[G.R. No. 52254. January 30, 1982.
] while attending to the outdoor projects which were part of
MERCEDES ABADIANO, for and in behalf of the minors,
Josephine, Rodolfo, Jose, Honorio, & Catalino, all
surnamed Buenvenida, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM & EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents.
Mercedes Abadiano in her own behalf.
Attys. Manuel M. Lazaro, Antonio F. Navarette and
Baldomero SP Gatbonton for Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Catalina B, Buenvenida, a public school teacher for 24
years, contracted cancer of the liver during the period of
her employment resulting in her death on December 13,
1971. As a school teacher, the decedent was exposed to
the elements while attending to the outdoor projects which
were part of the curriculum and extra-curricular activities
connected with her schoolwork. Her heirs filed a claim for
compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended,
which was, however, denied by the Government Service
Insurance System and on appeal by the respondent
Commission on the ground that her ailment is neither an
occupational disease nor work-related.  Buenvenida resulting from cancer of the liver contracted
On review by certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that,
considering the rulings in Cristobal v. Employees’
Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 473) and in Meñez
v. Employees’ Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 17)
and the facts of record, the death of Catalina B.
Buenvenida caused by cancer of the liver is compensable,
said illness having been caused or aggravated by her
duties as public school teacher for 24 years.
Assailed decision is set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;
DEATH COMPENSATION COVERAGE INCLUDES
LIVER CANCER CAUSED, OR AGGRAVATED BY
WORKING CONDITIONS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHER; CASE AT BAR. — The duties of the public
school teacher are not confined to the classroom. During
the 24 years that Catalina B. Buenvenida worked as a
teacher, she must have been exposed to the elements
the curriculum and extra-curricular activities connected
with her school work. These natural elements and
unwholesome conditions are occupational hazards of a
public school teacher. During the 24 years that the
deceased served as public school teacher she must have
gone hungry many times resulting in the weakened
condition of her body. Thus, the death of Catalina B.
Buenvenida caused by cancer of the liver is compensable,
said illness having been caused or aggravated by her
duties as public school teacher for 24 years.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Employees’ Compensation Commission in ECC Case No.
1334 entitled "Mercedes Abadiano etc., Appellant, v.
Government Service Insurance System, Respondent,"
dated December 6, 1979 which affirmed the decision of
the Government Service Insurance System denying the
claim for income benefits for the death of Catalina B.
by the deceased during her employment. 1 
The petitioner, Mercedes Abadiano, is the judicial
guardian of the minor legitimate children of the deceased
Catalina B. Buenvenida, namely, Josephine, Rodolfo,
Jose, Honorio and Catalino, all surnamed Buenvenida.
On account of the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida, the
petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under
P.D. 626, as amended, with the Government Service
Insurance System which denied the claim on the ground
that the ailment that caused the death of Catalina B.
Buenvenida is neither an occupational disease nor work-
related. From the adverse decision of the Government
Service Insurance System, the petitioner appealed to the
Employees’ Compensation Commission which also denied
the claim for death benefits and affirmed the ruling of the
Government Service Insurance System in a decision
rendered dated December 6, 1979.
