, that it is tran-
scending its natural capabilities and for a while loses the perception of
the world around it and even of itself. Richard uses a poetic metaphor
for this process: As the light of dawn vanishes when the morning sun
appears, so the light of human insight is flooded with divine light and
sees things beyond the limits of mere human comprehension. This state
of mind is mainly brought about by a deep love of the Divine. Richard
distinguishes between different levels of ecstasy: a state in which only
the activity of the corporeal senses is suspended, one in which imagina-
tion has come to a standstill and a final absorption in which even intelli-
gentia is no longer active. All forms of ecstasy are accompanied by
exaltation and intense joy. After the excessus mentis the mind returns
once again to itself and can then recollect and meditate or contemplate
the gifts which have been bestowed upon it.
Richard bases his theory of meditation and contemplation on
general epistemological and ontological considerations, and thereby
does not restrict it to certain Christian presuppositions and spiritual dis-
ciplines. But of course it is related to practices which formed a part of
his daily life as a monk for whom the bible was the ultimate source of

14
Benjamin maior I, 3 (Aris, 9,19-20): Specialiter tamen et proprie contemplatio dici-
tur, quae de sublimibus habetur, ubi animus pura intelligentia utitur.
15
Evagrios Pontikos and Dionysios Areopagita discriminate in an analogous manner
between theoría and ékstasis. See W. Völker, Kontemplation und Ekstase bei Pseu-
do-Dionysius Areopagita, Wiesbaden 1958; Ruh 1990: 57-63 and Aris 1996: 53-54.
For an extensive treatment of ecstasy in medieval piety and theology see B. Weiß,
Ekstase und Liebe. Die Unio mystica bei den deutschen Mystikerinnen des 12. und
13. Jahrhunderts, Schöningh: Paderborn 2000; specifically for the 12th century see
R. Javelet, Extase chez les spirituels du XIIe siècle, in: Dictionnaire de spiritualité
ascétique et mystique 4, 2109-2120.
16
Benjamin maior V, 2 (Aris, 124, 324-27): Mentis alienatio est quando praesentium
memoria menti excidit et in peregrinum quendam et humanae industriae invium
animi statum divinae operationis transfiguratione transit.
326 KARL BAIER

wisdom and salvation. Albeit strong systematical intentions he articu-

lates his thoughts on spirituality and contemplation often in the form of
biblical exegesis. Moreover, his interpretation of the Holy Scriptures is
in itself meant as a process which aims at spiritual transformation.
Richard’s exegetical works are a written articulation and model of this
process and are intended to lead the reader towards contemplation.
“Richard presents the biblical text as a starting point from which
the reader, participating in the reconstruction of the text, will compose
his thinking (cogitationes) and his feeling (affectiones) by mimetically
following the text. In this way, Richard describes and guides the inner
process. Sometimes he will emphasize the way to contemplation; at
other times, the subject of contemplation.”17
This way of writing has its roots in the monastic practice of
reading the Bible, lectio divina. Indeed, the trias of lectio, meditatio and
contemplatio appears regularly in the writings of the Victorines.18 Per-
haps more than anything else, meditation and contemplation were inte-
gral parts of their interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. It was the Car-
thusian Guigo II (?-1188 or 1192/93), who, influenced by the Victori-
nes, elaborated what was probably the most influential medieval theory
of lectio divina leading from simple reading to the ecstatic union with
God.

B. GUIGO II: MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION AS PART OF BIBLICAL

HERMENEUTICS
Guigo’s Scala Claustralium (ladder for monastics), also known as Scala
paradisi (the ladder to paradise) and Epistola de vita contemplativa (let-
ter on the contemplative life) contains one of the most concise analysis
of spirituale exercitium (spiritual exercise) written in the High Medieval
Ages.19 The abbot of La Chartreuse unfolds an elaborate understanding

17
Spijker 2004: 130.
18
See e. g. Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon III, 10; V, 9.
19
For a critical edition of the text see Guigo II. Introductions and interpretations: The
introduction to the above mentioned volume Sources Chrétiennes 163, 7-79; Tug-
well 1984: 93-124; Ruh 1990: 220-225. McGinn 2004: 357-359; Dariuz Dolatowski,
Die Methode des inneren Gebetes im Werk “Scala Claustralium sive tractatus de
modo orandi“ des Guigo II. des Karthäusers, in: J. Hogg (ed.), The Mystical Tradi-
tion and the Carthusians, vol. 2 (AC 55/2), Salzburg 1995, 144-167.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 327

of meditation and contemplation which integrates the two as well as

prayer into the reading and interpretation of the Bible. Lectio divina was
the fundamental individual monastic practice of Benedictine monasti-
cism which usually took two to three hours a day. In the course of the
early medieval period it had become more or less identical with the
memorizing of biblical texts for liturgical purposes. It was only in the
11th century that the tradition of the Desert Fathers was revived and the
new order of the Carthusians who took part in this reform movement
united the lifestyle of the hermit with monastic community life. This led
to an interiorization of religious reading which is reflected in Guigo’s
text.20 Influenced by the early scholastic culture he approaches his topic
in a systematical way, trying to clearly define the various stages of the
hermeneutical process which leads to a mystical understanding of the
Holy Scriptures:
“Reading is a busy looking into the scriptures with an attentive mind.
Meditation is a studious activity of the mind, which searches for some
hidden truth under the guidance of one’s own reason. Prayer is a devout
turning of the heart to God to get evils removed or to obtain good
things. Contemplation is a certain elevation of the mind above itself,
being suspended in God, tasting the joy of eternal sweetness.”21
The whole exercise can be described in more detail as follows (I
use the masculine form because the text was addressed primarily to
monks):

20
The shift towards personal experience is part of broader changes in spirituality,
away from the liturgical, ritual devotions of the earlier Middle Ages. These changes
continue during the 12th century. See G. Constable: The Reformation of the 12th
Century, Cambridge 1996. C. W. Bynum, Jesus as Mother. Studies in the Spiritual-
ity of the High Middle Ages, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1984, 16-17 sums up the de-
velopments which also affected the spirituality of the Victorines: “The fundamental
religious drama is now located within the self, and it is less a battle than a journey –
a journey towards God. Hagiography [...] focuses increasingly on inner virtues and
experiences (often accompanied by external phenomena as trances, levitation, and
stigmata) rather than grand actions on the stage of history.“
21
Guigo II, 84,32-38: Est autem lectio sedula scripturarum cum animi intentione in-
spectio. Meditatio est studiosa mentis actio, occultae veritatis notitiam ductu pro-
priae rationis investigans. Oratio est devota cordis in Deum intentio pro malis re-
movendis vel bonis adipiscendis. Contemplatio est mentis in Deum suspensae quae-
dam supra se elevatio, aeternae dulcedinis gaudia degustans.
328 KARL BAIER

• lectio: The monk reads the Bible in his cell – usually murmuring the
texts with a low voice – and follows the literal sense of the text as atten-
tively as possible.
• meditatio: If he comes across a passage or a single sentence which
touches his heart and awakens his special interest, he starts to repeat it
again and again (a practice which traditionally is called ruminatio, the
rumination of the text). He illumines it with the help of rational thinking
(ratio) by connecting the passage in a free, associative manner with
other texts of the Bible which come into his mind, because they contain
the same or similar keywords as the text which he is actually reading.
The focus of meditatio is the moral sense (sensus moralis) of the Bible.
It aims at insights as to what is of real importance in life according to
the Word of God, how one should act in order to achieve this, what
evils in one’s own soul would be obstacles to attain it and how to over-
come them. The example Guigo is giving for this process shows that he
defines meditatio according to the somewhat rationalized Victorine un-
derstanding and like it at the same time still clings to the traditional
monastic way of dealing with the Bible. This line of thought is not so
much shaped according to Aristotelian syllogisms or philological accu-
racy as in later academic theology. Using the scripture in a very free
way the meditating monk wove a web of allusions and quotations which
were meant to create an emotional impact and deepen it. In this respect
Guigo’s art of meditation is very similar to the rhetoric of medieval
monastic sermons and the style of exegetical works of his time. The
basis for this kind of thinking was the mnemonic culture of the monas-
teries.22
• oratio: The next step is to ask God for everything that is required for
the necessary change of one’s life and for opening the soul to His pres-
ence. The Christian tradition has always seen a close connection be-
tween meditation/contemplation and prayer. If we take the widest sense
of the word and understand prayer like John of Damascus as every kind

22
M. Carruthers, The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Im-
ages, 400-1200, Cambridge 1998, 115: “Though the goal of spiritual life is the un-
mediated vision of God, divine theoria, one can only get there by travelling through
one’s memory. A person’s entire memory is a composition among whose places,
routes, and pathways one must move whenever one thinks about anything. This is
why the most powerful, the most fruitful engine of the mind in meditation was con-
sidered to be that pia memoria of which Hugo of Rouen spoke.”
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 329

of “elevation of the mind towards God” then of course meditation and

contemplation are just different forms of prayer.23 Guigo uses the term
in the popular restricted sense of petitionary prayer and describes it as
the spontaneous result of meditation on the moral sense of the Bible.
The view that meditation leads to petitionary prayer was a common
feature in High Medieval spirituality, founded on the belief that a sub-
stantial change of one’s way of life would only be possible with the
help of the Divine. Hugh of St. Victor recognizes the same transition
and St. Bernard explains it in a very similar way to Guigo: “Meditation
teaches us what is lacking, prayer obtains it for us [...] By meditation we
recognize the dangers which beset us and by prayer, at the gift of our
Lord Jesus Christ, we escape them.”24
• contemplatio: God “does not wait until it [the soul, KB] has finished
speaking, but interrupts the flow of its prayer in mid-course and hastens
to present himself and come to meet the yearning soul, bathed with the
dew of heavenly sweetness.“25 The deepest level of understanding of
biblical texts is gained when one experiences their mystical sense (ana-
gogia, sensus mysticus). This can only be fully realized in contempla-
tion as a direct encounter with God. Guigo does not discriminate be-
tween contemplatio and excessus mentis as Richard did. For him con-
templation is the immediate ecstatic encounter with the Divine. He de-
scribes the experience of God’s loving presence as sweetness (dulcedo),
a very popular expression in medieval monastic literature.26 The most
important biblical reference is psalm 33: 9: Gustate et videte quam
suavis est Dominus!: “Taste and see how sweet the Lord is!“ In our text
dulcedo is an ecstatic bliss compared by Guigo with sexual ecstasy, a
common thought, since medieval exegesis interpreted the erotic poetry

23
John of Damascus: De fide orthodoxa III 24 [PG 94,1089]: elevatio mentis ad
Deum.
24
Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon on the Feast of St. Andrew 10 cited according to
Tugwell 1984, 115.
25
Guigo II, 96,159-164: Dominus autem [...] non expectat donec sermonem finierit,
sed medium orationis cursum interrumpens, festinus se ingerit et animae desideranti
festinus occurrit coelestis rore dulcedinis perfusus [...]. I quote the English transla-
tion of Tugwell 1984, 96.
26
See F. Ohly, Geistige Süße bei Otfried, in: Friedrich Ohly, Schriften zur mittelalter-
lichen Bedeutungsforschung, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1977,
93-127; R. Fulton: „Taste and see that the Lord is sweet“ (Ps. 33: 9): The Flavour of
God in the Monastic West, in: The Journal of Religion 86 (2006) 169-204.
330 KARL BAIER

of the Song of Songs as an allegory of the mystical union between God

and the soul.27
According to our abbot and many other medieval authors the
encounter with God takes place in the acies mentis, the peak of the
mind. This word and its many synonyms like apex mentis, synderesis,
radix animae and abditum mentis signify the very core of the human
person which was considered to be the ‘place’ of the mystic union with
God. The unity of the human soul, its undivided, centered being, was
thought of as transcending the manifold cognitive, emotional and vo-
litive faculties and their respective activities. One of the basic differ-
ences between meditation and contemplation is that in meditation the
different faculties of the soul are working, whilst in contemplation their
activities are calmed down and the ineffable center of the soul awak-
ens.28 In the eyes of Guigo, whose Chartusian way of life was directed
towards silence, solitude and prayer, the experience of tasting the
sweetness of the Lord is not something very extraordinary. God answers
to the longing of the soul with His self-communication even before its
petition has come to an end. Contemplation thus appears to be a not
unusual culmination of the lectio divina.
After distinguishing between the four stages of spiritual exercise
Guigo shows how they depend on each other. Reading without medita-
tion remains without fruit, while meditation without the guidance of
reading can lead to errors. Prayer without meditation is lukewarm.
Meditation not followed by prayer has no effect, while prayer leads to
contemplation. The attainment of contemplation without prayer happens
only rarely.29
This very coherent system of spiritual exercise remains influen-
tial until the present day where the protagonists of a revival of lectio
divina relate to it.30 But through developments that began in the time

27
See D. Turner, Eros and Allegory. Medieval Exegesis and the Song of Songs,
Kalamazoo 1995.
28
For the history of the concept which can be traced back to stoic and neoplatonic
philosophy see E. von Ivánka, Plato christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des
Platonismus durch die Väter, Einsiedeln 21990, 315-351.
29
See Guigo II, 112,349-354.
30
See e.g. M. Casey, Sacred Reading. The Ancient Art of Lectio Divina, Ligouri 1995,
58-63; E. Friedmann: Die Bibel beten, Münsterschwarzach 1995, 18-23; J. Johnston:
Savoring God’s Word. Cultivating the Soul-Transforming Practice of Scripture
Meditation, Colorado Springs 2004, 87-91.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 331

when the Scala Claustralium was written, the different steps that Guigo
had unified into a single practice either lost their importance, changed
or differentiated themselves into separate disciplines.

C. SURVEY OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL AGES

1. The decline of lectio as spiritual practice

Which changes with respect to meditation and contemplation did Chris-
tian Spirituality undergo in the two centuries after Guigo? Firstly, the
link between the reading of the Bible and meditation lost its importance.
“One of the reasons for the relative downfall of the old tradition of read-
ing as the essential discipline of the spiritual life was the combination of
more rigorous canons of exegesis with a more frankly speculative no-
tion of meditatio.“31 Also the rise of imaginative techniques (which will
be treated below) had the effect that the Bible was often replaced by
manuals for meditation like the Vita Christi which transformed the bib-
lical narratives into a sequence of scenes more suitable for visualization
and surrounded by commentaries which were easier to digest than the
original text. Whereas the quantity of devotional literature was explod-
ing, only few Christians had access to the Bible, at least to the whole
text. As many heretical sects based their criticism of the Church on a
careful study of the Holy Scripture, the Church officials were not very
enthusiastic about translations and the spreading of too much Bible-
knowledge.

2. Democratization of Monastic Practices

It is characteristic of the Late Medieval Ages, that meditation and con-
templation ceased to be a monastic privilege and became more and
more popular. This development is linked to social changes which did
not happen in the solitude of La Chartreuse but in the flourishing towns
of that time. Increasing participation and creativity of lay people were
important factors in almost every dimension of the late medieval urban
culture. One side of this development was the growing wish to play an
active part in religious life. We also find a steady expansion of lay liter-

31
Tugwell 1984: 107.
332 KARL BAIER

acy in urban society especially among the mercantile and artisan

classes. The techniques of bookmaking had been developed enough to
let a market of religious books emerge. Spiritual Handbooks (called
speculum or rosetum) became widespread. They usually contained
compilations of monastic mystical theology, simplified schemes of the
ascent to God, prayers, descriptions of visions and edifying stories
about saints and miracles.32 These books were not written in the lan-
guage of the Latinate elite but in the vernaculars and contributed to the
transfer of Latin theology and monastic spiritual literature into the
common language of the people.
The rising religious interest of the lay people was moreover
strengthened by the resolutions of the 4th Lateran-Council (1215) which
prescribed annual confessions as a duty and formulated the program of
religious education for everybody. Within this context the scheme of
penance-meditation was of increasing importance and became probably
the most influential and popular form of meditation. It usually starts
with a reflection on the calamity and corruption of man and the confes-
sion of one’s own sins (miseria nostra), while the second part deals with
the compassion of God especially as revealed in the life of Christ
(misericordia Dei). The meditation ends in praise of God.33 This way of
meditating was a kind of internalization of popular methods of cateche-
sis, preaching and education. It helped to stabilize the reign of the reli-
gious system and therefore it is not astonishing that its practice received
official encouragement.
An extra-liturgical, individualized piety flourished “which,
though often originating in religious communities, quickly found favour
with the laity.“34 The patterns of the new spirituality were often related
to more or less traditional monastic forms, which have been adopted for
the needs of the urban citizens. Typical for the dispersion of monastic
spirituality in the world outside the monasteries is the title given to the

32
See Steinmetz 2005: 82 and M. G. Sargent, Minor Devotional Writing, in: A. S. G.
Edwards: Middle English Prose. A Critical Guide to Major Authors and Genres,
New Jersey 1984, 147-175.
33
Penance-meditation was originally a monastic practice. The most influential literary
paradigms for it´s secularized use are John of Fécamp, Meditationes sancti Au-
gustini and Anselm of Canterbury, Meditationes et Orationes, both 11th. century.
34
Duffy 2005: 233.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 333

Middle English version of Guigos Scala Claustralium: “Ladder of clo-

ysteres and of othere Goddis lovers“.35
The secularized forms found their way back into the monasteries
and hermitages and influenced the practice of monks and nuns. The new
mendicant orders which consciously chose the urban societies as their
field of activity led a much more ‘worldly’ life than the traditional com-
munities which lived in the countryside and followed the Benedictine
rules. Therefore they also had to face the need to develop new ways of
religious practice. Of course the clergy was also affected by the spread
of monastic forms of spirituality in the Christian cities. So, from Late
Medieval Times onwards meditative and contemplative practices be-
came increasingly popular among all strata of the literate European
Christian society.

3. The New Mysticism

One side of this popularization was the emergence of what Bernard
McGinn has called “New Mysticism.” He characterizes this movement
as follows: “In Western Christianity, mysticism remained closely bound
to monasticism until the thirteenth century, when reforms in religious
life, especially the Beguines and the Mendicants, marked an important
change. Older forms of mysticism, based on the withdrawal from the
world and programs of moral discipline and contemplative prayer, did
not die out, but they were challenged by new lifestyles encouraging
types of mysticism that were more democratic, in the sense of being
open to all (and therefore also communicated in the vernacular), as well
as ‘secular’ in not demanding flight from the world.”36
Part of the New Mysticism was a revival of Denys the Are-
opagite. Thomas Gallus (the last important theologian from the school
of St. Victor) and others reinterpreted his apophatic theology in the light

35
Guigo II, A ladder of foure Ronges by which man mowe wele clyme to heven:
Deonise Hid Divinite, ed. P. Hodgson, London 1955 (Early English Text Society
231), 100/6-7. See Steinmetz 2005: 139.
36
B. McGinn, Mysticism, in: Hans J. Hillebrand (ed.): The Oxford Encyclopedia of
the Reformation, Vol 3, New York/Oxford 1996, 119-124: 119.
334 KARL BAIER

of a dichotomy between intellectus and affectus, intellect and love.37

God is incomprehensible through the intellect, they said, but love tran-
scends rational thinking. It alone is able to touch the divine mystery and
to unite with it. The apex or acies mentis is now qualified as apex affec-
tionis, the centre of a pure selfless love of God (amor castus) which
does not want anything from Him, transcends all bounds of knowledge
and meets God in mystical darkness. In order to cultivate this approach
to the Divine New Mysticism emphasized special forms of practice,
which supported imageless devotion and the calming of thought-
activities. The term “contemplation” was increasingly used not only to
describe a state of mind but also to denote these methods. Meditation
and Contemplation which used to be different stages of one continuous
process now became autonomous spiritual practices.38 Whereas medita-
tion, as shown above, found its place within the framework of the offi-
cial religious system, the popularization of techniques of contemplation
regularly caused tensions with the authorities of the Church, which fi-
nally led to the marginalization and even condemnation of this form of
religious life.

4. The Rise of Imaginative Techniques

In the Late Medieval Ages meditation is understood as a practice not so
much based on associative and argumentative thinking like in the 12th
century but on imagination. It no longer starts from reading the Bible
but rather from the imagination of biblical scenes which have been re-
moved from their original context and retold in special manuals for their
usage within imaginative meditation techniques. Anselm of Canterburys
Meditationes, Bernhard of Clairvaux and especially Aelred of
Rievaulx’s method of meditation (which was originally meant as a part

37
For the differences between this view and Denys’ mystical theology see D. Turner,
The Darkness of God. Negativity in Christian Mysticism, Cambridge 1995, 186-
194.
38
It is oversimplified to think that an exaggeration of analytical thinking was respon-
sible for the destruction of what is idealized as the innocent unity of medieval
prayer. For this view see T. Keating, Foundations for Centering Prayer and the
Christian Contemplative Life, New York 2004, 21: “Unfortunately this passion for
analysis in theology was later to be transferred to the practice of prayer and bring to
an end the simple, spontaneous prayer of the Middle Ages based on lectio divina
with its opening to contemplation.”
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 335

of eremitical piety) had created the basis for this form of meditation.
Now the imagination of the Life of Christ and especially the passion
became the central devotional activity.
One should imagine oneself directly taking part in the mysteries
of the life of the saviour. As Aelred of Rievaulx says: “Sta nunc quasi in
medio“, “Place yourself quasi in the middle [of the imagined situa-
tion].“39 The imaginations were not limited to visual phantasies, there-
fore I hesitate to call them visualizations. The meditator did not look at
inner images but participated in a dramatic event in which all senses
were involved. This included the performance of certain postures and
movements, talking with the imagined persons, touching them, smelling
the odors of heaven and hell and sometimes even swallowing drops of
Jesus’ sweat and blood.
The paradigms for the most popular forms of imaginative medi-
tation are to be found in the Meditationes Vitae Christi (≈ 1300,
wrongly attributed to Bonaventura) and in Ludolf of Saxony’s Vita
Christi (after 1348) one of the most widespread spiritual books of the
Late Medieval Age. A passage from Ludolf’s book shows that the fol-
lower of imaginative meditation considered this approach as superior
compared to the hearing and reading of the Bible and imageless devo-
tion:
“Oh good Jesus, how sweet you are in the heart of one who
thinks upon you and loves you [...] I know not for sure, I am not able
fully to understand, how it is that you are sweeter in the heart of one
who loves you in the form of flesh than as the word, sweeter in that
which is humble than in that which is exalted [...] It is sweeter to view
you as dying before the Jews on the tree, than as holding sway over the
angels in Heaven; to see you as a man bearing every aspect of human
nature to the end, than as God manifesting divine nature, to see you as
the dying Redeemer than as the invisible Creator.”40
Famon Duffy comments on this: “The enormous imaginative
power of this form of meditation, and its spread into the world of the

39
Aelred of Rievaulx, De institutione inclusarum in: C. H. Talbot (ed.): Aelredi
Rievallensis Opera Omnia (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 1), Bre-
pols 1971: 639-682: 679 (§ 33).
40
Quoted according C. A. Conway, The Vita Christi of Ludolph of Saxony and late
medieval devotion centred on the incarnation. A descriptive analysis ( Analecta Car-
tusiana 34) Institut für Englische Sprache und Literatur: Salzburg 1976, 56.
336 KARL BAIER

[...] laity, is evident from the accounts Margery Kempe has left of her
visionary experiences, which seem in places to be little more than lit-
eral-minded paraphrases of the relevant sections of the Meditationes
Vitae Christi or of Richard Rolle’s almost equally influential Medita-
tions on the Passion, works read to her by the spiritual directors she
found in such abundance in fifteenth century East Anglia.”41
Visual media were used to support and sometimes also to re-
place the imaginative methods of meditation. In the daily life practice of
lay people as well as in the monasteries, visualization was often re-
placed by contemplating pious paintings, drawings and woodcuts,
which were created especially for this purpose. Images should serve as
simulacra of visionary experience.42
The Books of Hours (Horae) which were from the 14th century
onwards among the first mass produced books are good examples for
this. They not only contain psalms and other prayers which should be
performed at certain times of the day, but also illustrations as visual
material for meditation and prayer. Paintings or woodcuts of the Trinity,
of the life of the Virgin, of the saints with their emblems, above all
scenes depicting the suffering and death of Christ, served in themselves
as focuses of the sacred, designed to evoke worship and reverence.
They were often conceived as channels of sacred power independent of
the texts they accompanied. The fifteenth century had seen the circula-
tion of devotional woodcuts which the faithful were encouraged to
meditate on, to kneel before, to kiss.43
The arguments of the theoreticians who tried to substantiate the
practice of imaginative meditation are very similar to the arguments
rhetoricians traditionally used to underline the importance of imagina-
tion for the art of creating impressive speech. It could well be, that gen-
erally the late medieval introduction of imagination into meditation is

41
Duffy 2005: 237.
42
See J. Hamburger, The Visual and the Visionary: The Image in Late Medieval Mo-
nastic Devotions, VIATOR (Medieval and Renaissance Studies) 20 (1989) 161-182:
K. Krüger, Bildandacht und Bergeinsamkeit. Der Eremit als Rollenspiel in der städ-
tischen Gesellschaft, in: H. Belting, D. Blume (ed.), Malerei und Stadtkultur in der
Dantezeit: die Argumentation der Bilder, Hirmer: München 1989, 187-200 and K.
Kamerick, Popular Piety and Art in the Late Middle Ages. Image Worship and
Idolatry in England 1350-1500, New York 2002.
43
Duffy 2005: 214.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 337

only an extension of the rhetorical structure which is so typical for the

Western European style of meditation from the Hellenistic schools of
philosophy until Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556).44 It is, for example,
obvious from the style of Aelred of Rievaulx´s writings that he was very
well educated in rhetorics and purposely uses colourful images to create
emotional responses within the reader´s mind. From here it is only a
short step to the new forms of meditation, as in meditation imagination
is also is used “ad maiorem impressionem“, to create a greater impres-
sion as Ludolf says.45 It thus functions as a link between the cognitive
and the emotional faculties of the human being. The meditative imagi-
nation of biblical scenes (Is this different from “visualization”?) aimed
at the emotional involvement in the life of Jesus and Mary.46 It should
finally lead to conformatio, a deep emotional mimesis with the protago-
nists (not only Jesus and Mary but also the shepherds who adore the
new borne Jesus or Simone of Cyrene who helped Jesus to carry the
cross etc.) of the holy drama – further supported by practices like real or
imagined self-flagellation or standing with widespread arms to imitate
the crucifixion etc.47
This identification should not only intensify the experience of
God’s redeeming love as present in the life and death of Jesus Christ.
According to rhetoric and the late medieval theory of Christian medita-
tion affectus mentis and effectus operis correspond with each other: only
the arousal of proper emotions is able to affect a certain behavior. In the
long run the emotional conformatio with the biblical moral examples
should build up good habits, cultivate virtues like compassion, humility,
obedience etc. This intention of the imaginative techniques is quite
close to Guigo’s understanding of meditatio, but the means to attain it
have changed significantly.
As already mentioned, the tie between meditation and contem-
plation was loosened. The new meditation techniques tended to become

44
See P. Rabbow, Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike, München
1954.
45
Vita Christi 4b, cited according Baier 1977: 484.
46
See F. O. Schuppisser, Schauen mit den Augen des Herzens. Zur Methodik der
spätmittelalterlichen Passionsmeditation, besonders in der Devotio Moderna und bei
den Augustinern, in: Walter Haug, Burghart Wachinger, Tübingen 1993, 169-210.
47
See P. Dinzelbacher, Christliche Mystik im Abendland. Ihre Geschichte von den
Anfängen bis zum Ende des Mittelalters, Paderborn 1994, 333-334.
338 KARL BAIER

self-sufficient rituals without any space for contemplative prayer. In

Ludolfs Vita Christi the basic unit of practice consists of three parts:
lectio, meditatio (sometimes completed by conformatio) and oratio in
the form of a concluding prayer.48 He has no distinct concept of con-
templation and uses considerare, contemplari, meditari and attendere as
equivalent expressions.49 At the end of some chapters or certain pas-
sages Ludolf summarizes the content of the previous meditation and
invites the practitioner to become absorbed with it. But even this more
contemplative mental process is connected with thoughts, intense emo-
tional movements, exclamations of pain, questions etc.50

D. THE EMERGENCE OF CONTEMPLATION AS AN INDEPENDENT

EXERCISE IN THE CLOWDE OF UNKNOWYNG

The Clowde of Unknowyng, written between 1375 and 1400, and nowa-
days one the most famous of all late medieval mystical texts, is suitable
to exemplify the outlined developments.51 The anonymous author was
probably a Carthusian. He addresses his text to a disciple, a young man,
who was about to start an eremitical life. The text is an introduction to
contemplative prayer which the author conceives as the highest form of
Christian spirituality. “His prime motive is to teach a ’special prayer’
over and above the ’preiers that ben ordeynid of Holy Chirche’.“52 The
author is very conscious about the fact that his manual, written in Mid-
dle English, will not only circulate among Latinized circles of religious
specialists but is bound to reach a broader audience. Therefore he in-

48
See Baier 1977: 488-489.
49
See Baier 1977: 489.
50
See Baier 1977: 497-498.
51
The full title of the text is A Book of Contemplacyon, the whiche is clepyd the
Clowde of Unknowyng, in the whiche a Soule is onyd with God. I use the critical
edition by P. Hodgson. Introductions and interpretations: W. Johnston, The Mysti-
cism of ‘The Cloud of Unknowing’. A Modern Interpretation (Religious Experience
8) St. Meinrad 1975; P. Hodgson, Introduction, in: P. Hodgson (ed.), The Cloud of
Unknowing and Related Treatises, ix-lxii; R. W. Englert, Scattering and Oneing. A
Study of Conflict of the ‘Cloud of Unknowing’ (Analecta Cartusiana 105), Salzburg
1983; J. P. H. Clark: The Cloud of Unknowing. An Introduction. Vol. 1: An Intro-
duction (Analecta Cartusiana 119/4), Salzburg 1995, Vol. 2: Notes on ’The Cloud of
Unknowing’, (Analecta Cartusiana 119/5), Salzburg 1996; Steinmetz 2005.
52
P. Hodgson, Introduction, xxi with reference to Cloud 41, 1-2.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 339

cludes instructions concerning the distribution of the book. It should not

be given to those who are merely curious about its content, but rather to
people who fulfill the criteria of being ready for contemplation. Those
to whom the book is passed on should be advised to take the time to
read the whole book, not only parts of it.53 Obviously he wants to
propagate the practice of contemplation, but on the other hand he em-
phasizes that he does not simply call upon everybody to just try it. In-
stead those who feel motivated to try his method should first thoroughly
test themselves.54
The text follows the traditional discrimination between vita ac-
tiva (actyve liif) and vita contemplativa (contemplatyve liif). It also al-
ludes to a stage in-between which is at the same time the second degree
of active life and the first degree of contemplative life.55 So altogether
we have three stages. The first stage of vita activa consists of works of
mercy and charity. The second stage of vita activa which is at the same
time the first stage of vita contemplativa is goostly meditacion. The sec-
ond stage of vita contemplativa attends to the specyal preier. These dif-
ferent ways of religious exercise are related to the active life in the
world and to monastical or eremitical life respectively. The author is in
favor of the second, which he thinks is the perfection of Christian life
and the best condition for contemplative prayer. But, as already said, the
Cloud was not written for monastics and hermits only. The prologue
explicitly says, that the following explanation of contemplative prayer is
also meant to help people who are living an active life but are motivated
by the Holy Spirit to participate at least from time to time in the specyal
preier as highest practice of contemplative life.56 Moreover, because it
is written in Middle English one could say that the Cloud answers to the
growing interest of the laity in the vita contemplativa and participates in
the democratization of contemplation. The author attempts to maintain a
standard of quality, to avoid the vulgarization of contemplative practice.

53
See Cloud 74, 72-73.
54
See Cloud 75, 74-75.
55
Out of reasons which cannot be discussed here, the author of the Cloud avoids
speaking about a vita mixta which since Augustine and Gregory the Great was the
usual expression for a form of life participating in both, vita activa and vita contem-
plativa.
56
Cloud 2, 7-13.
340 KARL BAIER

1. The Concept of Meditation

Meditation is thought of as a practice for beginners, a preparation for
the achievement of contemplation. The author knows Guigos’ scheme
and mentions the first three parts of it as three “menes [...] in the whiche
a contemplatiif prentys schuld be ocupyed, the whiche ben theese: Les-
son, Meditacion, & Oryson.“57 These three are now taken together as
one exercise called goostly meditacion. Its main topics should be mans
owne wrechidnes connected with sorrow and contrition, the Passion of
Christe with the awakening of pity and compassion and the joyes of
heven resp. the chiftes (of God) which should evoke thanks and
praises.58 The Cloud here obviously refers to the main points of repen-
tance-meditation. Not only reson and affeccioun but also ymaginacioun
is needed for this exercise. Of course the author was familiar with the
imaginative methods of meditation which were flourishing in his reli-
gious surroundings.
Within the context of the Cloud meditation fulfills a positive
function as a kind of necessary domestication of the powers of imagina-
tion.59 Because of their corroboration with sin the inner images and with
them the emotional part of the human soul have to be trained and re-
shaped. Through correct meditation one can overcome the manifold
distracting thoughts and empty fantasies which usually preoccupy the
mind of the practitioner. But the author makes clear, that the techniques
of imagination and meditative reflection are nothing more than a begin-
ning, and that he is obviously not interested in detailed analysis and
explanations. Instead much space is given to the treatment of dangers
which arise from imaginative techniques. He criticizes the literal under-
standing of images and metaphors. He makes jokes about different
kinds of hysterical behavior caused by a wrong practice of affective and
imaginative meditation and warns of deceptive visions.60 The activity of
imagination in meditation is repeatedly connected with a harmful cori-
ouste which only scatters the attention of the practitioner.61 The very

57
Cloud 39, 23-25.
58
Cloud 29, 35-47.
59
See Cloud 65, 65-66.
60
See Cloud 52,28-59,18.
61
For the role of coriouste in the Cloud-texts see Steinmetz 2005: 63-87.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 341

heart of spiritual life is only reachable through a radical abandoning of

the imaginative interior space.

