HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO VS.

THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 96681, December 02, 1991

Facts:

The Commission on Human Rights has also made plain its intention to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits. It
intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction on the issue of striking teachers. The striking teachers filed a complaint in
CHR that they were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of
administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors.

Issue:

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to take cognizance of the subject-matter for the same purposes of
hearing and adjudication?

Ruling:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA) VS.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. NO. 155336, July 21, 2006

Facts:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable
to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The CHR forwarded said
staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and
Management [DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin
Diokno denied the request

Issue:

Whether or not the approval by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation
and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR

Ruling:

This Court is convinced that the ConCom had intended to grant to the respondent
the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations automatically and regularly
released, but nothing more. Only recognized the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary; the
constitutional commissions, namely, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Audit, and the Commission on Elections; and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respondent is conspicuously left out of the enumeration. Respondent CHR as a
constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to
the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations;
nonetheless, its entire reclassification scheme remains subject to the approval of the
DBM. No pronouncement as to costs.
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 100150, January 05, 1994
Facts:

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon
City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor. In
said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12
July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. On 12
July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners. The
CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

Issue:

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to take cognizance of the subject-matter for the same purposes of
hearing and adjudication?

Ruling:

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for
a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
G.R. No. 155336 - COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ...

Facts:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998.  It provided for Special Provisions
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.  The CHR
forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a
request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the
request

Issue:

Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and

reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of
Budget and Management?

Ruling:

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification. Nor is there any legal basis to
support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.  In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law.  It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may
require from time to time. All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal
autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992

Facts:

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and
Pedro Ordoñez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint
complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and
remedies" (“Katarungan at iba pang tulong”).  The CHR conducted an investigation
of the complaint. According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers,
filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their
human rights.  The CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th
PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from
committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders
from the Commission and to appear before the Commission. EPZA filed in the CHR
a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and
temporary restraining orders. CHR contends that its principal function under Section
18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation"

Issue:

CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against

supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from
continuing the acts complained of?

Ruling:

The Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power ‘to investigate,’ cannot
and should not ‘try and resolve on the merits. CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue
the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.  
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. SENATOR JOVITO R.
SALONGA

G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989

Facts:

On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner

Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights."
The President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988 extended to petitioner
Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission.  On 9 January
1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information and
documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) is to be made with or without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments

Ruling:

Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not

among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16. Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the
Commission on Appointments. The Commission on Appointments has no jurisdiction
under the Constitution to review appointments by the President of Commissioners of
the Commission on Human Rights.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR.

G.R. NO. 153675, April 19, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-
95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one's liberty.

Issue:

Whether or not bail can be granted in extradition cases

Ruling:

Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee's rights to
life, liberty, and due process.

CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, ET AL. VS. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA

G.R. No. 134855, July 02, 2002

Facts:

On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known as
the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of
the Philippine National Police (PNP). SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes made a public
disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the eleven suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were instead summarily executed. The
Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject
incident.  SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate
hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government's Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Petitioners contend that under Section
3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2
dela Cruz, are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection program
even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers.

Issue:

Whether or not the law enforcers may be admitted into the witness protection
program

Ruling:

It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the present case, it is clear that the
legislative intent that the proviso under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981 does not apply
to Section 4. Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d), a
witness in a legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer,
may be admitted into the Program subject only to the requirements provided for
under Section 4.

DIRECTOR EDMUNDO S. ANCOG VS. JUDGE JOSE Z. TAN

A.M. No. MTJ-93-753, October 12, 1993

Facts:

In a letter dated 14 January 1993, Director Edmundo S. Ancog of the Human Rights
Commission charged respondent Judge Jose Z. Tan of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, with gross ignorance of the law in issuing an order for
the arrest of one Joel Navarete on the basis of hearsay evidence and in violation of
Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as a consequence of which Joel
Navarete was arrested and incarcerated for twenty-two (22) days. Respondent
Judge openly admits that he "inadvertently issued the warrant of arrest" or
"committed a mistake" in issuing it and that such issuance was based on his "honest
impression" that accused Joel Navarete "was also involved in the commission of the
crime."