The facts, as found by the Employees’ Compensation
Commission, are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The record shows that for about twenty four (24) years,
the late Catalina Buenvenida was employed at the
Department of Education (now Ministry of Education and
Culture) as elementary grades teacher. Her last
assignment as such teacher when her above-named
ailment supervened was in Catbalogan III Elementary
School in Catbalogan, Samar. Per certification of the
deceased’s attending physician Dr. Damaso J. Salinas Jr.,
of the Samar Provincial Hospital in Catbalogan, Samar,
the deceased’s liver cancer started in September of 1978
as gradual weight loss, nausea and vomiting. These
symptoms were later on accompanied by emaciation and
gradual enlargement of the upper abdomen. The decedent
was confined at the abovesaid hospital starting December
5, 1978, but apparently the deceased’s ailment at that time
could have already reached its terminal stage for on
December 13, 1978, the decedent died. She was then 51
years of age and her death was attributed to her affliction
of cancer of the liver." 2  him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his
The Employees’ Compensation Commission denied the
claim on the following ground:chanrobles law library : red
"Carcinoma of the liver or liver cancer is definitely not
accepted as an occupational disease in decedent’s
employment. The cause of cancer of the liver is not
known, but medical authorities have observed that most
cases are associated with liver cirrhosis, a form of liver
pathology the basic lesion of which is diffuse liver cell
death and the major cause of which is chronic alcohol
ingestion plus impaired nutrition." 3  well as dust. These natural elements and unwholesome
The petitioner contends that the claim is compensable
because:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In implementing the aforesaid definition, the Rule
implementing PD 626, as amended provides that ‘For the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease
listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions
set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions’ (Rule III. Section 1(b)). Clearly, from
the above Rule, where the ailment is not an occupational
disease, it could still be considered a compensable
ailment if it could be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by working conditions. Consequently,
decedent ailment comes within the compensable coverage
of the law for the simple reason that the risk of contracting
decedent’s fatal ailment, Cancer of the Liver, is increased
by the working conditions. Admittedly, a teacher’s work is
very demanding, not only was decedent subjected to the
rigors of physical and mental stress and strain but also
exposed to the vagaries of nature. She was overworked
and underpaid and because of this she was unusually
undernourished, the latter being accepted by the
Commission as one of the contributing factor in the
irritation of the liver cell and eventually the development of
cancer of the liver (p. 3, Decision). The fact that Cancer of
the Liver is caused by some other etiological factors is of
no moment in the face of what this Honorable Court
stressed in the oft-quoted case of Abana v. Quisumbing,
1968, which we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘While there is that possibility that factors other than the
employment of the claimant may also have contributed to
the aggravation of his illness, this is not a drawback to its
compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that
the employment be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of claimant’s illness to entitle
employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to
the development of the disease.’" 4 
The duties of the public school teacher are not confined to
the classroom. During the 24 years that Catalina B.
Buenvenida worked as a teacher, she must have been
exposed to the elements while attending to the outdoor
projects which were part of the curriculum and extra
curricular activities connected with her school work. The
deceased, Catalina B. Buenvenida, was exposed to the
elements, like inclement weather, heavy rains, typhoon as
conditions are occupational hazards of a public school
teacher. During the 24 years that the deceased served as
public school teacher she must have gone hungry many
times resulting in the weakened condition of her body.
In Cristobal v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 5
this Court declared rectal cancer as compensable for the
following reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one
of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose
of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the
provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number
of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under
the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of
the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied
in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and
protection to labor. The Employees’ Compensation
Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations
and the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to
the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man,
more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise,
these guarantees would be merely ‘a lot of meaningless
patter.’ (Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]).
"As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself
in its Comment dated January 5, 1978 —
‘It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and
again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This
comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC.
Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified
occupational disease in certain cases —
‘Occupational Nature of  Diseases Employment
‘1. Cancer of the pitelial lining Work involving exposure of
the bladder (Papilloma to alphwaphtylamine, betanapthy-
the bladder) lamine or benzidine or any part of the salts;
and auramine or magenta.
‘2. Cancer epithellomatoma The use or handling of,
exposure or ulceration of the skin of the to tar, pitch,
bitumen, mineral oil corneal surface of the eye due
(include paraffin) soot or any to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral
compound product or residue of or parrafin or any
compound any of these substances.
......
‘16. Cancer of the stomach Vinyl chloride workers, plastic
and other lymphatic and blood workers forming vessels;
nasal cavity and sinuses.
‘17. Cancer of the lungs, Vinyl chloride workers,  liver and
brain plastic workers
‘Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer
have no known etiology. Yet, they are regarded as
occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely
requires a reasonable work-connection’ (pp. 59-60,
rec., Emphasis supplied).
"From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the
respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the
policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to
labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the
actual causes or factors which led to the decedent’s rectal
malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal
interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically
all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases
whose exact etiology, cause of origin, is unknown. It is in
this regard that the evidence submitted by the petitioner
deserves serious consideration." 6 
And in Meñez v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,
7 this Court expressed concern for public school teachers,
thus:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the
Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the
enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of
a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and
emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when
it directed in one of its provisions that ‘Teachers shall be
protected against the consequences of employment injury
in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the
physical and nervous strain on the teacher’s health shall
be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in
accordance with laws’ (Pantoja v. Republic, Et Al., L-
43317, December 29, 1978)." 8 
In view of the foregoing and of the established facts of
record, the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida caused by
cancer of the liver is compensable, said illness having
been caused or aggravated by her duties as public school
teacher for 24 years.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees’
Compensation Commission appealed from is set aside
and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby
directed:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
(1) To pay the petitioner the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND
(P12,000.00) as death benefits; and
(2) To reimburse the petitioner of medical and hospital
expenses duly supported by proper receipts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57473 August 15, 1988
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,  Compensation Units and before the Workmen's
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SAN
MIGUEL BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION
(PTGWO) respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices for
petitioner.
