Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug.

26, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 and had three
children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11)
years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father but this was not the case in his private life.  At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.  Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel,
he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode.  Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim.  She
testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida.  She also had a one-time interview
with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by
antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s
hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45
of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of
his homosexuality.

HELD:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was
presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their
marriage.  The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. 
Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality
from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
Jimenez v. Canizares

L-12790, 31 August 1960

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice
of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the
marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court
summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical
examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of
interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

RULING:

No. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until
the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-
incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.

Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.

On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this,
Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida,
she assured him that she was a virgin.

The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the
marriage?   

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where
society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It
was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

Decision:
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision.  Costs to plaintiff-appellant
Aquino v. Delizo

G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960

FACTS:

The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any birth certificate to show the child was born within 180 days after
the marriage between the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof of the child’s birth but still his petition was
denied. The CA denied Aquino’s appeal on the theory that it was not impossible for the parties to have sex during their engagement
so that the child could be their own and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he
married her. In a motion for reconsideration filed by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer thus the motion for
reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of Aquino’s complaint is correct.

RULING:

No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.

Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she was pregnant by a man other than his husband constitutes fraud
and is a ground for annulment of marriage.

Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage,
we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat as alleged by
plaintiff.

According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman’s abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed,
be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of
the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996

FACTS:

On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due to the series of physical abuse against the
respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited drugs, cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal
child support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank debts without the respondent consent, respondent filed a petition
for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation.

Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his evidence. Counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding
the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.

Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties which was opposed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The trial court
denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene.

RULING:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or
adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition
for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor
upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-
appearance.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of
action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-
examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds
barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that
the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861, July 30, 2004 ]
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

TINGA, J,:
On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the verified Complaint[1] of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs.
Macias) dated May 11, 2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11,
Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte, of bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition of Civil Case
No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage, entitled "Mariano Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias."

The antecedents follow.

On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S.
Macias ("Mr. Macias"), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte.  The case was
raffled to the respondent's court.[2] On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued Summons to Mrs.
Macias.[3]However, the Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.
[4]
 Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication.  The respondent granted the motion in his Order[5] dated
March 7, 2001, with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice.  Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused
the publication of the Summons in the local weekly newspaper, "Tingog Peninsula," based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001
issue.[6]

Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons during the first week of April 2001.  Without delay, on April
10, 2001 or within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001.
[7]
 However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case on April 19,
2001, or one day before.

On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3,
2001.[8]After the scheduled hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision.
[9]

In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions and manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were
filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the respondent judge.[10] One was denied
while the rest were ignored. As previously stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30, 2001 without resolving the
other motions and manifestations.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due
process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint containing the above-cited facts before
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).[11] Also in the Complaint is her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte directing the
respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the subject case and imposing an administrative sanction against him.

Without waiting for the OCA's Indorsement, the respondent judge submitted his Comment/Answer[12] on May 25, 2001.[13]

The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons
who have knowledge of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein.  Also, he asserts that malice, bad
faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.

The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias' right to due process.  He argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to
be heard but chose not to give her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the trial despite prior notice.  Furthermore, he
points out that the records of the case would show that the proceedings was done in good faith and based on law and jurisprudence.

Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may have committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of
judicial remedies and not by resorting to the filing of an administrative action.  He argues that it is only after the Supreme Court finds
that a judge had committed malice or gross ignorance that he should be administratively sanctioned. Moreover, respondent claims
that a Petition[14]dated May 11, 2001, containing similar allegations as the instant complaint, was filed before the Court of Appeals, a
copy of which he received on May 21, 2001.

Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision[15] is valid and prays for the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.

In her Reply[16] which she filed on July 19, 2001, Mrs. Macias admits having filed a petition for certiorari[17] under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64733 entitled "Margie Corpus Macias v. Judge
Wilfredo G. Ochotorena" on May 18, 2001.[18]

In addition, Mrs. Macias claims that the Court of Appeals decided the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in her favor on July 13, 2001, finding respondent judge
blatantly transgressing her right to due process and ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure.  She notes that the
Decision[19]nullified the assailed proceedings and the Decision[20] rendered by the respondent judge on May 15, 2001 in Civil Case No.
S-695.[21]And finally, Mrs. Macias stresses that the instant charge against respondent judge may simply be verified by checking the
records of the case.
On June 4, 2001, the respondent judge retired from the service.  However, pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No.
10597-Ret. dated 22 October 2001, the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from his retirement
benefits, to answer for whatever administrative sanction the Court may impose in relation to the instant case.[22]

In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is
grossly ignorant of the law and procedure.  For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction
him.