Issue:

Whether or not respondent extreme penalty penalty for the deprivation of the liberty
of the subject person may not be imposed upon respondent

Ruling:

No. There is no allegation of malice in the issuance of the warrant for his arrest, nor
allegations that the said accused was totally innocent of the crime charged. On the
other hand, had the wife of accused Mate been presented before respondent during
the preliminary investigation, this complaint would have no leg to stand on. As a
matter of fact, after realizing to have committed a mistake, respondent had to order
the dismissal of the case against Joel Navarete. For ignorance of the law governing
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the Court hereby imposes upon respondent
Judge JOSE Z. TAN a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted
from his terminal leave pay.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. VS. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

Facts:

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of

more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in
behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC.
arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country. MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense,
contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article
and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an
expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to
cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for damages

Ruling:

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel
or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. In the
present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among
the Muslims were particularly defamed. Liability does not arise from mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, VS. CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO

G.R. No. L-53622, April 25, 1980

Facts:

This is not the first time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to this Tribunal by way of
a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to
travel. Travel Processing Center disagrees with the issuance.

Issue:

Whether or not certificate of eligibility to travel be granted

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its function

conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the
right to travel. In the address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos
before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last Tuesday, April 22,
1980, he emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights.  The freedom
to travel is certainly one of the most cherished. 
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, ET AL. VS. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA
G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005

Facts:

On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US
District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino
citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos
regime. The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the
proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed
that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary
estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was
proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. Respondent judge opined that contrary
to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed
capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign
court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not subject matter of the complaint is capable of pecuniary estimation

Ruling:

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country

merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally
accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave
concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the
value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will
almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the
applicable laws and standards of the forum. We cannot very well require that the
filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined by
the standards of the country where it is located. Thus, only the blanket filing fee of
minimal amount is required.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010

Facts:

The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-
list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad be accredited as party-list representative

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements
for accreditation. Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine
courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court's analysis. We
explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to
electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. JUDGE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

G.R. No. 117733, September 05, 1997

Facts:

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider that the issuance and implementation
of the reference order of the Hawaii court violated the sovereignty of the Philippines
and impinged on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.
Petitioner seeks to establish such a “right” by claiming that since the probate court
was the first to take cognizance of the settlement of the Marcos estate then pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, it exercises jurisdiction thereon to the
exclusion of all other courts; and that, accordingly, the District Court of Hawaii cannot
assert jurisdiction over the assets of said estate.

Issue:

Whether or not trial court committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:

No. Because the international law principles are clear and agreed upon by all
nations, this judicial action does not have the capacity of disrupting foreign relations
between the concerned countries. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines can state without hesitation or reservation that its foreign relations with
the United States will not be adversely affected if these human rights claims against
Ferdinand Marcos are heard in U.S. courts; and, in fact, relations may well be
improved if Filipino citizens see that justice is available in U.S. courts.
ROGELIO ABERCA, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER
G.R. No. 69866, April 15, 1988

Facts:

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM
raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts;
that all violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants
alleging that plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended

Issue:

Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution

Ruing:

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. We find merit in
petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et al. VS. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY
G.R. No. 158088, July 06, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the

Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to
transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." Petitioners interpret Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the
Senate.

Issue:

Whether or not the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate

Ruling:

Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine

representative with ratification.  It should be underscored that the signing of the
treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process.  As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties.   It is
usually performed by the state's authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. 
Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence,
to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit
a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994

Facts:

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint [2] with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area. The City Government of Caloocan claims that
it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare
provision of the Local Government Code. On the basis of said contention, it
questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist
order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City
Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

Issue:

Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a “cease and desist” order

Ruling:

While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers.[26] In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter
as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a “cease and desist order” is,
perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency. It
is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health
as a fundamental human right.