Isidro D. Amoroso for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
On May 1, 1974, the Labor Code 1 brought into being a
new employees' compensation program. 2
1) that is tax-exempt; 3
2) designed to ensure promptitude, in cases of work-
connected disability or death, in the award to employees
and their dependents of adequate income benefit and
medical or related benefits; 4
3) funded by monthly contributions of all covered
employers; 5
4) compulsory on all employers and their employees not
over 60 years of age;6
5) the benefits of which are exclusive and in place of all
other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive
damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents; 7 and
6) having its own adjudicative machinery with original and
exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute with respect to
coverage, entitlement to benefits, collection and payment
of contributions and penalties thereon, or any other matter
related thereto, independent of other tribunals except the
Supreme Court. 8
As might be expected, provisions were incorporated in the
Code to govern the transition from the old to the new
program. It was required, for instance, that all actions or
claims accruing prior to the effectivity of the Code as well
as those cases already pending before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission as of March 31, 1975 — were
to be determined in accordance with the laws, rules and
procedure in force at the time of their accrual and prior to
the effectivity of the Code. 9 Such actions, accruing before
the effectivity of the Code, and during a specified period
subsequent thereto ending on December 31, 1974, had to
be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the
Department of Labor not later than March 31, 1975,
otherwise they would be forever barred. 10 And the
effectivity of all workmen's compensation insurance
policies and indemnity bonds for self-insured employers
executed under the old law was declared to continue only
until their stipulated termination dates but in no case
beyond December 31, 1974.11
Now, prior to the inauguration of this new compensation
program, it had been the practice of the petitioner firm,
San Miguel Corporation, to grant to its salesmen and
helpers suffering work-connected sickness or disability,
their basic salary and other benefits consisting of average
commission one sack of rice per month, free
hospitalization, and cost of living allowance. The
aggregate value of these benefits was, of course, higher
than the corresponding benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. This practice was discontinued by
petitioner on effectivity of the new compensation scheme.
It registered itself and its employees with the Social
Security System, 12 commenced to pay to the State
Insurance Fund the required monthly premium
contributions, i.e., an amount equal to one percent (1%) of
each employee's salary credit, 13 and otherwise started to
comply with all the obligations imposed on all employers
by the new law.
Desiring to obviate the adverse effects of the reduction in
benefits caused by the change from the old to the new
compensation system, the union representing the
petitioner's salesmen and helpers within Metro Manila, the
respondent San Miguel Sales Forces Union (PTGWO),
filed a complaint with the Bureau of Labor Relations on
January 3, 1978, praying that the petitioner be compelled
to pay in proper cases the difference in monetary benefits
between what it had theretofore been granting and that
payable under the Labor Code. 14
Shortly thereafter, the Union filed a second
complaint, 15 this time with the Labor Arbiters' Office,
accusing the petitioner of non-compliance with the
requirements of PD 851, non-payment of premium pay for
work done during rest days and holidays, and
underpayment of wages under PD 928. It also prayed for
the inclusion in the bargaining unit of the salesmen and
helpers in the sales offices located in Valenzuela, Bulacan
and Muntinlupa, Rizal.
Conciliation proceedings were had but failed to bring
about an amicable settlement of the controversy. The
parties then agreed to consolidate the cases and submit
the same for compulsory arbitration. 16
The decision of the Labor Arbiter, rendered on July 14,
1978, 17 sustained the Union on all issues. As regards the
particular matter of compensation, the judgment held
the petitioner to be "under legal obligation to pay the union
members who have suffered industrial accident illnesses,
the difference between what they receive from the State
Insurance fund and their monthly salary as this has been
its practice and policy before the effectivity of the Code.
" 18
The petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission 19 which, on January 7, 1981, upheld the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that petitioner's
employees are "entitled to the same computation of work-
connected disability benefits as was the practice before
the effectivity of the Labor Code, thereby making .. (it)
liable for the deficiency in what the State Insurance Fund
pays."  20
The petitioner has instituted in this Court a special civil
action of certiorari and declaratory relief, 21 imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the NLRC and praying on that
account for nullification and setting aside of its decision.
