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2. Expertravel and Tours, Inc. vs.

Court of Appeals, 459 SCRA 147

Facts:

Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and has
been granted license to do business in the Philippines. On 6 September 1999, KAL, through its legal
counsel, Atty. Mario Aguinaldo filed a complaint against ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, for the collection of sum of money totaling PhP260,150.00 plus attorney's fees and exemplary
damages. The complaint was attached with verification and certificate of non-forum shopping wherein
indicated that Atty. Aguinaldo is the agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of
the said complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to
execute the above-mentioned verification and non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. KAL, thereafter, opposed the motion contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident
agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was also
alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo also served as the company's corporate secretary. 

During the hearing, Atty Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through the
resolution approved by the KAL Board of Directors during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999.
Thereafter. KAL submitted an Affidavit executed by its General Manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the
board of directors conducted a special teleconference which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also
averred that in that Teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the said complaint. Furthermore, Su
Kyoo Kim alleged that the corporation  had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution. 

Trial Court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty.
Aguinaldo and Su Kyoo Kim. ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order alleging that it is
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. 

CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. 

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Is the petitioner correct in assailing that until and after teleconferencing is recognized as a
legitimate means of conducting meetings, gathering quorum of board of directors, such cannot be taken
judicial notice of by the court.

Held: The petition is meritorious.


It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the
failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused.  The certification is a peculiar and personal
responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.  Hence, the certification
must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his counsel may be unaware
of such facts. Hence, the requisite certification executed by the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice.
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of
the said corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents.
 Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in
that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be
made by individuals through teleconferencing.  Teleconferencing is interactive group communication
(three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds
of miles.
This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types:
(1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound;
(2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and
(3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or
telecopying.
The Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of
persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along
with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there
had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum
shopping.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took
place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s Board of Directors during the said
teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert
the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
Petition granted.
3. Herrera vs. Bollos, 374 SCRA 107

Facts:

The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, , which reversed the ruling of the municipal trial court that it has
jurisdiction over the case of forcible entry.

On August 5, 1993, Teodora Bollos commenced before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayawan-
Basay Civil Case No. 993, for forcible entry, solely against Eddie Herrera alleging that the latter,
sometime in the second week of 1993, through stealth and strategy and taking advantage of the absence of
Teodora, entered and occupied her Sugarland known as Lot No. 20, GSS-615, located at Camandagan,
Maninyon, Bayawan, Negros Oriental. Teodora claims to have inherited said parcel, being the only heir,
from her deceased father, Alfonso Bollos.

Herrera said that his occupation of the property was not through stealth or strategy but by virtue of a
contract of lease executed between Conrado Bollos, as lessor, and Ernesto Tijing, as lessee. Herrera is
Tijings overseer on the land.

The lower court rendered decision dismissed the case for failure to make-out a forcible entry case because
of lack of jurisdiction.

On Appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, docketed as Civil Case No. 12014, the
challenged verdict was reversed in a Decision dated October 21, 1997, ordering the resotoration of the
land to the plaintiffs and ejecting the defendants from the said parcel of land
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but deleted the award of actual and moral damages.

Issues:

(a) Is the municipal trial court vested with jurisdiction over a second amended complaint impleading a
new defendant filed beyond one year from dispossession alleging a case of forcible entry in the original
action?

(b) May the regional trial court award moral and exemplary damages against defendants in an appeal
from a dismissal of the case for forcible entry by the lower court?

Held:

Resolving the first issue,  basic is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs complaint, both original and amended, contains sufficient allegations
constituting an action for forcible entry, as clearly alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint.

That sometime in the second week of June, 1993, defendant pursuant to an avaricious intent of enriching
himself at the expense of the plaintiffs, through stealth and strategy, and taking advantage of the absence
of the latter, entered and occupied the property in question and without any legal justification therefore,
fertilized the sugar cane rations growing thereon and planted the vacant portions with sugar cane.

Thus, the complaint alleged is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for forcible entry.

On the second issue, the concept of damages in an action for forcible entry and detainer cases is well
defined in several cases. These damages mean rents or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, or fair rental value of the property. Temperate, actual, moral and exemplary
are neither rents nor reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, nor fair rental
value, and are not recoverable in such cases.

In the case at bar, the municipal trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and the regional
trial court reversed the dismissal but rendered judgment ejecting the defendants from the parcel of land
involved, and condemning them to pay damages and attorneys fees. This is not correct. In case of
reversal, the case shall be remanded to the municipal trial court for further proceedings.   A court cannot
take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must allow the parties to
be heard thereon. The Court DENIES the petition and remands the case in the MTC for further
proceedings.

4. Landbank of the Philipines vs. Wycoco, 419 SCRA 67

Landbank vs. Wycoco


Facts:
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted
rice land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated in the Barrio of
San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his land
to the DAR for P14.9 million. The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were
the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation; and
(3) letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. However, the offered
price of the DAR is only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the offer. He then filed a case before
the RTC for the determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled that
there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public
knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is
from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and
fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a
total of P13,428,082.00.
Issue:
WON the just compensation determined by the RTC was valid and within its jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar,
the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of
practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of
determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering
the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of
acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax
declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for
determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact
is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.
The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action.

5. Karen and Khristy Fishing Industry vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 172760-61,15
October 2007

Petitioners spouses Heliodoro Tuvilla, now deceased, and Aquilina Tuvilla were the proprietors
of Karen & Kristy Fishing Industry which operated the fishing vessels M/V Karen and M/V Kristy.
On 11 August 1998, several fishermen-crew members of said vessels filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and money claims against Spouses Tuvilla and Karen &
Kristy Fishing Industry.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision on 1 December 1999 ordering petitioners to pay the
money claims but dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling, except for
the computation of the salary differentials, 13th month pay and service incentive leave. Both
parties sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision but were rebuffed.

The CA denied the petition of Karen & Kristy and the Tuvillas and gave due course to the
petition of the Employees.

A copy of the said decision was sent by registered mail to Atty. Eugenio Dela Cruz, petitioners’
counsel of record, but it was returned as said counsel had moved out of the address of record.
Thus, the Court of Appeals Clerk of Court resent another copy of the decision by registered mail
to spouses Tuvilla.

On 6 February 2006, petitioner Aquilina Tuvilla filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
captioned “Motion to Allow Petitioner/Movant a Period Within Which to Search for Her Counsel;
In the Alternative to Look for a New Counsel and Time to File Necessary Pleading or Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision Received by the Movant/Petitioner last January 27, 2006,”
manifesting that she had difficulty finding their counsel of record as it was her deceased
husband who was handling the case prior to his death. She filed other motions.

The Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution, denying the first three motions. The
appellate court ruled that a motion for extension of the period to file the motion for
reconsideration is not allowed by the Rules of Court. Petitioners’ failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the 29 December 2005 Decision within the reglementary period rendered
said decision final and executory, the Court of Appeals stated. Petitioners filed another motion
for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated 10 April 2006.

Hence, this petition.


Issue: Whether or not reglementary period for filing a MR of the CA decision had not
commenced because Atty. Dela Cruz (counsel of record) did not receive a copy of said
decision.

Ruling: The records show that the failure of Atty. Dela Cruz, petitioners’ counsel of record, to
receive a copy of the Court of Appeals decision was caused by his failure to inform the appellate
court of the change of his address of record. Thus, the Clerk of Court had to resend a copy of
the decision, this time to the address of record of spouses Tuvilla.

If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such omission
or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be
expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain
on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel
could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office.

6. Estioca vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173876, 27 June 2008
G.R. No. 173876             June 27, 2008
VALCESAR ESTIOCA y MACAMAY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:
The RTC convicted petitioner, Marksale Bacus, Kevin Boniao and Emiliano Handoc of robbery
under Article 299. The trial court imposed on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Since Boniao was a minor (14
years old) when he participated in the heist, he was sentenced to a lower prison term of six
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional as
maximum. They were also ordered to pay P15,000.00 as civil liability. Nonetheless, the
sentence meted out to Boniao was suspended and his commitment to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) was ordered pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603.1

Petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision
arguing that there was no conspiracy among them and that the penalty imposed was
erroneous.18 On 17 August 2004, the RTC issued an Order partially granting the motion. 19 The
trial court lowered the penalty imposed on them but affirmed its earlier finding of conspiracy and
conviction. It also ordered the DSWD to release and turn over Boniao to his parents.
Unsatisfied, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Order before the Court of Appeals. 21
Bacus, Boniao and Handoc did not appeal their conviction anymore. On 30 June 2006, the
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision and
Order accused KEVIN BONIAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged pursuant to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344, without prejudice to his civil liability.22

ISSUE:
W/N RA 9344 can apply retroactively to Boniao’s case?

HELD:

YES.
Although the crime was committed on 28 July 2001 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only
on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Boniao who was not
shown to be a habitual criminal.39 This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

However, as Boniao’s civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344, Boniao should be held jointly liable with petitioner, Bacus,
and Handoc for the payment of civil liability in the amount of P15,000.00 representing the stolen
items.
The alleged inconsistency between the affidavit of Nico and his court testimony is inconsequential.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement or affidavit and direct testimony given in open court do
not necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is oftentimes
incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court.
Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and
elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a
variety of reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific
inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant
himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement; hence,
omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution
witnesses’ direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their extrajudicial
statements. Since we find no error in the factual finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that the testimony of eyewitness Nico is credible, then the judgment of conviction against
petitioner, Bacus, Boniao, and Handoc should be affirmed. The positive and credible testimony of a
lone eyewitness, such as Nico, is sufficient to support a conviction.

7. Bughaw vs. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, 28 March 2008
Facts:
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner was employed as production worker by respondent.
Respondent was receiving information that many of its employees were using prohibited drugs
during working hours and within the company premises.
On 5 June 2001, one of its employees, Erlito Loberanes (Loberanes) was caught in flagrante
delicto by the police officers while in possession of shabu. Loberanes was arrested and sent to
jail. In the course of police investigation, Loberanes admitted the commission of the crime. He
implicated petitioner in the crime by claiming that part of the money used for buying the illegal
drugs was given by the petitioner, and the illegal drugs purchased were for their consumption
for the rest of the month.
Respondent served a Memo for Explanation to petitioner requiring him to explain within 120
hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed against him for his alleged involvement in
illegal drug activities. Petitioner was further directed to appear at the office of respondent's legal
counsel for the hearing on the matter. For the meantime, petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension for the period of 30 days effective upon receipt of the Notice.
Notwithstanding said Memo, petitioner failed to appear before the respondent's legal counsel on
the scheduled hearing date and to explain his side on the matter.
Respondent, through legal counsel, sent a second letter to petitioner directing him to attend
another administrative hearing at said legal counsel's office but petitioner once again failed to
show up.
Respondent, in a third letter addressed to petitioner, terminated the latter's employment
retroactive to 11 June 2001 for using illegal drugs within company premises during working
hours, and for refusal to attend the administrative hearing and submit written explanation on the
charges hurled against him.
On 20 July 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and its
President, Emmanuel Ong, before the Labor Arbiter.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the grounds of
patent misappreciation of evidence and misapplication of law. The appellate court found that
petitioner was afforded the opportunity to explain and defend himself from the accusations
against him when respondents gave him notices of hearing, but petitioner repeatedly ignored
them, opting instead to file an illegal dismissal case against respondent before the Labor
Arbiter. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to
explain one's side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of Due process
is not violated where one is given the opportunity to be heard but he chooses not to explain his
side.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT.

Ruling: NO.
Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-fold,
the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a just or
authorized cause, the rudimentary requirements of due process -notice and hearing- must,
likewise, be observed before an employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of the
two, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal, for employment is a property right
of which one cannot be deprived of without due process.
Hence, the two (2) facets of a valid termination of employment are: (a) the legality of the act of
dismissal, i.e., the dismissal must be under any of the just causes provided under Article 282 of
the Labor Code; and (b) the legality of the manner of dismissal, which... means that there must
be observance of the requirements of due process, otherwise known as the two-notice rule.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for terminating the services of an
employee:
ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his
duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The charge of drug abuse inside the company's premises and during working hours against
petitioner constitutes serious misconduct, which is one of the just causes for termination.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the
meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless, in connection with the work
of the employee, constitute just cause for his separation. This Court took judicial notice of
scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the user. It is
beyond question therefore that any employee under the influence of drugs cannot
possibly continue doing his duties without posing a serious threat to the lives and
property of his co-workers and even his employer.

Loberanes's statements given to police during investigation is evidence which can be


considered by the respondent against the petitioner. Petitioner failed to controvert Loberanes'
claim that he too was using illegal drugs. Records reveal that respondent gave petitioner a first
notice dated 11 June 2001, giving him 120 hours within which to explain and defend himself
from the charge against him and to attend the administrative hearing. There is no dispute that
petitioner received said notice as evidenced by his signature appearing on the lower left portion
of a copy thereof together with the date and time of his receipt. He also admitted receipt of the
first notice in his Memorandum before this Court. Despite his receipt of the notice, however,
petitioner did not submit any written explanation on the charge against him, even after the lapse
of the 120-day period given him. Neither did petitioner appear in the scheduled administrative
hearing to personally present his side. Thus, the respondent cannot be faulted for considering
only the evidence at hand, which was Loberanes' statement, and conclude therefrom that there
was just cause for petitioner's termination.

8. Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan vs. Louella A. Catalan Lee, G. R. No. 183622, 08
February 2012
Orlando Catalan was a naturalized American Citizen. He obtained a divorce decree in the US
from his first wife Felitas Amor and contracted another marriage with Merope Enriquez. Orlando
died and so Merope filed a Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration for her appointment
as administratrix of the estate. While the case was pending, Louella Catalan, daughter of
Orlando from his first marriage filed her Petition for Issuance of Letter of Administration. Both
cases were consolidated. Louella alleged that Merope is not an interested person to file the
case bevause there was a case for bigamy filed agaisnt her. But Merope alleged that she was
already acquitted in the case. The trial court ruled that since the divorce decree was not
recognized under the Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between Merope and Orlando was
invalid. Letters of Administration was granted to Louella and Merope was considered as an
uninterested party to the estate of Orlando. The CA denied her appeal. 
Issue: W/N Merope is an interested party to the estate of Orlando Catalan.

Ruling: Yes. It is well settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foriegn laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. It appears that the trial
court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of
US and the marriage between Merope and Orlando. Thus, there is a need to remand the case
to the trial court. Should Merope prove the validity of the divorce and subsequent marriage, she
has preferential right to be issued Letters of Administration. Otherwise, the next of kin, the
daughter Louella will be considered to be validly appointed administratrix.

9. Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190793, 19 June
2012
TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members, and Term of Office
DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only limited
to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.
 
FACTS:
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was
represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco
Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
 
On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in accordance with
Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and
Chairman, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala
Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This
and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of
organized societies.
 
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections, in which it stated that its membership includes former
members of the AFP, Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens. They filed an Amended
Manifestation, and in which they manifest that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti (sic)
cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration that is still pending. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the
Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Partys participation in the Party-List
System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.
 
The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant Petition, MAGDALO
argues that the findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are
based on pure speculation. The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The
subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo committed mutiny,
held innocent civilian personnel as hostage, employed violence and used unlawful means and in the
process defied the laws of organized society purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the
court trying their case, (RTC Makati) has not yet decided the case against them; and the Resolution
violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo and their basic
right of to due process of law.
 
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO
for registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this determination, as well as that of
assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which
cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.
 
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess
whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.
 
HELD: NO
This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition for
Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of
parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987
Constitution read:
 
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
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ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
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(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. x x
x.
 
RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration
and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to
the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
 
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
 
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of
parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its
exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of
the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that
respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
A.  The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood
incident.
 
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition
for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures.
This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of
matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers
administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by
reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v. American
Express,this Court explained as follows:
 
The concept of facts of common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men.
 
The Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject
of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these
facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of
evidence thereon.
 
B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or
unlawful means to achieve its goals.
 
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood
because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated
the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification
is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its
goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
 
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is
employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.  The Oakwood incident was
one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President
Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP
and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians,
march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These
brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its
support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
 
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use
of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express
renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate
brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of
ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the
very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the vulnerability
of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the
Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats
thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
 
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not
operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through violence
or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect,
preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of
innocence. This argument cannot be sustained.
 
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections
is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess
whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not
entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for
registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable:
 
An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former
does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same
set of facts.  The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have been
found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence the quantum of proof required in an
administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that the proposed
witness should not appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line with the character and purpose of a
criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed in these cases. They are standards
entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.
 
Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required for administrative
proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:
 
As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is
not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support
affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.
In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative
power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary
threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful
acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the
members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in
the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the
necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party. In arriving at its
assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to
support this conclusion.
 
On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of MAGDALO with
coup dtat following the events that took place during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC
and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they
nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds.
 
This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
 
 
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition
for Registration by MAGDALO.

10. Juan vs. Juan, G.R. No. 221732, 23 August 2017

Peralta, J.

Facts: Roberto Juan claims he began using the name and mark, “Lavandera Ko”, which he
registered with the National Library for a copyright. A certificate of copyright was thus issued.
Fernando Juan registered the same with the IPO. Roberto later received threats of litigation for
the use of “Lavandera Ko” from Juliano Nacino. Roberto found out that Fernando was selling
franchises.

The court took judicial notice of the fact that a song from 1942 was in fact entitled “Lavandera
Ko.”

Issue: WON the song entitled “Lavandera Ko” is a fact which deserves judicial notice.

Ruling: NO. The RTC’ss  basis or source,  an article appearing  in a website, in ruling that 
the song entitled “Lavandera Ko” is  protected by a copyright, cannot be considered  a
subject of judicial notice that does not need  further authentication or verification. Judicial
notice  is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take  and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to  them. Put differently, it is the
assumption by a court of a fact without  need of further traditional evidentiary support.
The principle is based on convenience  and expediency in securing and introducing
evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not  bona fide
disputed.

11. FASAP vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 178083, 13 March 2018 

Facts:

1.   1998: PAL retrenched cabin crew personnel in a retrenchment and demotion


scheme.

2.   Eventually, the Supreme Court found PAL guilty of illegal retrenchment.

a.   It disbelieved the veracity of PAL's claim of severe financial losses, and


concluded that PAL had not established its severe financial losses
because of its non-presentation of audited financial statements. 

b.   That the retrenchment program is in bad faith, and had not used fair and
reasonable criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched.
At the outset, Philippine Airlines incurred P 90 billion in liabilities during the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis. As a cost-cutting measure, PAL retrenches 5,000 of its employees,
1,400 of which are cabin crew personnel, the retrenchment program to take effect on 15
July 1998. The Flight Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) filed a complaint
against PAL and Patria Chiong, AVP for Cabin Services of PAL, for illegal retrenchment
at the National Labor Relations Commission. On 23 July 1998, a preliminary injunction
was issued – stopping PAL from implementing its retrenchment program.

Position papers were both filed by FASAP and PAL with the NLRC. Labor Arbiter
Jovencio Mayor ruled in favor of FASAP and orders PAL to reinstate retrenched
employees of PAL.

On 31 May 2004, NLRC reversed its decision due to lack of merit. FASAP elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC and opined
that PAL does not have to consult FASAP for its criteria on retrenchment program as it
was purely a management prerogative. FASAP went to the court of last resort, the
Supreme Court, to further argue the case. The SC special third division took cognizance
of the case. The SC ruled in favor of FASAP and orders PAL to reinstate the retrenched
employees. The case was further argued by the PAL in its motions for reconsideration.

Issue: WON the retrenchment is valid

Ruling: YES, the retrenchment is valid.


1.   PAL was discharged of the burden to prove serious financial losses in
view of FASAP's admission.

• FASAP averred in its position paper, and echoed in its reply and
memorandum, that it was not opposed to the retrenchment program
because it understood PAL's financial troubles; and that it was only
questioning the manner and lack of standard in carrying out the
retrenchment. 

• As a rule, indeed, admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the


course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive,
and do not require further evidence to prove them. 

2.   Judicial notice could be taken of the financial losses incurred; the


presentation of audited financial statements was not required in such
circumstances.

• After having been placed under corporate rehabilitation and its


rehabilitation plan having been approved by the SEC on June 23, 2008,
PAL's dire financial predicament could not be doubted. 

• To require PAL in the proceedings below to still prove its financial losses
would only trivialize the SEC's order and proceedings. That would be
unfortunate because we should not ignore that the SEC was then the
competent authority to determine whether or not a corporation
experienced serious financial losses. Hence, the SEC's order - presented
as evidence in the proceedings below -sufficiently established PAL's grave
financial status.

• Also, the Court cannot be blind and indifferent to current events affecting
the society and the country's economy, but must take them into serious
consideration in its adjudication of pending cases. 

• We emphasize, too, that the presentation of the audited financial


statements should not the sole means by which to establish the
employer's serious financial losses. The presentation of audited
financial statements, although convenient in proving the unilateral claim of
financial losses, is not required for all cases of retrenchment. The
evidence required for each case of retrenchment really depends on the
particular circumstances obtaining.

• To require a distressed corporation placed under rehabilitation or


receivership to still submit its audited financial statements may become
unnecessary or superfluous. 

 
JUDICIAL NOTICE- MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
1. City of Manila vs. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413

Sanchez, J.:

FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land forming one compact area in Malate,
Manila. Shortly after liberation, from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises
without plaintiff’s knowledge and consent. They built second-class materials without plaintiff’s
consent and without the necessary building permits.

In November 1947, the presence of defendants having been discovered, defendants were given
by Mayor Valeriano Fugoso written permits--each labeled “lease contract”--to occupy specific
areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. 

On September 14, 1961, the need arose for the expansion of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary
School, which is close, though not contiguous to the property. Plaintiff’s City Engineer, pursuant
to the Mayor’s directive to clear squatter’s houses on city property, gave each of defendants 30
days to vacate and remove the constructions on the premises. This was followed by the City
Treasurer’s demand for the payment of the amount due by reason of occupancy and to vacate
in 15 days. Defendants refused. Hence, plaintiff filed a suit to recover possession. The lower
court directed defendants to vacate the premises and to pay their monthly rentals from March
1962. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for
school purposes

RULING: YES.

The city’s evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00
had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962–1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction
of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to
say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in
the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that
there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very
document, Exhibit E, aforesaid. 

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For,
in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken—because he was duty bound to
take— judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal
board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the “construction of additional building” of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. 

2. Gallego vs. People of the Philippines, 8 SCRA 813 

FACTS:

Gallego and his companions were about to hold a meeting of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in front of the Public market.
The chief of police, approached him and asked if they have a permit to hold the meeting, he answered in the
negative. The chief of police enjoined him from proceeding but he refused. The chief of police warned appellant if
he continued with the meeting, he was to place him under arrest. Gallego disregarded the warning and continued the
meeting for at least 30 minutes.

The CA there was disobedience on appellant’s part is self-evident from his immediate reaction to the chief of police’
warning. And there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for
a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places.

He contends that he cannot be convicted of slight disobedience because, there is no proof of the existence of an
ordinance in force on March 10, 1957, requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting. For this purpose, petitioner
assails the CA for taking judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, series of 1957 when the trial court itself allegedly did
not take cognizance of the ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of a municipal ordinance

 RULING: YES. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, from taking cognizance of a municipal
ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice
of matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the CA did in this case in
holding that "contrary to appellant’s contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time providing for
a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places." It is not true, that the trial court did not take
notice of the ordinance. For the lower court mentioned petitioner’s "failure to secure the necessary permit" with
obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957. CFI should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that the trial court took notice of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957 of the Municipality of Lambunao.
3. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008
Facts
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan
Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil
companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence
work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In
exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate
within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The
Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional.

Ordinance No. 8027 Was Not Superseded By Ordinance No. 8119

The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119
entitled "An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
thereto" which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the
Court was never informed about this ordinance.

While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with
respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of
matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.73

Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that:

SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of
the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should
have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to
inform the Court about it.

Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances,
a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it
does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the
court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of.75 Counsel should take
the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a
statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances.

The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove
any discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance.
Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and
a party must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.

The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was
repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw
complaint and counterclaim stated that "the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by
virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]."79 They contend that such admission worked as
an estoppel against the respondent.

 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF RIVERS AND LAWS OF NATURE
1. Banatao et. al vs. Dabbay, et. al. G.R. No. 12264, 23 September 1918
FACTS: Forty or fifty years ago a new island made its appearance in the
Cagayan River at or near the spot where the land in question is situated. This
island was called Fugu. Soon after this island appeared, an ancestor of the
plaintiffs, named Juan Banatao, established himself upon its northern end, while
one Quienes and others respectively took possession of separate strips
extending across the island but lying further south.

As a result of the formation of this island the Cagayan River was divided into two
branches. The change of the river has thus operated to destroy the character of
Fugu as an island; and it has thereby become connected terrestrially with the
land lying on the eastern bank of the Cagayan River; but the old name remains
and the place is now known as the sitio of Fugu.

After the island of Fugu was formed changes of importance occurred in its
location and shape, owing to the shifting of the course of the Cagayan River. As
a result of this action of the river the island very slowly moved northward from the
place of its first appearance in the river, and slowly increased in size northwardly
and west-wardly. On the other hand, the process of accretion, which was going
on at the northern and northwestern end of the island, continually added to that
portion of the island where Juan Banatao had planted himself.

In this action the plaintiffs seek to obtain a judicial determination of the ownership
of certain land situated in the sitio of Fugu, barrio Malabbad, in the Province of
Cagayan, and to recover possession thereof from the defendants, with damages
and costs. From a judgment rendered in the Court of First Instance in favor of the
plaintiffs the defendants have appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are the owners of the land in dispute.