2. Entering the Cloud. The Practice of Contemplation

The Middle English term contemplacyon or contemplaccion is only
rarely used by the author of the Cloud.62 Instead he prefers to describe it
with terms like blynde thoucht or nakyd feeling or calls it specyal preier.
The latter is not conceived as the last phase or perfection of meditation.
Although it culminates in an ecstasy (excesse of the mynde, overpassyng
of thiself) of the kind which Guigo describes as contemplation, it is not
identical with it. Contemplation in the Cloud of Unknowing is not only a
state of mind or a certain experience of union with God. It has become
an exercise in its own right, which is caused by a call from above that
changes the whole spiritual life significantly, leading to a new form of
practice. The author mentions different signs which show that the time
for starting contemplative prayer has come: a spontaneous and long-
lasting joy when one hears or reads about the possibility of contempla-
tion and a decrease of inspiration in usual meditation.63
The step from meditation to contemplation means starting to
practice a form of prayer which aims at a wordless silence filled with
the love of God. Inner silence is produced and supported through undi-
vided attention on the meaning of single monosyllabic words, especially
Sin and God, without any discursive mental acts.64 The method of re-
ducing prayer and meditation to a very short formula or as in our case to
one word (very often the name of Jesus) has a tradition which goes back
to the Desert Fathers. It was, and in the Cloud still is, meant as a support
of the so-called continual prayer which should accompany the activities
of daily life and act as a means to gain mystical union with God.65 In the
late Medieval period it was a well known monastic practice, as one can
see for example from nuns’ vitae like the Dominican Tößer Schwestern-

62
See Steinmetz 2005: 171-176.
63
See Steinmetz 2005: 133-137.
64
See Cloud, 40,15-44,14.
65
For the historical roots see I. Hausherr, The Name of Jesus, Kalamazoo 1978.
342 KARL BAIER

buch (14th century).66 The Cloud adds something new to these informal,
individual practices. It contrasts the already well established system of
meditation with a systematized form of contemplation. By recommend-
ing Sin and God as mantras the two most important topics of repen-
tance-meditation are connected with contemplative prayer and elevated
to a higher level of understanding. The transition from meditation to
contemplation in his time started to become a much discussed question
and the author of the Cloud tries to develop criteria which are able to
evaluate when one is ready to begin with contemplation.
Through the proposed way of contemplation one should leave
behind distinct considerations of the self, sins, creation and God under a
“cloude of forgetyng.” What should remain in the end is an empty mind
surrendered to “nakyd” i.e. self-forgetful love, which aims at God him-
self and not at one of his divine goods which the practitioner may desire
to possess. In order to reach out towards union with God, one must beat
upon the cloud of unknowing which lies between ourselves and God,
with the ’sharp darte of longing love’. This has to become a settled
habit.67
As in the theology of Thomas Gallus with its priority of love,
for the author of the Cloud the pointe of spirit (apex mentis) is an apex
affectionis, syngulertee of affeccioun, which transcends cognition and
therefore resides in a cloude of unknowyng. If the practitioner reaches
this point he enters a nothing (noucht) which is everything (Al) because
in it one learns to comprehend all things at once without discriminative
knowledge.68 In this nothingness God and the soul are revealed in their
oneness. It may seem difficult to reach this point, but like many con-
templatives after him, the author of the Cloud assures us that contem-
plation is a very easy and fast way to God, presupposed that through
divine grace the flame of love has been ignited.69

66
E. Stagel, Deutsches Nonnenleben. Das Leben der Schwestern zu Töß und der Non-
ne zu Engelthal. Eingel. und übertr. von M. Weinhandl. Vorw. von A. Haas, Stein
am Rhein 2004.
67
J. P. H. Clark, The Cloud of Unknowing: An Introduction, Vol. I: Introduction,
Salzburg 1995, 32.
68
See Cloud, 67,37-68,21.
69
See Cloud, 9, 25-26.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 343

E. LATER DEVELOPMENTS
In the 15th century not only the meditation of the Life of Christ flour-
ished but also the methodical structuring of thought within meditation
became extremely elaborated. The representatives of the Devotio mod-
erna wanted to establish a most effective program of spiritual training
which should guarantee the spiritual success of each of the devotees by
a systematical cultivation of the inner man. Wessel Gansfort (1419-
1489) went beyond all previous efforts in systematizing meditation. He
constructed an ordo scalaris rationalis, a rational system of meditation,
whose twenty-four steps are based on the structure of the human mind,
which Gansfort in Augustinian manner divided into memoria (memory),
intelligentia (intellect) and voluntas (will and emotion).70 Extensively
using concepts of humanistic rhetoric he constructed a method capable
of developing any topic for any length of time by systematically arous-
ing the three faculties. The Devotio moderna influenced Ignatius of
Loyola whose ejercicios espirituales and especially his – compared to
Gansfort – simplified method of meditation with the three powers of the
soul became the most powerful paradigm of Christian meditation until
the 20th century.
The more meditation became formalized the more its limitations
and dangers became obvious. “The ignorant find it too great a tax on
their energies; the imaginative cannot pursue it without encountering
endless distractions; the simple-minded ask if no more direct approach
can be found for them to the sanctities of prayer.“71 There was the ten-
dency of too much self-reflection, a scrupulous observation of ones own
mental processes which never reaches the point of a simple opening
towards the divine mystery. Fear of hell was often more cultivated than
the pure love of God.
Protagonists of contemplative prayer continued to spread their
forms of practice in reform (lay) circles, religious orders and a large
number of spiritual books. The limitations of meditation, the misuse of
it, the transition from meditation to contemplation and the cultivation of
inner silence remained a topic of discussion among the Spanish Mystics

70
See D. Snyder: Wessel Gansfort and the Art of Meditation, Diss. Cambridge/Mass.
1966.
71
R. A. Knox: Enthusiasm. A Chapter in the History of Religion, Notre Dame 1994,
245-246.
344 KARL BAIER

of the 16th century, Madame Guyon and her companions and also in
pietism. Although nobody went so far as to abandon contemplation in
toto practitioners of contemplation had to face serious repressions. The
points of criticism remained the same through the ages: neglect of the
cultivation of Christian virtues, antinomianism, denial of salvation
through the mediation of the Church and its sacraments. The inquisition
persecuted several groups which were connected with the practice of
contemplation. It started with the heresy of the „Free Spirit“ (con-
demned in 1311), followed by the Alumbrados (condemned in 1525).
The last strike hit Quietism. With the condemnation and imprisonment
of leading Quietists at the end of the 17th century, the contemplation
movement which had started in late Medieval Europe came to its end.
Only with the growing influence of Eastern religions and the re-
vival of Western mysticism from the end of the 19th century onwards
did the popularization of contemplative practices start all over again.
The 20th century became the Age of the decline of the Baroque form of
European meditation and gave birth to a second contemplation move-
ment within Western Christianity. Shortly after the end of World War II
Giacomo Cardinal Lercaro – an expert in Christian meditation and con-
templation who later became one of the important reformers of the Sec-
ond Vatican Council – asked: “Why did the rich blossom of prayer
methods which characterized the 17th and 18th century expire completely
today? Why do they hardly survive – with the exception of the Ignatian
which is too often explained and taught in a miserable way […]? Why
was discursive prayer declared to be the ultimate stage attainable with-
out the help of extraordinary Grace?”72
People did not wait until clerics and theologians had found proper an-
swers to these questions (in fact hardly anybody went further into
them), but instead started to practice Yoga, New Age- and Buddhist
meditation or attended courses in which old forms of contemplative
Christian prayer were taught in a modern way. But this is another chap-
ter altogether.

72
G. Kardinal Lercaro, Wege zum betrachtenden Gebet, Basel/Freiburg/Wien 1959
[1947], 357.
 MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 345

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aris 1996 M.-A. Aris, Contemplatio. Philosophische Studien zum Traktat
Benjamin Maior des Richard von St. Viktor. Mit einer verbesser-
ten Edition des Textes, Josef Knecht: Frankfurt/Main 1996.
Cloud The Clowde of Unknowyng, in: The Cloud of Unknowing and
Related Treatises, ed. by P. Hodgson, Salzburg 1982, 1-74.
Baier 1977 Walter Baier, Untersuchungen zu den Passionsbetrachtungen in
der Vita Christi des Ludolf von Sachsen. Ein quellenkritischer
Beitrag zu Leben und Werk Ludolfs und zur Geschichte der Pas-
sionstheologie (Analecta Cartusiana 44), Institut für englische
Sprache und Literatur: Salzburg 1977.
Duffy 2005 F. Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars. Traditional Religion in
England 1400-1580, New Haven/London 22005.
Guigo II Guigo II, Epistola de vita contemplativa (Scala claustralium), in :
E. Colledge, J. Walsh (ed.), Guigues II le Chartreux: Lettre sur la
vie contemplative (L'Échelle des moines). Douze méditations, In-
troduction et texte critique, Traduction française par un chartreux
[Maurice Laporte], Sources Chrétiennes 163, Paris 1970, 82-123.
McGinn 2004 B. McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian
Mysticism, Vol. II: The Growth of Mysticism, The Crossroad
Publishing Company: New York 2004.
Ruh 1990 K. Ruh, Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik. Band 1: Die
Grundlegung durch die Kirchenväter und die Mönchstheolo-
gie des 12. Jahrhunderts, Beck: München 1990.
Spijker 2004 I. van’t Spijker, Fictions of the Inner Life. Religious Literature
and Formation of the Self in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century,
Brepols: Turnhout 2004.
Steinmetz 2005 K.-H. Steinmetz, Mystische Erfahrung und mystisches Wissen in
den mittelenglischen Cloudtexten, Berlin 2005.
Tugwell 1984 S. Tugwell, Ways of Imperfection. An Exploration of Christian
Spirituality, Darton, Longman and Todd: London 1984.
 DIANA RIBOLI

Shamans and Transformation in Nepal and

Peninsular Malaysia
This article is dedicated to halak Macang

INTRODUCTION
This article is a preliminary presentation of the different beliefs related
to shamanic transformation into animal and plant forms in Asian sha-
manism and in particular in the ethnic groups around which my field
research has been and is currently centered: the Chepang of southern
central Nepal and the Jahai and Batek in peninsular Malaysia. Despite
the geographical distance and significant cultural differences between
Malaysia and Nepal, it is particularly interesting to note the similar atti-
tude towards the forest. Both the Chepang – even though they aban-
doned their nomadic hunter gatherer lifestyle around forty years ago –
as well as the Jahai and the Batek of peninsular Malaysia are still de-
pendant on the rainforest to a great extent. In fact, there is still one no-
madic hunter gatherer group of Batek living in the large jungle – now a
national park – of Taman Negara.
The theories (Hamayon 1990: 293-320, Ripinsky-Naxon 1993:
22-23, Vitebsky 1995) about how the different forms of shamanism
throughout the world are intimately linked to the world of hunting, na-
ture and the wild, at least historically speaking, are well known. Despite
the necessary changes and adaptations of shamanic cultures to muta-
tions in social, economic and political conditions, the figure of the sha-
man generally remains that of a “hunter of souls” even in societies no
longer based on hunting and gathering.
For the Chepang, despite the fact that they have been sedenter-
ized for several decades now, the most important deity in their pantheon
is Namrung, the god of hunting. According to Chepang mythology,
Namrung, believed to reside in the world of humans, was created by the
other deities so he could hunt for them and provide them with fresh
food every day. Namrung lives alone, surrounded only by his ‘hunters’
(Namrung shikāri), a pack of wolves (or wild dogs) that follow him
348 DIANA RIBOLI

wherever he goes. Certain Chepang shamans describe Namrung as be-

ing a half man and half wolf (or half dog) that avoids the company of
humans despite the fact that he lives in their world.
While most of the other deities in the Chepang pantheon cur-
rently have Hindu names despite the fact that their characteristics often
differ significantly, Namrung has never been associated with any other
supernatural being in any other religion or different ethnic group.
Chepang shamans are somewhat reticent about Namrung: in the
areas inhabited by the Chepang hunting has been prohibited for many
years and the Chepang believe that for this reason Namrung has turned
against humans and conjures up different problems for them as he no
longer receives daily offerings of blood from wild animals. The Nam-
rung-pujā, a ceremony dedicated entirely to this deity and performed
generally by old and expert shamans at least once a year, during which a
ritual hunt takes place in the course of which at least one wild animal is
killed (Riboli 2000: 213-219), is held in secret in many Chepang areas.
It is interesting to note that the Semang-Negrito of peninsular
Malaysia and in particular the Jahai and Batek, who have been the sub-
ject of my research for the last three years, do not appear to have any
supernatural being particularly linked to hunting activities despite the
fact that hunting is still an essential component of these cultures. The
Batek and the Jahai recognize the existence of one deity only, called
Gobar or Karei, the irascible god of thunder that punishes humans by
sending down storms. Neither the Batek nor the Jahai acknowledge the
existence of other deities, only benign spirits that live in the jungle and
help humans in difficulty. For the Batek and the Jahai the rainforest is a
closed universe, divine and perfect, a sort of maternal uterus that is the
beginning and end of everything. For this reason, as we shall see below,
the rainforest is also the world where shamanic journeys take place.
For hunter gatherer populations like the nomadic Batek bands or
populations that have more or less recently abandoned a regime of hunt-
ing and gathering such as the Jahai of peninsular Malaysia and the
Chepang of southern central Nepal the separation of the two conceptual
worlds ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ which has been the subject of many an-
thropological debates has no particular significance.
In the words of Tim Ingold:
…I shall argue that hunter-gatherers do not, as a rule, approach their environ-
ment as an external world of nature that has to be ‘grasped’ conceptually and
appropriated symbolically within the terms of an imposed cultural design, as a
precondition for effective action. They do not see themselves as mindful sub-
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 349

jects having to contend with an alien world of physical objects; indeed the
separation of mind and nature has no place in their thoughts and practice. (In-
gold 2000: 42)

In the Jahai and Batek of peninsular Malaysia and the Chepang of

southern central Nepal the jungle represents a perfect cosmos where
plant, animal and human spheres co-exist in harmony. In this sense the
forest in some way represents a primordial world that reconnects with a
mythical ‘golden age’ when there was no clear distinction between the
human, plant and animal worlds and no distinction between these
spheres and the supernatural world either.
Numerous mythologies throughout the continents refer to the
existence of this perfect and almost undifferentiated primordial world
using similar patterns. One of the most complete accounts is that nar-
rated by Nâlungiaq, a Netsilik woman, to Knud Rasmussen, according
to which at the time of the myth humans lived happily and all had su-
pernatural forces (Rasmussen 1931: 208). At that time humans were
able to communicate directly with the deities and could also fly, assume
any form and move freely between the three cosmic zones – the heav-
ens, earth and the underworld – there was no distinction as death and
suffering were inexistent. Freedom was absolute, animals were ex-
tremely friendly and also communicated with the human race. Humans
could transform themselves into animals at will, and animals could
transform themselves into humans. The same language was spoken by
all, and all lived and hunted in the same way. As a result of a series of
cosmic events and catastrophes this harmony was destroyed and the
three cosmic spheres separated, as did the spheres of the animal, plant
and human worlds. From that point onwards only shamans, despite the
fact that they are often believed to be much less powerful than their
forefathers, can in some way relive and re-enact the harmony of pri-
mordial non-differentiation. Those who receive the call to shamanism,
which in itself for the most part pre-supposes the possibility of commu-
nication between the world of the divine and the world of humans, ac-
quire the ability to move between the three cosmic zones. Similarly, the
two worlds – animal and plant – and the animal world in particular,
appear to play an extremely important role for shamans, who are in
many cases attributed with the ability to effectively undergo metamor-
phosis.
Shamanic metamorphosis into animal and vegetal forms – in the
same way as shamanic journeys – is only a re-elaboration of the pri-
350 DIANA RIBOLI

mordial pattern when harmony, peace and perfection were possible due
to the non differentiation-collaboration between all living beings and
between the latter and supernatural beings.
Shamanic journeys and transformation into animal and vegetal
forms pre-suppose an alteration of effective reality, the reality experi-
enced by most humans. In other words, shamans overcome their limits
and the human limitations of the five senses, and reacquire (recall?) the
languages and abilities of other worlds, in particular those of the animal
and plant worlds.

TRANSFORMATION AND ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The ability to undergo transformations is mainly only attributed to those
in possession of the faculty to temporarily abandon a state of con-
sciousness common to human beings in order to enter ‘altered’ states of
consciousness. Though Mircea Eliade (Eliade 1951) and others have
acknowledged in ecstatic journeys an essential element which should
illuminate, define and distinguish shamanism from other complexes and
practices, at present, also thanks to much field research and to more
specific and extensive work, it is a well known fact that there are other
shamanic complexes in which altered states of consciousness and ec-
static journeys are almost absent. It should be noted however that in
many cases these are shamanic cultures, such as those of many Siberian
groups, which have experienced dramatic historical and cultural devel-
opments. Moreover, in order to clarify the content and argument of this
text, I would like to emphasize that generally speaking, despite the fact
that different shamanic activities such as certain therapies appear to be
performed in some ethnic groups without the assistance of altered states
of consciousness and without the requirement for cosmic journeys, for
shamanic transformation or metamorphosis into animal and plant forms
altered states of consciousness appear to be absolutely necessary.
These states can have different natures and entities: they can
take on the form of violent and apparently uncontrollable trances or can
be experienced almost without any movement when the shaman (as we
will see in the case of the Batek and the Jahai) leaves his sleeping body
at night to send his shadow soul into an animal to which he is especially
attached.
Altered states of consciousness (ASC) are one of the most stud-
ied topics in shamanism. However, what scholars simply call “trance”
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 351

or ASC is probably a much more complex cultural and sociological

matter. Physical manifestations during shamanic trance states appear to
be almost always identical, but what began to puzzle me during my
fieldwork in Nepal with the Chepang ethnic group (1991-1999) was that
not all altered states of consciousness during a shamanic séance are felt
and experienced by shamans, patients and the surrounding public in the
same way.
In fact, there are trance states during which shamans embody
supernatural beings or ancestors’ spirits – which in one of my earlier
works I named “incorporatory” trances – and trance states during which
the shaman’s soul is supposed to journey to other cosmic zones. I
named this last category “trances of movement” (Riboli 2002: 143-159).
As already indicated, the physical manifestations of both types
of trances can be very similar: the shaman’s body jerks and trembles
and he/she begins to sweat profusely, experiencing what appears to be
sensorial detachment. Both instances involve a journey. However, in the
first case the journey is undertaken by the supernatural being toward the
shaman, whereas in the second case, it is the shaman’s soul that moves
to the supernatural world.
Beside these typologies of ASCs that mostly occur during sha-
manic séances in public, there are more personal and secret altered
states of consciousness experienced by shamans who are able to trans-
form themselves into other entities, mostly into animal form. I decided
to name this third category “trances of transformation.”
Shamanic transformation and shape-shifting has been docu-
mented and is well known worldwide, despite the fact that not much
specific research has been conducted on the subject. This is probably
one of the most difficult fields to investigate because – as far as we
know – the majority of shamans need to be alone in order to leave their
human form.
As indicated earlier, the shamans’ faculty to transform them-
selves is quite often linked to something like a past mythological
‘golden age’ when all shamans were extremely powerful, could trans-
form themselves at will into animal and plant forms and were some-
times even believed to live together with deities and supernatural be-
ings.
During my field research in Nepal and peninsular Malaysia I
noted that what scholars generally term trance or ACS is actually a col-
lection of states experienced in different ways by shamans and the so-
352 DIANA RIBOLI

cieties they belong to, quite distinct from the purely physical manifesta-
tions that appear during trances. I arrived at this conclusion first of all
by observing that the Chepang language has no single term for the word
“trance,” and according to the documents and writings of Roberte
Hamayon there is no such definition in most of the Siberian languages
either (Hamayon 1990: 33).
In fact, after discussing this with shamans or pande as they are
known in Chepang, it was pointed out that it would be impossible for
there to be one single term to describe situations in which supernatural
beings are believed to possess the body of the shaman, and therefore
journey to the world of humans, and situations where the opposite is the
case, when shamans undertake the journey and abandon their terrestrial
bodies to travel to other cosmic zones. As mentioned earlier, I decided
to name the first type of trance “incorporatory trance” and the second
category “trance of movement.” In earlier works, I added the category
of “initiatory trances”, or altered states of consciousness, which occur
during the call to the profession and shamanic initiation, and differ from
the earlier categories in that the latter are usually not controlled by the
shaman him/herself, who, at least apparently, would appear to play a
much more passive role (Riboli 2002:165).
There are most certainly other types of shamanic trances and
other types of altered states of consciousness more difficult to document
in that most occur when the shaman is alone and often occur outside
shamanic séances, which are open to the public (trance of transforma-
tion). Many forms of shamanism throughout the world document the
belief that shamans can transform into non-human entities, and animal
forms in particular.
Aside from any eventual transformations, the link between the
animal world and the world of the shaman is present and important the
world over. The guiding spirits of shamans often present themselves in
animal form and the ornithomorphic symbols of many Siberian sha-
manic costumes is a clear reference to the magic flight to the skies
(Djakonova 1978: 160-161), whereas the use of skins, bones and other
parts of different animals such as the reindeer and the bear in shamanic
costumes is linked to journeys into the underworld (Holmberg 1922: 14-
18, Lommel 1967: 108). In many cases shamanism is still linked to the
magic of hunting. Many Chepang pande are carried to the skies during
their journeys by a large bird, and journey to the underworld on a large
fish. In other parts of the world it is believed that the most powerful
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 353

shamans can understand animal language and communicate with them

(Stutley 2003: 16-17).
In contrast to most of the dominant religions of the planet,
where the animal world is held to be inferior to the world of humans,
shamanism universally believes that the animal world is powerful and
close to the world of the supernatural, and it is therefore only logical
that shamans in many parts of the world should be able in some way to
contact and somehow encompass animal elements. It is probably not
easy to investigate shamanic transformation into animal form, because
in many cultures (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1975: 43) shamans believe this to
be a private act as some may not have total control over their instincts in
animal form and could act in a manner totally contrary to the traditional
ethical norms of their cultures.

CHEPANG SHAMANISM AND TRANSFORMATION

In Nepal and amongst the Chepang especially, the idea that pande have
the ability to transform into animals is linked to a mythical time, a
golden age when shamans had extraordinary powers far superior to
those they have today, when the distinction between the world of hu-
mans and the world of animals was still not very clear (Riboli
2000:127-130). As in many other shamanic cultures the Chepang be-
lieve the world is divided into three zones: the heavens (akās) – which
has nine levels - the earth in the middle where humans live, and the
underworld (pātāl). The pātāl is described as being a beautiful place full
of forests, rivers and animals for hunting, inhabited by the forefathers
and most Chepang deities. Access to the underworld is believed to be
extremely dangerous and only expert and powerful pande can undertake
the journey there. Most journeys undertaken by pande are to the under-
world and this is why the Chepang refer to their shamans (and very of-
ten the whole ethnic group) as ‘tunsuriban’ what describes this ability.
According to Chepang mythology, initially the pātāl was inhab-
ited by humans as well as by supernatural beings. At that time illnesses,
suffering and malign spirits were unheard of. Humans and animals
spoke the same language and deities and all the inhabitants of the un-
derworld had the ability to undertake journeys and fly to other cosmic
zones. Some versions note that primordial harmony was shattered be-
cause humans had begun to spoil the underworld with their physical
needs. As a result, certain deities decided to create a land far from their
354 DIANA RIBOLI

own and send the humans to live there. While this intermediary land
was being created two male deities – Batisé and Tiwasé – sacrificed the
cow Lendemuri. Its hide became the soil of the intermediary land and
its bones hills and mountains. Unfortunately, however, the two deities
failed to decapitate the cow in one fell swoop and it took three attempts
before they succeeded, during which the animal groaned in pain. These
sounds gave birth to demons and malign spirits that had not existed up
to that point. From that point onwards only the pande are allowed to
journey to all the cosmic zones and communicate directly with super-
natural beings. The more powerful pande are also believed to have the
ability to transform themselves into animals, mainly felines.
Shamans believed to be able to undergo transformation are
called gurau, but it would appear that there are only very few of these in
existence, and in eight years of research I have never met anyone who
talked about this openly. One of the clans that make up the Chepang is
called gurau, though none appears to remember the reason for this
name. All pande set the time of the last gurau as being more or less at
the time of their grandparents and all agree that at the dawn of humanity
all shamans were gurau or extremely powerful humans able to trans-
form themselves at will into different animals, especially tigers. The
nature of these first pande and perhaps of other men was not yet well
defined and distinct from the world of animals, which would appear to
be proved by the fact that the Chepang believe that at that time both
men and pande in particular could also understand the language of ani-
mals and were therefore able to communicate with them.
In the course of my research, which was centred on around
thirty pande, I only encountered three women in the profession, though
all three were considered to be particularly powerful. One of these, Dam
Maya, a well-known pande to whom people come for advice from vil-
lages many days walk away, is one of the few cases that I suspect could
be a gurau. Dam Maya is in fact the only pande I met who said that she
could call up a tiger in the course of a shamanic séance, what was con-
firmed by the other inhabitants of her village. In fact, these were not
real tigers, but a sort of smaller feline of similar dimensions to a leop-
ard. Despite the fact that she never admitted to being able to transform
into a tiger or other dangerous animal, Dam Maya freely recounted that
she often transformed herself into an insect, bird or “some other animal”
(Riboli 2000: 121) in order to journey to the pātāl.
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 355

My research in this field may well have been fairly superficial,

as transformation into predatory animals is often believed to be linked
to black magic. In fact, in one village I was told of a pande whom eve-
ryone considered to be expert in black magic who was held responsible
for making a girl very ill, and was thought to be responsible for the
mauling of the few animals – mainly chicken and goats – usually kept
in Chepang villages. After these serious acts, the pande was maltreated
and forced to go and live in another village. Neither the person in ques-
tion nor the inhabitants of the village would confirm this story directly
but everyone gave the impression that the animal predator that had
killed the domestic animals was the pande himself transformed into
feline form, as there were no animals of this type in the area where the
village was located.
Almost all the Chepang believe that the souls of dead shamans
can transform into different animals where the human part is still recog-
nizable from certain physical peculiarities such as missing paws, parts
of the faces or even missing beaks in the case of birds, or parts of the
body which have developed irregularly.
The primordial and perfect original world of the Chepang attrib-
uted all humans with the ability to transform into tigers, and felines and
other animals were believed to be able to transform into human form.
At that time there was obviously no differentiation between the two
conceptual worlds of nature and culture, no evil or suffering and no
black magic. The natural world and its forests, courses of water and
wild animals was in perfect harmony, a sort of ideal world which for the
Chepang is embodied only in the underworld where the souls of worthy
forefathers go to live after death. The equivalence between the natural
and primordial worlds and perfection changed when at some point the
world of humans was forced to separate from the world of the super-
natural for different reasons. According to the Chepang, all pande ini-
tially remained gurau with the ability to transform into animal and fe-
line forms in particular. For a certain period of time, certainly up to the
point when the ethnic group was forced to abandon their nomadic life-
style of hunting and gathering, according to sources there was an abso-
lute permeability between the world of humans - or rather between the
shamanic world - and the natural world which had extremely positive
valences.
As the world of humans progressively and clearly distanced it-
self from nature, many began to associate the dimension of the ‘wild’ –
356 DIANA RIBOLI

as represented by the felines – with negative connotations linked to

danger and black magic. It is probably no coincidence that while many
Chepang pande state clearly and proudly that up to a few generations
ago their shaman forefathers were gurau, or shaman-tigers, they are
reticent about their personal abilities to metamorphose into animal and
feline forms for fear of being accused of dabbling in black magic.
As we shall see, this situation differs significantly from that of
the Semang-Negrito groups in peninsular Malaysia, who are still inti-
mately linked to the rainforest and its flora and fauna.

SEMANG-NEGRITO SHAMANISM AND TRANSFORMATION

Shamanic transformation into animals would appear to be substantially
more documented for South-East Asia. For the past three years I have
been working on a research project in peninsular Malaysia entitled
“Traditional Medicine and Traditional Beliefs among the Semang-
Negrito of Peninsular Malaysia with particular reference to the Jahai
and Batek Ethnic Groups.” In Malaysia, indigenous groups are referred
to with the collective term “Orang Asli”, or “Original People.” Now
unfortunately making up only 0.8% of the population, the Orang Asli
have been divided up into three groups on the basis of their different
ethnic and linguistic origins: the Proto-Malay, the Senoi and the Se-
mang-Negrito, each of which consist of different ethnic groups. The
first inhabitants of this area would appear to be the Semang-Negrito,
who lived in the area for at least 4000 years. Groups of Negrito still
exist in different parts of Asia, especially in the Andaman Islands and
the Philippines. Unfortunately, anthropologists have not yet found a
satisfactory alternative term for Negrito, particularly offensive and
reminiscent of colonial times, which translates from the Spanish as “lit-
tle black man” and for this reason some of the scholars working in the
area prefer to add the term Semang, another term used to describe these
groups.
The term “Negrito” was used because of the physical attributes
of the individuals in these ethnic groups, who differ from the rest of the
population in their very dark skin, frizzy hair and short stature, particu-
larly noticeable in older generations.
All the Semang-Negrito of peninsular Malaysia have very
strong ties with the world of the rainforest and, as noted earlier, some
groups of Batek still lead nomadic lifestyles in one of the oldest jungles
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 357

in the world. Though it is not known exactly how many nomadic Batek
there are, numbers could be estimated at something between 400 and
500 individuals.
Many Orang Asli groups experienced a rapid abandonment of
nomadic life at the end of the 1940s, during the so-called “Emergency,”
when the British colonial empire, concerned about the uprising of
communist guerrillas using the jungles as a base, and even more con-
cerned about possible collaboration between the former and the Orang
Asli, decided to relocate many indigenous groups out of the jungle.
Many Orang Asli and most of the Semang-Negrito still live in villages
allotted to them by the government.
For centuries Malaysia has been a multiethnic country. Malay
Muslims, who currently hold the political power, make up around 60%
of the population, with around 30% Chinese, who are generally in con-
trol of the economy, 8% Tamil from southern India and the remainder
representing the Orang Asli and other minorities. A few years ago a
project was introduced for the Islamisation of many Orang Asli groups
based on what has been defined by the government as “positive dis-
crimination,” which provides material goods and better opportunities
for education and employment for those who convert to Islam.
However, in many aspects Islam is poles apart from the tradi-
tional cultures of most Orang Asli and this is also reflected in the differ-
ent considerations that Muslim Malays and ethnic minorities have about
the rainforest and animals.
For the Malays the world of the jungle is dark, wild and terrify-
ing, and populated by malevolent spirits and ghosts, in total contrast to
the ideas of progress and modernity favored by the dominating class.
For the Orang Asli and the Semang-Negrito in particular, the jungle
represents a comforting maternal uterus, being there to satisfy all the
primary requirements of its inhabitants or of those who respectfully turn
to her for help (Tuck Po 2004). Despite all the dangers that the jungle
undeniably presents, the Semang-Negrito and Batek in particular with
their nomadic life based on hunting and gathering have no fear of it, and
most supernatural beings believed to live there are considered to be
friendly towards humans. Most friendly of all are the poetic cenoi,
something like our fairies, described as tiny beautiful perfect men and
women who live inside flowers and offer help to humans in distress.
The animal and plant worlds hold particular importance for the
Semang-Negrito. One of the most powerful taboos, the breaking of
358 DIANA RIBOLI

which can bring extremely serious consequences, is to laugh at animals

or subject them to ridicule.
Though shamanism amongst the Semang-Negrito seems to be in
decline, until not long ago the most powerful shamans were believed to
be able to transform themselves into plants, animals and tigers, the big-
gest felines in the rainforest, in particular, and this belief may still be
encountered today.
Though tigers are feared, the nomadic Batek still identify with
them in some way. As pointed out by Tuck Po, tigers have many char-
acteristics in common with the Batek. As part of the animal world, ti-
gers should belong to the category of game, instead they are predators,
not hunted by humans or any other animal. Tigers inhabit the Batek’s
favorite habitat: they move following courses of water, enjoy playing in
the water, and belong to the foothills (Tuck Po 2000: 174). Their habits
and environments are fairly similar, though it is very important that
there be reciprocal respect and that a certain distance be kept between
the two. The analogies appear to have remained unchanged since the
primordial period when there was no differentiation between humans
and animals, but following the separation of the two spheres, as there
was no longer any possibility of direct communication, any close con-
tact between the two would be dangerous.
According to many Batek and Jahai sources, tigers and ele-
phants have abilities which are superior to those of other animals. Most
importantly, tigers possess the ability to see potential prey in red even at
night and elephants see anything that can be consumed in green. Apart
from the chromatic distinction linked to the search for food, these ani-
mals and tigers in particular are attributed with a sort of second sight.
When tigers encounter humans, the feline immediately sees a form of x-
ray image that can distinguish bones and all internal organs. This sec-
ond sight is also associated with the ability of tigers to ‘instantly read’
the hearts of humans, their morality, good nature and generosity. Many
Jahai and Batek believe that good humans have nothing to fear unless
starvation forces animals to attack immediately.
Some Jahai and Batek elders, one of whom is the old shaman
Macang referred to in detail below, believe that ordinary human beings
can also communicate with the big cats. When asked what course of
action to take in a close encounter with a tiger or elephant, the old men
explained that it was usually better to stay still. One should try not to
feel fear (the smell of fear will incite the tiger or elephant to attack) and
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 359

look the animal in the eye in a gentle and friendly fashion. An old Jahai
man recounted that many years ago when he was out hunting one day
he found himself a few meters away from a large female tiger and felt
no fear. He crouched down and looked the tiger gently in the eyes, reas-
suring her that he would not disturb her and excusing himself for inad-
vertently entering her territory. The conversation with the animal con-
tinued for some time as the man explained he was searching for food for
the many children he had left behind at the camp. He told the tiger he
had three children and found out that the tiger was also hunting for food
for her cubs. When asked what language was used for this communica-
tion between himself and the cat my informant was unable to explain
exactly. He said he spoke Batek with the tiger and that she replied sim-
ply by looking at him and communicated her thoughts to him by what I
would call telepathy. The man later added he suspected this was no or-
dinary tiger but a shaman in tiger form. In any case what is interesting is
that there is still, albeit limited, communication between humans and
animals.
The strong tie between tigers and humans is also illustrated in
many stories related to were-tigers. In the words of Tuck Po:
A number of myths posit the problems of were-tigers: sometimes a human is re-
vealed to be a tiger in disguise, at other times, a tiger longs for human relation-
ships and assumes human form to achieve it. It is one thing, as with shamans, for
the Bateks to appropriate the tiger’s power for benign purposes; it is quite an-
other when the tiger turns that power against people. For then the control is com-
ing from the tiger: the more or less equal co-existence – the partnership between
people and tigers – is upset. Things become upside down. The general problem
then is that the boundary between human and tiger societies is extremely thin.
(Tuck Po 2000: 175)