The sole issue raised by petitioner concerns the validity of
the NLRC ruling just quoted that petitioner continues to be
bound up to the present by the same obligation regarding
work-connected disability benefits that it had assumed
before the enactment of the Labor Code. The issue in
other words is whether or not the Labor Code put an end
to the petitioner's voluntarily assumed obligation, prior to
the Code's enactment, of paying work-connected disability
benefits to its employees of a value higher than that
granted by said Code.
At the time of the initiation (in January, 1978) of the
proceedings before the Bureau of Labor Relations by
respondent Union, for the purpose of defining and in effect
expanding the benefits otherwise due to its members
under the new compensation program of the Labor Code,
that Bureau and the Labor Arbiters and the National Labor
Relations Commission itself, for that matter had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof. That particular
subject matter had already been placed within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Social Security
System, 22 subject to appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission. This is clearly stated by
Article 180 of the Labor Code which reads as follows:23
ART. 180. Settlement of claims. — The
System shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute from
this Title with respect to
coverage, entitlement
to benefits collection and payment of
contributions and penalties thereon, or
any other matter related thereto, subject
to appeal to the Commission, which
shall decide appealed cases within
twenty (20) working days from the
submission of the evidence.
This, too, is the message of Policy Instructions No. 1 of
the Minister of Labor, dated April 23, 1976, that employee
compensation cases in private employment are under the
original jurisdiction of the SSS.
Now, it is evident that what was sought to be litigated by
the union before the Bureau of Labor Relations and later
before the Labor Arbiter, was the matter of its members'
entitlement to benefits for work-connected disability —
whether limited to those specified by the Labor Code or
inclusive of the difference between the latter and that
theretofore being paid by the petitioner. In any case, it
certainly was an issue unavoidably comprehended within
the catch-all phrase, "any other matter related thereto,"
contained in the afore-quoted Section 180 of the Code. It
was, therefore, undoubtedly an issue exclusively
cognizable by the SSS, and consequently, one beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that of
the Labor Arbiters as well — from which Article 217 of the
Code in fact expressly except "claims for employees'
compensation," among others.
Resolution of the case on this jurisdictional issue would
not, however, end the controversy. To do that, it is
necessary to decide the appeal on the merits. This the
Court will now proceed to do.
Two reasons have been given by the respondent
Commission for ruling as it did 24 viz:
1) the employees have already acquired a vested right to
the compensation package theretofore extended by their
employer for work-connected disabilities or death;
consequently, the right can not be withdrawn or
diminished without violating Article 100 of the Labor Code;
and
2) the exclusory proviso in Article 173 of the Code does
not exempt the employer from continuing to comply with
payment of compensation arising from prior unilateral
grant and practice. These reasons are not persuasive.
The right to compensation or benefit for the loss or
impairment of an employee's earning capacity due to
work-related illness or injury is premised on the
occurrence of the illness or injury. It accrues upon, and not
before, the happening of these contingencies.25 Since as
has already been stated, claims for indemnity under the
Labor Code are to be adjudicated "in accordance with the
law and rules at the time their causes of action
accrued, 26 the benefits due to an employee suffering from
a compensable disability must be computed in accordance
with the method existing at the time of the illness or the
injury. It is thus obvious that an employee acquires no
vested right to a program of compensation benefits simply
because it was operative at the time he became employed
and had been subsequently discontinued. That he must
have incurred the illness or injury during the program's
effectivity, given the cut-off date set by the law 27 is the
only fact which operates to vest the right to be indemnified
according to either the phased-out scheme or the new
one. 28
Compensation in accordance with the employer's
schedule of benefits in effect prior to the effectivity of the
Labor Code is in this case being sought for disabilities
which admittedly would be suffered long after said Labor
Code had come into effect and the new compensation
program implementd. Clearly, on such accruing claims no
recovery of compensation from the employer can be had
on the basis of the old indemnity scheme which in simple
fact would no longer be in existence at the time of birth or
generation of the employees' causes of action. What
would then already be in force would be an entirely
different program imposing upon the employer nothing
more than the liability to remit monthly premiums to the
State Insurance Fund. In the event of illness or injury, and
once a claim is made under such a new indemnification
scheme, it is the Fund which becomes liable to
compensate the employee for the disability, and its liability
is "exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer," regardless of whether these liabilities are
"provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Republic Act Eleven hundred sixty-one, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered one hundred
eighty-six, as amended, Republic Act Numbered six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-
eight hundred sixty-four, as amended .. (or) other laws
whose benefits are administered by the system .. ." 29
The exclusionary provision aforecited clearly admits of no
exception under which payment of the additional indemnity
sought in this case may be justified. It is in fact apparent
therefrom, and from the rules set forth in the Code