HELD: The possession of the plaintiffs, by their predecessors in interest,


dates from before the year 1881 and has continued, without interruption
except as to the part now occupied by the defendant Salvador Dabbay. In the
latter part of the year 1894 Jacinto Banatao, the son of Juan Banatao, caused
a possessory information to be drawn up and inscribed in the property
register, showing his occupation of that portion of the island then in his
possession. The circumstance that this document was drawn up within a year
after February 13, 1894, would indicate that the title thereby acquired
pursuant to the provisions of the royal decree of that date, was equivalent to
that which would have been obtained by composition with the State. And as
such it was treated by the court below. Whether this possessory information
actually combined all the requisites essential to constitute a title equivalent to
a composition title is immaterial, since the long duration of the possession and
cultivation of the property by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest
has perfected their title, whatever may have been the character of the
document referred to.

The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the Cagayan River is a
navigable stream. This is assigned as error by the appellant. The circumstance
that section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not especially mention the
navigability of rivers as a matter concerning which courts may take judicial notice
is of no moment, as this subject is one which in our opinion is clearly within the
general principle there stated. After mentioning numerous matters proper to be
judicially noticed by the court, among which are the territorial extent of the
several islands, forming the Philippine Archipelago and its geographical divisions,
said section states that all similar matters of public knowledge shall be
recognized by the courts without the introduction of proof.

In conformity with the principle thus stated the courts may take judicial notice of
the existence and location within the territory over which they exercise jurisdiction
of great rivers and lakes, and their relation to the national or provincial
boundaries, of the navigability of streams constituting highways of commerce and
other notorious facts concerning the same. The presumption of general
knowledge weakens as we pass to smaller and less known streams; and yet,
within the limits of any state the navigability of its largest rivers ought to be
generally known and the courts may properly assume it to be a matter of general
knowledge, and take judicial notice thereof.

It will thus be seen that the arguments in favor of ownership in the plaintiffs
proceed upon the idea that the island of Fugu was originally property of the
State, that the plaintiffs ancestor acquired title from the State by occupation and
by virtue of the possessory information recorded in his name, and that all the
accretion to said property belongs, under the provisions above cited, to him and
his heirs.

We are of the opinion that the case is one which falls more properly under article
366 of the Civil Code and article 84 of the Law of Waters than under article 373
of the Civil Code and that the plaintiffs therefore have the better right. As was
well observed by the trial judge the plaintiffs predecessors were the first to
appropriate the new island; there is no evidence as to the width of the eastern
and western branch of the river at the time the island was formed; nor as to who
were the opposite riparian owners. Nor does it appear that any person claimed
Fugu or any part of it, as of the public domain, and the plaintiffs are therefore to
be considered as having acquired their title form the government.

2. People of the Philippines vs. Meneses, G.R. No. 111742, 26 March 1998
KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
At around three o’clock in the early morning of December 15, 1991, thirty three year old Cesar
Victoria was stabbed to death while sleeping in a rented makeshift room in Tondo, Manila. His
son, Christopher, was also in the room at the time of the incident
Roman Meneses was charged with the murder of Cesar Victoria. The prosecution presented
Christopher, SPO3 Jaime Mendoza and SP03 Eduardo Gonzales and Medico-legal officer
Florante Baltazar.
Christopher testified that he witnessed the stabbing of his father. He stated that he was
awakened from sleep and saw his father being stabbed in the father with a “veinte nueve”. 
SPO3 Mendoza stated that when they, the police investigators went to the crime scene
questioned he asked Christopher who stabbed his father. Christopher stated that he could not
identify the attacker by name nor describe him. However, Mendoza said on re-direct that
Christopher identified the accused.

Roman Menesses for his defense interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He stated that on
the day of the crime he was in San Isidro, Mexico, Pampanga.

ISSUE: Whethe or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

Ruling: NO.
We find that the trustworthiness of the identification of appellant by Christopher is dubious,
raising reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as to appellant's culpability.

It was established that the crime took place in the wee hours of the morning, before the crack of
dawn, at around three o'clock. The court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature," such
as in the instant case, that at around three in the morning during the Christmas season, it is still
quite dark and that daylight comes rather late in this time of year. Nowhere in the description of
the crime scene by witness SPO3 Mendoza in his testimony was it established that there was
light or illumination of any sort by which Christopher could see the attacker.

We now consider the identification itself. We note a glaring discrepancy, not inconsequential, in
the testimony of SPO3 Mendoza regarding Christopher's identification of appellant. SPO3
Mendoza testified thus:

Q Where was the son of the victim when you arrived?

A Inside the house, sir.

COURT:

Q Did you talked (sic) to the son of the victim?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did he tell you?


A He told me he can remember the suspect whenever he sees him again.

Q Then he can identify him?

A Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. SARMIENTO:

Q So at the time that you were there, the son of the victim was not able to tell you who the
suspect was?

A Yes, sir.

xxx     xxx xxx

Q Neither the wife nor the husband [referring to the spouses Ardiete], nor the son tell you
that they saw the killing?

A The son of the victim said that he can identified (sic) the suspect.

Q Did you asked (sic) him if he can identify?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what did he tell you?

A He knows the face of the suspect.

Q Did you ask him the name of the suspect, if he knows him at that time?

A He can't tell the name.

Q Did he tell you the description of the suspect?

A He can't tell the description of the suspect but he insist (sic) that if he can see him again,
he can identify. 

During his direct and cross-examination, SPO3 Mendoza asserted that Christopher could not
name his father's attacker nor give a description; however, in his re-direct examination he said
that Christopher mentioned categorically appellant's name, Roman Meneses, thus:

Q When you responded to the scene of the crime, and talking to Christopher Victoria who
can identify the suspect, did you asked [sic] him why he can identify the suspect?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did he say?

A He remember [sic] the face.


Q And did you ask him why he can remember the face?

A Yes, sir. Because he openly sees the face, sice (sic) he was his uncle.

Q Did you asked [sic] the son what is the name of his uncle?

A Yes, sir.

xxx     xxx xxx

Q What is the name?

A Roman Meneses

Indeed, it taxes the credibility of Christopher's testimony that while he knew appellant prior to
the crime, being his uncle, who for some time he was staying with, he failed to point to appellant
as the attacker when questioned by the police immediately after the incident.

The prosecution did not endeavor to explain Christopher's failure to name the attacker at the
time he was questioned immediately after the crime. From SPO3 Mendoza's testimony,
Christopher was at that time coherent and answering clearly questions from the police.

3. Gabriel vs. Court of 


Appeals, G.R. No. 128474, 06 October 2004

Facts:
The case emanates from a three-way vehicular collision on the night of 19 April 1990 along Maharlika
Highway in San Pablo City, Laguna. Three persons died as a result, and for their death, petitioner
Arnel Gabriel (Gabriel) was found guilty of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Double
Homicide and Damage to Property by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City. 3 Gabriel
fruitlessly appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the RTC's decision by finding Gabriel liable
instead for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide.4

The three vehicles involved in the collision were a passenger type jeep (jeepney), 6 a Volkswagen
Beetle car (Beetle),7 and a six-wheeler Isuzu delivery truck (six-wheeler). 8 The Beetle carried three
persons, including Dr. Philip Plantilla, director of the Nagcarlan District Hospital, who was injured in
the accident. The other two occupants of the Beetle died in the accident - the driver, Fernando
Pitargue, Sr., and Carlos Asistido.9 The third fatality, Isabela Banes, was one of the passengers of the
jeepney driven by Gabriel.10 On the other hand, the six-wheeler was driven by Romeo Macabuhay, who
also appeared as the principal witness of the prosecution. 11

The mishap occurred on the stretch of the Maharlika Highway located in Barangay San Vicente, San
Pablo City. The highway is a two-lane, two-way road. The prosecution alleged that on the night of the
accident, the Beetle and the six-wheeler were both traveling on the same lane of Maharlika Highway,
proceeding towards the direction of San Pablo City. The six-wheeler was behind the Beetle. The
jeepney, on the other hand, was travelling the opposite lane on the way to Atimonan, Quezon,
purportedly at high speed. After negotiating a curve, the jeepney veered out of its lane, swerving into
the lane occupied by the Beetle and the six-wheeler. The jeepney collided with the left side of the
Beetle, forcing the latter out of the road and into the right shoulder of the highway. The collision with
the Beetle also forced the jeepney to turn turtle and thereafter hit the front portion of the truck, which
was then fifteen (15) meters behind the Beetle. The second impact forced the jeepney into the same
right shoulder lane where the stricken Beetle had rested. The six-wheeler meanwhile moved into the
opposite side of the road and parked on the left shoulder of the highway.

The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC except in two respects. The appellate court found that the
RTC failed to consider that Gabriel was also liable for the death of Isabela Banes, and thus found
Gabriel guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide, instead of Double
Homicide.17 The Court of Appeals awarded Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to the heirs of
Banes.18 Finally, the appellate court found no basis for the lower court's award of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to Dr. Plantilla by way of reimbursement of his gifts to the medical staff who attended to
him.

Issue: W/N Gabriel is liable.

Ruling:

Yes. Just as the claims of Gabriel and Marquez on the point of impact are devoid of credence, the
damage sustained by the Beetle is not necessarily inconsistent with the defense's position that the
accident occurred on the Quezon-bound lane and not on the San Pablo-bound lane. Assuming the
Beetle had veered the San Pablo-bound lane while overtaking, it could have very well been struck on
the side by the incoming jeepney. Indeed, the question on which lane the first collision occurred is the
most crucial at hand, as it determines which vehicle was on the wrong side of the road. Both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals concluded that the collision occurred on the San Pablo-bound lane and that it
was the jeepney which veered to the wrong side. Such findings are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

The testimony of Gonzales, which conveniently corroborates Gabriel on all material points, is even
more incredulous, notwithstanding Gonzales's being the Barangay Captain then of San Vicente, where
the accident occurred. As noted by the RTC, Gonzales declared that he was on the shoulder of the
road, beside the truck, when the first collision took place. 26 From his vantage point, his view was
obstructed by the truck.27 He claimed to have first heard the collision. He immediately took five big
steps onto the highway, and then saw the Beetle and the jeepney colliding. 28 In short, the sound of
the collision took place before the actual collision itself. If true, this would rate as one of
the greatest scientific revelations of all time. But since courts are obliged to take judicial
notice of the laws of nature,29 this Court prefers to side with prudence. 30

The RTC also correctly pointed out that the natural tendency in such case would be for Gonzales to
have taken caution and avoid exposure to danger.31 Instead, Gonzales, who was already on the
shoulder of the road, stepped into the highway and along the possible course of the collision he
claimed to have heard occurring. The human mind may be less predictable than the physical laws, but
the conjunction of two unnatural occurrences at once is just too much for this Court to believe but
more than enough to taint the credibility of Gonzales.

NO JUDICIAL NOTICE OF INCURABILITY OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS


1. Singson vs. Singson, G.R. No. 210766, 08 January 2018
 

Facts:

Maria Concepcion N. Singson filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were
married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said
marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living together,
petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the
family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler ; that respondent
7
was immature, and was not able to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also irresponsible,
an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely
unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the
sole breadwinner.

Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro
Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr.
8

Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:

Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering


from Pathological Gambling. He apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a
young boy, it would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are]
etiologically related to the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood. Such pattern is
inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational and interpersonal
relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and can be traced back [to] his
adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering
from Personality Disorder. All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital
obligations.
9

However, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity,


juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant case because petitioner's
allegations are not supported by facts.

RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

CA- REVERSED RTC and held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this
case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing
at the time of the marriage.

Issues: Whether or not respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court, including its
juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.

Ruling: NO. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and
serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable.

Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution."

In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

We are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the capability and ability to
perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement that
respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations as a
husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the land
where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their
children."
40

Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was
working at a certain point." This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical
41

Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the
parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying
for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their
marriage. 42

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized
summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's
share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million.
Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from
1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their
children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills came from this money. And
no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the family home
was built.

By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at
the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible,
and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that
"[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." "[I]t is not
45

enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness." 46

Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for
gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital
obligations.

This Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are
generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated,
was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into
a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie." This is the situation
60

here. Petition is DENIED.

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF COURT’S OWN ACTS AND RECORDS


1. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 633

”Judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleading or judgment of a case in another court
between the same parties or involving one of the same parties as well as of the record of
another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of
court personnel.”

Facts:

Josefa Gacot claimed a parcel of land, the area of which is not indicated, in Palawan. Gacot
claims that she has been in actual possession of the property for more than 30 year and bought
the land from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera by virtue of a deed of sale and introduced improvement
thereon and paid taxes for the land in her name. It appears that a certain Ceferino Sabenacio is
a co-owner of the land who later waived his claim in favor of Gacot and admitted that he was
only a boundary owner of the land and it was Gacot who is in actual possession of it. Prior to the
hearing, the Land Registration Authority intervened, calling the attention of the court on the
decision made by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring the property as owned by the Republic.
However, it did not bar Gacos from filing her answer, presenting evidence of her actual
possession of the said property and tax declaration and payment made in her name. The
counsel of the petitioner did not present evidence and submitted the case for resolution.