Generally speaking, it is preferable for the worlds of felines and humans

to remain separate despite and perhaps due to their similarities, though
in certain cases there would still appear to be some form of communica-
tion between the two. This certainly does not apply to Batek and Jahai
shamans who instead mainly transform themselves or send their
shadow-souls into plants and animals in a return to the harmony of their
origins.
According to documentation collected by Kirk Endicott at the
end of the 1970s, the Batek believe that certain especially powerful
shamans have tiger bodies that they can use at night in the forest (Endi-
cott 1979: 132-141). At night, while the shaman is sleeping, his
shadow-soul abandons his body to enter the body of the tiger. At sunrise
360 DIANA RIBOLI

the shadow-soul returns to its human body, and the tiger goes off to
sleep in the depths of the forest. The function of these tiger shamans
would appear to be linked to positive acts and they are believed to be
able to protect humans from attacks by real tigers during the night.
Once the shamans take on their tiger forms they run the same risks as
the real felines, the difference being that in the event of illness or non
mortal injury, as their animal body was guided by the shadow-soul, the
shaman may know the cure. However, if they fall into a trap their des-
tiny will be the same as that of a real tiger. For this reason tiger shamans
stay as far away as possible from groups of humans and hunters in par-
ticular. Despite the fact that the tiger shamans retain some of their hu-
man features even though this may not be very evident and consists
mainly of resemblance to physical traits of the face of the shaman with
the muzzle of the tiger his shadow-soul has entered, hunters might not
realize this and could proceed with a kill. When a tiger shaman is killed
in his animal form by mistake, the same destiny will face the sleeping
shaman immediately. Similarly, when the shaman dies in his human
form the same destiny applies to his tiger-body.
Though I have noted a decline in many of the shamanic prac-
tices described by Endicott in the 1970s, I can however confirm, con-
trary to the beliefs of certain scholars, that despite the strong pressures
and tensions they are continually subjected to, both Batek and Jahai
forms of shamanism still survive today. As mentioned earlier, part of
my research is centered round groups of Batek who are still nomadic,
and another part is being conducted in a village of Jahai who have been
sedenterized for around thirty years. Shamans are known by the Batek
as halak and by the Jahai as jampi. In fact, it should be noted that cer-
tain Jahai use the term jampi to indicate shamans with lesser powers,
similar to herbalists, and the term halak to refer to real shamans.
Batek halak and Jahai jampi do not appear to experience trances
with very evident external physical manifestations. All knowledge and
songs, especially those of a therapeutic nature, are received in the
course of dreams, which are very personal and in many cases kept se-
cret. In fact, for these ethnic groups dreams and trances are considered
to be almost the same, which probably also explains the fact that tiger
shamans only abandon their human body for the body of one of the big
cats which mainly move about and hunt at night when the shamans are
sleeping and probably dreaming.
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 361

To indicate the state of trance and its experience, both halak and
jampi use the Malay expression ‘berjalan dalam mimpi,’ or ‘walking in
your dreams’. Thanks to the clearly therapeutic songs they receive, sha-
mans can carry out spirit journeys, which mainly take place in the realm
of the earth.
In the course of field research carried out in the jungle of Taman
Negara in 2005, I had the opportunity of meeting and working with one
of the oldest and most respected Batek halak: Macang. Macang was
probably already very ill with tuberculosis and died in June 2006. His
death appears in some way to have been a form of encouragement for
the younger generations rather than another blow for Batek shamanism.
One day, when I was walking with Macang in the thick jungle in
search of medicinal plants, the old halak asked me to stop and rest a
while. After we had sat down, slightly apart from each other, he began
to sing quietly and move his arms about almost as if in a dance. Later on
he explained that the very act of walking in the jungle corresponded to a
shamanic journey; only his body was walking with me, but his soul was
flying from a mountain to a river to rest on a tree or flower.
When he was younger, Macang was able to transform into a ti-
ger during these states, but given his venerable age, he no longer had
the strength and preferred to transform himself into a tree or flower. In
any case, whether in the form of tiger, tree or flower, the need to be-
come part of the lush vegetation the Batek live in is evident. This is no
longer, as in many other forms of shamanism, a journey to the heavens
or the underworld, but a form of return to that mythical age when all
beings lived in harmony and the boundaries between the worlds of hu-
mans and animals and even plants were still not clearly defined.
Macang, now at the end of his life, recounted that he had found
it particularly pleasant to transform himself into a flower. For Batek
culture, like that of the Jahai, flowers have a strong symbolic signifi-
cance and are closely linked to the world of the supernatural. As ob-
served by Kirk and Karen Endicott:
During all-night singing sessions, which might culminate in trancing and com-
munication with the superhuman being, both men and women donned bandoliers
of fragrant leaves, mainly wild gingers, and wore flowers or fragrant leaves in
their waistbands and hair. People said these decorations were pleasing to the su-
perhuman beings because they are what the superhumans themselves wear. The
good smells of the flowers and leaves were also thought to attract the superhu-
man beings to come down and listening to the singing. (Endicott, Kirk and
Karen, 2008: p.32)
362 DIANA RIBOLI

In many of the therapeutic songs received during dreams by Macang,

names of plants and flowers with extraordinary powers are repeated.
The halak himself told me that the very act of knowing and repeating a
particular melody (kept a secret from most people) and chanting the
names of two specific plants bestows the ability to fly anywhere on
earth to any destination.
In a way the jungle and all its creatures are considered to be
closer to the sphere of the deities and are certainly in themselves divine.
This concept is probably what makes the Batek pantheon appear to be
so lacking in supernatural beings.
As already noted, most Batek and the Jahai believe in only one
god1, known as Gobar by the Batek and Karei by the Jahai. Despite the
fact that neither Batek nor Jahai speak willingly of this divinity, it is
still greatly feared and respected. Gobar-Karei would appear not to be
particularly interested in human affairs and usually manifests himself in
the role of punisher. In any case, most Batek and Jahai appear to believe
that the god of thunder does not live in the heavens, as one would natu-
rally presume, but on the earth, alongside the cenoi, the spirits which
guide and help humans and shamans in particular. During one of my
last periods of fieldwork in Malaysia from July to September 2006, I
met more groups of Batek and Jahai and discovered that a few of them
believe that Gobar-Karei probably lives in the sky.
Gobar-Karei is also believed to live in the depths of the jungle,
probably on a mountain, in complete isolation and solitude. The rainfor-
est is again centre of the universe, in some way all-encompassing so
that anyone becoming part of it comes closer to the world of the divini-
ties. With this assumption it would be easy to understand how shamanic
journeys correspond to journeying through the forest-universe, even
better if in the form of a tree, flower or animal, and especially in the
form of the tiger, the most powerful, most respected, most mysterious
and feared feline of the jungle.
When I learnt of Macang’s decease, believed by many to be the
last of the great halak, I was afraid that a significant part of traditional
Batek culture and beliefs had also been lost. Towards the end of his life,

1
During the seventies Endicott collected many testimonies about the existence of
other Batek deities (Endicott 1979:161-190). The Batek and Jahai I have encoun-
tered to date only mention the god of thunder and very rarely the existence of the
wife of this divinity who in any case is described as a sort of double of the latter.
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 363

the Batek and nomadic bands of Taman Negara with whom the old ha-
lak lived appeared no longer to have complete faith in his abilities de-
spite their respect for him. However, after his death, his knowledge and
powers would appear to have been passed on to a new, very young gen-
eration of shamans. On the first day of my return to Taman Negara
months later, I was immediately informed that after the funeral cere-
mony Macang’s shadow-soul had entered a tiger that had often visited
the different Batek camps at night without ever attacking any humans.
The tiger had calmly entered the camp I had visited a couple of nights
earlier and everyone said they had recognized the features of Macang’s
face on the tiger.
In this way Macang had regained full vigor, the strength of his
youth and his powers. Despite their great fear, also considering the in-
crease in the number of attacks against humans, the Batek appeared to
find the presence of the big cat near the camp reassuring. Macang in
tiger form would be able to protect humans from eventual attacks by
other wild animals and was somehow a living testimony to the ‘force of
the jungle’ many young people had begun to lose faith in. That same
evening, while discussing the event, a group of youngsters little more
than adolescents enthusiastically declared that this appearance clearly
demonstrated that the Batek were still able to ‘receive’ and ‘use’ the
force of the jungle, which would soon once again re-invigorate their
ethnic group so threatened by a multitude of external problems and in
particular by the radical change of customs proposed by the official
culture of the country.
While continuing my research I learnt that many young people
had begun to receive dreams in which Macang taught them about the
shamanic profession. Thus, in the course of the last few months, com-
pletely unexpectedly, a new generation of halak appeared to be forming,
though it is still too early to arrive at definitive conclusions given that
the future shamans, many of whom are little more than adolescents,
confess that Macang himself had explained that it would be years before
their knowledge was complete and they would be able to celebrate
ceremonies.
Of the many young persons selected to become future halak,
one of the most mature candidates, who confessed he had received the
call before Macang’s decease, is a young man who for the moment pre-
fers to remain anonymous and whom I shall refer to simply as B.
364 DIANA RIBOLI

B. believes he is a scorpion-shaman, as he feels strong ties to

this animal. Almost every night he sends his shadow-soul into the body
of a large scorpion and pushes his way to the river to catch crabs. For B.
this transformation is an extremely satisfactory experience. As soon as
he finishes his favourite food, he allows himself to be transported by the
waters of the river to the bank and crawls back into the foliage of the
plants and large trees.
The other young persons who have received the call more re-
cently have stated they belong to the category of halak-butterflies. They
frequently enjoy flights through the jungle in the form of butterflies
though their knowledge is still limited and sometimes confused. Both B.
and these young people recount that when they venture out into the jun-
gle alone, at some point, apparently without meaning to, they lose the
sense of perception of their surroundings. For many hours they are not
aware of what is happening to them and usually, after these states are
over, awake at a location in the forest, they have no recall of having
journeyed to. For the moment no-one has the ability to send their
shadow-souls into tigers or elephants, and in fact, this form of transfor-
mation requires full knowledge and awareness.
The increase in shamanic vocation and generally speaking the
current status of Semang-Negrito shamanism could well reflect a certain
more or less conscious resistance to the propagation of the dominant
Islamic religion. During my fieldwork with a group of Jahai sedenter-
ized around thirty years ago I came across several shamans, whose
powers were considered to be inferior to those their colleagues had been
attributed with in the past.
The Jahai village is located in the north of Malaysia, close to the
borders with Thailand, and is surrounded by jungle. Though the con-
sumption of game and wild boar in particular is prohibited in Islam, the
Jahai diet is still mostly based on the products of the jungle. The jungle
is missed, respected and loved, and though it is feared much more by
the Jahai than the Batek nomads, even in this case it continues to be the
centre of the universe.
Jahai jampi also ‘walk in their dreams,’ receive magic chants
and fly to beautiful and mysterious places in the forest. For the moment,
only one of the jampi I have had frequent conversations with has said he
himself cannot transform into tiger form, but has a tiger-spirit whom he
can call on at will to defend the village in the event of danger and espe-
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 365

cially if there are real tigers roaming in the area at great peril for village
inhabitants.
This tiger-spirit is perfectly visible, but never attacks human be-
ings, and at night it even engages in fierce battles with real tigers that
come too close to the village. The similarities with evidence collected
by Kirk Endicott are numerous, though at this actual stage in my re-
search, this tiger-spirit would not seem to be hosted by a human
shadow-soul. The same jampi said he was sure there were still many
Jahai shamans who could transform themselves into animal forms such
as tigers and elephants, and plant forms such as flowers and trees.
Both Jahai and Batek also believe that in most cases, as noted
with the decease of the old halak Macang, once the souls of deceased
shamans have abandoned their human forms, they enter the body of a
tiger to continue living in the jungle, a form of reversion to the primor-
dial situation.
Participation in the world of the rainforest is clearly evident in
the deep respect and knowledge Jahai and Batek have of the jungle, and
even in simple everyday gestures such as the adornment of hair and
body with flowers and leaves which the women in particular undertake
long and tiring expeditions to collect. The jungle provides food, shelter
and medicinal plants for a whole multitude of illnesses. It is a perfect,
autonomous universe that has no need of any help from the outside.
And it is for this reason that the forest is in a way used for dressing: it
may take hours to find a rare flower to wear in one’s hair, but all efforts
are rewarded in the end because in some way the sublime beauty and
perfection of that flower will transfer to the person wearing it.
Transformation into animal and plant forms of Batek halak and
Jahai jampi is experienced as a form of return to a natural state per-
ceived as supreme and perfect, in exact contrast with the Malay percep-
tion where nature is diametrically opposed to culture. In its quality as a
perfect and supreme state, nature is always perceived in a positive fash-
ion, and metamorphoses into dangerous animals are never interpreted as
expressions of black magic, in contrast with the gradual change in per-
ception in the Chepang of southern central Nepal.
The Malays and many environmentalists would prefer the no-
madic Batek to abandon their way of life and would like the jungle to
become a mere destination of great interest for tourism. But for the
Batek and in a way also for the sedenterized Jahai, a jungle without
human presence is a dead jungle, because in order for the universe to
366 DIANA RIBOLI

maintain its equilibrium all its creatures should be present and in con-
tinuous exchange. Betraying the jungle by abandoning it or repudiating
it would correspond to the loss of a culture and identity, the conse-
quences of which would be very serious.
Though the Batek nomads fear the tiger, as we have seen, they
do not feel particularly threatened by it. In fact, in the jungle where they
live, which is part of the national park, there is still sufficient space to
allow the big cats plenty of hunting grounds, and it is only on extremely
rare occasions that there have been reports of tigers attacking humans.
The situation is somewhat different for the sedenterized Jahai,
as the tropical forest area they live in has been dramatically reduced to
create space for oil palm plantations. It is no longer rare for there to be
occasions when starving tigers, confused by the continuous and brusque
changes in territory, enter villages and attack humans. This situation is
extremely stressful for the Jahai, who interpret it as a form of vengeance
wreaked on them by Mother Forest, who has been betrayed and
wounded. For this reason in particular the role of the jampi is more im-
portant than ever, as he can still communicate with the jungle and can
even, in the form of an animal or by calling on the assistance of the
spirit-tigers, control this justified rage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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maness. Shamanism in Siberia (V. Diószegi and M. Hoppál
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Eliade 1951 M. Eliade, Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïque de
l’extase, ed. Payot. Paris 1951.
Endicott 1979 K. Endicott, Batek Negrito Religion: The World-View and Rituals
of a Hunting and Gathering People of Peninsular Malaysia, ed.
Clarendon Press. Oxford 1979.
Endicott 2008 K. and K. Endicott, The Headman was a Woman. The Gender
Egalitarian Batek of Malaysia, ed. Waveland Press. Long Grove
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Hamayon 1990 R. Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme. Esquisse d’une théorie du cha-
manisme sibérien, ed. Société d’Ethnologie. Nanterre 1990.
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nales Universitatis Fennicae Aboensis B, 1, no. 2. 14-18.
Ingold 2000 T. Ingold, The Perception of the Environment. Essays in liveli-
hood, dwelling and skill, ed. Routledge. New York 2000.
Lommel 1967 A. Lommel, Shamanism: The Beginning of Art, ed. McGraw-Hill.
New York 1967.
 SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 367

Raichel-Dolmatoff 1975 G. Reichel-Dolmatoff, The Shaman and the Jaguar: A Study

of Narcotic Drugs among the Indians of Columbia, ed. Temple
University Press. Philadelphia 1975.
Rasmussen 1931 K. Rasmussen, The Netsilik Eskimos: Social Life and Spiritual
Culture. Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition, 1921-1924, vol.8,
Copenhagen 1931.
Riboli 2000 D. Riboli, Tunsuriban. Shamanism among the Chepang of Central
and Southern Nepal, ed. Mandala Book Point. Kathmandu 2000.
Riboli 2002 D. Riboli, Trances of Initiation, Incorporation and Movement:
Three Different Typologies of the Shamanic Trance. SHAMAN,
Vol. 10 (2002). Molnar and Kelemen Oriental Publishers. Hun-
gary. 143-159.
Ripinsky-Naxon 1993 M. Ripinsky-Naxon, The Nature of Shamanism. Substance and
Function of a Religious Metaphor, ed. State University of New
York Press. New York.
Stutley 2003 M. Stutley, Shamanism: An Introduction, ed. Routledge. London
Tuck Po 2000 L. Tuck Po, Forest, Bateks, and Degradation: Environmental
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Vol. 38, No. 2, September 2000. 165-184.
Tuck Po 2004 L. Tuck Po, Changing Pathways: Forest Degradation and the
Batek of Pahang, Malaysia, ed. Lexington Books: Lexington
Vitebsky 1995 P. Vitebsky, The Shaman, ed. Duncan Baird Publishers Ltd. Lon-
don 1995.
 DAGMAR EIGNER

Transformation of Consciousness through

Suffering, Devotion, and Meditation

This paper deals with the spiritual and personal development of sha-
mans and mediums in Central Nepal. It is based on the work I have
done with traditional healers in Central Nepal. The study was carried
out from 1984 to 2005 for the total duration of 36 months.1
Initially I focused on Tamang shamans living in the middle hills
east of Kathmandu Valley. The Tamang constitute the largest ethnic
minority in Nepal. They came from the southern part of Tibet and speak
a Tibeto-Burmese language (Bista 1967:52ff). A great number of sha-
mans can be found among the Tamang. Especially in the multi-cultural
areas of Central Nepal, a large part of their clientele are members of
other ethnic groups, because it is the healers’ reputation rather than their
cultural background that attracts customers. During those inter-ethnic
consultations Nepali, the lingua franca of Central Nepal, is spoken.
Due to economic and political pressures, more and more people
of all ethnic groups have moved from the middle hills to the Kathmandu
Valley. This in turn has resulted in an increasingly dense population of
predominantly low-status people who strive to make a living and due to
bad working conditions have a lot of health problems. To visit hospitals,
that may sometimes be rather poorly equipped, is a fairly expensive and
alienating undertaking. Furthermore, Western-style doctors usually do
not offer treatment for psychosocial problems and provide no emotional
support for those who do not come to terms with their new living condi-
tions, especially children who have been sent to town by their parents in
order to make some cash for increasing the family income.

1
I would like to thank the Austrian Funds for the Advancement of Research and
Science for the generous financial support of this research (1995 to 1997: Charlotte
Bühler habilitation stipend, 2001 to 2003: Research project “Shamans’ Comments in
their Rituals”).
370 DAGMAR EIGNER

Due to the changing social situation, the study focused on inter-

cultural therapies, with a special emphasis on the following basic issues:
How much common background or assumptions about the world and
the functioning and values of societies is necessary for rendering inter-
cultural therapies effective? Which roles do the myths, that have been
handed down the generations, play for successful healing of patients?
What has become of shared knowledge and worldview in an interethnic
setting? What are the similarities and differences in the healing methods
applied by various specialists? An investigation of this kind calls for the
integration of different types of traditional healers belonging to different
ethnic groups. In Central Nepal healers who establish a strong connec-
tion to the spiritual domain are mainly shamans, mediums and tantrics.
The tantrics were difficult to approach because their practice is based on
a secret body of knowledge that is accessible only to few people, and in
addition a fair number of them do not use their abilities for healing.
The mediums and shamans may differ in their contact with the
spiritual world. Even though Reinhard (1976:16), in his definition of a
shaman, states that he or she either becomes possessed (that is the case
for a medium as well) or goes on a magical flight, there are consider-
able cultural differences. Because of that I use the term medium for
those who are not in the Himalayan tradition, and reserve the term sha-
man for those healers among the ethnic minorities in the middle hills of
Nepal who have also migrated into the Kathmandu Valley.
Most of the mediums in the Kathmandu Valley belong to the
ethnic group of Newar. They are the original inhabitants of the Valley
and still comprise a large percentage of the population. They have their
own language, Newari, which belongs to the Tibeto-Burman language
group (Bista 1967:16ff, Gellner 1994:30). Due to continued migration
into the valley there is an ongoing shift in population and cultural domi-
nance. Today there are also non Newar mediums and Newar healers
who work more in the style of shamans and trace their shamanic power
back to their forefathers. They even claim to have received some para-
phernalia handed down from ancestors and to have learned ritual tech-
niques from them. One Tamang healer I have met calls herself a tantric,
but she has not undergone a formal initiation specific for tantrics, and
the mantras she works with have not been given to her by a human
teacher but in her dreams and visions. Some of the shamans who belong
mainly to the groups of Tamang, Gurung, Magar, Sherpa, Chetri and
Brahmin have changed traditional healing methods, partly because a
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 371

lack of traditional knowledge, and partly because of the need or pres-

sure to adjust to the multi-cultural area they live in. The question arises
to what extent the concepts of illness causation and the understanding of
symbolic therapeutic actions have to be shared by healers and patients.
According to most traditional healers it is the connection with deities
and tutelary spirits that is crucial in order to make the treatments effec-
tive.

THE CALLING
Shamans and mediums usually have a calling experience, which signi-
fies that they have been chosen by a spiritual power to become a healer.
Often the experience is not recognized as such right away, and the cho-
sen person’s unusual behavior is at first interpreted as a disturbance of
her or his well-being for a variety of reasons. The cause to which the
disturbance is attributed depends on the chosen person’s social envi-
ronment and the interests of lay people or the point of view of medical
specialists who make the diagnosis. Thus, there are often contradicting
assumptions regarding the cause of a person’s unusual behaviour.
Pfeiffer (1994:213) has pointed out that maybe we should not
speak of an initial illness but of a crisis. When an ordinary illness is
cured, the person can go back to her or his life. In contrast, due to the
experiences the person has undergone she or he probably has grown and
can continue life on a higher level. A crisis will definitely change peo-
ple’s life; if someone is able to overcome the crisis he or she will move
on as a more mature person; but if a crisis is not resolved, the chances
are high of gliding into pathology. A calling experience is obligatory
and if it is not complied with it will lead to death or madness. In any
case, a call will bring with it a lot of difficulties. Therefore most of the
chosen persons beg the deities to stop the process, because they are
afraid of the changes in their lives, the confrontation with the illness-
causing powers and the suffering they will have to go through. In addi-
tion, they can never be sure that they will overcome the crisis and be-
come respected persons who are likely to be re-integrated in their com-
munities.
A shaman’s or a medium’s crisis often starts with a period of
disturbing events that cause indisposition or a feeling of being ill due to
unknown reasons. The hardships that persons usually have to undergo
in the course of the process of becoming healers are expressed in differ-
372 DAGMAR EIGNER

ent ways. The following narration of a female medium is centred round

the difficulties in her life and her suffering, up to the point when she
considered committing suicide:
“Sixteen years after my marriage I got my first child. That time my hus-
band started to drink a lot of alcohol and gave me more and more trou-
ble. I was very sad and I did not want to stay with him anymore. I felt
like going somewhere to kill myself. Until I did not have a child he
made me feel very bad about not having a child, and now I have a child,
but he does not feed it. Where could I go to have peace? I thought there
was no use to live on, even though people would say bad things about
me. To continue living with him would not do any good. Then I said to
myself “just go to the field”. Because my financial situation was very
bad, one family let me work on their field for my livelihood. As long as
I was working on the field they would not take it back. One day, when I
was very depressed, I went to the field to cut paddy. Suddenly some-
thing came on my leg. First it was a very small snake that felt cold on
my skin. When I looked around it came to my shoulder where I felt
some kind of heaviness. I did not know what had come up on my body.
Later on I saw that the snake was standing right behind me. When I saw
that it was standing on its tail, I thought that it must be Bhagwān. Then I
took a bunch of paddy where the snake could crawl onto and put it on
the ground. Right after that I felt a sensation like electric current run-
ning through my body. First I did not know what to do, but then I
thought if I stay on the field, my husband would not come to see me
there, nobody would come to see me there. I called the two women who
were working on the field next to mine to show them the snake. I told
them that it was very small before, but now it is so big. That was Bhag-
wān who had come to me, because there was so much hardship in my
life, so much poverty, and I was not able to go anywhere. Because I
wanted to die, Bhagwān came to help me and gave me the power to heal
other people.”
The medium told that she was nine years old when she became
very sick for the first time. After that she was fine until she got married
at the age of eighteen. For days she was in a strange state crying, laugh-
ing, screaming and beating her husband. She was taken to a local healer
and later also to a hospital where the doctor said that nothing was wrong
with her and there was no need to bring her to the hospital.
In the case of this woman, the resentments of family members
of the older generation who were afraid that the traditional life-style and
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 373

social order could be endangered were an important factor for prolong-

ing her suffering. Especially the parents-in-law refused to accept her
calling, because as a healer she should not bow down to their feet, sit
lower than they or touch anything polluted by them, such as food left-
overs or dirty clothes. Eventually this obstacle was overcome and the
medium was able to set up a regular practice.
One Newar medium had problems with her family members
who were not religious and did not believe that mediums could be effec-
tive healers. Her father was a politician who considered it as inappropri-
ate that his daughter was a medium. She was expected to be a good
housewife, taking care of all the practical matters in the home. Only
when her mother became seriously ill and was cured by her daughter
she was finally acknowledged as a healer.
A male medium had extraordinary experiences from his early
childhood that were due to his special connection with Hariti Mā. She is
the Buddhist goddess of smallpox, who is believed to be a spirit (yakṣa)
converted to Buddhism and the guardian of young children (Gellner
2001:2003). Although this medium had to suffer a lot, because it was
not realized that a deity had come over him, he was also protected by
the goddess so that nothing serious or life threatening would happen to
him. When, finally, Hariti spoke through him, it was also his legitimisa-
tion that he would become a powerful healer. Despite the suffering he
took his experiences more lightly, at least afterwards when he was al-
ready a well-established healer. The way he told his life story inter-
spersed with funny incidents made his listeners laugh and difficult
events lay in the past:
“I was very sick (bimāri) for a long time. One health assistant came and
gave injections, he gave injections for such a long time and nobody
knew what was wrong with me. He checked my pulse and said that
nothing bad would happen. He always gave medicine to me. Then one
time a man from the village who traded with buffaloes came. My grand-
father asked him what was happening to his grandchild. At that time
nobody was able to move my head that was standing straight like a rock
and I had become very thin. The man from the village said that the head
should not be kept like that. Doctors had already given so much medi-
cine to me. Then the man took some rice and checked my problem and
374 DAGMAR EIGNER

said: ‘Alas! You should do pujā2 for Mā!’ Following his advice I was
getting better every day.”
Like in other narrations it was emphasized that Western-type
medicine is of no use for problems of this kind. Sometimes it is even
considered as a treatment that could make the condition of the suffering
person worse. Only the man from the village realized that Hariti Mā had
an influence on the young man, who should manifest devotion to the
deity. Later in life his condition became again very serious:
“After I had married off my daughter, I was possessed very often. At
that time I was throwing things here and there and made much mess in
the house. Everyone was so scared that my brother decided to bring the
army doctor from nearby. They tried to calm me down and I was given
an injection in my buttock. It was so painful! I asked the army doctor
why he had given me an injection, because there are no cuts and no
fever. Then I became unconscious. As soon as I was awake I behaved
like mad again. Then they took me to the hospital. I said to someone:
“you are not a doctor”, and he replied: “Prabhu3, you are in tension!”
Why should I have been in tension? I did not have any problem. The
doctor was so surprised and said: “It is not like this, Prabhu.” Later they
also wanted to give oxygen to me, but I told them that I did not need
any oxygen and pulled the tube out. Finally they sent me back to the
house. … Some time later they brought a shaman. He started to do a
healing ritual for me and went on for such a long time. I grabbed the
little broom from him and said: “How can you heal me with this?”4 Af-
ter that he left the house, the doctor and the health assistant were also
gone. You could ask those people who were sitting here at that time.
And then it was all over. I poured a bucket of water on myself and took
a bath. Everyone realized that something had changed. It was around
ten years ago. Since then I have a lot of power.”
The Nepali word bimāri means sick, but its connotation is ex-
tensive, ranging from just not feeling well to being seriously ill. When
he told about the incidents with the doctors, of course, he understood
them from the point of view of his present life. Injections and oxygen
seemed as crazy treatments that could not make his condition any better.

2
Ritual to honour the deity.
3
Respectable way of addressing god.
4
If a person already has a strong connection with deities, no healer or doctor can do
anything.
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 375

The medium even pointed out that the doctors regarded him as a god –
but one who needed medicine to calm him down. The outrageous be-
havior was considered as a transient state of mind and not as an illness,
so also the shaman was not able to cure him with simple methods like
brushing out illness-causing agents. As soon as the strange behavior has
ceased, the power of the deity invested in the shaman can be used fully.
A calling experience or a deity revealing itself through a chosen
person is usually followed by a long period of intense personal and
spiritual development that should also lead to a life-style that is suitable
for deities. Sometimes such a period also precedes the calling experi-
ence or is considered to be part of it. The traditional shamanic initiation
ceremony that introduces the neophyte to the public and after which he
or she is accepted as a mature shaman - if the tests are mastered - (Pe-
ters 1998:77ff) is often not carried out anymore, especially in the Kat-
mandu Valley. Mediums traditionally just start to practice and are re-
spected more and more if their treatments are successful. Some of them
have an experienced medium that helps them establish their practice,
but they do not learn anything from that person.

PURITY
To be pure is something essential for the work of mediums as well as
for that of shamans. A kind heart, a good way of life, and helping other
people are considered as most important in the career of spiritual heal-
ers. This implies also avoiding pollution in everyday life. If a person
shows unusual behavior or is ill for a prolonged time, bringing him or
her in contact with something polluted can be used as a provocation
technique to find out the reason for the person’s strange state. A Ta-
mang shamaness told about the time before it became clear that she was
going to be a healer:
“One day my husband, who was working in the army at that time, was
preparing for his written test that is required to be taken by military men
in their barracks. I was trembling and one of my hens was moving
around. It was quite a big hen. Suddenly the hen was caught by a wild
cat and carried away. … A footman on duty threw a rock at the wild cat
which ran away leaving the hen at the spot. Because the hen was not
dead, it came back running toward us fast. When we looked at it, we
saw two small holes at its neck that were caused by the wild cat when
carrying the hen away holding it with its teeth. After some medicine
376 DAGMAR EIGNER

was applied on the wounds the hen suffered even greater pain. My hus-
band proposed to cut the hen, which was quite big, and eat it rather than
let it go like that. I did not agree to eat it. He persuaded me to eat the
chicken trying to convince me that it was not dirtied by anybody, not
tasted at all, but only injured by the wild cat. So we cooked the chicken
in the evening and ate it. After dinner I went to bed while my husband
was still reading. Exactly at twelve o’clock in the night deities ascended
on me and I began to tremble. In that trembling state I hugged a cotton
quilt firmly. When my husband looked at me, I laughed. Later on my
husband told me that I laughed boisterously as he looked at me and he
was very much scared at the situation. It was a hot month but even then
I was hugging the quilt and laughing like mad. Then he tried to wake
me up shaking me and asked me why I was laughing like that. He told
me later that the more he wanted to know the reason for my laughter,
the louder I went on laughing. At this he became very scared and kept
the door wide open so that he could run away in case I came down upon
him. Then he splashed water over my face from a brass pot with a
spout. Instantly I stood up from my bed and asked him angrily why he
had made me eat chicken that had already been tasted and fouled. My
husband expressed his surprise at this question and said that he had not
done that. Again I shouted at him that he indeed had given me the pol-
luted chicken that had already been tasted and fouled by the wild cat.
After this I trembled vehemently. I went on shivering and trembling all
over. The fouled chicken was the root cause of all this.”
Due to the strong connection with deities, pollution cannot be
tolerated anymore. For the husband of the shamaness this also means
that he too has to change his life, respecting the situation. In the narra-
tion of the shamaness the polluted hen precipitated a series of events
that set an end to her suffering and eventually made her a healer ac-
cepted by the community.
Stories like this are told many times in pretty much the same
way. They show the paths from being a disturbed person to becoming
someone who needs special treatment - because of the strong connec-
tion with spiritual beings - so that the therapeutic actions can exert posi-
tive effects on the whole community and its individual members. Such
incidents also give legitimisation to the healers. Thus, shamans who do
not know the “creation myths” sing their own life stories during the
long rituals. They say that no specific texts have to be recited, but that
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 377

anything that describes their position and how it came about fulfils the
same function.
Pilgrimages are important for gaining and renewing power, but
pollution can happen easily on the road. At the pilgrimage places people
are under the protection of the deities and the atmosphere is so strong
that no accident happens and in a trance-like state people avoid every-
thing that could cause pollution.
The Tamang shamaness told that on the way back from a pil-
grimage place she met a man who was in a very serious state. Despite
the fact that shamans work as “individual” healers they undertake pil-
grimages in smaller or larger groups. Undertaking pilgrimages in groups
is partly due to practical reasons, in terms of expenses and entertain-
ment, and partly for creating opportunities to share experiences and
provoke each other in a sort of contests. On such a special occasion
there are usually also quite a number of lay people accompanying the
healers, attending them and getting blessings at a holy place. According
to the shamaness, the other healers present at the place where they
found the sick man, left saying that they were not able to bear the ex-
treme chill there. But the sick man was wreathing with acute pain in his
heart. When asked what had happened he answered: “Mother, I am go-
ing to die, the pain is unbearable. Please, do something!” The sha-
maness said that she started to examine him, wondering where she
could find some ashes5 at a place like that:
“I picked up some soil dust instead, and when I had just touched him, I
found it was effective. I blew my breath over his body chanting mantras
and gave him some empowered water to drink. After that I told him to
leave the place immediately, because it was not suitable for a sick man
to stay any longer at such high altitude. We asked him to go ahead of us
and sat down on the hill. All the members of our group had not yet as-
sembled together. We borrowed a plate from the sick man to eat some
snack. Later it was found out that the plate had been left unclean. I felt
its effect immediately. At first I had thought that it was clean and pure
and so I had borrowed it. As soon as I had eaten I felt a shiver all over
my body. It struck my mind that I had eaten from a defiled plate. In an
instant I felt its pressure. I said that the plate was unclean and defiled.