Sec of Justice vs Lantion

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 159940, February 16, 2005

Facts:

On July 31, 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente and Jose
Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by
the Ombudsman. The CSC approved the appointments on the condition that for the
appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service
Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB. Petitioner subsequently
reclassified several positions by Resolution No. 02-03 dated August 18, 2003
including Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified to Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officer III. The Ombudsman thereupon requested the approval of
the proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified positions. Subsequently,
the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of August 28, 2003, changed the status of
Carandang’s and Clemente’s appointments to permanent effective June 6, 2003, but
not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he “has not met the eligibility
requirements.

Issue:

Whether or not De Jesus is eligible for the position

Ruling:
It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus
possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in
the earlier quoted Qualification Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the
ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made
permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear
encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing
authority.
ISIDRO T. HILDAWA VS. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

G.R. No. 67766, August 14, 1985

Facts:

Petitioners pray that a "preliminary injunction issue directing respondents to recall

the crimebusters and restraining them from fielding police teams or any of this sort
with authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the order of respondents
fielding crimebusters null and void and making the injunction permanent." They
alleged that the formation and fielding of secret marshals and/or crimebusters with
absolute authority to kill thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets and slashers are
violative of the provisions of the New Constitution

Issue:

Whether or not the formation of special operation teams is unconstitutional

Ruling:

It is lawful on the part of respondents to form special operation teams of whatever

name they may be called to combat the upsurge of crimes against passengers of
public utility vehicles.  What is disagreeable and cannot be tolerated, for it is
uncivilized, is the license to kill because it is violative of our fundamental law and the
universal human right.  In fact, "no violence or unnecessary force shall be used in
making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint that is necessary for his detention.
LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and
on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the
issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. Petitioner assiduously argues
that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our international obligations, in
particular, the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, 

Issue:

Whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our international
obligations

Ruling:

Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life.

Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital
punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation that
it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".  On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights
Committee issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant
stating that "(while) it follows from Article 6 (2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged
to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular,
to abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

Facts:

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included:  implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment
of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination
and unfair labor practice's

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the SSSEA from striking and
order the striking employees to return to work

Ruling:

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either

petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.  If
there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.  But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like
workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands.  The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner
union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-31195, June 05, 1973

Facts:

Petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was held a demonstration on the

alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm. Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what
they believe were police excesses. Respondent firm prevent the employees from
joining the demonstration.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioners can hold demonstration

Ruling:

Yes. Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim
that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more expedient
for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight
for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the
respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was
pure and simple selfishness, if not greed. Such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and
more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the company nor any of its officers.
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO VS. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 174153, October 25, 2006

Facts:

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) [4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."[6] These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

Issue:

Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

Ruling:

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative.
ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE VS. LYN B. MACALINGAY

G.R. No. 166809, April 22, 2008

Facts:

Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated

October 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office
vehicle assigned to petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance
even if he was using the said vehicle, and that he certified that he did not use any
government vehicle, when in fact he did, in order to collect transportation allowance.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he
failed to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the
opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. [6] Due process
of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court
is not always essential to due process. The constitutional requirement of due
process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency
or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered.  One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. The right to
cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.  Nor is an actual
hearing always essential.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL
JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO
G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the
search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution."[39] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents' exclusionary right. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure,
private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Issue:
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

Ruling:
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under
the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. The
revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the
Philippines is a signatory. However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not
included in the warrant. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless
these items are contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must be returned to the
person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor.
We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

BLAS F. OPLE VS. RUBEN D. TORRES

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further erosion. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its
Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the
use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."

Issue:

Ruling:
TIn the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but,
it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold
that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not
do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not
irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire
matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards
to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades
individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 162215, July 30, 2007

Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that its specific, exclusive and discretionary
constitutional and statutory power as an independent constitutional body to
administer and supervise its own officials and personnel, including the authority to
administer competitive examinations and prescribe reasonable qualification
standards for its own officials, cannot be curtailed by the general power of the CSC
to administer the civil service system.