The court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot thus the Solicitor General elevated the case to
the CA and filed a motion for the court to reopen and remand the case back to the trial court to
allow the Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos which motion was granted by the
court. The hearing was set several times and Gacot was able to submit her memorandum while
the Republic was unable to submit any evidence to support the claim of the government in
court. The Government failed to present the said order of Judge Garlitos in evidence. Thus, the
CA ruled in favor of Gacot because the order of Judge Garlitos not having been offered as
evidence, it cannot take judicial notice of such.

Issue: Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of the order of Judge Garlitos.

Ruling: Yes. Firstly, that the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value in ordinary trials of evidence which is not formally offered, and secondly, that
adjective law is not to be taken lightly for without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not
remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not
ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient
dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed
liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case facts established in
prior proceedings in the same case of the authenticity of its own records of another case
between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records
on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or
judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same
parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court.
Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.

Exceptions:
1. Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commission of Internal Revenue, 457 SCRA 482
G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005

Panganiban, J.
Facts:   Calamba Steel is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for use by
manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and household appliances. It filed an
Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996. It also reported quarterly payments for
the second and third quarters of 1995. It is Calamba Steel’s proposition of the that for the year 1995,
several of its clients withheld taxes from their income payments to it and remitted the same to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus, an administrative claim was filed by it on April 10, 1997 for the refund
of the amount representing excess or unused creditable withholding taxes for the year 1995. To buttress
its claim, Calamba Steel presented documentary and testimonial evidence. The CIR, on the other hand,
presented the revenue officer who conducted the examination of Calamba Steel’s claim and found
petitioner liable for deficiency value added tax. Petitioner also presented rebuttal evidence. The CTA and
CA both denied the refund, ratiocinating that no evidence other than that presented before the
CTA was adduced to prove that excess tax payments had been made in 1995. From the inception of
the case to the formal offer of its evidence, petitioner did not present its 1996 income tax return to
disclose its total income tax liability, thus making it difficult to determine whether such excess tax
payments were utilized in 1996. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:   Whether the CA erred when, while purportedly requiring Calamba Steel to submit its 1996 annual
income tax return to support its claim for refund, nonetheless ignored the existence of the tax return
extant on the record the authenticity of which has not been denied or its admissibility opposed by the CIR.

 Held: YES. The CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final adjustment return
which had been attached in CTA Case No. 5799. "Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of
equal force."

As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in
other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually
pending before the same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference to such
records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties:

'". . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending. '"

Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was already well-aware of the
existence of another case pending before it, involving the same subject matter, parties and causes of
action. Because of the close connection of that case with the matter in controversy, the CTA could
have easily taken judicial notice of the contested document attached in that other case.

Furthermore, there was no objection raised to the inclusion of the said 1996 final adjustment return in
petitioner's Reply to Comment before the CA. Despite clear reference to that return, a reference made
with the knowledge of respondent, the latter still failed to controvert petitioner's claim. The appellate
court should have cast aside strict technicalities and decided the case on the basis of such uncontested
return. Verily, it had the authority to "take judicial notice of its records and of the facts [that] the record
establishes."

Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts "may take judicial notice of matters x x x ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions." If the lower courts really believed that petitioner was not
entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily required respondent to ascertain its veracity and accuracy
and to prove that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in 1996.

Petitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial evidence that extended beyond two taxable
years, because the excess credits in the first (1995) taxable year had not been used up during the second
(1996) taxable year, and because the claim for the refund of those credits had been filed during the third
(1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment return was instead attached to its Reply to Comment filed before
the CA.

In this case, however, the BIR has not been given the chance to challenge the veracity of petitioner's final
adjustment return. Neither has the CTA decided any other case categorically declaring a net loss for
petitioner in taxable year 1996. After this return was attached to petitioner's Reply to Comment before the
CA, the appellate court should have required the filing of other responsive pleadings from respondent, as
was necessary and proper for it to rule upon the return.

 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF OFFICIAL ACTS OF LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Uy vs. Contreras, G.R. No. 11416-17, 26 September 1994
Facts: Felicidad Uy subleased from Susanna Atayde the second floor of the building where she
operated and maintained a beauty parlor. When she failed to remove her properties when the
subleased expired, an argument which turned into scuffle ensued. Atayde’s party filed a
complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati. But only Uy appeared on the day of
confrontation. 
Two informations of slight physical injuries were filed before the MTC of Makati. Uy
submitted a counter-affidavit claiming that the Informations were prematurely filed due to failure
to undergo conciliation proceedings. Judge Contreras denied the motion to dismiss on the basis
that motion is bereft of merit and that at that point, the parties already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings. 
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Contreras erred in denying the motion to dismiss.
Ruling: 
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government
Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, is
distressing. He should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under 
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice
of “the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines.” We
have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. He should have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay
law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done so, this petition would not have
reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more
important cases.

2. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 11 November 2003
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT.
 
JUDICIAL NOTICE- POST OFFICE PRACTICES; BANKING PRACTICES; FINANCIAL
CONDITION OF THE GOVERNMENT
1.Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504

Facts:

On February 13, 1979, the lower court, acting upon petitioner's manifestation filed on January 9,
1979 and motion filed on February 8, 1979, allowed the Solicitor General to borrow the records of
the expropriation case "under proper receipt, the Clerk of Court taking the necessary steps to index
and number the pages thereof and to ensure its integrity; and granted a second extension of thirty
(30) days from February 17, 1979, within which to file the record on appeal of the Republic of the
Philippines" (p. 79, C.A. rec.).

Again, on March 22, 1979, the lower court granted petitioner's third motion for an extension of thirty
(30) days from March 19, 1979 within which to file its record on appeal (p. 80, C.A. rec.).

Subsequently, the lower court, in an order dated April 24, 1980, acted favorably upon petitioner's
motion for a fourth extension of thirty (30) days from April 19, 1979 within which to file its record on
appeal and petitioner's request that the records of the expropriation case be forwarded to the
Solicitor General (p. 81, C.A. rec.).

In a motion dated May 17, 1979, the petitioner, invoking heavy pressure of work, asked for a fifth
extension of thirty (30) days from May 18, 1979 or until June 17, 1979, within which to file its record
on appeal (pp. 82-83, C.A. rec.).

On June 7, 1979, when its motion for a fifth extension has not yet been acted upon by the lower
court, petitioner filed its record on appeal (p. 13, rec.).

On June 15, 1979, eight (8) days after petitioner had filed its record on appeal, private respondents
filed an opposition to the aforesaid fifth motion for extension (pp. 85-87, C.A. rec.), and an objection
to petitioner's record on appeal (pp. 88-89, C.A. rec.), on the ground that the same was filed beyond
the reglementary period, because petitioner's motion dated May 17, 1979 for extension to file record
on appeal was mailed only on May 21, 1979 (pp. 13-14, rec.).

On June 27, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the aforesaid objection to its record on appeal,
contending that the said May 17, 1979 motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 18,
1979, which was the last day of the extended period allowed by the lower court's order of April 24,
1979 (p. 14, rec.).
In an order dated August 13, 1979 but received by the Solicitor General only on September 10,
1979, the lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth motion for
extension of time dated May 17,1979 within which to file the record on appeal and the record on
appeal were filed out of time. The lower court found that the said fifth motion for extension of time
was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as claimed by petitioner (pp. 14, 34-
35, rec.). The order of dismissal reads:

Upon consideration of the approval of the record on appeal filed by the Republic and
acting on the manifestation filed on July 25, 1979 by the defendants thru counsel, the
Court finds no merit in the same.

The last motion of the Office of the Solicitor General for extension of time to file
record on appeal was on May 17, 1979, seeking for an additional extension of thirty
(30) days from April 18, 1979.

The thirty-day period requested by the Solicitor General from May 18, 1979 therefore
expired on June 17, 1979. But this last request for extension was not acted upon by
the court. The Republic of the Philippines had therefore only up to May 17, 1979,
within which to file record on appeal. The record on appeal was filed only on June 11,
1979 (should be June 7), which is well beyond the period to file record on appeal
Moreover, the last motion for extension which was not acted upon by the Court had
only been filed on May 21, 1979 as shown by the stamp of the Manila Post Office,
the date of the mailing which should be reckoned with in computing periods of mailed
pleadings, and received by the Court on June 22, 1979. Both the motion for
extension filed on May 21, 1979 and the record on appeal filed on June 11, 1979
(should be June 7), have therefore been filed beyond the reglementary period of 30
days from April 18, 1979, or up to May 18,1979.

On the merits of the dismissed appeal, petitioner stressed that the creation of a three-man
committee to fix the just compensation of the expropriated lot was without legal basis, because
Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court upon which the same was anchored had already been
repealed by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 76 which took effect on December 6, 1972 —
under which the court has no alternative but to base the just compensation of expropriated property
upon the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator. or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

Issue: W/N the motion was filed out of time

Ruling:
The Court deplores the insinuation of plaintiff's counsel that it took hook, line and sinker, defendant's
allegation about the fact of mailing. I t has carefully gone over the record and found that the date of
mailing of the motion for extension is May 21, 1979, as shown by the stamp 'Registered, Manila,
Philippines, May 1, 1979 appearing on the covering envelope containing the motion for extension.
Therefore, the explanation contained in Annex B of the motion for reconsideration to the effect that
registered Letter No. 3273, addressed to the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Malolos,
Bulacan, was received by the Manila Post Office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979, but was not
included in the "only" morning dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979,
Monday (May 20 being a Sunday), under the Manila—Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15', can not
overturn the fact of date of actual mailing which is May 21, 1979, because it is of judicial knowledge
that a registered letter when posted is immediately stamped with the date of its receipt, indicating
therein the number of the registry, both on the covering envelope itself and on the receipt delivered
to the person who delivered the letter to the post office. The letter Annex B of the motion therefore
lacks sufficient weight and persuasiveness to prove the fact that the letter asking for another
extension was actually filed on May 18, 1979, and not May 21, 1979.

But the Court of First Instance of Bulacan opined that said certification cannot override the prevailing
practice in post offices "that a registered letter when posted is immediately stamped with the date of
its receipt, indicating therein the number of the registry, both on the covering envelope itself and on
the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the letter to the office" of which it took judicial
notice.

WE entertain grave doubts that the aforesaid post office practice is a proper subject of judicial
notice.

Undoubtedly, the post office practice of which the Court of First Instance took judicial notice is not
covered by any of the specific instances cited above. Neither can it be classified under "matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions ... . " For a matter to be taken judicial notice of by
the courts of law, it must be a subject of common and general knowledge. In other words, Judicial
notice of facts is measured by general knowledge of the same facts.
But even assuming that the motion for extension to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 was
filed not on May 18, 1979 but on May 21, 1979 as claimed by private respondents, which is a delay
of only one (1) working day, May 19 and 20 being Saturday and Sunday, respectively, that
circumstance alone would not justify the outright dismissal of the appeal of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, especially so in the light of the undisputed fact that petitioner had already filed with the
lower court the record on appeal at the time the questioned dismissal order was issued by the lower
court.
Moreover, a special circumstance which is the subject of one of the main issues raised by petitioner
in its appeal warrants US to exercise once more OUR exclusive prerogative to suspend OUR own
rules or to exempt a particular case from its operation as in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals.

2. Solidbank Corporation vs. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, 464 SCRA 409

Facts:  Private respondents herein secured a loan to the petitioner bank under the name of the
respondent corporation.  In the course of the corporations operation, it was not able to pay its
obligation to the petitioner and has to stop its operation. Petitioner bank filed an action against
the corporation together with its principal officers for the collection of the loan they acquired. 
The RTC ruled in favor of the bank petitioner and ordering the respondent corporation to pay the
amount of loan plus interest. On appeal, the CA held the decision of the RTC and ruled also that
the private respondents were not solidary liable to the petitioner. he appellate court took judicial
notice of the practice of banks and financing institutions to investigate, examine and assess all
properties offered by borrowers as collaterals, in order to determine the feasibility and
advisability of granting loans.

Issue:  Whether or not principal officers can be held personally liable upon signing the contract
of loan under the name of the corporation?

 
Ruling: Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from that of each person composing or representing it. Equally
fundamental is the general rule that corporate officers cannot be held personally liable
for the consequences of their acts, for as long as these are for and on behalf of the
corporation, within the scope of their authority and in good faith.  The separate
corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability of corporate officers,
whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation. Moreover, it is axiomatic that
solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. Since solidary liability is not clearly expressed
in the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the obligation in this
case, no conclusion of solidary liability can be made.  Furthermore, nothing supports the
alleged joint liability of the individual petitioners because, as correctly pointed out by the
two lower courts, the evidence shows that there is only one debtor: the
corporation. Judicial Notice

of Bank Practices

This point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court in taking judicial notice of
the practice of banks in conducting background checks on borrowers and sureties.
While a court is not mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under Section 1 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it nevertheless may do so under Section 2 of the same
Rule. The latter Rule provides that a court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of
"matters which are of public knowledge, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions."

Thus, the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of banks and other financial
institutions. Precisely, it has noted that it is their uniform practice, before approving a
loan, to investigate, examine and assess would-be borrowers' credit standing or real
estate32 offered as security for the loan applied for.

3. Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance, Co. Inc., G.R. No. 171406, 04 April
2011

Issue:
(3) whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.

Ruling:
NO

Judicial notice does not apply

Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01, 67 Article VII of the Management
Contract for cargo handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioner’s liability to
₱5,000.00 per package.

Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.


The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters
which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive
department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, 68 is
a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the
country.69 Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a
Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 14, 2005 Decision and the
February 14, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61798 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

Shandong Weifand Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinliann I 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense
from China to Manila. Upon arrival in Manila on November 21, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals
Inc unloaded the bags from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area for temporary storage and
safekeeping. When the unloading of the bags was completed, it was found out that the more than 2k bags were in
bad order condition. Thus, respondent insurer was compelled to pay Shandong the insurance proceeds for the lost
cargo and subrogated the rights of Shandong against Asian Terminals.

RTC and Court of Appeals Ruling:


It was found out by the RTC that Asian Terminals was liable for the damage or loss because the proximate cause of
the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the
vessel. It found out that despite the admonitions of the two marine cargo surveyors, it still used the steel hooks
which pierced the bags. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision.

Petitioner’s contention:
1) There was no cause of action because respondent insurer was not able to produce the insurance contract
or policy covering the subject matter.
2) It also avers that the finding of the RTC and CA that the stevedores were negligent is contrary to the
documentary evidence presented (TOSBOC, the RESBOC, and the Reporter’s survey. The said documents
proved that no additional damage was sustained by the subject shipment under its custody.
3) Petitioner also contends that amount of damages should not be more than 5K pursuant to its Management
Contract for cargo handling services with PPA. It contended that the CA should have taken judicial notice
of the said contract since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial recognizance.

 
JUDICIAL NOTICE IN RELATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
1.Garcia vs. Garcia-Recio, 366 SCRA 437

Facts: Recio, a Filipino citizen, married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in 1987. They
lived as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, an Australian family court issued a decree of
divorce purportedly dissolving their marriage.

In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. He and Garcia, a Filipino citizen, were married in
1994. In their application for a marriage license, Recio was declared as “single” and “Filipino”.

In 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
in Australia in 1996, their assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured there.

In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. She claimed that she learned of Recio’s prior and allegedly subsisting marriage only in
November of 1997.
Recio said that he told Garcia in 1993 about his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.

Also in 1998, Recio secured a divorce decree from a family court in Australia because the
marriage had irretrievably broken down. His answer the Complaint was that it should be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action as there was no longer anything to
nullify.

Issues:

Whether the divorce between Recio and Editha Samson was proven

Whether Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia

Ruling:

1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. A divorce obtained by an alien, however, may
be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. This
necessitates that the party must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity of the
foreign law allowing it.

Recio argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document, a written official act, and
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. But before it is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must be proven according to the rules on evidence (Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132) by either (1) an official publication, (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
(a) be given certification by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed where it is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. This was not
satisfied by the divorce decree alone.

However, because Garcia did not object as to the admissibility of the divorce decree, it was
rendered admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Philippine personal laws no longer bound Recio after he acquired Australian citizenship.
Compliance with the mentioned provisions was then no longer necessary.

Although Garcia is the party challenging the validity of a foreign instrument, the burden of
proving the divorce decree is on Recio, who was the one who raised it as a defense. Courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, and so these laws must be alleged and proved
like other facts.

Two basic types of divorce are absolute divorce and limited divorce. The first kind terminates the
marriage, and the second simply suspends it. There is no showing which type was procured by
Recio.

Recio presented an interlocutory decree, for which an absolute divorce may follow upon lapse of
the prescribed period if there is no reconciliation. The document at hand, in fact, has a restriction
that says: “1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.” The decree did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to Australian law.

Garcia argues that Recio did not present a Certificate of Legal Capacity in their
application for a marriage license, and the absence thereof proves that he did not have legal
capacity to remarry. However, while there is no proof that he was legally capacitated to
marry her, there is still the possibility that he really was capacitated to marry her. The best
thing to do is to remand the case to the RTC to receive conclusive evidence upon which a
decision can be made.

(In passing, the Court said a marriage celebrated on the basis of a license obtained without
a Certificate of Legal Capacity would remain valid as the absence of the certificate is
simply an irregularity.)

Verdict: Case remanded to RTC for the admission of evidence of Recio’s legal capacity to
marry Garcia. Failing this, their marriage is to be declared void on the ground of bigamy.

2. Northwest Orient Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 192

FACTS: 
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in the RTC- Manila, a judgment
rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc.,
(SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws. Northwest Airlines and Sharp,
through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,
whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
agreement, plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of
the ticket sales, with claim for damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District
Court of Japan against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132,
Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons
was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the
person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila and would be back on
April 24, 1980.

On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant’s office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo
refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the defendant.

After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court
decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the
defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon the defendant’s
head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons (p. 276, Records). Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff’s complaint and on
[January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 
83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to
and until payment is completed (pp. 12-14, Records).

On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment.
Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.

Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for
enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 54. defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court: (1) the
foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said
judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of
law.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter in its
reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait wherein it was held that “the process of the court has no
extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant by serving
him beyond the boundaries of the state.” To support its position, the Court of Appeals further
stated: In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of summons
within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena
Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary.

ISSUE: whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing
business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine
corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had
failed.

HELD: YES. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.  The judgment may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.(See Sec. 50, R 39) Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment.It is settled
that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 8 In this case, it is the
procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of
law.

It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law
is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly,
the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the
Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.

Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official
designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance 

NORTHWEST’s complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent C.F.
SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the foreign
judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied

3. Laureano vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 414

FACTS: Petitioner was employed in Singapore Airlines as the pilot captain of B-707. On September 25,
1981, he was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at
respondent Singapore Airlines’ expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course,
petitioner was cleared for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain
of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia.

Sometime in 1982, respondent, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen expatriate
captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement. Consequently, defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including petitioner of the situation and advised them to take advance
leaves. Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, respondent decided to terminate its
excess personnel. It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed,
twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, petitioner was not one of the twelve.

Aggrieved, petitioner on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Respondent moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint
was withdrawn. Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo.

Again, respondent on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the instant case. Defendant contends that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other
aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Laureano and against respondent Singapore Airlines, ordering
respondent to pay petitioner the amounts of unearned compensation plus damages.

CA dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
petitioner only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982. Hence, the action has already prescribed.

ISSUE related to evid topic: W/N the Singapore laws should apply

RULING: NO.

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippine law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the petitioner is legal under the Singapore
Laws because of the respondent's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this
case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial
notice of the laws of Singapore. The respondent that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws
to this case has the burden of proof. The respondent has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine
law should be applied.

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when respondent filed its appeal before said court. On
this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further
the issue of jurisdiction.

4. PCIB vs. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266

FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo City. In her will, she
left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie, however, also stated
in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and
sister.
In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled in the Philippines). While the probate
proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles, filed a
motion before the probate court so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive.
Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in
Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. The said motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since
said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as administratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed
the said petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s
brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.
Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law;
that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes
(Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas, which states that the law of the domicile of the deceased
applies for personal properties and laws of the situs applies on real properties, refers the matter
back to Philippine laws. (applying the renvoi doctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the
first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any
proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual
knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been
actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise.
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court since both parties failed to adduce
proof as to the law of Texas.

5. ATCI Overseas Corporation vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, 11 October 2010

FACTS:

Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one year.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on
February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly
ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of her contract.
The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-
year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws.

The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.

RULING:

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money
claims of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign
principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign
principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the
immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign
principals liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary
liability inutile.

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules,
customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with the Rules of Court.

These documents submitted by petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too
following the express provision of R.A. 8042:

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

The petition is DENIED

6. Condon vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, 10 August 2012

Reyes, J.

Facts: Private respondents filed a quo warranto petition to question the election of Condon as
vice mayor, alleging that she was an australian citizen. When she, prior to the elections,
reacquired her Filipino citizenship, she filed an unsworn declaration of renunciation of australian
citizenship. She claims that the same was sufficient under 9225. RTC Granted. COMELEC
dismissed the appeal. 
 
Issue: WON petitioner is a Filipino citizen

Ruling: NO. Sec. 5(2) Those  seeking  elective public  office in the Philippines  shall meet
the qualification  for holding such public office  as required by the Constitution and  existing
laws and, at the time of the  filing of the certificate of candidacy, make  a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign  citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.

Hence,  Section 5(2)  of Republic Act  No. 9225 compels natural-born  Filipinos, who have
been naturalized  as citizens of a foreign country, but  who reacquired or retained their
Philippine  citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance  under Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9225, and (2)  for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,  to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any  and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior  or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, to qualify  as candidates in Philippine elections.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is
already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven.29 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
which reads: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in


paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record


is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
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The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath
of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law
operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was
in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the
prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in
the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the
written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the
Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a
competent proof of that law.

 
JUDICIAL ADMISSION
1. Republic Glass Corporation vs. Qua, G.R. No. 144413, 30 July 2004
Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation ("RGC") and Gervel, Inc. ("Gervel") together with
respondent Lawrence C. Qua ("Qua") were stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. ("Ladtek"). Ladtek obtained
loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company ("Metrobank")[5] and
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines[6] ("PDCP") with RGC, Gervel and Qua as
sureties. Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and Qua executed Agreements for Contribution,
Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks ("Agreements").
The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladtek's loans, the parties would
reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to the creditors.
Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of stock of General Milling
Corporation ("GMC") in favor of RGC and Gervel. The pledged shares of stock served as security
for the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel may be held liable under the Agreements.
Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Hence, Metrobank filed a
collection case against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua... which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati
During the pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. 
Later, Metrobank executed a waiver and quitclaim dated 7 September 1988 in favor of RGC and
Gervel. Based on this waiver and quitclaim,[9] Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed on 16 September
1988 a joint motion to dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel.  Accordingly,
RTC-Branch 149 dismissed the case against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants.
RGC and Gervel's counsel, Atty. Antonio C. Pastelero, demanded that Qua pay P3,860,646, or
42.22% of P8,730,543.55,[11] as reimbursement of the total amount RGC and Gervel paid to
Metrobank and PDCP. Qua... refused to reimburse the amount to RGC and Gervel.  Subsequently,
RGC and Gervel furnished Qua with notices of foreclosure of Qua's pledged shares.
Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application for a temporary restraining order...
with RTC-Branch 63 to prevent RGC and Gervel from foreclosing the pledged shares.
ISSUE
Whether or not judicial admission is present in this case
RULING
An admission , verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in:
a. The pleadings filed by the parties
b. During the trial either by verbal or written  manifestations or stipulations
c. In other stages of the judicial proceeding
The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements ‘not in
the same case” (Collection Case and Foreclosure Case) as required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To
constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is
offered. 
If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the
case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding, it is entitled to greater weight.

2. Programe Incorporated vs. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 144635, 26 June 2006

FACTS: BASECO was the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge, both located in
Mariveles, Bataan. On May 14, 1986, BASECO granted petitioner a contract of lease over Piazza
Hotel at a monthly rental of P6,500 for 3 years, from Jan. 1, 1986 to Jan. 1, 1989. In April 1989,
the PCGG issued a sequestration order against BASECO and among the properties provisionally
seized and taken over was the lot on which Piazza Hotel stood.

On July 19, 1989, Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes to
respondent Province of Bataan. The title of the property was transferred to respondent. 

On July 21, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and collection of sum of
money against BASEC. Respondent, as the new owner of the property, filed a motion for leave
to intervene. It prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge for
lack of legal interest.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Province of
Bataan. CA affirmed said ruling.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Province of Bataan was the legitimate owner of the Piazza Hotel
and Mariveles Lodge

RULING: YES. 

The evidence clearly established respondent’s ownership of Piazza Hotel. First, the title of the
land on which Piazza Hotel stands was in the name of respondent. Second, Tax Declaration No.
12782 was in the name of respondent as owner of Piazza Hotel. Third, petitioner was doubtlessly
just a lessee. In the lease contract annexed to the complaint, petitioner in fact admitted
BASECO’s ownership then of the subject property. A stipulation in the contract read:

WHEREAS, the lessor (BASECO) is the owner of the building PIAZZA HOTEL and its outlet
MARIVELES LODGE located at BASECO, Mariveles, Bataan x x x (emphasis ours) 

The Rules of Court states that “[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.”

In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money, petitioner acknowledged that
it was not the owner of the property when it stated that “BASECO leased to petitioner the
building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles Lodge for monthly rentals of P6,500.00.”
Petitioner could not possibly be the owner of a building leased to it.