regarding the institution of claims and the continued
effectivity of the abolished systems until the cut-off date
therein prescribed, that the new scheme was intended to
replace the old, whether the latter had been established by
law or by a voluntary employer policy or practice. The
clear intent of the law is that the employer should be
relieved of the obligation of directly paying his employees
compensation for work-connected illness or injury on the
theory that this is part of the cost of production or business
activity; and that no longer would there be need for
adversarial proceedings between an employer and his
employee in which there were specific legal presumptions
operating in favor of the employee and statutorily specified
defenses available to an employer. 30 To repeat, the new
compensation program now imposes on the employer
nothing more than the obligation to remit monthly
premiums to the State Insurance Fund, and it is the latter
on which is laid the burden of compensating the employee
for any disability. 31 Once the employer pays his share to
the fund, all obligation on his part to his employees is
ended. 32The petitioner asserts, and the respondents do
not deny, that it has in fact remitted and continues to date
to remit millions of pesos to the State Insurance Fund as
mandatory premiums or contributions to defray the cost of
compensation and disability benefits not only for its
employees but others as well. The employer would be
unwarrantedly reverted to the old setting were it to be
compelled both to remit its contributions to the Fund under
the prevailing set-up and to answer for the difference
between what it used to pay and what is due to the
employee from the Fund. It is manifestly unfair to require
the employer in effect to maintain two systems of
compensation, one governed by the Labor Code, and the
other, by the old Workmen's Compensation Act. This
would entail a return to the adversarial type of proceeding [G.R. No. 58176. March 23, 1984.]
involving particular presumptions and specific statutory
defenses under an act which has already been repealed, RUTH JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’
and resolution of issues for which the adjudicative COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
machinery previously set up no longer exists. This is a SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondents.
situation certainly not intended by the law.
Isidro Pasana for Petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission The Solicitor General for Respondents.
dated January 7, 1981 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one entered dismissing the private
respondent's complaint. No pronouncement as to costs. SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION;
COMPENSABILITY OF ILLNESS; CANCER OF THE
LUNGS, A BORDERLINE CASE REQUIRING STUDY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CASE. — Admittedly, cancer of
the lungs (bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those
borderline cases where a study of the circumstances of
the case is mandated to fully appreciate whether the
nature of the work of the deceased increased the
possibility of contracting such an ailment. WE have ruled
in the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation
Commission (111 SCRA 634, L-57416, January 30, 1982)
that" (U)ntil now, the cause of cancer is not known."
Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through
which petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility
that the deceased’s ailment could have been caused by
the working conditions while employed with the Philippine
Constabulary. Respondents maintain that the deceased
was a smoker and the logical conclusion is that the cause
of the fatal lung cancer could only be smoking which
cannot in any way be justified as work-connected.
However, medical authorities support the conclusion that
up to now, the etiology or cause of cancer of the lungs is
still largely unknown.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSION OF COMMISSION

NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MEDICAL AUTHORITIES
AND FACTS ON RECORD. — The sweeping conclusion
of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission
to the effect that the cause of the bronchogenic carcinoma
of the deceased was due to his being a smoker and not in
any manner connected with his work as a soldier, is not in
accordance with medical authorities nor with the facts on
record. No certitude can arise from a position of
uncertainty. WE are dealing with possibilities and medical
authorities have given credence to the stand of the
petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic
carcinoma while working as a soldier with the Philippine
Constabulary. The records show that when the deceased
enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was
found to be physically and mentally healthy. A soldier’s life
is a hard one. As a soldier assigned to field duty, exposure
to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep
and rest is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals
while handling ammunition and firearms cannot be
discounted. WE take note also of the fact that he became
the security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung,
Cagayan, and he always accompanied the doctor
wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.). Such assignment
invariably involved irregular working hours, exposure to
different working conditions, and body fatigue, not to
mention psychological stress and other similar factors
which influenced the evolution of his ailment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THEORY OF INCREASED RISK. —
The theory of increased risk is applicable in the case at
bar. In the case of Cristobal v. ECC (103 SCRA, 336-337)
where the Court held that "to establish compensability
under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of
work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is
merely substantial evidence, which means ‘such relevant
evidence to support a decision’ (Ang Tibay v. The Court of
Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69
Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this
connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.