Issue:

Ruling:

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials
and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen.
[9]
 Thus, a person occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative
Service or Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is
appointed by the Ombudsman, not by the President. As such, he is neither
embraced in the CES nor does he need to possess CES eligibility. [10] Under the
Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. [14] As a guaranty
of this independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except his deputies. [15] This power
necessarily includes the power of setting, prescribing and administering the
standards for the officials and personnel of the Office.
G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997

MERLINDA JACINTO, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS;

Facts:

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila.
Between the period September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences
in connection with the mass actions then staged; and on September 17, 1990, DECS
Secretary Isidro Cariño immediately issued a return-to-work order. Petitioners raise
the following grounds for their appeal that the Respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission that penalized all the petitioners whose only ‘offense’ (except
Jacinto) was to exercise their constitutional right peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.

Ruling:
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the
proviso “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by
law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive
Order 180[29] which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government
workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which
“enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service,”[30] by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed. [As it was, the
temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted
public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against
strikes by government workers.
EDITA T. BURGOS VS. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

G.R. No. 183711, June 22, 2010

Facts:

On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision[1] in the consolidated
petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,[2] for Contempt[3] and for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo[4] filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her
son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of
four men and by a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant,
located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon
City, on April 28, 2007.  This CA decision[5] dismissed the petitioner's petition for the
Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioner's motion to declare the
respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in
favor of the petitioner.

Ruling:
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case,
we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive
and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to
exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo requires.

For this reason, we resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Court's
directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the
Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its
factual findings and recommendations to this Court.  We take into consideration in
this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and
empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines. [25]

ISABELITA S. LAHOM VS. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

Facts:

On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more
intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with
the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin
Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom. A sad turn of events came many years later.
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Issue:

May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

Ruling:
In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption
was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges
for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted
child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew
the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child
the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come
into force, no longer could be pursued. It is still noteworthy, however, that an
adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child.

PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., VS. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO

G.R. No. 136726, September 24, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents,

detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May
1995. On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and
Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for
reconsideration of the detail order. Without acting on respondents' request for
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995 addressed to
Abarca placing him under "preventive suspension" for 90 days without pay pending
investigation for alleged grave misconduct.

Issue:

Whether petitioner was denied of his right to due process when the appellate court
dismissed his appeal for failure of the OSG to file the memorandum.

Ruling:

Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard [19] and this opportunity

was not denied petitioner.  Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in
the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed
to do so.  Clearly, petitioner's former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This
negligence, however, binds petitioner.  As a general rule, a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel.  Only when the application of the general rule would result
in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for.  Furthermore, petitioner
cannot now complain of the OSG's errors. Petitioner should have taken the initiative
of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of
his case.[23] Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to
do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. [24] 

G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

AND MANAGEMENT, RESPONDENT.

Facts:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus
seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002.  At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
autonomy. By petitioner's claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated
for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total
allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to
P285,660,790.44.[1]  It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent
to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby
leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.Respondent, at the outset, opposes
the petition on procedural grounds.  It contends that first, petitioner did not exhaust
administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from respondent's
Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court. 

Ruling:
By parity of construction, "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should
thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. 
This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this
Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a "no report, no release" policy
against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the
Constitution.[10] The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy
should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all
other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. Respondent's
act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

G.R. No. 124374/126354/126366, December 15, 1999

ISMAEL A. MATHAY JR., VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed private
respondents[2] to positions in the Civil Service Unit ("CSU") of the local government of
Quezon City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
51 which was allegedly signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972. On June 4,
1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing
all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one
year from issuance of the said Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the ground that the same never became
law.  Despite the provision on absorption, the regular and permanent positions in the
DPOS were not filled due to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the insufficiency of
regular and permanent positions created.Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the
situation by offering private respondents contractual appointments for the period of
June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991. Upon their expiry, these appointments,
however, were no longer renewed.

Ruling:

.  In a long line of cases,[11] we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service
Commission's power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment.  It does
not have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made. 
Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the person chosen to fill a vacant
position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends.  The Civil
Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing
authority. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right.  The
right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.
[17]
 Since Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it could not be
a source of rights.  Neither could it impose duties.  It could not afford any protection. 
It did not create an office.  It is as inoperative as though it was never passed.