5
Used for treatments. Purified ashes are used along with blowing mantras on a sick
person, and are sometimes also ingested orally.
378 DAGMAR EIGNER

The sick man, on the other hand, got better after ten minutes’ walk.
Unclean and defiled food does not suit me and I have to be given only
pure food. As soon as I realized that the food was impure, I threw up.
Then I felt like defecating. When everything I had eaten had come out
completely, I was relieved.”
Also in this case the deities with whom the shamaness was con-
nected so strongly did not tolerate any impurity. The only way to deal
with such a situation is to get rid of everything polluted right on the
spot. This may not be done intentionally, but it happens and it works.
Eating outside one’s house always bears dangers with it and
should be avoided as far as possible. A young male medium told that he
always cooks his meals himself to make sure that they are not polluted
by anyone and that there are no impure ingredients in the food. He does
not eat chicken meat or chicken eggs and therefore he also stays away
from noodles because there might be chicken products in them. Which
kinds of food items are considered to be impure is said by the deities,
and is culture-specific to a large extent. Those healers who follow a
strict discipline stay home as much as possible, at least insofar as eating
and drinking are concerned. In general, it can be said that the ethnic
minorities from the hills feel more relaxed about their food.
Even though the healing methods of shamans and mediums are
based on specific cultural traditions, they can be applied in regard to
clients from different cultures and at any place in the world. Outside
Nepal the practical everyday life can be quite difficult. A shamaness
told that during her visit to America she had lots of problems with her
food, because she cannot eat some types of meat and several kinds of
vegetables. Furthermore, if she eats something that has been touched by
a person who is impure for some reasons, it will have a bad effect on
her.
A Newar medium, who was asked if she had practiced as a
healer while living in the United States, replied that it was too difficult
to avoid the food she is not supposed to eat and that she suffered a lot
because she was punished by the deity. After a dispute with her only
son who had lost everything in business, she wanted to earn some
money to build a house. A Brahmin family, for whom she had worked
before, agreed to send her to some relatives in the United States to cook
for them and do other chores in the household.
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 379

“I went alone and stayed over there only for three months. Then I could
not bear to touch anything polluted, because it had a very bad effect on
me making my body tremble. I was desperate and I suffered a lot. Mā
[Hariti] would not allow me to touch anything impure. I cannot eat beef
or pork and so I had a very hard time over there. One day I cooked pork
and so I had to clean the meat. At night Mā said that I have to do a ritual
for her, she was gritting her teeth and expressing her anger. When I got
up the following morning one of my fingers was swollen very much and
I felt a lot of pain. I told them about my finger and asked them to take
me to a doctor. They scolded me and said that it is not like in Nepal,
doctors are too expensive in America. What to do? Then I put some ash
that I had taken with me from Nepal on my finger. I wanted to sit in
meditation, but there was no place for that. The only thing I could do
was to go to the bathroom, like going to the toilet, lock the door and sit
in meditation. I started to see Mā and got blessings from her. I did not
want to get out of the bathroom anymore. They knocked at the door and
asked me what I was doing in the bathroom for such a long time. Then I
told them that I wanted to go back to Nepal.”
The medium found it difficult to find a suitable place for devo-
tional rituals but she is sure that Ma is present all over the world. Due to
the insensibility and ignorance of some people in America she was not
able to adjust and to work as a healer. Even her host family from Nepal
have become estranged from their traditional way of life and threatened
the medium that she would end up in a mad house if she continued to
show such strange behavior.

INTERRUPTION AND CONTINUITY

Even if a calling is accepted, but a person cannot continue the path that
he or she has been chosen to follow, there will again be serious prob-
lems and/or illness and suffering. The growing union with spiritual
powers cannot be reversed anymore. Some women may neglect their
profession because they are very busy with their children and the
household. Men may look for a different job to earn more money to
support their families and then find it too difficult to continue the spiri-
tual path in a secular surrounding. A shamaness told about her life:
“After I got married and had come here, I did not work as a healer for
six years. Then I had a very serious crisis again. For three months I was
380 DAGMAR EIGNER

lying in bed sleeping. There was no pain, nothing of that sort, but I was
sleepy all the time and did not know what was going on around me.
When I got up I had to vomit, when I slept there was no vomiting. In
this room I was lying all day and night. At the beginning of the fourth
month – it was on a full moon day – I heard a voice ordering me to get
the shaman’s equipment that I had used before. When I had everything
with me I should do a ritual in my house. Only thereafter I would be-
come alright. Like we are talking now this was told to me. I was not
able to get up and so I asked my husband to bring the equipment. My
husband replied: “Today, I am not on leave. Tomorrow I will get leave,
so I could go to the village tomorrow. But I will ask my father.” Then
the father said he would go to get the things. He might have reached my
home – how funny – my japmālā6 arrived in my bed. How did it come?
Nobody knows that. I was sleeping like this,7 it was right in my hand.
Then I felt as if I awoke from a sleep and I wanted to get up. For a mo-
ment I was afraid that I would vomit again after getting up. But when I
got up I found myself very light. I was told to take a bath. Since there
was no tap there I asked some relative to go and fetch a pot of water and
also get me some titepāti8. She wanted to know what for I needed that. I
told her that I wanted to take a bath. “If you are so sick, how are you
going to take a bath?” I replied that I had to take a bath that day. The
water and the titepāti were brought, I took a bath, and I threw away my
clothes. That morning after taking a bath I became very fresh, strong
and light. Then I told my younger sister to smear the house with cow-
dung9, because I would do a ritual that night. Father and the others of
the group who had gone to my village would arrive home bringing my
stuff. At that time we had cows and my younger sister did everything
needed. In the evening I did a special ritual in my house. Then suddenly
the disease was gone forever. It was not there any more. Because I had
quit working as a healer for some years, I had to bear all that.”
When the shamaness was prepared to practice again as a healer,
all her complaints suddenly disappeared. Her instant recovery from the
crisis lasted until the end of her life. Being her neighbor during several

6
Rosary used for muttering the name of a god or a religious formula repeatedly.
7
Shows lying back.
8
Bitter weed (Artemisia vulgaris).
9
To clean and purify it.
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 381

periods of my fieldwork I had the chance to observe and take part in her
healing work for some time. She never showed any signs of confusion,
disorientation, depression or lack of energy again. More and more cli-
ents came to consult her, because she was considered to be a powerful
healer. When she got old and felt she would die soon, she went back to
her village bringing with her the ritual paraphernalia so that someone of
her father’s family could use them.
A calling influences a person’s whole life until the end. If the
demands of deities or ancestor spirits are not obeyed, suffering, insanity
or death will ensue. Even if a person becomes sloppy in regard to devo-
tional and healing practice later in his or her career, life will definitely
become very hard. One Tamang shaman, a specialist for the old tradi-
tional rituals, neglected devotion and purity for some years. During this
period there were a lot of problems in his family and the shaman started
to drink in the early morning so that he was hardly able to see his pa-
tients. His clientele as well as his income dwindled and this in turn
made him drink even more. Eventually the shaman managed to get out
of the vicious circle so that his life took a different turn again.
Regardless of how many obstacles there are and how much suf-
fering someone has to endure, the deities’ demands to improve life-
style, to work hard on overcoming the crisis, to give in to spiritual pow-
ers and get transformed bear many consequences. For the matured
healer the issue is not if life has become more or less enjoyable and
comfortable, but to accept life the way it is. Family, mundane activities
or even hardship are slowly fading as emotional experiences. With time
conflicts dissolve and relationships are seen in a different light. A me-
dium told about her situation right after having set up her practice as a
healer:
“Because of Bhagwān my life has changed a lot. I cannot eat what I
want, and my husband is still young, so sometimes he gets angry with
me and tells me that he wants to marry another woman, because he has
a desire for things, but I do not feel any desire. I just want to stay clean,
quiet, and calm…. If I did not have my daily responsibilities it would be
good. I just want to show devotion to the deities.”

GAINING POWER, KNOWLEDGE AND CLIENTS

In order to strengthen the connection with the spiritual world after a
calling, deities and ancestor spirits must be worshipped regularly. One
382 DAGMAR EIGNER

common technique is reciting the names of deities and concentrating on

them. During this process there is a loosening of ego boundaries and a
change in the sense of being oneself. A growing submission of the own
person to spiritual powers takes place.
Repetition of these words mero bhakti guruko śakti “my devo-
tion, the guru’s power” is also used for devotional practice. It does not
make any difference if the words are pronounced aloud or silently. Ac-
cording to many shamans, continued remembrance of gurus is essential
for successful healing: “Without guru nothing can be done.”
Notably, the devotional exercises do not have to follow a certain
pattern, so that each healer develops his or her own individual style.
One shamaness, for example, takes a bath and performs a pujā with
pure water from a well nearby every day in the early morning. Patients
may arrive before she has finished her pujā in her house. When she is
still doing her devotional exercises they have to stay outside whereas
later they wait for their turn inside the healer’s room. Specific practices
might change over the years. Once she told me that she gets up at three
o’clock in the morning to visit some holy places in addition to her usual
daily routine.
A shaman living in the Katmandu Valley has integrated hand
reading (which has happened to learn in the public parks of Katmandu
as a child) into his healing practice. Although hand reading and sha-
manic techniques come from quite different cultural traditions, their
combination is not considered as inappropriate. In the course of the
years he has become quite popular and sees sixty to hundred clients per
day. When asked if he also performs the traditional night rituals he re-
plied: “I work from six o’clock in the morning until six, seven or eight
o’clock in the evening. How can I work during the night, too? If some
people want a traditional Tamang ritual I refer them to someone else.” It
appears that the demand for the elaborate night rituals is decreasing.
Performance of only short therapies also means that there is no
more reciting on a regular basis of the “creation myths”, telling about
the beginning of shamanic practice and the paraphernalia that have been
used since primordial time. Those myths used to be an essential part of
a traditional healing ritual. Because this shaman (who also practices
hand reading) did not want to break with the tradition, he started singing
the myths every Saturday morning before seeing the clients. In this way
he remembers his gurus and practices devotional meditation. In his
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 383

opinion it is one important factor that has made him such a popular
healer.
Many Newar mediums follow a very strict daily discipline.
They get up very early to take water from a tap or well, that should not
be touched by anyone, and clean all the plates and cups used for rituals.
Afterwards they take a bath with however much water there is and wash
face, hands and feet or the whole body. They do some kind of medita-
tion, remember the deities by saying their names, and give offerings.
Before the healing sessions they should not eat anything and not even
drink tea in order to be pure and clean.
Meditation practices and presentation of devotional offerings
have aesthetic qualities. Special words are spoken in rhythmical ways or
sung in melodies created by the individual healers in connection with
their tutelary deities. The various kinds of materials used as offerings
are arranged according to the wishes of the deities. There are no specific
demands and no rules to be followed by the healers. It is a creative
process that is being shaped instantaneously in the given situation.
It may happen that during devotional exercises a person’s body
starts trembling. This too is interpreted as a sign that someone is con-
nected with a spiritual power. Rhythmical drumming, singing, and
trembling are also used to mark the beginning of the ritual time10, in
which different processes are made possible and the laws of everyday
life are somewhat relaxed and alleviated. Drumming and dancing are
traditional techniques of the shamans; trembling is a technique for sha-
mans as well as for mediums.
Furthermore, drumming, dancing and trembling are highly efficient
techniques for inducing altered states of consciousness.11 The term tech-
nique implies intentionality, but the shamans and mediums say that the
trembling just happens. Certain behaviors influenced by deities can
even show up suddenly, for example, in the streets. In such cases the
healers go in front and the people behind them will be protected.
Reinhard’s definition (1976:16) states that “a shaman is a person
who at his will can enter into a non-ordinary psychic state”. Crapanzano
(1977:9f) argues that the emphasis on control may be of more impor-

10
Compare Turner (1989) and van Gennep (1909).
11
The effect of rhythmic movements of the body can be used in any culture. Contem-
porary music therapy in the West emphasizes the therapeutic value of rhythm and its
importance in the development to a healthy person.
384 DAGMAR EIGNER

tance for the Western observer than to the healers and their communi-
ties. Deities can act through shamans and mediums at any time, but it
never happens at an inappropriate moment. Uniting with deities leads to
non-dual action that is “spontaneous (because it is free of objectified
intention), effortless (because it is free from a reified “I” that must exert
itself), and “empty” (because one is wholly the action, so that there is
no dualistic awareness of an action)” (Loy 1988:10).
In order to be able to work as a shaman or a medium, one has to
explore the spiritual world, overcome fears and gain the ability to con-
trol demons and other illness-causing spirits.
Whatever ability or knowledge is needed for working as a healer
is learned through connection with spiritual powers. A shamaness told
that she has learned everything from the spirit of her deceased father
and the deities with whom he has been connected. During her dreams
spiritual teachers lead her to some places, and give her mantras and
everything else she needs for her work. The teaching might also take
place while she is awake and engaged in some daily routine. “My
imagination (kalpanā) reaches at other places. The body remains here,
but I reach to places far away. At that time I am fully absorbed in my
plays and conversations with the spirits.” When she was asked if she
also visits other places in her imagination while performing healing
rituals, she answered:
“No, I don’t. Now I am fully mature. I have completed my staying in
the cave.12 I have already eaten the incense and the lamp and completed
playing with the spirits. Thus, I am now a fully trained shaman, the
knowledge has penetrated me completely. That is the reason why I can
do everything that a shaman has to do. If it were not like that, spiritual
powers13 would come over me only at moments, and at other times they
would leave me alone. Deities have made me experienced by asking me
to do a thing like this and another thing like that. I learned from them
day by day slowly and gradually. Now I have achieved all the required

12
guphā – traditionally structure for storage (Peters 1998:94); in this shamaness’ case
a military tent was put up on a cremation ground. The tent was provided by her hus-
band’s colleagues. Usually a shaman has to stay there for three days and three nights
continuously, deal with illness-causing spirits or demons to show that he/she has o-
vercome fears and is a mature healer.
13
Helping spirits who are invoked at the beginning of healing rituals.
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 385

skills. It was only when I was a beginner that I went outside in the
flights of imagination. Now everything comes rushing towards me.”
Under the influence of deities, healers exhibit extraordinary
powers. One medium told that just by blowing a mantra on a rope that
was tied around him, the rope would open. He also emphasizes that
some people in his community changed their minds perceiving his spe-
cial abilities: “When I just moved my hand a coconut came out of it.
Then people slowly started to believe in the power that was in me and
started to respect me.”
Deities come over the healers and show themselves in different
appearances, speak and act in unusual ways. One medium has a post-
card that shows “herself” with the faces and attributes of several deities.
During her healing sessions she sits behind a thick cloth so that people
might not become frightened by the appearances. For the advanced
healers corporeal form and mind are non-dual.
“… it is a radically transformed world. The familiar, everyday world of
material objects was formerly balanced by an ego-consciousness that
was supposed to be observing it. The disappearance of that discrete
consciousness requires a new explanation of what awareness is. The
awareness that was previously understood to be observing the world is
now realized to be one with it. No longer do “I”, as the locus of con-
sciousness, see something external. Rather, the non-dual, self-luminous
nature of the world stands revealed. When we want to describe this ex-
perience, what shall we say?” (Loy 1988:210).
Bāgh Bhairab, a fierce powerful deity in the shape of a tiger,
comes in critical stages of healing sessions and brings a special atmos-
phere into the room.14 When I asked a shamaness how she feels when
Bāgh Bhairab comes over her she answered: “At that time my aware-
ness changes, and even my body becomes more or less like a tiger. I can
feel the shape of a tiger from the inside.” According to her, in the
Golden Age it was possible to transform into a tiger completely. An-
other shaman told that he could become a tiger if he knew the right
mantra.

14
The ability of shamans who transform themselves into tigers or other animals is a
widespread belief (see also Riboli in this volume).
386 DAGMAR EIGNER

CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE I
Scharfetter (1996:72ff) points out that in Western societies for person
who is awake and conscious the ego (I, me) stays the same continuously
in the course of one’s life and personal history. The consciousness of
the I is the certainty that “I am myself” all the time. Furthermore, Schar-
fetter notes that we do not have consciousness, but we are conscious-
ness. In his opinion the I is something abstract that stands for the human
person being oneself. Being one with the cosmic consciousness is what
he calls transpersonal, a trans-ego-experience.
Even though Scharfetter (2004) takes into account cultural dif-
ferences, he emphasizes the dangers of the spiritual path. If the demar-
cation of the I (i.e., the border of one’s own person), the consistency of
the I (i.e., the certainty that one has a coherent life, being the same all
the time) or the activity of the I (i.e., the certainty that one’s own ex-
periences, thinking, and acting are determined by oneself) decrease ap-
preciably, one glides into a pathological state. Ego-boundaries can be
loosened at times to experience an oceanic feeling, but in everyday life
there is no room for that.
Spiritual healers in Nepal have given up their sense of being
oneself to a large extent; their actions are not done with their own inten-
tion, and the calling constitutes a break in the coherence of their lives.
Yet, they are perfectly fine and able to help the people around them.
During the healing sessions shamans and mediums are treated like dei-
ties. Clients bow down to them, offer incense and give those deities,
who like to have light, burning wicks to eat. Sometimes they also ask
for a special kind of incense or even burning coal. An atmosphere of
awe is created that opens up the patients so that even very short treat-
ments exert a big effect.
Some deities like to eat burning wicks that are offered by the
people in the audience. The healers swallow the burning wicks that are
given to them, but the light is an offering for the deities with whom they
are united. While watching a video recording that showed deities com-
ing over her during a healing session together with a medium, the sha-
maness was very surprised. Sounds, gestures, and movements were
determined by the deities. She had never seen herself like this and said:
“This is not me. My appearance is the same as Kāli’s. Nobody will say
this is me. My voice is different. Look at my eyes! Some said that they
had seen different faces but I never believed them. Now it is becoming
clearer to me.”
 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 387

One medium through whom several deities speak during the

healing rituals sings a devotional song addressing Mother Earth. In the
course of the song she herself becomes Mother Earth.
Mātā you are Mother Earth
It is only your support
With which we have been living
Mother Earth Mātā
Be kind
Who else is there for us
Carrying the load of the earth
Has been difficult, Mātā
This is Kāliyug15
When it is difficult to keep up the earth
Liberate the people of the world
Be kind
I cannot bear it all
I cannot carry the earth anymore
If I leave
Then the world will be finished
Be kind
Oh Buddha Bhagwān
The medium’s identity has changed: she is herself and not herself, she is
not a perceiver who perceives something that is separate from herself;
the consciousness of the I is not set against the world that she could be
conscious of.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bista 1967 Jor Bahadur Bista, People of Nepal, Ratna Pustak Bhandar 1967.
Crapanzano 1977 Vincent Crapanzano, “Introduction”, in V. Crapanzano and V.
Garrison (eds.), Case Studies in Spirit Possession, Wiley & Sons,
New York 1977, 1-39.
Eigner 2001 Dagmar Eigner, Ritual, Drama, Imagination. Schamanische The-
rapie in Zentralnepal, Wiener Universitätsverlag, Wien 2001.

15
The present age that has been preceded by three others. It is the Black Age in which
bad qualities of people are prominent, prosperity declines, and everything will come
to an end.
388 DAGMAR EIGNER

Gellner 2001 David Gellner, The Anthropology Buddhism and Hinduism: We-
berian Themes, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2001.
Loy 1988 David Loy, Nonduality. A Study in Comparative Philosophy,
Humanity Press, New Jersey 1988.
Peters 1998 Larry Peters, Tamang Shamans. An Ethnopsychiatric Study of
Ecstasy and Healing in Nepal, Nirala Publications, New Delhi
1998.
Pfeiffer 1994 Wolfgang Pfeiffer, Transkulturelle Psychiatrie, Georg Thieme
Verlag, Stuttgart 1994.
Reinhard 1976 Johan Reinhard, “Shamanism and Spirit Possession: The Defini-
tion Problem”, in J. Hitchcock and R. Jones (eds.): Spirit Posses-
sion in the Nepal Himalayas, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi
1976, 12-20.
Scharfetter 1996 Christian Scharfetter, Allgemeine Psychopathologie, Georg
Thieme Verlag, Stuttart 1996.
Scharfetter 2004 Christian Scharfetter, Das Ich auf dem spirituellen Weg, Verlag
Wissenschaft & Praxis, Sternenfeld 2004.
Turner 1989 Victor Turner, Vom Ritual zum Theater. Der Ernst des menschli-
chen Spiels, Qumran, Frankfurt 1989.
Van Gennep Arnold van Gennep, Übergangsriten, Campus, Frankfurt 1986.
1909/1986
 JOHN R. BAKER

Psychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness:

Insights from the Biocultural Perspective

INTRODUCTION
The contributions in this volume attest to both our extraordinary human
abilities to voluntarily enter into altered states of consciousness and to
the sophisticated conceptual frameworks that people draw upon to com-
prehend these states. Although certainly not exhaustive, these papers
demonstrate that a wide variety of techniques for inducing altered states
of consciousness have been developed in both traditional and modern
contexts. They also make it clear that these states can vary both in terms
of the experiences they are associated with and the ways that these ex-
periences are interpreted and understood.
In this paper, I will employ a biocultural perspective as I discuss
a methodology for altering consciousness that is different from all of the
others presented at this symposium: the ingestion of psychedelic sub-
stances. The use of psychedelics may be more ancient than all of the
other techniques for altering consciousness discussed in this volume.
Yet in spite of the widespread use of these substances across cultures
and throughout time, cultural training and individual variation continue
to play as great a role in shaping their effects and outcomes as they do
in the meditative and contemplative traditions. What is more, the fact
that profound altered states of consciousness can be spontaneously in-
duced through exogenous agents as well as through long periods of trai-
ning makes the study of psychedelics very useful for discerning the
roles that cultural expectations and individual characteristics play in
shaping the experiences of an altered state and the ways in which these
experiences will be understood. Moreover, since psychedelic substances
are almost “guaranteed” to produce effects in even naïve individuals,
they can help us to understand the constructive potential that altered
states of consciousness may have for a much wider population than just
390 JOHN R. BAKER

those persons who are both motivated and privileged enough to study
and practice meditation and other similar techniques.

THE BIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

The biocultural perspective is an emerging anthropological paradigm
that aims at developing a more comprehensive framework for under-
standing human life by incorporating biological insights into explana-
tions of sociocultural phenomena. While biological scientists are able to
draw upon the robust explanatory framework provided by neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory when investigating such topics as intras-
pecies cooperation and interspecies competition, researchers who inves-
tigate such cultural phenomena as politics or warfare do not yet have an
equally well-articulated and integrated view of their phenomena at their
disposal. Biological insights offer a way out of this theoretical impasse.
As in the other social and behavioral sciences, many of the theo-
ries developed within anthropology have downplayed or even denied
the role that biological factors play in human social life. This tendency
has its roots in the Enlightenment, when such thinkers as John Locke
argued that the mind of a newborn infant was like an “empty cabinet”
which his or her culture then filled with knowledge (Harris 1968:10-
16). To be sure, there were great differences in opinions as to what kind
of “wood” this empty cabinet may have been made off (contrast the
rather pessimistic perspective that Thomas Hobbes offered on human
nature with the more romanticized view of Jean Jacques Rousseau).
This “enlightened” thinking led to numerous nineteenth century ideas
based upon the general notion of social “progress,” which were framed
(whether implicitly or explicitly) in ways that provided justification for
the imperial, colonial, and missionary activities of the European powers.
The focus on the influences that social and technological complexity,
religious beliefs, and even geographical latitude and climate could have
on human life represent an early emphasis on “nurture” (as opposed to
“nature”) that overlooked the very real biological differences between
individuals. This trend found perhaps its most extreme example in the
recent postmodern movement, whose proponents frequently complain
that efforts to identify the biological bases of human life represent an
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 391

attempt to assert the “hegemony” of science over other, equally legiti-

mate “narratives” about the human condition (cf. McKinley 2000).1
However, ignoring our biology can make it well nigh impossi-
ble to comprehend even quite simple aspects of human life, such as why
different people have different dietary requirements, or why some peo-
ple are more sensitive to sunlight than others. When looking at con-
sciousness, leaving biology out of the picture can make it difficult to
understand why one person can more readily attain a particular state of
consciousness than another, or why changing our mental state may af-
fect our breathing, digestion, and body temperature. Because the biocul-
tural perspective considers both the biological mechanisms and proc-
esses that make human consciousness possible and the cultural tech-
niques and explanatory frameworks that are used to produce and under-
stand any particular consciousness state, it offers a comprehensive and
powerful paradigm for understanding the effects of different techniques
for altering consciousness.
Two biological facts about humans are especially pertinent to
the present discussion: 1) modern humans are descended from animals
that possessed smaller and simpler brains; and 2) humans differ from
one another with respect to numerous micro-features of our brains and
nervous systems. Although these facts may appear to be so basic as to
be trite, they have important implications for the present discussion. In
vertebrates, the brain is the integrative center for almost all nervous
system functions. As vertebrates evolved, their brains acquired increas-
ingly powerful abilities to not only control their bodies, but also to re-
tain memories of past events, learn from present experiences, and con-
template ever more complex scenarios about the future. The diversity
found in the vertebrate subphylum today bears witness to the stages in
which vertebrate brains—and their associated abilities—evolved. Sim-
ple vertebrates, such as the fish and amphibians, possess quite limited
mental abilities, and consequently exhibit a rather narrow spectrum of
behaviors, social groupings, and experiential states. Others, especially
the birds and mammals, are capable of a much wider range of behav-

1
One colleague of mine told me of a conference she had attended in which a shouting
match had erupted between supporters of postmodernist thinking and proponents of
a more empirical view. When one empiricist attempted to introduce genetic evi-
dence in support of his argument, his appalled opponent shouted out “You don’t
really believe in genes, do you?”
392 JOHN R. BAKER

iors, social groups, and experiential states (see Griffin 2001 for a more
detailed discussion).
The ultimate expression of this trend, of course, is the human
brain, which has also acquired the ability to communicate what it has
learned to others. In addition to the macroevolutionary processes that
have made humans distinct from all other animals, the microevolution-
ary processes of random mutation and selection, and the process of in-
dividual development, make each of us distinct from one another. As a
result, every human possesses a somewhat different constellation of
mental qualities, resulting in disparate degrees and types of intelligen-
ces. Because states of consciousness are directly linked to brain func-
tioning, this implies that each of us varies in terms of our abilities to
learn about and enter into altered states of consciousness.

THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Although we commonly speak of “states” of consciousness, this choice
of terms glosses over the ever-changing nature of conscious experience
(cf. Zinberg 1977). Mammalian consciousness shifts between three pri-
mary modalities, each of which in turn consists of a wide range of expe-
riential states: the waking state, REM sleep, and deep sleep. Put simply,
the mammalian waking state is the modality in which animals are able
to actively engage their external world, while REM sleep and deep sleep
allow animals to recover from their exertions and process their waking
experiences.
Within these three primary modalities of consciousness exist
countless subtle variations. In the waking state, we may at one moment
be alert and focused on the task at hand, while the next moment may
find us drowsy and unable to concentrate at all. Even when we are com-
pletely awake, our ability to focus our attention varies, as do the objects
that engage our awareness. These fluctuations in our mental activity
have long been recognized, and some meditative traditions explicitly
aim at taming our “monkey mind,” the tendency of our attention and
awareness to wander (cf. Chodron 1999).
The monkey metaphor raises interesting questions as to how and
when our ancestors first became able to voluntarily induce altered states
of consciousness and to utilize these for constructive purposes. Even
casually observing another animal is sufficient to see that like humans,
it too has periods of activity and quiet, and that the objects that may
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 393

interest it at one moment will be ignored at another. We can assume that

the consciousness of our ancestors, like that of humans and other ani-
mals today, was characterized by similarly alternating periods of alert-
ness and drowsiness, focus and lack of focus. As their intelligence and
self-awareness increased, our ancestors would have needed to be able to
exert some degree of control over these shifts in conscious awareness,
for there would have always been those basic “reality checks” that came
from the external world, whether in the form of predators that they nee-
ded to evade or potential mates that they would have wanted to recog-
nize. The selective pressures coming from the world outside of their
bodies would have been unforgiving, and those individuals who could
not quickly respond to important events in their external world would
have paid with their lives.
Evolutionary fitness is measured by the number of offspring an
individual produces, and therewith the number of genes that the indi-
vidual is able to contribute to the next generation. Clearly, those indi-
viduals that were better able to rapidly disengage from the internal
worlds of deep and REM sleep and face their external worlds in a real-
ity-based manner (that is, one that would benefit their survival and re-
production) would possess advantages over those that were less capable
of doing so. Moreover, as brains increased in size (especially relative to
an animal’s body size), animals became more capable of both process-
ing the information being provided by their senses and to remember
their previous experiences. This led to increases in their abilities to dis-
cern the differences between specific events and to envision alternative
scenarios about both the causes and the implications of these events.
These increases in intelligence, coupled with the development of more
complex social groups in which individuals could observe, interact, and
learn from one another, eventually led to the emergence of culture
(Bonner 1980).
The broad strokes of these evolutionary events are documented
in the fossil record, and we know much about the general sequence in
which they occurred in our own hominid lineage (see, e.g. Johanson
1996). But are these increases in intelligence and social complexity
enough to explain the emergence of the types of consciousness tradi-
tions discussed in this volume? This is not likely. For one thing, all
known contemporary traditions of consciousness alteration rely upon
detailed and nuanced models for describing the effects of the experi-
ences they aim at evoking, and these models are communicated through
394 JOHN R. BAKER

language (examples may be found in the other papers in this volume).