3. Camitan vs. Fidelity Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, 16 April 2008

Petitioners Camitan and Lopez filed a petition for issuance of another duplicate copy of TCT
before the RTC in Calamba, alleging that the owner’s copy was lost and cannot be found. This
was granted by the Calamba RTC. Fidelity filed a petition for annulment of judgment and
cancellation of the TCT alleging that they had the owner’s duplicate of the TCT, obtained
through purchase, and that they have been in open and continuous possession of the subject land
for about 27 years. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and ordered Fidelity to
present the TCT during the Preliminary Conference. During the Preliminary Conference, the
counsel for petitioners admitted to the genuineness of the TCT presented by Fidelity. Petitioner’s
counsel, in a subsequent memorandum retracted his statement citing honest mistake and
negligence owing to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the Court of Appeals.
They also pointed out some irregularities in the TCT (the purported duplicate copy of the title in
question submitted by the respondent to the Court of Appeals, the judicial form thereof was
already small and it clearly appeared that it might have been NEWLY ISSUED NEW COPY OF
TITLE. It might be the revised new form in 1988 that is presently used in the Register of Deeds).
Fidelity argues that Petitioners are bound by the Judicial Admission made by their counsel
during the preliminary conference. The court of appeals held that the judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It also held that honest
mistake and negligence are not sufficient grounds to invalidate the admission.

 ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider that the judicial admission
of petitioners counsel was a palpable mistake

 RULING: NO. The transcript of the preliminary conference indubitably shows that
counsel for petitioners made a judicial admission and failed to refute that admission during
the said proceedings despite the opportunity to do so. As correctly pointed out by the CA,
such an admission may only be refuted upon a proper showing of palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. Thus, the claim of “honest mistake and negligence” on the
part of the counsel due to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA did
not suffice.

 Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the alleged discrepancies are
more imagined than real. Had these purported discrepancies been that evident during the
preliminary conference, it would have been easy for petitioners’ counsel to object to the
authenticity of the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity. As shown in the
transcript of the proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners’ counsel to
examine the document, retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he
chose not to contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the petitioners’
counsel was made through palpable mistake. The mistake or negligence of the client’s counsel,
which may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule
otherwise would encourage every defeated party, to claim neglect or mistake on the part of his
counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation.

Exception: where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is deprived of
his day in court or of his property without due process of law. In these cases, the client is
not bound by his counsel’s mistakes and the case may even be reopened. In the case at bar,
however, these exceptional circumstances do not obtain.

3. Cuenco vs. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, G.R. No. 174154, 17 October 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the
contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner
participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter,
petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the
sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad
faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer,
respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the cost
of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.

The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of
damages. The respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court.
The RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.

ISSUES: Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the
admission.

HELD: Yes.

Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an


alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the
amount of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner
exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by
respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the respondents.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The
stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of
judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing
that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus,
the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and
conclusive upon them.

Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the
same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and
may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt
therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence
of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act
performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of
the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or
representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial.
Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents'
evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.

4. Asia Pacific Planners vs. City of Urdaneta, G.R. no. 162525, 23 September 2008
FACTS:

This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction and TRO filed by respondent Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of
Urdaneta and Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners APP and APP
Construction and Dev’t. Corp. (APPCDC).
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor entered into 5 contracts for the preliminary
design, construction and management of a 4-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel amounting
to P250M, funded by a loan from the PNB. For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95M. Del
Castillo claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men, which
is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a
public elementary school. He also claimed that the contracts are void because they were all awarded
solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC, and Urdaneta City asserted that the contracts were
valid. Respondent Capalad, through counsel, likewise filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaim and
motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
After pre-trial, Urdaneta City filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City’s
Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City’s
complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial, which the RTC granted.
The RTC also granted Capalad’s motion to expunge all pleadings filed by his counsel. Capalad
was dropped as defendant, and his complaint was admitted and  consolidated with the complaints of Del
Castillo and Urdaneta City.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed.
APP and APPCDC’s subsequent MR was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the CA erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and
APPCDCs subsequent compliance.
(2) WON the RTC erred and commited grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondents Capalad
and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants.

HELD:
(1) Yes, it was thus error for the CA to deny reinstatement of the petition. Indeed, proof of authority to sign
the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corp. must be attached; otherwise, the petition is
subject to dismissal. However, it must be pointed out that the SC had considered as substantial
compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the MR of the authority to sign the
verification and certification, as in this case. Similarly, the SC considered as substantial compliance
petitioners’ submission in the MR of the certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders. Petitioners
also included in the MR their explanation that copies of the petition were personally served on the
Lazaro Law Firm, and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance, as supported by the
affidavit of service.
(2) No, the court may allow amendment of pleadings. Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved
thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order already defined as an issue
whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties’ evidence on the
issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and
admissible. Note also that under Sec. 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to
cause them to conform to the evidence. In addition, despite Urdaneta City’s judicial admissions, the
RTC is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not
necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party’s testimony in
open court may also override admissions in the Answer.

5. Spouses Santos vs. Spouses Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007

Facts:

On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc.
On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share to respondents through a
document denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa”. Respondents claim that the document was
witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo Santos as shown by their signatures in said
document. On the second occasion Rita sold 7 square meters as evidence by a “Bilihan ng Lupa”

The respondent Spouses Lumbao then took possession of the lot and built a house thereon which
they have been occupying. They made several demands upon Rita to execute the necessary
documents for the issuance of a separate title to them. Rita replied that she could not do so since
the estate of her mother, Maria is yet to be partitioned. 

On May 2, 1986 the Spouses Lumbao claimed that the petitioners conspired and fraudulently
executed an extrajudicial settlement, partitioning and dividing among themselves the estate of
Maria which included the lot sold to them. The respondents through counsel sent demand letters
to petitioners but petitioners refused to reconvey the subject lot. Respondents then filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses
Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.

II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus,
they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with
damages.
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa"
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to
herein respondents spouses Lumbao.

RULING:

NO. While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and
the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute should have been
brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which
happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside. In the event that respondents
Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition precedent, their Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s non-compliance with the aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal.
Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages
filed by respondents spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely instituted and the trial
court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said
complaint.

YES. Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon.
Moreover, in petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as
witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.19 However, in order
to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-
examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not
remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time
that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979

As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are
binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement
of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the
presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to
consider other evidence presented. However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals
mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to override
the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the
[Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of
the document, x x x." Virgilio’s answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that
the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this
case.

 Yes. Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this
rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have
over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the
property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the
heirs.

6. Casent Realty Development vs. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, 14


September 2007

Facts:

In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed 2 promissory notes in


favor of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No.
84-04) and PhP 681,500 (PN No. 84-05). It was agreed the loans would earn an interest of 36%
and 18% per annum, respectively and penalty of 12% in case of non-payment on due dates. On
August 8, 1986, these promissory notes were assigned to  respondent Philbanking Corporation
through a Deed of Assignment.

Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon
maturity such that its obligation already amounted to PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993.
Respondent filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the RTC for the collection of said amount.
In its Answer, petitioner raised the following as special/affirmative defenses, among others:

xxx

1. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago (Dacion) which ceded and
conveyed petitioner’s property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the intention of totally
extinguishing petitioner’s outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a
Confirmation Statement dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondent stating that petitioner
had no loans with the bank as of December 31, 1988.
2. Petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the
property since the obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements in
the latter months of 1989, which showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan;
and

Xxx

Thus, petitioner, by way of compulsory counterclaim, alleged that it made an overpayment of


approximately PhP 4 million inclusive of interest based on Central Bank Reference Lending
Rates on dates of overpayment. The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the
pre- trial conference. Thereafter, respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its
exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, pointing out
that the plaintiff’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents; and
that since the Dacion obliterated petitioner’s obligation covered by the promissory notes, the
bank had no right to collect anymore.

Issues:

1. Does respondent’s failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and due
execution of these documents?
2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? If yes,
are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the
complaint?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written
instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10
which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the
Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be
made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered
by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992), that “[w]hen the due execution
and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure
to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.”

2. Yes. What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is


whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence
contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding
technical aspects such as capacity to sue.22 However, the plaintiff’s evidence should not be the
only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The “facts” referred to in Section 8 should
include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial
proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made
during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the
defendant’s evidence.

7. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.166859, 12 April 2011

8. Republic vs. Cojuangco, et. al, G.R. No. 180702, 12 April 2011
Facts:

For over two decades, the issue of whether the sequestered sizable block of shares representing
20% of the outstanding capital stock of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) at the time of acquisition
belonged to their registered owners or to the coconut farmers has remained unresolved.

On July 31, 1987, the Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by
complaint, impleading as defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.  and 59 individual
defendants.

The Republic avers that defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. taking undue advantage of his
association, influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and other  individuals closely associated with the Marcoses,
embarked upon devices, schemes and stratagems, including the use of various corporations as
fronts, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as
when he – misused coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares of stock of
San Miguel Corporation in order to control the largest agri-business, foods and beverage
company in the Philippines.

These so called front companies, which ACCRA Law Offices organized for Defendant
Cojuangco to be able to control more than 60% of SMC shares, were funded by institutions
which depended upon the coconut levy such as the UCPB, UNICOM, United Coconut Planters
Assurance Corp. (COCOLIFE), among others. Cojuangco and his ACCRA lawyers used the
funds from 6 large coconut oil mills and 10 copra trading companies to borrow money from the
UCPB and purchase these holding companies and the SMC stocks. Cojuangco used $150 million
from the coconut levy.

Herein defendant specifically denies the  allegations including any insinuation that whatever
association he may have had with the late Ferdinand Marcos or Imelda Marcos has been in
connection with any of the acts or transactions alleged in the complaint or for any unlawful
purpose.

During the pre-trial Sandiganbayan advised the plaintiff to present more factual evidence to
substantiate its allegations. The Republic nonetheless in choosing not to adduce evidence
proving the factual allegations, particularly the matters specifically asked by the Court, instead
plaintiff opted to pursue its claims by Motion for Summary Judgment.

On November 28, 2007, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case  for failure of plaintiff to prove
by preponderance of evidence its causes of action against defendants.

Issues:

1) What are the "various sources" of funds, which the defendant Cojuangco and his companies
claim they utilized to acquire the disputed SMC shares?
2) Whether or not such funds acquired from alleged "various sources" can be considered coconut
levy funds;

3) Whether or not defendant Cojuangco had indeed served in the governing bodies of PC, UCPB
and/or CIIF Oil Mills at the time the funds used to purchase the SMC shares were obtained such
that he owed a fiduciary duty to render an account to these entities as well as to the coconut
farmers;

Ruling:

The Supreme Court  affirmed the decision of November 28, 2007, because the Republic did not
discharge its burden as the plaintiff to establish by preponderance of evidence that the
respondents’ SMC shares were illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds.

The Republic mainly relied on the statement made by Mr. Conjuangco on his Pre-trial brief and
hastily derived conclusions from the defendants’ statements in their previous pleadings although
such conclusions were not supported by categorical facts but only mere inferences.

"According to Cojuangco’s own Pre-Trial Brief, these so-called ‘various sources’, i.e., the
sources from which he obtained the funds he claimed to have used in buying the 20% SMC
shares are not in fact ‘various’ as he claims them to be. He says he obtained ‘loans’ from UCPB
and ‘advances’ from the CIIF Oil Mills. He even goes as far as to admit that his only evidence in
this case would have been ‘records of UCPB’ and a ‘representative of the CIIF Oil Mills’
obviously the ‘records of UCPB’ relate to the ‘loans’ that Cojuangco claims to have obtained
from UCPB – of which he was President and CEO – while the ‘representative of the CIIF Oil
Mills’ will obviously testify on the ‘advances’ Cojuangco obtained from CIIF Oil Mills – of
which he was also the President and CEO."

From the foregoing premises, plaintiff went on to conclude that:

"These admissions of defendant Cojuangco are outright admissions that he (1) took money from
the bank entrusted by law with the administration of coconut levy funds and (2) took more
money from the very corporations/oil mills in which part of those coconut levy funds (the CIIF)
was placed – treating the funds of UCPB and the CIIF as his own personal capital to buy ‘his’
SMC shares."

Plaintiff’s contention that the defendant’s statements in his Pre-Trial Brief regarding the
presentation of a possible CIIF witness as well as UCPB records, can already be considered as
admissions of the defendant’s exclusive use and misuse of coconut levy funds to acquire the
subject SMC shares and defendant Cojuangco’s alleged taking advantage of his positions to
acquire the subject SMC shares is unacceptable.. Moreover, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court "should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against
whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all inferences." Inasmuch as this issue
cannot be resolved merely from an interpretation of the defendant’s statements in his brief, the
UCPB records must be produced and the CIIF witness must be heard to ensure that that the
conclusions that will be derived have factual basis and are thus, valid.
The Court is given a very clear impression that the plaintiff does not know what documents will
be or whether they are even available to prove the causes of action in the complaint. The Court
has pursued and has exerted every form of inquiry to see if there is a way by which the plaintiff
could explain in any significant particularity the acts and the evidence which will support its
claim of wrong-doing by the defendants. The plaintiff has failed to do so.

1) What are the "various sources" of funds, which the defendant Cojuangco and his
companies claim they utilized to acquire the disputed SMC shares?

Mr. Cojuangco claimed that it came from various sources, a loan from UCPB and advances from
CIIF. How? He is not obliged to explain because the Republic failed to present preponderance of
evidence the burden of proof  has not shifted on Mr. Cojuangco.