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs.
Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to
Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.

The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After
the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-
trial." Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the
motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.

What happened in the case is a classic example of "railroading" or "procedural short-cut." Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss,
the respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias'
evidence ex-parte.

The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception
of Mr. Macias' evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered the case submitted for decision
despite Mrs. Macias' filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of the case
up to its completion, the respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.

It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court, even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint
after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits.  The
Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.[23]

In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by
the Public Prosecutor of his investigation.[24]

Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in
the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.

While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed a Certification dated May 04, 2001[25] with the
respondent judge's court, stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation
of plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no
objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the
mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the
parties.  Such directive must be made by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already
been had.  Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.

Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he completely
ignored the pertinent rules.  A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence.[26] When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to
know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.[27]

Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious
offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three
(3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.

Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus, dismissal or suspension from the service is no longer
possible.  Nonetheless, a penalty of fine may still be imposed upon him considering that under the Resolution of the First Division in
A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated October 22, 2001,[28] the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from his
retirement benefits to answer for whatever administrative sanction the Court may impose upon him with regard to this case.
Considering that this is the first time the respondent judge will be meted a penalty,[29] the Court finds a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) appropriate.

WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement
benefits.  The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining
balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its
further retention.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE
ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES
and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO
FAJARDO, respondents. [G.R. No. 79955; January 27, 1989]
TOPIC: ADOPTED CHILDREN
PONENTE: PADILLA, J.

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo andGina Carreon, who are common-
law husband and wife. They offered the child foradoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely
two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was executed by respondent Gina Carreon.
2. The petition for adoption was filed bypetitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the petition. It ordered
that the child be freed from the parental custody of her natural parents, and henceforth, that she shall be a child of
Zenaida and Nelson.
3. On March or April, 1987, the spouses received a letter from Gina and Conrado demanding that they be paid the
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise they would get their child.
4. When the spouses ignored their demands, Gina took the minor from her yay a and brought the child to her house
in Paranaque City. The spouses demanded the return of the child, but Gina refused, saying she had no desire to
give up her child; the affidavit of consent was not fully explained to her; however, she sent word that she will
return Angelie to the spouses if they paid the amount of P150,000.00.
5. Thus, the spouses filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court to compel Gina to return custody of Angelie
to them. During hearing, the social worker who conducted the case study testified that she interviewed Gina in
connection with the petition for adoption and Gina manifested her desire to have the child adopted by the
spouses.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the adoptive parents have rightful custody over Angelie.
HELD: YES.

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. The
provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where
the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.[1] In all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this
Court deviated from this criterion.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 152577.                September 21, 2005

FACTS:

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had
a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of
her Americanhusband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological
incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
who is already married to another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

RULING:

1st issue:

The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using
the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the allegedpsychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

2nd issue:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and
the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her Americanhusband
in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an Americancitizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely
was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not
have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
Espiritu vs. CA Case Digest
Espiritu vs. CA 
242 SCRA 362 
Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work
as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind
Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return
to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. 

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as
allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children
home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. 

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two
petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed
the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. 

Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. 

Ruling: SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit
or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting
moral values against the children. 

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record.
From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been
affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
Mangonan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006

FACTS:

On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi
City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised
her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina
were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second
husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was
accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and
Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.

2. Whether Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

RULING:

1. Yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica and Rina in default of the father.

Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina.

2. No. Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The
latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. With the filing of this case,
and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly
difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial
relationship with them. Given the moral obstacle, the Court could not see Rica and Rina moving back to the Philippines in the
company of those who have disowned them.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953.  Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation.  The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the
marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim.  While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that
several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his.  According to her, the non-
divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.  She prayed for the annulment of her
marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for
annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute
fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to.. chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.  Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore
would not warrant an annulment of marriage.