While we will never be able to fully reconstruct the sequence of evolu-
tionary events that led to the appearance of Homo sapiens, the fossil
record clearly indicates that modern humans are descended from smal-
ler brained animals that lived in social groups of about 100 individuals
or less. With brains no larger than those of a modern chimpanzee, and
lacking a system of language like that used by all human groups today,
it is safe to assume that the traditions of consciousness alteration de-
scribed elsewhere in this volume did not—indeed could not—exist until
our ancestors had acquired not only the anatomical features that make
these experiences possible, but had also developed the linguistic abili-
ties that enabled them to describe their experiences to their fellows and
to discuss with one another what these experiences meant.
We do not know when our ancestors first acquired the capacity
for language as we now know it. In all likelihood, a number of steps
were necessary before human language could emerge (see Mithen 1996
for one possible scenario). Lacking language, it would have been im-
possible to develop the explanatory models found in the meditative tra-
ditions discussed in this volume. Without language to teach a person
how to achieve a meditative state, it is likely that the first mystical sta-
tes of consciousness that our ancestors experienced were spontaneous
events.
While extreme activity—including excessive physical exertion,
hunger and thirst, and sleeplessness—may have elicited these events,
there are other possibilities, and these are present in many environments
around the world. The number of plants, fungi, minerals, and even ani-
mals capable of rapidly inducing profoundly altered states of con-
sciousness is unknown, but it is large (see Rätsch 2005). As our forag-
ing ancestors browsed through their environments in search of food and
other resources, they would have occasionally and unavoidably encoun-
tered psychoactive agents. As they gained familiarity with their effects,
they would have learned that some of these agents could help them to
stay awake, others would cause them to fall asleep, and still others were
able to induce experiences unlike any they had ever known. It is this
latter group of agents that may have served as the catalysts that would
eventually lead to the emergence of other techniques for voluntarily
altering consciousness.
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 395

PSYCHEDELICS AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Of all the naturally occurring psychoactive substances, those with the
most profound effects upon consciousness have become known by
many names. Lewis Lewin, the German physician regarded as the father
of modern toxicology, called them “phantastica” (Lewin 1980[1927]).
Some of the other terms that have been put forth include “hallucino-
gens” (Hoffer et a. 1954), “entheogens” (Ruck 1979), and “psychointe-
grators” (Winkelman 1995). In the present context, perhaps the most
appropriate term is “psychedelic”, a term coined in 1956 (Osmund
1957). The word literally means “mind manifesting”, and refers to the
abilities of such substances as LSD, mescaline, and psilocybin to tem-
porarily suspend our normal perceptual and mental functioning while
having little effect upon memory. Visual and other sensory effects are
common, and higher dosages can lead to a complete dissolution of an
individual’s awareness of himself as an individual (producing a sense of
“merging”), an inability to distinguish between perceptions arising from
inside and outside of the body, and the temporary suspension of normal
cognitive and affective interpretations of perceptions.
A wide variety of substances can produce these effects, and the
use of these substances has been documented throughout the world
(Dobkin de Rios 1984, Furst 1990, Schultes 2001). Depending upon
their chemical structure, their mechanisms of action vary considerably.
Some naturally occurring psychedelic substances (such as the tropane
alkaloids) can produce lethal as well as visionary effects. In spite of
such dangers, Datura, Mandragora, Atropa, Nicotiana, and other mem-
bers of the Solanaceae family have been used for shamanic, initiatory,
and other ritual purposes since prehistoric times (cf. Baker 1994, Wil-
bert 1987). The use of such plants reflects both our basic human predi-
lection to enter into altered states and the fact that almost any psychoac-
tive substance can be utilized for personally integrative and culturally
constructive purposes when used appropriately.
The use of the more powerful hallucinogens, such as mescaline
and psilocybin, is also ancient. Ayahuasca, a preparation made by boil-
ing the stems of the Banisteriopsis caapi vine together with the leaves
of the Psychotria viridis bush, has been used by Amazonian tribes for
centuries. The pharmacology of ayahuasca is extraordinary, for sub-
stances present in the caapi vine (Banisteriopsis caapi) inhibit the re-
lease of an enzyme—monoamine oxidase—that normally breaks down
the substances present in the chacruna leaves (Psychotria viridis). The
396 JOHN R. BAKER

potent visionary effects characteristic of ayahuasca can only be

achieved when these two plants are used in combination. When and
how the indigenous peoples of South America first learned to combine
these two plants is unknown, but its use is now so pervasive in the
Amazon basin—and increasingly elsewhere—that ayahuasca may be
the most commonly used psychedelic preparation in the world today
(for more on the history, pharmacology, and psychology of ayahuasca
as well as numerous personal reports, see Metzner 1999).
In contrast to the traditional use of psychedelic substances in
non-western cultures, the modern use of psychedelics in the West has
often been associated with the idea of “bad trips.” One reason is our
long-standing cultural attitudes towards altered states of consciousness
in general, for of all the world’s cultures, those whose roots lie in the
eastern Mediterranean basin are the least likely to have institutionalized
religious traditions of altering consciousness (Bourguignon 1973). To-
day’s western “hallucinophobic” attitude has a long tradition. The pro-
scriptions against “pagan” religions issued by the Emperor Theodosius
in 380 C.E. when he adopted Christianity as the official religion of the
empire suppressed such previously accepted practices as the Eleusinian
and Dionysian Mysteries (or forced them far underground), and resulted
in a loss of knowledge concerning the proper ways to use psychedelic
substances.
During the next sixteen hundred years or so, most European
knowledge about the proper ways to use these substances and exploit
their effects for constructive purposes was lost. Consequently, few were
prepared for the rediscovery of the psychedelic substances that began in
the nineteenth century and accelerated in the twentieth, especially after
the discovery of LSD in the 1940s. Many of the first experiments in
which chemists and other researchers ingested LSD and psilocybin pro-
duced such unanticipated effects that it was thought that these sub-
stances produced a kind of transitory psychotic state (Stoll 1947). The
“psychotomimetic” and “toxic psychosis” models that were developed
to explain these effects led some clinic and hospital administrators to
urge their physicians, nurses, and other attending staff to have experi-
ences with these compounds so that they could gain temporary access
into the worlds that their patients were thought to inhabit on a more or
less permanent basis. It was thought that this would enable these health
care workers to better understand their patients and to develop more
effective methods for treating them. But many of these “normal” people
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 397

noticed that their experiences were completely different from those of

their patients, and it quickly became clear that new models were needed
(see Grob 1994 for a more detailed discussion).
Humphry Osmond, the British psychiatrist who coined the term
“psychedelic”, used LSD to treat psychiatric patients who did not re-
spond to more conventional treatment methods. He and his colleagues
administered extremely high doses (usually once) in order to evoke
experiences that would literally overwhelm their patients and lead them
to reassess their lives (Osmond 1957). This treatment method, which
aimed at essentially bypassing repressed traumatic events and eliciting a
religious “conversion” experience, worked especially well with alcohol-
ics and other patients with rigid personality structures (see also Sher-
wood 1967-68).
In contrast to this largely North American methodology, much
of the clinical work performed in Europe followed a protocol in which a
series of low to medium dosages of a psychedelic agent were adminis-
tered in conjunction with psychoanalysis and group work. This “psy-
cholytic” (literally: “mind dissolving”) approach aimed at peeling back
the layers of personality and memory as if they were an onion, allowing
repressed material to emerge into conscious awareness at a pace and
tempo that could be tolerated by patients. This treatment strategy al-
lowed patients to uncover, understand, and accept the traumatic events
of their past, and gave researchers unanticipated insights into the dy-
namics of the mind (Sandison 1954a; Sandison 1954b; Grof 1976).
In addition to these clinical studies, psychedelic substances were
also given to artists and other persons to assess the impact they might
have on creativity (Dobkin de Rios 2003). As increasing numbers of
people were being exposed to psychedelics, it was only a matter of time
before they would “escape” from the laboratory and make their way to
the streets, where millions of individuals were ultimately able to take
their own psychedelic “trips”. By the early 1960s, the settings in which
psychedelics were used varied enormously, ranging from individual and
small group sessions in natural settings or at home to large scale gather-
ings at parties and concerts. Lacking any traditional contexts for using
these substances, some people were unprepared for the personal and
transpersonal insights that accompanied the spectacular visual and other
sensory effects, and they experienced “bad trips”. Others suffered phy-
sical injury because they were temporarily unable to react appropriately
to external events. Yet for many people, the inner worlds revealed by
398 JOHN R. BAKER

these substances were mysterious and beautiful, and they offered a stark
contrast to the images of violence and destruction that were coming
back from Vietnam and to the crass consumerism and the push for con-
formity that were the legacies of the return to normalcy after World War
II. For many in this group, the vistas revealed by psychedelics sug-
gested alternative ways of living that were quickly perceived as threats
to the existing social order. The psychedelic insights expressed in the
lyrics to the Beatles’ song “All You Need is Love” were matched by
hyperbole from more conservative quarters. For example, C.W. Sandi-
man, who was then serving as the chairman of the New Jersey Narcotic
Drug Study Commission, described LSD as “the greatest threat facing
the [United States] today, … more dangerous than the Vietnam War”
(cited in McGlothlin 1967:42).
Laws were quickly passed that prohibited the manufacturing,
distribution, use, or possession of psychedelic substances. By the mid-
1960s, all legitimate scientific research using psychedelics on human
patients had been curtailed. In spite of a large body of research suggest-
ing that psychedelic experiences can be beneficial for personal and
spiritual growth (e.g., Pahnke 1972, Smith 2000, Winkelman 2007),
most people in the West continue to view psychedelics in a highly nega-
tive light. Clearly, the influence of cultural attitudes about altered states
remains powerful.

CULTURAL CONTEXTS: SACRAMENTS VS. SACRAMENTALS

If we recall the role that culture plays in such mundane aspects of hu-
man life as what types of things can be eaten or when a person may
engage in sexual activities, it should not be surprising that cultures also
have something to say about what states of consciousness are allowed
and what these states mean. The cultural context in which psychedelics
are used is one of the most important variables for understanding their
effects. To distinguish between the use of psychedelics in societies that
permit and even encourage their use from the use that occurs in socie-
ties in which such use is proscribed, it is useful to differentiate psyche-
delic “sacraments” from psychedelic “sacramentals” (Baker 2005).
In spite of their profound effects upon consciousness, the “ma-
jor” psychedelic agents (psilocybin, mescaline, LSD, ayahuasca) have
few adverse effects upon a person’s physical health. Indeed, unless a
person has serious psychological issues, the most dangerous aspect of
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 399

psychedelic use has to do with the possibility of a person harming them-

selves while he or she is unable to perceive or understand the outside
world, and with the potential legal consequences that can result from the
possession and use of these substances. In contrast, traditional societies
both respect these substances and provide supervision for novices, both
to prevent harm and to help them deal with any issues that may arise
while they are in an altered state. In such societies, the first use of a
psychedelic substance often has an initiatory quality, and experienced
users coach novices about the types of experiences they should expect.
Armed with a detailed “map” of the worlds they will be entering, con-
vinced of the significance of their experiences, and supervised while
they are in the altered state, a novice’s fears can be allayed and positive
outcomes become more likely.
In societies which have little or no understanding of psychedelic
substances, or which view them with fear and suspicion, psychedelic
use tends to occur clandestinely, and users typically have no guides. As
they explore their new worlds, they must find their own way through
the tangle of their visions, thoughts, and emotions. The emergence of
repressed memories or a vision of an unexpected nature may evoke ter-
ror in a user, and any issues that are not resolved during the acute
phases of the psychedelic experience may emerge later as a “flash
back.” In spite of these possibilities, many people in such societies have
experiences that provide personal insights that they interpret as benefi-
cial (cf. Stolaroff 1999).
When the use of a psychedelic substance occurs in an accepting
and supportive context that promotes the importance of the experiences
for both the individual and society, we may refer to such use as a “sac-
rament.” Thus, both the ancient mysteries of Demeter that were carried
out for centuries at Eleusis (Wasson 1998) and the contemporary use of
peyote among both the Huichol Indians of Mexico (Myerhoff 1974) and
the members of the Native American Church (Stewart 1987) may be
considered to be psychedelic sacraments. They are sacraments because
they occur in culturally sanctioned ritual settings, and novice users are
provided with a shared cultural framework that enables them to antici-
pate what they will experience and to understand their experiences once
they have passed. Under such conditions, the use of psychedelic sub-
stances is considered beneficial and aids in integrating the individual
into their society.
400 JOHN R. BAKER

In contrast, the use of psychedelic substances in societies which

prohibit their use can lead a person to question that society’s value sys-
tem if he or she has an experience different from that which they have
been taught to expect. Any rituals or interpretational models that may
surround such use will tend to be either personal in nature or be shared
by only a small group of individuals. Although the individual may find
their experiences beneficial, the larger cultural context will not agree.
Under such conditions, idiosyncratic interpretations of psychedelic ex-
periences are common, and these interpretations may not lead to greater
social cohesion. It is for these reasons that I have used the term “sacra-
mental” to distinguish these contexts of use from their more traditional
and accepting counterparts (Baker 2005).
The western emphasis upon individual development—often at
the expense of other members of the group—stands in stark contrast to
the emphasis traditional societies place upon integrating the individual
within the group. In and of themselves, psychedelic agents do not pro-
mote anti-social attitudes. It is the context in which they are used that
determines whether the experiences may lead to social cohesion or
fragmentation. A society that can accurately describe and teach its
members to safely navigate through the visionary worlds revealed by
psychedelics will minimize the possibility that these members will re-
sort to “counter”- (or even “anti”-) social interpretations for these ex-
periences. A society that tells its members that these experiences are
illusory or have no meaning risks having its members question its other
values as well.

THE UNIQUE NATURE OF ALL ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The “sacrament”/”sacramental” distinction underscores the role that
cultural expectations play in shaping the experiences and interpretation
of an altered state. The idea that some people are more susceptible to
“bad trips” because of repressed traumas or other personal, biographical
factors points to the role that may be played by individual psychological
differences. Moreover, it is likely that basic genetic (and thus molecu-
lar) differences between individuals also play a role in determining sen-
sitivity to psychedelic substances. For example, the effects of LSD are
known to be at least partially related to a specific type of serotonin re-
ceptor site known as 5-HT5a (Grailhe 1999), and the gene which codes
for this protein is polymorphic in humans (i.e., it has more than one
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 401

expression). Studies have been conducted into the role that this genetic
variation may play in schizophrenia (Iwata 2001) and in major depres-
sion and bipolar disorders (Arias 2001), but the results have been equi-
vocal. Yet just as psychedelic substances exhibit affinities to specific
receptor sites, it is likely that structural differences in those receptors
may affect the uptake of these substances and therewith the extent to
which their effects will be elicited.
My aim here is not to provide an overview of the physiological
mechanisms involved in psychedelic activity, but to point out that the
variation which humans exhibit at the molecular level is also likely to
shape the experiences elicited by psychedelic agents. Thus, the un-
avoidable genetic and psychological uniqueness of each individual sug-
gests that the experiences a person has while in a psychedelic state will
always be somewhat different than those of another individual, even
when the same psychedelic substance is being used at the same time in
the same cultural context. The American anthropologist Anthony F.C.
Wallace has described culture as a system that organizes the diversity of
human views of reality (Wallace 2003). Thus, in traditional societies,
the preparatory phase in which novices learn to interpret and anticipate
their experiences will help to channel their experiences into similar
courses, yet there will always be some individual idiosyncrasies in these
experiences. But in societies that do not provide such preparation, an
individual’s experiences while in a psychedelic state are much more
likely to diverge from those of her fellows, and idiosyncratic interpreta-
tions are far more likely as well.
Moreover, since each psychedelic substance has its own unique
chemical structure, each of these substances will affect the nervous sys-
tem in a different way and elicit a unique state of consciousness. The
constant changes in the neural “wiring” in an individual as well as the
role of experience also suggest that no two psychedelic states of con-
sciousness can ever be identical. Even in the same person, prior experi-
ence (or lack thereof) will shape the ways in which a psychedelic ses-
sion unfolds. Although we speak of consciousness “states”, in reality
consciousness is fluid.
402 JOHN R. BAKER

THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHEDELICS FOR UNDERSTANDING

MEDITATION AND YOGIC PERCEPTION
Although this paper has focused on the use of psychedelics, I believe
that the points it raises apply to consciousness in general, and to medita-
tion and yogic perception in particular. All organisms must be able to
pay some attention to the world around them, and their ability (or in-
ability) to do so has been a potent evolutionary selective force. Yet
normal mammalian functioning also depends upon an animal being able
to periodically withdraw from the outer world, both to restore the body
and to process mental events. Meditative techniques represent a new
and uniquely human way of withdrawing from the outer world. While
meditative traditions differ in terms of the techniques they utilize and
the ways in which they are interpreted and understood, all involve shifts
in consciousness away from the normal ways in which humans interact
with the external world.
As with psychedelic substances, cultural training and personal
histories will affect an individual’s abilities to enter into and learn from
meditative experiences. This fact has been recognized by many medita-
tive traditions and conceptualized in manners consonant with the other
assumptions of the cultures in which they arose. According to the Hindu
and Buddhist traditions that are the primary focus of this volume, for
example, it may take many lifetimes for an individual to overcome their
negative karma and achieve a birth that is conducive to attaining mok-
sha or nirvana. This negative karma is said to be the result of past
thoughts and actions. What such traditions have not considered—at
least as far as I am aware—is the role that what we now call genetic
factors may play in shaping a person’s mood, intelligence, or memory.
What makes the study of psychedelics particularly interesting in
the context of this volume is that they explicitly remind us of the role
that even small-scale molecular processes can play in the large-scale
picture of human consciousness. It is for this reason that I am arguing
that a comprehensive understanding of any type of methodology for
altering consciousness must consider not only the cultural assumptions
associated with that methodology, but also the insights offered by biol-
ogy. In other words, consciousness is a product of processes that occur
from the “bottom up” as well as the “top down.” Understanding con-
sciousness requires that we look at both.
Psychedelic substances also provide us with another important
lesson. Unlike most meditative and contemplative traditions, which
 PSYCHEDELICS, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 403

demand that practitioners devote extended periods to learning and

gradually refining their abilities, the effects of psychedelic agents are
rapid in their onset and almost impossible to overlook. Psychedelics
offer a short-term “break” from normal reality that a person can easily
work into their schedule. Consequently, they have the potential to “de-
mocratize” consciousness by making it possible for large numbers of
people to explore the worlds that exist within them and to examine and
refine their conceptions and attitudes about the world. How helpful it
would be if our cultures would provide us with both an accepted means
and an accurate map for exploring these worlds.

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 SHULAMITH KREITLER

Altered States of Consciousness as Structural Variations

of the Cognitive System

ABSTRACT
The chapter presents a new approach to defining consciousness in terms
of an innovative theory of meaning (Kreitler & Kreitler). Most of the
existing approaches to consciousness are based on the assumption that
differences in consciousness consist primarily in degrees of awareness,
so that it may seem superfluous to dwell on the characterization of vari-
ous so-called alternate states of consciousness (SOCs). However, an
analysis of different SOCs reveals several major dimensions in which
they differ, e.g., status of the ”I” or sense of control. The new approach
is cognitive and is based on the theory of meaning which deals with the
contents and processes underlying cognitive functioning. The major
thesis is that SOCs are a function of encompassing changes in the cog-
nitive system brought about by specific organizational transformations
in the meaning system. Structural changes of this kind may affect cogni-
tive functioning, personality manifestations, mood and affect, as well as
physiological processes. The new approach may enable matching of
cognitive tasks to adequate SOCs, the production of SOCs by self-
controlled cognitive means, and even the definition of new SOCs.

DEMYSTIFYING CONSCIOUSNESS
According to Dennett (1991: 21) “human consciousness is just about the
last surviving mystery”, whereby mystery he defines as a phenomenon
that people do not know how to think about and where to look for an-
swers about it. This paper is designed to make a contribution to demys-
tifying consciousness by embedding it in a relevant context, which may
inspire thoughts about consciousness, and possibly the basic compo-
nents for a new theory of consciousness (Kreitler 1999; 2001; 2002).
408 SHULAMITH KREITLER

CONSCIOUSNESS AND AWARENESS

Any survey of the common definitions of consciousness readily reveals
that most of them tend to equate consciousness with the mental state of
awareness (Sutherland 1995; Dennett 1996). This conception has its
origins in the approaches to consciousness prior to Freud (Whyte 1962:
17ff) and has been adopted and developed by Freud and the psychody-
namically oriented psychologists (Freud 1981).
According to this approach consciousness is considered as a
property that varies along one continuum, best described in terms of the
triarchic set ‘conscious,’ ‘preconscious’ and ‘unconscious.’ The contin-
uum is mostly positioned perpendicularly, with consciousness charac-
terizing its upper end, unconsciousness its lower end, and preconscious-
ness holding a middle position, in between the extremes. The upper end
of the continuum represents ordinary consciousness, with its highly
valued qualities of awareness and clarity, to which other similarly val-
ued characteristics became attached, mainly logical reasonable thinking,
control of drives and emotions, the power of volition, reality-orientation
and self-regulation of behavior. The lower end of the continuum stands
for the various altered states of consciousness (SOCs). Since awareness
was considered as the major property of consciousness, it did not make
much sense to dwell on the characteristics of the various altered states
of consciousness, all of which seemed to be characterized by low or
fuzzy awareness. Differences among SOCs were dealt with, if at all, in
terms of the external stimuli or triggers, such as drugs, alcohol or hyp-
notic induction.
Psychodynamically oriented theoreticians may differ in the de-
scriptions they provide of the contents of the unconscious. Thus, ac-
cording to the Freudians (Freud 1981) the contents are mainly sexual
and aggressive drives and personally repressed issues, whereas accord-
ing to the Jungians (Jung 1982) they also include collectively shared
archetypes of structures and meanings of general importance for human
beings. But differences in contents of this kind did not lead these theo-
reticians to attribute psychological importance to differences among
SOCs that have been experienced and documented by many people and
peoples.
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 409

MULTIPLE PHENOMENA
The assumption that consciousness is characterized mainly by aware-
ness leads to a unidimensional conception of consciousness. This ap-
proach seems to be too narrow and may result in an erroneous concep-
tualization of the problems of consciousness.
Our first step towards a different approach would be considering
the phenomena that are relevant for consciousness. The literature and
documentation of consciousness contain a long list of concepts, labels,
descriptions, or terms denoting SOCs (e.g., Barber, Spanos & Chaves
1974; Blackmore 2004; Eliade 1964; Fischer 1978; Foulkes 1990; Ha-
bel, O’Donoghue & Maddox 1993; Harrison 1989; Kakar 1992; Orn-
stein 1977; Riboli 2000; Singer & Antrobus 1972; Wulff 2000; Zuck-
erman 1969). Let us mention at least some of the major ones.
A regular textbook or encyclopedia mentions SOCs that can
come about through physical disorders, such as indigestion, fever, ni-
trogen narcosis (deep diving), a traumatic accident or deprivation of
food or water or sleep or oxygen; states induced by meditation, prayer,
or techniques bound with specific disciplines (such as Mantra Medita-
tion, Sufism, Yoga, Surat Shabbda Yoga); intoxication states induced
by psychoactive substances or opioids (e.g., LSD, mescaline, heroin,
marijuana, MDMA or ecstasy, psychedelic mushrooms, datura or jim-
son weed, peyote, ketamin, ayahuasca, DXM or dextromethorphan,
amphetamines, cocaine, including perhaps also the lower-grade ones,
such as nicotine, caffeine and Ritalin or methylphenidate); states in-
duced by sensory deprivation (also called floating tank, sensory attenua-
tion tank or Restricted Environmental Stimulation Therapy or Floatation
REST); states induced by physical means, such as postures, dancing or
breathing exercises; mental disorder states, such as mania or psychosis;
states bound with hypnosis, self-hypnosis or guided imagery; sleep,
dreaming, lucid dreaming, and transitional states between sleep and
wakefulness (hypnagogic and hypnopompic, false awakening, and sleep
paralysis); drunkenness (e.g., induced by the consumption of alcohol);
states induced by shamanistic practices, including music and drugs;
mystical experiences; oceanic experience; psychological states like
flow, as well as intense emotional states (e.g., fear or panic, love, anger,
sadness or depression); peak experiences; trance states including rapture
or religious ecstasy, Samadhi, “possession” and “channeling”; and the
state often produced by immersion in a crowd.
410 SHULAMITH KREITLER

The list that uses the terms commonly applied in this context
presents a mixture of several points of view. The main ones are (a) con-
tents that characteristically appear in the described states (e.g., mystical
experiences), (b) conditions under which the states characteristically
occur (e.g., sleep, mental disorders, physical state of deprivation, sen-
sory deprivation), (c) techniques used for inducing particular states
(e.g., meditation, hypnosis, shamanistic practices, music, dancing), and
(d) chemical or other substances applied as triggers (e.g., psychoactive
drugs, alcohol, stimulants). Sometimes the category of chemical sub-
stances is further subdivided into classes of drugs in line with their gen-
eral effects, such as stimulants, opioids, psychedelics, dissociatives and
delirants.
It is possible that one or more of the states categorized under
one of the four major headings is similar to or identical with a state
categorized under a completely different heading, for example, a state
induced by hypnosis and a state triggered by a certain drug.
This unclarity calls for a new attempt to construct a taxonomy of
the different SOCs which would enable productive research considering
the whole range of observed variations.

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
Several approaches are possible to the issue of setting up a taxonomy of
SOCs. Those of potentially greatest interest are the psychological and
the physiological ones. The psychological approach to be applied here
has the advantages of being closer to the phenomenological-experiential
level of SOCs and of being based at present on a larger store of infor-
mation than the physiological one is. It may be hoped that in the future
the two sets of characterization will be combined.
The psychological approach proposed here consists in defining a
set of dimensions, each of which may get different values. It is expected
that this approach will result in the characterization of each state of con-
sciousness by a profile of values along each of the dimensions. The first
part of the task is to define the relevant dimensions.
There are several proposals of dimensions for mapping the con-
sciousness phenomena. One often applied dimension refers to the con-
tinuum from the outer being to the inner being and is rooted apparently
in different mystical traditions including the Indian, Jewish (Kabala,
Hassidism) and European (Gooch 1972; Lilly 1972). It is often de-
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 411

scribed in metaphorical terms as representing a variety of axes, the main

ones being from the subjective to the objective, the personal to the im-
personal, the illusory to the absolutely true, the material to the spiritual,
and the temporary to the constant. Two other proposals are often
quoted. Tart (1975) suggested two orthogonal dimensions of irrational-
ity and of the ability to hallucinate, which define the locations of three
clusters labeled REM dreaming, lucid dreaming and ordinary con-
sciousness. Fischer (1978) proposed two dimensions fanning to the
sides from one origin: one along the perception-hallucination continuum
of increasing ergotropic arousal (of the sympathetic nervous system),
which describes a gradual turning inward toward a mental dimension
while turning away from the physical arousal, and includes creative,
psychotic, and ecstatic experiences; and another dimension along the
perception-meditation continuum of increasing trophotropic arousal,
which includes the hypoaroused states of Zazen and Yoga Samadhi.
To our mind these proposals are inadequate. The axis from the
outer to inward reality is overly general and vulnerable to metaphorical
expansion and fuzziness; irrationality and ability to hallucinate are both
cognitive characteristics and do not seem sufficient to cover the whole
variety of experiential phenomena, beyond the three clusters discussed
by Tart; the two dimensions of ergotropic and trophotropic arousal de-
fine in fact one dimension of arousal and is also too limited in scope.
The following dimensions are based on preliminary investiga-
tions and present an attempt to do justice to the field in psychological
terms. They emphasize aspects of the phenomena that, on the one hand,
are sufficiently close to the observed characteristics to have at least face
validity, but, on the other hand, have the potential to account for charac-
teristics that may not be directly observable, so that they have construct
validity. It will be noted that the dimensions refer to specific psycho-
logical variables.
The listed dimensions do not stem from any specific psycho-
logical theory and may match different theoretical approaches. Further,
none of the dimensions was defined in view of one specific state of con-
sciousness, so that they all apply to all the different SOCs. At present
there are 9 dimensions, but the number may change somewhat in the
future. Brief definitions and examples will follow the presentation of
each dimension.
412 SHULAMITH KREITLER

1. Salience and status of the “I”. This dimension describes the role,
salience and status of the I in the different SOCs. In ordinary con-
sciousness the I is experienced as the major agent of all actions, clearly
delineated and differentiated from external reality, in charge of all its
components, which include also the body. It functions actually as “the
measure of all things”. In dream states the I is not always prominent,
and often occupies a secondary role in the fringes; in hypnosis the I may
relinquish its ruling status and transfer it to another agent, such as the
hypnotizer; in an oceanic experience the I may experience a sense of
connectedness to everything in the vicinity or even a feeling of “one-
ness” with all beings; in shamanistic states the I may even give up its
existence and get transformed into the shapes or functions of other be-
ings, human or animal; and even in a state of immersion in a crowd
situation the individual may lose the sense of one’s self.
2. Sense of control and ability to control. The strength of the sense of
control and the domains in regard to which control is exercised or felt to
be viable differ in the various SOCs. Thus, in ordinary consciousness
the individual may feel having control of oneself and one’s behavior as
well as over the closer environment, but neither over physiological
processes within one’s body nor over reality at large. In some dream
states a person may feel having control over external reality (e.g.,
changing some parts of reality); and in hypnosis - over physiological
processes, if the instructions are adequately given. In other SOCs one
may experience loss of control over one’s muscles and ability to move
(e.g., ‘false awakening’) or in contrast experience the ability to fly (e.g.,
shamanistic flights).
3. Clarity of thought. Clarity of thought, sharpness of attention, and
ability to concentrate and to focus when performing any cognitive act
vary from one SOC to another, regardless of the contents of the
thoughts. Clarity is increased in the states of inspiration as for example
in “Flow” and after ingesting stimulants, but it is decreased in states of
fatigue, disorders of metabolism, liver, kidneys, lungs, or heart as well
as following toxic exposure, carbon dioxide or opioid toxicity.
4. Precision of perception in regard to external reality and envi-
ronment. Precision of reality perception is fairly good in ordinary con-
sciousness, but it is impaired for example in states of sleep or intoxica-
tion due to alcohol ingestion or certain drugs, when even the perception
of constancies is transformed and time and place disorientation may
follow. The hallucinogenic drugs produce hallucinations that impair
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 413

external reality perception. In other states it may be enhanced, as for

example in depression or increased fear, especially in regard to the
threatening stimuli. In some SOCs due to the ingestion of certain drugs
there is an enhanced perception of colors and sounds of music, but fol-
lowing other drugs (e.g., LSD) there may be dramatic changes in per-
ception.
5. Precision of perception in regard to internal reality and envi-
ronment. In some SOCs there may be an enhanced perception of inner
states, physiological or others (sometimes called intuitions), as in hyp-
nosis or specific types of meditation, whereas in other SOCs there may
be complete dissociation from the inner and bodily processes.
6. Emotional involvement. The different SOCs differ greatly in the
amount and direction of emotional involvement. Some SOCs are char-
acterized by low degree of emotionality, sometimes to the point of dis-
sociation. In other SOCs there is a tendency toward intensified emo-
tions, as in a crowd situation with a “charismatic” leader, or after inges-
tion of certain drugs. The evoked emotions may be positive (following
the ecstasy drug) or negative (e.g., fear, anxiety, disorientation).
7. Arousal. Basically this dimension describes the differences in arousal
that characterize SOCs, which may range from peaks of hyperarousal
(e.g., following a leader in a crowd situation, ecstatic experiences, or
psychosis) to low level of hypoarousal (e.g., dream states, following the
ingestion of sedatives).
8. Kind of cognitive processes activated. A large body of data indi-
cates that SOCs differ greatly in the cognitive processes that are promi-
nent or weak while they last. Thus, some SOCs are characterized by
logical and systematic thinking, primarily verbal (e.g., ordinary con-
sciousness); some – by creativity (perhaps LSD; and other SOCs – by
imagial (imaginative?) integrative thinking that produces connections
and relations between different themes or domains (e.g., night dreams).
9. Accessibility and inhibition of certain kinds of information
(kinds of and amount). This dimension focuses on accessibility of in-
formation. In no SOC is all available information also accessible. In
ordinary consciousness the accessible information refers primarily to
the external interpersonally shared reality that is socially and culturally
confirmed and approved. The inaccessible information refers mostly to
personal information of a threatening nature, emotions, often the nega-
tive ones, as well as drives and wishes that are classified as taboo in
one’s culture, or traumatic experiences and memories that are bound to
414 SHULAMITH KREITLER

significant figures in one’s life. Basically, all the inaccessible informa-

tion is of the kind viewed as “unconscious” by the psychodynamic ap-
proaches. In dream states the accessible information refers to personal
emotions and experiences of the kind labeled as unconscious in ordinary
consciousness, while the inaccessible information refers to external and
interpersonally shared reality. In drug induced states, such as following
the ingestion of ayahuasca information referring to spiritual and reli-
gious themes is apparently accessible while the information referring to
external and interpersonally-shared reality is inaccessible. In a state of
being in love the accessible information includes all the good qualities
of the beloved one and those that express optimism in general, but all
the weaker features pointed to mostly by others are inaccessible.
The presented dimensions were selected for their relative gener-
ality and ability to account for other psychological phenomena that dif-
fer among the SOCs but could be derived from one of the dimensions or
a combination of several dimensions, whereby both higher and lower
values on the relevant dimensions need to be considered. Thus, for ex-
ample, suggestibility could be derived from low values in Dimension 3,
“Out-of-the-Body” experiences are likely to be facilitated by low values
on Dimension 1, when the strongly delineated boundaries of personal
identity are weakened. High values on Dimension 1 are involved in I-
Thou relations and empathy for others (but not identification) that re-
quire clarity and stability of the personal identity. Telepathy and para-
psychological effects also require the activation of values on specific
dimensions, most likely high values on Dimensions 9 and 5. All the
effects that are presented as dependent on one or more dimensions may
be considered as derivatives or secondary manifestations of the dimen-
sions.
Some of the derivatives are more complex because they seem to
depend on a combination of several values of several dimensions. One
example is healing power, actual or virtual. There is evidence that in
some SOCs the individuals report experiencing being endowed with a
healing power, which may be illusory or actual (e.g., shamanistic states,
mystical experiences). One may surmise that in specific SOCs the sense
of this particular power is more likely to be evoked or elicited than in
others. Dimensions that are probably involved include low values on
Dimension 1, high on Dimensions 5, 6 and 9. The second example is
specific scientific disciplines. It seems that specific sciences thrive more
or better under specific SOCs than under others. For example, psychol-
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 415

ogy as a science requires among others a high value on Dimension 1

given that its basic unit of inquiry is the human individual; the life sci-
ences require high values on Dimensions 3 and 4; while mathematics
requires also high values on Dimension 5.

Table 1: Schematic presentation of dimensional profiles of four SOCs

Dimensions Ordinary Con- Hypnosis Dreams Ecstatic state

sciousness
Status of the I High Medium Low High
Control High Low Low Low
Clarity High Low Low Low
External High Low Low Low
reality
Internal Low High High Medium
reality
Emotion Medium Medium High High
Arousal Medium Medium Low High
Thinking Logical Imagial Paralogical Unsystematic
Information External High External Low External Low Low
Internal Low Internal High Internal High

The dimensions could be used for setting up profiles characterizing

different SOCs. (See Table 1 for examples). At present some of the
profiles may be incomplete due to missing information. The dimensions
may also be helpful in organizing the different SOCs into clusters on the
basis of similarities among them in several of the dimensions. A taxon-
omy of this kind could promote the efforts of matching the psychologi-
cal characteristics present and future physiological information about
processes mediating the psychological phenomena. A further use of the
profiles could be that they would help in devising additional elicitation
procedures for the different SOCs (in line with the specific values on
the dimensions). Another advantage is that the profiles could promote
diagnosing specific benefits and risks of the different SOCs. For exam-
ple, some SOCs are characterized by highly accurate perception of ex-
ternal reality, whereas other SOCs may be characterized by enhanced
fantasy functioning. The former SOC would seem to be adequate for
tasks such as monitoring screens for detecting the earliest signs of dan-
416 SHULAMITH KREITLER

gerous weather changes, whereas the latter SOC would be more ade-
quate for tasks such as producing creative advertisement. Most impor-
tantly, the profiles could help in selecting the appropriate SOC for per-
forming a particular task, if the means and procedures for eliciting the
diverse SOCs are under our control (see Kreitler 2002).