2) Whether or not such funds acquired from alleged "various sources" can be considered
coconut levy funds?

No, since in a contract of loan the money borrowed becomes the property of the debtor. Mr.
Cojuangco’s liability at most will be the collection of sum of money. Besides the Republic failed
to present its evidence to prove this allegation.

3) Whether or not defendant Cojuangco had indeed served in the governing bodies of 
PC, UCPB and/or CIIF Oil Mills at the time the funds used to purchase the SMC shares
were obtained such that he owed a fiduciary duty to render an account to these entities as well as
to the coconut farmers?

 Although the trust relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangco’s being an officer and member
of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the borrowings or
advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the loans or borrowings, their amounts,
the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan could not presume his breach of
fiduciary duties without evidence showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is never presumed, but
must be alleged and proved.

Doctrines:

Admissions; It is fundamental that any statement, to be considered as an admission for purposes


of judicial proceedings, should be definite, certain and unequivocal—otherwise, the disputed
fact will not get settled.—

The statements found in the joint Pre-Trial Brief of Cojuangco, et al. were noticeably written
beneath the heading of Proposed Evidence. Such location indicated that the statements were only
being proposed, that is, they were not yet intended or offered as admission of any fact stated
therein. In other words, the matters stated or set forth therein might or might not be presented at
all. Also, the text and tenor of the statements expressly conditioned the proposal on the Republic
ultimately presenting its evidence in the action. After the Republic opted not to present its
evidence, the condition did not  transpire; hence, the proposed admissions, assuming that they
were that, did not materialize. Obviously, too, the statements found under the heading of
Proposed Evidence in the joint Pre-Trial Brief were incomplete and inadequate on the important
details of the supposed transactions (i.e., alleged borrowings and advances). As such, they could
not constitute admissions that the funds had come from borrowings by Cojuangco, et al. from the
UCPB or had been credit advances from the CIIF Oil Companies. Moreover, the purpose for
presenting the records of the UCPB and the representatives of the UCPB and of the still
unidentified or unnamed CIIF Oil Mills as declared in the joint Pre-Trial Brief did not at all show
whether the UCPB and/or the unidentified or unnamed CIIF Oil Mills were the only sources of
funding, or that such institutions, assuming them to be the sources of the funding, had been the
only sources of funding. Such ambiguousness disqualified the statements from being relied upon
as admissions. It is fundamental that any statement, to be considered as an admission for
purposes of judicial proceedings, should be definite, certain and unequivocal; otherwise, the
disputed fact will not get settled.

The Rules of Court has no rule that treats the statements found under the heading Proposed
Evidence as admissions binding on the party—on the contrary, the Rules of Court has even
distinguished between admitted facts and facts proposed to be admitted during the stage of pre-
trial.—

The Rules of Court has no rule that treats the statements found under the heading Proposed
Evidence as admissions binding Cojuangco, et al. On the contrary, the Rules of Court has even
distinguished between admitted facts and facts proposed to be admitted during the stage of pre-
trial. Section 6 (b), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, requires a Pre-Trial Brief to include a
summary of admitted facts and a proposed stipulation offacts. Complying with the requirement,
the joint Pre-Trial Brief of Cojuangco, et al.  included the summary of admitted facts in its
paragraph 3.00 of its Item III, separately and distinctly from the Proposed Evidence. 

Burden of Proof; The burden of proof, according to Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, is
“the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law”; That burden requires the Republic in ill-
gotten wealth cases to demonstrate through competent evidence that the defendants had
purchased the shares of stock with the use of public funds, and that the affected shares of stock
constituted ill-gotten wealth.—

The burden of proof, according to Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, is “the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.” Here, the Republic, being the plaintiff, was the party that
carried the burden of proof. That burden required it to demonstrate through competent evidence
that the respondents, as  defendants, had purchased the SMC shares of stock with the use of
public funds; and that the affected shares of stock constituted ill-gotten wealth. The Republic
was well apprised of its burden of proof, first through the joinder of issues made by the
responsive pleadings of the defendants, including Cojuangco, et al. The Republic was further
reminded through the pre-trial order and the Resolution denying its Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra, of the duty to prove the factual allegations on ill-gotten wealth against
Cojuangco, et al. 

Summary Judgments; With the Republic nonetheless choosing not to adduce evidence proving
the factual allegations, particularly the aforementioned matters, and instead opting to pursue its
claims by Motion for Summary Judgment, the Sandiganbayan became completely deprived of the
means to know the necessary but crucial details of the transactions on the acquisition of the
contested block of shares.—

With the Republic nonetheless choosing not to adduce evidence proving the factual allegations,
particularly the aforementioned matters, and instead opting to pursue its claims by Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Sandiganbayan became completely deprived of the means to know the
necessary but crucial details of the transactions on the acquisition of the contested block of
shares. The Republic’s failure to adduce evidence shifted no burden to the respondents to
establish anything, for it was basic that the party who asserts, not the party who denies, must
prove. Indeed, in a civil action, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading every essential fact and
element of the cause of action and proving them by  preponderance of evidence. This means that
if the defendant merely denies each of the plaintiff’s allegations and neither side produces
evidence on any such element, the plaintiff must necessarily fail in the action. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed Civil Case No. 0033-F for failure of the Republic to prove its
case by preponderant evidence. 

Upon a motion for summary judgment the court’s sole function is to determine whether there is
an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved
against the moving party—in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take
that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving that
party the benefit of all favorable inferences.—A summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court is a procedural technique that is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to the
existence of a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is
a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed
and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record. Upon a motion
for summary judgment the court’s sole function is to determine whether there is an issue of fact
to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against the
moving party. In other words, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the existence
of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against
whom it is directed, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences.

Words and Phrases; The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up
in bad faith, and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial; The rule
on summary judgment does not invest the trial courts with jurisdiction to try summarily the
factual issues upon affidavits, but authorizes summary judgment only when it appears clear that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.—

The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, and
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine
this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. Well-settled is
the rule that a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly
the absence of any genuine issue of fact. Upon that party’s shoulders rests the burden to prove
the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay.
After the burden has been discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to
entitle him to defend. Any doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment shall be resolved
against the moving party. We need not stress that the trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only in cases where no genuine issue as to any material fact
clearly exists between the parties. The rule on summary judgment does not invest the trial courts
with jurisdiction to try summarily the factual issues upon affidavits, but authorizes summary
judgment only when it appears clear that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

9. People of the Philippines vs. Janjalani, G.R. No. 188314, 10 January 2011

10. Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. vs. Josefa Capistrano, G.R. No. 180157, 08 February 2012

Facts:

Respondent Josefa Capistrano allegedly applied for Manila Yacht Club membership. Since,
MYC and petitioner Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. had a credit card sponsorhip agreement, Mrs.
Capistrabo was granted a Visa Credit Card. It was also alleged that her daughter, Mrs. Redulla
was authorized to receive the card.

Mrs. Redulla personally issued a P45,000.00 check as partial payment of Mrs. Capistrano’s
account with ECI. But Mrs. Redulla’s check bounced upon deposit. Because Mrs. Capistrano
was unable to settle her P217,235.36 bill, ECI demanded payment from her. But she refused to
pay, prompting ECI to file on a collection suit against her before the RTC of Cebu City.

Mrs. Capistrano denied ever applying for MYC membership and ECI credit card; that Mrs.
Redulla was not her daughter; and that she never authorized her or anyone to claim a credit card
for her. Assuming she applied for such a card, she never used it. Mrs. Redulla posed as Mrs.
Capistrano and fooled ECI into issuing the card to her.

The RTC ruled that, having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
ECI’s actionable documents that were attached to the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano impliedly
admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents. In effect she admitted: 1)
applying for membership at the MYC;4 2)  accomplishing the MYC membership information
sheet5 which contained a request for an ECI Visa card; 3) holding herself liable for all
obligations incurred in the use of such card; 4 ) authorizing Mrs. Redulla to receive the Visa card
issued in her name;6 5) applying for an ATM Card with ECI;7 and 6) using the credit card in
buying merchandise worth P217,235.36 as indicated in the sales slips. 

The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling stating that Mrs. Capistrano was able to prove that her
signatures were forged.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed to make an effective
specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she overcame this
omission by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed to object.

Ruling:

A party’s admissions in the course of the proceedings, like an admission in the answer of the
genuineness and true execution of the plaintiff’s actionable documents, can only be contradicted
by showing that defendant made such admission through palpable mistake. Here, Mrs.
Capistrano never claimed palpable mistake in the answer she filed. It is of no moment that
plaintiff ECI failed to object to Mrs. Capistrano’s evidence at the trial that the subject documents
were forgeries. As the Court ruled in Elayda v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 349 (1991), the trial
court may reject evidence that a party adduces to contradict a judicial admission he made in his
pleading since such admission is conclusive as to him. It does not matter that the other party
failed to object to the contradictory evidence so adduced.  

Notwithstanding the above, the Court holds that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of ECI’s
action since, contrary to the RTC’s finding, Mrs. Capistrano effectively denied the genuineness
and due execution of ECI’s actionable documents. True, Mrs. Capistrano denied ECI’s
actionable documents merely “for lack of knowledge” which denial, as pointed out above, is
inadequate since by their nature she ought to know the truth of the allegations regarding those
documents. But this inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that she was also denying the
allegations regarding those actionable documents “for the reasons as stated in her special and
affirmative defenses.” 

And, since Mrs. Capistrano in fact verified her claim that she had no part in those transactions,
she in effect denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents supporting
them. For this reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents were
forged. 

 
NEGATIVE PREGNANT
1. Venzon vs. Rural Bank of Buenavita, G.R. No. 178031, August 28, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Virginia M. Venzon filed a Petition   to nullify foreclosure proceedings and Tax
Declaration issued in the name of respondent Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan del Norte), Inc.
Petitioner alleged that in 1983 she and her late spouse, George F. Venzon, Sr., obtained a
₱5,000.00 loan from respondent against a mortgage on their house and lot; that she was able to
pay ₱2,300.00, thus leaving an outstanding balance o f only ₱2,370.00; that sometime in March
1987, she offered to pay the said balance in full, but the latter refused to accept payment, and
instead shoved  petitioner away from the bank premises; that in March 1987, respondent
foreclosed on the mortgage, and the property was sold at auction for ₱6,472.76 to respondent,
being the highest bidder; that the foreclosure proceedings are null and void for lack of notice
and publication of the sale, lack of sheriff’s final deed of sale and notice of redemption period;
and that she paid respondent ₱6,000.00 on October 9, 1995, as evidenced by respondent’s
Official Receipt No. 410848 6 issued on October 9, 1995.

 On the other hand, respondent claimed that petitioner did not make any payment on the loan;
that petitioner never went to the bank in March 1987 to settle her obligations in full; that 
petitioner was not shoved and driven away from its premises; that the foreclosure proceedings
were regularly done and all requirements were complied with; that a certificate of sale was
issued  by the sheriff and duly recorded in the Registry of Deeds; that petitioner’s claim that she
paid ₱ 6,000.00 on October 9, 1995 is utterly false; that petitioner’s cause of action has long
prescribed as the case was filed only in 2005 or 18 years after the foreclosure sale; and that
petitioner is guilty of laches. 

 Issue: Whether or not the foreclosure proceedings were legal

 Ruling:

Interestingly, respondent did not deny being the issuer of Official Receipt No. 410848. Instead, it
averred that petitioner’s payment to it of ₱6,000.00 was false and self -serving, but in the same
breath argued that, without necessarily admitting that payment of ₱6,000.0 0 was made, the same
cannot be considered as redemption price.

 By making such an ambiguous allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent is
deemed to have admitted receiving the amount of ₱6,000.00 from petitioner as evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 410848, which amount under the circumstances it had no right to receive. If
an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is
deemed admitted. Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and the
denial is conjunctive, a ‘negative pregnant’ exists, and only the qualification or modification is
denied, while the fact itself is admitted. 

 A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be


ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied.  
Profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's
knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at all. In fine, respondent failed to
refute petitioner’s claim of having paid the amount of ₱6,000.00.

 Since respondent was not entitled to receive the said amount, as it is deemed fully paid from the
foreclosure of petitioner’s property since its bid price at the auct ion sale covered all that 
petitioner owed it by way of principal, interest, attorney’s fees and charges, it must return the
same to petitioner.

2. Mahilum vs. Spouses Ilano, G.R. No. 197923, June 22, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Ruby Ruth S. Serrano Mahilum is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by a transfer certificate of title. She entrusted the original owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT to Teresa Perez (Perez) – a purported real estate broker – who claimed that she can assist
petitioner in obtaining a loan with the TCT as collateral. After several months, petitioner
demanded the return of the title, but Perez failed to produce the same; after much prodding,
Perez admitted that the title was lost. In June 2004, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss and
caused the same to be annotated upon the original registry copy of the transfer certificate of title.
Petitioner was informed however that her TCT was not lost, but that it was presented to the
registry by respondents, spouses Edilberto and Lourdes Ilano, who claimed that the property
covered by the title was sold to them. The respondents however did not register the alleged sale.