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, VS. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,

G.R. No. 76353, May 02, 1988

Fact:
During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated
were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school
year 1986-1987. Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due
process which requires that there be due notice and hearing and of substantive due
process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be
competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. Furthermore, petitioners
point out that the acts of respondents constitute a wanton and deliberate disregard of
petitioners' freedom of expression (ibid.).

Issue:
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not there has been deprivation of due
process

Ruling:
The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The
school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and
teachers. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the
demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right
to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them: (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case. Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3)
days from receipts of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take/mete
out any administrative sanction on them in view of their participation in the
commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CRISTITO LATASA,

APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 144331, August 19, 2003

Facts:

The thrust of the instant appeal is that the prosecution failed to prove accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt as his identity as the author of the crime
was not satisfactorily established. Accused-appellant avers that Joyce had not
sufficiently seen the culprit the night her husband was fatally shot to make a reliable
identification. He points out that Joyce admitted seeing the gunman for a mere split
second before she turned her attention to her husband. Considering that she was
unfamiliar with the culprit as that was the first time she had seen him, and that she
failed to take a second and better look at him as she immediately ran to her room
after her husband slumped to the floor, her brief look at him was not enough to leave
an accurate imprint of his appearance. Accused-appellant posits that the
implausibility of Joyce's identification is evidenced by the NBI artist's sketch of the
gunman which was drawn from the description furnished by Joyce. He claims the
sketch of the gunman did not resemble him at all.

Ruling:

We are convinced that the brief span of time by which Joyce was able to view the
gunman was enough to commit his face to memory. Contrary to the assertions of
accused-appellant, it was not improbable for the witness to sufficiently remember his
face despite the brevity of the encounter. As the Court held in one case, the accused
cannot capitalize on the failure of the witness to get a long, hard look at him during
the incident when circumstances render the same unnecessary. [21] While evidence as
to the identity of accused-appellant as the person who committed the crime should
be carefully analyzed, this Court has consistently held that where conditions of
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the man
on the dock, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be
normally accepted.[22]

FERDINAND E. MARCOS VS. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Facts:

This case is unique.  It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator
forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic
and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks
to return, is in a class by itself. The petitioners contend that the President is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
“within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.  They advance the view that before the
right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there
must be legislation to that effect. The petitioners further assert that under
international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.

Issue:

  Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos
and his family to the Philippines?

Ruling:

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law
of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate
from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof
[Art. 12 (4).] WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 107590, February 21, 1995

PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA (PLM) VS. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION (CSC)

Facts:
The sixteen (16) individual private respondents were full-time instructors of PLM
under "temporary contracts" of employment renewable on a yearly basis. They,
among other instructors, joined the PLMFO. Uniform notices of termination, all dated
24 April 1990, were individually sent to private respondents informing them of "the
expiration of their temporary appointments at the close of office hours on 31 May
1990" and the non-renewal of their appointments for the school year (SY) 1990-
1991. A series of letter-complaints addressed to the CSC by private respondents
evoked a letter-response from PLM, dated 16 May 1990, traversing the
complainants' right to compel a renewal of the appointments. They were advised that
their retention was not recommended by their respective Deans. On 29 May 1990,
private respondents, through PLMFO, filed with the CSC a verified complaint for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner and its officers.

Ruling:

The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term, it is true, is ordinarily a valid

mode of removal at the end of each period. [11] This rule, however, must yield to the
superior constitutional right of employees, permanent or temporary, to self-
organization. While, a temporary employment may be ended with or without cause, it
certainly may not, however, be terminated for an illegal cause. We ruled, time and
again, that "due process" was designed to afford an opportunity to be heard, [13] not
that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. In any case, in its
reply to private respondents' comment, PLM enumerates the alleged causes for the
non-renewal of the contracts.
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GUMERSINDO DE LA
SANTA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 3181, October 10, 1907

Facts:

It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage
early in the year 1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The
complaint was not filed until February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though
less than 25 years of age, and was signed, sworn, and submitted by one Esteban
Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings were had, he appearing as the
private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila Sevilla.