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION

An examination of the different dimensions and the range of effects that
they represent reveal a large number of phenomena that are affected by
changes in SOCs. Some investigators treat the changed aspects as one
package and lump them together under a general term, such as “mental
functioning” (Tart 1972: 1203). Others (Farthing 1992) provide a de-
tailed list of the domains in which changes take place: attention, percep-
tion, imagery and fantasy, inner speech, memory, higher-level thought
processes, meaning and significance, time perception, emotional feeling
and expression, arousal, self-control, suggestibility, body image, sense
of personal identity. Despite its length it is unlikely that the list is com-
plete. Notably missing are effects in the domain of behavior, including
motor actions, and physiological processes.
However it may be, scanning the list, even though it is partial,
raises the question of what kind of system in the living organism could
be responsible for such a diversity of effects? There is only one system
that could be considered as a candidate for this role. At least at present,
on the psychological level cognition is the only system that has been
shown capable to promote, originate, enable and affect phenomena in
all the named domains, ranging from perception to behavior, including
all the cognitive processes, emotions, and personality traits.
There are a great many indications in the writings about con-
sciousness that suggest the intimate relations that have long been noted
between consciousness and cognition. Many investigators have noted
that consciousness and changes in consciousness affect cognition. For
example, ordinary consciousness promotes learning new and complex
material (Baars & McGovern 1996: 74-75; Hardcastle 1995); a hypnotic
state intensifies the individual’s imaginative processes (Barber, Spanos
& Chaves 1974). Others considered cognition as the object of con-
sciousness, so that consciousness has been described as referring to
contents contained in ‘primary memory’ (a kind of short-term working
store) defining the ‘psychological present’ (James 1890/1950). Another
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 417

conceptualization emphasizes cognition as the antecedent, condition or

cause for consciousness (Mandler 1984). Most prevalent is the concep-
tion of cognition as the function of consciousness, evident in regard to a
specific cognitive subsystem, e.g., episodic memory (Tulving 1983), or
the majority of cognitive processes (Baars 1988: chap. 10).
The close interrelatedness of consciousness with cognitive proc-
esses and contents encourages attempts to construct cognitive theories
of consciousness. Some of the better known ones have been proposed
by investigators of different theoretical orientations (e.g., Baars 1988;
Johnson-Laird 1988; Kihlstrom 1993; Nastoulas 1994; Velmans 1996).
However, these attempts have been limited in the scope of their contri-
butions to the understanding of consciousness, mainly because of sev-
eral assumptions they share concerning consciousness and cognition.
One major assumption concerns the unidimensional character of
consciousness, conceived solely in terms of a continuum denoting dif-
ferences in clarity and awareness. As noted, this assumption leads to
disregarding differences between the SOCs, lumping all those that are
characterized by apparently lower awareness under the heading of “un-
conscious states”. Another important assumption concerns the consid-
eration of cognition as a set of subsystems, each reflecting one of the
standard functions, such as memory, attention or problem solving. Other
functions, including dreaming or daydreaming are mostly overlooked as
well as the underlying substratum that may maintain the functioning of
all of the separate subsystems. According to this approach, conscious-
ness is distinct from cognition, which it may however affect. More im-
portantly, changes in consciousness are viewed as mediated by agents
external to consciousness, or for that matter, to cognition (e.g., physio-
logical phenomena, drugs) and are not themselves cognitive.
These assumptions, one or more of which may be implicit, have
resulted in too narrow conceptualizations of both cognition and
consciousness, which do not suffice for a comprehensive theory.
Despite these critical remarks, cognition is the context we
suggest as relevant for the comprehension and study of consciousness.
We will outline a blueprint for a new cognitive approach to conscious-
ness that is based on other assumptions. According to this new approach
consciousness and cognition are considered as inextricably bound
together. Though distinct, one cannot be described satisfactorily without
the other. Further, consciousness is viewed as a characterization of the
cognitive system as a whole, not just of this or another part of it. It
418 SHULAMITH KREITLER

expresses or manifests something that inheres in or depends on the

totality of the cognitive system. The cognitive system itself is conceptu-
alized as including not only processes (e.g., abstracting, categorizing),
as is commonly assumed, but also contents (e.g., memories, informa-
tions) which are involved in the performance of all cognitive functions,
both the standard ones (e.g., memory, problem solving) as well as the
not yet standard ones (e.g., dreaming). All these assumptions derive
from the basic conceptualization that cognition is a psycho-semantic
system, namely, it is a meaning-processing and meaning-processed
system, or in more specific terms, it is a system that produces, assigns,
stores, retrieves, transforms, applies and elaborates meaning. This
assumption will become clearer after the next section that deals with
defining meaning and illustrating its role in cognition.

MEANING AND COGNITION

The theory of meaning is based on a large body of data and empirical
studies (Kreitler & Kreitler 1988; 1990a; 1993b). Meaning is defined as
a referent-centered pattern of cognitive contents. Referent is the input,
the carrier of meaning, which can be anything, including a word, an
object, a situation, an event, or even a whole period, whereas meaning
values are cognitive contents assigned to the referent for the purpose of
expressing or communicating its meaning. For example, if the referent
is ‘Town,’ responses such as ‘includes buildings’ or ‘it is bigger than a
village’ represent two different meaning values. The referent and the
meaning value together form a meaning unit (e.g., Town – includes
buildings).
Five sets of variables are used for characterizing the meaning
unit (see Table 2): (a) Meaning Dimensions, which characterize the
contents of the meaning values from the viewpoint of the specific
information communicated about the referent, such as the referent's
Sensory Qualities (e.g., Grass - green), Feelings and Emotions it evokes
(e.g., Storm - scary) or experiences (e.g., I - love my sister), Range of
Inclusion (e.g., Body - the head, arms, torso and legs); (b) Types of
Relation, which characterize the immediacy of the relation between the
referent and the cognitive contents, for example, attributive (e.g.,
Summer - warm), comparative (e.g., Summer - warmer than spring),
exemplifying instance (e.g., Country - the U.S.); (c) Forms of Relation,
which characterize how the relation between the referent and the
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 419

cognitive contents is regulated, in terms of its validity (positive or

negative; e.g., Yoga - is not a religion), quantification (absolute, partial;
Apple - sometimes red), and form (factual, desired or desirable; Law -
should be obeyed, Money - I wish I had more); (d) Referent Shifts,
which characterize the relation between the referent and the presented
input, or - in a chain of responses to some input - the relation between
the referent and the previous one, for example, the referent may be
identical to the input or the previous referent, it may be its opposite, or a
part of it, or even apparently unrelated to it (e.g., when the stimulus is
“U.S.” and the response is “I love New York,” the response refers to a
part of the stimulus) ; (e) Forms of Expression, which characterize the
forms of expression of the meaning units (e.g., verbal, denotational,
graphic) and its directness (e.g., actual gesture or verbal description of
gesture) (Kreitler & Kreitler 1990a).

Table 2: Major Variables of the Meaning System: The Meaning

Variables

MEANING DIMENSIONS FORMS OF RELATION

Dim. Contextual Allocation FR 1 Propositional (1a: Positive; 1b: Nega-
1 tive)
Dim. Range of Inclusion (2a: FR 2 Partial (2a: Positive; 2b: Negative)
2 Sub-classes; 2b: Parts)
Dim. Function, Purpose & FR 3 Universal (3a: Positive; 3b: Negative)
3 Role
Actions & Potentialities FR 4 Conjunctive (4a: Positive; 4b: Negative)
Dim.
for Actions (4a: by
4
referent; 4b: to referent)
Dim. Manner of Occurrence FR 5 Disjunctive (5a: Positive; 5b: Negative)
5 & Operation
Dim. Antecedents & Causes FR 6 Normative (6a: Positive; 6b: Negative)
6
Dim. Consequences & Re- FR 7 Questioning (7a: Positive; 7b: Negative)
7 sults
Dim. Domain of Application FR 8 Desired, wished (8a: Positive; 8b:
8 (8a: as subject; 8b: as Negative)
object)
420 SHULAMITH KREITLER

Dim. Material SHIFT IN REFERENTB

9
Dim. Structure SR 1 Identical
10
Dim. State & Possible change SR 2 Opposite
11 in it
Dim. Weight & Mass SR 3 Partial
12
Dim. Size & Dimensionality SR 4 Modified by addition
13
Dim. Quantity & Mass SR 5 Previous meaning value
14
Dim. Locational Qualities SR 6 Association
15
Dim. Temporal Qualities SR 7 Unrelated
16
Dim. Possessions (17a) & SR 8 Verbal label
17 Belongingness (17b)
Dim. Development SR 9 Grammatical variation
18
Dim. Sensory Qualities (19a: SR 10 Previous meaning values com-
19 of referent; 19b: by bined
referent)
Dim. Feelings & Emotions SR 11 Superordinate
20 (20a: evoked by refer-
ent; 20b: felt by refer-
ent)
Dim. Judgments & Evalua- SR 12 Synonym (12a: in original
21 tions (21a: about refer- language; 12b: translated in
ent; 21b: by referent) another language; 12c: label in
another medium; 12d a differ-
ent formulation for the same
referent on the same level)
Dim. Cognitive Qualities SR 13 Replacement by implicit
22 (22a: evoked by refer- meaning value
ent; 22b: of referent)
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 421

TYPES OF RELATIONa FORMS OF EXPRESSION

TR 1 Attributive (1a: Quali- FE 1 Verbal (1a: Actual enactment;
ties to substance; 1b: 1b: Verbally described; 1c: Us-
Actions to agent) ing available materials)
TR 2 Comparative (2a: FE 2 Graphic (2a: Actual enactment;
Similarity; 2b: Differ- 2b: Verbally described; 2c: Us-
ence; 2c: Complemen- ing available materials)
tariness; 2d: Relation-
ality
TR 3 Exemplifying- FE 3 Motoric (3a: Actual enactment;
Illustrative (3a: Exem- 3b: Verbally described; 3c: Us-
plifying instance; 3b: ing available materials)
Exemplifying situa-
tion; 3c: Exemplifying
scene)
TR 4 Metaphoric-Symbolic FE4 Sounds & Tones (4a: Actual
(4a: Interpretation; 4b: enactment; 4b: Verbally de-
Metaphor; 4c: Symbol) scribed; 4c: Using available
materials)
FE5 Denotative (5a: Actual enact-
ment; 5b: Verbally described; 5c:
Using available materials)
a
Modes of meaning: Lexical mode: TR1+TR2; Personal mode: TR3+TR4
b
Close SR: 1+3+9+12; Medium SR: 2+4+5+6+10+11; Distant SR: 7+8+13

Each individual tends to use only a part of the different meaning

variables in assigning meaning to inputs. The individual’s tendencies
for meaning assignment can be assessed through the Meaning Test,
which yields information about the individual’s meaning profile,
namely, the frequency with which the individual uses each of the
meaning variables.
Each meaning variable has characteristic manifestations in the
different spheres of cognitive functioning. For example, the meaning
dimension Locational Qualities is involved in performance of tasks that
rely on spatial and locational aspects, such as finding one’s way or
storing things. A body of data has shown in regard to a great many
cognitive tasks that a set of different meaning variables is involved in
the performance of each task, and that individuals who use most or all
422 SHULAMITH KREITLER

of these meaning variables frequently (according to their meaning

profile) succeed better in the performance of the specific task than those
who do not use them often. Specific patterns of meaning variables -
which could be called ‘meaning profiles of tasks’ - were found to
correspond to good performance on cognitive tasks which assess spatial
navigation, curiosity, creativity, constancy, problem solving, planning,
learning of reading and reading comprehension (Arnon & Kreitler 1984;
Kreitler & Kreitler 1985b; 1986a; 1986b; 1987a; 1987b; 1990b; 1990c;
1994; Weissler 1993). Such patterns reveal, as it were, the infrastructure
of the cognitive processes involved in performing the cognitive act of,
say, planning or solving a problem, thereby providing insight into the
cognitive dynamics characteristic of the act.
When meaning variables are used for exploring the cognitive
processes involved in specific cognitive tasks, they are grasped in a
dynamic sense, whereby each meaning variable corresponds to some
process (e.g., the meaning dimension ‘range of inclusion’ - to analyzing
into components; the comparative type of relation - to detecting
similarity or difference). The meaning system can however be
conceptualized also in a static sense, whereby each meaning variable
corresponds to some specific domain of contents (e.g., the meaning
dimension ‘sensory qualities’ - to contents such as sensations of
different kinds; the metaphoric type of relation - to metaphors). The
dynamic and static manifestations of each meaning variable
complement each other.
The central role that meaning fulfills in regard to cognition has
led to the conceptualization of cognition as a meaning-processing and
meaning-processed system. This conceptualization expresses one of the
basic functions of meaning, which is to provide the infrastructure and
the raw materials for cognitive functioning. However, our studies
revealed other basic functions of meaning, a major one being in the
domain of personality. A body of research has shown that each of
almost 300 personality traits and tendencies was correlated with a
specific set of meaning variables (Kreitler & Kreitler 1990a; 1993a;
1997). These findings support the conceptualization that each personal-
ity trait corresponds in fact to a unique pattern of meaning variables that
is characterized by specific qualities. Again, an individual whose
meaning profile contains the meaning variables that define a particular
personality tendency would show evidence of behaving in line with this
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 423

personality tendency. Thus, a second function of the meaning system is

to provide the cognitive foundations for personality traits.
Further, studies showed that the meaning system provides the
cognitive raw materials for the self-concept (Kreitler & Kreitler 1987c),
and is also similarly involved in the elicitation, selection and imple-
mentation of emotions (Kreitler 2003; Kreitler & Kreitler 1985a;
1987a). In conclusion, it seems justified to assume that cognition, as it
is modulated and activated by the infrastructure of meaning, is
potentially adequate and capable to account for SOCs. How does this
take place?

COGNITION AND SOCS

Cognition is a system that is constantly activated since it is involved in
all cognitive acts and other activities of the organism which depend on
cognitive support, regardless of whether the acts are conscious or not. In
each activity only those cognitive processes and contents that are
relevant for the task as well as accessible to the individual are involved.
One major factor that defines and modifies the accessibility of the
adequate cognitive processes in the individual is the state of the
cognitive system in the course of performing the task. The state of the
cognitive system is defined in terms of the kind and number of meaning
variables that are in a focal position and salient at the time, namely, they
have an organizational primacy and a functional advantage for elicita-
tion and involvement in the act, whereas the other meaning variables are
in the background in different states of inactivation.
A great many changes occur in the cognitive system due to
ongoing cognitive operations. These include actions elicited by some
externally presented task, such as solving a problem; handling some
task arising from the needs of the cognitive system itself, e.g.,
organizing material; or performing a cognitive act in response to the
needs of other systems in the organism, e.g., emotional or social. Some
of the changes are relatively small, for example, in contents defined as
changes within one meaning variable, others may be larger in the sense
that more processes are involved, or more complex, in the sense that the
changes are interdependent and more enduring. However, regardless of
how encompassing or how long they last, these changes do not affect
the cognitive system as a whole.
424 SHULAMITH KREITLER

Changes that affect the whole cognitive system may be brought

about by means of organizational transformations in the meaning
system. These kinds of transformations take place because of the needs
and dynamics of the meaning system itself sui generi or in response to
the needs of the organism, for example, reorganizing when a mass of
new contents has become available, developing structural complexity,
complementing a rudimentary or fragmentary view of reality, etc.
Changes motivated by the dynamics of the meaning system typically
consist of placing in the focal position one or more specific meaning
variables or even merely one or more meaning values and changing
accordingly the whole structure of the meaning system (organizational
transformation). Changes motivated by the meaning system include, for
example, placing in a focal position (a) the meaning dimensions
‘Contextual Allocation,’ ‘Results and Consequences,’ and ‘Causes and
Antecedents’ which manifest the so-called ‘abstract approach’; (b) the
meaning dimensions ‘Sensory Qualities,’ ‘Size and Dimensions,’
‘Weight and Mass,’ and perhaps also ‘Locational Qualities’ - all of
which manifest the so-called ‘concrete approach’ or ‘concrete thinking’;
or (c) the meaning dimension ‘Feelings and Emotions,’ which would
manifest the ‘emotional approach.’ Likewise, we could refer to the
‘evaluative-judgmental approach,’ when the meaning dimension ‘Judg-
ments and Evaluations’ is in the focal position, the ‘actional approach’
when the meaning dimension ‘Actions and Potentialities for Actions’ is
in the focal position, the ‘comparative approach’ when one or more of
the comparative types of relation is in the focal position, the ‘disjunctive
(or either/or) approach’ when the disjunctive form of relation is in the
focal position, or the ‘nonverbal approach’ when one of the nonverbal
forms of expression (e.g., gestural, graphic) is in the focal approach. As
a matter of fact, almost any of the meaning variables and quite a number
of sets of meaning variables could serve as foci for the meaning system
and be the carriers of an organizational transformation.
In order to exemplify the process of organizational transforma-
tion and its effects one set of studies will be described briefly. The
studies dealt with two complementary organizational structures of the
meaning system: one focused on the interpersonally-shared (or lexical)
mode of meaning and the other on the personal (or subjective) mode of
meaning (see Table 2). The definitions and experimental procedures
were based on prior findings about the salience of these modes of
meaning in interpersonal and personal communication. The interperson-
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 425

ally-shared mode of meaning is defined by the two following types of

relation: 1. the attributive, which relates the meaning value to the
referent directly in a substantive (e.g., Flower - in the garden) or
actional way (e.g., Dog - can bark); 2. the comparative, which relates
the meaning value to the referent through the mediation of another
referent, by way of similarity (e.g., Sea - has the same color as the sky),
difference (e.g., House - unlike a tent is built of wood or bricks),
complementarity (e.g., Wife - has a husband and husband has a wife),
and relationality (e.g., Highway - broader than a path). In contrast, the
personal mode of meaning is defined by the two following types of
relation: 1. the exemplifying-illustrative, which relates the meaning
value to the referent by way of an example, in the form of an instance
(e.g., Wisdom - Moses), an image portraying a situation (e.g., Mother-
hood - a woman holding a baby in her arms) or a scene with dynamic
elements (e.g., Aggression - an unemployed person comes to the
government agency for employment, the clerk tells him that there is no
work for him, the person feels warm anger rising in him, his fists
clench, his vision becomes blurred etc.); 2. the metaphoric-symbolic,
which relates the meaning value to the referent in a mediated way using
non-conventional contents, in the form of an interpretation (e.g., Life -
the unknown known), metaphor (an image related interpretatively to a
more abstract referent, e.g., Wisdom - cool water in the desert at noon),
or symbol (a metaphoric image that resolves contrasting elements, e.g.,
Love - a fire that produces and consumes) (Kreitler 1965). A method
was developed for inducing experimentally each of the meaning modes
so that the participants acted when their cognitive system was structured
in line with one or the other mode (Kreitler, Kreitler & Wanounou
1987-88). In different groups of participants the findings showed that
under the impact of induction of personal meaning - as compared with
their performance under the impact of interpersonally-shared meaning
induction - participants scored higher on visual memory tasks,
identifying embedded figures, recalling faces; performed better on
creativity measures of fluency, flexibility and originality; reported many
more unusual and bizarre experiences; produced a greater number of
associations; grasped texts more often in metaphoric terms; made more
mistakes on judging the validity of logical syllogisms; had lower scores
on reality testing and emotional control in the Rorschach test; and had
higher scores on scales assessing emotions (negative as well as
positive). Findings of this kind demonstrate first, that it is possible to
426 SHULAMITH KREITLER

produce cognitive changes by manipulating modes of meaning, second,

that the produced cognitive changes are of various kinds and in various
domains, and third, that the level of performance of specific cognitive
tasks depends on the organizational state of the cognitive system.
The changes brought about by the placement of different
meaning constituents in a focal position include changes in the nature,
salience, and interconnectedness of contents and cognitive processes
that affect cognitive functioning. But the changes are not limited to the
cognitive sphere. Since, as noted, the meaning system is also involved
in personality traits, the self-concept and emotions, it is likely that the
organizational transformations of the meaning system affect these
spheres too, directly or indirectly. Hence, one may expect the
organizational transformations of the meaning system to be manifested
in the form of changes in cognitive functioning (e.g., changes in
attention, memory, creativity, the difficulty of solving different types of
problems, styles of decision making, fluency and flexibility of
associations, etc.), in the self concept (e.g., thoughts about oneself, self-
esteem, one's biographical narrative, the experiential atmosphere of the
self, etc.), in personality traits (e.g. changes in the strength and salience
of different traits and other personality dispositions), and in emotions
(e.g., changes in the strength and salience of different emotions and
moods). These changes in turn may bring about further changes in the
affected domains as well as in other domains, including overt behavior
and physiological reactions.

BLUEPRINT FOR A MEANING-BASED COGNITIVE THEORY OF

CONSCIOUSNESS
In view of the theoretical considerations and empirical findings
presented above, it seems justified to suggest that SOCs are products of
changes that concern cognition as a whole, reflecting organizational
transformations in the meaning system (Kreitler, 1999; 2001; 2002).
Since cognition is involved in the functioning of many systems in the
organism, the suggested definition may be expanded by emphasizing
that SOCs refer to a total state of the individual that in principle
encompasses, in addition to the cognitive system, also other systems in
the individual (emotions, personality, self) affected directly by changes
in the meaning system or the cognitive system or both. The above
definition refers to SOCs rather than to consciousness for two reasons.
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 427

First, as noted earlier, consciousness is identified by many investigators

as awareness, which is only one of the dimensions in terms of which
SOCs may differ. Secondly, according to the approach presented in this
chapter consciousness is the overall quality that refers to the state of the
cognitive system, and since the cognitive system is always in some
state, it would be more precise and correct to refer to the State of
Consciousness (SOC) rather than to consciousness.
It may not be superfluous to reiterate at this point that according
to the here suggested definition, conscious-unconscious adjectives
describe the state of different contents and processes in each SOC.
Hence, unconsciousness is not a SOC or an altered SOC but denotes a
specific degree of availability or readiness for evocation and can be
applied in regard to each SOC. In each SOC there are contents or
processes that are not available and may hence be considered as
"unconscious". The difference between the SOCs consists then merely
in the kind of contents or processes that are unconscious. Thus, every
SOC has an unconscious but the SOCs differ in the duration of the
unconsciousness, the ease with which the unconsciousness can be
overcome or suspended and mainly in the rules defining which material
(contents or processes) is rendered unconscious.
Defining SOC as reflecting the state of the cognitive system
(and other systems) under the sway of a meaning-based organizational
transformation has several theoretical implications and practical
applications. First, in contrast to the definitions that assume the
existence of ‘the’ consciousness (presumably denoting ordinary
consciousness) and so-called altered SOCs, the suggested meaning-
based definition implies that there are an infinite number of potential
SOCs and all are evaluated as of equal potential importance and status.
Indeed, any one of them can become dominant for any duration and can
come to characterize a given culture. It is possible that some of the
possible SOCs are not yet known or described. Moreover, it is likely
that it is even possible to invent new SOCs.
In principle, any organizational transformation in the meaning
system may be considered as generating a SOC. Thus, there is an
infinite number of possible SOCs. In practice, however, not all
organizational transformations affect the cognitive system and other
systems (personality, emotions, etc.) to the same extent. Sometimes the
changes may be minimal, or hardly noticeable, so that they may pass
unnoticed or may be experienced as fluctuations in the prevailing SOC.
428 SHULAMITH KREITLER

In other cases the changes may be very salient, so much that they are
clearly experienced or considered as alterations in consciousness (viz.
altered SOCs).
The extent of the changes could be associated with their
duration, but does not depend on them. There may be dramatic changes
in the SOC that may last milliseconds and yet be noticed, sometimes
even treasured for a lifetime. Another factor that can affect the extent of
the changes is probably the number and nature of the meaning variables
that are placed in the focal position in the meaning system bringing
about the organizational transformation in the system. It may be
assumed that there exist core variables in the meaning system whose
placement in a focal position yields a far-reaching organizational
transformation (e.g., the modes). Further factors affecting the extent of
the changes are probably the salience of emotional reactions among the
changes, and the difference between the resulting SOC and the one
habitual for the individual.
It is likely that some changes in SOCs become noticeable
because they are sanctioned by the culture to which the individual
belongs, or are bound to a specific technique that is salient in a
particular culture (Faber 1981). Thus, the training of Yoga may focus
on differentiation of SOCs that a regular untrained person from Western
culture can hardly make sense of. A case in point is the differentiation
between the following two consciousnesss states that form part of
Buddhist meditation: Dhāraṇā and Dhyāna. Dhāraṇā (=“fixation of
attention”) is described as the first step of deep concentrative
meditation, when the target object is held in the mind without wavering
of consciousness, but the meditating person, the act of meditation and
the object of meditation remain separate. Though consciousness is
focused on one object, awareness of the object is still interrupted.
Dhyāna (=“concentration,” “meditative stability”) is described as a
more advanced stage of meditation, when consciousness of the act of
meditation dwindles away, and only the consciousness of being and the
object of concentration continue to exist in the mind. As a result,
awareness of the object is complete and without any interruption
(Fischer 1978: 42; Maehle 2006: 234). Admittedly, an untrained person
can hardly be expected to comprehend and apply SOCs of this kind.
Another important implication of the suggested definition of
SOC is that SOC depends upon and is characterized by changes
occurring in the cognitive system (through an organizational transform-
 ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF C O G N I T I V E S Y S T E M 429

ation in the meaning system), regardless of the nature of the agent or

conditions that brought about the changes. Even when the changes are
induced by conditions external to meaning and cognition, for example,
behavioral, emotional, physiological, technological (e.g., virtual
reality), the changes that form the basis for SOC occur in cognition.
This conclusion as well as the findings of the studies on
inducing interpersonally-shared and personal-subjective meaning modes
indicate that it is possible to generate SOCs by psychological means
tailored to produce the targeted SOCs. The use of psychological induc-
tion methods may broaden infinitely the range of individuals that will
expose themselves to SOCs and the range of SOCs that they will
experience. Notably, the psychological induction methods of SOCs will
eventually make it possible for individuals to produce desired SOCs by
self-controlled cognitive means.
Moreover, by using psychological induction methods it may be
possible to produce not only already known SOCs but also new not yet
documented or experienced SOCs. Generating and inventing SOCs
depend on values of SOCs in terms of the defining dimensions (e.g.,
Table 1) and the relations between these values and the meaning
variables of the meaning system.
There are three major reasons for improving the potentialities of
experiencing SOCs and expanding the range of available SOCs. One
reason is that some SOCs are apparently accompanied by enjoyable
experiences, which many people seek out and crave for, as manifested
in the popularity of various drugs and stimulants. Another reason is that
SOCs seem to lead to unraveling new and hitherto unknown aspects of
oneself, others and the world, which make possible the attainment of a
deepened knowledge of the self and reality. It is possible to speculate
that the exposure of new aspects of the personal and impersonal reality
may in principle culminate in the formation of new scientific
disciplines. The third reason is of a more practical nature. Since there is
evidence that some cognitive tasks are performed better under specific
SOCs than under others (see above the set of studies on the induction of
modes of meaning), it is of importance to be able to elicit for each
cognitive task the SOC that promotes its performance in the best
possible way.
In sum, the means for inducing, defining and creating SOCs
provided by the new approach presented in this paper may serve to
expand our view of consciousness, our methodology for studying
430 SHULAMITH KREITLER

consciousness and our ability to manipulate, shape and experience

consciousness.

ABBREVIATIONS

SOC State of consciousness

REM Rapid Eye Movement

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 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

Mindfulness and Psychotherapy

The Revival of Indian Meditative Traditions
within Modern Psychology, Psychotherapy, and
Medicine

I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last ten years the practice of mindfulness entered the fields
of scientific medicine and psychotherapy. For sure, mindfulness is a
very ancient and useful medicine going back to times immemorial. The
Pali word satipatth āna - usually translated as mindfulness - also means
the way of mindful remembrance or recognition. Some Buddhist texts
 āna as a clear and easy means leading to enlighten-
describe satipatth
ment and liberation from suffering. In Majjhima Nikāya 1,10 (Bhikkhu
1995: 145) we read for example:
Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the sur-
mounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief,
for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of Nibbāna – namely, the
four foundations of mindfulness.
These few words claim that the practice of mindfulness is able to liber-
ate everyone from all kinds of sufferings and psychological burdens.
Moreover, they clearly indicate that this practice can lead to nibbāna or
the supreme state of enlightenment. Mindfulness is called “fourfold”
(cf. Majjhima Nikāya 1, 10, 31-38), because we have to focus our mind
on four areas:
1. On our own body: breathing, moving, digesting, the use of our
five senses, as well as focusing on the decay of our body after
death, clearly looking at the decomposition of all organs up to
the final structureless heap of bones. The latter part of this
mindfulness training sounds like a shamanic initiation practice
(cf. Eliade 1983: 65-67).
436 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

2. On our own feelings and passions: mainly focusing on their

processes of “becoming, intensifying, declining and disappear-
ing”.
3. On our own thoughts and ideas: not only clearly registering their
context, but also and most important their process of becoming,
sustaining and disappearing.
4. On external things or beings: their coming and going, but also
on Buddha’s central teachings such as the four noble truths.
Looking at the satipatthāna-sutta from a psychological and therapeutic
perspective, the following main aspects emerge:
• We should observe one by one the contents of our mind just as
somebody opening a jar full of different beans and berries, de-
scribing every item very cautiously.
• We should observe the coming and going in every mind proc-
ess.
• Buddha insists on different stages of mindfulness. The training
must be adapted to the trainee’s level.
• He also insists on gaining a meta-perspective or “meta-
narrative”. The trainee has to focus on the dhamma or the prin-
ciple of non-substantiality or impermanence,
• satipatthāna cannot be delegated to other people. It is always a
matter of one's own mind experience.
• Buddha insists upon strong motivation and perseverance. As to
the duration of the training, we find no precise statement: it can
last from at least seven days up to seven years and more.
• Buddha, however, is very optimistic: if people are really moti-
vated, the satipatthāna method will indeed be successful, i.e.,
will lead to nibbāna.
The satipatthāna-sutta relies on a kind of universal metaphor: a way
leading from a starting point (e. g., some actual level of consciousness)
to an end point, a supreme mind transformation or remembrance. At any
starting point, we will encounter a suffering mind. At the end point, we
will enjoy enlightenment or liberation from any suffering. This kind of
metaphor is also very common or central for modern mindfulness ther-
apy. Here we start our journey at some point of suffering - for example,
a social phobia or a pernicious depression - and we try to reach a point
of liberation or at least the alleviation of complaints.
 MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 437

In the last decade or so, the parallels between psychotherapy and

wisdom traditions such as Taoism, Hinduism, and predominantly Bud-
dhism were deeply reflected by psychotherapists, far beyond meta-
phoric superficiality. For example, cognitive behavior therapy and psy-
choanalysis started to focus on training mindfulness as a privileged
method to overcome a lot of clinical symptoms and sufferings. Needless
to say, the programs and goals of modern therapy are distinctly different
from the specific agenda of yogic trainings. Nevertheless, quite a lot of
intensive studies have renewed the emphasis on the utility of a dialogue
at all levels (so to speak: from a meta-theoretical to a hyperpractical
level).
The recent shifting within cognitive behavior therapy from
symptoms as “contents” towards attitudes or mental modalities as “con-
text” offers a certain analogy with the traditional distinction between
pure consciousness as context and conscious processes or structures as
contents within Buddhism or other Asian wisdom traditions.
The following three metaphors briefly illustrate the relationship
between “context and content” in mindfulness or Asian wisdom tradi-
tions (cf. van Quekelberghe 2007: 168-196):

1. emptiness, pure peace of mind, pure silence (context) versus

ego-related passions (contents)
2. endless ocean versus “ego-waves”
3. crystal like, pure mirror versus plenty of mirages (thoughts,
feelings,…).

Such metaphors try to describe the subtle difference between con-

sciousness itself (for example, pure awareness) and the contents of con-
sciousness.

Ad 1. Emptiness versus passions

A progressive detachment from strong passions and countless strivings
leads to a kind of a context without any perceivable content, a “pure
awareness.” Surely, as soon as we try to further describe this context,
we produce a lot of new contents. Therefore, the Asian traditions are
psychologically right and wise in their saying that we have to experi-
ence primarily and not to think about emptiness. Great silence, inner
peace, “no mind,” and pure awareness are usual descriptors of such a
438 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

conscious experience. Only if we enter deep into our “heart”—beyond

thoughts and feelings—and discover our awareness as endless, infinite,
without beginning, timeless, indivisible, then we can observe all con-
scious contents, so to speak, beyond our own limited conscious ego.
Developing emptiness or pure consciousness leads not only to a
kind of awakening or enlightenment, it also helps to overcome plenty of
psychic sufferings and cognitive bias of our own mind.

Ad 2. A limitless ocean of pure awareness/mind versus waves of

thoughts, feelings, strivings, or passions
The endless ocean, similar to the “Dirac-Sea” or the quantum vacuum
of modern physics, presents the first or last context, the infinite ground
for all real or potential phenomena or contents (cf. van Quekelberghe
2005: 77-91). Patañjali-Yoga tries to bring this limitless awareness into
the focus of a mindful meditation through complete cessation of any
“wave or disturbing content” of one's own mind: citta-vṛtti-nirodha.
This resonates through the Patañjali-Sūtra like a “mantra” and is a good
expression of the relationship between pure awareness or mind and its
countless vṛttis or contents. For Patañjali the drastic reduction of vrttis
is undoubtedly the best medicine, mainly because of quieting and free-
ing the mind, and at the same time the best means to achieve mokṣa.
Moreover, the nature of our mind is oceanic. Dazzled with “content
waves,” we often oversee the endless ocean as context in and out of us.

Ad 3. A mirror reflecting all kinds of contents

Many wisdom traditions describe pure awareness or mindfulness as a
mirror endlessly reflecting all possible mind contents. Surely, such a
metaphor is to be found in many shamanic traditions. A mirror on the
chest belongs to the attributes of numerous Siberian shamans (cf. Eliade
1983: 134-135). In Buddhism (e.g., Fa-Tsang), Sufism (e.g., Rumi) or
Christianity (e.g., Gregory of Nazianz), only a soul free from ego-
related views is able to generate a pure awareness or mindfulness mir-
roring the only “one context” of all possible contents, namely, accord-
ing to the spiritual vocabulary of each tradition: Emptiness, Satcitān-
anda, God, Great Spirit, Shiva-Consciousness, Absolute Oneness, Nir-
vāna and so on.
 MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 439

All three metaphors focus on the necessity for stepping back

from a close bondage to endless contents in order to come in touch with
the changeless one context. Spiritual traditions, mainly yogic and Bud-
dhist meditative schools claim that stepping back from any content and
at the same time opening an endless context of awareness are decisive
steps for the achievement of mind enlightenment.
While modern psychotherapy refers more and more to the dis-
tinction between context and content, only a few therapists, however,
are fully aware of the spiritual dimension of such a distinction. The
more we try to understand or even experience the meaning of a “con-
tentless context,” the more, I guess, we have to open our mind to an
absolute, endless or spiritual dimension, i.e., the very deep dimension of
our own mind.

II. BUDDHISM AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: A BRIEF SURVEY OF A BEGINNING

DIALOGUE

In the following brief survey, four main areas of modern medicine or

psychotherapy with relevance for Buddhist views and meditations for
health care or psychotherapy are overviewed. These areas are:
1. Classical psychiatry and psychoanalysis,
2. Jung and the Neo-Freudians,
3. Cognitive behavior therapy,
4. Transpersonal psychology and psychotherapy.