Respondents however insist on evidence which would
establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal
cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict
requirement which even medical experts cannot support
considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease
would negate the principle of the liberality in the matter of
evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal
relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the
law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which
states that ‘all doubts in the implementation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."cralaw
virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRICT RULES ON EVIDENCE NOT
APPLICABLE; STATE POLICY OF LIBERALITY
TOWARDS LABOR MUST BE MAINTAINED. — In San
Valentin v. ECC (118 SCRA 160), the Court held that "In
compensation cases, strict rules on evidence are not
applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is
required or that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working condition." This is in line with the
avowed policy of the State as mandated by the
Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 9) and restated in the New Labor
Code (Art. 4) to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated
August 20, 1981 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in
ECC Case No. 1587, which affirmed the decision of
respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), denying petitioner’s claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who
joined the government service in June, 1969 as a
constable in the Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.)
After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to
the rank of constable second class. On December 16,
1974, he was again promoted to the rank of sergeant (p.
26, rec.)
Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus
from Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to Anulung, Cagayan. While
on their way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was seated on the left
side of the bus, fell down from the bus because of the
sudden stop of the vehicle. As a result, he was confined at
the Cagayan Provincial Hospital for about one (1) week,
and thereafter, released (comment of respondent ECC,
pp. 25-36, rec.). He was again confined for further
treatment from November 7, 1978 to May 16, 1979 at the
AFP Medical Center in Quezon City.
While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, he was assigned as security to one Dr. Emilio
Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan (ECC rec., Proceedings of
the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). In compliance with
his duty, he always accompanied the doctor wherever the
latter went (p. 26, rec.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On November 7, 1978, the deceased was again confined
at the Cagayan Provincial Hospital and then transferred to
the AFP V. Luna Medical Center at Quezon City for further
treatment. He complained of off-and-on back pains,
associated with occasional cough and also the swelling of
the right forearm. The doctors found a mass growth on his
right forearm, which grew to the size of 3 by 2 inches, hard
and associated with pain, which the doctors diagnosed as
"aortic aneurysm, medrastinal tumor" (p. 27, rec.)
His condition improved somewhat after treatment and he
was released on May 16, 1979. He was advised to have
complete rest and to continue medication. He was then
given light duty inside the barracks of their company.
Unfortunately, his ailment continued and became more
serious.
On May 12, 1980, he died in his house at Anulung,
Cagayan, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening. He was
barely 35 years old at the time of his death.
The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is
"bronchogenic carcinoma" which is a malignant tumor of
the lungs.
On June 6, 1980, an administrative hearing was
conducted before the PC Regional Board. It was their
official findings that the subject enlisted man "died in line
of duty" ; that the deceased was a PC member of the
111th PC Company at Tuguegarao, Cagayan; that he died
due to "bronchogenic CA" ; and that he "died not as a
result of his misconduct and did not violate any provisions
of the Articles of War" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC
Regional Board, June 6, 1980).
The Board recommended "that all benefits due to or
become due subject EP be paid and settled to his legal
heirs" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board,
June 6, 1980). Thus, as per records of the GSIS, petitioner
was paid benefits due to her deceased husband under
Republic Act No. 610 (Comment of respondent ECC, p.
27, rec.)cralawnad
Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits
under PD No. 626, as amended with the respondent
GSIS. Said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground
that her husband’s death is not compensable "for the
reason that the injury/sickness that caused his death is not
due to the circumstances of the employment or in the
performance of the duties and responsibilities of said
employment" (Letter of denial by the GSIS dated July 14,
1980, ECC rec.)
The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees
Compensation Commission in its decision dated August
21, 1981, stating among others:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x       x       x
"After an exhausted (sic) study of the evidences (sic) on
record and the applicable law on the case, we conclude
that the law has been properly applied by the respondent
System. . . .