Ruling:

We think that since the complaint was not filed until after the offended party had
attained her majority, criminal proceedings based on the alleged seduction could
only be instituted and maintained at her "instance," and she, and she alone, could
file a complaint which would give the trial court jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The complaint having been filed by her father, at whose instance the proceedings in
this case were had, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged, and
its judgment of conviction should be reversed and the complaint upon which it was
based dismissed. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a woman 23 years old is of
age. From that period she is in the full possession of her civil rights, save only in
certain exceptional cases expressly prescribed in the code. The right to appear and
prosecute or defend an action in the courts is not one of these exceptions and,
indeed, it is inherent to the full exercise of civil rights.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 141309, June 19, 2007

Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which
took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at
the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took
effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax.[4] 

Ruling:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection
of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the
pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of
good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. The Code
Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private
individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil
Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional
right of the plaintiff.[26] The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32
of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an
action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the
same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore
correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.

FRANCISCO ABELLA JRVS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004

Facts:

“Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July
1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department.  “Two years after
his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)
on a contractual basis.  On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a
permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. 
However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that
petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner imputes to the CA “grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction” for ruling that he had no legal standing
to contest the disapproval of his appointment. [12] 
Issue:

Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner lacks the personality to question the
disapproval by respondent office of petitioner’s appointment

Ruling:

On this point, the concepts of “legal standing” and “real party in interest” become
relevant.If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part,
then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his
appointment.  Clearly, he was prejudiced by the disapproval, since he could not
continue his office.Although petitioner had no vested right to the position, [33] it
was his eligibility that was being questioned.  Corollary to this point, he should be
granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility.  He had a personal stake in the
outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his
permanent appointment.

G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, VS. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GRACE DE GUZMAN

Facts:
That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that
what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted
marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company
policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law,
such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was
not aware of PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along
she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. [5] Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations.

Ruling:

Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals
and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose
her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible
and inalienable right.[38] Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the
same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.[39] 
G. R. No. 43361, August 21, 1937

THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

Facts:

On February 12, 1930, the Province of Camarines Sur, thru its provincial fiscal, filed
with the Court of First Instance of said province an application for the registration of
several parcels of land comprised in the agricultural school site of the province. The
Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that these parcels are
public lands. Appellants claim that they and their predecessors in interest have been
since time immemorial in the continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of
lot No. 3 under a bona, fide claim of ownership arid that, therefore, they are entitled
to the registration of the same under the provisions of Act No. 496 or, in the
alternative, under the beneficial provisions of Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6,
and Act No. 2874, Chapter VIII, section 45, paragraph (b), respectively.

Ruling:

It has been uniformly held by this court that to justify judicial confirmation of title to a
public agricultural land, the claimant must prove actual and physical occupation of
said land, and that the possession must be continuous, open, exclusive, notorious,
adverse and under a bona fide claim of ownership If the possessory right has been
enjoyed in the. manner set forth in the foregoing cases, it ripens into one of
presumptive ownership. The appellants' claim of ownership, therefore, fails for lack
of sufficient proof of continuity of possession on their part or on the part of their
predecesso. Assessment alone, however, is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax
declaration does not vest ownership of the property in the declarant
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
G.R. Nos. 54558 & 69882, May 22, 1987

Facts:

Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein the fundamental question is whether
or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are
open and functioning.  'Civilians placed on trial for offenses under general law
are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process.  Judicial
power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as are duly established by law.  Military commissions, or tribunals, are
not courts and do not form part of the judicial system.  

Ruling:

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a military commission

or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law,
over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are
open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a
civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned.[51] 
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV VS. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR

Facts:
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court,
and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate
staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business
with him in his capacity as Senator; and     (ii) direct respondents to allow him access
to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all
sessions and official functions of the Senate. Moreover, circumstances indicating
probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount
of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. [31]  In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong.   Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither
a matter of right nor of discretion.[32]

Ruling:

Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected
him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom
of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison." [44]The performance
of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.  Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special
class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. [51]