1. Classical psychiatry and psychoanalysis

Franz Alexander (1891-1964), professor of psychiatry, psychoanalyst
and founder of the first Institute for Psychosomatics worldwide, pub-
lished a well known study in 1931, entitled “Buddhistic training as an
artificial catatonia”. In this article, he describes the Buddhist meditation
as narcissistic self-absorption, a kind of artificial schizophrenia, and as a
compulsory masochistic practice killing any emotion. Furthermore,
Alexander describes Lord Buddha as a neurotic man not having ana-
lyzed his repressed emotions and their transfer to his followers. This
early study inspired many leading psychiatrists and psychoanalysts to
focus on the parallels between schizophrenic regression or at least com-
pulsory disorders and yoga or Buddhist meditative practices (cf. Alex-
ander and Selesnick 1966).
440 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

The German psychiatrist Johannes Schultz was surely one fa-

mous exception. The development of his autogenic training in the thir-
ties was largely influenced by his positive view of the yogic traditions.
Finally, Arthur Deikman (1977) was the very first psychiatrist who
fought against the naïve arrogance of psychiatry and psychoanalysis
toward Eastern meditative practice.

2. Jung and the Neo-Freudians

C.G. Jung rejected the psychoanalytic view of Asian or Buddhist medi-
tations as infantile regression, autistic defense formation or narcissistic
neurosis. He studied different Eastern traditions and recognized their
therapeutic power. Terms such as “Mandala, I Ching, Tao or Yoga” are
often to be found in his collected works. Nevertheless, he believed that
an integration of Western psychotherapy and Eastern meditation was - if
ever possible - not desirable. Therefore, he often quoted Kipling's
words: “East is east and West is west. And never the twain shall meet.”
Quite independent from Jung, the so-called Neo-Freudians such
as Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harold Kelman got in touch with
Zen-Buddhism in the fifties. Karen Horney (1885-1952) met the now
renowned Zen author Daisetz T. Suzuki in the winter of 1950/51.
Shortly after this meeting, she lectured about Zen-Buddhist principles
and practices at the American Institute for Psychoanalysis. Horney saw
a deep relationship between the Zen-mindfulness of “Here and Now”
and the free floating attention in psychoanalysis. She understood this
kind of attention as an endless, non-judgemental and warm-hearted
mindfulness in sharp contrast to the positivistic, neutral attitude of her
colleagues (cf. Horney 1987: 19-21). Erich Fromm (1900-1980) organ-
ized a conference in Cuernavaca (Mexico) on Zen-Buddhism and psy-
chotherapy, inviting Daisetz T. Suzuki as keynote speaker. In the first
book on Zen-Buddhism and psychoanalysis (Fromm et al. 1960),
Fromm emphasized strong convergences between both traditions. He
believed that Zen, like psychoanalysis, was able to free the individual
from all unconscious or repressed strivings. Kelman (1960), a student of
Karen Horney, considered psychoanalysis as a meditative training in
mindfulness and emphasized the development of a therapist-client-
relationship in analogy to the relationship of guru and disciple as a radi-
cal new perspective for modern psychoanalysis.
 MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 441

The psychoanalyst and psychologist Jeffrey Rubin (1985) tried

to integrate Buddhism into a so-called contemplative psychoanalysis.
Even if he somehow confused the Buddhist conception of egoless-ness
(Pali: anatta) with psychoanalytic narcissism theory, he strongly advo-
cated a free dialogue between Buddhism and psychotherapy (cf. Rubin,
1996). Brazier (2003), Magid (2002), Molino (1998), and Safran (2003)
have developed this free dialogue further.
The New York psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Barry Magid
(2002) is perhaps the best known representative of this new era. In con-
trast to the previous pioneers such as Horney, Fromm, or Kelman,
Magid is not only a psychotherapist, but also a Zen master. Within his
integrative psychoanalytic Zen practice, Buddhist issues such as
enlightenment or egoless-ness are discussed psychoanalytically; on the
contrary, transference or defense mechanisms are questioned from a
Buddhist point of view.

3. Cognitive behavior therapy and Buddhism

Mikulas (1978, 1981) was the first behavior therapist arguing for an
integration of Buddhist meditation into behavior therapy. He delineated
many common aspects of behavior therapy and Buddhism, as for exam-
ple:
• emphasis of individual self-control skills,
• few theoretical constructs,
• preference for observation and description of behavioral se-
quences,
• mainly focusing on concrete contents of conscious experiences,
• clear distinction between observable behavior and problematic
ideas such as “person, ego, identity, world”,
• reduction of anxiety reactions with the help of relaxation, dis-
traction, self-control procedures,
• emphasizing possible behavior changes by means of rehearsal,
• emphasizing regular exercise,
• optimistic view of learning capacities.
De Silva (1985) found such exercises in Buddha's sayings clearly corre-
sponding to modern techniques of behavior therapy. Kabat-Zinn's mind-
fulness-based stress reduction program (MBSR) - developed during the
eighties on the basis of Buddhist satipatthāna according to the tradition
442 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

of the Burmese monk Mahasi Sayadaw - was surely the primary source
for the further integration of vipassanā and Zen-meditation into cogni-
tive behavior therapy. Grossman et al. (2004) have recently published a
review and meta-analysis of MBSR-studies. The statistically significant
results strongly indicate that the mindfulness-based stress reduction
program can have an important positive impact on a broad range of psy-
chic and psychosomatic disorders.
Linehan (1987), Hayes (2002), and Teasdale and Segal (Segal et
al. 2002) are the foremost representatives of the so-called “third genera-
tion” (and up to now the last generation) of behavior therapy, namely
the mindfulness cognitive behavior therapy. Marsha Linehan working
with borderline patients introduced mindfulness meditative exercises
into her behavior therapy programs in order to develop a radical, non-
judgemental acceptance of any present situation. Some aspects of her
training remind us of Gestalt therapy. Perls (1893-1970) has always
claimed a narrow relationship between the main principle of Gestalt
therapy (concentration on the “here and now”) and the principles of
Zen-Buddhism.
Linehan's dialectic behavior therapy is based on the concept of
“wise mind.” As a synthesis of cognitive and emotional systems, this
“wise mind” is at the same time the source and the goal of any concen-
tration on the “here-and-now” of any situation with a radical, non-
judgemental acceptance. For Linehan, “wise mind” is the cornerstone of
acceptance and mindfulness within therapy and the source of a sort of
universal spirituality, so to say beyond Buddhism or Christianity (cf.
Robins, Schmidt, and Linehan 2004).
Inspired by Kabat-Zinn, Segal et al. (2002) I have developed the
so-called mindfulness cognitive behavior therapy” with special pro-
grams for the treatment of clinical depression. Empirical results show
that a mix of mindfulness, meditative and cognitive skills is more effi-
cient than a cognitive training alone (cf. van Quekelberghe 2007: 210-
214). Steven Hayes (2002, 2004) has developed the acceptance and
commitment therapy” (ACT). The influence of Buddhist vipassanā
meditation on ACT cannot be overseen. Meditative concentration and a
non-judgmental approach to any experience are its main components.
Hayes emphasized:
1. the learning of diffusion, making a clear distinction between
verbal or cognitive representations and the direct experience of
 MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 443

situations (cognitive fusion and getting entangled in contradic-

tions often lead to psychic disorders),
2. the learning of the difference between our ego as context and
our various ego-contents.
Mindfulness meditation greatly contributes to both these learning goals.
The second main component, the distinction between context
and content, surely leads to a spiritual view of our own self. While
learning a kind of de-identification from all our ego-contents, we come
very close to the meditative Asian traditions which emphasize the step-
ping back from all forms of strong attachment to contents. It is interest-
ing to note that Hayes (2004: 20-21) refers to a “transcendent sense of
self” which cannot be identified with any ego-content. He also refers to
the metaphor used by the transpersonal therapist Roberto Assagioli.
According to Assagioli, we should see our own ego as the chessboard
and not plainly identify ourselves with any white chess piece (for ex-
ample, our good thoughts or feelings) or with any black chess piece (for
example, our bad thoughts or feelings).

4. The transpersonal psychotherapy and Buddhism

An important area of dialogue between Asian traditions and psycho-
therapy is surely the transpersonal psychology and therapy. Since the
launching of the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (1969) and the
foundation of a scientific society (1970), many psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists, and social scientists have greatly contributed to a broad dialogue
between Asian wisdom traditions and modern science (especially psy-
chiatry and psychotherapy). Authors such as Ken Wilber or Stan Grof
have largely influenced the development of this new research area. In
my book (van Quekelberghe 2005), I describe the main fields of this
transpersonally or spiritually oriented psychotherapy.

III. THE BODHISATTVA WAY: A POSSIBLE IDEAL FOR A SPIRITUALLY

ORIENTED (POST)MODERN PSYCHOTHERAPIST?

The Bodhisattva ideal belongs to Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Bodhi-

sattva (bodhi: Sanskrit for “enlightening/enlightenment”; sattva: San-
skrit for “being”) is centering all his/her life on enlightenment and the
freeing of all sentient beings from suffering. The Bodhisattva resolves
444 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

to achieve a pure state of mind for the liberation of other beings from
the chains of craving and suffering. The Bodhisattva vow goes like this:
The sentient beings are countless; I vow that I'll free all of them from
suffering.
The illusions are countless; I vow that I'll destroy all of them.
The dharma gates are countless; I vow that I'll go through each of them.
The enlightenment is endless; I vow that I'll realize it!
In Mahāyāna Buddhism we have two main types of Bodhisattvas: the
transcendent and the transient or human ones. Transcendent Bodhisatt-
vas are for example Avalokiteshvara (Bodhisattva of compassion) and
Mañjushrī (Bodhisattva of wisdom).
The transient or human Bodhisattva has to go through 10 sta-
tions (Sanskrit “bhumi”) before achieving a transcendent or completely
enlightened state of consciousness. There are at least six perfections to
be trained:
1. generosity
2. passionless behavior
3. patience
4. courage
5. mindfulness
6. wisdom
The training of such attitudes leads to the following four stable charac-
teristics of the Bodhisattva state of consciousness, the so-called brah-
mavihāras:
1. mettā (Pali for “goodness”)
2. karunā (Pali for “compassion”)
3. muditā (Pali for “serenity”)
4. upekkhā (Pali for “equanimity”)
Perfect wisdom and compassion, the essential characteristics of any
transcendent Bodhisattva, emerge out of the training of the six perfec-
tions (Sanskrit: pāramitās) and the four brahmavihāras as perfect states
of consciousness. Both characteristics are grounded in the primary per-
ception of an unitary (endless) context for all possible contents.
The Bodhisattva way could be helpful for any spiritually ori-
ented therapist - not only for Buddhist therapists - at multiple levels of
actions and different stages of training, for example:
 MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 445

• developing a profound compassion for any suffering human be-

ing,
• enjoying the alleviation of suffering (surely a good remedy
against the burn out syndrome),
• developing more acceptance and more mindfulness of one' s
own emotions and cognitions,
• reducing our own defense mechanisms and resistance, i.e., be-
coming more flexible in all kinds of situations,
• developing perfections (pāramitās) such as generosity, patience,
and courage is surely quite adequate for long term patients
and/or low motivated clients
• the third bhumi (Sanskrit: prabhākara) means “radiant cha-
risma.” So the more a therapist progresses along the Bodhisattva
path, the more he/she will be able to communicate non-verbally
some sort of “positive healing energy.” This non-verbal cha-
risma will also reduce the resistance and/or motivate the patients
to go beyond a verbal level of comprehension and communica-
tion.
These few examples show us that the Bodhisattva way should be useful
for any post-modern therapist interested in cultivating a spiritual dimen-
sion along acceptance and mindfulness. It should be clear that this way
is really open to all forms of “Weltanschauung”: agnostic, atheistic,
theistic, Hinduistic, Jewish, Christian, Islamic, etc.

IV. NĀLANDĀ
Finally, I would like to point to Nālandā as to our real need for post-
modern “wisdom research centers” to help physicians, psychotherapists,
teachers and others on the long way towards a fully enlightened and
enlightening mind. Nālandā, 60 miles south of Patna (Bihar, India), was
such a wisdom research center for nearly eight hundred years (V-XIII
centuries c.e.). Such a center offered the possibility for long retreats and
the teachings of top skilled persons such as Nāgārjuna or Naropa.
We need many post-modern “wisdom research centers” in order
to promote a sustained, deep, and competent move of modern medicine
and psychotherapy towards more mindfulness, acceptance and spiritual-
ity.
446 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

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extase. Payot. Paris 1983.
Fromm 1960 E. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. In: E. Fromm, D.
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Molino 1998 A. Molino, The couch and the tree: Dialogues in Buddhism and
psychoanalysis. North Point Press. New York 1998.
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therapie. Dietmar Klotz. Eschborn bei Frankfurt/M. 2007.
 MICHAEL DELMONTE

Empty Thy Mind and Come to Thy Senses: A

De-constructive Path to Inner Peace

“For there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so”
William Shakespeare, Hamlet

1. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, we live in an age of hyper-communication – in terms of
both sheer quantity and speed. If one takes a complete break from one’s
office for a couple of weeks, then the e-mails, text messages, letters,
faxes, phone messages, etc, pile up and await us in intimidating bulk, all
demanding instant attention upon our return. On top of all of these we
have the ever-present radios, televisions, newspapers, magazines, vid-
eos, DVDs and the like also competing for our limited mental space. If
this were not enough, bill-boards try to out-perform each other for our
special attention – as do the many demands of our work colleagues and
last, but hopefully, not least, the demands of our loved ones, families
and friends.
Then there is the endless chatter – at work, social gatherings and
conferences. The chattering species – or “Homo chatteraticus” – would
punningly describe our manifest nature - especially that of our sub-
species that dwells in our modern expanding urban sprawls. Is it any
wonder that we compulsively prattle so much? Our minds are probably
over-stimulated, with a constant barrage of hyper-communication on a
level to which our so-called “primitive” ancestors were relatively unac-
customed.
Our over-talkative mouths reflect, of course, our unstoppable
minds: Minds which find it increasingly difficult to switch off. Even
when we go on holidays we take these over-stimulated, hyper-active
minds with us on frenetic attempts to “enjoy ourselves” via novel forms
of stimulation (de Botton, 2003). Well, not quite always – if we know
how. Never before has quiet meditation been more appropriate as an
antidote to this volume of mental overdrive. A real mental vacation
means just that – a vacant mind. Meditation – whether by means of con-
450 MICHAEL DELMONTE

centration on only just one stimulus at the time, or temporarily (trying)

to remain mindful, i.e. practicing being a neutral, non-judgmental ob-
server – aims at minimizing the thinking/analytical mind and fostering
clearer sensory and reflective awareness instead. Paradoxically, deep
mindfulness, if practiced competently, can eventually lead to a peaceful
void or “mindlessness” – characterized by a state of “no thought” –
even if it is only for brief moments initially.

2. THE TALKING CURE

So what can we do with anxiously driven and chronically over-aroused
minds? Typically, one option is to offer them the “talking therapies”
with a “talking cure” in mind! So we have Freud’s “free association”
monologues, cognitive therapy’s “cognitive restructuring” dialogues,
and many other variants all using verbalization as their modus operandi.
I have no doubt that these are often very useful approaches – usually in
the earlier (i.e. “repair”) stages of psychotherapy when dealing with
deficits, conflicts and defenses, but I am less convinced that this always
remains the case, for example, with those among us with varying de-
grees of obsessive thinking. Can problems of the pained and over-active
mind exclusively be solved by the thinking mind? Hopefully some clar-
ity on this shall emerge as we proceed.

3. INTERNALITY VERSUS EXTERNALITY

You may object that I am also right now engaging in communicative
chatter! Well, yes, this has to do with externality. Talking and writing
are useful means of communication between “objects,” i.e. between
people. Internality, must not, however, be neglected. We are not just
objects to each other, we are also subjects. Our internal space – our sub-
jectivities – should not be overlooked. Again this is where meditation is
also valuable. When we attend to our inner space we often notice how
our incessant thinking is like a compulsion, well-nigh impossible to
stop, even when we claim that these thoughts are often unwanted. This
repetitive thinking has typically been dealt with in cognitive therapy by
“thought stopping”, but evidence suggests that a gentler approach,
based on the acceptance of unwanted cognitions via mindful “witness-
ing”, may be more effective (Tolle, 1999, 2005; Thich Nhat Hanh,
1975, 1991, 2003; Barnes-Holmes, et al, 2004). This is not a defeatist
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 451

acceptance, but rather a mindful choice. Hayes and Smith (2005) refer
to the acceptance emergent from mindfulness practice as “radical accep-
tance.”
“Awakening” our “inner observer” capacity is what mindfulness
meditation promotes. Much of our private thinking is comprised of un-
productive monologues at best (often telling ourselves illusory stories),
but also by destructive imaginary, internal disputes and conflicts. Many
people suffer from minds which are ceaselessly engaged in anxious or
depressive self-statements, in weary “battles” and the like, with little in
the way of creative outcome. Many of us also “live in our heads,” dis-
connected from our bodies. What can be done about all of this? For a
start one can begin to raise one’s awareness level via mindfulness train-
ing.

4. MINDFULNESS AND DIS-IDENTIFICATION

It may be easier to start mindfulness training by observing our physical
bodies in action, e.g. simply by watching ourselves walking as in walk-
ing meditation. We can do likewise for various other daily activities, for
example, while washing our hands or eating. The mindful practice of
Hatha Yoga affords us an excellent means to deepen awareness of our
embodiment. Paradoxically, when we apply our “inner observer” to our
own thinking minds while practicing mindfulness, it is not necessarily
with the intention of “refining” our thinking, but rather to learn how to
dis-identify from it (Assogioli, 1965; De Mello, 1990; Holmes, 1997;
Tolle, 1999; DelMonte, 2000, 2003). Observing our thoughts, like
clouds passing through the sky without either rejecting or clinging onto
them, is what dis-identification is basically about. Thereby one learns to
let go temporarily of unsolicited and invasive thoughts so as to have a
less “muddied” consciousness, and eventually to let go momentarily of
all thoughts, rendering moments of stillness – or better still, the “just
being ” of clearer consciousness (see “Adaptive Dis-identification”
later). Although consciousness without thought is a possibility, its op-
posite, thought without some consciousness is not (excluding the Freu-
dian repressed unconscious). Consciousness thus appears to be primary,
and from it emerges thought as a secondary epi-phenomenon: An epi-
phenomenon that can become “parasitic,” in the sense that conscious-
ness can play the role of a reluctant host to our unbidden thinking - as in
dreams, obsessional ruminations and when “hearing voices” (auditory
452 MICHAEL DELMONTE

hallucinations). When, in meditation for example, we experience con-

sciousness without thought, we may be in touch with “just being”, i.e.
our deeper essence beyond mental and physical form. Brain activation
produces cognitions and emotions. Quieten this brain activity with
meditation and one is left with the “no thought” of clear consciousness.
Thus consciousness appears to be primary and mentation secondary.

5. AWARENESS TRAINING
It is possibly obvious by now that the early stages of mindfulness prac-
tice can also be seen as a form of sensory awareness training. Aware-
ness training often starts with self-observation (De Mello, 1990). As
already mentioned, we have several objects of choice on which to focus
our attention, such as our breathing, hearing, and so forth. We learn to
train, i.e. sensitize, all our senses in this way. This is best done non-
analytically and in the “hic et nunc” (here and now) mode. We can also
observe our cravings, our dislikes, our clutching and needy minds in
action and via “just letting-be,” learn to side–step them. Such stoic side
stepping can be seen as a form of adaptive dissociation. Identification
with the desired contents of one’s mind, i.e. with one’s attachments,
typically leads to fear of their loss, and consequently to emotional dis-
tress, pessimistic thinking and compensatory behavior. These cravings
can be simply observed, and, for a change, neither judged nor acted
upon. We can also become attached to, and identified with, our pain,
losses and suffering, as in a felt sense of prolonged victimhood. (See
Attachments section below).
So developing an awareness of our varied attachments is another
aspect of mindfulness training, contradictory as some of these attach-
ments may seem to be. Craving for sensory gratification, for continued
existence and for annihilation, corresponding to the Freudian constructs
of libido, ego and the death instinct (See de Silva, 1990), can all be
problematic. Dependence on sensory gratification implies dependence
on instinct and on externality. Craving for continued existence is a de-
nial of impermanence, and craving for annihilation is surrender to the
death wish, i.e. to Thanatos. This can be seen in impulsive aggression
turned outwards on others (sadism), or inwards on oneself (masochism),
as found with drug and alcohol abuse, self-harm and suicide. Behind the
death wish is often a desire to return to a non-suffering peaceful state
free of longing, frustration and fear. This peace can, temporarily, be
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 453

attained on earth much more constructively via meditation, yoga and

mindfulness practice.
Many approaches to mental health see the development of self-
awareness as beneficial. The insight gained through psychoanalysis is
purportedly transmutative in terms of neurotic symptoms (Freud, 1900).
Likewise, the self-awareness fostered in Gestalt therapy (Perls, et al.,
1973) was seen as therapeutic. (See later for psychodynamic, Gestalt
and constructivist approaches to awareness). Schwartz (1983) saw self-
attention per se as playing an important homeostatic, and thus integra-
tive, role. It has also been argued, with some empirical support, that
meditation in general, and mindfulness meditation in particular, is con-
ducive to well-being (Shafii, 1973b; Carrington & Ephron, 1975;
Deatherage, 1975; Brown & Engler 1980; DelMonte, 1984a, 1985,
1990; DelMonte & Kenny, 1985).
Moreover, it has been suggested that increased (non-neurotic)
self-awareness, with its attendant clarity of vision, should allow one to
make more informed choices, and thus enable one to discard old habits,
attitudes and attachments that no longer serve our evolving needs. The-
se claims are addressed (see later) in the context of our attachments to
people, objects, emotions and ideas, as well as in the context of our
attempts to foster self-awareness via self-attention strategies. So is there
a link between self-attention and health?

6. SELF-ATTENTION, AWARENESS AND SELF-REGULATION

Schwartz’s (1983) disregulation theory can be catch-phrased as: “Re-
pression and Disease versus Mindfulness and Health”. He postulated
that awareness is linked to health and that repression is associated with
“dis-ease”. He produced considerable empirical evidence that repressors
show elevated levels of psycho-physiological distress such as electro-
cortical (brain-wave), electromyographical (muscular) and, especially,
cardiovascular arousal. These latter findings are consistent with some
later work of my own also showing a significant relationship between
defensiveness and haemodynamic arousal in general and cardiovascular
arousal in particular (DelMonte, 1984a, 1985). Repressors also report
significantly more physical illness than “true low anxious” subjects (see
Schwartz, 1983).
Schwartz agrees with Galin (1974) when he proposed that re-
pression is produced by a functional cerebral disconnection syndrome in
454 MICHAEL DELMONTE

which the left hemisphere (which is usually associated with verbal and
analytic functioning) becomes functionally isolated to varying degrees
from the right hemisphere, with its relative non-verbal (e.g. emotional)
and spatial function. Schwartz produced evidence that repressive sub-
jects appear to show more (right hemisphere) cerebral lateralization
with regard to negative emotions and in situations which are potentially
threatening. He also quotes other evidence indicating a relative attenua-
tion of information transfer from the right to the left hemisphere in “re-
pressive” compared with “true low anxious subjects.“ Traumatic memo-
ries tend to be stored in the right parietal lobes (van der Kolk & Fisher,
1995). Overall, the right hemisphere seems to be activated in the ex-
pression of difficult and disturbing emotions, and the left hemisphere
tends to be associated with the expression of positive emotions such as
joy and happiness. Two months of mindfulness training has been shown
to lead to a significant shift to a higher ratio of left-sided compared with
right-sided brain activation (Davidson, et al, 2003).
Warrenburg, et al. (1981), reported a significantly high propor-
tion of hypertensives being repressors. For these hypertensive individu-
als, the more relaxed they said they were during the speech-task the
higher their blood pressure! This observation is supported by other evi-
dence that high blood pressure (internal arousal or “noise”) can be used
to dampen cognitive awareness of distress (Dworkin, et al., 1979; Del-
Monte, 1984a).
Schwartz (1983) argued that self-attention, as practised in vari-
ous mindfulness meditation techniques, “seems to have specific auto-
nomic, self-regulatory, stabilizing effects on physiological functioning”
(p.114). He contended that self-attention can promote localized healing,
“especially if the self-attention is guided by relevant imagery that is
targeted to the appropriate part(s) of the body” (p.114). This suggestion
is interesting in terms of the often quoted pioneer work done by Simon-
ton and Simonton (1974) and by Meares (1978) in which they used
meditation and visualization exercises with cancer patients.
In a similar fashion the insight gained in psychotherapy may be
therapeutic. There is some evidence that those receiving psychotherapy
are less likely to subsequently report physical illness (Rosen & Wiens,
1979). Psychotherapy typically aims to enhance insight and awareness,
as well as provide a corrective attachment experience. But do we need
to distinguish between such positive attachment experiences, and our
tendency to clutch indiscriminately in many directions?
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 455

7. ATTACHMENTS
Much has been said elsewhere (DelMonte 2003, 2004) about our clutch-
ing minds attaching to opinions, appearances, possessions, success,
power, status, prestige, wealth, pride and so forth. Less has been stated
about our minds’ equal capacity to identify with, and stay with, suffer-
ing, by either living in the past in holding onto bygone insults, losses,
hurts, defeats, etc, or by anticipating the future in pessimistic, paranoid
or hypochondriacal ways. Victimhood can become a fixed identity, i.e.
an attachment and even a way of life (Tolle, 1999; Bruckner, 2000).
The “Pain-body” (Tolle, 1999, 2005) and the pain-mind are often char-
acterised by an exaggerated need to wallow in and talk about suffering
compulsively and self-righteously – usually blaming others for our cur-
rent misery. Then there is the compulsion to compare and judge others
from a “knowing” position. Engaging in such non-compassionate “sit-
ting in judgment” and “forming opinions” self-righteously about others
only isolates us. Psychic pain is inevitable if one is identified with one’s
egotistic mind, which seeks a constant array of ego gratifications, in-
cluding the need to be always right or victorious. Ego identifications
lead us to cling to past gains, regret past losses and worry about future
snags, snares, pitfalls and more losses; thereby taking us away from
living fully in the present reality – especially when it can have so much
to offer. Life inevitably involves a series of gains and losses. Griffin
(2001) saw adjustment to loss as a lifelong regenerative learning proc-
ess. Losses also open up new opportunities.
Then there is the social domain. Attachment has both physio-
logical and psychological components. Developing a “theory of mind”
in childhood facilitates the latter (Fonagy, et al, 1994). People often
remark on the proclivity of human beings to form strong emotional
bonds. We are popularly described as “social animals”. However, there
is considerable variation in this tendency to seek out others and to main-
tain contact. Social “stickiness” does not appear to be spread out evenly
in the population. Some individuals deliberately enhance their out-
reaching social skills, whilst others, for a variety of reasons, use various
strategies to distance themselves from people or to withdraw into them-
selves. I shall go on to explore the way Eastern techniques, in particular,
can be used to alter these apparently opposite inclinations – to either
“connect” with others or to retreat from them.
Much has been written about the manner in which children learn
to socialize as they grow up. Establishing “healthy” roles and social
456 MICHAEL DELMONTE

links is seen as a prerequisite to mental health. Those of us who are

unable to form and sustain intimate affiliations are usually perceived as
having serious emotional problems – but so are those whose emotional
bonds are overly dependent. In other words, extremes in emotional dis-
tance, that is, being too closely enmeshed in a dependent way or, at the
other end of the scale, being excessively self-reliant, are considered
socio-maladaptive in adults (see Birtchnell, 1997).
As already alluded to, we not only become attached to people,
we also form strong attachments to a range of objects and experiences,
such as the taste of certain foods and drinks, the sound of particular
forms of music, our possessions such as childhood toys, paintings, or-
naments, land, houses, money, etc. Moreover, we also become attached
to the non-material realm in terms of our languages, religions, ethnic
groups, theories, ideologies and achievements. We may identify with
such attachments, to the point of describing ourselves in terms of their
labels. So we may characterize ourselves as “communist,” “nationalist,”
“feminist,” “Protestant,” “Orthodox,” “liberal,” “left-wing,” “Afrikaans-
speaking,” “humanist,” etc. We also characterize these attachments in
egotistical terms, e.g. my religion, my flock, my people, my career, my
territory, in my opinion, and so forth, and express strong dislikes of
other identities. So, is our real identity the sum of such potentially divi-
sive, personal attachments, or is this just our mask hiding a deeper es-
sence? We may cling as arduously onto non-material as onto material
attachments, e.g. try persuading an “opinionated” person to change his
mind! Attachments do not always make much rational sense. We can
become attached to, or enmeshed with, other peoples’ difficulties, our
own personal problems and abusive relationships. Attachments can
limit, hold and constrain consciousness to particular viewpoints, atti-
tudes and perspectives. They can imprison and isolate us, and impede
our further development.

8. ATTACHMENT AND LOSS

However, attachment and loss are two sides of the same coin. Nothing
is permanent – all is flux. Much is illusion and even delusion. All in-
vestments are potential losses – if not during our current lifetimes then
certainly upon their physical ends. We all live in the shadow of death –
the ultimate narcissistic blow!? This knowledge – colored by our own
personal history of previous losses (both emotional and material) – has
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 457

as a consequence that we can feel varying degrees of insecurity about

our desired attachments.
Paradoxically, the various objects and people on whom we have
become dependent for our emotional identity and security may also
become the very source of our deepest anxiety, as observed in the
“separation anxiety” linked to their feared loss. Although with emo-
tional attachment comes varying degrees of social support, this support
is often at a price – namely that of burdensome counter demands and
responsibilities! Caring for others can be emotionally draining – not just
rewarding.

9. DEFENSIVE DETACHMENT
Some of us try to avoid this anxiety by means of a “schizoid defence”.
It is likely to be found in those who are fearful of the risks involved in
emotional inter-dependence, often due to past failures and hurts in this
area. This defense is characterized by a contrived emotional detachment
(largely unconscious) based on an exaggerated attitude of personal self-
sufficiency, often where childhood bonding with care-givers was pain-
fully inadequate or insensitive. In the absence of adequate parental at-
tunement and nurturing behavior, emotional self-dependency may be
sought via varying degrees of emotionally insulating and “autonomous”
behavior. An extreme version of this defense could be the affective
“non-attachment” (and non-attunement) found in borderline personality
disorder, where long-term intimacy is too uncomfortable to be sustained
(see Holmes, 1997). However, several variants of defensive isolation, or
extreme egoism, exist. Solipsism, for example, is an intellectual ration-
alization for this cut off stance in life. But is mere withdrawal adequate?
How can one really enjoy such false “escapism” when surrounded by
others who may be in pain? This issue of defensive detachment shall be
expanded on later. (See “Problems with Detachment and Dis-
identification”).

10. ADAPTIVE DIS-IDENTIFICATION

Not all forms of detachment are mal-adaptive defenses. Some psycho-
therapists deliberately encourage a form of non-attachment as a way of
coping with potential loss. For example, both Assagioli (1965) and,
later, Holmes (1997) refer to the strategy of “dis-identification” when
458 MICHAEL DELMONTE

dealing with psychic pain (see earlier “Mindfulness and Dis-

identification”). Assagioli’s viewpoint was similar to that of those Bud-
dhists who perceive our tendency to identify in a clinging way with
objects of our desire as ultimately leading to the pain of their actual or
imagined loss. He described cognitive exercises to encourage the devel-
opment of a mental set of “dis-identification” as a counter-force in cop-
ing with this tendency to over-invest and to over-identify ourselves with
our physical bodies, emotions, thoughts, etc., and with our attachments
in general. The objective of Assagioli’s “dis-identification” exercises is
to be less at the mercy of our longings, wishes and desires. One finds an
echo here of the Buddhist dictum, already referred to, that craving is the
source of suffering. Mindfulness training can raise awareness of our
acquisatorial nature and help liberate us from the slavery of endless
grasping, of which contemporary materialism and consumerism are
obvious hedonistic examples. For Freud (1900, 1912, and 1930) the pull
of the pleasure principle is not freedom, and is only one side of a dual-
ism – the other side being the displeasure which inevitably follows in
the heels of pleasure seeking. Psychological freedom also comes from
letting go of defensive and reactionary views, and from moving above
polarised construing as in “them versus us” attitudes.
Let us now look at a non-clinical example of dis-identification.
The exile is an interesting case, especially if he, or she, comes from a
poorly understood cultural background or ethnic group. Being an exile
in a foreign land often means that one’s former cultural identity has to
be suspended while a new one is being constructed. Todorov (1996)
refers to the latter process as acculturisation. Here we should also speak
of de-constructing one’s former persona (or de-culturisation) and devel-
oping a new identity (or mask?). This can be a painful process, charac-
terized by considerable nostalgia for lost familiarities and by obses-
sional reminiscing about the lost world in an attempt to keep it mentally
alive while we construct a new one. But this process is rarely fully
complete, so that one is left as a transcultural hybrid betwixt two
worlds. Rather than view this new state of affairs as a failure, it could
on the contrary be seen as an adaptive dynamic in which one’s identity
is “elastic.“ Fixity gives way to resilient flexibility in which acquisitions
(identifications) are constantly being balanced by losses (dis-
identifications) to produce a freshly evolving self.
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 459

11. NON-ATTACHMENT TECHNIQUES OF THE ORIENT

In the Orient there is a long tradition going back thousands of years
linked to Hinduism, Taoism and Buddhism, of using various techniques
such as meditation, Yoga, Tai-chi, Qi-gong and so forth to achieve al-
tered mental states characterized by equanimity and non-grasping, by
moving beyond (i.e. "transcending”) the issues and problems onto
which our thoughts can “stick” (see Mascaro, 1962; DelMonte, 1995a;
DelMonte, 2000). Meditation, Hatha Yoga, and Qi-gong exercises can
be used to focus on bodily posture, breathing and the contents of one’s
mind. They (like the use of Zen Koans) also play down the value of
intellectualization, rationalization and other aspects of what is known as
“shi-shen” in ancient Chinese Qi-gong. Shi-shen, or conceptual knowl-
edge, must be balanced by “yuan-shen” which lies beyond conceptual
consciousness, yet permeates all aspects of life – being its very source.
Yuan-shen is seen as the dynamic force inherent in “Qi”. Qi could be
referred to as “vital energy” in the West. Yuan-shen, being essentially
ineffable, is difficult to symbolize, e.g. to put into words. During medi-
tation and Koan contemplation one tries to side-step the discursive mind
with its focus on conceptual knowledge or shi-shen. The periods of
meditative “no thought” characterized by stillness, silence and openness
may present opportunities to experience the ineffable yuan-shen re-
ferred to above. Moreover, yuan-shen may be phenomenologically simi-
lar to Jung’s (1958) “collective unconscious”, namely a vast, loose, pre-
verbal, pre-conscious and inchoate transpersonal resource of vast poten-
tial. This resource can be “tapped into” more readily by the use of cer-
tain techniques such as meditation in which the chattering conceptual
mind is temporarily silenced. Lose thy mind and come to thy senses – in
the here and now! (See “Gestalt Therapy Perspective”).
Dorcas argued that meditation and Qi-gong are similar insofar
as they both use attentional concentration and mindfulness to tune the
mind to “an advanced level of consciousness, in which the divisions
between subject and object cease to exist, the division between me and
not me melts away and in which one feels at one with the entire uni-
verse" (Dorcas, 1996, p.13). This advanced state of consciousness is
also hallmarked by “choiceless awareness” (Krisnamurti, 1991) in so far
as such awareness implies a non-seeking and non-clutching approach to
the contents of perception.
Bearing the above train of thought in mind, a distinction can
usefully be made between “detachment”, which implies detaching, i.e.
460 MICHAEL DELMONTE

withdrawing interest or giving up something previously valued on the

one hand, and “non-attachment” on the other, which implies a more
neutral or non-grasping stance whilst accepting, in a non-possessive
manner, all of that which momentarily forms part of our experiential
world. Whereas detachment can seem anti-social, non-attachment does
not imply a lack of compassion, nor indifference to the world or to the
lot of others. Detachment can also be seen as harboring strong defensive
undertones and may have little to do with maturing through life’s ex-
periences – be they work or love related.