"Bronchogenic carcinoma, medical authorities disclose, is
the most common form of malignancy in males reaching a
peak between the fifth and seventh decades and
accounting for one in four male cancer deaths. The sex
incidence is at least 5 to 1, male to female. Extensive
statistical analysis by medical authorities have confirmed
the relationship between lung cancer and cigarette
smoking. Other factors that may have potential roles are
exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to chromates,
metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and
asbestos (Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine by
Wintrobe, Et Al., 7th Edition, p. 1322).
"Although Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, was
envisioned to give relief to workingmen, who sustain an
injury or contract an ailment in the course of employment
and that to best attain its lofty objective, a liberal
interpretation of the law should pervade in its
implementation, this precept, however, may not be
invoked as not even a slight causal link between the
development of the ailment and the decedent’s (sic) duties
and working conditions as a PC sergeant could be
deduced from the records of this case. The respondent
System’s ruling that appellant’s claim does not fall within
the beneficiant provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626,
as amended, and therefore the same should be denied, is
in full harmony with the law and the facts obtaining herein.
. . ." (Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.)
On September 28, 1981, Petitioner, assisted by counsel,
filed the instant petition, the only pertinent issue being
whether or not her husband’s death from bronchogenic
carcinoma is compensable under the law.
The petitioner contends that her husband’s death is
compensable and that respondent Commission erred in
not taking into consideration the uncontroverted
circumstance that when the deceased entered into the
Philippine Constabulary, he was found to be physically
and mentally healthy. She farther contends that as a
soldier, her husband’s work has always been in the field
where exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and
lack of sleep and rest was the rule rather than the
exception. The nature of work of a soldier being to protect
life and property of citizens, he was subject to call at any
time of day or night. Furthermore, he was even assigned
as security to one Emilio Cordero and always
accompanied the latter wherever he went. Exposed to
these circumstances for several years, the deceased’s
physical constitution began to deteriorate, which
eventually resulted to his death from bronchogenic
carcinoma (Petition, pp. 2-9, rec.)
On the other hand, respondent Commission maintains that
while the deceased soldier may have been exposed to
elements of dust and dirt and condition of lack of rest and
continued fatigue by virtue of his duties to protect the life
and property of the citizens, such conditions have no
causal relation to his contraction of bronchogenic
carcinoma. It is also the opinion of the respondent that
since there is evidence of the deceased to be a smoker,
"the late Sgt. Jimenez may have indulged heavily in
smoking and drinking, not merely ‘occasionally’. And it has
been demonstrated medically that the more cigarettes a
person smokes, the greater the risk of developing lung
cancer" (Memorandum, p. 62, rec.). In short, the
respondent alleges that the deceased was responsible to
a large degree for his having contracted bronchogenic
carcinoma that led to his demise.cralawnad
WE find the petitioner’s claim meritorious.
Primary carcinoma of the lung is the most common fatal
cancer and its frequency is increasing (The Merck Manual,
13th Edition, p. 647). Admittedly, cancer of the lungs
(bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline cases
where a study of the circumstances of the case is
mandated to fully appreciate whether the nature of the
work of the deceased increased the possibility of
contracting such an ailment. In the case of Laron v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 90),
WE held, citing Schmidt’s Attorney’s Dictionary of
Medicine, 165 Sup. 143; Beerman v. Public Service
Coordinated Transport, 191 A 297, 299; Words and
Phrases, 6 Permanent Edition 61, "The English word
‘cancer’ means ‘crab’, in the medical sense, it refers to a
malignant, usually fatal, tumor or growth." Findings of fact
by the respondent points out that bronchogenic carcinoma
is a malignant tumor of the lungs. WE have ruled in the
case of Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission
(111 SCRA 634, L-57416, January 30, 1982) that" (U)ntil
now, the cause of cancer is not known." Indeed, the
respondent has provided an opening through which
petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility that
the deceased’s ailment could have been caused by the
working conditions while employed with the Philippine
Constabulary.
Respondents maintain that the deceased was a smoker
and the logical conclusion is that the cause of the fatal
lung cancer could only be smoking which cannot in any
way be justified as work-connected. However, medical
authorities support the conclusion that up to now, the
etiology or cause of cancer of the lungs is still largely
unknown as provided for in the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Although the etiology of cancer in humans cannot yet be
explained at the molecular level, it is clear that genetic
composition of the host is important in cancer induction.