Petitioner confronted respondents, who showed her a notarized Agreement with right of
repurchase and an unnotarized and undated Deed of Absolute Sale on which documents
petitioner’s purported signatures were affixed. Petitioner denied having executed said document
and claimed that her purported signatures therein were in fact falsified and forged. She
demanded the return of her TCT which respondents refused.

Thereafter the petitioner filed an action for “annulment of agreement and deed of
absolute sale.

On appeal the CA dismissed the petitioner’s case for failure to state a cause of action –
for failure of the complaint to allege that respondents were purchasers in bad faith.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondents can interpose the defense of being innocent purchasers for

value

Held:  NO. Since a new title was never issued in respondents’ favor and, instead, title remained
in petitioner’s name, the former never came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens
system, where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. Since respondents never acquired
a new certificate of title in their name, the issue of their good or bad faith which is central in an
annulment of title case is of no consequence; petitioner’s case is for annulment of the Agreement
and Deed of Absolute Sale, and not one to annul title since the certificate of title is still in her
name. The jurisprudential bases for the CA’s pronouncement that there is a failure to state a
cause of action if there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents were purchasers in bad
faith – Castillo v. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal and Heirs of Julian Tiro v. Philippine Estates
Corporation – involved complaints for annulment of new titles issued to the buyers; they cannot
apply to petitioner’s case where title remains in her name.

Petitioner’s case is to annul the agreement and deed of sale based on the allegation that
they are forgeries, and that respondents were parties to the fraud; since no new title was issued in
respondents’ favor, there is no new title to annul. Indeed, if the agreement and deed of sale are
forgeries, then they are a nullity and convey no title. The underlying principle is that no one can
give what one does not have. Nemo dat quod non habet. 

In this case, it is petitioner who must be protected under the Torrens system – as the
registered owner of the subject property. “A certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and
put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.”

 
IMPLIED JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
1. PNB vs. Refrigeration Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 156178, 20 January 2006
Facts:
Prior to 1984, respondent RII occupied a portion of the assembly plant of Delta Motor Corporation
(DMC). RII installed in the plant equipment, machinery and other chattels RII used in its business. 3
In February 1984, PNB, then a government-owned and controlled bank, foreclosed several parcels
of real estate and chattels of DMC located at the DMC Compound. In an auction of the foreclosed
properties, PNB was the highest bidder. Thus, it took possession of all chattels inside the DMC
compound, both as owner of chattels and as mortgagee of the remaining properties.
On June 18, 1984 when PNB took possession of the DMC compound, RII demanded the release of
its properties still inside the compound, now the subject of the case, after RII made statements
claiming ownership over them. PNB allowed RII to remove some of its personal properties from the
DMC compound, upon the latter’s showing of proof of ownership. However, respondent failed to
produce any proof of ownership.

PNB’s refusal to release the subject properties led to the filing of a complaint by RII for Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the RTC of Makati on June 10, 1986.
At all the scheduled pre-trial conferences, PNB consistently manifested in court its willingness to
release the chattels conditioned upon RII’s showing of evidence of ownership. Eventually, some of
the properties were released.
By virtue of Proclamation No. 50 as implemented by Administrative Circular No. 14 dated February
27, 1989, certain properties of RII inside DMC’s compound, with some other acquired assets of PNB
covered by the Circular, were transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). Hence in 1992, APT
was impleaded as a party-defendant. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8758, 6 the corporate existence of
APT expired on December 31, 2000. On December 6, 2000, former President Joseph Estrada
signed Executive Order No. 323 creating the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) which
succeeded the APT. At the time, RII had not yet shown additional evidence to support its claim over
the remaining personal properties in PNB’s possession.
Six (6) years later, on February 10, 1995, RII filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.7 It averred
that there was no genuine issue to any material fact except the issue on damages, costs and
attorneys’ fees. RII alleged that during the pre-trial conference, PNB manifested to APT, in a letter 8
dated May 11, 1989, that the machineries and equipments of RII listed in Annex "C" of the complaint
were erroneously transferred to APT, and that in a letter 9 dated May 31, 1989, APT acknowledged
the mistakes and agreed to release the properties to the authorized representative of RII.
Both PNB and APT (PMO) opposed the motion on the ground that there still existed a genuine
factual issue, which was the ownership of the chattels.
On August 7, 1995, a Summary Judgment was rendered favoring RII.
Issue:
W/N the CA DID NOT CONSIDER THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE ISSUE IN THIS CASE, THAT
OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE CONTESTED CHATTELS, THAT WOULD PRECLUDE ISSUANCE
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Ruling:
We agree that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the summary judgment was properly rendered
by the trial court.
Firstly, it may be noted that PNB admitted in its May 11, 1989 letter to APT that the contested
chattels belonged to RII, but were erroneously taken during the foreclosure of DMC’s properties; that
these were eventually transferred to APT. Secondly, we also note that APT admitted that PNB wrote
the letter dated May 11, 1989; and that APT wrote a letter dated May 29, 1989 to PNB. With these
admissions, there is no genuine issue concerning RII’s ownership of the chattels and their erroneous
delivery to APT had remained. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation
of evidence. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to the facts.lvvphil.

Summary judgment, as prescribed by the rules must then ensue as a matter of law, to weed out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, to avoid the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial, and to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is
genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of trial.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim that there was no admission on their part that respondent owned the
chattels, our review of the records shows that petitioners failed to either specifically deny or directly
assail and raise as an issue, the validity of the letter dated May 11, 1989 and the letter dated May
29, 1989. Their failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of the said documents amounts
to a judicial admission pursuant to Section 8,  Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior
showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.These letters are deemed
admitted as evidence, and they likewise supersede the defenses interposed by petitioners in their
respective answers.
It may lastly be recalled that from the very start, PNB consistently manifested its willingness to
release the said properties upon respondent’s proof of ownership over them. The correspondence
between the parties shows that PNB actually admitted that the subject chattels belonged to RII but
were erroneously transferred to petitioner APT. Conformably then, the trial court’s summary
judgment is proper and correct. No reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in
affirming it.
 

2. Manzano vs. Despabiladeras, 16 December 2004


3. Municipality of Tiwi vs. Antonio Betito, G.R. No. 171873, 09 July 2010
 
ADMISSION IN AMENDED, SUPERSEDED, OR DISMISSED PLEADING
1. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
2. Torres vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 24

Facts:

The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan.
Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow.
Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero
Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan),
Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private
respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases, while Vicente died on June 4,
1957, during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny.

After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without
benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres was born. Subsequently,
or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married.

Lot 551 had been leased temporarily by the Government to Margarita who was the actual
occupant of the lot. On December 13, 1910, the Director of Lands issued to Margarita a Sale
Certificate over said lot, payable in 20 annual installments. 20 years before his death, Leon sold
and transferred in a notarial deed his rights and interest to the ½ portion of the lot in favor of
Macaria.

On June 6, 1953, about 22 years after the death of Margarita and 20 years after the death of
Leon, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot 551 and asking for the
issuance of title in his name. A Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the legal
heirs of Margarita.

Santillan and the children of Antonina filed a case of forcible entry against Macaria, alleging that
the latter had entered a portion of the lot without their consent, constructed a house thereon and
refused to vacate upon demand. 

Paragraph 3 of the original complaint states:

the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of
Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931. 

However, Santillan et. al amended the complaint, the underlined portion was deleted so that the
statement simply read:

That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza,
Cavite, on December 20, 1931.

Macaria claimed to be a co-owner of the lot, being one of Margarita’s daughters. She instituted
an action for partition of the lot, alleging that said lot was the conjugal property of Margarita and
Leon, and that she is their legitimated child. The statement in the original complaint for
ejectment, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the
determination of her participation in the disputed property.

The CFI declared that Macaria Torres is a legitimated child of spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres, thus making her a co-owner of the lot.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, declaring that Macaria Torres is not the legitimated
child of spouses Arbole and Torres since Macaria Torres is not legally acknowledged before or
after the marriage of her parents.

Issue: Whether or not the statement is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the
determination of her participation in the disputed property 

Ruling: No. The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents’ original
complaint in the Ejectment Case reading: “the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista
are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on
December 20, 1931.” The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation
and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed property. We are not
persuaded.

In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the
underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read: “That the plaintiffs are the
legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20,
1931;”

In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no
longer forms part of the record.

If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which
would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility
of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner’s submission, therefore,
there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to
offer it in evidence.

3. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16

Ching, officer of Philippine Blooming Mills, executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of ABC.
Ching agreed to sell the goods for cash with the express obligation to remit to the  bank the
proceeds of the sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand. Ching, once in
possession of goods allegedly with grave abuse of confidence misappropriated to his own
personal use the said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale, and despite repeated demands, failed
and refused to remit the proceeds of sale to ABC. He was charged before the RTC Makati with
four counts of estafa under Art 315 par. 1(b) of the RPC, in relation to the"Trust Receipts Law.”
Ching filed a case before the RTC Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for
damages. Ching asked for suspension of criminal prosecution on the ground of prejudicial
question, RTC denied. Ching moved to reconsider but the same was denied. CA denied the
appeal. Notwithstanding the decision of CA, the RTC-Manila admitted Ching’s amended
complaint which, inter alia, prayed the court for a judgment: Declaring the transaction as one of 
"pure and simple loan with the trust receipts as mere additional or side documents" contrary to
petitioners allegation in his original complaint that the trust receipts were executed as collateral
or security.
ISSUE: Whether the judicial admission in the original complaint was abandoned by virtue of an
amended complaint
RULING:  sPleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as
pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the
pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must be formally offered in evidence. If not offered in
evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered. Consequently, the original
[30]

complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. The amended complaint takes the place of the original. The
[31]

latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
original complaint no longer forms part of the record.[32]

The actuations of petitioner demands stern rebuke from this Court. This Court is not unwary of
the tactics employed by the petitioner specifically in filing the amended complaint only after the
promulgation of the assailed decision of the CA. A lapse of almost 2yrs from the filing of the
original complaint to the filing of the amended complaint, is too lengthy a time sufficient to
enkindle doubts as to the true intentions of petitioner regarding the early disposition of the
pending cases. Though the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court which would not normally be disturbed on appeal, this rule is
relaxed when evident abuse thereof is apparent. Amendments are not proper and should be
[33]

denied when: (1) delay would arise; (2) amendments would result in a change of cause of action
or defense or change the theory of the case; (3) would be inconsistent with the allegations in the
original complaint. Ching, by filing the amended complaint, in effect, altered the theory of his
case. The allegations embodied in the amended complaint are inconsistent with that of the
original complaint inasmuch as in the latter, petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were
intended as mere collateral or security, the principal transaction being one of pure loan. Yet, in
the amended complaint, petitioner argued that the said trust receipts were executed as additional
or side documents, the transaction being strictly one of pure loan without any trust receipt
arrangement. Obviously these allegations are in discord in relation to each other and therefore
cannot stand in harmony. These circumstances gives doubt the genuine purpose of petitioner in
filing the amended complaint. Again, we view petitioners actuations with abhorrence and
displeasure. T he civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not
constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa.

4. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 643


 
ADMISSION MADE BY COUNSEL
 
1. Fule vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79094, 22 June 1988

Melencio- Herrera J.

Facts: Accused, an agent of Towers Assurance, issued and made out a check to Roy Nadera.
Nadera is the complaining witness. The check was for the remittance of a collection. The same
was dishonored because the account was already closed. Appellant waived the right to present
evidence and instead submitted a memorandum confirming these stipulated facts. The Trial
Court convicted the appellant based thereon and the CA affirmed the conviction. The
admissions in the Stipulation of Facts, however, were not signed by the accused. Counsel
merely confirmed the same in the memorandum.

Issue: WON the conviction may be sustained.

Ruling: NO. SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed.·No agreement oradmission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless
reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) 
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall” further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may been forced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And
more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado, No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA648).The conclusion
is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be
presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by
consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened.

3. King vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 131540, 02 December 1999

Facts:

         On several occasions in January, 1992, at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, petitioner discounted
with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable Bank checks postdated from July 23 to 29,
1992 in the total amount of P1,070,000.00 in exchange for cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
When the checks were deposited for payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because
they were drawn against an account without sufficient funds. Petitioner failed to make good the
checks despite demand.

During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the prosecution
offered in evidence its documentary evidence. Petitioner admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the documents presented.

Issue: 

         Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in admitting in
evidence all the documentary evidence of the prosecution though their due execution and
genuineness were not duly established in evidence pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence

Ruling:

         An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A pre-trial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible, true. However, the conviction
of petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents submitted during the trial, all
of which were admitted without any objection from her counsel.

         From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents
offered and admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of
Appeals 17 would not apply to the present controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted
during which the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based
solely on the stipulation of facts made during rile pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not
signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in
evidence under Section 4 of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of his guilt.
3. People of the Philippines vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 108028, 30 July 1996
4. Silot vs. De La Rosa, G.R. No. 159240, 04 February 2008

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