12. MINDFULNESS MEDITATION PRACTICE

Advanced practitioners of meditation often focus their attention on the
phenomenology of consciousness by means of introspective mindful-
ness (see DelMonte, 1995a; Kabat-Zinn, 2005). With mindfulness tech-
niques the meditator is encouraged to maintain “a quiet awareness,
without comment, of whatever happens to be here and now” (Watts,
1957). The objective of mindfulness meditation is “to come to know
one’s own mental processes, to thus begin to have the power to shape or
control the mental processes, and finally to gain freedom from the con-
dition where the mental processes are unknown and uncontrolled, with
the individual at the mercy of his own unbridled mind” (Deatherage,
1975, p.134). Hendricks (1975) sees such introspection as a form of
discrimination training which helps meditators to observe their own
thoughts in a relatively detached way. He speculates that “since nearly
everyone has a certain number of neurotic thoughts mental health is
dependent upon the ability to recognize that they are “just thoughts”
(p.145). This approach can be applied to depressive, anxious and obses-
sive cognitions, and several authors have done just that (e.g. Kabat-
Zinn, 1996; Teasdale, 2000).
A variant of meditative mindfulness (analytic mindfulness
meditation) can also used to observe the psychic nature of felt attach-
ments, with their complex interwoven webs of emotional, cognitive,
attitudinal and behavioral sub-components. In observing the very con-
struction of consciousness in this non-attached (i.e. non-grasping or
non-identificatory manner) practitioners hope, at least temporarily, to
move beyond the pull of their unbridled yearnings and the push of irra-
tional dislikes. Being mindful of the impermanence of all material and
psychic attachments facilitates awareness of the ephemeral nature of our
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 461

personal consciousness, laden as it is with regular eruption of instinctive

craving. Freedom is where craving is converted into mindful choice. If
cravings are invariably suppressed then we are no freer than if we al-
ways yield to them! Full acceptance of “the now,” by neither clinging to
nor rejecting our experiences, is the essence of mindfulness. Its aim is to
free us from our reactionary minds, i.e. minds dominated by raw instinct
and by past conditioning.
Mindfulness meditation encourages an opening to broader con-
sciousness. In this way it is similar to some forms of spiritual practice.
One can say that such meditation favors an opening of our intuitive self.
It fosters this intuitive self over our more driven instinctive self and
reactive conditioned self, as well as over our split-off cerebral self. The
insights gleaned from meditation are not to be limited to personal gain,
but should be transformed into relational acts of kindness, compassion,
respect and tolerance of others. Acceptance of the suchness of reality
does not preclude compassionate work towards improving the lot of
ourselves and of others.

13. THE SILENCE OF MEDITATION

Meditation, with practice, can become very simple. For example, we
can learn to observe the silence within us – if we progress that far. Mo-
ments of timelessness may emerge as may a sense of formlessness. Our
personal experience of timelessness is just a small chip off the eternity
“block,” just as our experience of formlessness yields a sense of infin-
ity. These moments of dwelling in timelessness and formlessness, how-
ever brief they may be, nevertheless yield a sense of unity where the
dualistic discursive mind has suspended its “me/other” construing. By
letting go of dualistic sense-making and just “letting be” one approaches
whatever emerges with increasing equanimity. Deeply silent meditation,
characterized by “no thought” and by a sense of unity, brings us face-to-
face with the unmanifest, i.e. with yet-to-be expressed potential - a real
break from repetitive and predictable thinking.
This dichotomy between the discursive mind and no-thought
does not imply an inherent conflict. Thinking undoubtedly has its value
and place – especially when we use thought and speech to facilitate
informative, creative, humorous or playful communication. Silence, on
the contrary, facilitates communion (Shafii, 1973a), i.e. the meeting of
minds (or rather of “hearts”) non-verbally through intuition, feeling,
462 MICHAEL DELMONTE

empathy and sensation. As Jung pointed out (Jung, 1958) there are four
ways of knowing – i.e., thinking, sensation, feeling and intuition – with
thinking being increasingly favored in contemporary Western culture.
However, with the silence of meditation one uses focussed sensory at-
tention (sensation) to foster the emergence of the intuitive mind.
The practice of silent meditation leading to “no thought” can be
described as the “via negativa” (the empty way) as opposed to the “via
positiva”, which is the more habitual mode as seen daily in our discur-
sive minds. They represent opposite ways of sense making. The path of
meditation (silence) should not seek to negate the mind in action, but
rather to assist in the liberation of one’s self from blind allegiance to our
instinctual impulses, obsessions and compulsions (Freud’s id), and also
from fleeing from our dislikes and fears. It may also free us from the
impoverishment resulting from our maladaptive defenses which primar-
ily serve to limit our awareness, and from judgmental attitudes (Freud’s
“harsh” super-ego). Silence and mindful meditation thus facilitate the
emergence of “creative emptiness” in which “benevolent depersonaliza-
tion” is fostered, i.e. the discarding of unhelpful id and super-ego im-
pulses and control (see Moncayo, 2003 for fuller exposition).

14. SILENCE IN PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

Western insight psychotherapy, compared with Eastern mindfulness
meditation, is a neophyte on the world stage. Both, nevertheless, are
concerned with awareness, in so far as the insight sought from therapy
and the mindfulness emergent from meditation may be similar. How-
ever, most forms of psychotherapy use verbalization as their modus
operandi. A common view held by psychoanalysts is that those who do
not learn to “think through (i.e. to symbolize verbally) are bound to “act
out” and to go on suffering – as with the hysterically inclined who tend
to “feel” too much. Hence we have the “pain-body” (Tolle, 1999), a
somatizing body impoverished in terms of its capacity for reflective
thinking. While one would not dispute that there is great merit in the
“talking cure” approach there is, nevertheless, a growing corpus of
opinion on the value of some fecund silence in therapy. For example,
the obsessionally inclined, in thinking (and often talking) compulsively,
block out feelings, and, in so doing, demonstrate that we cannot always
just “think” our way out of problems. In therapy they typically have
difficulty in being “in touch” with feelings – their own and those of
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 463

others – and are usually very uncomfortable with silence. Hence the
endless chatter, which is often split off from feeling. This is sometimes
pejoratively referred to as “free disassociation” (Perls, et al, 1973) or
split-off intellect. (See Gestalt Therapy Perspective later). These people
may need to learn that speech, just like music, is given deeper meaning
by being punctuated by fertile silence so that something more profound
than words may emerge. According to O’Donoghue (1977) “If you are
outside of yourself, always reaching beyond yourself, you avoid the call
of your own mystery. When you acknowledge the integrity of your soli-
tude, and settle into its mystery, your relationships with others take on a
new warmth, adventure and wonder”. Thereby silence can foster a sense
of compassionate communion.
However, silence on the part of the patient was seen as resis-
tance by Freud (1912). But, Balint (1958) argued that “if we can change
our own approach – from considering silence as a symptom of resis-
tance to studying it as a possible source of information – then we may
learn something about this area of mind”. Later authors saw silence as
indicative of shyness, shame, sorrow, anger, hostility, psychic absence
and fear (Shafii, 1973a; Coltart, 1992). Silence has also been construed,
at times, as adaptive regression to pre-verbal sense-making (as opposed
to malign or psychotic regression – Shafii, 1973a).
The psychoanalyst Coltart (1992) goes as far as saying that “my
own preference above all others, is for a silent patient.“ This may be
because the relatively silent patient allows the analyst ample time to
work with the visceral felt-sense of the counter-transference. It should
come as no surprise that Coltart also described herself as a practitioner
of meditation and Buddhism. This is a long way from Freud who typi-
cally did not work with the counter-transference, and who saw religious
experience, meditation and mysticism as regressive, irrational and mal-
adaptive phenomena, i.e. forms of “oceanic” fusion and oneness with
mother, or the wish to re-experience intra-uterine life (Freud, 1930). To
facilitate the patient in adaptive regression the therapist must also be
capable of silence, e.g. by avoiding premature, aggressive and excessive
interpretations, instructions or comments. In this way pre-verbal trau-
mata can be “re-experienced and mastered again in silence” (Shafii,
1973a).
Dreams also tend to be silent. It is well known that Freud (1900)
described dreams as the “royal road to the unconscious.“ Perhaps less
well known is that Jung (1958) similarly described meditation as a “sort
464 MICHAEL DELMONTE

of a royal road to the unconscious” (p.508). Jung, however, also saw

meditation as a “surrender” to the collective unconscious, as its practice
leads primarily to an indefinite experience of oneness and timelessness,
which according to Jung are hallmarks of the collective unconscious.
Kretschmer (1962) also saw meditation in a similar light, and I quote
“Dreams are similar to meditation except meditation gains the reaction
of the unconscious by a technique which is faster than depending on
dreams” (Kretschmer, p.76). However, it may take several years of
practice to arrive at the adeptness of an “advanced” meditator.
By now it should be obvious that it is not just meditators who
strive to clear the mind of its sticky attachments. Psychoanalysts like
Bion (1970), Shafii (1973a) and Coltart (1992) also see value in ana-
lysts themselves temporarily creating an empty or “fallow” state of
mind during clinical sessions so as to be more receptive to the patient’s
transferences (see DelMonte, 1995b). Bion (1970) advised therapists to
forsake memory, desire and understanding during clinical practice. He
quoted from a letter written by the English poet John Keats in 1817 in
which Keats referred to “negative capability” as “when a man is capable
of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reach-
ing after fact and reason” (Bion, 1970, p.125). Here we see a psycho-
analyst advising his colleagues not to hold too tightly onto one’s profes-
sional opinions and theories when dealing with an individual patient.
This is also a variant of mindful non-attachment. The silent mindfulness
emergent from meditation training allows the analyst to listen more
deeply to their patients, to receive their projections, and to let go of
these projections after the therapy session. Other forms of therapy, in
particular Gestalt therapy, also question the value of too much focus on
verbalization in therapy.

15. GESTALT THERAPY PERSPECTIVE

Perls was influenced by Tao philosophy as well as by Freud, Reich,
Mareno, Gestalt psychology and existentialism. He emphasized per-
sonal responsibility in the resolution of problems. Both Gestalt therapy
and meditation techniques focus on the “hic et nunc” (here and now) of
experience, i.e. both meditation and the various Gestalt techniques play
down the value of verbalization. In fact, Perls, et al (1973) stated that
verbalization, as in free-association, could become a sort of escapist
“free-disassociation” from feelings and emotions. Together with obses-
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 465

sional verbalization, Perls also saw excessive rationalization as a de-

fense against subjective feelings.
Instead, Perls stressed the importance of “contact” and “sens-
ing,” hence his admonition “lose your mind and come to your senses”.
He described many specific techniques, involving sensation, used to
foster awareness. In this regard it is worth noting that Perls defined
himself as an existentialist who applied the phenomenological approach
(Perls, et al, 1973). The phenomenological method used by many exis-
tentialists is a method of subjective inquiry originally developed by
Edmund Husserl and later used by Martin Heidegger as a means to ex-
amine one’s immediate experience. It has to do with a critical and scru-
pulous inspection of one’s mental processes and one’s consciousness. It
involves an attempt to exclude all assumptions about external causes of
internal phenomena. (See DelMonte, 1989, for a fuller discussion of
phenomenology and existentialism). As existentialist phenomenology
concerns subjective awareness without prejudice (prejudgment) it could
be argued that it closely resembles the technique of mindfulness medita-
tion in that the latter is purportedly characterized by a de-automatization
of experience (i.e. the dropping or suspension of perceptual and cogni-
tive habits). With both the mindfulness and phenomenological methods
one strives for a permeable (or open) stance to the flux of consciousness
without trying to punctuate any experience had. In this way both meth-
ods are typified by what Perls calls “confluence”, i.e. the absence of
figure/background contrasts.
In both meditation and Gestalt therapy the observer role is val-
ued. For example, Perls encouraged patients to observe tension and
anxiety and not to engage in “pre-mature relaxation.“ In other words,
Perls promoted “approach techniques” rather than avoidance. In the
same way in mindfulness meditation one is encouraged to observe
steadfastly one's moods, feelings, thoughts, and so forth in a non-
attached and non-judgmental way, i.e. neither clinging to them nor
pushing them away.
Perls, like Schwartz (1983) and many practitioners of medita-
tion saw awareness per se as being therapeutic. This even included awa-
reness of simply “being” for which he used his “internal silence” and
“make a void” techniques. Perls acknowledged an influence from Tao
philosophy here, and the similarity between Perls’s internal silence
technique and the “no thought” strategy of concentrative meditation is
466 MICHAEL DELMONTE

striking (See earlier and DelMonte, 1990, for a fuller discussion on “no
thought”).
Perls also used breathing exercises similar to those found in
breath meditation. Both involve paying attention to one’s breathing. In
Gestalt therapy there are also exercises for focusing on anxiety, panic,
depression, fatigue, psychosomatic symptoms and behavioral problems
– all in order to “integrate” and resolve them, thus leading to Gestalt
“closure.“ Likewise, mindfulness is increasingly being used with a simi-
lar range of psychological disorders (Kabat-Zinn, 1996, 2005; Teasdale,
2000). Finally, it has been argued by McGee, et al., (1984) that those
experiences which are too threatening to one’s core psychological func-
tioning may be suspended as “unexperienced experiences,” i.e. without
being fully processed or integrated at a conscious level. Such experi-
ences remain akin to the “unfinished business,” the “unfulfilled needs”
or the “incomplete Gestalten” of Gestalt therapy. These incomplete
Gestalten tend to be at low levels of awareness and “acted out” behav-
iorally or hysterically in order to be communicated or when trying to
achieve closure. In this sense the symptoms of hysteria are seen to be
functional and symbolic (Szasz, 1972). It may be that the weakening of
one's cognitive defenses during Gestalt exercises, free association and
meditation facilitates the abreactive emergence of incomplete Gestalten
(or repressed material). Following abreaction, patients can check on any
emotions that they have just experienced. Such enquiry should enable
the client to put some verbal structure onto these preverbal feelings. By
learning to put verbal form on feeling the client is in a better position to
discuss his or her experiences with others – including the therapist. Put-
ting verbal form on feelings, i.e. labeling them is also an aspect of con-
structivist psychotherapy.

16. PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY APPROACH

George Kelly (1955) saw man as living in two realities, firstly the real-
ity beyond human perception and secondly our interpretations or per-
sonal constructions, as he would put it, of this primary reality. For
Kelly, man is like a scientist developing bi-polar constructs in order to
make sense of the world by looking for repetitive patterns of similarity
and difference among a series of events occurring through time. Even as
infants, before we acquire language, we construe events dichotomously
via bi-polar discriminations such as “milk versus not milk”, “mother
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 467

versus other,” “thick versus thin,” “hot versus cold,” and so forth.
Therefore, initially these discriminations or constructs are pre-verbal,
that is, they have not been verbally labeled. Although a growing child
learns to attach verbal labels to many such discriminations, much of
adult construing remains non-verbal (or somatic). As each person
moves along the dimension of time he, or she, develops his or her own
personal construct system to be used in the anticipation of events. The
construct systems of “normal” individuals are constantly being “up-
dated” in the light of newly assimilated evidence. Such accommodation
or revision of our construct systems allows for a better fit with primary
reality.
As McWilliams (1984) postulates, both Buddhist psychology
and personal construct theory acknowledge that normal human under-
standing of the universe involves the use of dualistic dimensions to
make sense of a unitary universe. Buddhist approaches would empha-
size the need to see through this illusion of duality via practices such as
mindfulness meditation. On the other hand, constructivist psychologists
would focus on the reality of a more sophisticated and more effective
personal construct system in order to be able to more accurately predict
events. Buddhists and many Eastern writers such as De Mello (1990)
would see suffering as stemming from our desire to force the unitary
world to conform to our dualistic and egocentric cravings, beliefs and
values. A fundamental concern about dualistic construing is that it cre-
ates conceptual divisions and boundaries in a universe that Buddhists
postulate to be inherently holistic, unitary and in flux. Thinking tends
towards dualism. Concepts tend to fragment reality. Different languages
fragment reality in their own unique ways, rendering exact translations
impossible. As McWilliams says, “to the extent that we attend to con-
ventional, dichotomous, ideas about the universe, we are taken away
from direct, immediate experience of the universe”. McWilliams con-
tends that the Buddhist viewpoint is that it is possible to transcend the
delusion of our self-invented dualistic world, and, in seeing the trans-
parency of our construct system, experience a greater sense of unity
(with the universe). Such an experience comes from an awareness of
how we personally construct our subjective view of this greater reality.
This awareness may be unfolded through mindfulness meditation prac-
tice. An aim of this practice is to put us in touch with the inter-
penetration and the inter-dependence of all forms of life, and also with
compassion and “inter-being” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1975, 1991, 2003).
468 MICHAEL DELMONTE

Kelly was adamant on the notion of bi-polarity of constructs.

One always abstracts on the basis of both similarity and contrast. Di-
chotomy is seen as an essential feature (and limitation) of thinking it-
self. Whilst Kelly says that one can transcend one’s biography and not
become a victim of circumstance, one can only do this through develop-
ing alternative constructs. One never escapes from one’s construct sys-
tem, but always assimilates the world through it or through its elabora-
tions. Thus, when one transcends a particular bi-polarity, one tends to
climb to a higher and more abstract level, but to a level which, nonethe-
less, is structured in bi-polar terms. It may be that some meditation and
yoga approaches are directly or indirectly attempting to elaborate the
non-verbal construing of the person so that it supersedes the verbally-
labeled constructions. From this point of view one could initially be
talking about “descendence” from the psyche to the soma, rather than
transcendence. One, therefore, has to distinguish between descendence,
ascendence and transcendence. Descendence implies moving “down”
from cognitive to pre-verbal or somatic construing. In psychodynamic
terms this is known as adaptive regression as opposed to psychotic re-
gression. Here there may be a gradual decrease in the level of cognition
(thinking) right down to the unconscious level. Ascendence, on the
other hand, describes a movement “up” to a higher and more abstract
bi-polar construct, i.e. to super-ordinate construing within one’s per-
sonal construct system. Such super-ordinate construing may, if taken far
enough, be seen as the supra-conscious (Assogioli, 1965) and may also
become difficult to verbalize. Transcendence, as in “no-thought”, is the
feeling of unity or bliss when the meditator has the experience that he or
she has transcended the bi-polarity of all construing – but nonetheless is
still construing at a very basic somatic level in terms of balance, pos-
ture, respiration, osmo-regulation, blood pressure and other vital aspects
of one’s metabolism. Transcendence is, therefore, where the person
recovers his or her non-verbal sense of “oneness” by not confusing the
duality of our personal bi-polar construing with the essential unity of
greater reality. Both ascendance and descendence, in so far that they
side-step the bi-polar thinking mind, may involve varying degrees of
transcendence.
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 469

17. PROBLEMS WITH DETACHMENT AND DIS-IDENTIFICATION

As I mentioned earlier, there are individuals whose attachments are
problematic, being either, too intense and overly dependent, or in the
other direction, practically non-existent. Does meditation ever encour-
age an exaggerated introverted stance to the external world, at times
bordering on pathological dissociation and fostering social isolation, i.e.
the avoidance, or even rejection, of the relational domain?
Epstein (1990) thought that meditation could lead to “narcissis-
tic emptiness” as ego-strivings aimed at the external world are negated.
Castillo (1990), in a similar vein, could see excessive meditation prac-
tice as leading to pathological de-realization and de-personalization as
both the external world and the self are eschewed. These comments
shall be returned to later.
So what is it about Eastern techniques, like meditation, that may
lead to these concerns? Are there any parallels with Western techniques
such as hypnosis in general and auto-hypnosis in particular? For exam-
ple, Wang (1998) described similarities between “internal Qi-gong” and
self-hypnosis. Both can be used to raise finger temperature, an indicator
of relaxation (Song, 1998). It can also be argued that adaptive dissocia-
tive processes may be operative, to varying degrees, in meditation, hyp-
nosis and Qi-gong. All require a capacity for relaxed absorbed attention
in the practitioner which is directed inwards and away from external
stimuli.
Those forms of meditation which employ a relaxed posture, clo-
sed eyes and the rhythmical and monotonous repetition of a mantra,
encourage a shift away from one’s habitual construing of external real-
ity towards a trance-like state in which suggestibility may be enhanced
(see DelMonte, 1981; 1984b). Thus mantra meditation, like hypnotic
induction, can weaken one’s ability to marshal one’s cognitive defenses,
thereby encouraging partial dissociation between external reality and
one’s inner world dominated by memories, fantasies, wishes, desires,
and the like. It has also been argued that turning attention away from the
external world facilitates an exploration of the internal realm, including
the unconscious and archetypal imagery in the Jungian sense (see Del-
Monte 1995a, 1995b). Such an exploration would usually be seen as
“adaptive” regression. Adaptive regression operates in the “service of
the ego” (Shafii, 1973b). It purportedly leads to a fuller familiarity with
one’s internal world.
470 MICHAEL DELMONTE

18. PATHOLOGICAL REGRESSION

Adaptive regression can be contrasted with “pathological” regression.
The practice of meditation is typically associated with adaptive regres-
sion, but it can also lead to pathological regression, i.e. back to primi-
tive psychic functioning with those who are emotionally vulnerable and
probably in need of psychotherapy prior to taking up meditation. The
practice of meditation can, especially with novices, increase suggestibil-
ity (DelMonte, 1981). The monotonous repetition of a mantra, the re-
laxed posture and the reduced sensory input all tend to increase regres-
sive mentation and hence facilitate a relaxation of one’s cognitive, e.g.
intellectual, defenses.
This regression can become pathological with some individuals
when it no longer serves healthy ego functions nor Eros (love, the life-
force or Qi), but instead becomes fixated on the id, or worse still, on
Thanatos (the death-drive, i.e. the wish to return to an undemanding
pre-incarnate state). It is thus not surprising that several decades ago
Alexander (1931) described meditation as a “sort of artificial schizo-
phrenia with complete withdrawal of libidinal interest from the outside
world” (Alexander, p.30). He is referring to the meditators’ attempted
non-attachment to desires and drives, and to their avoidance of ego-
gratification. Here people can be split off emotionally from others, from
meaningful relationships and escape from troublesome aspects of social
life into isolated self-absorption. This fostered (maladaptive) dissocia-
tion between the self and one’s surroundings can, for those at risk, lead
to de-realization, as one becomes estranged from once-familiar aspects
of the external world. It can also lead to defensive de-personalization as
the (often excessive) meditator may dis-identify from his or her periph-
eral social constructs (and even to some degree from one’s personal
constructs) and thus increasingly withdraw into a minimalist core disso-
ciated from the external trappings of selfhood and devoid of the neces-
sary motivation to deal with outside demands. The twin effects of such
avoiditive de-realization and de-personalization can amount to a prema-
ture dis-engagement from life in which relationships – both of the
“heart” and of work – are neglected in favor of an obsession with the
complexity of one’s internal space. Here meditation, in some cases, may
lead more to self-absorption than to self-awareness. Such self-
absorption has little to do with either creative de-personalization or with
adaptive “transcendence.“ As it lacks compassion for, and social en-
gagement with, others the relational aspect of growth is neglected.
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 471

19. THE VULNERABLE

Not everybody is suitable, i.e. ready for meditation. In the West, those
who take up meditation tend to be more anxious, neurotic and to report
more problems than the population at large (DelMonte, 1990). Those
with dissociated-identity disorders, as well as psychotic, narcissistic,
very shy, schizoid, paranoid and socially phobic individuals, i.e. those
who are already having difficulties in the social domain, and whose
ability to “read” other people’s emotions and to empathize is impaired,
may inadvertently come to use meditation as a schizoid defense to es-
cape even further from others and end up feeling even less connected
and thus more isolated.
Furthermore, immature or traumatized people with very poorly
integrated personalities may use meditation to “escape” into a split off
sub-personality which is less orientated to the outside world. In other
words, when meditation practice induces solitary escapist dissociation,
poorly adapted “alter-egos” may emerge in those whose personalities
only hold together rather loosely.
It thus is argued that the deliberate fostering of non-attachment
to the external world, i.e. to mundane reality, may lead to a pathological
detachment (or indifference) in those who are already emotionally and
socially frail. Likewise, deliberate dis-identification from the contents
of one’s consciousness can also be used as a mal-adaptive defense by
those whose self-identity has remained under-developed and never blos-
somed. In other words, when special techniques are used to foster non-
attachment and dis-identification this can, for some, have varying de-
grees of pathological dissociation as its outcome. This is not to argue
against the obvious benefits of adaptive non-attachment, dis-
identification and mindfulness as practised by the majority of medita-
tors However, it does suggest that with more vulnerable individuals, i.e.
those with poor ego-strength, psychotherapy may be indicated to help
build up their ego-strengths before they embark upon prolonged medita-
tion practice, as the latter is about learning to side-step identification
with one’s over-reactionary and egotistic mind. It should be easier to
meditate successfully with a reasonably well-integrated ego. Paradoxi-
cally, one needs considerable ego-strength in order to successfully sus-
pend reactionary ego-functioning by means of meditation.
472 MICHAEL DELMONTE

20. CONCLUSION
In general, practices like meditation, Hatha Yoga, Qi-gong, Gestalt
therapy and some forms of insight–orientated psychotherapy, by en-
couraging quiet adaptive introspection, circumspection and mindful-
ness, can, with many people, serve psychological growth (Eros) by en-
couraging the development of a more reflective self through an explora-
tion of the conditioned and furtive aspects of consciousness, and of the
clutching nature of our attachments and of our dualistic obsessional
thinking. The resultant self-awareness should help clarify our desires
and choices.
However, all techniques can be used inappropriately by the vul-
nerable. Thus meditation can encourage dis-engagement and de-
motivation with respect to the external world and lead to an escape into
an inner-self, to the detriment of social engagement, emotional attach-
ments and cathecses. Here neither love nor work satisfaction can be
properly experienced, as the individual in the premature grasp of Thana-
tos forgoes compassion and the interactional aspect of living. Life does
involve taking risks, both with attachments and with the building up of
a sense of self-identity – even if death shall finally transform all physi-
cal and mental attachments into naught (or into the spiritual domain?).
The fear that nothing of the body and of the mind (like castles in the
sand) can survive in their present forms prompts many of us to try to
transcend these passing aspects of experience in a quest for something
durable beyond the dance of earthly impressions. However, the defen-
sive pursuit of escapist “transcendence” can itself become a form of
selfish ego-striving. Such escapist “transcendence” is really a culti-
vated, but maladaptive, form of dissociation.
The dilemma facing all of us as self-conscious and reflective be-
ings is, how to build up and forge an internal sense of self, how person-
ally and socially to sustain this fragile sense of self and attain a continu-
ity of deeper identity, while living in the shadow of impermanence and
dis-continuity. The ancient practices of meditation, Yoga and the like,
as well as the contemporary practices of Gestalt therapy, constructivist
and psychodynamic psychotherapies, offer us some choice out of many
possible approaches in dealing with this challenge; but no approach is
without its own limits and risks. Balance is required in dealing with this
dilemma.
Our quest for knowledge and fulfillment has two principal ori-
entations – namely those typified by introversion and those by extraver-
 EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 473

sion. Both are valuable and neither should be neglected. It is a question

of equilibrium. Introversion naturally implies introspection and elabora-
tion of our subjectivity and self-awareness, whereas extraversion in-
volves circumspection and adaptation to cultural reality, thereby en-
hancing social awareness. Such extraverted social adaptation more typi-
cally occurs during the first half of life. On the other hand, with intro-
spection one is connected inwardly with our essence, i.e. the mystery of
the self (- a microcosm of the universe?). Such introspection tends to
become more important to us as we age, but can be precipitated at any
stage of life if in crisis.
Circumspection is the sine qua non of enhancing our sense of
relatedness to external form, i.e. to social convention and to “languag-
ing”. Inwardness (i.e. subjectivity) and outwardness (i.e. objectivity)
can be complementary. (Also see Nino, 1997, on this topic). Put psy-
chodynamically, self-psychology should be balanced by object rela-
tions. It may be tempting to escape from harsh external reality by taking
refuge inwardly into illusions and even delusions. Likewise, one can
remain in exile from one’s true core-self by being overly adapted to and
concerned with external reality, and by developing a false self or fa-
cade. Bridging the chasm between our inner and outer worlds allows for
a two-way flow that enriches both in the process, and brings them more
into harmonious alignment. This is the nature of our connection with the
social and physical worlds of which we form a part.
A final point is that the Western obsessive focus on individual-
ism, with the forging of a strong individual identity, can create a neuro-
sis around the loss of this over-valued persona or mask. When we iden-
tify with this mask we are identified with a limited and false self. The
traditional Eastern emphasis on developing a social sense of collective
identity, i.e. an awareness of social inter-penetration, which does not
overly focus on individualism, may facilitate attempts to dis-identify
from over-invested egoism. The aim of meditation, Yoga, (and other
Eastern techniques) and some forms of psychotherapy is not to become
atomised emotional islands, but rather to be more in touch with the per-
sonal, social and spiritual aspects of living. Some individuals also use
mindfulness meditation to foster a personal relationship with the spiri-
tual domain, and as a preparation for an after-life. However, this quest
is enhanced by wholeheartedly including the relational aspect of our
spirituality in our daily living by practising compassion, loving kind-
ness, inter-being and the like. We can thereby evolve our capacity to
474 MICHAEL DELMONTE

perceive, and to relate to, the deeper essences in both ourselves and in
others.

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 CONTRIBUTORS

Orna Almogi Universität Hamburg, Asien-Afrika-

Institut, Edmund-Siemens-Allee 1,
D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
ornaalmogi@yahoo.de
John Baker Moorpark College, Life Sciences
Department, 7075 Campus Road,
Moorpark, CA 93021, USA
johnbaker@vcccd.net; momoy@juno.com
Karl Baier Universität Wien, Institut für Christliche
Philosophie, Freyung 6a/2/4,
A-1010 Vienna, Austria
karl.baier@univie.ac.at
Michael M. DelMonte St. Edmundsbury Hospital, Lucan, County
Dublin, Ireland
pmdelmo@gofree.indigo.ie
Dagmar Eigner Medizinische Universität Wien, Institut für
Geschichte der Medizin, Währingerstrasse
25, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
dagmar.eigner@meduniwien.ac.at
Vincent Eltschinger Österreichische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Institut für Kultur- und
Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-
Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
vincent.eltschinger@assoc.oeaw.ac.at
Eli Franco Universität Leipzig, Institut für Indologie
und Zentralasienwissenschaften, Schiller-
strasse 6, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany
franco@uni-leipzig.de
Shulamith Kreitler Tel Aviv University, Department of
Psychology, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
krit@netvision.net.il
Anne MacDonald Universität Wien, Institut für Südasien-,
Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Uni-
Campus AAKh, Hof 2.1, Spitalgasse 2-4,
482 CONTRIBUTORS

A-1090 Vienna, Austria

Anne.MacDonald@univie.ac.at
Lawrence McCrea Cornell University, Department of Asian
Studies, 370 Rockefeller Hall, Ithaca NY
14853, USA
ljm223@cornell.edu
Philipp Maas Universität Wien, Institut für Südasien-,
Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Uni-
Campus AAKh, Hof 2.1, Spitalgasse 2-4,
A-1090 Vienna, Austria
phmaas@arcor.de
Marion Rastelli Österreichische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Institut für Kultur- und
Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-
Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
marion.rastelli@oeaw.ac.at
Diana Riboli Fotomara 93-93
11745 Neos Kosmos
Athens, Greece
dianariboli@gmail.com
John Taber University of New Mexico, Philosophy
Department, MSC 03 2140, Albuquerque,
NM 87131-0001, USA
jataber@unm.edu
Marcus Schmücker Österreichische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Institut für Kultur- und
Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-
Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
marcus.schmuecker@oeaw.ac.at
Renaud van Universität Koblenz-Landau. Mailing
Quekelberghe address: Dürkheimerstr. 140a,
D-67227 Frankenthal, Germany
rvanq@web.de
 CONTRIBUTORS 483

Dorji Wangchuk Universität Hamburg, Asien-Afrika-

Institut, Edmund-Siemens-Allee 1,
D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
dorji.wangchuk@uni-hamburg.de