Related immunologic factors may predispose the host to a
putative carcinogen. There is some evidence that viruses
may play a role in the neoplastic process. In addition, both
environmental and therapeutic agents have been identified
of carcinogens" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine,
9th Edition, 1980, p. 1584).
"Considerable attention has been directed to the potential
role of air pollution exposure to ionizing radiation and
numerous occupational hazards, including exposure to
chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel,
beryllium and asbestos" (Harrison, Ibid, p. 1259).
"The lungs are the site of origin of primary benign and
malignant tumors and receive metastases from many
other organs and tissues. Specific causes have not been
established but a strong dose-related statistical
association exists between cigarette smoking and
squamous cell and undifferentiated small (oat) cell
bronchogenic carcinomas. There is suggestive evidence
that prolonged exposure to air pollution promotes lung
neoplasms" (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647).
"What emerges from such concepts is the belief that
cancers in man do not appear suddenly ‘out of the blue’. . .
. Moreover, there need not be a single etiology or
pathogenesis. Many influences may be at work during the
evolution of the lesion and many pathways may be
involved. Indeed, the term cancer may embrace a
multiplicity of diseases of diverse origins" (Robbins,
Pathologic Basis of Disease, 2nd Edition, 1979, p.
185, Emphasis supplied).
WE cannot deny the fact that the causes of the illness of
the deceased are still unknown and may embrace such
diverse origins which even the medical sciences cannot
tell with reasonable certainty. Indeed, scientists attending
the World Genetic Congress in New Delhi, India, have
warned that about 25,000 chemicals used around the
world could potentially cause cancer, and Lawrence
Fishbein of the U.S. National Center for Toxilogical
Research pointed out that humans were daily exposed to
literally hundreds of chemical agents via air, food,
medication, both in their industrial home and environments
(Evening Post, December 16, 1983, p. 3, cols. 2-3).
The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant
case. WE had the occasion to interpret the theory of
increased risk in the case of Cristobal v. Employees
Compensation Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-
49280, February 26, 1981):chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
"To establish compensability under the said theory, the
claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly,
the degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence, which means ‘such relevant evidence to support
a decision’ (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations
and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and
convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed
out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on
evidence which would establish direct causal relation
between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of
the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even
medical experts cannot support considering the
uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the
principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence,
Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind
of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in
Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that ‘all
doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor.’
". . . As the agents charged by the law to implement the
social justice guarantee secured by both 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal
attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially
when there is some basis in the facts inferring a work-
connection. This should not be confused with the
presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. While these
doctrines may have been abandoned under the New
Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may
still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the
law, in general, still subsists. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
The sweeping conclusion of the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission to the effect that the cause of
the bronchogenic carcinoma of the deceased was due to
his being a smoker and not in any manner connected with
his work as a soldier, is not in accordance with medical
authorities nor with the facts on record. No certitude can
arise from a position of uncertainty.
WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities
have given credence to the stand of the petitioner that her
husband developed bronchogenic carcinoma while
working as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The
records show that when the deceased enlisted with the
Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was found to be
physically and mentally healthy. A soldier’s life is a hard
one. As a soldier assigned to field duty, exposure to the
elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest
is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while
handling ammunition and firearms cannot be discounted.
WE take note also of the fact that he became the security
of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and he
always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went
(p. 26, rec.). Such assignment invariably involved irregular
working hours, exposure to different working conditions,
and body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and
other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his
ailment.
WE held in the case of San Valentin v. Employees
Compensation Commission (118 SCRA 160)
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
"In compensation cases. strict rules of evidence are not
applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is
required or that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw
library

In the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation

Commission 

(L-57416, January 30, 1982), WE held the death of

Wenifreda Dator, a librarian for 15 years, caused by
bronchogenic carcinoma compensable. Being a librarian,
"she was exposed to duty books and other deleterious
substances in the library under unsanitary conditions"
(Ibid., 632). WE do not see any reason to depart from the
ruling in the said case, considering that a soldier’s duties
and environment are more hazardous.

This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as

mandated by the Constitution (Article II, Section 9) and
restated in the new Labor Code (Article 4), to give
maximum aid and protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS

HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY
ORDERED.

1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE

THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH
BENEFITS;

2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER’s MEDICAL AND

HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY
PROPER RECEIPTS; AND

3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR
BURIAL EXPENSES.

SO ORDERED.